UFO, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 71: Offentlige svar på ECPRD-forespørgsel til øvrige europæiske parlamenter om ydelser af en økonomisk fordel i forbindelse med nedlæggelse af et parlamentsmandat.

Udvalget for Forretningsordenen 2024-25
UFO Alm.del Bilag 71
Offentligt

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPLY

TO ECPRD REQUEST 6116

The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a

seat in parliament

FROM DENMARK - FOLKETINGET

08/07/2025

ECPRD EP Deputy

Correspondent

Barbara PINTO LEITE

[email protected]

Replies provided by

Alexis BISTIS

[email protected]

QUESTIONS

1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that

prohibits

i.) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition

that they resign their seat;

ii.) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s

own party.

2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it en-forced?

I. Independence of Members

UFO, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 71: Offentlige svar på ECPRD-forespørgsel til øvrige europæiske parlamenter om ydelser af en økonomisk fordel i forbindelse med nedlæggelse af et parlamentsmandat.

The principle of the free mandate of the Members of the European Parliament is explicitly

stated in Article 6 of the Electoral Act (the

Act of 20 September 1976)

“Members

of the European Parliament [...] shall not be bound by any instructions and shall

not receive a binding mandate.”

The freedom and independence of Members are also enshrined in Articles 2(1) and 3 of the

Statute for Members of the European Parliament (2005/684/EC, Euratom)

, as follows:

Article 2(1):

“Members shall be free and independent”

Article 3:

“Members

[...] shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding

mandate.

2. Agreements concerning the way in which the mandate is to be exercised shall be null and

void.”

The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament also contain an obligation for Members

to exercise their mandate freely and independently, in Rule 2 thereof:

“In

accordance with Article 6(1) of the Act of 20 September 1976 and with Article 2(1) and

Article 3(1) of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, Members shall exercise

their mandate freely and independently, shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not

receive a binding mandate.”

In order to safeguard their independence, Members are entitled to an appropriate salary

(Article 9 of the Statute). The salary is set at 38.5% of the basic salary of a judge at the Court

of Justice (Article 10 of the Statute). For guidance, the gross salary currently is EUR 10 927,44.

The net salary after deduction of Community tax and insurance contributions is EUR 8 517,01.

Apart from the salary and other legal financial benefits to which Members are entitled in

accordance with the Statute, they shall refrain from accepting any gifts or similar benefits

with an approximate value of more than EUR 150, in accordance with Article 6(1) of the Code

of Conduct for the Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and

transparency

“Members

of the European Parliament shall refrain from accepting, in their capacity as

Members, any gifts or similar benefits, other than those with an approximate value of less

Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (as

amended

by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June and 23 September 2002),

OJ L 278, 8.10.1976,

p. 5.

Decision of the European Parliament of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European

Parliament (2005/684/EC, Euratom),

OJ L 262, 7.10.2005, p. 1.

Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.

than EUR 150 given in accordance with courtesy usage or those given to them in accordance

with courtesy usage when they are representing Parliament in an official capacity.”

II. Legal value of agreements concerning the resignation from office of a Member

According to recital 4 of the Statute:

“Undertakings made by Members to relinquish their office at

a given time, or declarations of

their intent to relinquish office on an unspecified date, which political parties can make use of

at their discretion, should be considered as incompatible with Members' freedom and

independence and should therefore not be

binding in law.”

This safeguard of Members’ freedom is further enshrined in

Article 2(2) of the Statute:

“Agreements concerning the resignation from office of a Member before or at the end of a

parliamentary term shall be null and void.”

Moreover, the resignation procedure provided for in Rule 4(2) of the Rules of Procedure

intends to guarantee that any resignation is made voluntarily and in compliance with the

Electoral Act and the Statue of Members:

“Members

who resign shall notify the President of their resignation and of the date on which

that resignation is to take effect, which may not be more than three months after notification.

This notification shall take the form of an official record drawn up in the presence of the

Secretary-General or his or her representative, signed by the latter and by the Member

concerned and immediately submitted to the committee responsible, which shall enter it on

the agenda of its first meeting following receipt of the document.

If the committee responsible considers that the resignation is in compliance with the Act of 20

September 1976, a vacancy shall be declared with effect from the date indicated by the

resigning Member in the official record, and the President shall inform Parliament thereof.

If the committee responsible considers that the resignation is not in compliance with the Act

of 20 September 1976, it shall propose to Parliament that it not declare a vacancy.”

III. Financing of European political structures

Appropriations from Parliament’s budget allocated

the financing of European political

structures may not be used to pay a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament

in return for their resignation.

•

European political groups

The financing of European political groups is governed by the Rules on the use of

appropriations from budget Item 400 adopted by the Bureau on 30 June 2003 (as amended).

The nature of expenditures covered by the funds allocated to European political groups is

strictly defined in Article 1.1.1:

“The appropriations made available from Item 400 are intended to cover:

- the administrative and operational expenditure of the political groups/non-attached

Members' secretariat;

- expenditure on political and information activities conducted by the political groups/non-

attached Members in connection with the European Union's political activities.”

Moreover, the nature of expenditure must conform to the common accounting plan, which

forms an integral part of the rules. In this accounting plan, there is clearly no room for the

“payment of a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament in

return for their

resignation”.

•

European political parties and foundations

The financing of European political parties and foundations is governed by:

- Title XI of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the

Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the

Union (“Finacial Regulation”)

- Regulation (EU, Euratom) no 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European

political foundations.

According to Article 225 of the Financial Regulation:

“Direct financial contributions from the budget may be awarded to European political parties

as defined in Article 2, point (3), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 (European political

parties) in view of their contribution to forming European political awareness and to

expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union in accordance with that Regulation.”

Any expenditure that does not comply with the above-mentioned regulations is considered

ineligible. It is our understanding that using funds allocated to European political parties and

foundations for the “payment of a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament

in exchange

for their resignation” would fall under this category and thus be deemed

ineligible.