UPN, Alm.del - 2025-26 - Bilag 42: 2025 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2025-26, Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn 2025-26
NPA Alm.del Bilag 1, UPN Alm.del Bilag 42
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POLICY

RECOMMENDATIONS

ADOPTED IN 2025

178 SESA 25 E | 13 October 2025

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAKING NATO DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE TO THE NEXT LEVEL

AT THE HAGUE SUMMIT

DECLARATION 496

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN UKRAINE

DECLARATION 497

BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIETIES TO

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

RESOLUTION 498

MEETING THE MOMENT: NATO’S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IMPERATIVES AFTER THE

HAGUE SUMMIT

RESOLUTION 499

STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AND SECURITY AFTER

THE NATO SUMMIT IN THE HAGUE

RESOLUTION 500

FOSTERING STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

RESOLUTION 501

SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE

RESOLUTION 502

PREPARING NATO FOR THE FUTURE OF UNCREWED WARFARE

RESOLUTION 503

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TAKING NATO DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE TO THE NEXT LEVEL

AT THE HAGUE SUMMIT

DECLARATION 496

The Assembly,

Stressing

that NATO remains the indispensable cornerstone of all Allies’ security and that, for

76 years, it has guaranteed the security of both Europe and North America;

Underlining

that NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept outlines a security environment marked by

strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks, and identifies Russia as the most

significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and terrorism as the most direct

asymmetric threat;

Reiterating

its firm condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale

war of aggression against

Ukraine which poses a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;

Reaffirming

its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, right to

self-defence and self-determination, including its irreversible path towards full NATO membership;

Convinced

that a strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area

and

welcoming

efforts to bring about a fair and lasting peace

that provides for Ukraine’s long-term

security;

Clear-eyed

about the multiple and systemic challenges the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

poses to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values as well as to the rules-based international order;

Deploring

the growing and destabilising collusion between autocratic regimes in Russia,

China, Iran, North Korea and Belarus;

Deploring

the growing presence of destabilising actors under Russian, Chinese, and Iranian

influence in the Southern Neighbourhood, including the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan

Africa;

Welcoming

the important decisions taken to address the entire set of threats and challenges

to Euro-Atlantic security at the 2022, 2023 and 2024 Summits, which mark a step change and a new

baseline for a radically enhanced NATO deterrence and defence posture;

10.

Underlining

the ironclad commitments to the unique transatlantic bond and collective defence

enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty;

11.

Stressing

that the NATO defence spending target of 2% of GDP

—

and any future agreed-

upon increases

—

is not an optional requirement, but an obligation to the citizens of the Alliance;

12.

Highlighting

the significant progress achieved in defence spending, including an increase of

more than USD 700 billion in European and Canadian defence spending since 2014 and a 20%

increase in 2024, as well as the ongoing outstanding contribution of the United States;

13.

Welcoming

several Allies’ announcement to increase defence spending significantly;

14.

Stressing

that, in line with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, to respond to an unprecedented set

of threats and challenges, Allies must ensure defence plans are fully resourced and deliver

Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Dayton, Ohio, United States on

Monday 26 May 2025

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significant new capabilities, which requires substantial and across-the-board increases in defence

spending;

15.

Acknowledging

that all NATO Allies understand the importance of increasing their respective

share of responsibility for transatlantic security;

16.

Welcoming

recent European efforts, including within the framework of the European Union,

to accelerate the mobilisation of the necessary instruments and financing in order to bolster

transatlantic security;

17.

Stressing

the need for Allies, in line with the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic

Treaty, to constrain, counter and contest authoritarian powers’ attacks against democracy and the

rules-based international order, and to prevent the Alliance's strength from being undermined by

trade barriers among Allies;

18.

Welcoming

Allies’ and NATO’s strengthened response to these authoritarian powers’

campaign of hybrid operations targeting Allies, saluting, in particular, the prompt launch of

Baltic Sentry and establishment of NATO Task Force X to strengthen the protection of critical

infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, including against the Russian shadow fleet;

19.

Stressing

that The Hague Summit must now take NATO’s deterrence and defence to the next

level, rebalance the United States’, Canada’s and Europe’s respective roles in support of

Euro-Atlantic

security and enhance the Alliance’s collective and Allies’ national resilience;

20.

Recognising

that NATO’s partnerships remain vital to enhance stability, contribute to

international peace and security, and uphold the rules-based international order;

reaffirming

their

essential role in supporting NATO’s three core tasks and the Alliance’s 360-degree

approach to

security; and

underlining

in particular the strategic importance of NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood

in light of the persistent and interconnected challenges emanating from the region, including

terrorism, hybrid threats, irregular migration, and state fragility, as well as the opportunities for

enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and African partners;

21.

Noting

that Georgia, a candidate country for Euro-Atlantic integration, is currently undergoing

an accelerated process of democratic decline;

22.

Reiterating

the importance of stability and peace in the Western Balkans and

expressing

its

serious concern about the latest legislation and initiatives in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and

Herzegovina that undermine and threaten the country’s constitutional order, sovereignty and

territorial and functional integrity, as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement signed 30 years ago;

23.

Convinced

that NATO’s strength and credibility lies in the unity, cohesion and resolve of Allies

and

affirming

its determination to continue to support a strong Alliance through parliamentary

dialogue, as it has done for the past 70 years;

24.

Recognising

both civil and military dimensions of defence planning as mutually necessary

and beneficial when building resilient societies;

25.

Recalling

that, building on the Defence Production Action Plan agreed at the Vilnius Summit

in 2023, at the NATO Summit 2024 Allies committed to doing more together as Allies, including to

strengthen defence industry across the Alliance, and agreed the NATO Industrial Capacity

Expansion Pledge (NICE);

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26.

URGES

Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit meeting

in The Hague:

to agree on a Transatlantic Deterrence Initiative through which Allies will commit to

stepping up efforts to rebalance Allied contributions to transatlantic security, with

individual Allies reconsidering their share of responsibility and adjusting it to match the

reality of a contested threat environment;

to commit to the implementation of ambitious capability targets which will ensure NATO

is fit for purpose today and for the long term in order to be prepared for high-intensity

and multi-domain collective defence;

to reinforce NATO’s posture in the Baltic Sea region, including by strengthening the

Air Policing and Baltic Sentry missions, towards a credible forward defence posture

aligned with NATO’s New Force Model;

to agree on a Hague Defence Investment Pledge including an ambitious new defence

spending target well beyond 2% of GDP, in order to ensure that Allies deliver the

capabilities needed to remedy existing shortfalls, to deny any potential adversary any

possible

opportunities for aggression against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity,

and to commit to urgently develop national plans to meet this new target;

to commit to provide the necessary forces, capabilities, resources, and infrastructure for

existing Allied defence plans;

to continue to ensure NATO retains a modern, credible, effective, safe and secure

nuclear deterrent mission which is the cornerstone of Alliance security;

to further modernise and increase the capabilities, readiness, scalability and integration

of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) to eliminate, either through

individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single points of failure and ensure full

coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against

the proliferation of ballistic missiles through the full development of NATO Ballistic

Missile Defence;

to continue to bolster Allied space capabilities, plans and procedures;

to recognise and treat space-based infrastructure, as well as corresponding supply

chains, as critical infrastructure, and apply lessons learned from other sectors to

enhance its safety, protection, and resilience;

to continue implementing cyberspace as an operational domain throughout peacetime,

crisis and conflict by strengthening cyber deterrence, defence and cooperation across

the Alliance, including by speeding up plans to operationalise the NATO Integrated

Cyber Defence Centre (NICC);

to continue to foster and strengthen cooperation in countering terrorism in all its forms

and manifestations, which constitutes the most asymmetric threat to the security of our

citizens and to international peace and prosperity;

to expand NATO-led efforts and funding under the NATO Security Investment

Programme to develop critical military infrastructure across Central and Eastern Europe,

including support for the Eastern Shield initiative and the Baltic Defence Line, enhancing

defensive

capabilities and interoperability along NATO’s Eastern Flank, thus improving

the Alliance’s overall readiness and capacity for rapid deployment and sustained defence

operations;

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to deliver on NATO’s recent defence innovation initiatives and agree on an ambitious

Rapid Adoption Action Plan to advance NATO’s technological edge by speeding up the

adoption of innovative technologies;

to step up work with industry to accelerate the development and delivery of critical

capabilities, including through large scale, multinational procurement;

to adopt a plan to increase and strengthen the implementation of NATO standards to

enhance interoperability and interchangeability;

to further strengthen NATO’s partnerships, in line with the 2024 Washington Summit

Declaration, by adopting a more strategic and result-oriented approach to engagement

with partners, particularly in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood where the role of the

Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Southern Neighbourhood should

be strengthened to enhance trust, visibility and cooperation;

to further leverage cooperation with the European Union, in particular to support

increased European defence spending and capability development as well as to closely

cooperate on military mobility and logistics, including secure and resilient energy

supplies to the military;

to increase cooperation with like-minded partners to enhance the security of supply

chains, support the development of key capabilities and adoption of innovative

technologies;

to further leverage cooperation with Ukraine to identify and apply lessons from Russia’s

war of aggression, primarily through the Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre

(JATEC), to enhance NATO’s ability to adapt its deterrence and defence posture

and

increase Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO;

to sustain and increase diplomatic, military, financial, and humanitarian support for

Ukraine, to both address its immediate needs and strengthen its position at the

negotiating table;

to recommit to the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine and to make

full use of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the

NATO-Ukraine Council, the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), JATEC, the

NATO Representation in Ukraine, and other instruments to support Ukraine now and for

the long term;

to agree a revised strategy for countering hybrid warfare, which further increases the

Alliance’s and Allies’ resilience to Russia’s and other authoritarian powers’

destabilisation campaigns while imposing costs to deter and defend against further

attacks;

to continue to constrain and contest Russia’s aggressive actions and to counter its ability

to conduct destabilising activities against NATO and Allies;

to reinforce and communicate an accurate and credible narrative of NATO’s steadfast

commitment to freedom, security, and democracy, stepping up efforts to counter

information manipulation and interference by foreign actors, as well as the spread of

disinformation through traditional and social media

–

activities aimed at creating

confusion, deepening societal divisions, destabilising democratic institutions, and

ultimately weakening the Alliance;

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to continue boosting Allied resilience to China’s systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic

security, including by reducing strategic dependencies, investing in cyber defences and

working with partners of the Alliance, particularly the EU and like-minded Indo-Pacific

partners, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;

to continue to strengthen the protection of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), and

enhance Allied ability to deter, detect and respond to threats, including through NATO’s

Centre for Security of CUI, NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network and

NATO Task Force X;

to operationalise NATO’s commitment to defending shared democratic values by

directing the establishment of a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO

Headquarters;

to reiterate the strategic importance of the Black Sea Region for transatlantic security,

continued support to Allied regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability

and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region including, as appropriate, through the

1936 Montreux Convention, as well as strengthen NATO’s posture and regional

readiness along the Eastern Flank, from the Black Sea to the Baltic area;

to reduce and eliminate, as appropriate, obstacles to defence trade and investment

among Allies;

to continue their commitment to security and stability in the Western Balkans, support

reconciliation across the region, and enhance assistance to regional partners in

countering malign influences;

to keep up pressure on Russia by backing the ramping up and effective enforcement of

sanctions against it and its accomplices, particularly in the oil and gas sector

–

including

the Russian shadow fleet

–

as well as metallurgy and the banking and financial sectors;

to encourage Allies to develop and adapt policies that enable a greater flow of investment

and technology among Allies, thereby facilitating the rapid enhancement of defence and

deterrence capabilities and capacities across the Alliance.

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PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN UKRAINE

DECLARATION 497

The Assembly,

Reiterating

its condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against

Ukraine, for which Russia bears sole responsibility, and

denouncing

Russia’s unacceptable attacks

against civilians and civilian infrastructure, which have continued despite pledges to cease fire;

Reaffirming

its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity within its

internationally recognised borders, and right to self-defence and self-determination, including its

NATO membership path;

Expressing

profound respect and admiration for the remarkable bravery, resilience and

resolve of the people, the democratic institutions and the armed and security forces of Ukraine;

Denouncing

the assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean

regimes to Russia’s war of aggression;

Highlighting

that Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a critical test of the collective resilience

of democracies and that by supporting Ukraine, Allies also protect their own security and shared

democratic values;

Stressing

that the outcome of this war will shape the future European and international order

and set a precedent that will influence the future actions and strategic calculations of Russia, China

and other enablers of Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as those of other

malign actors;

Welcoming

efforts by the United States, in dialogue and consultation with European Allies

and Canada, to bring about a just and lasting peace

that provides for Ukraine’s and Europe’s long-

term security,

saluting as well

efforts initiated by France and the United Kingdom to build a ”coalition

of the willing” to provide a reassurance force in support of peace, and

convinced

that transatlantic

unity is essential to achieving and securing any sustainable agreement;

Emphasising

that only a peace through strength can lead to lasting peace;

Stressing

that there can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, and that

all those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of international law, human

rights and international humanitarian law;

10.

Convinced

that a strong and independent Ukraine with robust, modernised, coherent, and

well-equipped armed forces, capable of deterring and defending against future aggression, is vital

for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area;

11.

Stressing therefore

that any negotiated solution includes robust and credible security

guarantees for Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression;

12.

Welcoming

Allies’ ongoing robust and vital financial and military assistance, which is critical

to Ukraine’s immediate and long-term

defence needs and that will aid and support long-term

European security;

Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Dayton, Ohio (United States) on

Monday 26 May 2025.

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13.

Welcoming

all EU initiatives supporting Ukraine, including the new EU Security Action for

Europe instrument, which should be employed to the fullest extent in order to accelerate and scale

up Ukrainian military production;

14.

Saluting

NATO’s political and practical support for Ukraine, particularly through the

NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), the NATO Representation in Ukraine (NRU), the NATO Security

Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the

Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education

Centre (JATEC), and other instruments to support Ukraine now and for the long term;

15.

Reaffirming

its readiness and determination to support Ukraine’s further democratic

consolidation, which brings it closer to NATO membership, including through the NATO PA special

fund to support Ukraine’s democracy;

16.

URGES

the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to sustain and increase diplomatic, military, financial, and humanitarian support for

Ukraine, to both address its immediate civilian and battlefield needs and strengthen its

position at the negotiating table;

to continue to work towards fairer burden sharing among all Allies across all types of

assistance to Ukraine;

to continue to step up and speed up the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine and to

urgently ramp up Allied and Ukrainian defence industrial capacity and production,

including through direct investments into Ukraine’s domestic defence industrial base,

notably via direct purchases from Ukrainian defence companies to supply the Ukrainian

Armed Forces;

to continue to train and equip the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strengthen Ukraine’s

long-term deterrence and defence posture;

to keep up pressure on Russia by backing the ramping up and effective enforcement of

sanctions against it and its accomplices, particularly in the oil and gas sector, including

the Russian shadow fleet, as well as the banking and financial sectors;

to maintain and bolster transatlantic unity in the pursuit of peace through strength in

Ukraine;

to welcome the Summit recently hosted by Türkiye in Istanbul;

to work together and with Ukraine to ensure that any agreement deters future Russian

aggression, guarantees Ukraine’s long-term

security, and strengthens European and

Euro-Atlantic security;

to support efforts to put together a multinational reassurance force to help guarantee a

future peace agreement;

to reiterate their longstanding position that they will never recognise Russia's illegal and

illegitimate occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories;

to reaffirm all elements of the July 2024 Washington Summit declaration and NATO-

Ukraine Council Statement, and make full use of all of NATO’s fora and instruments in

support of Ukraine to deepen political consultation, bolster Ukraine’s self-defence,

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transition Ukraine to full interoperability with NATO, and continue bringing Ukraine closer

to eventual membership;

to invite Ukraine to participate in the NATO Summit in The Hague and hold a meeting of

the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of Heads of State and government;

to reaffirm that Ukraine’s future NATO membership is a sovereign decision of Ukraine

and the NATO Allies alone, based solely on the will of the Ukrainian people and

authorities and the fulfilment of membership criteria, and to reiterate that no third party

–

including the Russian Federation

–

can have a veto over NATO membership;

to set NATO assistance to Ukraine on a sustainable footing by recommitting to the

Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, and providing sustainable funding

and speeding up the delivery of funds for the Comprehensive Assistance Package and

NSATU trust funds;

to further leverage JATEC to identify and apply lessons from Russia’s war against

Ukraine and increase Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO;

to increase cooperation with Ukraine and its defence industry on technology innovation,

including by implementing joint activities to support Ukraine’s self-defence

via such

initiatives as the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap;

to bring Ukraine’s defence procurement further in line with Euro-Atlantic

best practices,

including through the Strategic Defence Procurement Review process;

to continue to use the NUC format, to the fullest extent, for advancing Ukraine’s

Euro-Atlantic aspirations, for discussing issues of common security and as a crisis

consultation mechanism;

to step up cooperation with the Assembly in support of Ukraine;

to allow for engagement between the NUC and the Assembly on the parliamentary

dimension of the NATO-Ukraine relationship;

to continue to strengthen the NRU;

to designate a liaison officer in the NRU to work with the Assembly to support

capacity-building efforts for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

to fully support Ukraine’s path of democratic reform, including by establishing a Centre

for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a platform for sharing

resources and exchanging best practices as well as by helping Ukraine implement its

adapted Annual National Programme;

to work on an ambitious long-term plan for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine,

including by developing legal frameworks to allow for the full use of frozen Russian

assets for Ukraine's reconstruction based on international law and the principle that the

aggressor must pay for the consequences of its aggression;

to welcome the Fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2025), due to be co-hosted

by Italy and Ukraine in Rome in July 2025, aimed at mobilising international support for

Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, reform, and modernisation, as well as to

acknowledge the results of the previous conferences held in Lugano (2022), London

(2023), and Berlin (2024).

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BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF EURO-ATLANTIC

SOCIETIES TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

RESOLUTION 498

The Assembly,

Recalling

that the defence of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law is enshrined

in the North Atlantic Treaty, and that democratic resilience is a pillar of collective security;

Highlighting

that foreign interference aims to threaten the stability, cohesion and

democratic functioning of Allied societies, and that Euro-Atlantic deterrence and defence are

intrinsically linked to democratic resilience;

Deploring

that the Russian Federation has intensified its campaign of aggressive hybrid

actions against Allies, directly and through proxies, across the Euro-Atlantic area;

Warning

that other authoritarian states, including the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and

North Korea, as well as their non-state proxies, are also increasingly resorting to similar hybrid

tactics, including disinformation, cyberattacks, and election interference, to manipulate public debate

and erode democratic institutions in Allied nations;

Stressing

that authoritarian regimes also target democratic countries outside the Alliance

with foreign interference operations aimed at imposing their repressive models of governance,

disseminating their malevolent narratives and eroding sovereignty, as exemplified

by Russia’s

actions before and during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine;

Concerned

by the way authoritarian regimes increasingly echo and reinforce one

another’s false narratives, and misuse emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, and

social media platforms to amplify the scale, speed and impact of their interference efforts;

Noting

that terrorist groups also exploit elements of hybrid warfare, notably disinformation

and cyber means, to spread fear, radicalise, and destabilise societies;

Reaffirming

that the response to foreign interference must uphold the openness,

transparency and freedom of expression that define Allied democracies;

Applauding

already existing initiatives by individual Allies and NATO to counter hybrid

attacks, including foreign interference, such as the updated NATO Strategy for countering hybrid

threats, and

underlining

the need to develop national and collective frameworks and initiatives to

identify, expose, and respond to such efforts;

10.

Welcoming

the inclusion in the Defence Investment Plan adopted at The Hague Summit

of a commitment by Allies to spend 1.5% of GDP on defence and security-related investments,

including the strengthening of national and collective resilience;

11.

Recognising

the vital role of parliamentarians in upholding and promoting democratic

resilience to foreign interference through legislation, oversight and public engagement;

12.

Emphasising

that addressing foreign interference is a whole-of-society endeavour,

requiring strong and independent institutions, vibrant civil society, free and pluralistic media, digital

literacy, and transparency in political and electoral systems;

Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on

Monday 13 October 2025.

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13.

Reaffirming

the importance of NATO in supporting and coordinating resilience-building

efforts against foreign interference, while

recognising

that these areas remain primarily national

prerogatives;

14.

Underscoring

the need for increased cooperation with the European Union, as well as

regular and appropriate exchange with like-minded partners and international institutions, to

effectively deter, address and mitigate foreign interference attempts;

15.

URGES

Allied Governments and Parliaments and, where appropriate, NATO institutions:

a. to treat foreign interference as a strategic threat to national and collective security and to

democratic governance, and to bolster policies to detect, prevent and respond effectively;

b. to allocate a portion of the 1.5% of GDP in defence and security-related investments

agreed on at The Hague Summit to strengthening the resilience of their societies to foreign

interference;

c. to adopt whole-of-society approaches to countering foreign interference involving national

security institutions, civil society, media, academia, and the private sector;

d. to enhance early-warning and attribution capabilities, and impose meaningful sanctions

and diplomatic consequences on perpetrators;

e. to reinforce legal frameworks and allocate sufficient resources to counter foreign influence

and disinformation and to strengthen electoral and institutional defences, particularly to

cyberattacks;

to foster partnerships with technology providers, academia, fact-checkers and civil society

to make information and environments more resilient, and to promote public education in

digital and media literacy, as well as civic awareness;

g. to regulate established and emerging technologies, particularly social media platforms and

artificial intelligence, to prevent their misuse in hostile information operations, while

adequately protecting freedom of speech and promoting transparency and accountability;

h. to strengthen transparency frameworks regarding foreign funding of political parties, media

outlets, academic institutions and civil society, to reduce the risk of covert influence;

consider integrating democratic resilience into NATO’s baseline requirements for

national resilience, at the collective level, and including core democratic institutions and

processes among critical infrastructure, at the national level;

to deepen cooperation with the European Union, and to exchange on a case-by-case basis

with like-minded countries and international organisations facing similar foreign

interference risks; and continue to support Ukraine in building its cyber defence and

counter-disinformation capabilities as well as broader democratic resilience;

k. to establish a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO HQ to share best practices and

support Allies and partners in countering foreign interference;

to promote comprehensive and sustained media and digital literacy programmes, including

through formal education and lifelong learning, in order to equip citizens of all ages with

the skills to recognise and resist manipulation and disinformation.

_______________

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MEETING THE MOMENT: NATO’S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE

IMPERATIVES AFTER THE HAGUE SUMMIT

RESOLUTION 499

The Assembly,

Recognising

that Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allied security demanding

an immediate and strong response;

Aware

that Russia’s recent airspace incursions of Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, the most

consequential violations of NATO airspace in its history, are in line with Russia’s escalating and

reckless brinkmanship against Allies’ territory, populations, infrastructure,

and interests, which

includes sabotage, targeted assassinations, signals jamming, disinformation campaigns, and

dangerous nuclear rhetoric, among other nefarious actions designed to undermine Allied unity and

weaken support for Ukraine;

Recognising

that all Allies, particularly those along the Eastern Flank, are exposed to near

constant Russian threats and probing, that could be classified as state terrorism, and that Russia’s

aggressive policies, hostile to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, will not stop even in the event

of a ceasefire or eventual structured peace agreement in Ukraine;

Welcoming

the European Union and national commitments to build a drone wall along the

Eastern Flank;

Welcoming

Allies’ swift decision to launch operation

Eastern Sentry,

a multi-domain effort to

further enhance Allied defences along the Eastern Flank to shield and protect Allied territory and

populations against any further incursion attempts;

Remaining clear eyed

that Russia’s unprovoked, brutal, and illegal full-scale

war of

aggression against Ukraine is the principal driver of the sea change in the Euro-Atlantic security

environment that has upended longstanding principles and norms and constitutes a direct challenge

to the post-WWII rules-based international order underwritten and defended by NATO Allies and

their partners;

Condemning

in the strongest possible terms Russia’s systematic and deliberate targeting of

civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine via daily missile and drone strikes

–

including on

hospitals, schools, power plants, and grain export facilities

–

in flagrant violation of the Geneva

Conventions and international humanitarian law;

Knowing

that a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, based on its sovereignty, independence,

and territorial integrity is indispensable for the security of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area, and

that any unjust settlement would deeply damage the principles of sovereignty and rule of law

underpinning global stability and security;

Understanding

that NATO Allies’ continued high levels of military, financial, and political

support to Ukraine remain vital for its legitimate self-defence efforts, and a core security imperative

for Allies; and

applauding

the over USD 170 billion in military aid already delivered;

10.

Deeply concerned

by Russia’s suspension of its participation in New START, and its

continued selective implementation, or total disregard, of its arms control obligations; and

Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on

Monday 13 October 2025.

UPN, Alm.del - 2025-26 - Bilag 42: 2025 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

178 SESA 25 E

fully aware

that the erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks and

norms further destabilises the global strategic environment;

11.

Deeply troubled

by the growing role of China as a strategic enabler of Russia’s war of

aggression against Ukraine through the supply of dual-use technologies, microelectronics, and

satellite imagery, alongside its growing imports from Russia that significantly undermine the impact

and effectiveness of international sanctions;

12.

Strongly condemning

North Korea’s large-scale

transfer of artillery shells, short-range

ballistic missiles, and other munitions to Russia in blatant violation of UN Security Council

resolutions, as well as the deployment of North Korean military personnel to support Russian

operations,

materially extending Moscow’s capacity to continue its war of aggression on Ukraine;

13.

Also strongly condemning

Iran’s supply of thousands of Shahed-136

attack drones, short-

range ballistic missiles, and military advisers to aid Russia’s war effort, which have had an outsized

role on Russia’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians and vital-to-life

infrastructure;

14.

Understanding clearly

the deepening strategic alignment between Russia, China, Iran,

Belarus, and North Korea, whose growing convergence presents a systemic, coordinated, and

pernicious challenge to Allied security, interests, and values;

15.

Noting further

that China and North Korea’s enablement of and material support to Russia’s

war on Ukraine is the clearest manifestation to date of the increasing interlinkages of Euro-Atlantic

and Asia-Pacific security;

16.

Underlining

that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains the most direct

asymmetric threat to Allied populations and international peace and prosperity;

17.

Acknowledging

Allies’ substantial and sustained efforts since 2014 to strengthen NATO’s

deterrence and defence posture, including enhanced forward presence, rotational deployments, and

improved rapid reinforcement readiness;

18.

Recalling

the ambitious and historic decisions taken at the 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius

Summits, including the adoption of the New Force Model, the scaling up of battlegroups to the

brigade level, and significant enhancements in force structure, which mark another fundamental shift

in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture;

19.

Highlighting

the importance of NATO’s forward presence along the Eastern Flank and

commending

the progress achieved in scaling up presence and capabilities, while

underlining

the

Alliance’s 360-degree

approach to security and the interlinkage of threats across the Eastern and

Southern Flanks, where a range of threats recall the need for continued reinforcement;

20.

Underscoring

that nuclear deterrence remains at the core of NATO’s collective defence, and

that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance and Allies will continue

to take all steps necessary to ensure NATO’s nuclear deterrent remains safe,

secure, and effective;

21.

Welcoming

the significant increases in Allied defence spending over the last two years,

including an additional USD 187 billion by NATO Europe and Canada, which represent a meaningful

step forward to guaranteeing NATO’s future security, and

applauding

Allied heads of state and

government for taking the necessary and bold steps at The Hague Summit to agree to push for the

most ambitious defence spending and investment requirements in a generation;

22.

Appreciating

the adoption of the 2024 NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and the

updated 2025 Defence Production Action Plan resulting in already significantly expanded defence

industrial production across the Alliance, steps to eliminate defence trade barriers among Allies, and

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lower barriers to joint production, and paving the way for a new dynamism in transatlantic and cross-

partner defence industrial cooperation;

23.

Acknowledging

the potential of innovation initiatives such as the Defence Innovation

Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund to push new avenues for

defence innovation and to sustain Allies’ technological edge;

24.

Supporting

deeper and fully complimentary NATO-EU cooperation fostering stronger defence

industrial investment, cooperation and production in the EU and with EU partners; and

encouraged

by recent EU initiatives, including Security Action for Europe (SAFE), and the ReArm Europe

Plan/Readiness 2030 to accelerate rearmament, strengthen the European defence industrial base,

and ensure transatlantic interoperability;

25.

Recognising

Allies’ efforts to promote closer cooperation with Indo-Pacific

partners through

instruments such as the 2024 Agenda for Tackling Shared Security Challenges and new Individually

Tailored Partnership Programmes, and via increased joint military exercising, expanded defence

industrial cooperation, and the participation of the IP4 leaders at NATO summits and ministerials;

26.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to demonstrate an ironclad and enduring political will and strength of character to tackle

the significant and complex threats and challenges of the current security environment,

thereby underwriting Article 5 commitments as the cornerstone of the Alliance of today

and for tomorrow;

to meet the moment of a generation by raising defence investments to 5% of GDP, as

agreed to at The Hague Summit, with at least 3.5% of GDP allocated to core defence

requirements to meet NATO’s Capability Targets, and to submit the annual plans needed

to demonstrate a credible path to reach the established target;

to allocate the further 1.5% of GDP to defence- and security-related investments to

protect critical infrastructure, defend cyber networks, boost civil preparedness and

resilience, jumpstart innovation, and strengthen defence industrial bases;

to implement the legislative frameworks needed to send consistent demand signals to

unlock new funding to sustain the new defence spending momentum, vital to the

Alliance’s transformational promise of a new baseline for deterrence and defence;

to continue to work to eliminate inter-Allied defence trade barriers and lower barriers to

inter-Allied and partner defence industrial cooperation and innovation;

to channel new investments into immediate priorities such as air, missile, and drone

defences, advanced armoured vehicles, all forms of ammunition, enabling capabilities,

long-range precision strikes, uncrewed platforms, and warships and aircraft, and more

according to NATO’s defence planning requirements for today and tomorrow;

to support the initiatives of the European Union and individual Allies to build a drone wall,

in close cooperation with NATO and drawing on Ukrainian practical expertise;

to understand that Allies must commit to at least a five-fold increase in air and missile

defence systems to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative

initiatives, all single points of failure across the Alliance’s Eastern Flank, and to

ensure

these systems are interoperable and integrated within a wider integrated air and missile

defence architecture that is tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from

all strategic directions from state and non-state actors;

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to accelerate the implementation of the New Force Model and complete the scale-up of

the battlegroups into brigades along the Eastern Flank, and to reinforce operation

Eastern Sentry,

providing them with additional capabilities such as air defence, heavy

armour and forward positioned artillery and other strike capabilities to further strengthen

Allied deterrence posture against increased Russian probing;

to agree on a revision of NATO’s rules of engagement, notably to combat the threat of

drones;

to continue to increase the quality and quantity of Allied joint-force exercising to further

hone interoperability and readiness;

to sustain and expand support for Ukraine to ensure it can defend as well as liberate

territory, and achieve just and durable peace, including via new pledges of vital military

and financial assistance, particularly the delivery of the additional USD 35 billion of

outstanding pledged security assistance, additional contributions to the Prioritised

Ukraine Requirements List, and increased investment in Ukraine’s domestic defence

industry;

to strengthen recruitment and retention efforts across the Alliance’s armed forces to

sustain NATO’s enhanced collective defence posture, drawing on best practices from

Allies with effective personnel models;

to pursue frank and constructive consultations already underway between European

Allies, the United States, and Canada on global force-posture priorities and equitable

burden sharing;

to support a more strategic and results-oriented approach towards the Mediterranean

and the Southern Neighbourhood, as well as NATO’s High North and Arctic;

to broaden cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners through expanded joint exercises,

industrial initiatives, and increased Allied presence in the region to secure common

security interests and counter coercive practices targeting Allied and partner interests;

to address systemic challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, including

through robust cyber and societal resilience efforts by engaging Allied populations in a

whole-of-nation defence concept.

_______________

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STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AND

SECURITY AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IN THE HAGUE

RESOLUTION 500

The Assembly,

Stressing

that economic cooperation remains an essential element of the transatlantic

partnership and

reaffirming

the importance of economic collaboration among NATO members in

line with Article 2 of the NATO Treaty;

Observing

that NATO Allies must coordinate military and economic strength to create a

powerful deterrent against any threats to the peace, independence and stability of NATO members;

Understanding

that robust economic security instruments can play a key role in

complementing military and political means of achieving traditional Allied security objectives;

Concerned

that strategic competition among the world’s largest economies, challenges to

the resilience of vital supply chains and a growing risk of technology theft move the world economy

into a phase of geo-economic fragmentation;

Cognisant

that Allies face challenges in striking the right balance between achieving security

and remaining economically open;

Stressing

that overexposure to overly concentrated international supply chains for strategic

commodities needed in the defence industrial, energy, digital, food and other sectors critical to

national security can leave Allies’ militaries and economies vulnerable to

enemies and competitors;

Reiterating

its firm condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale

war of aggression

against Ukraine which poses a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;

Recognising

that Russia’s war against Ukraine as well as Russia’s hybrid campaigns in

Europe and assertiveness in the Global South has had a profound impact on the global economy,

energy and food security as well as migration;

Concerned

that China uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and

enhance its influence as well as seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical

infrastructure and strategic materials, including critical raw materials and supply chains;

10.

Recognising

that China’s toolbox for economic coercion has become more sophisticated,

targeted and institutionalised;

11.

Convinced

that to effectively prepare for the new threats and challenges posed by Russia

and China, NATO Allies should work to build a renewed sense of political and economic cohesion,

recognising that economic issues have important bearing on Allied security;

12.

Endorsing

Allies’ decision at the NATO Summit in The Hague, committing to invest 5% of

GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence- and security-related spending by

2035 to ensure Allies’ individual and collective obligations, in accordance with Article

3 of the NATO

Treaty, as well as The Hague Summit decision to work to eliminate defence trade barriers among

Allies and leverage our partnerships to promote defence industrial cooperation;

Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on

Monday 13 October 2025.

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178 SESA 25 E

13.

Welcoming

NATO’s increased focus on resilience, including resilient energy supplies as well

as food and water resources, and

supporting

the decision to spend up to 1.5% of GDP annually

inter alia

protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring Allied civil preparedness and resilience,

unleashing innovation, and strengthening the Allied defence industrial base which will strengthen

economic security;

14.

Welcoming

the Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade

between the European Union and the United States, and the Priority Ukraine Requirements List

(PURL) mechanism established to bolster Ukrainian defence,

noting

the European Union’s plans

to substantially increase procurement of military and defence equipment from the United States,

with the support and facilitation of the US government, and

acknowledging

that both parties

commit to cooperate on ensuring secure, reliable, and diversified energy supplies, including by

addressing non-tariff barriers that might restrict bilateral energy trade, while constituting a structured

defence and technology industrial base capable of responding to the Russian threat;

15.

Welcoming

the Economic Prosperity Deal between the United Kingdom and the United

States and

noting

that it aims at strengthening among others aerospace and aircraft manufacturing

supply chains;

16.

Acknowledging

efforts to decrease dependence on Russian energy and

noting

the recent

European Union legislation to completely phase out Europe’s dependency on imported Russian

natural gas and oil by 2028, while prioritising imports from our allies and fully respecting the specific

geographical dependencies and structural constraints of individual member states, and ensuring

that no Allied nation’s energy security is compromised in the process;

17.

Acknowledging

that the future of the digital economy, sustainable energy industries and the

defence sector depend on access to a range of critical raw materials;

18.

Endorsing

Allied actions to reduce their dependence on China for the supply of critical raw

materials and

supporting

NATO’s Defence-Critical

Supply Chain Security Roadmap;

19.

Recognising

the importance of prioritising and strengthening economic security partnerships,

including with Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union, Ukraine, Georgia, Global South countries

and the private sector as well as

acknowledging

that deep public-private collaboration is essential

and governments should treat private sector businesses as full partners in shaping and

implementing economic security policies;

20.

URGES

the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to avoid economic policies that undermine the rules-based multilateral trade and

investment system, recognising that trade wars among friends and Allies could empower

states that do not share the Alliance's values;

to ensure that the defence spending increase agreed at The Hague Summit solidifies the

transatlantic economic partnership and the partnerships between Alliance members,

ensures economic growth in Alliance nations, and helps lay the foundation for the

technological strengths of their economies;

to recognise economic power as an important pillar of deterrence and a cornerstone of

Allied strategy to enhance transatlantic security more effectively;

to revitalise NATO’s approach to economic security by reintroducing regular high-level

meetings and consultations focused on economic matters;

to reestablish the NATO Economic Security Committee to handle economic security

issues through monitoring global economic trends, assessing potential security threats,

and coordinating economic security strategies among Allies;

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178 SESA 25 E

to include economic resilience as a critical part of the update of the seven NATO baseline

requirements for resilience planned for 2026;

to strengthen NATO cooperation with the European Union on the economic security

agenda, including defence industry, innovation and technology, resilience, civil

preparedness and critical infrastructure protection, while ensuring inclusion of non-EU

Allies

in the EU’s respective efforts in these fields;

to foster a more institutionalised NATO-OECD policy alignment, including by the NATO

Parliamentary Assembly’s active participation in the OECD Global Parliamentary

Network, to discuss economic security issues, such as standards;

to create a NATO Partnership for Essential Raw Materials to build a common

understanding among Allies on strategic raw materials and align their economic policies

to secure reliable access to them and enhance supply chain resilience;

to develop a coherent strategy to counter geo-economic fragmentation in relations

between Allies and countries in the Global South to stimulate economic growth and

reduce pressure of economic migration;

to reinforce and make full use of export control mechanisms by ensuring that incentives

are in place for commercial operators to comply with the rules, including criminal statutes

aimed at those violating these export controls;

to deepen enforcement cooperation and work to harmonise existing and future sanctions

and trade measures on Russia to facilitate enforcement and make circumvention far

more difficult;

to rapidly expand transatlantic defence industrial cooperation and work to eliminate

defence trade barriers;

to mobilise private capital engagement in the defence sector and stimulate regionally

dispersed investment to rebuild Allied industrial capacity that should lead to building

cross-national technological and industrial Allied ecosystems;

to recognise that economic security requires a cultural shift and both private and public

sectors must adapt long-standing assumptions, practices and operating procedures to

reflect today’s more contested security environment;

to encourage the private sector to move from an opportunity-first mindset to one that

prioritises geopolitical risk awareness, resilience planning and investment in security;

to leverage the economic security agenda to synchronise military and non-military

instruments of power in order to better integrate private-sector capabilities across

domains, expand industrial base capacity and protect critical infrastructure from kinetic

and non-kinetic attacks;

to prioritise moving food to international markets in an unhindered manner, even in a

time of geo-economic fragmentation and recognise the strategic value of food production

and food commodities;

continue to work on food security in NATO in the framework of the Food and Agriculture

Planning Group and maintain close cooperation with Ukraine in this regard to ensure the

resilience of food systems across the Alliance, and future-proofing them against

disruption and shocks.

_______________

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178 SESA 25 E

FOSTERING STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WESTERN

BALKANS

RESOLUTION 501

The Assembly,

Reaffirming

NATO’s long-standing

engagement in the Western Balkans as essential to

safeguarding peace, security, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and

underscoring

the region’s

strategic importance to the Alliance;

Commemorating

the 30

anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the

Bosnian War and preserved Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a single state, and

recalling

the

Spring Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly hosted by the City of Dayton, Ohio, from

23-26 May 2025, attended by Heads of State and Government from across the Western Balkans as

well as key leaders who were instrumental in the negotiations of the Dayton Peace Accords;

Commemorating

the 30

anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, honouring the memory of

the victims, and reaffirming the significance of justice, reconciliation, and the prevention of future

atrocities in BiH and the wider region;

Recognising

the remarkable transformation of Southeastern Europe over the past 30 years

and the valuable contributions of NATO Allies Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and

Slovenia to NATO operations and to the collective security of the Alliance, and

welcoming

their

continued efforts to promote regional stability;

Expressing deep concern

about the political and constitutional crisis in BiH, particularly the

secessionist rhetoric and actions of the

Republika Srpska’s

leadership and repeated violations of the

Dayton Peace Accords,

reiterating

that the

country’s

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and

long-term stability must not be questioned or undermined while

commending

the strong and united

stance of Allied leaders in unequivocally condemning this dangerous and destabilising behaviour;

Welcoming

the continued presence of EUFOR Operation Althea and KFOR as stabilising

anchors in the region, and

reaffirming

the importance of coordination and cooperation between

NATO and the EU in the region;

Expressing concern

about the lack of progress and

encouraging

further efforts to revitalise

the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue as the principal avenue to normalise relations, ensure

the rights of all communities, and advance both parties’ European aspirations;

Expressing concern

over increasing external interference, especially from the

Russian Federation, which seeks to exploit unresolved political disputes, fuel polarisation, and

undermine democratic institutions and public trust in the Western Balkans;

Recalling

NATO’s commitment to the Open Door Policy and

supporting

the Euro-Atlantic

aspirations of BiH;

10.

Emphasising

the need to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law, and media

freedom across the Western Balkans in order to ensure sustainable peace in the region;

Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71

Annual Session

of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

UPN, Alm.del - 2025-26 - Bilag 42: 2025 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

178 SESA 25 E

11.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to reaffirm NATO’s enduring commitment to peace and stability in the Western Balkans,

to support the region’s democratic consolidation, and to accelerate its European and/or

Euro-Atlantic integration processes;

to continue signalling that the Alliance will not allow a security vacuum to return to the

region and will take action, if necessary, to safeguard peace;

to strengthen NATO’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including through

support for NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, political engagement, the Defence Capacity

Building Package, and other mechanisms of practical cooperation, in close coordination

with the EU and its EUFOR Operation Althea;

to reaffirm NATO’s Open Door Policy and support BiH’s Euro-Atlantic

aspirations,

including assistance in implementing its Reform Programme with NATO and fostering

inclusive political dialogue;

to condemn inflammatory secessionist rhetoric and actions by RS leadership in BiH,

while supporting efforts to de-escalate tensions, foster reconciliation and, if necessary,

to reform BiH institutions through the constitutional process with the consent of the

country’s three

constituent peoples;

to ensure continued support for KFOR’s presence and mandate in Kosovo as a

guarantor of stability and deterrent against renewed violence, and to expand support for

confidence-building measures between communities;

to support the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and encourage both parties to

refrain from unilateral steps that risk escalating tensions and to seek full and sustainable

implementation of their commitments under the 2013 Brussels Agreement and the

2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation (Ohrid Agreement);

to maintain their engagement with Serbia, respecting Serbia’s sovereign choices, while

upholding the values and security interests of the Alliance;

to further increase NATO-EU complementarity in the Western Balkans, including joint

planning, intelligence-sharing, and coordinated capacity-building for regional partners;

to increase efforts to counter malign foreign influence and hybrid threats in the region,

including through enhanced strategic communications, media literacy, infrastructure

security, and resilience-building;

to deepen cooperation with civil society actors, local institutions, and independent media

across the region to strengthen democratic resilience, media pluralism, and rule-of-law

frameworks in the face of authoritarian influence;

to ensure NATO remains visibly and substantively engaged in the Western Balkans

through high-level visits, public diplomacy, parliamentary outreach, and regular

consultations with regional leaders to foster stability, trust, and shared security.

_______________

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178 SESA 25 E

SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A JUST AND

LASTING PEACE

RESOLUTION 502

The Assembly,

Pledging

to stand firmly with Ukraine until and beyond the achievement of a just and lasting

peace;

Condemning in the strongest terms

Russia’s ongoing aggression and intensifying attacks

against Ukraine, including missile, drone and artillery attacks against civilians and critical

infrastructure;

Denouncing

Russia’s reckless and escalatory violations of the airspace of Allied nations in

connection with its aggression against Ukraine,

expressing

its full solidarity with the Allies

concerned, and

welcoming

NATO’s decision to execute Eastern Sentry along NATO’s

Eastern flank;

Deeply concerned

about the Russian shadow fleet and its negative impact on

security, the environment and the economy;

Welcoming

Allies’ decisions at recent NATO Summits to strengthen deterrence and defence,

institutionalise long-term support to Ukraine, and include direct military support to Ukraine in national

defence and defence-related spending targets;

Backing

the diplomatic initiatives of the United States, including through the Istanbul

negotiation process, to bring the war to an end while preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial

integrity and deterring future aggression,

commending

the close coordination between the Allies

and Ukraine, based on the principle that nothing about Ukraine should be decided without Ukraine,

and

emphasising

the role of European Allies in all discussions on the path towards peace;

Emphasising

the importance and urgency of an immediate, comprehensive and verifiable

ceasefire;

Stressing

that meaningful and enforceable security guarantees are essential to deter renewed

aggression;

Recognising

the strategic importance of working towards fairer burden sharing among all

Allies across all types of assistance to Ukraine, and

welcoming

the commitment of the Coalition of

the Willing to provide robust security guarantees to Ukraine and, if requested by Ukraine, a

multinational reassurance force, while

underscoring

the indispensable role of the United States’

support in these efforts;

10.

Deploring

the consistent refusal of the Russian Federation to accept a ceasefire and its

determination to persist in its war of aggression;

11.

Saluting

the political and practical support that NATO and individual Allies continue to provide

to Ukraine, particularly through the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), the NATO Representation in

Ukraine (NRU), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the

Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for

Ukraine, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), NATO Prioritised Ukraine

Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71

Annual Session

of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

UPN, Alm.del - 2025-26 - Bilag 42: 2025 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

178 SESA 25 E

Requirements List (PURL) initiative and other instruments to support Ukraine’s ability to defend itself,

its resilience and its Euro-Atlantic integration;

12.

Condemning

the Russian Federation’s systematic use of torture, inhuman and degrading

treatment, medical neglect and starvation against Ukrainian prisoners of war, in violation of

international humanitarian law, and

demanding

immediate and unconditional access for

international monitoring missions, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN

mechanisms, to all places of detention;

13.

Stressing

that a just and durable peace requires full accountability for the crime of aggression,

war crimes, and other grave violations of international law, the full exchange of prisoners of war, and

the safe return of all abducted and unlawfully transferred Ukrainian civilians, especially children;

14.

Recalling

the disproportionate impact of the war on women, and

underscoring

the

importance of mainstreaming the Women, Peace and Security and Human Security agendas in all

assistance and peace support efforts;

15.

Highlighting

the importance of continuing to mobilise international support for Ukraine’s

recovery, reconstruction, reform and modernisation, and

welcoming

the progress achieved in the

recent fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome in July 2025, as well as the previous

conferences held in Lugano (2022), London (2023), and Berlin (2024);

16.

Supporting

the important work of the Crimea Platform;

17.

Emphasising

the imperative of nuclear safety and security, including the restoration of full

Ukrainian control over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and uninterrupted IAEA access;

18.

Denouncing

the assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean

regimes to Russia’s war of aggression;

19.

Acknowledging

the vital role of Allied parliaments in sustaining public support and funding for

assistance to Ukraine and for any future peace-support arrangements;

20.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to implement fully and promptly the decisions of the NATO Summit in The Hague on

defence spending in order to strengthen NATO’s collective defence, as

well as to support

Ukraine’s defence needs as Ukraine’s security contributes to Allies’ own security;

to ensure the timely and continuous delivery of critical capabilities to Ukraine, including

layered air and missile defence, long-range precision strike, artillery systems and

ammunition, multi-role fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, counter-UAS and electronic

warfare systems, maritime and air domain awareness tools, leveraging

NATO coordination mechanisms, including PURL, and Allied facilities;

to ensure that Ukraine, in its international right to defend itself, can use weapons

provided by NATO Allies to strike legitimate targets in Russia;

to coordinate closely

–

among themselves and with Ukraine

–

diplomatic initiatives to

end the war;

to reaffirm that Russia’s attempts to occupy and annex internationally recognised

Ukrainian territory will never be recognised;

to deliver, in consultation with Ukraine and interested partners, on the commitments to

establish a multinational reassurance force with a robust mandate to deter and respond

to ceasefire violations, including over-the-horizon support and rapid-reinforcement

mechanisms, as well as clear command and force protection arrangements;

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178 SESA 25 E

to reaffirm that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is irreversible, and that Ukraine’s

future NATO membership is a sovereign decision of Ukraine and NATO Allies alone,

based solely on the will of the Ukrainian people and authorities and the fulfilment of

membership criteria;

to consider the strongest bilateral or multi-lateral mutual defence guarantees to Ukraine,

to deter future aggression;

to commit to assisting Ukraine in sustaining robust, well-trained and well-equipped

armed forces over the long term, including after the war, to serve as Ukraine’s first line

of defence against future aggression;

to expand, tighten, and fully enforce sanctions and export controls on Russia and its

enablers, including through secondary measures and by closing evasion channels, to

raise the cost of continued aggression;

to support international accountability efforts, including the work of the Special Tribunal

for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine within the framework of the Council of

Europe;

to require the full release and exchange of prisoners of war, the safe return of abducted

civilians, particularly children, and to mandate diplomatic missions to assist tracing and

family reunification efforts;

to accelerate defence-industrial expansion, including co-production

with Ukraine’s

defence sector, secure supply chains, and integration with NATO and EU initiatives;

to support Ukraine’s governance and reform agenda, including anti-corruption

institutions and transparent defence procurement, as key enablers for sustained

assistance and Euro-Atlantic integration;

to assist Ukraine in reinforcing civilian and energy resilience, including critical

infrastructure protection, cyber defence, and strategic communications;

to support Ukraine’s reconstruction through sustained public and private financing,

including the use of frozen Russian assets and windfall proceeds, and to develop

investment frameworks to attract private capital;

to continue deepening EU-NATO cooperation on Ukraine, while ensuring full inclusion

of non-EU Allies and coordination with like-minded partners around the world;

to continue contributing to Black Sea security, safety of navigation in line with the Vilnius

and Washington Summit decisions,

Ukraine’s maritime domain awareness and grain

corridor protection.

_______________

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PREPARING NATO FOR THE FUTURE OF UNCREWED WARFARE

RESOLUTION 503

The Assembly,

Recognising

that uncrewed systems are transforming armed conflict, as demonstrated in

recent conflicts, and that leadership in this field is crucial to maintaining NATO’s technological edge;

Acknowledging

the potential military benefits that integration of uncrewed systems offers in

the air, on the ground and at sea;

Stressing

that uncrewed systems complement, rather than replace, crewed systems, and

underlining

that uncrewed systems necessitate near-constant innovation and adaptation;

Highlighting

that attacks by drones can represent a form of financial and industrial

denial-of-service attack aiming to overwhelm traditional air defence systems, and that defending

against uncrewed systems poses unique challenges, creating a clear cost asymmetry between

attack drones and interceptors;

Observing

that uncrewed systems, and their associated pace of innovation and rapid

deployment demand, present opportunities and challenges for armed forces, warranting caution that

international law and ethical and legally binding rules of engagement not be overlooked to meet

demands of rapid deployment;

Applauding

Ukraine for its development, production, and use of uncrewed systems in its fight

against Russia’s illegal invasion and its pioneering in innovative procurement and production cycles

through the introduction of an online marketplace for military technology, thereby empowering

soldiers to order what they need when they need it and pushing procurement command and control

down to the tactical level; while also

emphasising

the clear threat posed by Russian uncrewed

systems to NATO airspace and sovereignty;

Strongly supporting

NATO’s efforts to foster an innovative ecosystem and forward-looking

approach to uncrewed systems and warfare through the NATO Innovation Fund, its investments in

promising start-ups working on uncrewed aerial systems and uncrewed surface vessels, and the

NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic’s (DIANA) 2026 focus on autonomy and

unmanned systems;

Encouraging

the Alliance to do more joint exercises focusing on uncrewed systems, like

NATO’s Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Technical Interoperability Exercise;

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to advance joint efforts on uncrewed systems to ensure that NATO maintains its

technological edge and that its armed forces can leverage the technology’s benefits

while being cognisant of the operational, ethical, and legal challenges, including civilian

oversight, of uncrewed systems;

to continue advancing and streamlining the Alliance’s conceptual thinking on uncrewed

systems, and to continuously assess and ensure their interoperability to deconflict their

utilisation in a shared warfighting space, while also ensuring that these systems are

compatible with civilian airspace use during peacetime;

Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

71st Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on

Monday 13 October 2025.

UPN, Alm.del - 2025-26 - Bilag 42: 2025 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

178 SESA 25 E

to develop and enforce joint operational and tactical standards on the integration of

uncrewed systems to legacy systems to strengthen collective defence, and to address

future interoperability challenges by incorporating uncrewed systems in all

Allied exercises;

to continue ensuring and enhancing the Alliance’s ability to adapt to volatile

environments by putting in place structures that prepare the Alliance for the rapid cycles

of measures, counter-measures and counter-counter-measures, and innovation,

development and production, while allowing soldiers on the ground to directly engage

with developers and producers of uncrewed systems and a rapid ramp up in production

of new and adapted systems, including through forward-deployed 3D printers that

facilitate production of required materials close to the tactical level;

to actively continue delivering on the goal of eliminating defence trade barriers among

Allies and leveraging partnerships with actors like Ukraine to promote further defence

industrial cooperation, as reaffirmed by the Summit Declaration issued in The Hague;

to work towards a proactive and coherent strategic framework and activities across

NATO bodies and member countries, enabling governance to keep pace with technical

developments and innovation and ensuring that ethical and legal guidelines are

effectively implemented on the ground;

to ensure that the development and acquisition of uncrewed systems at the national

level is coherent with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP);

to further advance the inclusion and streamlining of uncrewed systems in all aspects of

defence planning while ensuring their complementarity with crewed systems, making

sure that Allies consider uncrewed systems as fully part of multi-domain operations, and

not as an either/or, to ensure that their potential is fully leveraged to prepare the Alliance

for the future of uncrewed warfare.

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