ERD, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 10: Tekster vedtaget under 4. session 2025

Europarådet 2024-25
ERD Alm.del Bilag 10
Offentligt

2025 ORDINARY SESSION

Fourth part

29 September – 3 October 2025

TEXTS ADOPTED

BY THE ASSEMBLY

Provisional versions*

*subject to editorial review.

F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex | Tel: + 33 3 88 41 2000 |

ERD, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 10: Tekster vedtaget under 4. session 2025

Table of contents

Opinions

Opinion 308 (2025)

Opinion 309 (2025)

Draft Council of Europe convention on the co-production of audiovisual

works in the form of series (Doc.

16238)

Draft convention establishing an international claims commission for

Ukraine (Doc.

16270)

Recommendations

Recommendation 2299 (2025)

Recommendation 2300 (2025)

Youth movements for Democracy (Doc.

16239)

Artificial intelligence and migration (Doc.

16240)

Resolutions

Resolution 2616 (2025)

Resolution 2617 (2025)

Resolution 2618 (2025)

Resolution 2619 (2025)

Resolution 2620 (2025)

Resolution 2621 (2025)

Resolution 2622 (2025)

Resolution 2623 (2025)

Resolution 2624 (2025)

Resolution 2625 (2025)

Resolution 2626 (2025)

Resolution 2627 (2025)

Resolution 2628 (2025)

Resolution 2629 (2025)

Resolution 2630 (2025)

The Parliamentary Assembly should support Kazakhstan to continue its

democratic reforms (Doc.

16245)

The honouring of membership obligations to the Council of Europe by

Hungary (Doc.

16249)

Journalists matter: the need to step up efforts to liberate Ukrainian

journalists held in captivity by the Russian Federation (Doc.

16237)

Youth movements for Democracy (Doc.

16239)

Post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria (Doc.

16246)

Russian democratic forces (Doc.

16247)

Russia: new threats to European democracies (Doc.

16272)

Urgent call to put an end to the devastating humanitarian catastrophe and

the killing of journalists in Gaza (Doc.

16273)

Uphold democracy and the rule of law in Georgia (Doc.

16271)

Political parties and democracy (Doc.

16248)

Analysis and guidelines to guarantee the right to housing (Doc.

16244)

Promoting universal health coverage (Doc.

16243)

Artificial intelligence and migration (Doc.

16240)

Sexual violence against men and boys (Doc.

16250)

Ensuring Parliamentary Assembly members can travel freely to carry out

their work (Doc.

16252)

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Opinions

308-309

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Opinion 308 (2025)

Draft convention establishing an international claims

commission for Ukraine

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly considers that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences

of all of its internationally wrongful acts committed in and against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation

of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as any violations of international humanitarian law and

international human rights law. These include violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS

No. 5) committed until 16 September 2022. The Russian Federation must make full reparation for all the

damage, loss or injury caused by these breaches of international law to the State of Ukraine and all natural

and legal persons concerned. This is in accordance with the principles of State responsibility under

international law and in line with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/5 of

14 November 2022. The Assembly reiterates that many of the internationally wrongful acts committed by the

Russian Federation violate

erga omnes

obligations and peremptory norms of general international law,

thereby affecting the international community as a whole.

The Assembly has previously addressed the requirement for a compensation mechanism for Ukraine in

the context of the ongoing war of aggression against this country. In its

Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and

human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”,

the Assembly called on

member States to set up an international compensation mechanism for Ukraine, including a register of

damage, a claims commission and a compensation fund. It also considered that the Organisation should play

a leading role in setting up and managing such a mechanism. Following the establishment of the Register of

Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (“Register of Damage”) as an

enlarged partial agreement on 12 May 2023, which became operational in 2024, the Assembly reiterated in

numerous resolutions its call for the establishment of an international claims commission and an international

compensation fund as the second and third components of the compensation mechanism. In

Resolution 2598

(2025) “Russian war of aggression against Ukraine: the need to ensure accountability and avoid impunity”,

the

Assembly considered that the best model for establishing a claims commission would be an open Council of

Europe convention, which could ensure the necessary cross-regional support while benefitting from the

leadership and expertise of the Organisation. In its related

Recommendation 2294 (2025),

the Assembly

called on the Committee of Ministers to work without delay towards the establishment of a claims commission

for Ukraine, notably by setting up an ad hoc committee for the drafting of an open Council of Europe

convention.

The Assembly warmly welcomes the finalisation of the draft convention establishing an international

claims commission for Ukraine (“draft convention”) by the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of a Claims

Commission for Ukraine (CAHEC). This work followed formal negotiations outside the Council of Europe,

under the auspices of an Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee, which included over 50 States, the

European Union and the Council of Europe. The draft convention marks a further step in the Council of

Europe’s global response to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its aggression against Ukraine. It

creates an additional and innovative legal tool (the International Claims Commission, hereafter “the

Commission”) to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal and economic consequences of all the

Assembly debate

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting) (see

Doc 16270,

report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and

Human Rights, rapporteur: Lord Richard Keen).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Opinion 308 (2025)

damage caused. The Commission will complement the work of other international adjudicative bodies, courts

or tribunals dealing with the consequences of the aggression, such as the European Court of Human Rights

and the future Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Justice and accountability cannot

be complete without reparations for the victims of the aggression, the State of Ukraine and the individual

victims concerned. By establishing the Commission, the Council of Europe is supporting Ukraine in its efforts

to ensure justice, redress and reconstruction, while also upholding the rule of law and the international legal

order that has been blatantly breached by the Russian Federation. The Assembly commends the Council of

Europe’s ability to innovate and fill gaps in the international legal response to the aggression, and reiterates

that any future peace settlement aimed at ending the aggression must include reparations and redress, or at

least not interfere with existing mechanisms.

The establishment of a claims commission within the Council of Europe’s institutional framework is the

natural next step following the setting up of the Register of Damage at the Reykjavik Summit in May 2023.

The Assembly reiterates its full support for the Register of Damage, which has already received claims from

more than 60 000 individuals across 13 categories of claims. The Register’s work will be transferred to the

Commission under the terms of the draft convention, and claims will continue to be submitted to the

Commission. The fact that both the Register of Damage and the Commission will be within the institutional

framework of the Council of Europe will facilitate an efficient transition without any interruption of work.

The Assembly is satisfied that the draft convention is based on a victim-centred approach, ensuring that

individuals and legal persons injured by the aggression are eligible to submit claims to the compensation

mechanism, in line with the existing rules concerning the Register of Damage. Regarding the organisational

structure of the Commission, the Assembly notes that it follows well-known precedents in international law.

The Assembly considers that, overall, it ensures the necessary independence and impartiality of the decision-

making bodies, while allowing, with certain safeguards, for the participation of Ukraine and the Russian

Federation should they become members. The Assembly further welcomes the fact that the draft convention

contains specific provisions on the independence of the Commissioners, the Executive Director and the

Secretariat, as well as on procedural standards such as fairness, objectivity and transparency.

However, the Assembly regrets that the draft convention does not provide clearer regulation of the

funding of the compensation awards and their enforcement and payment. The future existence of a

compensation fund is merely mentioned as a possibility in the preamble and Article 22. Without the Russian

Federation participating in the Commission – a scenario which seems rather unrealistic in the current context

and in light of the conditions set out in Article 28 – the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism can be

called into question. Although compensation awards are a necessary step towards justice and reparations,

they must be enforced and paid to individual claimants. While noting the incremental approach followed by the

States involved in the negotiations on the draft convention, the Assembly urges them to work without delay

towards the establishment of an international compensation fund mandated to pay compensation to

successful claimants. In line with previous Assembly resolutions (Resolution

2539 (2024)

“Support for the

reconstruction of Ukraine” and

Resolution 2556 (2024)

“Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian

Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”) and in accordance with international law, member States and other

States holding frozen Russian State assets should consider the repurposing of such assets for transfer to the

future compensation fund.

The Assembly further regrets that the temporal scope of the Commission is currently limited to the

damage caused by violations of international law committed on or after 24 February 2022. The Assembly has

consistently recognised that the Russian Federation’s war of aggression started on 20 February 2014 and that

it escalated into a large-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. It therefore considers that all victims of the

Russian Federation’s aggression since 2014 should be entitled to compensation. The Assembly calls on the

future Parties to the convention to re-examine this issue and consider an amendment in this regard, as

foreseen in the preamble and Article 33.2 of the draft convention.

The Assembly notes that Article 19 of the draft convention addresses in very general terms the

relationship with judgments or awards by courts or tribunals and other international adjudicative bodies. Given

the overlap in the jurisdiction of both the future Commission and the European Court of Human Rights for the

period between 24 February 2022 and 16 September 2022, the Assembly invites the future Commission

bodies to clarify this issue in their rules, in consultation with the Court.

The Assembly recognises that the convention should aim to attract as many non-European States as

possible, in order to strengthen the Commission’s international legitimacy and representativeness. However,

as it is a Council of Europe convention, the Assembly believes that the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS

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Opinion 308 (2025)

No. 1) and relevant Assembly resolutions should be referenced in the preamble to strengthen its legal basis

and acknowledge the Organisation’s leading role. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of

Ministers make the following amendments to the draft convention:

9.1. in the preamble, add a new fourth paragraph that would read: “Having regard to the Statute of

the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1), which in its preamble underlines the pursuit of peace based upon

justice and international co-operation;”;

9.2. in the preamble, add a new paragraph before the current eleventh paragraph that would read:

“Noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its

Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal

and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”,

called on the

Council of Europe member States to set up an international compensation mechanism, including a

establish an international claims commission and an international compensation fund in Resolution

2539 (2024)

“Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”, Resolution

2556 (2024)

“Legal and human

rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, and

Resolution 2605 (2025)

“Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine;””.

10. The Assembly is of the view that the draft convention establishing an international claims commission

for Ukraine can be adopted and opened for signature as soon as possible.

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Opinion 309 (2025)

Draft Council of Europe convention on the Co-Production of

Audiovisual Works in the Form of Series

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly welcomes the finalisation of the draft Council of Europe convention on the

co-production of audiovisual works in the form of series (hereinafter the “draft convention”) and commends its

ambition to promote cross-border collaboration and cultural diversity.

Certain member States, industry representatives, and the European Union have raised concerns

regarding the absence of an impact assessment, the inadequate consultation of stakeholders, and the risks

associated with certain elements of the draft convention.

Some issues require further consideration to enable the greatest number of member States to ratify the

convention with confidence in its benefits, free from fear of unintended side effects on their local ecosystems.

The draft convention defines the term “independent co-producers” as “audiovisual production

companies that are bound by a co-production contract and qualify as independent under the domestic law

provisions of their countries of establishment or, in the absence of such provisions, that satisfy the criteria of

independence as set out in Appendix III”.

Such a definition may generate normative interference with domestic legal frameworks and public

support regimes, resulting in regulatory misalignment, reducing the effectiveness of national mechanisms, and

deterring stakeholder participation in co-productions. Although the definition set out in Appendix III applies

only in the absence of domestic legislation, it can still be considered a

de facto

supranational standard. This

could exert undue normative pressure on States, distort eligibility criteria for public funding, and compromise

the principle of subsidiarity that underpins the autonomy of national audiovisual ecosystems.

Accordingly, the Assembly considers it essential that each State defines independence in a manner that

reflects its own audiovisual ecosystem.

Moreover, the rules regarding copyright, data sharing, and artistic control impose restrictions that may

undermine established practices or legal harmonisation at European Union level.

Consequently, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers, before considering its

adoption, carry out a market analysis and an impact assessment of the draft convention with the participation

of stakeholders. Furthermore, it recommends that the Committee of Ministers make the following amendments

to the draft convention:

8.1. include a provision requiring that each signatory which does not have a definition of

“independent producer” for the purposes of the draft convention shall adopt such a definition before the

entry into force of the convention in its territory;

8.2. redraft Article 3(e) as follows: “the term ‘independent co-producers’ shall mean audio-visual

production companies that are bound by a co-production contract and qualify as independent under the

relevant rules of their countries of establishment”;

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting) (see

Doc. 16238,

report of the Committee on Culture, Science,

Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Valentina Grippo).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Opinion 309 (2025)

8.3. in Article 7(1), delete the second sentence worded as follows: “The allocation of shares should

take into account the respective financial contributions of the independent co-producers and their

creative and technical expenditures”;

8.4.

delete Article 7(2);

8.5. in Article 7(3) delete the second sentence worded as follows: “Exploitation rights may not be

licensed in perpetuity and the periods of licensing shall allow the independent co-producers to benefit

from the residual value of the rights”;

8.6.

in Article 8(3), delete the words: “manage and”;

8.7. redraft Article 9 as follows: “Understanding of the success and circulation of officially co-

produced series 1. Audiovisual media service providers and their subsidiaries established in Parties to

the Convention shall provide audience data and information on the exploitation of series that have

obtained official co-production status and received financial benefits pursuant to Article 4, to competent

authorities, as defined in Article 5, paragraph 5, provided it is required by national legislative and

regulatory provisions. Competent authorities shall treat this information confidentially.”;

8.8.

8.9.

in Appendix II, point 1, paragraph 2, delete the words: “or of Appendix III”;

delete Appendix III.

The Assembly also recommends that the Committee of Ministers make the necessary amendments to

the draft explanatory report to reflect those made to the draft convention.

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Recommendations

2299-2300

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Recommendation 2299 (2025)

Youth movements for democracy

Parliamentary Assembly

Referring to its

Resolution 2619 (2025)

“Youth movements for democracy” emphasising that young

people across Europe are not only participants but also essential defenders and innovators of democracy, and

that their engagement is critical to sustaining democratic resilience in the face of authoritarianism, institutional

distrust, socio-economic exclusion, digital transformation and environmental crisis, the Parliamentary

Assembly:

1.1. stresses the need for the Council of Europe and its member States to protect and promote youth

civic engagement and (financial) support to youth organisations, safeguard youth rights, and dismantle

the structural barriers that prevent young people from fully participating in democratic life;

1.2. welcomes the Council of Europe’s longstanding achievements in promoting youth participation

through the co-management system, the European Youth Centres, the European Youth Foundation,

and its standard-setting work, in particular the Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young

People in Local and Regional Life and the forthcoming reference framework for a youth perspective.

In view of the above, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

2.1. ensure that youth participation, as a core priority for the Organisation on the basis of the

Reykjavik Declaration and Reykjavik Principles for Democracy, is mainstreamed across all sectors of

the Council of Europe’s work;

2.2. integrate youth civic space as a standing item in the Council of Europe’s human rights

monitoring and co-operation programmes, including within accession, post-monitoring and thematic

review processes;

2.3. invite relevant intergovernmental committees, including the European Steering Committee for

Youth (CDEJ) and the Joint Council on Youth (CMJ), to develop and strengthen standards for member

States on protecting youth civic engagement, in line with Articles 10 and 11 of the European

Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), and to report regularly on implementation;

2.4. encourage the adoption and promotion of the Revised European Charter on the Participation of

Young People in Local and Regional Life by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, its own

recommendations and the reference framework for a youth perspective, and support their

dissemination and implementation at national and local levels;

2.5. strengthen the resources of the European Youth Foundation and the European Youth Centres in

order to provide support for youth-led democratic initiatives, including in contexts where civic space is

shrinking;

2.6. promote intergovernmental exchanges of good practice on lowering the voting age to 16,

introducing youth quotas and multi-age electoral lists, and embedding democratic civic education in

formal and non-formal settings;

Assembly debate

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting) (see

Doc. 16239,

report of the Committee on Culture, Science,

Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 1 October 2025

(33rd sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Recommendation 2299 (2025)

2.7. enhance co-operation with other international organisations, including the European Union, the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations, to co-ordinate

action in monitoring and defending youth human rights, supporting civic infrastructure, and maintaining

warning mechanisms for threats to youth civic space;

2.8. ensure the effective participation of young people from diverse backgrounds, including those

from rural areas, minority communities, and diaspora and refugee populations, in Council of Europe

activities and policy processes;

2.9. make full use of the Assembly’s youth participation mechanism and the role of youth rapporteurs

in order to create regular and structured opportunities for dialogue between the Committee of Ministers,

the Assembly, and youth-led organisations.

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Recommendation 2300 (2025)

Artificial intelligence and migration

Parliamentary Assembly

Noting the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) in migration management as in other areas,

the Parliamentary Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers encourages the signature,

ratification and implementation of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and

Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225) by all member States and other States.

In light of

Resolution 2628 (2025)

“Artificial intelligence and migration”, the Assembly urges the

Committee of Ministers to prepare a recommendation guiding member States on the use of AI in migration

management, followed by concrete actions that prioritise transparency, accountability and human rights

protection.

The Assembly urges the Committee of Ministers to ensure that migration-related policy instruments

incorporate strong and enforceable safeguards and calls for the establishment of a code of good practice on

the use of AI in migration management and in procedures affecting the rights of migrants, refugees and

asylum seekers, which could form part of the above recommendation.

The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers plans – within the Council of Europe –

awareness-raising programmes on the implications of AI in migration management for ombudsman institutions

and equality bodies. These activities should strengthen their capacity to safeguard human rights. Similar

awareness raising and training should be rolled out for migration officers, caseworkers and NGOs; the Council

of Europe HELP programme (Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals) and the EU Digital Europe

Programme may be useful instruments in this respect.

The Assembly recommends strengthening co-operation with all the relevant bodies and agencies of the

European Union and the United Nations on the application of AI in migration management. It emphasises also

the importance of co-operation between the Council of Europe and civil society on this question, which would

be particularly valuable in the design of any forthcoming instruments.

Assembly debate

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting) (see

Doc. 16240,

report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees

and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Mr Petri Honkonen).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolutions

2616 to 2630

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Resolution 2616 (2025)

The Parliamentary Assembly should support Kazakhstan to

continue its democratic reforms

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its

Resolution 1506 (2006)

“External relations of the Council of

Europe” and reiterates its commitment to enhancing the role of the Council of Europe in promoting

democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights beyond its borders, in particular in neighbouring

regions, as an essential contribution to security, stability and development.

The Assembly recalls

its Resolutions 1526 (2006)

“Situation in Kazakhstan and relations with the

Council of Europe” and

2193 (2017)

“The relations of the Council of Europe with Kazakhstan” and reiterates

its view of Kazakhstan as one of the pillars of stability in the Euro-Asian region. This role has gained particular

relevance in the increasingly strained geopolitical environment that has emerged following the Russian

Federation's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. It further notes Kazakhstan’s growing

international profile, supported by its strategic geographic location and balanced foreign policy, and welcomes

Kazakhstan’s contributions to international diplomacy.

The Assembly reiterates its commitment to the 2004 Co-operation Agreement with the Parliament of

Kazakhstan which, in the last two decades, has served as a cornerstone for enhancing interparliamentary

dialogue and fostering mutual understanding between the Council of Europe and Kazakhstan. It welcomes the

commitment by the Parliament of Kazakhstan to uphold and further develop the structured dialogue with the

Assembly, as underscored in the joint declaration by the President of the Assembly and the Speaker of the

Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan on the occasion of the 20

anniversary of the agreement.

The Assembly further welcomes the commitment of Kazakhstan’s political leadership to democratic

transformation of the country and takes positive note of the constitutional and legislative reforms undertaken

since 2019. It particularly commends Kazakhstan for the abolition of the death penalty in 2022, which has

been one of the Assembly’s key demands from the outset of the establishment of its relations with the

Parliament of Kazakhstan. At the same time, the Assembly deplores credible reports that Kazakhstan has

recently acquired and deployed commercial-scale internet censorship and surveillance infrastructure from

China, severely restricting free expression and digital rights. These systems reportedly include deep packet

inspection, real-time subscriber monitoring, website and application filtering, regional traffic control, internet

throttling and blackouts, virtual private network (VPN) detection, and the ability to target individuals based on

online activity – capabilities which researchers have characterised as “terrifying” and far in excess of any

legitimate, lawful interception framework.

The Assembly welcomes the comprehensive co-operation between Kazakhstan and the Council of

Europe within the framework of the Neighbourhood Co-operation Priorities, which has served as a valuable

instrument for aligning the Kazakh legislation with Council of Europe’s standards. At the same time, the

Assembly expects tangible progress in justice reform, anti-corruption measures, promotion of human rights,

and support for democratic governance,

inter alia

through the co-operation with the Assembly, in particular:

releasing 39 political prisoners, individuals targeted for their involvement in peaceful protests, civil society and

anti-corruption activities, social media publications, or their support of peaceful opposition movements;

Assembly debate

on 30 September 2025 (31st sitting) (see

Doc. 16245,

report of the Committee on Political Affairs

and Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Zsolt Németh).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 30 September 2025 (31st sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2616 (2025)

fulfilling obligations to ensure freedom of political association and to stop the domestic and transnational

persecution of representatives of the peaceful political opposition movements “Democratic Choice of

Kazakhstan”, “Koshe Partiyasy” and “Alga Kazakhstan”, as recalled in the European Parliament Resolutions

of 20 January 2022 on the situation in Kazakhstan and of 17 January 2024 on the European Union strategy

on Central Asia.

The Assembly highly appreciates the fact that Kazakhstan is party to a growing number of Council of

Europe conventions and instruments and has requested to accede to a number of others. The Assembly has

particularly taken note of Kazakhstan’s request for a two-year extension of the invitation to accede to the

Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence

(CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”), with the expressed aim to continue aligning its legislation and

acceding the convention thereafter. The Assembly is determined to follow up on this issue in due course.

The Assembly recalls that the 2004 Co-operation Agreement with the Parliament of Kazakhstan

commits to the principles of parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms. The

Assembly expresses grave concern at the Ministry of Justice’s persistent refusal to register the peaceful

opposition party “Alga Kazakhstan” for the twenty-fifth time and condemns the criminalisation of fundraising for

opposition campaigns and the weaponisation of financial and anti-money laundering measures to restrict

critics’ access to essential services and employment. The Assembly calls for the full rehabilitation and

immediate release of imprisoned opposition leaders like Marat Zhylanbayev, Askar Sembai, Asylbek

Zhamuratov, Aidar Syzdykov, Asanali Suyubaev, and journalist Duman Mukhametkarim – sentenced to terms

of five to ten years for exercising their civil rights, including exposing Kazakhstan’s assistance in evading

sanctions against the Russian Federation. The Assembly further condemns the absence of an independent

investigation into the transnational assassination of opposition journalist and political refugee Aidos Sadykov,

as well as the violent crackdown on protesters in January 2022, the unclear role of external intervention

following the request by President Tokayev to President Putin and the subsequent order to shoot without

warning. The Assembly calls for an end to these practices, and urgently calls for the immediate cessation of

all forms of harassment and intimidation against human rights defender Bakhytzhan Toregozhina, in full

respect of Kazakhstan’s international obligations regarding political participation and fundamental freedoms.

The Assembly remains committed to a co-operation with Kazakhstan that is based on shared values

and is determined to support Kazakhstan to continue its democratic reforms. This support should be strategic

and principled, encouraging Kazakhstan to continue with the implementation of reforms and exploring ways of

closer co-operation.

Therefore, the Assembly encourages the Parliament of Kazakhstan to:

9.1. use its strengthened position within the country's institutional framework – a positive outcome of

the recent constitutional reforms – to drive forward the democratisation process in Kazakhstan;

9.2. encourage the authorities of Kazakhstan to broaden the country’s participation in the European

legal space and acceding to relevant Council of Europe conventions which are open to non-member

States, in particular:

9.2.1.

accelerate progress toward the ratification of the Istanbul Convention;

9.2.2. consider becoming a member of the Council of Europe International Co-operation

Group on Drugs and Addictions (Pompidou Group);

9.3.

10.

increase its participation in the work of the Assembly and its committees.

The Assembly calls on the authorities of Kazakhstan to:

10.1. continue with their reform agenda and translate political commitments into sustained,

transparent, and measurable progress;

10.2. make full use of the expertise and tools available under the Council of Europe Neighbourhood

Co-operation Priorities, particularly in the newly expanded fields of justice reform, anti-corruption,

human rights protection, and democratic governance.

11.

The Assembly urges the authorities of Kazakhstan to:

11.1. acknowledge the importance of open public discourse and constructive criticism in a democratic

society, foster genuine political pluralism, and ensure meaningful political competition and participation;

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Resolution 2616 (2025)

11.2. ensure a pluralistic and independent media environment and avoid disproportionate restrictions

on independent journalism and civil society, including by removing legal and administrative obstacles

that hinder their operation;

11.3. align with international human rights standards by ensuring that its domestic legislation, policies

and practices reflect these norms, take into account the views and recommendations of domestic and

international human rights bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and

implement their recommendations in full;

11.4. advance reforms aimed at enhancing judicial independence and accountability, reinforcing

access to justice and the right to a fair trial;

11.5. ensure full accountability for past human rights violations, including those linked to the January

2022 events, and strengthen safeguards against torture and ill-treatment in all places of detention.

12.

The Assembly encourages the authorities of Kazakhstan to:

12.1. continue their constructive engagement with the Council of Europe and other international

bodies in the field of protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and intensify efforts to

address the concerns raised;

12.2. build on Kazakhstan’s active participation in international diplomacy by supporting dialogue,

regional stability, and co-operation in line with international norms and Council of Europe values. This

includes the steadfast commitment to preserving and strengthening fundamental principles such as

respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, the non-use of force or

threats of force, and the peaceful resolution of disagreements and disputes between countries;

12.3. maintain their support for a peaceful resolution to the unprovoked war of aggression against

Ukraine, guided by the principles of international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and consider

joining international efforts aimed at creating a comprehensive approach to accountability, ensuring

justice for victims and reinforcing international law.

13. The Assembly should regularly assess the situation in Kazakhstan and its adherence to the values of

the Council of Europe, and stresses that any positive assessment must remain conditional on measurable

progress in the reform agenda.

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Resolution 2617 (2025)

The honouring of membership obligations to the Council of

Europe by Hungary

Parliamentary Assembly

Hungary joined the Council of Europe on 6 November 1990. Upon accession, it undertook to honour

the obligations incumbent on all member States under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS

No. 1) with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The Parliamentary Assembly has

closely followed Hungary’s honouring of its Council of Europe membership obligations since 2013. In

Resolution 2460 (2022),

in light of long-standing concerns relating to the rule of law and democracy, the

Assembly decided to open a monitoring procedure in respect of Hungary.

Since this resolution, the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member

States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) has requested five opinions from the European

Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). These opinions cover the creation of an

Office for the Defence of Sovereignty, judicial reforms, electoral reform, and a bill on the transparency of

public life. The chairperson of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination has submitted a request

concerning the compatibility of the 15th amendment to the Fundamental Law with international human rights

standards. The Assembly welcomes the adoption of the 2023 legislative reform that improved the

independence of the judiciary and strengthened the self-governance of the judicial system. This is in line with

the Venice Commission’s recommendations and the Assembly’s

Resolution 2460 (2022).

It stresses the need

for the Hungarian authorities to execute the judgment in the

Baka v. Hungary

case in full and to fully

guarantee judges’ freedom of expression in matters of public interest concerning the judiciary. It invites the

Hungarian authorities to consider structural solutions for the indexation of the salary base for judges to further

guarantee their independence from political pressure.

The Assembly is seriously concerned by the lack of progress, and the worsening situation in certain

areas, regarding a significant number of recommendations laid down in

Resolution 2460 (2022).

In the field of constitutional law, the Assembly refers to

Resolution 1941 (2013)

and reiterates its

concerns about the weakening of democratic checks and balances, as well as the instrumentalisation of the

constitutional norms, Fundamental law and cardinal laws, to cement the political preferences of the ruling

party. The Assembly calls on Hungary to ensure that appointments by parliament to the Constitutional Court,

to high judicial positions and to independent supervisory bodies are made irrespective of the candidate’s

political affiliation, in line with the Venice Commission’s opinions and reports, in particular in relation to

qualified majorities and anti-deadlock mechanisms.

The Assembly notes the concerns regarding the law-making process, in particular as to its

transparency, the effectiveness of public consultations on draft legislation and the role of the opposition in

parliament. The Assembly is deeply concerned that Hungary has been under a special legal order since 2020,

enabling the government to enact emergency decrees that override ordinary laws and further erode

parliamentary oversight and checks and balances. The Assembly urges the Hungarian authorities to put an

end to this “state of danger” special legal order well before the next elections.

Assembly debate

on 30 September 2025 (31st sitting) (see

Doc. 16249,

report of the Committee on the Honouring of

Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteurs:

Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross and Mr George Papandreou).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 30 September 2025 (31st sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2617 (2025)

In the field of elections, the Assembly refers to

Resolution 2460 (2022)

in which it concluded “that the

current electoral framework does not ensure a level playing field conducive to fair elections.” Successive

reforms have amplified the distortion between the number of votes received and the number of seats held.

Although Hungary's mixed system was initially designed to balance majoritarianism with proportionality, the

reforms have favoured dominant parties, turning Fidesz's electoral victories into two-thirds constitutional

majorities in every election since 2014. The Assembly notes that according to the Venice Commission’s

Opinion on Act LXXIX of 2024 amending certain laws relating to elections, the latest electoral reform failed to

address this concern.

The Assembly concurs with the Venice Commission in calling for a complete overhaul of the electoral

legislation after the 2026 elections, based on an inclusive consultation with main political parties, civil society

organisations and scholars. Such a reform should:

7.1. take into account the outstanding recommendations of the Venice Commission and the Office

for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) regarding the determination of constituency

boundaries;

7.2. reduce the number of single-member constituencies and counties in which each party needs to

nominate candidates;

7.3. enhance the transparency of the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns, including

on social media, and ensure robust and politically independent enforcement of the regulations on

political finance, including the State Audit Office;

7.4. reform the system for minority representation in parliament in accordance with the Court’s

decision in the

Bakirdizi and E.C. v. Hungary

case, and ensure the effective participation of persons

belonging to all national minorities in the political decision-making processes and elected bodies at

national level.

Regarding the fight against corruption, the lack of political will to tackle high-level corruption is deeply

disturbing. The Assembly calls on the Hungarian authorities to authorise without delay the publication of the

Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) reports assessing compliance regarding prevention of

corruption in top executive functions and in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, to

strengthen independent anti-corruption institutions, and to ensure transparent public procurement practices.

The Assembly calls on Hungary to ensure public oversight over “public interest asset management

foundations” (KEKVAs) by guaranteeing transparent governance, parliamentary scrutiny, and accountability

for all public assets and funds managed by these entities.

10. In the field of media, the Assembly reiterates its concerns regarding the concentration of media

ownership, the lack of media pluralism and the political influence over media content. The Assembly calls on

the Hungarian authorities to strengthen the functional independence of the Media Council, reducing the term

of office of the Media Authority’s president and withdrawing some of his/her powers of appointment. It also

again calls on the Hungarian authorities to consider implementing a more open and pluralistic appointment

procedure for Media Council members, including by allowing civil society groups to participate in the

nomination process. Given the State's and State-owned companies' extremely significant role in the media

advertising market, through which they channel significant State resources to pro-government media, the

Assembly asks the authorities to ensure that the distribution of such advertising, including on social media, is

fair and transparent.

11. With regard to civil society, the Assembly is deeply concerned by the succession of measures aimed at

silencing civil society organisations and the independent media. The Assembly recalls that, as set out in the

Reykjavik Principles for Democracy, civil society is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy as well as a

safe and enabling environment in which civil society and human rights defenders can operate free from

hindrance, insecurity and violence. To ensure such an environment, the Assembly calls on Hungary to abolish

the Office for the Protection of Sovereignty and to amend the Bill on the Transparency of Public Life in

accordance with the Venice Commission's recommendations.

12. The Assembly expresses its readiness to further the constructive dialogue and close co-operation with

the Hungarian authorities in the framework of the monitoring procedure in order to support the implementation

of these recommendations and looks forward to a fruitful collaboration that will reinforce Hungary’s

commitment to the Council of Europe's values and standards.

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Resolution 2618 (2025)

Journalists matter: the need to step up efforts to liberate

Ukrainian journalists held in captivity by the Russian

Federation

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly deplores the challenging conditions under which journalists and media

professionals report during wartime. In all too many cases, these individuals must make significant sacrifices

and take life-endangering actions to provide us with reliable information in times of conflict.

The ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine is a dramatic manifestation of both the importance and

the difficulty of their mission.

Since the start of the full-scale war of aggression in February 2022, over 800 crimes against media and

media personnel have been documented as committed by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation

has killed 108 media professionals since 24 February 2022: 12 died while reporting, 96 died as combatants or

were killed by Russian shelling or torture. Despite displaying their “PRESS” identification, they are sometimes

deliberately targeted by military fire. Investigative journalists are facing an increase in targeted attacks against

them, both physical and online. Cyberattacks, breaches of source confidentiality and restrictions on access to

information are further matters of concern.

The Russian Federation has targeted media facilities, hitting TV towers in at least nine Ukrainian

regions, causing significant destruction to the editorial offices of Ukraine’s State Foreign Broadcasting

Enterprise, Channel 5 and other media outlets.

This situation is unsurprising, as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is also a war against

truth, and as such free media and journalists are treated as enemies by the aggressor State, which does not

want the world to know about the atrocities it has committed.

At least 26 media professionals and journalists are unlawfully deprived of their liberty and held as

civilian detainees in the Russian Federation and in the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine, facing

fabricated criminal charges, violation of basic rights, torture, and even death. The whereabouts of several

Ukrainian journalists remain unknown, which – depending on their situation – could constitute cases of

enforced disappearances under international law. It is deeply concerning that the number of victims among

journalists is growing.

The systematic abduction and mistreatment of professional and citizen journalists started with the

occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, and some of these journalists have been in Russian

captivity for almost ten years.

The Assembly recalls that the Russian Federation is bound by its obligations under international

humanitarian law and international human rights law. Journalists working in areas of armed conflict are

civilians and are protected as such under international humanitarian law, provided that they do nothing to

adversely affect their legal status.

Assembly debate

on 1 October 2025 (32nd sitting) (see

Doc. 16237,

report of the Committee on Culture, Science,

Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk; and

Doc. 16251,

opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and

Human Rights, rapporteur: Ms Nadejda Iordanova).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 1 October 2025 (32nd sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2618 (2025)

The Assembly underlines that the process of establishing a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine must

encompass a humanitarian component, including the unconditional release of all civilian captives.

10. Given the current Russian regime’s disregard for international law, the only means at present to ensure

the release and return to Ukraine of unlawfully detained journalists is exerting every available political,

economic and diplomatic pressure on the Russian Federation.

11. This is an essential role that all member States of the Council of Europe can and must play. Moreover,

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international organisations of which the Russian

Federation is a member, in particular the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

(OSCE), can play an important role in this regard.

12. The Council of Europe’s Campaign for the Safety of Journalists entitled “Journalists Matter” should

highlight the situation of Ukrainian journalists illegally detained by the Russian Federation, and this

awareness-raising effort could be amplified by international and local journalists’ associations. Moreover, the

Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists could put pressure on the Russian

authorities by collecting and verifying alerts on serious threats, demanding official replies, and reporting them

to the public.

13. Individuals responsible for crimes against journalists must be held accountable. The Assembly

particularly abhors the fate of Victoria Roshchyna, a Ukrainian journalist who was tortured and died in

unspeakable circumstances after spending over a year in Russian custody.

14. The Assembly welcomes the recent release of three Ukrainian journalists: Vladyslav Yesypenko,

unlawfully detained by the Russian Federation since March 2021, after having been abducted in Crimea,

Dmytro Khyliuk, arrested in Kozarovychi, Kyiv region in March 2022; and Mark Kaliush, arrested in Melitopol,

Zaporizhzhia region in August 2023. Their return home serves as a powerful reminder of the importance of

international efforts to put pressure on authoritarian regimes to respect the fundamental rights of civilians,

including journalists. The Assembly expresses its heartfelt support to these journalists and to all other those

journalists who continue to suffer under unlawful detention.

15. Finally, the Assembly stresses the necessity of providing reparations to victims of Russia’s crimes,

particularly those affecting journalists and media infrastructure.

16.

In light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on the Russian Federation to:

16.1. immediately cease all ongoing violations of international law concerning media personnel and

media facilities;

16.2. implement the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the

Ukraine v. Russia

interstate cases, delivered on 25 June 2024 and 9 July 2025, in particular by immediately releasing all

journalists who were unlawfully detained and are still in the custody of the Russian authorities, and

ensuring their safe return to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian authorities;

16.3. release immediately all journalists detained in contravention of international law, including the

following (name, place of arrest, date of arrest):

–

Oleksii Bessarabov, Sevastopol, Crimea, 09/11/2016;

Dmytro Shtyblikov, Sevastopol, Crimea, 09/11/2016;

Ernes Ametov, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 11/10/2017;

Marlen Asanov, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 11/10/2017;

Tymur Ibrahimov, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 11/10/2017;

Seiran Saliev, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 11/10/2017;

Server Mustafaiev, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 21/05/2018;

Rustem Sheikhaliev, Simferopol, Crimea, 27/03/2019;

Ruslan Suleimanov, Simferopol, Crimea, 27/03/2019;

Osman Arifmemetov, Rostov-on-Don, Russia, 28/03/2019;

Remzi Bekirov, Rostov-on-Don, Russia, 28/03/2019;

Amet Suleimanov, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 11/03/2020;

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Resolution 2618 (2025)

–

Asan Akhtemov, Simferopol, Crimea, 04/09/2021;

Iryna Danylovych, Koktebel, Crimea, 29/04/2022;

Yevheniy Ilchenko, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 10/07/2022;

Vilen Temerianov, Vil'ne, Crimea, 11/08/2022;

Iryna Levchenko, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 06/05/2023;

Vladyslav Hershon, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 20/08/2023;

Anastasia Hlukhovska, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 20/08/2023;

Heorhiy Levchenko, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 20/08/2023;

Oleksandr Malyshev, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 20/08/2023;

Maksym Rupchov, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 20/08/2023;

Yana Suvorova, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, 20/08/2023;

Aziz Azizov, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 05/03/2024;

Rustem Osmanov, Bakhchysarai, Crimea, 05/03/2024;

Hennadiy Osmak, Henichesk, Kherson region, 11/03/2024;

16.4. provide precise and updated information to international bodies and families on the location and

health conditions of these detainees;

16.5. ensure unhindered access for the ICRC and/or other independent humanitarian organisations to

all places of civilian detention in order to monitor the conditions of their detention and their state of

health;

16.6. ensure unhindered access for the United Nations Monitoring Mission with regard to those

prisoners held in detention in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

17.

The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States to support:

17.1. the operation of the Register of Damage for Ukraine,

17.2. the establishment of a Claims Commission for Ukraine,

17.3. the setting up and operation of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine,

17.4. the accountability mechanisms established under the auspices of the Council of Europe, with a

focus on addressing the needs of victims and survivors, including journalists;

17.5. any actions which would ensure the enforcement of judgments of the European Court of Human

Rights, notably those delivered in the inter-state cases of

Ukraine v. Russia;

17.6. efforts towards the development of a new special protocol to the Fourth Geneva Convention and

the promotion of a United Nations General Assembly resolution recognising the status of civilians

unlawfully deprived of liberty, including professional and citizen journalists, establishing procedures for

the verification, return, monitoring and release of such civilians during armed conflicts.

18. The Assembly calls on the International Criminal Court, or member States under the principle of

universal jurisdiction, to prosecute and hold accountable the Russian Federation’s officials involved in the

unlawful detention, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance or killing of Ukrainian journalists and

destruction of media infrastructure.

19.

The Assembly urges member States and the European Union to:

19.1. reinforce their sanctions regime and impose individual sanctions against those responsible for

crimes against journalists and media infrastructure. Sanctions may include travel bans, financial

sanctions, asset freezes, restrictions on participation in multilateral fora, as well as visa restrictions for

immediate family members. Such sanctions should apply to senior military and security officials of the

Russian Federation who, by virtue of their positions, had access to relevant information and decision-

making powers, and who failed to prevent or stop such violations, but also to lower-ranking officials,

including heads of detention facilities and guards involved in these violations. These include:

19.1.1. commanders of operational troop groups of the Russian Armed Forces involved in the

aggression against Ukraine;

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Resolution 2618 (2025)

19.1.2. chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs within these groupings;

19.1.3. commanders of missile, drones (UAV), and artillery forces at the operational or district

level;

19.1.4. fleet commanders (in particular, the Black Sea Fleet), operating in areas where strikes

on civilian infrastructure were recorded;

19.1.5. officials of the General Staff and leadership of military intelligence (GRU) involved in

operational planning and targeting;

19.1.6. heads of detention facilities where journalists and civilians were unlawfully held and

tortured;

19.1.7. leadership of the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian

Federation;

19.1.8. officials overseeing media control and propaganda in occupied territories;

19.2. support Ukrainian journalists and free media financially to help them survive in times of war and

encourage the integration of journalists displaced externally into the operation of European media

outlets and projects;

19.3. raise awareness of the plight of Ukrainian journalists, establish mentoring programmes for

detainees and provide support by sending letters to their places of detention.

20. The Assembly calls on member States and the International Criminal Court to investigate and

prosecute any direct and public incitement to commit genocide against the Ukrainian people, including

through hate speech, disinformation and propaganda, notably those aiming to justify the war of aggression

against Ukraine.

21. The Assembly also calls on member States to support the work of national human rights institutions,

including Ombudsman offices, in monitoring, documenting, and advocating for the rights and protection of

journalists during armed conflict, including through technical, financial, and capacity-building assistance.

22. Finally, the Assembly hereby decides to establish an annual commemoration during its autumn part-

session, honouring war correspondents and journalists who risk (and often lose) their lives in the line of duty

while defending the right to information in conflict zones. This commemoration will be named “Victory for

Victoria” in memory of Ukrainian journalist Victoria Roshchyna.

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Resolution 2619 (2025)

Youth movements for democracy

Parliamentary Assembly

Over the past years, youth-led movements have emerged as vital forces in the defence and renewal of

democratic values, particularly in the face of rising authoritarianism, institutional distrust, socio-economic

exclusion, digital transformation and environmental crisis, as well as shrinking civic space that undermines

young people’s ability to participate in democracy and advocate for change.

Referring to its

Resolution 2553 (2024)

“Strengthening the youth perspective in the work of the

Parliamentary Assembly” and

Resolution 2610 (2025)

“Social mobilisation, social unrest and police reaction in

Council of Europe member States: is there a need for a new social contract?”, the Parliamentary Assembly:

2.1. affirms that young people across Europe are among the most active defenders and imaginative

builders of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, advancing inclusive visions of justice, rights

and participation;

2.2. recognises the creativity, resilience and civic innovation of youth organisations and youth

movements, which are pioneering new forms of political participation, from participatory budgeting to

open-data civic labs, and from environmental justice frameworks to community-led democratic

education, while also reshaping political participation through non-institutionalised forms of direct action,

such as protests, petitions, boycotts, occupations, and online activism;

2.3. is deeply concerned by the growing repression faced by young activists and youth organisations

in some member States, including politically motivated arrests, criminalisation of peaceful protests,

harassment, surveillance and stigmatisation;

2.4. stresses that governments and institutions must respond to youth civic engagement not with

repression or indifference, but with recognition, protection, support and structural reforms.

The Assembly welcomes the long-standing work of the Council of Europe in supporting youth

participation through its co-management system, European Youth Centres, European Youth Foundation and

policy frameworks such as the Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and

Regional Life.

In the light of recent developments, the Assembly urges Council of Europe member States to:

4.1.

protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of young people by:

4.1.1. guaranteeing the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association for

young people, in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human

Rights (ETS No. 5), and removing administrative and political obstacles that disproportionately

affect youth-led organisations and movements;

Assembly debate

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting) (see

Doc. 16239,

report of the Committee on Culture, Science,

Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 1 October 2025

(33rd sitting).

See also

Recommendation 2299 (2025).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2619 (2025)

4.1.2. repealing or amending legislation that criminalises or unjustly restricts peaceful protest,

including vague provisions on public order, national security or “extremism” that are often used

to silence youth dissent;

4.1.3. ending politically motivated arrests of young activists and ensuring that any deprivation

of liberty is strictly compliant with legal standards, while strengthening access to legal aid and

judicial remedies for youth facing persecution for their civic engagement;

4.2.

institutionalise youth participation in political processes by:

4.2.1. ensuring meaningful youth representation in elected bodies, such as national

parliaments and local councils, by supporting effective and inclusive structures and mechanisms

to integrate young people in policy and decision making;

4.2.2. consider lowering the voting age to 16 across all Council of Europe member States to

foster early civic responsibility and inclusion;

4.2.3. introducing multi-age electoral lists and youth quotas in political parties and public

institutions to counter generational imbalances and promote intergenerational solidarity in

governance;

4.2.4. ensuring meaningful youth representation through independent and representative

youth councils, which are empowered to provide advice on any policy initiative or issue relevant

to children and young people, either on their own initiative or at the request of the authorities;

4.3.

support youth-led initiatives and civic infrastructure by:

4.3.1. protecting young people’s human rights and freedoms, guaranteeing the right to

freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association;

4.3.2. allocating dedicated public funding for youth civic infrastructure, including safe and

inclusive community centres, independent online platforms, legal clinics and participatory spaces

where young people can organise and collaborate;

4.3.3. promoting youth-led media and embedding democratic civic education in school

curricula, in line with the Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights

Education and the Council of Europe’s Reference Framework of Competences for Democratic

Culture, to equip young people with the values, attitudes, skills and knowledge needed to

engage in democratic life and resist disinformation and extremism;

4.3.4. encouraging active involvement of young people and youth-led organisations in post-

war recovery and reconstruction processes, recognising their potential to contribute with

innovative solutions, promote inclusive governance and strengthen democratic resilience in

societies emerging from conflict or facing complex political transitions. Special attention should

be paid to supporting youth in countries at war or in fragile political situations, ensuring that their

voices and initiatives are protected and integrated into national and international recovery

strategies;

4.4.

tackle structural barriers to youth democratic participation by:

4.4.1. addressing youth socio-economic precarity through inclusive housing, employment,

and education policies that recognise the link between economic marginalisation and democratic

disengagement;

4.4.2. strengthening the provision of quality leisure activities for children and young people in

the fields of youth work, sports and culture, as a means to fostering their personal development

and social inclusion;

4.4.3. promoting access to free, independent and pluralistic media, including in digital format,

to ensure that youth have access to diverse sources of information and can freely express their

views;

4.4.4. supporting international and European youth co-operation and youth-to-youth

exchanges, as a means of building democratic cultures across borders, fostering solidarity and

preventing conflict.

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Resolution 2619 (2025)

by:

Furthermore, the Assembly calls for strengthened international co-operation to uphold youth civic space

5.1. promoting the Council of Europe’s role as the main pan-European driving force for the

development of youth policy and standards in Europe, taking forward the outcomes and results of the

10th Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth scheduled to take place on

8-9 October 2025, in Valletta, Malta;

5.2. encouraging the European Union to integrate civic space benchmarks into enlargement

processes and funding frameworks, including specific indicators on youth rights and participation;

5.3. co-ordinating with international organisations, such as the United Nations and the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to improve access of young people to human rights,

capacity building, support to youth organisations and movements, and complement existing Council of

Europe mechanisms to address shrinking civic space;

5.4. engaging diaspora and refugee youth in democratic participation strategies, recognising their

unique experiences and potential to contribute to democratic development both in their countries of

origin and in host societies.

The Assembly commits itself to:

6.1. strengthening the participation of young people in its work, including through the activities of

youth rapporteurs, regular dialogue with youth-led organisations, and structured input from the Advisory

Council on Youth;

6.2. mainstreaming youth perspectives across all committees and reports, treating youth civic space

as a standing democratic concern, and monitoring restrictions on youth rights with the same urgency as

other human rights violations;

6.3. ensuring that the Assembly’s Bureau and part-sessions provide platforms for youth

perspectives, particularly from those in repressive contexts;

6.4. promoting exchanges between parliamentarians and youth activists, organisations and youth

movements including by providing sustainable, inclusive and effective mechanisms, including funding

as appropriate.

The Assembly encourages all relevant stakeholders, including international organisations, civil society,

academia and the private sector, to work in partnership with youth organisations and youth movements to co-

design democratic innovations, amplify youth voices in decision making, and invest in sustainable civic

infrastructure.

Protecting youth freedoms, institutionalising participation, and dismantling structural barriers are

democratic imperatives, and youth movements must be recognised not as threats but as indispensable actors

in building democratic resilience in Europe.

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Resolution 2620 (2025)

Post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria

Parliamentary Assembly

Bulgaria joined the Council of Europe in 1992. Until 2000, it was subject to the full monitoring

procedure. By means of

Resolution 1211 (2000),

the Parliamentary Assembly decided to close the full

monitoring procedure and open a post-monitoring dialogue on a number of outstanding concerns arising from

non-fulfilment of Bulgaria’s commitments entered into upon accession and obligations incumbent upon every

member State under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS

No. 1)

with regard to democracy,

the rule of law and human rights. Since 2000, the progress in addressing these outstanding concerns has

been systematically assessed by the Assembly.

The Assembly refers to its most recent resolution on post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria,

namely

Resolution 2296 (2019)

in which it recognised the unquestionable progress achieved in terms of the

crucial reforms and legislative framework put in place. However, it resolved not to close the post-monitoring

dialogue until remaining issues in the areas of judiciary, fight against high-level corruption, media, human

rights of minorities, combating hate speech and violence against women are addressed, with a view to

ensuring sustainability and irreversibility of reforms.

Bulgaria should be commended for having overcome the political crisis and instability illustrated by

seven consecutive early parliamentary elections held on 4 April 2021, 11 July 2021, 14 November 2021 (on

the day of the presidential election), 2 October 2022, 2 April 2023, 9 June 2024 and 27 October 2024.

The Assembly welcomes the establishment of a coalition government in January 2025 and its

demonstrated sustained political will and commitment to fully honour the commitments and obligations

reflected in

Resolution 2296 (2019)

as confirmed by its continued co-operation with Council of Europe

monitoring mechanisms including the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by

Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) of the Assembly and the European

Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission).

The Assembly recalls that, on 20 December 2023, the parliament adopted constitutional amendments,

which addressed some long-standing concerns of the Venice Commission and the Assembly with regard to

the system of governance of the judiciary and of the prosecution service.

The Assembly takes note of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26 July 2024 (No. 13), which

declared unconstitutional most of these constitutional amendments and stated that their adoption required a

Grand National Assembly and not an ordinary parliament. Consequently, the reform of the Supreme Judicial

Council was not pursued, which is to be regretted.

The Assembly welcomes the reform of the Criminal Procedure Code of 26 May 2023, which established

a mechanism for the accountability and criminal liability of the Prosecutor General and his/her deputies.

Following this reform, prosecutors’ decisions not to open investigations into certain categories of criminal

offences (including corruption related offences) can be subject to judicial review. The Assembly notes with

satisfaction that the Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of these legislative amendments (ruling

Assembly debate

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting) (see

Doc. 16246,

report of the Committee on the Honouring of

Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteurs:

Ms Deborah Bergamini and Mr Yves Cruchten).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2620 (2025)

No. 14 of 26 July 2024). It also welcomes the fact that the same court confirmed the constitutionality of the

constitutional amendments of 20 December 2023 limiting the excessive powers of the Prosecutor’s Office

(ruling No. 13 of 26 July 2024). All these developments are in line with Venice Commission’s

recommendations.

While the above legislative and constitutional changes constitute, overall, considerable progress in the

accomplishment of Bulgaria’s commitments and obligations, it should be regretted that not all issues with

regard to the judicial system have yet been addressed. In particular, the five-year probationary period for

judges has been retained. Moreover, the broad and vaguely defined role of the Inspectorate of the Judiciary

and the lack of safeguards which would prevent interference with the substance of the courts’ decision

making, are a matter of concern.

The Assembly welcomes the measures undertaken by the Bulgarian authorities with a view to

combating high-level corruption. It welcomes the adoption, on 6 October 2023, of the Anti-Corruption Act,

which introduced a new structure and new powers for the Commission for Counteracting Corruption and the

Commission for Illegal Assets Forfeiture, in particular the power to investigate corruption offences committed

by persons holding public positions. The lack of this power was one of the main weaknesses of the former

Anti-Corruption Commission.

10. The Assembly notes with satisfaction the adoption, on 27 January 2023, of the long-awaited Law on the

Protection of Whistleblowers or Persons Publicly Disclosing Information about Violations, which provides for a

comprehensive and streamlined legal framework for reporting and whistle-blower protection in compliance

with democratic standards. The amendments to the Law on Public Procurement, aimed at ensuring more

transparency, mark further progress. Moreover, the Assembly notes the ongoing work on new legislation in

the areas of lobbying and foreign bribery.

11. The Assembly takes note of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) Second Compliance

report on Bulgaria of January 2020, assessing the implementation of the recommendations of the Fourth

Evaluation Round on the prevention of corruption in respect of members of parliament, judges and

prosecutors, which concluded that out of 19 recommendations, Bulgaria has implemented 16, and that the

three remaining recommendations have been partly implemented.

12. The Assembly refers to GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round report on Bulgaria on preventing corruption

and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement authorities, in

which it formulated 28 recommendations. In November 2024, GRECO concluded that only seven

recommendations had been implemented satisfactorily (mainly those concerning the integrity of police),

eleven had been partly implemented and ten had not been implemented. The Assembly urges the Bulgarian

authorities to fully and rapidly implement GRECO’s recommendations included in the fourth and fifth

evaluation Rounds.

13. Despite some high-level corruption scandals in the country, a solid track-record of final convictions in

high-level corruption cases continues to be lacking in Bulgaria to date. In 2023, Bulgarian political figures were

sanctioned in third countries in cases related to high-level corruption after the judicial proceedings against

them had been halted in Bulgaria. The Assembly expects that the effectiveness of the newly introduced anti-

corruption measures will be demonstrated through a better track-record of final convictions in high-level

corruption cases.

14. Over 90 leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Bulgaria are pending

implementation, with around one third of them pending for at least 10 years. The Assembly calls on the

authorities to continue to co-operate with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with a view to

making tangible progress in the execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, in

particular as regards cases concerning the reform of the judiciary (S.Z.

v. Bulgaria, Kolevi v. Bulgaria

and

Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria),

forced evictions and demolition of houses of Roma (Yordanova

and Others

v. Bulgaria)

and refusals to register associations of persons asserting a Macedonian ethnic consciousness

(UMO

Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria

and similar cases).

15. The Assembly notes with satisfaction that Bulgaria has considerably improved its framework as regards

freedom of expression. A number of positive developments should be noted, including amendments to the

Criminal Code providing for better protection of journalists in cases of alleged of defamation with regard to

public officials, adopted in July 2023. The alleviation of criminal liability has addressed a long-standing

recommendation of the Council of Europe. A major improvement in the jurisprudence of national courts with

regard to defamation charges against journalists in application of the case law of the European Court of

Human Rights should be acknowledged.

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Resolution 2620 (2025)

16. Regrettably, persisting problems include high levels of media concentration, and a lack of transparency

in media ownership, distribution and media providers and an important number of strategic lawsuits against

public participation (SLAPPs) targeting journalists. The Assembly calls on the Bulgarian authorities to

introduce legislative measures addressing these concerns.

17. The Assembly remains concerned about the fragile situation of the Roma population which is the

largest minority group and constitutes almost 5% of the population in Bulgaria. While a number of

programmes, strategies and action plans have been designed and implemented in recent years to improve

the situation of Roma, no significant progress has been noted, and reports relating to the employment,

housing, material situation, education and health of the Roma population continue to be alarming. The

Assembly urges the Bulgarian authorities to pursue their efforts in order to achieve tangible progress in the

integration and inclusion of the Roma population.

18. The Assembly notes with satisfaction that a number of measures have been taken to combat hate

speech. The latest amendments to the Criminal Code adopted in July 2023 provide for a more extensive

definition of hate speech and crime, and for more severe punishment for these offences. National campaigns

and training have considerably contributed to increasing public and professional awareness.

19. The Assembly recognises the considerable progress achieved with regard to combating violence

against women. It commends Bulgaria in particular for the adoption, in July 2023, of the amendments to the

Law on Protection from Domestic Violence, which cover the protection of victims of domestic violence from an

early stage, irrespective of the legal status of their relationship. Furthermore, the amendments to the Law on

Protection from Domestic Violence adopted in August 2023 give additional rights to the victims. At the same

time, the Assembly urges the Bulgarian authorities to increase budgetary resources for shelters for victims of

domestic violence.

20. While the overall progress in the fulfilment of Bulgaria’s commitments and obligations is not questioned,

some remaining shortcomings still require remedy. The Assembly calls on the Bulgarian authorities to resume

the reform of the organisation of the State (which was stopped following the ruling of the Constitutional Court

of 26 July 2024 (No. 13)), through the adoption of ordinary legislation and/or new constitutional amendments

by the Grand National Assembly. It also invites the authorities to address other outstanding issues in close co-

operation with the Committee of Ministers, the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European

Court of Human Rights, the Venice Commission and other Council of Europe bodies.

21. The Assembly recalls that all successive early parliamentary elections in 2021-2024 were observed by

its

ad hoc

committees for the observation of elections. The legal framework was adequate for the conduct of

democratic elections and fundamental freedoms were respected. Overall, the consecutive elections were

considered to be competitive and well managed by the election administration.

22. The Assembly notes that, in September 2023, the European Commission terminated the Co-operation

and Verification Mechanism in respect of Bulgaria, following the satisfactory fulfilment of all the benchmarks

and recommendations under this mechanism in the field of the judiciary, fight against corruption and

organised crime. It also welcomes the decisions of the relevant European Union institutions on Bulgaria’s

accession to the Eurozone as of 1 January 2026.

23. Against this background, the Assembly resolves to close the post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria and

follow the developments in the country with regard to the rule of law, pluralist democracy and human rights in

the framework of its periodic reviews.

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Resolution 2621 (2025)

Russian democratic forces

Parliamentary Assembly

On 16 March 2022, the Russian Federation was expelled from membership of the Council of Europe,

as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and escalated into a large-scale

invasion. In its

Opinion 300 (2022)

adopted on the previous day, while calling on the Committee of Ministers to

request the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw from the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary

Assembly added that “the Council of Europe should envisage initiatives to be able to continue to support and

engage with human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent civil society in the

Russian Federation”. Subsequently, in its

Resolution 2433 (2022)

“Consequences of the Russian Federation's

continued aggression against Ukraine: role and response of the Council of Europe”, the Assembly resolved “to

intensify its engagement with Belarusian and Russian civil society, human rights defenders, independent

journalists, academia and democratic forces respecting the values and principles of the Organisation,

including the territorial integrity of sovereign member States”. Similarly, meeting in Reykjavik in May 2023,

Council of Europe Heads of State and Government agreed to “find ways to strengthen co-operation with

Russian and Belarusian human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent civil

society”. In its Resolutions 2540 (2024) “Alexei Navalny’s death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin’s

totalitarian regime and its war on democracy”and 2588 (2025) “European commitment to a just and lasting

peace in Ukraine”, the Assembly noted the ongoing forced russification, repression and discrimination of

indigenous peoples and minorities in the Russian Federation, in breach of the International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It concluded that genuine democracy in Russia is impossible

without decolonisation, underlined that lasting peace requires the Russian Federation to abandon its imperial

ambitions and called for the implementation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)

(1960).

On the strength of these texts, and as the outcome of a long-standing process of dialogue and

engagement, the Assembly decided to set up a representative delegation of Belarusian democratic forces. As

far as Russian democratic forces are concerned, some of them were invited to participate in hearings

organised by Assembly committees. Furthermore, an informal platform for dialogue bringing together

members of the Assembly holding specific functions and members of Russian democratic forces was set up,

to discuss topics of common concern. Amongst them were the role of Russian democratic forces in bringing

the Russian Federation’s aggression to an end, ways to strengthen sanctions against the Russian regime,

ensure that Russians can have access to free and independent media, and ways to counter Russian

disinformation, and the situation of Russian democratic forces in exile. The situation of Russian political

prisoners was also addressed. Over this period, the Assembly condemned the murder of Alexei Navalny and

repeatedly demanded the release of Vladimir Kara-Murza, winner of the 2022 Václav Havel Human Rights

Prize, and called for sanctions against the Russian officials involved in his illegal detention.

The Assembly reiterates its strong condemnation of the systematic repression of Russians opposing

the regime and attempts to silence them, inside and outside the Russian Federation. It honours the

commitment of those Russian human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent civil

society who oppose the totalitarian and neo-imperialistic Russian regime, fight for democracy, human rights

and the rule of law and support Ukraine, sometimes at the risk of their lives and freedom, and emphasises

Assembly debate

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting) (see

Doc. 16247,

report of the Committee on Political Affairs and

Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2621 (2025)

that this fight must continue. The Assembly notes that unlike Belarusian democratic forces, Russian

democratic forces do not have a single, unified political structure. The Assembly encourages Russian groups

and initiatives in exile to join forces with the aim of countering disinformation by the totalitarian and neo-

imperialistic Russian regime, advocating for a democratic change in the Russian Federation, exposing all

international crimes committed by Russian actors in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, and

supporting Ukrainians in their struggle against the aggressor State, in a variety of ways.

The Assembly recalls that, in 2024, a

General Rapporteur on Russian democratic forces was

appointed, with the mandate to promote the coherence of the Assembly’s action aimed at building dialogue

with Russian democratic forces who respect the values and principles of the Council of Europe, including the

territorial integrity of sovereign member States. Also as a result of the work of the General Rapporteur,

the

Assembly believes that time has come for ad hoc and informal initiatives to give way to a more structured

engagement with Russian democratic forces. This would help strengthen the capacity of Russian democratic

forces to bring about a sustainable democratic change in Russia and help achieve a lasting and just peace in

Ukraine, alongside ensuring the responsibility of Russian actors for the international crimes committed, while

providing to the Assembly an insight into developments in the Russian Federation and amongst Russian

democratic forces. If an organisation or movement among the Russian democratic forces undermines these

efforts, the Assembly will discontinue its engagement with this organisation.

In light of these considerations, the Assembly decides to establish a Platform for Dialogue with Russian

Democratic Forces (“the Platform”), as a forum for a two-way engagement between the Assembly and

Russian democratic forces to address issues of common concern through exchanges in the context of the

Platform, to be chaired by the President of the Assembly or a member of the Assembly delegated by the

President. Participation in the Platform would also enable Russian democratic forces to attend meetings of the

Assembly’s committees, sub-committees and networks during part-sessions, and to take the floor when

authorised by the respective Chairpersons.

The list of the “Participants of the Russian Democratic Forces” in the Platform shall be approved by the

Bureau of the Assembly upon the proposal made by the President of the Assembly and shall be valid for the

ordinary session. The list of potential candidates should be submitted to the President of the Assembly by a

common decision of Russian democratic forces organisations, members of which meet the criteria set out in

paragraph 8. The specific modalities for the implementation of this resolution, in particular the composition and

functioning of the Platform and the participation of Russian democratic forces therein, shall be approved by

the Bureau on the basis of a memorandum to be prepared by the Secretary General of the Parliamentary

Assembly together with the General Rapporteur on the Russian democratic forces. One year after the

establishment of the Platform, the Bureau shall review the implementation of this resolution and consider

possible amendments or other measures to be taken. The Bureau’s decisions require ratification by the

Assembly.

In case of a substantiated complaint about the non-compliance of a participant with the criteria set out

in paragraph 8, the President of the Assembly shall immediately suspend the participation of the person

concerned until the Bureau takes a decision, which shall be published together with the reasoning, no later

than ten days after the Bureau takes the decision on suspension.

The “Participants of the Russian Democratic Forces” should be persons of the highest moral standing

who are currently in exile and who meet the following requirements, to be verified by the Bureau of the

Assembly at the time of the approval of the list, or at any other time following a decision to that effect by the

Bureau (the criteria set in Paragraph 8.8 shall not apply to representatives of indigenous peoples and national

minorities, or to those on active duty fighting in the Ukrainian military):

8.1. be Russian political leaders, civil society representatives, human rights defenders, independent

journalists, scholars and/or other members of the Russian resistance against the totalitarian and neo-

imperialistic regime in the Russian Federation;

8.2.

share the values of the Council of Europe and be willing to promote them;

8.3. unconditionally recognise and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of

Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and

Sevastopol City, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions;

8.4. have a record of publicly opposing the totalitarian and neo-imperialistic regime in the Russian

Federation and work towards a regime change with the goal of establishing of a democratic political

system in the Russian Federation that adheres to international law, and principles of peaceful and

good-neighbourly relations;

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Resolution 2621 (2025)

8.5. respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova,

Georgia and other States;

8.6. have not advocated non-democratic policies in the Russian Federation or neo-imperialistic

policies towards the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, or other sovereign States; or have

denounced previous statements in a credible and convincing manner; have not justified international

crimes committed by Russian actors either abroad or within the Russian Federation, nor encouraged

others to commit violations of international law;

8.7. clearly denounce all international crimes committed by Russian actors and support international

mechanisms for accountability and justice;

8.8. have signed the Berlin Declaration of the Russian Democratic Forces before they agree to

participate in the Platform and continue to uphold the principles it sets forth;

8.9. submit a declaration of the absence of conflicts of interest and accept verification by the

Assembly Secretariat;

8.10. have not held, after 2014, any position in the State bodies of the Russian Federation or, if they

have, have publicly and convincingly renounced these bodies' activities and contributed to their

accountability;

8.11. have not held, after 2014, any position in Russian occupation administrations in the temporarily

occupied territories of Ukraine;

8.12. have never disseminated or publicly rejected narratives that deny the Russian Federation's

crime of aggression against Ukraine or other international crimes committed there;

8.13. recognise and respect unconditionally the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of

the Republic of Belarus, as well as the Belarusian nation's aspiration for a democratic future and

European choice;

8.14. have not received funding or material support from State or State-controlled entities of the

Russian Federation or Belarus, or related persons or foundations, and shall submit annual declarations

of sources of funding;

8.15. publicly support the establishment of a Special tribunal for the crime of aggression against

Ukraine, as well as an international compensation mechanism, including the Register of Damage for

Ukraine and an international claims commission for Ukraine.

The “Participants of the Russian Democratic Forces” shall not use, display or reproduce State symbols

of the Russian Federation, including its flag, coat of arms, anthem, or other official insignia at the Assembly

premises or events. The white-blue-white colours are recognised by the Russian Democratic Forces as a

symbol of resistance.

10. The question of the rights of the indigenous peoples and national minorities of the Russian Federation

and the preparedness to engage into a meaningful dialogue with their representatives and the preparedness

to engage into a meaningful dialogue with the representatives of Russia’s national and ethnic groups will play

a critical role in shaping a democratic political system that adheres to international law and the principles of

peaceful and good-neighbourly relations. The issue of overcoming the colonial legacy of the Russian

Federation would have to be addressed, including the concerns and interests of indigenous and colonised

peoples residing in the territories of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The Assembly is

committed to establishing a Dialogue Platform with the representatives of indigenous peoples and national

minorities of the Russian Federation. Until a Dialogue Platform with the representatives of indigenous peoples

and national minorities is established, one third of the seats for the Platform shall be reserved for the

representatives of indigenous peoples and national minorities of the Russian Federation, reflecting their share

of the population of the Russian Federation. When a Dialogue Platform for the indigenous peoples and

national minorities of the Russian Federation is established, this quota will be terminated.

11. The Assembly refers particularly to its

Resolution 2605 (2025)

and reiterates that, in violation of

international humanitarian law, the Russian Federation continues the colonisation of the temporarily occupied

territories of Ukraine by encouraging hundreds of thousands of its own citizens to settle there, including

through federal programmes. These initiatives form part of the aggressor State’s policy aimed at the forcible

alteration of the demographic composition of the population, thereby significantly complicating the processes

of de-occupation and the restoration of peace. Such actions constitute a violation of the Russian Federation’s

international obligations and amount to crimes under international law, and should entail appropriate legal

consequences.

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Resolution 2621 (2025)

12. The Assembly welcomes other parliamentary initiatives supporting Russian democratic forces and

encourages synergies between its Platform and other initiatives, in particular those undertaken by the

European Parliament.

13.

The Assembly calls on the Council of Europe member States to:

13.1. provide administrative, legal and logistical support to facilitate the functioning of the Platform,

including assistance with travel, visas, temporary residence issues and digital engagement;

13.2. support the functioning of the Platform, notably through voluntary contributions, by developing

training programmes and workshops;

13.3. strengthen the visibility and impact of the Platform and encourage partnerships with other

international organisations and democratic institutions.

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Resolution 2622 (2025)

Russia: new threats to European democracies

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned by the growing, multi-faceted threat posed by Russia

to Europe’s security and stability. New military and hybrid threats build upon a long history of repeated and

extensive violations of international law by Russia, including human rights violations against its own citizens

and attempts to assert its

de facto

control and undue influence in neighbouring countries. It is imperative that

Council of Europe member States fully grasp the magnitude of the threat posed by Russia and do everything

in their power to strengthen their deterrence, preparedness and resilience capabilities against it, in order to

safeguard Europe’s democratic security and peaceful future.

Russia has responded to diplomatic efforts to end its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine by

escalating its attacks. In recent weeks, the intensification of Russia’s missile and drone attacks on civilian

infrastructures in Ukraine, including in Kyiv, have taken a devastating toll on civilian lives, destroying schools

and residential buildings and damaging diplomatic facilities. The Assembly strongly condemns this further

escalation of the illegal, unjustified and unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, including the

forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children and civilians from temporarily occupied territories, acts

recognised as grave violations of international law, and reiterates its urgent call for just and lasting peace in

Ukraine to ensure Europe’s long-term security and Ukraine’s European future.

The Assembly deplores and firmly opposes the military-style education system imposed by the Russian

Federation on children from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, viewing it as an integral part of the

Russian Federation’s broader strategy to prepare for a renewed wave of aggressive warfare. The Assembly

denounces this policy as constituting a real and objective threat to the peace and security of mankind, and

underlines that only by ensuring accountability for the militarisation of a young generation can the international

community provide an adequate response.

Likewise, the Assembly is deeply alarmed by the increasing number of incursions by unidentified

drones and Russian military aircraft into the airspace of Council of Europe member States. In September

2025, Estonia, Poland and Romania recorded unacceptable and intentional violations of their airspace that led

Estonia and Poland to call for consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Drone activity near

critical infrastructure and military sites in Danish and German airspace has also disrupted civilian aviation,

including temporary airport closures in Denmark. These deliberate provocations are part of a wider strategy to

test Europe’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, Europe’s internal cohesion and the strength of Euro-

transatlantic relations. They recklessly increase the risk of an enlargement of military operations in Europe. If

left unanswered, such airspace violations risk normalising deliberate Russian provocations and undermining

collective security across Europe..

Furthermore, in recent months, Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare – combining hard and soft

power – through sophisticated cyberattacks, intelligence operations and co-ordinated disinformation

campaigns. Heightened military activities and growing hybrid threats have significantly challenged the security

and stability of the Baltic Sea region. Russia has particularly increased its hybrid assault on European

electoral processes. It has deployed an unprecedented, sophisticated combination of covert interference,

information warfare and destabilisation tactics, through large-scale use of social media, vote buying and

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (34th sitting) (see

Doc. 16272,

report of the Committee on Political Affairs and

Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Iulian Bulai).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025 (34th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

ERD, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 10: Tekster vedtaget under 4. session 2025

Resolution 2622 (2025)

cyberattacks. These methods were on full display in the presidential elections in Romania in 2014 and 2015,

and in the Republic of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, where unprecedented foreign interference and

co-ordinated online manipulation networks targeted institutions and voters to derail the country’s pro-

European course and seek wider destabilisation. On the election day itself, attempted destabilisation persisted

with bomb threats against polling stations in the Republic of Moldova and abroad. The Moldovan people and

institutions demonstrated exceptional resilience and solidarity in defending the electoral process against such

massive foreign interference, allowing the people’s pro-European choice to prevail. Persistent risks caused by

disinformation and foreign interference have also been highlighted in the context of the observation of the

2025 presidential election in Poland. Beyond electoral contexts, last week’s disinformation campaigns in

Latvia around the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and

domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) illustrate how Kremlin propaganda narratives are

used to polarise societies and undermine democracies.

Referring to its

Resolution 2593

(2025) “Foreign interference: a threat to democratic security in Europe”,

the Assembly firmly condemns Russia’s interference in democratic processes across Europe and its attempts

to destabilise European democracies, increase domestic polarisation and undermine trust in public

institutions.

The Assembly also condemns the deployment by Russia of information warfare through state-

sponsored media outlets and Russian cultural centres, used to destabilise political systems, distort public

opinion, and undermine democratic processes across Council of Europe member States. It recalls that

Russian oligarchs and affiliated actors residing in Europe have been implicated in exerting financial and

political pressure, underscoring the necessity for co-ordinated, transparent, and robust responses at national

and international levels.

In its current warfare, Russia has rewritten the concept of weaponry. The Assembly has already

acknowledged the weaponisation of migration by Russia, and its attempts to destabilise democratic societies

by exploiting or amplifying alleged minority grievances and misusing the status of the Russian language.

These attacks have also undermined economic resilience and exacerbated societal divisions throughout the

continent.

Furthermore, Russia has intensified its diplomatic activity worldwide, strengthening ties with non-

democratic countries that tangibly support its aggression against Ukraine by providing weapons, or troops or

by making their territory available for hosting Russian weapons and launching attacks – such as Belarus, Iran

and North Korea; relying on economic partners – in Europe and outside – to circumvent the sanctions system;

and developing an alliance with a global player such as China to promote a new world order.

10. The Assembly reiterates that the strategy of Russia, aimed at destabilising European democracies

using force, fear and foreign influence, should be strongly opposed and defeated. Russia must stop its

unprovoked aggressions and provocations and be held accountable for its repeated crimes and violations of

international law. In light of accelerating attacks and threats, the Assembly, at this critical juncture, stresses

that enduring peace in Europe will only be achieved through democratic security and resilience.

11. In the light of these considerations, with regard to the need for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, the

Assembly:

11.1. referring to its previous resolutions, in particular

Resolution 2588

(2025) “European commitment

to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”, calls for unwavering European commitment and greater unity,

beyond Europe, in support of Ukraine and a just and lasting peace, which is indispensable for Ukraine’s

European future and the security of the entire European continent;

11.2. insists that any peace negotiations must involve Ukraine and respect its right to determine its

own future, including its sovereign right to continue its integration into the European Union, as well as

membership of other international organisations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), as Ukraine also has the sovereign right to choose its own security arrangements; such

negotiations must also include the necessary security guarantees;

11.3. considers that a just, lasting and effective peace can only be achieved by anchoring it in the

international human rights framework as stressed by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human

Rights;

11.4. reiterates that enhanced support to Ukraine is also crucial in order to strengthen its capacity to

effectively uphold human rights, the rule of law and democracy, which remains key to its democratic

security and recovery and its accession process to the European Union;

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Resolution 2622 (2025)

11.5. calls on Council of Europe member and observer States, as well as relevant European

institutions and international partners, to increase support for the Council of Europe Action Plan for

Ukraine “Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction” 2023-2026.

12.

With regard to the need to ensure accountability, the Assembly:

12.1. referring to

Resolution

2605 (2025) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian

Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, welcomes the judgment of the European Court of Human

Rights of 9 July 2025 in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, which held the Russian

Federation responsible for widespread and flagrant abuses of human rights in Ukraine – including the

downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, torture, rape as a weapon of war, summary executions, and

unlawful and arbitrary detentions;

12.2. welcomes the landmark signing of the agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine

on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine on 25 June

2025, as well as the finalisation of a draft convention establishing an international claims commission

for Ukraine;

12.3. stresses the need to expedite the establishment of a comprehensive accountability system,

bearing in mind that reparations should remain a core component of any peace settlement;

12.4. asks Council of Europe member and observer States and like-minded countries, to:

12.4.1. work without delay towards the establishment of the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the

Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine

and to join the enlarged partial agreement as soon as possible, in accordance with their national

procedures;

12.4.2. conclude co-operation agreements with the future Special Tribunal;

12.4.3. work towards the adoption and opening for signature of the convention establishing an

international claims commission for Ukraine, taking into account the Assembly’s

Opinion 308

(2025);

12.4.4. intensify efforts to establish the third component of the international compensation

mechanism, an international compensation fund, which could be funded by repurposing and

transferring frozen Russian State assets;

12.5. calls for the swift operational launch of the international claims commission for Ukraine, to

ensure that victims of Russian aggression, including deported children and survivors of torture, can file

claims effectively;

12.6. recalls the need to ensure accountability for deliberate and systematic attempts to erase

Ukrainian cultural identity and all war crimes;

12.7. calls on national parliaments to strengthen parliamentary diplomacy to mobilise broader support

for Ukraine, in particular for accountability mechanisms and its accession process to the European

Union.

13. With regard to the need for increased pressure on Russia, the Assembly calls on Council of Europe

member and observer States, as well as relevant European institutions and international partners to:

13.1. reinforce the current sanctions regime against Russia, its allies and their political and military

leaderships, notably by:

13.1.1. renewing efforts to reduce sanctions circumvention, including through secondary

sanctions against third countries and other economic actors facilitating it and greater

transparency to prevent the use of complex ownership structures to bypass restrictions;

13.1.2. enlarging the list of targeted individuals and entities, including all senior financial

officers, all Russian banks and all shadow fleet vessels;

13.1.3. enlarging the sectoral scope of sanctions, by targeting the supply chain of larger groups

of dual-use materials, machineries and technologies;

13.1.4. lowering further oil price caps and tightening energy-related sanctions;

13.1.5. strengthening the co-ordination among national authorities in terms of compliance

enforcement of sanctions;

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Resolution 2622 (2025)

13.2. pursue further diplomatic isolation of Russia through co-ordinated efforts to exclude Moscow

from key forums and rally global partners in defence of international law; these efforts should include

sport diplomacy, which is widely used by Russia to project its influence;

13.3. strengthen accountability mechanisms for all Russian violations of international law and their

respective rules.

14. With regard to increased hybrid warfare, the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member and

observer States, as well as relevant European institutions and international partners, to:

14.1. develop non-military responses to violations of airspace and related threats – alongside

adequate military responses when needed – through a comprehensive strategy and cross-cutting

action, combining deterrence, preparedness, protection and reactivity measures, for both infrastructures

and populations, in order to enhance the resilience of democratic societies. Such a comprehensive

resilience strategy should ensure co-ordination among public authorities across sectors, including

legislators, law enforcement, education and health services, as relevant. It should also seek to preserve

national unity as Russia aims at polarising and dividing European countries and their societies;

14.2. implement robust countermeasures against foreign interference, particularly in the context of

electoral integrity, including updating national legal frameworks to criminalise covert foreign involvement

in political funding, electoral campaigns, and information operations, and enhance transparency and

oversight of media and financial flows;

14.3. offer solid counternarratives to Russian propaganda seeking to undermine European core

values, notably by supporting free media such as Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and other

independent media platforms countering disinformation in occupied and neighbouring regions;

14.4. operate closely with and provide support to States targeted by Russian threats to help them to

resist covert Russian attempts to undermine elections and national sovereignty;

14.5. as the current security situation requires a unified response from like-minded countries, reinforce

international co-operation and co-ordinated measures to defend European democracies and develop

an ever stronger and agile multilateralism that can react quickly to Russian threats and ensure

accountability;

14.6. improve the efficiency and resilience of the European security architecture.

15. While defence issues are excluded from its remit, the Council of Europe should contribute to enhancing

the comprehensive and long-term security of its member States within the scope of its mandate, making them

more resilient to countering threats and preventing conflicts. In this context, the Assembly:

15.1. welcomes the New Democratic Pact for Europe, launched by the Secretary General of the

Council of Europe, which should help reinforce democratic security in Council of Europe member

States;

15.2. considers that the Council of Europe should strengthen its work on democratic security, in order

to take into account the rapidly evolving nature of the threats and challenges faced by Europe, including

from Russia. Projects on fighting disinformation should be further developed, possibly with the support

of the Council of Europe Development Bank. The Council of Europe should also play a proactive role in

the discussions on the European political and security architecture, within the scope of its mandate;

15.3. invites Council of Europe member States to adopt a strategic, long-term approach to shaping the

Council of Europe’s support for Ukraine, bringing together the closely related aspects of democratic

security, resilience and reconstruction;

15.4. calls on Council of Europe member and observer States to continue strengthening Ukraine’s

defence capabilities, including but not limited to by increasing investment in Ukraine's security and

defence sectors as one of the core elements of a resilient and stable Europe, able to defend democracy

and human rights;

15.5. stresses the need to develop interparliamentary dialogue and co-operation with relevant security

forums, including the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

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Resolution 2623 (2025)

Urgent call to put an end to the devastating humanitarian

catastrophe and the killing of journalists in Gaza

Parliamentary Assembly

Two years on from the appalling terrorist attack and hostage taking perpetrated by Hamas against

Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Parliamentary Assembly has from the outset unequivocally condemned,

Israel’s military operations in Gaza continue without respite. These protracted military operations have inflicted

an unbearable toll on civilians, devastated Gaza and its infrastructure for decades to come and spread

instability across the wider region.

Over this period, efforts to find a way out of the current crisis in Gaza have not succeeded, and the

devastation of the territory and human suffering of the civilian population is giving rise to increasing dismay

and condemnation internationally, including in Europe. A growing number of States, including several Council

of Europe member and observer States, have recognised the State of Palestine in 2025, reflecting a

deepening international consensus that a return to a credible political perspective is essential to finding a long-

lasting peace. The Assembly recognises both the responsibility of Hamas in igniting the current crisis and in

continuing to hold the hostages, and that of the Israeli Government in its disproportionate response to the

attacks of 7 October, taking tens of thousands of civilian lives and reducing much of the Gaza Strip to rubble.

The Assembly notes the renewed efforts led by the United States to find a negotiated solution and

expresses hope for an end to the conflict.

The Assembly recalls its previous resolutions on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, in

particular

Resolution 2582 (2025)

“The absolute and urgent need to end the humanitarian crisis for women,

children and the hostages in Gaza”, which have sought a permanent and unconditional ceasefire, the return of

the hostages, and a renewed effort to achieve a political solution in Gaza.

Supporting all efforts to identify a peaceful end to the current crisis and a long-lasting reconciliation

process and political agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders and peoples, the Assembly once

more calls for an urgent end to the severe humanitarian crisis, which worsens day by day, and pays particular

attention to the protection of journalists in Gaza, so that they can carry out their work of reporting to the world,

in safety, on the situation on the ground.

The military response of Israel to the 7 October 2023 attacks has killed more than 65 000 Palestinians,

including over 17 000 children. Entire neighbourhoods have been levelled, with housing, schools, hospitals,

and cultural sites reduced to rubble. The hardship of multiple displacements of the population to overcrowded

shelters or makeshift camps has been compounded by Israel’s blocking of aid and food, leading to the formal

recognition of famine in areas of Gaza by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review

Committee in August 2025. The Assembly underlines that the deliberate targeting of civilians and the

widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure cannot be justified under the pretext of self-defence and

represent grave violations of international humanitarian law.

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (34th sitting) (see

Doc. 16273,

report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees

and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Lord Michael German).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025

(34th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2623 (2025)

It is especially sad that the Palestinian children of Gaza have lost their families, homes and access to

education, and have been endangered and traumatised to an extent that will affect their whole lives, wherever

they live.

On 16 September 2025, the United Nations Human Rights Council Independent International

Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel concluded

that the State of Israel has committed and is continuing to commit genocide. The Assembly emphasises the

essential role of international judicial institutions in addressing these grave allegations and that accountability

for violations of international humanitarian law is essential for any sustainable peace. It also highlights in this

respect the obligation of all States Parties to prevent genocide pursuant to Article 1 of the United Nations

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The Assembly deplores the use of violent and dehumanising language by Israeli officials, including

members of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government. Several Council of Europe member States have

imposed sanctions on Israeli Government ministers for repeated incitement against Palestinian civilians. Such

rhetoric contributes to a climate conducive to serious human rights abuses against the Palestinian civilian

population.

10. The expansion of military operations targeting Gaza City, beginning in August 2025, have intensified

the already intolerable human suffering and humanitarian catastrophe. These operations have resulted in

further mass displacement, a new acceleration in the widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure, and

the further loss of civilian life in a situation where the population was already facing extreme deprivation.

11. The formal confirmation of famine in Gaza City and surrounding areas by the Integrated Food Security

Phase Classification Famine Review Committee in August 2025 has demonstrated that Israel has not

responded to repeated calls to allow unhindered food, medical supplies, fuel, and other essential aid into

Gaza to reach those in need. Aid delivery models approved by Israel’s Security Cabinet have violated core

humanitarian principles and have exposed civilians and aid workers to significant harm, often resulting in

deaths including of children seeking food and water for their families. The Assembly stresses that the

deliberate obstruction of humanitarian relief constitutes a grave breach of international humanitarian law.

12. The Assembly welcomes efforts by member States of the Council of Europe to increase the flow of aid

into Gaza and the commitment taken on 23 September 2025 by the governments of 24 member States to

provide support needed for the treatment of patients from Gaza.

13. The Assembly underlines that transparency and accountability in situations of armed conflict depend on

the ability of independent journalists to operate safely. Journalists are our eyes and ears on the ground,

bearing witness to political and military developments, and most importantly humanitarian catastrophes and

crises. Journalists' exposure to life-threatening circumstances, or even death, deprives us of access to

information. Since October 2023, more than 200 journalists, mostly Palestinian, have been killed, and dozens

detained. Although Israel denies deliberately targeting journalists and insists it only strikes military objectives,

it has alleged that the majority of journalists killed were in fact terrorists, and has also alleged a collaboration

between Al Jazeera and Hamas. This claim has been rejected by Al Jazeera and international press

associations. At the same time, Hamas itself has been accused by the Committee to Protect Journalists of

under-reported repression, including intimidation, detentions, and violence toward critics. Despite immense

risks and amid the destroyed media infrastructure as well as the severe humanitarian crisis, local journalists,

often young and non-professional and thus lacking any resources or security protection, continue to document

daily life.

14. Foreign reporters remain largely barred from Gaza and those allowed entry are controlled by the Israel

Defense Forces, limiting independent coverage. In addition to hundreds of media outlets, international

organisations such as Reporters Without Borders, the Committee to Protect Journalists and the European

Federation of Journalists, have issued urgent appeals for free access and the protection of journalists. They

have also demanded investigations into alleged war crimes such as systematic starvation.

15. The Assembly deplores the exceptionally high number of journalists killed or injured in Gaza and

reiterates that journalists and media workers are civilians under international humanitarian law. It calls on all

parties to ensure their protection and the safe, unhindered access of all journalists to conflict areas so that the

realities of the war can be accurately and independently reported.

16. The Assembly is following the progress of the Global Sumud Flotilla towards Gaza. This civilian and

non-violent initiative comprises about 50 vessels and several hundred volunteers, including many citizens of

Council of Europe member States. Its purpose is to deliver humanitarian aid and to draw attention to the

longstanding Israeli blockade of Gaza. Members of the Israeli Government have made threats concerning this

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Resolution 2623 (2025)

flotilla, based on unsubstantiated allegations that it constitutes an initiative by Hamas. The Assembly notes

with grave concern unprecedented reports of drone strikes in Tunisian waters on 8 and 9 September 2025

and again on 23 and 24 September off the Greek coast. In response to these incidents, Italy and Spain have

deployed naval escorts to accompany the flotilla.

17. The Assembly is convinced that only a return to a situation in which the principles of humanitarian law

are fully respected and seen to be respected, and in which journalists are allowed to carry out their work of

information gathering and reporting in safety and independence, will create the necessary conditions for a

resolution of the current crisis, and a secure and peaceful future for the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. It calls

upon the parties to the conflict, and to all the international community, to put an end to the man-made

humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza with no more delay.

18.

With regard to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, the Assembly:

18.1. demands the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held in Gaza;

18.2. calls for an immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza to halt the appalling loss

of civilian life, prevent further displacement, and create space for political dialogue;

18.3. insists that all parties comply strictly with international humanitarian law, ensuring full protection

of civilians, medical facilities, and humanitarian workers;

18.4. calls for the immediate and unhindered entry and distribution of humanitarian aid, including food,

water, medicine, fuel, and shelter.

19.

As regards the role of Council of Europe member and observer States, the Assembly calls on them to:

19.1. take resolute and immediate measures to help ensure the return of the remaining hostages and

put an end to the conflict in Gaza, and provide the necessary humanitarian and other assistance to the

people of Gaza;

19.2. respect and uphold their obligations under international law, including by supporting to the work

of United Nations organs and agencies and the work of the International Court of Justice, and by

ensuring respect for the rules laid down in the Geneva Conventions in all circumstances;

19.3. facilitate medical evacuations, including the provision of both treatment and transportation, with

particular attention to children and their families, as well as pregnant women and their families;

19.4. devise and put in place special rehabilitation programmes for Palestinian children.

20.

As regards journalists, the Assembly urges Israel to immediately:

20.1. allow safe and unhindered access to Gaza and other conflict areas to accredited journalists and

media workers;

20.2. stop targeting journalists and their families, in addition to civilians;

20.3. carry out full and independent investigations into the deaths of journalists in Gaza, make public

the conclusions and take any steps necessary to hold those responsible to account.

21.

The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States to:

21.1. continue to exert pressure to grant immediate free and safe access of accredited international

journalists and media workers to Gaza so that the situation on the ground can be observed and

reported;

21.2. call for and facilitate the evacuation of Palestinian journalists and their families from Gaza and

provide them with psychological and material support, where necessary, for their immediate protection.

22. The Assembly urges the International Criminal Court to investigate the alleged war crimes committed

by the Israeli army against journalists in Gaza.

23.

With regard to the Global Sumud Flotilla, the Assembly:

23.1. condemns all reported attacks and acts of harassment against it and reiterates the obligation of

all States to respect international law, in particular the law of the sea, including the duty to conduct

search-and-rescue operations whenever vessels within their designated zones are in distress;

23.2. calls on member States to engage in diplomatic efforts with Israel to guarantee the safe delivery

of humanitarian aid by the flotilla.

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Resolution 2624 (2025)

Uphold democracy and the rule of law in Georgia

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its

Resolution 2585 (2025)

“Challenge, on substantive grounds,

of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia” and

Resolution 2600 (2025)

“The

situation in Georgia and follow up to Resolution 2585 (2025) ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still

unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia’” in which it expressed serious concerns

about the rapid democratic backsliding and deep political and social crisis in Georgia. These developments

raise serious doubts about the authorities' willingness to abide by Georgia’s membership obligations and

accession commitments to the Council of Europe.

The Assembly deeply regrets that the Georgian authorities have systematically ignored its concerns

and recommendations about the democratic crisis in Georgia, which are shared by the international

community at large. The rapid democratic backsliding has continued to such an extent that the very existence

of democracy in Georgia is now being questioned.

The Assembly deplores the increasingly isolationist policies and antagonistic relations of the Georgian

authorities with European organisations and their member States. It also deplores the unfounded attacks and

baseless, damaging accusations against members of the international community in Georgia, which have

multiplied in recent months. Against this backdrop, the Assembly deeply regrets the Georgian authorities'

rejection of any form of dialogue with the Assembly and their refusal to co-operate with the European

Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) in preparing its opinions on Georgian

legislation.

The Assembly is concerned by reports that former members of the Georgian delegation to the

Assembly risk criminal prosecution for their votes or activities as members of the delegation. The Assembly

reiterates that its members cannot be prosecuted for words spoken or votes cast by them in the exercise of

their functions. The Assembly calls on member States to exert all efforts necessary to prevent any such

development from taking place.

Regarding the upcoming local elections in Georgia, the Assembly deplores the fact that its call for an

immediate, inclusive process to establish an electoral environment conducive to new, genuinely democratic

elections was not implemented, as is evident from the decision by the majority of opposition parties not to

participate in the upcoming local elections. The Assembly regrets that these elections will not be observed by

civil society organisations with a well-respected track record in election observation, due to the crackdown on

civil society. In this respect, it deeply regrets that the Georgian authorities did not invite the Congress of Local

and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe to observe the upcoming elections. The Assembly also

regrets that the invitation to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for

Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) to observe these elections was issued purposefully so

late as to render their observation impossible.

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting) (see

Doc. 16271,

report of the Committee on the Honouring of

Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteurs:

Ms Edite Estrela and Ms Sabina Ćudić).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2624 (2025)

The Assembly condemns the ongoing and relentless crackdown on political dissent, including by the

adoption of repressive legislation and the abuse of politically motivated legal proceedings against civil society,

independent media, opposition forces and individual protesters. This crackdown exacerbates the country’s

social and political crisis, violates its Council of Europe membership obligations and deepens its democratic

backsliding.

The Assembly reiterates its condemnation of the politically motivated prosecution of opposition

members, journalists, and civil society representatives in Georgia. In this regard, it deplores the

disproportionate and politically motivated imprisonment of the journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli and several

opposition party leaders on trumped-up charges. Such prosecutions aim to silence dissenting voices and are

incompatible with a democratic society.

The Assembly deeply regrets that, despite its calls to the contrary, no effective investigations have been

conducted into police brutality and other human rights abuses during the demonstrations, nor into the many

substantiated reports of torture and ill-treatment of demonstrators during their arrest and detention. This

stands in stark contrast with the lengthy prison sentences handed down to protesters on questionable and

allegedly fabricated charges. The Assembly calls for an immediate end to the abuse of legal procedures to

silence opposition and dissent, and for the immediate release of all persons subjected to politically motivated

persecution in Georgia.

A dynamic and pluralistic civil society is essential for a well-functioning democracy. Civil society in

Georgia has historically played a pivotal role in the country's democratic development. The Assembly is

therefore seriously concerned about the Georgian authorities' actions against NGOs to enforce the

controversial Foreign Agent Registration Act, which endangers their functioning and existence. The Assembly

notes that, alongside the Foreign Agent Registration Act, the Transparency of Foreign Influence Law, which

falls short of European standards, remains in force. Furthermore, the Assembly regrets the adoption of the

amendments to the Law on Grants by the Georgian Parliament on 16 April and 10 June 2025. This law

requires international donors, including the Council of Europe and its member States, to obtain the Georgian

Government's approval before providing funds or assistance to Georgian civil society organisations. Receiving

an unauthorised grant will result in the local organisation being fined twice the amount received. At the

moment of adopting this resolution, more than 60 civil society organisations had been informed that they

would be subjected to inspections by the anti-corruption bureau, the independence of which from the

executive branch of government has been widely questioned. The cumulative effect of these laws has been

devastating for civil society in Georgia, whose survival is currently at risk. In this context, the Assembly

deplores the freezing of the bank accounts of seven well-respected civil society organisations as part of a

criminal investigation into alleged sabotage on behalf of foreign entities. This measure has had a devastating

effect on those organisations, resulting in their de facto liquidation.

10. The Assembly is concerned that intimidation and retaliation against civil servants, including a large

number of dismissals, have continued. This undermines the existence of an independent and impartial civil

service in Georgia.

11. The Assembly reiterates its serious concerns regarding the parliamentary investigative commission into

the activities of the “United National Movement (UNM) regime' and its political representatives between 2003

and 2012. This investigation was later extended to cover the period from 2012 until the present day. The

Assembly deplores the commission’s conclusion that the UNM and its affiliated parties hindered the

establishment of a healthy political system in Georgia and should therefore be banned. The Assembly strongly

condemns the recent announcement by Georgia's prime minister that the ruling majority will appeal to the

Constitutional Court to declare all parties belonging to the “collective UNM” – practically the entire current

democratic opposition – unconstitutional. In the Assembly's view, such banning of the democratic opposition

would effectively establish a one-party dictatorship in Georgia, which would be incompatible with Council of

Europe membership.

12. The Assembly urges the Georgian authorities to immediately reverse the breakdown of democracy in

the country. It reiterates its readiness to engage in open and constructive dialogue with the authorities and all

political and social forces in Georgia, with the aim of reversing the democratic backsliding and ensuring that

the country honours its membership obligations and accession commitments to the Council of Europe.

However, the Assembly emphasises that such a dialogue can only be based on acceptance of the Council of

Europe's fundamental norms and principles. It notes that Georgia can benefit from the full support of the

Council of Europe in this respect and urges the authorities to make use of all tools available. As a sign of its

readiness for dialogue, the Assembly supports the rapporteurs for Georgia of the Committee on the Honouring

of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) to

visiting the country at their earliest convenience.

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Resolution 2624 (2025)

13. The Assembly recognises that reversing the breakdown of democracy in Georgia is an issue for all

Council of Europe bodies. It therefore urges the bodies of the Council of Europe to use all available means

including those under Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and invites

member States to use interstate applications to the European Court of Human Rights under Article 33 of the

Convention, to ensure that Georgia fully honours all the standards and obligations stemming from Council of

Europe membership.

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Resolution 2625 (2025)

Political parties and democracy

Parliamentary Assembly

Democracy in Europe is in danger. Across the continent, democratic backsliding continues, marked by

the corrosion of institutional checks and balances, restrictions on media freedom, disinformation, and foreign

interference. It is manifested in declining political participation, weakening public trust, and rising polarisation,

which together erode the resilience of democratic systems. Political parties stand at the centre of this crisis.

Strong, responsive, and inclusive parties are not only vital for healthy political representation, but

indispensable for confronting these threats and safeguarding democracy.

The Parliamentary Assembly believes that political parties are the cornerstone of representative

democracy. They are the key element of electoral competition, articulate and aggregate citizens’ preferences,

channel demands into political institutions, facilitate democratic government formation, and enable peaceful

alternation of power. Without political parties, pluralism cannot be meaningfully represented, and parliaments

cannot function effectively.

The Assembly considers that political parties, when they respect democratic norms, foster open

competition and act transparently, are not only guarantors of representation but also the most effective agents

of democratic renewal in Europe.

Political parties play a fundamental role beyond electoral processes. They serve as permanent

institutions of democratic education, socialisation, and negotiation. By recruiting political leaders, fostering

civic skills, and transmitting democratic values across generations, they build and sustain the trust and

legitimacy on which resilient democracies depend. They are uniquely positioned to provide structured fora for

dialogue and deliberation, to mediate between diverse social groups, and to transform competing interests

into a coherent programme for government.

The Assembly observes, however, that political parties in many Council of Europe member States face

profound challenges. Long-term decline in membership and active participation, combined with heightened

electoral volatility, indicate a weakening of traditional forms of political attachment. Public opinion surveys

consistently show that political parties are among the least trusted institutions, with many citizens associating

them with elitism, self-interest, or corruption.

The erosion of trust has serious consequences. It fuels political apathy, anti-party sentiment, and the

rise of anti-establishment movements. Polarisation and political gridlock often stem from parties’ inability or

unwillingness to build consensus. When parties fail to act as trusted bridges within society, or are perceived

as unresponsive to the concerns and needs of citizens, democracy risks becoming dysfunctional.

These challenges are unfolding within the broader context of democratic backsliding across Europe,

geopolitical pressures, and persistent attempts at foreign interference aimed at destabilising democracies. At

a time when public trust in institutions is fragile, political parties bear a particular responsibility for

safeguarding democratic cohesion and stability. Their most basic commitment must be to uphold the core

principles of democracy including free and fair elections, respect for pluralism, and the protection of

fundamental freedoms.

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting) (see

Doc. 16248,

report of the Committee on Political Affairs and

Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Ingjerd Schie Schou).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2625 (2025)

The Assembly, in the fulfilment of its political mandate, has consistently paid close attention to the state

of democracy and the institutions that sustain it. It welcomes the call of the Secretary General of the Council of

Europe for a New Democratic Pact for Europe, and underlines that political parties are an essential motor for

democratic renewal.

The Council of Europe, particularly through the European Commission for Democracy through Law

(Venice Commission), has provided extensive guidance on the regulation and functioning of political parties.

Through its “Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties” and numerous Opinions, the Venice

Commission has underlined foundational principles of transparency, fairness, pluralism, and internal

democracy. These standards affirm that political parties must be able to operate freely and independently,

while at the same time remaining accountable and respectful of democratic norms.

10. The Assembly considers that these principles remain indispensable for restoring citizens’ trust in

political parties across Europe, and it is within this framework that it seeks to encourage further modernisation,

innovation, and citizen engagement in party life.

11. By enhancing inclusive membership, participatory decision making, and ethical political communication,

political parties can reconnect citizens with political institutions and restore confidence in representative

democracy. Far from being obsolete, parties can be the central actors in addressing democratic backsliding,

rebuilding trust and fostering a democratic culture adapted to contemporary challenges.

12. In light of these considerations, the Assembly underlines that trust must be a guiding principle of all

party reform, and calls on political parties across Council of Europe member States to actively demonstrate

their integrity, accountability, and responsiveness to citizens’ expectations in order to reinforce their role as

pillars of both resilient democracies and democratic security in Europe.

13. In order to respond to citizens’ expectations, the Assembly calls on political parties to reconnect with

citizens by placing social justice and equality at the core of their programmes, ensuring that policies deliver

measurable improvements in living standards, access to quality health care, education, housing and decent

work.

14. With regard to strengthening the representational link to citizens, the Assembly encourages political

parties to widen and deepen opportunities for political participation by:

14.1. developing accessible and flexible pathways for engagement;

14.2. adopting transparent and participatory mechanisms for leadership and candidate selection;

14.3. strengthening intermediary structures, including local branches, affiliated organisations, unions,

and civil society platforms, to ensure citizens’ perspectives can inform and shape party direction;

14.4. enhancing and sustaining internal forums for deliberation to foster dialogue, reflection, and

consensus building among members and supporters.

15. To combat issues of under-representation, the Assembly urges political parties to adopt concrete

strategies for inclusion by:

15.1. integrating gender equality, youth participation and diversity into party statutes, vision and

strategic plans;

15.2. establishing measurable objectives, targets, and accountability mechanisms to enhance

progress on gender balance, youth involvement, and representation of minorities and disadvantaged

groups;

15.3. exploring the application of inclusive procedures for candidate selection and leadership

recruitment, such as parity measures, transparent quotas, or other measures designed to widen

participation;

15.4. ensuring diversity in electoral lists and leadership positions through fair and transparent

selection processes.

16. The Assembly further invites political parties to promote diversity and inclusion across their internal

functioning by:

16.1. developing support and capacity-building initiatives for under-represented groups;

16.2. endorsing the revised Charter of European political parties for a non-racist and inclusive society;

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Resolution 2625 (2025)

16.3. establishing mechanisms to prevent and sanction hate speech, incitement to hatred and

discrimination by their members.

17.

With regard to safeguarding integrity, the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States to:

17.1. fully implement recommendations by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on the

funding of political parties and electoral campaigns;

17.2. review and enhance national frameworks governing financial contributions to political parties,

advertising and electoral campaigns to mitigate the risk of inappropriate or illicit foreign financial

interference;

17.3. ensure effective monitoring and introduce clear sanctions against illicit foreign funding.

18.

The Assembly calls on political parties to strengthen internal accountability by:

18.1. adopting codes of conduct and conflict-of-interest rules for party officials;

18.2. establishing transparent disciplinary procedures to address misconduct;

18.3. introducing clear rules on lobbying and relations with donors to safeguard parties from undue

influence.

19.

In highlighting the role of political parties in sustaining democratic culture, the Assembly:

19.1. calls on political parties to re-centre their role as platforms for dialogue across social divides,

promoting compromise and cohesion;

19.2. encourages political parties to provide spaces for democratic education, debate and civic

engagement;

19.3. in line with its

Resolution 2552 (2024)

“Strengthening democracy through participatory and

deliberative processes”, calls on political parties to foster more robust civic engagement with

deliberative technologies and participatory processes;

19.4. condemns political parties that, through their explicit actions or votes, support military

aggression against sovereign States.

20.

The Assembly recommends that political parties harness digital tools and innovations responsibly by:

20.1. using online consultations, deliberative forums, and transparent digital primaries to widen citizen

participation;

20.2. committing to ethical online campaigning, avoiding manipulative micro-targeting, and ensuring

disclosure of digital advertising;

20.3. supporting digital literacy initiatives to help citizens navigate the information environment.

21. As regards its own work, the Assembly, including through its General Rapporteur on democracy,

resolves to:

21.1. continue actions to strengthen democracy, counter its backsliding and promote innovative

practices to enhance citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and their participation in political decision

making;

21.2. continue to review, in co-operation with the Venice Commission, the Code of Good Practice in

the field of Political Parties and the issues raised in it, with a view to developing it further if required.

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Resolution 2626 (2025)

Analysis and guidelines to guarantee the right to housing

Parliamentary Assembly

The right to adequate housing is a universal human right recognised in the international human rights

law, including the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163). It stems from everyone’s right to an

adequate standard of living and is key for the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights within the

international human rights framework, on a similar footing with civil and political rights. Adequate housing

means the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity – in a home that is safe, healthy, affordable,

accessible and adapted to needs, with safe drinking water, sanitation and energy facilities. Ensuring the right

to housing for all is not only a legal obligation but a cornerstone of social justice and human development, and

thereby of democratic stability.

As human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, a violation of the right to

adequate housing may affect the enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights. At the same time, the right

to adequate housing may also be affected by the extent to which other human rights are guaranteed. While

the right to adequate housing is central to human well-being, it remains a broken promise for more than one

billion people worldwide who are not adequately housed. In Europe, over 1.3 million people were homeless in

2023, including 400 000 children, and about 19.2 million experienced severe housing precariousness.

Wars and armed conflicts escalate the housing problem for the population affected such as in Ukraine

where about 13% of housing is severely damaged or destroyed. The Parliamentary Assembly notes that in the

light of deliberate mass destruction of homes in war zones, notably the catastrophic humanitarian situation in

Gaza where 92% of all residential buildings are destroyed or damaged, the United Nations Special

Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing has called for the establishment of a new crime – domicide – at

international level.

The Assembly deplores the financialisation of housing which is treated as a commodity rather than a

human right and a social good. It is concerned that the lack of housing supply in many cities, rising income

inequalities and unemployment, the cost-of-living crisis, high interest rates, as well as soaring rents and

housing shortages caused by secondary residences and short-term rentals, are putting access to adequate

housing under pressure across Europe. In this context, certain categories of the population – such as low-

income and single-parent households, migrants, including refugees, and internally displaced persons, Roma,

the unemployed and precarious workers, persons leaving institutional care, students and young people,

families and older persons – are particularly vulnerable and require special protection.

The Assembly underlines the obligation for member States to ensure the effective implementation of

the right to housing in line with the requirements of international human rights law, notably the European

Social Charter (revised) (Articles 31, 30 and 16), emphasising the prevention of homelessness and providing

for holistic short-, medium- and long-term measures. It highlights the need to adapt existing and new housing

to the modern requirements of sustainable development and increased resilience to the effects of climate

change and natural disasters.

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting) (see

Doc. 16244,

report of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health

and Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Ms Aurora Floridia; and

Doc. 16268,

opinion of the Committee on Migration,

Refugees and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Mr Paul Galles).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025

(35th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2626 (2025)

The Assembly is concerned about rising income and housing inequalities in member States, while the

social housing sector has been outsourced to the private sector and underfinanced in many of them. It

acknowledges the pressing need to counter the financialisation of and speculation in housing markets,

promote affordability and prevent homelessness. It calls on Council of Europe member States to:

6.1.

treat housing as a human right, not as a commodity;

6.2. increase public investment in social and affordable housing, in particular at local authorities’

level;

6.3. adopt long-term, rights-based housing strategies focused on prevention of homelessness. The

prevention of homelessness should also be considered when designing migration and asylum policies;

6.4. ensure legal safeguards against forced evictions and homelessness enforced in all contexts,

irrespective of the residents’ administrative status, as well as balanced protection for both owners and

tenants;

6.5.

remove all administrative barriers to accessing emergency shelters;

6.6. improve housing benefit systems, income support mechanisms and the transmission of housing

between generations;

6.7.

6.8.

regulate short-term rentals and vacant properties to increase housing supply;

implement stronger regulations to curb real estate speculation.

Recognising good practices in selected member States and cities, the Assembly highlights the

effectiveness of long-term public investment, mixed-income housing, integrated social services and

sustainable construction. It invites member States to:

7.1. introduce rent regulation in urban areas with high demand for housing and link rent increases to

regional average income rather than inflation;

7.2.

promote housing cooperatives and limited-profit housing schemes;

7.3. support young people’s access to affordable housing through co-housing, student

accommodation, targeted subsidies and intergenerational housing facilities and support young refugees

and asylum seekers in their transition to adulthood by extending access to adequate housing and

support services beyond the age of 18, in line with Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)4 of the Committee

of Ministers to the member States of the Council of Europe on supporting young refugees in transition

to adulthood;

7.4. ensure access to decent housing for low-income and single-parent households, migrants,

including refugees, Roma, persons with disabilities, the elderly, women leaving violent relationships and

persons leaving institutions;

7.5.

provide education on housing rights and financial literacy for tenants.

The Assembly considers that the right to housing viewed through the sustainability prism blends the

ecological perspective (resources-saving, climate-resilient design, low environmental footprint) with social

justice (protection of the vulnerable population groups, non-discrimination, equal opportunities for all), public

health (“One health” approach to balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems) and

economic rationale (quality growth, shared prosperity, smart investment and long-term gains). Considering

that action is less costly than inaction, the Assembly urges member States to:

8.1. prioritise large-scale renovation of ageing housing stock, notably under the European Green

Deal and Renovation Wave where appropriate;

8.2.

mainstream energy-efficient, climate-resilient and low-carbon housing models;

8.3. invest in sustainable public infrastructure and spatial planning that integrate environmental,

economic and social objectives;

8.4.

facilitate access to the financing of environmentally friendly housing for vulnerable households.

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Resolution 2626 (2025)

The Assembly reminds member States of their obligations under the European Social Charter (revised)

to provide adequate housing to all persons regularly residing on their territory, and at the very least to provide

shelter for all others. To fulfil these obligations in practice, it urgently calls on member States to:

9.1. increase the number of available places in reception accommodation and include contingency

planning, so that every person seeking asylum and every unaccompanied minor can be adequately

housed;

9.2. refrain from accommodating asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors in unsuitable facilities

such as (de facto) detention sites and military facilities;

9.3. ensure independent monitoring of reception facilities, with accessible complaint procedures, as

recommended in Resolution 2613 (2025) “The challenges and needs of public and private actors

involved in migration management”;

9.4. support refugees leaving reception centres, people leaving immigration detention centres, and

unaccompanied minors leaving care facilities, in moving into independent housing within the local

community. This should be accompanied by sufficient timeframes for leaving institutional settings;

9.5. ensure that housing support services are not required to report persons in an irregular situation

to immigration enforcement authorities, and that information collected to support access to adequate

housing is not used for immigration control.

10. The Assembly reminds member States of their obligations under Articles 16, 30 and 31 of the European

Social Charter (revised) and recommends:

10.1. accepting Articles 16, 30 and 31 and ratifying, accepting or approving the Additional Protocol

Providing for a System of Collective Complaints (ETS No. 158), if they have not yet done so;

10.2. strengthening the enforcement of socio-economic rights based on guidance of the European

Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), and extending the implementation of social rights enshrined in the

European Social Charter (revised) to all persons residing on their territory;

10.3. collecting disaggregated housing data to identify and address systemic inequalities.

11. The Assembly strongly supports the work of the Council of Europe Development Bank in helping

member States deliver more sustainable, inclusive and affordable housing for the vulnerable population,

particularly in reconstruction efforts in Ukraine and in addressing structural housing deficits in disadvantaged

urban and rural areas.

12. The Assembly encourages member States to guarantee that humanitarian organisations and

individuals providing shelter or aid to migrants experiencing homelessness are not criminalised or faced with

administrative sanctions, including under laws to combat migrant smuggling, as recommended in Resolution

2568 (2024) "A shared European approach to address migrant smuggling”.

13.

Finally, the Assembly invites national parliaments of member States to:

13.1. monitor the implementation of the right to housing at national and local level;

13.2. ensure meaningful participation of youth and vulnerable communities in housing policy design;

13.3. work towards the recognition of domicide and the establishment of it as a crime at international

level.

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Resolution 2627 (2025)

Promoting universal health coverage

Parliamentary Assembly

Universal health coverage (UHC), based on the principle of “leaving no one behind”, is a central political

commitment of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and is the subject of target 3.8

of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3. In the Pact for the Future adopted in 2024, the Heads of State and

Government meeting at the United Nations General Assembly reiterated their commitment to redoubling

efforts to achieve this goal.

Health is a political priority for the Council of Europe. As the Secretary General pointed out on the

occasion of World Health Day (7 April), “Health is our most precious gift – and a top concern for all

Europeans... Now more than ever, health care is about trust, safety and access – and this calls for a holistic

approach... On this day, and every day, let us reaffirm that equitable, high-quality health care is essential to a

healthy democracy.”

The objectives pursued in the field of health, both at global and regional levels, are based on a solid

legal foundation for which there is broad consensus. The right to the highest attainable standard of physical

and mental health, the right to protection of health and the right to social protection without discrimination are

fundamental human rights, inseparable from human dignity and crucial for the effective exercise of all other

rights.

The Parliamentary Assembly has already put this on its agenda in Resolution 2500 (2023) “Public

health emergency: the need for a holistic approach to multilateralism and healthcare”. In that resolution, it

recalls that primary healthcare is the cornerstone of UHC, providing prevention, health promotion, treatment

and financial protection, and requires sustainable financing. In this context, since preventing and combating

gender-based discrimination are essential, UHC must fully encompass sexual, reproductive, and mental

health, as well as comprehensive care for victims of violence.

UHC is a strategic investment in sustainable development. It improves health outcomes, social

cohesion, equity, gender equality and economic stability. It is recognised as an essential basis for global

health security to withstand health, geopolitical, economic and climate crises. Despite this, progress towards

UHC has stalled, with more than 4.5 billion people not fully covered by essential services, 2 billion facing

hardship due to out-of-pocket health spending, and 344 million in extreme poverty due to health costs and

worsening financial protection.

Although Council of Europe member States are making better progress than the world average,

inequalities in access to healthcare and health disparities persist and are in some cases worsening. The

Assembly stresses the urgent need to step up action to achieve target 3.8 of SDG 3 by 2030, by fully

leveraging the 2024-2027 Strategic Framework of the UHC2030 platform, ahead of the next high-level

meeting scheduled for 2027.

Assembly debate

on 2 October 2025 (35th sitting) (see

Doc. 16243,

report of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health

and Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Stefan Schennach).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 2 October 2025

(35th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2627 (2025)

A leading advocate for the advancement of UHC, the Council of Europe makes a unique contribution

based on human rights. Through its treaties – the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), the

European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163) and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine

(ETS No. 164, “Oviedo Convention”) – it influences the social and public health legislation and policies of its

member States. This holistic approach, centred on human dignity, combines the case law of the European

Court of Human Rights and the European Committee of Social Rights, the efforts of the Steering Committee

for Human Rights in the fields of Biomedicine and Health, the work of the Commissioner for Human Rights

and initiatives by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. It is a crucial lever for making the right to

health a reality for everyone, in line with the objectives of UHC and of SDG 3.

The Assembly recognises that the European Social Charter is the Council of Europe's key instrument

for promoting UHC. Articles 11 and 13 of the Charter, interpreted in the light of the World Health

Organization’s (WHO) definition of health, guarantee the right to protection of health for all persons present in

the territory of the State Parties, regardless of administrative status. The case law of the European Committee

of Social Rights reinforces this framework by specifying the positive obligations on States: to guarantee

available, economically and geographically accessible, culturally acceptable and quality care, while ensuring

effective access to essential healthcare. It also incorporates the social determinants of health (housing,

energy, food), thus emphasising a comprehensive and integrated approach to UHC.

The Oviedo Convention directly supports target 3.8 of SDG 3 by establishing the principle of equitable

access to quality care, taking into account health needs and available resources. Building on this,

Recommendation CM/Rec(2023)1 of the Committee of Ministers calls on States to provide equitable access

to medicines and medical equipment, including in times of shortage, for people with serious health conditions.

The Assembly also welcomes the efforts of the Steering Committee for Human Rights in the fields of

Biomedicine and Health, which has made equitable and rapid access to medical innovations a strategic

priority.

10. Against the backdrop of diminished political support, growing geopolitical tensions and budgetary

constraints, the Assembly stresses the importance of conveying a clear, collective message that will galvanise

support for UHC. The SDG commitments are binding on Council of Europe member States. For UHC to

become a reality, it is vital that each State embrace these objectives, and that each parliament play an active

role in implementing them in national public policies.

11. The Assembly considers it entirely appropriate that the Council of Europe should join the UHC2030

platform, alongside other international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development. Such a move would enhance its contribution to the global alignment of efforts to achieve UHC

and provide an opportunity to promote its standards and tools within a multilateral framework. By joining the

platform’s Steering Committee and endorsing the UHC2030 Global compact, the Council of Europe could

further rally support among its member State governments and parliaments, strengthen the place of human

rights in health systems and help to make UHC a common, shared and measurable goal.

12. The Assembly calls on the member and observer States of the Council of Europe, and States whose

parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly:

12.1. with regard to UHC and health policies, to:

12.1.1. include the objective of UHC as a national political priority, in accordance with target

3.8 of SDG 3 and the commitments reiterated in the Pact for the Future adopted in 2024,

allocating a sufficient budget for its achievement in accordance with,

inter alia,

the WHO

recommendations;

12.1.2. ensure, in particular for people in vulnerable situations, equitable, affordable and quality

access to physical and mental healthcare, including proactive intervention mechanisms for

individuals who, due to their health condition, are unable to recognise their need for care or to

travel to services;

12.1.3. invest more and sustainably in primary healthcare, recognised as the foundation of

UHC and an essential condition for social and health resilience;

12.1.4. recognise and integrate the social determinants of health (such as access to housing,

food, energy and a healthy environment) into public health and social cohesion policies;

12.1.5. include, within the framework of UHC, comprehensive and accessible services for

prevention, sexual, reproductive and mental health, as well as support for victims of sexual

violence;

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Resolution 2627 (2025)

12.2. with regard to leveraging Council of Europe instruments, to:

12.2.1. make progress towards wider acceptance of the provisions of the European Social

Charter (revised) that are necessary to reduce health inequalities and move forward on the

commitment to leave no one behind;

12.2.2. refer systematically to human rights standards and activities of the Council of Europe

when developing health policies, in particular the European Social Charter (revised) and the

Oviedo Convention;

12.2.3. apply the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers on equitable access to

medicinal products and care, in particular Recommendation CM/Rec(2023)1, including in times

of crisis or shortage;

12.2.4. actively promote the work of the Steering Committee for Human Rights in the fields of

Biomedicine and Health on equitable and rapid access to medical innovation;

12.3. with regard to co-ordination and multilateralism, to:

12.3.1. affirm their commitment to UHC in the relevant international fora and make the case for

a human rights-based approach in health systems;

12.3.2. support Council of Europe membership of the UHC2030 multilateral platform, in order

to give voice to social rights and to promote alignment between international commitments and

European standards;

12.3.3. enhance parliamentary accountability in implementing the objectives of UHC, in

particular by providing parliaments with tools and resources offered by the UHC2030 platform

and the Inter-Parliamentary Union guides, in order to monitor, guide, evaluate and adjust public

health policies;

12.3.4. translate into national legislation the multilateral commitments made in the area of UHC

(in particular within the framework of the UHC2030 platform), by adopting laws, dedicated

budgets and parliamentary monitoring mechanisms, drawing on European standards and best

practice gleaned from international co-operation.

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Resolution 2628 (2025)

Artificial intelligence and migration

Parliamentary Assembly

The Parliamentary Assembly acknowledges the transformative potential of artificial intelligence (AI)

across a range of sectors, including migration management. AI systems – capable of autonomous decision

making and complex data analysis – are increasingly used in border surveillance, visa processing, biometric

identification, natural language processing and integration support. These applications promise enhanced

efficiency and service accessibility for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

The Assembly also underlines the opportunities created by the responsible and ethical use of AI. AI can

contribute to saving lives through enhanced search and rescue operations, provide migrants and refugees

with multilingual and accessible information, and support their integration by facilitating language learning,

education and access to labour markets. When designed with transparency, human oversight and strong

human rights safeguards, AI can foster innovation, reduce administrative burdens and strengthen trust in

institutions. In this way, AI can make migration management not only more efficient but also more humane

and inclusive.

The Assembly emphasises, however, that technological innovation must not come at the expense of

fundamental rights. If wrongly used, AI can reinforce structural inequalities, infringe on privacy and undermine

asylum protection. The Assembly therefore reiterates its call for all Council of Europe member States to sign

and ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights,

Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225, hereinafter the “Framework Convention on AI”), which aims

to ensure the development and deployment of AI in line with human rights standards and explicitly prohibits AI

applications that violate the right to seek asylum, as stated in Article 5.

AI-driven modernisation must be carried out in a way that minimises dangerous effects and risks for

migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, such as discrimination and bias, and that does not unintentionally

reinforce existing stereotypes or prejudice. States should rather harness the potential of AI to foster a more

inclusive, secure and humane migration system.

Recognising the profound impact that AI can have on individual rights and liberties, the Assembly

stresses that AI should support – not replace – human decision making in migration and asylum processes,

even if in some cases, AI may offer greater security and effectiveness than human decision making alone, by

reducing the scope for human error. All AI tools must be transparent, accountable and subject to oversight,

and be deployed in alignment with key international instruments, including the European Convention on

Human Rights (ETS No. 5, hereinafter the “Convention”), the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention relating to

the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) and the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU).

Assembly debate

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting) (see

Doc. 16240,

report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees

and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Mr Petri Honkonen).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting).

See also

Recommendation 2300 (2025).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

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Resolution 2628 (2025)

Noting that the EU Artificial Intelligence Act classifies migration-related AI as high-risk technology, the

Assembly underscores the need for additional safeguards. The use of AI in migration, asylum and border

control management must not allow for the bypassing of international obligations, in particular under the

Refugee Convention. Nor should they be used to in any way infringe on the principle of

non-refoulement,

or to

deny safe and effective legal avenues into States’ territory, including the right to international protection.

It is important therefore that AI systems in migration and asylum procedures undergo human rights,

democracy, and rule of law impact assessments before their deployment. The Assembly recommends the use

of the Council of Europe HUDERIA methodology to identify and mitigate risks, including algorithmic bias and

privacy violations. Oversight must be embedded throughout the life cycle of AI systems with independent

evaluations and mandatory human review.

The Assembly calls for a prohibition on the use of AI tools such as automated credibility assessments,

emotion recognition and risk profiling based on nationality or ethnicity. These technologies lack scientific

validity and are incompatible with Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention.

Noting the critical importance of data protection, privacy and security in the use of AI for asylum

procedures, the Assembly emphasises that sensitive data, including biometrics, interview transcripts and

country-of-origin information, must be end-to-end encrypted and must not be shared with the country of origin

in case of risk of persecution, in accordance with the Data Protection Policy of the Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

10. Artificial intelligence applications in migration management must thus balance efficiency gains with

rigorous protection of human rights at all stages of the migration journey. The specific issues related to the

use of AI in the field of migration must be addressed for each distinct stage of the process, from pre-departure

activities to transit, arrival, stay, circulation, temporary or permanent return and sustainable (re)integration.

Priority should be given to safeguards against bias and human oversight and to ensure the dignity of migrants,

refugees and asylum seekers, as follows.

11. At the pre-departure stage, AI tools used in visa and asylum screening should undergo human rights

impact assessments before deployment. Systems like the European Travel Information and Authorisation

System (ETIAS) should provide for manual review in cases flagged as high risk. All screening tools must be

transparent and free from discriminatory outcomes. AI-powered chatbots can provide real-time multilingual

information to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, provided they disclose their automated nature and

comply with ethical standards to avoid spreading misinformation.

12. As regards labour migration via the appropriate channels, AI tools may be used to streamline, in a fair

and accessible manner, the application process for employment and residence permits. AI may further

support the detection of exploitative recruitment practices by identifying predatory employers and alerting the

relevant authorities. AI tools such as visa checkers should be bias-audited and provide transparent outcomes

that can be contested.

13. The Assembly encourages the ethical use of AI in climate migration forecasting through the analysis of

environmental and socio-economic data to improve humanitarian planning in accordance with its

Resolution

2401 (2021)

“Climate and migration”. AI tools such as those developed by the International Organization for

Migration (IOM) can provide policy makers with a clearer predictive picture of climate-driven displacement

patterns. Such predictive models can inform proactive support measures.

14.

AI may also be used to identify and disrupt smuggling networks through responsible data analysis.

15. During the transit stage, the Assembly stresses the need for strict regulation of AI surveillance

technologies. Predictive policing and biometric identification must be limited to strictly necessary and

proportionate use, and all biometric data must be encrypted and restricted to authorised personnel. The

Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI limits biometric categorisation to strictly necessary and

proportionate cases. AI systems like the European Union’s European Border Surveillance System

(EUROSUR) that monitor border movements must comply with the IOM’s 2023 Data Protection Principles.

16. Surveillance technologies for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in transit must be regulated with a

view to protecting their rights, and AI-driven mass surveillance, such as drones and facial recognition, should

be prohibited. AI may be used in a positive sense to support humanitarian corridors by using conflict mapping

to identify safer transit routes.

17. The Assembly recognises the essential role of eu-LISA (the European Union Agency for the

Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) and other

EU bodies in managing migration-related databases such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the

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Resolution 2628 (2025)

Visa Information System (VIS), and Eurodac (the European Union’s centralised biometric database). Co-

operation between EU and non-EU Council of Europe member States is important to ensure consistent data

protection standards and respect for humanitarian obligations.

18. The Assembly expresses once more its deep concern and sorrow over the deaths at sea of migrants,

refugees and asylum seekers. It calls on member States to employ AI technologies to enhance search and

rescue capabilities, and to uphold the dignity of deceased individuals, in accordance with the principles laid

down in its

Resolution 2569 (2024)

“Missing migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – A call to clarify their

fate” and

Resolution 2612 (2025)

“Saving the lives of migrants at sea and protecting their human rights”.

19. At the arrival stage, AI can be used to support individualised, fair and rights-compliant asylum

procedures, while never replacing the role of human caseworkers in interactions and decision making. AI-

generated documents should be accessible in applicants’ languages and in plain language formats.

20. Biometric systems and language recognition tools should be subject to routine bias audits to ensure

equitable treatment, while facial recognition tools, such as those used in smart border tunnels, should undergo

demographic testing to ensure compliance with non-discrimination requirements and adhere to EU-wide audit

standards.

21. AI systems in asylum processing should be verified and corrected for skewed datasets to avoid

discriminatory proxies, and AI-generated evidence must be verified by humans, with access to judicial review.

The use of tools such as emotion recognition or lie detectors should not be included, and predictive tools

assessing the likelihood of absconding must not be used to justify detention, especially of minors. Impact

assessments such as HUDERIA should be carried out prior to any roll-out of new systems.

22. During the stay period, inclusive integration policies, in accordance with Assembly

Resolution 2502

(2023)

“Integration of migrants and refugees: benefits for all parties involved”, can be supported by the ethical

use of AI, which can play a key role in accelerating the self-reliance of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers

and boosting the resilience of host communities. Tools may be co-developed with refugee communities and

NGOs and made accessible offline (telephone hotlines without internet access for example) and through voice

interfaces to bridge digital divides.

23. AI labour-matching tools should prioritise ethical criteria such as family unity and cultural fit. Gender-

sensitive design is essential to avoid reinforcing labour market segregation that directs women into low-wage

sectors. Continuous feedback loops should help address misplacements. Annual audits of AI systems used in

welfare and housing are essential to detect and correct bias. Predictive analytics can support equitable urban

planning, helping to prevent segregation and foster innovation and safety in diverse communities.

24. The Assembly calls for the creation of independent oversight bodies such as the EU Artificial

Intelligence Board, which should include civil society and legal and technological experts and should monitor

the implementation of AI-powered systems in migration, asylum and border control management based on the

guidelines of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), on the Council of

Europe Framework Convention on AI and on relevant EU regulations.

25. Robust redress and compensation mechanisms must also be available to allow for the contesting of AI-

generated evidence through expedited legal channels. Legal aid should be expanded to cover algorithmic

disputes.

26. For circular migration and return stages, AI chatbots used in return support programmes should comply

with fairness standards, avoid nudging techniques and provide unbiased information. Migrants, refugees and

asylum seekers should retain control over their data, with the ability to delete or transfer information upon

exiting programmes and a guarantee against the sharing of biometric information with the country of origin.

The sharing of biometric data with countries of origin must be banned if there is any risk of persecution. AI-

based assessments of environmental conditions may assist in determining the safety of return destinations.

27. Sustainable reintegration requires robust post-return monitoring. States should implement community-

informed impact assessments and ethical AI tools to track outcomes related to employment, housing, and

well-being. Offline-accessible AI assistants must support migrants to navigate reintegration services.

28. In line with its

Resolution 2343 (2020)

“Preventing discrimination caused by the use of artificial

intelligence”, the Assembly underscores the importance of specific action to prevent discrimination and

disproportionate negative impact on groups such as women, minorities and the most vulnerable and

marginalised individuals, including migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

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Resolution 2628 (2025)

29. Such potential discrimination in AI should be addressed at the design phase, which can usefully benefit

from the participation of civil society organisations representing migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to

increase trust and reliability. Awareness raising and training for asylum officers, NGOs and AI developers will

strengthen ethical AI deployment.

30. Member States must safeguard against the misuse of AI for disinformation, manipulation or

cyberattacks that exploit migration vulnerabilities. Geopolitical threats, including those linked to the Russian

Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, demand increased vigilance and resilience in migration policy

frameworks to avoid a negative impact on the protection offered.

31. As regards the general climate of opinion around migration issues, States should ensure that AI-

powered chatbots are used ethically to provide accessible, accurate and multilingual migration information,

and ensure that these tools are not used to manipulate narratives or asylum decisions. Here too, participatory

design in chatbot development is to be favoured.

32. To support the above measures, awareness raising and capacity building among all public and private

stakeholders – particularly public authorities and officials, developers, small and medium-sized enterprises

and start-up AI enterprises – on the use of AI in migration management is essential, based on the relevant

regulatory frameworks and practical implementation.

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https://pace.coe.int

Resolution 2629 (2025)

Sexual violence against men and boys

Parliamentary Assembly

Sexual violence against men and boys is a reality but also a hidden phenomenon which must be

prevented and combated, giving priority to the needs of all victims/survivors and without detracting attention

nor funding from addressing gender-based violence against women and girls.

There is a lack of comprehensive and disaggregated data on sexual violence against men and boys in

all their diversity in our member States, as well as limited research, which is partly due to under-reporting.

While all victims/survivors of sexual violence share the difficulties of facing stigma, negative attitudes,

and victim-blaming, the specificities of violence against men and boys need to be tackled, including different

perceptions around masculinities and sexuality.

Sexual violence against men and boys takes place in many different places and contexts: at home and

within the closest circles, in education and religious settings, during sports activities, in a migration context, in

closed institutions, and in conflict-related and humanitarian settings, among others. Measures to prevent this

violence, report and prosecute it, and support victims, need to be applied and adapted to the different

contexts.

Men and boys in all their diversity can be subjected to sexual violence regardless of age, sexual

orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics, migration status, disability, origin and any

other characteristic. All measures to prevent and combat such violence against men and boys and to protect

victims/survivors should be applied without discrimination on any ground and by adopting an intersectional

approach.

Many male victims/survivors of sexual violence need a long time to address the feelings of shame, fear

and isolation, which leads to non-reporting or doing so many years after the sexual violence took place. This is

also due to the lack of awareness and knowledge by victims/survivors about their rights, reporting

mechanisms and support services, as well as lack of trust in the justice system more broadly.

Under-reporting leads to high levels of impunity, which is compounded by the different statutes of

limitations for sexual offences against children across countries. It is therefore critical to raise awareness

about sexual violence against men and boys and to advocate for the abolition of statutes of limitations.

Engaging with male victims/survivors of sexual violence should be mainstreamed across all relevant

activities and policy-making processes, so that their lived experiences are taken into account in the

development and review of relevant policies and laws.

Studies indicate that the physical and mental health consequences of surviving sexual violence can

include anxiety, depression and suicidal tendencies, which need to be addressed as public health issues in

national policies and strategies. Official recognition of the sexual violence victims/survivors have suffered is an

important part of the healing process. This can also help them to recover and reclaim their life after the trauma

of sexual violence, by confirming that they are never responsible.

Assembly debate

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting) (see

Doc. 16250,

report of the Committee on Equality and Non-

Discrimination, rapporteur: Mr Edmunds Cepurītis).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2629 (2025)

10. The Parliamentary Assembly underlines the need to meet relevant targets under the United Nations

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, including Goal 3 on good health and well-being for all, Goal

5 to achieve gender equality, and Goal 16 to promote peaceful and inclusive societies and provide access to

justice for all.

11. The Assembly refers to its

Resolution 2533 (2024)

“Child abuse in institutions in Europe” and

Resolution 2547 (2024)

“The protection of children against online violence” as regards preventing and

combating sexual violence against boys.

12. The Assembly further refers to its

Resolution 2607 (2025)

“Protecting human rights in and through

sport: obligations and shared responsibilities” and underlines the widespread and systemic abuse of children

and vulnerable adults in sport, including sexual abuse, and the lack of victim-centred reporting mechanisms

and trauma-informed redress systems.

13. The Assembly welcomes the work carried out over the years by the Lanzarote Committee as it

oversees the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against

Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201, the “Lanzarote Convention”).

14. It further recalls that the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against

women and domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) encourages Parties to apply the

Convention to all victims of domestic violence.

15. The Assembly looks forward to the completion of the draft recommendation of the Committee of

Ministers to member States on age-appropriate comprehensive sexuality education to strengthen responses

for

inter alia

preventing and combating violence against children, as an additional tool to address sexual

violence against boys and girls. It also looks forward to the forthcoming adoption by the Committee of

Ministers of the first legal instrument on the equality of rights of intersex persons.

16. The Assembly calls on the member and observer States of the Council of Europe, and States whose

parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly:

16.1. with regard to data collection and research, to:

16.1.1. support disaggregated data collection, through official statistics and surveys, from

relevant authorities and institutions in different settings, and where appropriate, directly from

male victims/survivors themselves, about experiences and reported cases of sexual violence;

16.1.2. encourage and support research about the specificities of sexual violence against men

and boys in all their diversity, in order to successfully address the underlying factors that fuel it,

and barriers to reporting;

16.1.3. conduct research on what does and does not work well to prevent sexual violence

against men and boys in various contexts, in co-operation with specialised organisations;

16.1.4. disseminate the data and research results in accessible formats, in order to raise

awareness and to guide evidence-based policy making;

16.2. with regard to awareness-raising and other prevention measures, to:

16.2.1. conduct awareness-raising and information campaigns about sexual violence against

men and boys, targeting different settings and age groups and including accessible information

on the rights of victims/survivors, reporting mechanisms and support services;

16.2.2. develop measures to counter and challenge the “social discourse” and cultural

assumptions regarding male behaviour, roles and power dynamics that contribute to sexual

violence against men and boys and their stigmatisation, including harmful masculinities,

structural homophobia, and traditional gendered roles;

16.2.3. implement prevention programmes and measures by working,

inter alia,

with youth,

women’s rights and LGBTI organisations, focusing on challenging and transforming gender

norms to build more gender equal societies for the future;

16.2.4. make available preventive intervention programmes and measures to persons

prosecuted and/or convicted for sexual violence against children, as well as to children who

have committed sexual offences, in accordance with the Lanzarote Convention;

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Resolution 2629 (2025)

16.2.5. implement age-appropriate comprehensive sexuality education to provide boys with the

knowledge and language to protect themselves and to respect the boundaries of others, and to

address bodily integrity and sexual consent in education and outreach measures;

16.3. with regard to detecting and reporting cases of sexual violence in different settings, to:

16.3.1. create an enabling environment for professionals who work with children to report

cases of sexual violence; and consider introducing, for certain employments/professions,

mandatory reporting of sexual violence to the relevant authorities;

16.3.2. set up children-centred and trauma-informed safeguards and reporting mechanisms

where children and young men are present, such as schools, extracurricular facilities, sports

clubs, churches and online platforms,

16.3.3. ensure that systems for reporting sexual violence against men and boys are well

publicised, and tackle barriers that prevent victims/survivors from reporting;

16.3.4. tackle systemic weaknesses in organisations and institutions which leave men and

boys vulnerable to sexual violence, exposed to harm or denied access to justice;

16.4. with regard to legal and policy measures, to:

16.4.1. include male victims/survivors of sexual violence and their specific needs in national

laws and policies to prevent and combat sexual violence; and consider linking national strategies

on gender-based violence with LGBTI strategies;

16.4.2. review relevant criminal law definitions of sexual violence, including rape, and amend

them as necessary, to base them on the principle of lack of consent and include men as

possible victims;

16.4.3. consider abolishing the statute of limitations for crimes related to sexual violence

against children;

16.4.4. apply the Istanbul Convention to male victims of domestic violence, in line its Article

2(2);

16.4.5. ban so-called “conversion” or “reintegrative therapies”, and conversion practices, aimed

at changing or suppressing an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, as

they can amount to sexual violence;

16.4.6. implement integrated child protection systems that promote co-ordination among the

health, education, social protection, online support, and justice sectors, and which address the

connections between online and offline sexual violence;

16.4.7. monitor and evaluate laws, policies and measures aimed at preventing and responding

to sexual violence against men and boys, in order to make informed decisions about future

steps;

16.4.8. take measures to provide full reparation to male victims/survivors of sexual violence;

16.5. with regard to providing support to male victims/survivors of sexual violence, to:

16.5.1. establish accessible and country-wide specialised and gender-sensitive support

services, catering to the needs of men and boys victims/survivors of sexual violence without

discrimination on any ground and taking into account the specific needs of GBTI men, in co-

operation with relevant civil society organisations;

16.5.2. provide age-appropriate and quality support services, including telephone helplines,

sexual violence referral centres, healthcare, psychosocial support, legal assistance, shelters,

online counselling, as well as group and peer-to-peer counselling;

16.5.3. help and assist child victims of sexual violence in a non-traumatising environment,

including through the application of the Barnahus model;

16.5.4. provide training to relevant professionals, such as law enforcement, healthcare,

educators and social care professionals, to raise their awareness about the experiences and

needs of male victims/survivors of sexual violence, and to prevent secondary victimisation: the

HELP (Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals) course on the protection of children

against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse can be a useful tool in this respect;

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Resolution 2629 (2025)

16.6. with regard to the participation of male victims/survivors of sexual violence in the development of

measures that affect them, to:

16.6.1. involve and consult men and boys victims/survivors of sexual violence, and the

organisations representing them, when developing such measures;

16.6.2. apply the “Guidelines for policy makers on engaging with victims and survivors of child

sexual exploitation and sexual abuse ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’”, published by the Council

of Europe, to support the participation of victims/survivors in policy making;

16.6.3. consider adopting the participatory “survivors’ council” model to involve victims/

survivors of sexual violence in the development of policy and measures.

17. The Assembly invites the Lanzarote Committee to consider focusing a forthcoming edition of the Day

on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, held on 18 November each year,

on preventing and combating sexual violence against boys in all their diversity.

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Resolution 2630 (2025)

Ensuring Parliamentary Assembly members can travel freely to

carry out their work

Parliamentary Assembly

The participation of members of the Parliamentary Assembly in its work is both a right and a

responsibility. The Assembly cannot function effectively without the engagement and participation of its

members. It is the responsibility and international obligation of the member States and in particular their

national parliaments to facilitate the participation of members of the Assembly in its activities.

The Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No.1) and the General Agreement on Privileges and

Immunities of the Council of Europe (ETS No.2) create clear legally binding international obligations

prohibiting any administrative or other restrictions on the free movement of members travelling on Assembly

business. Barriers, however, still exist, hence the need to strengthen the national authorities’ understanding of

the legal requirements and the appropriate procedures to follow.

National parliaments should facilitate travel and attendance by members of the Assembly in the

exercise of their functions. Authorisation procedures should be transparent, objective and consistent with

national legislation and internal rules. National parliaments must endeavour to eliminate mechanisms or

practices by which the right of Assembly members to participate in its meetings is hampered by discretion or

interference by parliamentary or political authorities. Such political or administrative controls or delayed

authorisations are not appropriate in a healthy, functioning pluralist democracy. There should be no discretion

in issuing authorisations for members with a right to attend a meeting and any authorisation should be done

well in advance, with best practice being to approve all attendance at all foreseeable meetings of the

Assembly for the whole session. Budgetary considerations are not a justification for refusing travel to

members with a role to play in Assembly meetings.

At a minimum, attendance should be guaranteed and funded by the national parliament for:

4.1. travel to Assembly sessions for all members of the national delegation (representatives and

substitutes);

4.2.

travel to committee meetings for:

4.2.1.

full members of a committee;

4.2.2. alternate members of a committee when replacing a full member; or when the alternate

is a rapporteur and has a report on the agenda of a committee meeting, or is a candidate for

appointment as a rapporteur;

4.3. travel to meetings of the Standing Committee, Bureau or Presidential Committee where a

member’s presence is required due to their obligations to their political group, national delegation,

committee, or in respect of a report;

4.4. travel to participate in ad hoc committees. In case of exceptional financial pressures, such

participation can be organised on a rotational basis.

Assembly debate

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting) (see

Doc. 16252,

report of the Committee on Rules, Ethics and

Immunities, rapporteur: Mr Sergiy Vlasenko).

Text adopted by the Assembly

on 3 October 2025 (36th sitting).

Provisional version subject to editorial review.

https://pace.coe.int

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Resolution 2630 (2025)

In case of conflicting obligations, it should be for the member of the Assembly concerned to determine

how to balance their competing obligations as a member of the Assembly, a member of their national

parliament, and any other relevant consideration affecting them.

With respect to the composition of national delegations, the decision to remove a member’s name from

the national delegation, despite that member being proposed by their national political party or group in

accordance with the principle of fair representation of political parties or groups, is significant; it prevents that

member from participating in the work of the Assembly and undermines the spirit of fair representation. In

principle, it should be for national political groups within national parliaments to fulfil the seats allocated to

them on the delegation, without interference. Any changes to the delegation must be duly reasoned,

transparent and communicated both to the Assembly and to the political group concerned.

The Assembly notes that some impediments to the free movement of its members necessitate clarifying

the application and operation of the provisions related to the regime of parliamentary immunities in the

Assembly so that these are easier to follow for national authorities. The Assembly therefore amends Rule 73

of its Rules of Procedure and the Guidelines on the scope of parliamentary immunities enjoyed by members

of the Parliamentary Assembly (Appendix III to the Rules of Procedure) as set out in the paragraphs 13 and

14 to 19 of this resolution, in particular with the aim of providing further clarity as to:

7.1. the sorts of travel that fall within the exercise of a member’s functions for the purposes of

parliamentary immunity;

7.2. how to approach travel restrictions imposed as a result of criminal proceedings and which

negatively affect a member’s ability to fulfil their functions (for example, a travel ban, house arrest,

curfew or detention);

7.3.

the interrelationship of some of these immunities;

7.4. the practical steps that need to be taken by parliamentary, judicial, investigatory and

prosecutorial authorities when dealing with a case in which immunities of a member of the Assembly

are engaged.

The Assembly regrets that there remain instances of failures by national authorities to respect the

immunities of its members, which consequently impedes the ability of those members to fulfil their functions.

The Assembly resolves to clearly assert and defend these immunities in cases where they are not respected.

The Assembly wishes to support the President of the Assembly in his prerogatives, and encourages the

President to inform the Assembly of such cases so that appropriate measures can be taken.

The Assembly recalls that parliamentary inviolability for words spoken and votes cast in national

parliaments, and in interparliamentary assemblies, is a core democratic principle common to democratic

States and is reflected in Article 14 of the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities and Article 40 of

the Statute of the Council of Europe.

10. The Assembly deplores Azerbaijan’s reported “blacklist” of at least 77 members of the Assembly from

at least 28 member States of the Council of Europe, including the President of the Assembly, whose names

have been added to that list due to votes cast or opinions expressed in the Assembly and who have since

been subject to “sanctions” such as a travel ban from entering Azerbaijan. The Assembly calls on the

Azerbaijani authorities to approach to Azerbaijan’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe in good

faith and to immediately remove any “sanctions” imposed in consequence of protected activities such as

voting or expressing opinions within the Assembly.

11. The Assembly expresses concern at the politically motivated criminal proceedings against some of its

members by the Russian Federation and notes concerns that the Russian Federation may seek to abuse

international co-operation mechanisms such as Interpol to persecute foreign parliamentarians and members

of the Assembly. The Assembly underlines that its members benefit from parliamentary immunities, including

immunity from arrest, detention or prosecution. No arrest warrant, from Interpol or otherwise, should be issued

or given effect, in respect of those highly politically-motivated criminal proceedings given their political nature

and the immunities from which members of the Assembly benefit. The Assembly invites Interpol to take note

of its position.

12.

The Assembly invites all Council of Europe member States to:

12.1. inform the Assembly of their domestic parliamentary immunity provisions;

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Resolution 2630 (2025)

12.2. provide clear guidance and appropriate training on the requirements of the General Agreement

on Privileges and Immunities to national investigatory, prosecutorial and judicial authorities, building on

the revised “Guidelines on the scope of parliamentary immunities enjoyed by members of the

Parliamentary Assembly”, so that these authorities are aware of the Guidelines and of the actions to

take if dealing with a case that concerns immunities of members of the Assembly;

12.3. review their visa requirements for members of the Assembly travelling on Assembly business, to

ensure that the length and complexity of the form; the cost; and the time taken in delivering the visa, are

reduced to the minimum necessary, in accordance with the prohibition in Article 13 of the General

Agreement on Privileges and Immunities on “administrative or other restrictions” impeding the free

movement of members of the Assembly;

12.4. ensure that their border guards and customs officers are properly informed about the Council of

Europe, the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities and the Council of Europe laissez-

passer. The Assembly notes that the agenda for a committee meeting contains the convocation for

members of that committee. This should suffice for proving that the provisions of the General

Agreement on Privileges and Immunities apply to members travelling to attend that meeting.

Extract of the Assembly Rules of Procedure

13.

Rule 73 – Waiver of the immunity of representatives and substitutes

13.1. (73.1) Members of the Assembly enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the General

Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (of 2 September 1949) and its

Additional Protocol (of 6 November 1952). These immunities are granted in order to preserve the

integrity of the Assembly and to safeguard the independence of its members in exercising their

European office.

13.2. (73.2.) Any request addressed to the President by a competent authority of a member State for

the waiver of immunity of a representative or substitute shall be announced in a plenary sitting or

Standing Committee meeting and then referred to the Committee on Rules, Ethics and Immunities (“the

Rules Committee”).

13.3. (73.3.) The Rules Committee shall immediately consider the request. It may issue an opinion on

the competence of the requesting authority and on the formal admissibility of this request. It shall not

make any examination of the merits of the case in question. In particular, the Rules Committee shall

not, under any circumstances, pronounce on the guilt or otherwise of the member, or on whether or not

the opinions or acts attributed to him or her justify prosecution. At the earliest opportunity, it shall

provide the member concerned by the request, or another member of the Assembly representing the

member, with an opportunity to be heard. The member concerned may submit any document which he

or she deems relevant. The Rules Committee may ask the competent national authorities to provide it

with any information and details it considers necessary to determine whether or not immunity should be

waived. The report of the Rules Committee shall conclude with a draft resolution for the retention or the

waiver of immunity. No amendment to that decision will be admissible

13.4. (73.4.) The report shall be the first item of business of the Assembly on the first sitting day after

the report has been tabled. The debate on the report shall be confined to arguments for or against the

waiver of immunity. In the event of the request to waive immunity relating to more than one accusation,

each of these may be the subject of a separate decision.

13.5. (73.5.) The President shall immediately communicate the decision of the Assembly to the

authority which submitted the request.

13.6. (73.6.) In the event of a member of the Assembly being arrested or deprived of freedom of

movement in supposed violation of their privileges and immunities, the President of the Assembly may

take the initiative of confirming the privileges and immunities of the member concerned, where

applicable following consultation of the competent Assembly bodies. The President of the Assembly

may ask the competent national authorities to provide any information and details considered

necessary. A member or former member may address a request to the President of the Assembly to

defend his or her immunity and privileges. At the request of the President, the Bureau may, subject to

ratification by the Assembly, refer the case to the relevant committee.

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13.7. (73.7.) When dealing with requests for the waiver of the Council of Europe immunity, or with

requests to defend the immunity of an Assembly member, the competent Assembly organs shall

interpret the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe as follows:

13.7.1. (73.7.a.) Assembly members (representatives and substitutes) are immune from

prosecution, arrest and deprivation of their free movement in the exercise of their functions as

Assembly members or when travelling on Assembly business, whether this is inside or outside

of their national territory. If they are not active within this meaning or not travelling on Assembly

business, the national regime shall apply within their country.

13.7.2. (73.7.b.) The terms “deprivation of their free movement” include measures that contain

administrative, legal, judicial or other restrictions on an Assembly member’s free movement and

includes detention, house arrest, curfew, surrender of passport and travel ban (whether an

absolute travel prohibition or a travel ban requiring judicial authorisation for travel). It does not

include a measure that explicitly allows travel in the exercise of their functions as a member of

the Assembly.

13.7.3. (73.7.c.) The terms “in the exercise of their functions” include all official duties

discharged by Assembly members in the member States on the basis of a decision by a

competent Assembly body and, if necessary, with the consent of the appropriate national

authorities. It includes (but is not limited to) travel to attend:

–

Assembly sessions (for all members of the Assembly).

meetings of the Standing Committee (for all members of the Assembly)

meetings of the Presidential Committee (for members of the Presidential Committee or

those covering for them)

meetings of the Bureau of the Assembly (for members of the Bureau or those covering

for them)

meetings of general committees, ad hoc committees, including ad hoc committees on

the observation of elections, sub-committees and ad hoc sub-committees (for both full

members and, where applicable, alternate members of those committees or sub-

committees)

meetings of networks, platforms and alliances of the Assembly

travel on a mission as a rapporteur of the Assembly

travel on a representative mission on behalf of the Assembly or a committee.

–

13.7.4. (73.7.d.) In case of doubt, the Bureau of the Assembly shall decide if Assembly

members’ activities took place in the exercise of their functions.

13.8. (73.8.) In cases where there are concerns that the immunities and privileges protected under the

General Agreement in Privileges and Immunities have not been fully respected, the President may

make a statement during the next part-session. This statement should note any recent interference with

such privileges and immunities, and, if necessary, may remind the competent authorities of their

obligations set out under the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities.

13.9. (73.9.) The guidelines on the scope of parliamentary immunities enjoyed by members of the

Parliamentary Assembly shall be appended to these Rules of Procedure as a complementary text.

Guidelines on the scope of the parliamentary immunities enjoyed by members of the Parliamentary Assembly

(Appendix of the Resolution 2392 (2021) adopted by the Assembly on 27 September 2021 (as amended))

14.

(A.) Purpose and general principles

14.1. The following principles pursue the objective of clarifying the application of the existing rules

under the Statute of the Council of Europe and under the General Agreement on Privileges and

Immunities of the Council of Europe (hereafter “GAPI”) and the Additional Protocol thereto.

14.2. Members of the Parliamentary Assembly enjoy privileges and immunities which serve to

preserve the integrity of the Assembly and ensure the independence of its members in the discharge of

their office. These privileges and immunities are granted by Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of

Europe and by Articles 13 to 15 of the GAPI and Article 3 of the Additional Protocol thereto.

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14.3. Their practical implementation is further detailed in the Rules of Procedure and relevant

Assembly resolutions bearing in mind:

–

the need to protect the independence of the Assembly;

the functional purpose underlying the concept of immunities;

existing precedents.

14.4. Parliamentary immunity is not a member’s personal privilege but an institutional privilege which

members enjoy in their individual capacity.

15.

(B.) The immunities of members of the Parliamentary Assembly that are protected and

guaranteed under the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe

15.1. The following immunities of Assembly members are protected and guaranteed under the GAPI,

the Statute of the Council of Europe and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly:

15.1.1. Absolute immunity in respect of words spoken and votes cast in the meetings of the

Assembly (Article 14 GAPI and Article 40 of the Statute).

15.1.2. Free movement of members of the Assembly to and from meetings of the Assembly –

with a clear prohibition on the imposition of administrative or other restrictions on such

movement (Article 13 GAPI, Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure). This includes and is linked to:

15.1.2.1. immunity from detention – unless the Assembly has waived such immunity

(Articles 13 and 15 GAPI, Article 3 of the Protocol to GAPI, Article 40 of the Statute and

Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure);

15.1.2.2. immunity from other restrictions affecting travel on Assembly business, such

as the imposition of a travel ban, house arrest or curfew, unless (1) that measure

expressly allows all travel to Assembly meetings; or (2) the Assembly has waived such

immunity (Articles 13 and 15 GAPI as read together, Article 40 of the Statute, as well

as Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure);

15.1.2.3. immunity from arrest, except in case of in

flagrante delicto

(Article 15 GAPI).

15.1.3. Immunity from prosecution, specifically:

15.1.3.1. immunity from prosecution on the territory of other member States (Article

15.b GAPI, Article 3 of the Protocol to GAPI, Article 40 of the Statute and Rule 73 of the

Rules of Procedure);

15.1.3.2. on the national territory, immunity from prosecution on the same terms as

national protections in respect of parliamentary immunity from prosecution (Article 15.a

GAPI, Article 3 of the Protocol to GAPI, Article 40 of the Statute and Rule 73 of the

Rules of Procedure); the application of this immunity requires an understanding of the

extent of the national law providing for parliamentary immunity.

16.

(C.) Absolute immunity in respect of words spoken and votes cast (Article 14 of the General

Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe)

16.1. Freedom of expression is the most valuable tool enabling members to exercise their duties and

it enjoys enhanced protection. Therefore, the immunity guaranteed by Article 14 GAPI:

16.1.1. is absolute, permanent and perpetual in nature; it continues to apply after the end of a

member’s mandate; it cannot be waived by the Parliamentary Assembly or a national

parliament;

16.1.2. is an institutional privilege; a member or a former member has no liberty to waive or to

renounce it;

16.1.3. applies to all legal proceedings (criminal, civil or administrative) which may arise in

relation to words spoken and votes cast. As a corollary, no parliamentarian covered by such an

immunity should be heard, including as a testifying witness, with regard to information obtained

confidentially in the performance of their parliamentary duties which they do not see fit to

disclose;

16.1.4. has an autonomous scope, which could be different from the scope of the absolute

immunity that protects national parliamentarians, to be established bearing in mind relevant

statutory provisions, the case law of the European jurisdictions and relevant Assembly practices;

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16.1.5. given the exceptional protection, covers merely what is strictly necessary to allow the

Assembly members to perform their duties, engage in respectful debate or express critical

positions while precluding the misuse of the privileges and immunities for personal benefit. With

this in mind, immunity does not cover activities prohibited by the Code of Conduct for members

of the Parliamentary Assembly, such as paid advocacy;

16.1.6. covers words spoken and votes cast by the members of the Assembly “in the exercise

of their functions”, bearing in mind the present-day definition of core functions of the Assembly

members;

16.1.7. could, in addition to covering statements made by members during a debate in the

plenary or during meetings of the committees and sub-committees, be also extended to verbal

and written statements made by members outside official premises as well as to other activities

performed by them in their capacity as Assembly members if there is an obvious and direct

connection between these statements or activities and the exercise of their functions as

Assembly members;

16.1.8. does not cover an inquiry into bribery-related offences (for example, offering or

requesting undue advantages in return for certain voting behaviour), given that those offences

do not pertain to words spoken or votes cast.

16.2. It is the responsibility of competent national courts to recognise that a member or a former

member enjoys absolute immunity owing to the direct and obvious link to his or her parliamentary

functions. By doing so, the relevant Council of Europe bodies and national courts must co-operate so

as to avoid any conflict in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute and the

General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities

16.3. Where a request for waiver of immunity is submitted to it by a national authority, the Assembly

must first of all ascertain whether the facts giving rise to the request for the waiver are covered by

Article 14 GAPI, in which case immunity cannot be waived.

16.4. It is inherent in Article 40.a of the Statute, and Article 14 as read with Article 13 GAPI, that the

imposition of sanctions, entry or exit restrictions or so-called “blacklisting” of members of the Assembly

in consequence of words spoken or votes cast in debates of the Assembly is a violation of GAPI, of

democratic principles and of a State’s obligations as member of the Council of Europe.

17.

(D.) Immunity from prosecution (Article 15 of the General Agreement on Privileges and

Immunities of the Council of Europe)

17.1. The purpose of this immunity is to protect a parliamentarian from undue pressure which could be

exercised against him or her in respect of acts which do not constitute a part of typical parliamentary

activities and applies as follows:

17.1.1. members of the Assembly enjoy the immunity provided for in Article 15 during the

Assembly sessions. The term “during the sessions” covers the whole parliamentary year in view

of the continuous activity of the Assembly and its bodies;

17.1.2. members of the Assembly enjoy the immunities secured by this provision when they

are no longer members of their national parliament, and do so until their replacement as

members of the Assembly or until the opening of the next session;

17.1.3. according to the Statute, protection afforded to members of the Assembly applies

during their Assembly mandate. It could also cover proceedings initiated prior to becoming a

member of the Assembly as long as those proceedings contain evidence of

fumus persecutionis.

This position, which intends to make protection fully effective, is in line with practices existing in

several member States and does not contradict the Statute in that it links the acquisition of

immunity to the beginning of the term of office. Nor does it contradict the principle of the

functionality of parliamentary immunity in that the protection will only be granted if factual

elements indicate that the intention underlying the legal proceeding predating the mandate of an

Assembly member is to damage a member’s political activity and thus the Assembly. In all other

cases if the prosecution is for no other reason than the proper administration of justice, immunity

must be lifted at the request of the national authority;

17.1.4. immunity cannot be invoked in cases of in

flagrante delicto.

As the objective of this

provision is to quickly restore public order and reduce the risk of evidence disappearing, its use

by national authorities shall not be inspired by concerns unrelated to the proper administration of

justice;

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17.1.5. at all stages when parliamentary immunity is waived the presumption of innocence

must be respected;

17.1.6. when considering a request to waive immunity, the Assembly must consider the

following elements: legal proceedings initiated against the member should not jeopardise the

proper functioning of the Assembly; the request must be serious, that is, not inspired by reasons

other than that of dispensing justice. If neither of these elements can be established, the

Assembly should normally propose waiving immunity;

17.1.7. immunity cannot be waived except by the Assembly at the request of a “competent

authority” of the member State concerned. The competent authority is normally the judge in

charge of the case, but it could also be the public prosecutor or the Minister of Justice. The

request to waive immunity may be submitted by an authority of a member State other than the

one of which the member in question is a national;

17.1.8. where members are required to appear as witnesses or expert witnesses, there is no

need to request a waiver of immunity provided that they will not be obliged to appear on a date

or at a time which prevents them from performing their parliamentary duties or which makes it

difficult for them to perform those duties, or if they are able to provide a statement in writing or in

any other form which does not make it difficult for them to perform their parliamentary duties.

18.

(E.) Immunity from measures preventing travel on Assembly business, such as detention, a

travel ban, house arrest or curfew, unless the measure expressly allows all travel on Assembly

business (Articles 13 and 15 of the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of

Europe as read together, Article 3 of the Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and

Immunities of the Council of Europe, Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, and Rule 73 of

the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure)

18.1. Article 13 GAPI prohibits all administrative or other restrictions from being imposed on a

member’s free movement to and from meetings of the Assembly. The purpose of this immunity is to

allow the free movement of members of the Assembly travelling on Assembly business – that is to say,

to ensure that members of the Assembly are able to travel in the exercise of their official functions and

are not unduly prevented from performing those functions without an appropriate waiver of that

immunity.

18.2. The term “in the exercise of their functions” includes all official duties discharged by Assembly

members in the member States on the basis of a decision by a competent Assembly body and, if

necessary, with the consent of the appropriate national authorities. It includes (but is not limited to)

travel to attend:

–

Assembly sessions (for all members of the Assembly);

meetings of the Standing Committee (for all members of the Assembly);

meetings of the Presidential Committee (for members of the Presidential Committee or those

covering for them);

meetings of the Bureau of the Assembly (for members of the Bureau or those covering for

them);

meetings of general committees, ad hoc committees, including ad hoc committees on the

observation of elections, sub-committees and ad hoc sub-committees (for both full members

and, where applicable, alternate members of those committees or sub-committees);

meetings of networks, platforms and alliances of the Assembly;

travel on a mission as a rapporteur of the Assembly;

travel on a representative mission on behalf of the Assembly or a committee.

–

18.3. This includes immunity from the imposition of measures restricting travel (such as detention,

house arrest, curfew, travel ban or the surrender of a passport) unless (i) that measure expressly allows

all travel on Assembly business; or (ii) the Assembly has waived such immunity

18.4. In the case of a judicial, prosecutorial or investigatory service wishing to impose measures

restricting a member’s travel (such as detention, house arrest, a curfew, a travel ban or bail conditions

restricting travel) that would not expressly allow all travel on Assembly business, then they would first

need to make an application to waive immunity before imposing such a measure

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18.5. This immunity applies as follows:

18.5.1. members of the Assembly enjoy the immunity provided for in Articles 13 and 15 during

the Assembly sessions. The term “during the sessions” covers the whole parliamentary year in

view of the continuous activity of the Assembly and its bodies;

18.5.2. members of the Assembly enjoy the immunities secured by this provision when they

are no longer members of their national parliament, and do so until their replacement as

members of the Assembly or until the opening of the next session;

18.5.3. according to the Statute, protection afforded to members of the Assembly applies

during their Assembly mandate. It could also cover proceedings initiated or related to events that

occurred prior to becoming a member of the Assembly, given that a member of the Assembly

needs to be at liberty to travel in order to fulfil their mandate, and therefore such protection is

necessary if this immunity and their role are to be fully effective. However, in cases where a

measure is necessary for the proper administration of justice and no lesser options are feasible

in the circumstances, immunity must be lifted at the request of the national authority;

18.5.4. immunity cannot be invoked in cases of a short duration arrest in

flagrante delicto.

the objective of this provision is to quickly restore public order and reduce the risk of evidence

disappearing, its use by national authorities shall not be inspired by concerns unrelated to the

proper administration of justice and must only be of a very short duration;

18.5.5. at all stages when parliamentary immunity is waived the presumption of innocence

must be respected;

18.5.6. when considering a request to waive immunity, the Assembly must consider the

following elements: legal proceedings initiated against the member should not jeopardise the

proper functioning of the Assembly; the request must be serious, that is, not inspired by reasons

other than that of dispensing justice. If neither of these elements can be established, the

Assembly should normally propose waiving immunity;

18.5.7. immunity cannot be waived except by the Assembly at the request of a “competent

authority” of the member State concerned. The competent authority is normally the judge in

charge of the case, but it could also be the public prosecutor or the Minister of Justice. The

request to waive immunity may be submitted by an authority of a member State other than the

one of which the member in question is a national;

18.5.8. restriction of the liberty and free movement of an Assembly member requires very

serious grounds as it prevents him or her from exercising his or her functions. Where there are

no indications that the suspect is likely to evade justice, the proper conduct of the investigation

shall be ensured, if possible, by other security measures (release on bail, for example).

19.

(F.) Practical Guide for judicial, prosecutorial or investigatory authorities in bringing a

prosecution against a member of the Parliamentary Assembly

19.1. This part of the guidelines is intended as a practical guide for investigators, prosecutors and

judges when dealing with criminal cases concerning members of the Assembly.

19.2. A waiver of immunity is required prior to:

19.2.1. imposing measures which restrict the travel of a member of the Assembly – this

includes arrest, detention, house arrest, curfew, travel ban or bail conditions restricting travel

(such as the retention of a passport). If the measures expressly does not apply to travel on

Parliamentary Assembly business, then a waiver of immunity is not required;

19.2.2. in the member’s national country, initiating the prosecution of a member of the

Assembly if such a waiver of immunity is required under national law;

19.2.3. in all other member States, initiating a prosecution of a member of the Assembly.

19.3. The procedure for seeking the waiver of immunity is as follows (subject to any national

procedural requirements that may apply):

19.3.1. the “competent authority” (usually the judge in charge of case, the public prosecutor or

the Minister of Justice) must submit a request addressed to the President of the Assembly, in

writing, seeking a waiver of immunity;

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19.3.2. the request for the waiver of immunity must specify the reasons for the request,

specifically what the waiver of immunity relates to including:

19.3.2.1. whether the request is to waive immunity for the purposes of (1) restriction

of free movement (for example a travel ban, detention, house arrest, curfew or other

travel restriction); and/or (2) initiation of prosecution;

19.3.2.2. the charges or offences to which the request relates;

19.3.2.3. whether any lesser measures have been considered that would still enable

the member’s full participation in the activities of the Assembly (and if so, what

measures and any reasoning as to why they have or have not been pursued).

19.3.3. the Assembly, specifically the Committee on Rules, Ethics and Immunities, will

consider the request immediately in accordance with the procedure set out in Rule 73 of the

Rules of Procedure and the Guidelines on Parliamentary Immunities.

19.4. Where an investigative, prosecutorial or judicial authority has imposed any of the measures

listed in paragraph 18 above on a member of the Assembly without a waiver of immunity, the following

actions should be taken:

19.4.1. The parliamentary authorities (normally the Speaker of the national parliament) should

write to the relevant judicial, prosecutorial and/or investigatory authorities underlining the

existence of the immunities under GAPI and the legal impossibility of imposing the relevant

measure (travel restriction, detention or – if applicable – initiation of prosecution) without the

waiver of immunity by the Assembly. This letter should explain the procedure for requesting the

waiver of immunity and the importance of not imposing (or annulling the imposition of) any such

measures unless and until such immunity has been waived.

19.4.2. If necessary, the President of the Assembly should write to the Speaker of the national

parliament recalling the immunities under GAPI, asserting the defence of the immunity of the

relevant member of the Assembly, and asking the Speaker to take the relevant steps to ensure

that the national authorities (including the executive and judicial authorities) are fully aware of

these obligations and of the steps to be taken to seek a waiver of immunity before the imposition

of any measures restricting travel (for example detention, travel ban, house arrest) or – if

applicable – instigation of prosecution