Udenrigsudvalget 2024-25
B 175 Bilag 1
Offentligt
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To:
Honourable members of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament
Submitted by:
Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan´s bureau of International Relations
Dear members of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament
We, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, a political organization committed to the
promotion of democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law, respectfully submit
this legal submission in support of the initiative presently before the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Danish Parliament. This initiative calls upon Member States of the
European Union to take appropriate legal measures to designate the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, in accordance with Council Common
Position 2001/931/CFSP, related EU counterterrorism instruments, and the applicable
principles of international and national law. This submission outlines the legal basis, factual
evidence, and jurisprudential precedents that substantiate such a designation under EU law.
I. Legal Status and Function of the IRGC
The IRGC was established under Article 150 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran and formally recognized through a statute enacted by the Iranian Parliament on 6
September 1983. Article 2 of its Statute designates its primary mission as the protection of the
“guardianship of the Islamic Revolution” and the defence of its ideological foundations. In
line with this mandate, the IRGC has acquired extensive powers across Iran’s political,
economic, intelligence, and military domains.
Domestically, the IRGC has played a decisive role in suppressing political dissidents,
monitoring civil society, and operating clandestine detention facilities under its Intelligence
Organization. Credible documentation points to systemic human rights abuses, including
arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance—acts which contravene both Iranian
law and international human rights obligations.
Internationally, the IRGC’s Quds Force functions as a vehicle of extraterritorial state
violence, providing support to armed non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and various
Shi’a militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These activities have included training, financial
assistance, intelligence sharing, and weapons provision. Notably, the IRGC has been
implicated in major international terrorist incidents, including the 1983 Beirut barracks
bombings, the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and the Mykonos restaurant
assassinations in Berlin.
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A former IRGC minister, Brigadier General Mohsen Rafighdoost, has publicly confirmed the
Corps’ orchestration of overseas assassinations targeting Iranian dissidents. The Komala Party
itself has lost numerous members to IRGC-sponsored terrorist actions abroad. In Denmark,
IRGC-affiliated operatives have planned and attempted terrorist operations, including the
2018 assassination plot against an Al-Ahwaz opposition figure and the 2024 attempted
bombing near the Israeli Embassy in Copenhagen. Reports from Danish intelligence agencies
substantiate the IRGC’s operational presence within EU borders, thereby satisfying the
evidentiary threshold for EU terrorist listing procedures.
II. Legal Basis for the Designation of the IRGC under EU and International Law
Under European Union law, the designation of individuals, groups, or entities as terrorist
organizations is primarily governed by Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and
Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, which implement the EU’s obligations under UN
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). These instruments provide the legal
foundation for targeted sanctions, including asset freezes and restrictions on economic
resources, against those involved in terrorist activities.
According to Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, a “terrorist act”
includes intentional acts designed to:
•
•
Seriously intimidate a population;
Unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or abstain from
performing any act;
Seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or
social structures of a country or international organization.
•
Acts such as attacks on life and physical integrity, hostage-taking, and causing mass
destruction are explicitly included. The IRGC, through its military arm (Quds Force) and its
network of proxies, has repeatedly committed such acts both within and outside Iran.
To be designated under this framework, there must be a decision by a competent authority—
typically judicial or administrative—within an EU Member State confirming the group’s
involvement in terrorism. The following decisions constitute strong legal precedents
supporting the IRGC’s designation:
•
Germany (2023 – Düsseldorf Judgment): In
Case No. 6 StS 1/23,
the
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Regional Court) confirmed the IRGC's role in
planning and supporting a terrorist attack against a synagogue in North Rhine-
Westphalia. The court’s findings established operational links between IRGC
operatives and the perpetrator, thereby qualifying as a competent decision under EU
law.
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•
Germany (1997 – Mykonos Case): In
Case No. 2 StE 2/93,
the Kammergericht Berlin
found that senior officials of the Iranian regime, including IRGC agents, orchestrated
the extrajudicial killings of Kurdish opposition members at the Mykonos restaurant in
Berlin. The court concluded that these acts were directed by Iran’s leadership and
executed by IRGC personnel. This case remains one of the strongest precedents for
attributing acts of terrorism to a state organ in Europe.
Denmark (2018–2024): Danish intelligence services (PET) uncovered and disrupted
multiple IRGC-directed plots, including a 2018 assassination attempt against an
Iranian-Arab dissident and a 2024 attempted terrorist act near the Israeli Embassy in
Copenhagen. These operations were directly linked to the IRGC and its agents. Danish
authorities have publicly named the IRGC as the entity behind these acts, which
qualifies as an “administrative decision” for purposes of Article 1(4) of Common
Position 2001/931/CFSP.
United States (2019): The U.S. formally designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) under §219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In
Todd
Akins v. Iran,
No. 1:20-cv-00786-RDM, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19
U.S. service members in Saudi Arabia.
Canada (2024): The Canadian government listed the IRGC under Section 83.05 of the
Criminal Code, following a review by national security services. The designation was
based on the IRGC’s provision of material support to terrorist organizations and its
involvement in systematic human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial
killings.
•
•
•
These judicial and administrative findings—particularly those issued by EU Member States—
fulfill the evidentiary requirement of Article 1(4) of the Common Position, enabling the
Council of the EU to lawfully add the IRGC to its terrorist list.
In parallel, international law supports such designation. Article 2(1)(a) of the 1999
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism prohibits the
provision of funds or resources with the knowledge that they will be used to carry out acts
intended to intimidate or coerce populations or governments. The IRGC’s ongoing financial
and operational support to groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shi’a militias in Iraq and
Syria clearly falls within this prohibition.
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Furthermore, under the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, particularly Article 4, acts
committed by an official organ of a state—such as the IRGC—are attributable to that state.
The IRGC is formally embedded in Iran’s constitutional and military structure, established
under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution. Its conduct, therefore, constitutes state-
sponsored terrorism, implicating Iran in ongoing violations of international law.
Taken together, the legal instruments of the EU, the jurisprudence and administrative findings
of national authorities, and international legal norms all converge to support the lawful
designation of the IRGC as a terrorist entity.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps meets the legal, factual, and procedural requirements
for designation as a terrorist organization under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
Its conduct, both domestically and internationally, reflects a sustained pattern of terrorist
activity and human rights violations directly attributable to the Iranian state. EU Member
States, including Denmark, possess substantial evidentiary findings that satisfy the criteria for
listing.
Accordingly, we respectfully urge the Danish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee to
recommend that the Council of the European Union initiate the formal procedure to designate
the IRGC as a terrorist entity. Such a step would reflect the European Union’s commitment to
international law, human rights, and the collective security of its Member States.
We remain available to provide further legal documentation or testimony as required to
support this initiative.
Best regards,
Keywan Faramarzi, head of International Relations
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