Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21
FOU Alm.del Bilag 89
Offentligt
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Why NATO Members Should Join
the UN Ban on Nuclear Weapons
 FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 89: ICAN-rapporten "A NON NUCLEAR ALLIANCE – Why NATO members should join the UN ban on Nuclear Weapons", fra FORBYD ATOMVÅBEN - ICAN i Danmark
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PRINCIPAL AUTHORS
Richard Lennane
Tim Wright
OTHER CONTRIBUTORS
Elizabeth Minor
Seth Shelden
Jean-Marie Collin
Daniel Högsta
Florian Eblenkamp
Noah Nicholas
The authors thank those who
reviewed a draft of the report.
[email protected]
PUBLISHED JUNE 2021
 FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 89: ICAN-rapporten "A NON NUCLEAR ALLIANCE – Why NATO members should join the UN ban on Nuclear Weapons", fra FORBYD ATOMVÅBEN - ICAN i Danmark
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Contents
Summary
5
11
17
35
51
63
93
99
103
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Disarmament for Security
Moving in the Wrong Direction
A New Global Norm
Benefits of Joining the Ban
Support for the Ban within NATO
Myths and Misconceptions
Towards a Non-Nuclear Alliance
Annex: TPNW
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The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear
Weapons (ICAN) is a Nobel Peace Prize-winning
coalition of non-government organisations in over
one hundred countries promoting adherence to the
UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Abbreviations
APMBC
BWC
CCW
CWC
IAEA
ICAN
NATO
NPT
TPNW
WMD
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
Biological Weapons Convention
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Chemical Weapons Convention
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Weapons of Mass Destruction
COVER
Foreign ministers from NATO member states meet ahead of the NATO Summit in
Brussels in June 2021 to discuss “how to continue to adapt NATO for the future”. Credit: NATO
INSIDE COVER
Negotiations for the TPNW are held in New York in June 2017. Credit: ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Summary
s the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) holds its 2021
Summit in Brussels to take decisions on the NATO 2030 agenda and
set the strategic direction of the alliance over the coming decade,
the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has
prepared this report as a substantive and comprehensive contribution
to the deliberations of NATO members on nuclear weapons and nuclear
disarmament. The report aims to provide perspectives, evidence, and
analysis to help NATO members navigate the path to achieving the
alliance’s stated goals of complete implementation of the Nuclear
Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and global nuclear disarmament.
A
Disarmament for Security
NATO has long recognised the threat that nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction pose to its security, and for this reason has
repeatedly expressed its commitment to arms control, disarmament,
and the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons. As the NATO
2030 Reflection Group concluded:
Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation play an important
role in promoting peace in the Euro-Atlantic region and preserving
a stable international order. NATO has for many years actively
contributed to effective and verifiable nuclear arms control and
disarmament efforts, not only as an Alliance but through the efforts
of its members. Beyond Cold War-era frameworks, Allies have long
recognised the threat posed by WMD, as well as their means of
delivery, by state and non-state actors.
1
All NATO members are parties to the NPT. Under this treaty, the three
NATO members that possess nuclear weapons – France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States – have made an “unequivocal undertaking
… to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals”.
2
Many NATO members have played key roles in developing NPT review
conference agreements on practical steps towards nuclear disarmament
1
NATO 2030: United for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group
Appointed by the NATO Secretary General,
NATO, 25 November 2020, p. 36.
2
Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, p. 14.
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
and preventing proliferation. All members have signed the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and all except the United States have ratified it.
3
NATO’s stated commitment to nuclear non‑proliferation and
disarmament, and the efforts deriving from it, are based on a clear
understanding of the scope and magnitude of the threat. Any use of
nuclear weapons would have wide-ranging and catastrophic effects –
as catalogued in detail by three international conferences held in 2013
and 2014, in which almost all NATO members participated. As well as
the immediate and massive destruction, death, and displacement, these
effects include profound and long-term damage to the environment,
climate, human health, and socio‑economic development.
A deteriorating global security environment, rising tensions among
nuclear-armed states, aggressive behaviour by Russia and China, and the
build‑up of nuclear forces are increasing the risks of nuclear weapons
being used, and exacerbating the already acute threat posed to NATO
members and their populations by nuclear weapons. NATO continues to
rely on the long‑contested policy of “nuclear deterrence” to try to meet
these growing threats. But even supporters of that policy are starting to
recognise that the evolving security challenges described in the NATO 2030
Reflection Group report – such as terrorism, emerging and disruptive
technologies, cyber, hybrid, and “grey zone” warfare – are not amenable
to deterrence. Overall, current dynamics are simultaneously increasing the
risk of nuclear weapons being used while further diminishing their already
disputed utility.
Moving in the Wrong Direction
Given the growing risks, it would be natural for NATO to be reinvigorating
and accelerating its efforts on nuclear disarmament. Perversely, however,
the alliance has been moving in the opposite direction – contrary to its
own objectives, and undermining its own security.
Despite NPT commitments to work to reduce stockpiles and diminish the
role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines,
4
the three nuclear‑armed
NATO members are all modernising and enhancing their nuclear arsenals.
In some cases, they are developing new weapons, or new missions. The
United Kingdom recently announced that it will
increase
the maximum
size of its nuclear arsenal and reduce the information it provides about it.
5
These moves not only breach existing commitments,
6
they show contempt
for the good-faith efforts by non-nuclear-armed NATO members on
verification and other practical steps to facilitate nuclear disarmament.
Equally disturbingly, these moves have been accompanied by a hardening
of NATO rhetoric in favour of nuclear weapons, and a tendency within
the alliance to “circle the wagons” around nuclear deterrence. Political
support by individual NATO members for retaining and even expanding
3
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty,
opened for signature on 10 September 1996. Ratification by
China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the US is still needed for entry into force.
4
Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.
5
See “Five Ways the UK Is Undermining the NPT”, ICAN, 7 April 2021.
6
See, for example, “Legality under International Law of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Policy as Set out
in the 2021 Integrated Review”, legal opinion by Christine Chinkin and Louise Arimatsu, April 2021.
6
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
NATO’s nuclear weapons capability is increasingly seen as a test of
loyalty and unity; dissent or simply discussion of the wisdom of NATO’s
continuing dependence on nuclear weapons is less and less tolerated.
Although the North Atlantic Treaty – NATO’s foundation document –
makes no mention of nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence, and many
NATO members have resisted a nuclear doctrine for the organisation,
NATO was officially dubbed a “nuclear alliance” in the 2010 Strategic
Concept,
7
and this deliberate embedding of nuclear weapons in the
alliance’s identity has steadily continued in the decade since.
Coming at a time when much of the world is strengthening and expanding
the norm against nuclear weapons by joining the 2017 Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this trend within NATO has
unfortunate consequences: it undermines NATO’s security by encouraging
proliferation of nuclear weapons, by provoking arms racing in nuclear‑
armed rivals, and by severely constraining the possible scope of action
for the alliance and its members to pursue effective steps towards
nuclear disarmament. It stifles diversity of opinion and policy, narrows
perspectives and options, and needlessly closes off potential pathways to
improving cooperation and partnerships with those outside the alliance.
A New Global Norm
Nowhere is the harmful effect of this trend clearer than in the relationship
of NATO with the TPNW. NATO has been adamantly opposed and hostile to
this treaty – an approach which is both unnecessary and directly contrary
to NATO’s own security interests.
The objective of the TPNW is the same as that professed by NATO: ending
the nuclear weapons threat by totally eliminating nuclear weapons. The
differences therefore come down to the means by which this objective
is to be achieved. While some NATO members have said that they are
not willing or ready to commit to a total prohibition of nuclear weapons
immediately, and all NATO members wish to ensure that NATO military
planning, cooperation, and interoperability are not hampered by nuclear
disarmament measures, it is unwise that NATO should attempt to impose
a blanket ban on engagement with and support for the TPNW by alliance
members that are ready and willing to explore the potential for the treaty
to contribute to the achievement of NATO’s nuclear disarmament goals
and fulfilment of its obligations.
Throughout the history of NATO, members of the alliance have taken
different approaches to weapons and strategy issues. As the NATO 2030
Reflection Group notes, “as befits a community of sovereign democratic
states, NATO has never been able to achieve complete harmony”.
8
Individual member states have adopted a variety of different policies
concerning the degree of their involvement with NATO’s nuclear weapons.
Many members have joined treaties that comprehensively outlaw certain
weapons that remain in use in other NATO states. None of this has caused
any fundamental strategic or operational problem for the alliance.
7
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,
adopted by NATO in 2010, p. 5.
8
NATO 2030: United for a New Era,
NATO, 2020, p. 20.
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
As the Reflection Group concludes:
Allies have occasionally disagreed in the past over interests and
values, sometimes straining the Alliance. Yet another key to NATO’s
success is that it has been resilient in the face of many challenges
because Allies do not deviate, even under strained circumstances,
from an inviolable commitment to defending each other’s security.
9
There is no legal reason that NATO allies cannot join the TPNW; doing
so would not infringe any treaty obligation.
10
This has been confirmed by
academic institutions and government authorities in a number of member
states. Questions over military cooperation with nuclear‑armed allies
would be best solved by one or more NATO members joining the TPNW and
establishing practice and precedent along with other TPNW states parties,
as was done with the treaties prohibiting anti‑personnel landmines and
cluster munitions.
Conversely, the approach of blanket dismissal of and hostile
non‑engagement with the TPNW will only constrain NATO’s options,
alienate potential partners, and push the alliance’s nuclear disarmament
goal further out of reach. The best way for NATO members to defend each
other’s security – and promote international peace and stability – is to
support the prohibition and work to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Benefits of Joining the Ban
The TPNW offers NATO members a practical means of renewing and
reinvigorating their pursuit of the NATO objective of reducing and
eventually eliminating the security threats posed by nuclear weapons. By
joining the TPNW, individual NATO states can help to build and entrench a
robust new global norm against nuclear weapons, strengthening barriers
against proliferation, diminishing pressure for nuclear arms races, and
reducing the overall reliance of NATO on nuclear weapons (in line with
NPT commitments), opening up pathways for progress on disarmament.
By joining the TPNW, NATO members will clearly demonstrate their
commitment and good faith in fully discharging their NPT disarmament
obligations. This will significantly lessen tensions in the NPT, and allow
these states to act as credible and effective bridge-builders in helping to
repair relations between nuclear‑armed and non‑nuclear‑armed states
and find common ground for renewed cooperation and progress on
implementing all aspects of the NPT.
NATO members joining the TPNW will have the opportunity to participate
in exploring and designing structured approaches to key disarmament
challenges such as verification and irreversibility. They will be able to work
with other TPNW states parties to ensure that the treaty regime develops
in a way that offers the best chance of securing the eventual accession
of all nuclear‑armed states, and meets the security needs of all NATO
members for verifiable, irreversible disarmament.
9
Ibid.
10
See, for example, “Nuclear Umbrella Arrangements and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School, June 2018.
8
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
The TPNW also offers NATO members a structured means of participating
in and contributing to assistance to victims of nuclear testing and efforts
to remediate environmental damage caused by testing (including by three
NATO members). NATO members have played a leading and vital role in
implementing, or supporting the implementation of, similar provisions in
the treaties prohibiting anti‑personnel landmines and cluster munitions.
Support for the Ban within NATO
Given that the objectives of the TPNW are fully in line with those of NATO,
and that widespread adoption and implementation of the treaty will
increase NATO’s security, it is not surprising that there is strong support
within many NATO member states for joining the TPNW.
A range of former leaders, including NATO secretaries general and defence
and foreign ministers, have called on NATO states to join the TPNW.
11
Parliaments in NATO states have passed motions in support of the treaty;
cities across the alliance have called on their governments to join it.
There have been many statements of support from religious leaders and
civil society organisations. Public opinion polls in many NATO states
consistently support, by a clear margin, accession to the TPNW.
The TPNW also enjoys support among key NATO partners. In Europe,
Austria, Ireland, and Malta are states parties; in the Asia-Pacific, US allies
New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand have joined. This list will only
grow; cooperation between NATO members and TPNW states parties is
already a reality and will steadily become more common.
In light of all this, it is difficult to reconcile the foundational mission for
NATO, as set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, to “safeguard the freedom,
common heritage, and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the
principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”
12
with the
bitter and intransigent opposition to the TPNW displayed so far by NATO.
Myths and Misconceptions
While some criticism of the TPNW is made in good faith and based on
genuine analysis, much of the opposition – including, regrettably, from a
number of NATO member states – is based on myths, misconceptions, and
sometimes deliberate falsehoods.
The TPNW does not contradict or undermine the NPT; not only is it fully
compatible with and complementary to the NPT, it was designed as a
means of implementing Article VI of the NPT. The non‑proliferation
aspects of the TPNW, including the safeguards provisions, are at least as
strong and verifiable as those of the NPT, and in some important respects
stronger; a non‑nuclear‑armed state withdrawing from the NPT and
joining the TPNW would certainly gain no additional freedom or ability to
pursue a nuclear‑weapon programme.
11
“Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, 21 September 2020.
12
North Atlantic Treaty, adopted on 4 April 1949, entered into force on 24 August 1949, preamble.
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Nuclear disarmament under the TPNW does not “lack verification”; on the
contrary, Article 4 of the treaty clearly requires legally binding verification
measures to be elucidated, agreed, and applied to any disarmament
procedure. Unverified disarmament is simply not permitted by the treaty.
By any measure, the TPNW’s disarmament verification provisions are far
ahead of those of the NPT – which does not have any.
The TPNW does not require unilateral disarmament (although it certainly
allows for it – and many states parties, as well as ICAN, would encourage
it). The TPNW was designed to facilitate the simultaneous accession of any
number of nuclear‑armed states, which can negotiate a joint disarmament
plan with TPNW states parties in accordance with Article 4.
Towards a Non-Nuclear Alliance
NATO currently labels itself a “nuclear alliance”. But if it should one day
reach its long‑standing goals of full implementation of the NPT and global
nuclear disarmament, it will necessarily be a “non‑nuclear alliance”. This
would surely be something to celebrate. Yet rather than openly aspiring
to achieving such status, and discussing how it might look and function,
the alliance seems to be actively avoiding – even suppressing – any
consideration of the possibility. This is a dangerously counterproductive
and shortsighted approach. As the NATO 2030 Reflection Group concluded:
[T]he Alliance would benefit from adopting a long-term perspective
and re-embracing the vision of NATO from earlier decades – as a
preventative tool to shape its environment rather than primarily
an instrument for managing crises once they have already broken
out. This proactive mentality should permeate how Allies think
about strengthening NATO’s political role, cohesion, and unity, and
consultation and decision-making for the coming decade.
13
It is time for NATO members to shake off the restrictions of reactive,
short‑term thinking about nuclear weapons, and instead to re‑embrace
the vision of nuclear disarmament as a preventative tool for shaping
NATO’s security environment. While total elimination of nuclear weapons
may remain a distant goal, envisioning and planning for NATO as a
“non‑nuclear alliance” should begin now. Positive and constructive
engagement with the TPNW, including joining the treaty for those NATO
members willing and ready to do so, would be a logical place to start.
13
NATO 2030: United for a New Era,
NATO, 2020, p. 22.
10
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
1
Disarmament
for Security
NATO has long recognised the threat that nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
pose to its security. Rising tensions and risks are
only increasing the incentives for disarmament.
hether in the form of weapons actually held by rival states, or
in the shape of the risk of proliferation to other states or to
non‑state actors, the security threat of nuclear weapons has
always held a central place in NATO policy, doctrines, and planning.
As a key strategy to address this threat, NATO has repeatedly stated its
commitment to – and adopted policies that appear to support – arms
control, disarmament, and the eventual total elimination of nuclear
weapons. Marking the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2020, the North Atlantic Council said:
Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made, and
should continue to make, an essential contribution to achieving
NATO’s security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our
collective security. NATO Allies have a long track record of doing their
part on disarmament and non-proliferation. We reaffirm our resolve
to seek a safer world for all, and to take further practical steps and
effective measures to foster nuclear disarmament.
14
14
Statement on the 50th anniversary of the NPT, North Atlantic Council, 5 March 2020.
W
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
NATO’s support for nuclear disarmament is consistently expressed
and manifested through its support for the NPT, which it views as
the “cornerstone of the global non‑proliferation and disarmament
architecture”
15
and as the multilateral legal framework under which all
progress towards – and ultimate arrival at – a world without nuclear
weapons must be achieved. NATO has repeatedly called for “the full
implementation of the NPT in all its aspects”, and many NATO members
have shown a determination to push ahead with implementing the
disarmament and non‑proliferation aspects of the NPT with additional
legal measures, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty,
even in times of political tension and a changing security environment.
Humanitarian Imperative
As all NPT states parties acknowledged in 2010, any use of nuclear
weapons would have “catastrophic humanitarian consequences”.
16
No
state is immune to these consequences. Even people living far away
from a conflict zone in which nuclear weapons are used would suffer
from the effects of radioactive fallout, climate disruption, economic
collapse, and large‑scale forced migration. NATO’s stated commitment
“to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”
17
is based
on an understanding of the scope and magnitude of the threat that these
weapons pose to humanity and the planet.
Three major intergovernmental conferences on the humanitarian impact
of nuclear weapons hosted by Norway, Mexico, and Austria in 2013 and
2014 provided compelling scientific evidence supporting the conclusion
that urgent action is needed for disarmament. All NATO members, with
the exception of France, participated in one or more of these conferences;
most participated in all three. Many delivered national statements
expressing their profound concern at the continuing threat of nuclear war.
In the UN General Assembly’s First Committee in 2014, 17 NATO states,
together with Australia, Finland, and Japan, said:
The renewed global focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons has re-energised concerns about the horrific consequences
for humanity that would result from the use of a nuclear weapon,
a major nuclear weapons accident, or a terrorist attack involving
fissile material … It is our concern about the continuing nuclear
risks to humanity, and a desire for a peaceful future for successive
generations, which underpins our long-standing advocacy for
effective progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
particularly through the [NPT].
18
15
Ibid.
16
Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, p. 19.
17
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,
adopted by NATO in 2010, p. 23.
18
“Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, delivered by Australia,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain in the
First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 20 October 2014.
12
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
The use of even a single nuclear weapon, whether deliberate or accidental,
would cause death, destruction, and displacement on a massive scale.
In the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, two relatively
small US nuclear bombs killed over a quarter of a million people instantly
or within a few months, with many thousands more succumbing to
radiation‑related illnesses years later.
19
The use of multiple nuclear
weapons against large metropolitan areas today would have regional and
even global consequences, causing millions of immediate casualties, as
well as long‑term damage to the environment, climate, health and well‑
being, socio‑economic development, and the social order.
20
Radioactive
fallout would contaminate food supplies and the atmosphere, impacting
children and women disproportionately,
21
and soot from burning cities
would block sunlight and reduce precipitation over a prolonged period,
resulting in widespread agricultural collapse and famine.
22
Fact-based discussions
The first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons, hosted by Norway in 2013, reinvigorated disarmament efforts.
Credit: Norway MFA
19
See “Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings”, ICAN.
20
See “Report and Summary of Findings of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of
Nuclear Weapons”, presented by Austria on 9 December 2014.
21
See, for example, Anne Guro Dimmen, “Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear
Weapons from a Gender Perspective”, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and
International Law and Policy Institute, 2014.
22
See, for example, Ira Helfand, “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk – Global Impacts of
Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition”, International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2013.
ICAN
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As the International Committee of the Red Cross has warned, “an effective
means of assisting a substantial portion of survivors in the immediate
aftermath of a nuclear detonation, while adequately protecting those
delivering assistance, is not available and not feasible at the international
level”.
23
No state, humanitarian organisation, or UN agency will ever have
the capacity to respond adequately. If a nuclear weapon were detonated
over a populated area today, there would not be enough specialised burn
units anywhere to cater for the large number of burn victims, and entering
the zone of destruction to reach survivors would pose serious risks to
first responders. All of this underscores the humanitarian imperative for
prevention of use through the elimination of nuclear weapons.
“[A]n effective means of assisting a substantial
portion of survivors in the immediate aftermath
of a nuclear detonation … is not available and
not feasible at the international level.”
International Committee of the Red Cross
Catastrophic harm
Photos and illustrations of victims of the US atomic bombing of
Hiroshima, as displayed at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
Wikimedia Commons
23
Statement by Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the Vienna
Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna, 8 December 2014.
14
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Increasing Risks
In view of today’s international conflicts and tensions in a changing and
increasingly uncertain security environment, and given the policies and
actions of nuclear‑armed states, the risk of a nuclear weapon being used
is greater than generally acknowledged, and is widely considered to be
growing. According to more than 50 past leaders and foreign and defence
ministers from 20 NATO states, the risk “appears to be increasing, with
the recent deployment of new types of nuclear weapons, the abandonment
of long‑standing arms control agreements, and the very real danger of
cyber‑attacks on nuclear infrastructure”.
24
In January 2021, the science
and security board of the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
expressed alarm
that “[g]overnments in the United States, Russia, and other countries
appear to consider nuclear weapons more and more usable, increasing the
risks of their actual use. There continues to be an extraordinary disregard
for the potential of an accidental nuclear war, even as well‑documented
examples of frighteningly close calls have emerged.”
25
The dangers of access to nuclear weapons and related materials by
non‑state actors, particularly terrorist groups, persist; nuclear command
and control networks are vulnerable to human error and cyber‑attacks;
and some 1,900 US, Russian, British, and French nuclear weapons remain
on high alert, ready to be used on short notice.
26
A recent report published by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research
identifies three “intertwined trends” that are acting to exacerbate risks:
1) There is greater multipolarity and heightened tensions among
nuclear-armed states. In particular, strategic interactions among
multiple nuclear-armed states are now closely interconnected, with
several nuclear triads, especially China–Russian Federation–United
States, China–India–Pakistan, and United States–Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea]–China. As a result,
managing the strategic relationships between these states is
becoming even more complex as actions in a bilateral dimension can
spill over into the broader triad … Overall, relations among many of
the nuclear-armed states remain or have become more tense.
2) The fabric of international institutions, treaties, and norms
that has historically contributed to predictable and more stable
relationships among nuclear-armed states is deteriorating.
3) Several current or imminent technological developments are
heightening the uncertainties and unpredictability in the strategic
relationships among nuclear-armed states. These include anti-
ballistic missile defences, hypersonic and other advanced long-range
weapons, anti-satellite weapons, cyber, artificial intelligence and
machine learning, and – although not a new technology per se –
lower-yield nuclear weapons.
27
24
“Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, 21 September 2020.
25
Doomsday Clock statement,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
27 January 2021.
26
See Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, FAS, March 2021 update.
27
John Borrie and Lewis A. Dunn, “The Strategic Context for Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence, and
Strategic Arms Control Dialogue”, UNIDIR, November 2020.
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The NATO 2030 Reflection Group report similarly identifies a range of
evolving security challenges, including terrorism, emerging and disruptive
technologies, cyber‑attacks, and hybrid and “grey zone” warfare, that
are magnified by aggression or confrontational behaviour by Russia and
China. On hybrid warfare, the group notes:
The return of geostrategic competition has also brought a
proliferation of hybrid attacks. This grey zone activity has eroded
the traditional boundaries of conflict. Domestic and international
security bleed across into each other. The line between civilians and
combatants is being blurred, through the use of proxies and private
military companies, disinformation, and subversion.
28
NATO views aggression from Russia and China, along with actions by
North Korea and Iran, as among the most significant threats to the
alliance, and continues to frame its members’ nuclear weapons as a
necessary “deterrent”. As NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, put
it recently, “in an uncertain world, these weapons continue to play a vital
role in preserving peace. Only three NATO allies possess nuclear weapons.
But all NATO allies benefit from the security guarantees they provide.”
29
Nuclear deterrence has always been controversial; ICAN, along with
many governments, does not accept that it has ever been an effective or
ethical security doctrine. But even defenders of nuclear deterrence are
considering and debating the extent to which the evolution of the security
environment is changing long‑held assumptions and calculations about
the effectiveness and reliability of deterrence, and thus the utility of
nuclear weapons.
30
The current dynamics operate in two directions. First, instabilities,
tensions, emerging technologies, hybrid and grey zone warfare, and
developments such as lower‑yield nuclear weapons all increase the
risk of nuclear weapons being used in conflict, whether deliberately or
by miscalculation, accident, or sabotage. Second, the nature of many
emerging threats – disruptive technologies, cyber‑warfare, hybrid and
grey zone warfare – mean that they (like terrorism, an older challenge
for deterrence advocates) are not amenable to nuclear deterrence. Indeed,
this is often the rationale for developing and deploying them: to make
attribution difficult and military retaliation dangerous or impossible.
Even for those who accept the logic of nuclear weapons in deterring
“traditional” military aggression by states, nuclear weapons are clearly
addressing a smaller and smaller portion of the overall strategic risk
profile that NATO faces.
In short, as the risks of use of nuclear weapons are growing, their
utility – always contested – is shrinking. This trend only reinforces the
wisdom and necessity of NATO’s professed commitment to achieving full
implementation of the NPT and total nuclear disarmament.
28
NATO 2030: United for a New Era,
NATO, 25 November 2020, p. 17.
29
Speech by the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, at the 16th annual NATO Conference on
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, 10 November 2020.
30
See, for example, Andrew Futter, “The Risks Posed by Emerging Technologies to Nuclear
Deterrence”, in Beyza Unal, Yasmin Afina, and Patricia Lewis (editors),
Perspectives on Nuclear
Deterrence in the 21st Century,
Chatham House, 2020.
16
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2
Moving in the
Wrong Direction
Instead of accelerating its efforts to advance
nuclear disarmament, NATO has been moving
in the opposite direction – contrary to its own
objectives, and undermining its own security.
G
iven the growing risks associated with nuclear weapons as outlined
in chapter 1, it would be natural for NATO to be reinvigorating its
efforts on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, this is what its members
have pledged to do under the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty. At the
NPT review conference in 2010, all states parties – including every NATO
member – agreed to pursue policies that are fully compatible with “the
objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons”.
31
In addition, the
NPT nuclear-armed states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States – committed “to undertake further efforts to reduce
and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons” and “to accelerate
concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament”.
32
More than a decade later, however, there is scant evidence of progress
– and much evidence of movement away from the universally agreed
objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Instead of working to accelerate
efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, the three nuclear-
31
Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.
32
Ibid.
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armed NATO members have actively opposed, and even tried to sabotage,
initiatives to advance disarmament – most notably the negotiation
of the TPNW. They have also undermined various earlier nuclear‑
weapon‑related treaties; continued to make major investments in the
augmentation of their nuclear forces; and amplified their rhetoric in
favour of nuclear weapons as an “ultimate insurance policy”
33
against all
manner of threats, real and perceived. In many cases, they have been aided
and abetted by their non‑nuclear‑armed allies.
All of this is reflected in the generally abysmal approach that NATO as a
whole has taken over the past decade towards addressing the grave threat
that nuclear weapons pose to global security, including to the security of
NATO states. By working against disarmament, NATO has acted contrary
to its own mission as set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, and contrary to
its Strategic Concept of 2010, in which it resolved “to seek a safer world for
all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”.
34
In his November 2020 speech, the NATO secretary general, Jens
Stoltenberg, claimed that “NATO has been at the forefront of nuclear
disarmament for decades”, while at the same time insisting that weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of NATO members “continue to play a
vital role in preserving peace” and guaranteeing security. “Our nuclear
deterrent is our strongest deterrent,” he said. “[It] has preserved peace in
Europe for more than 70 years.”
35
Such rhetoric is not only dangerous and
misguided; it is also fundamentally at odds with the national positions of
many of the non‑nuclear‑armed members of NATO, where there is little
public acceptance of the kinds of views that the secretary general put forth.
More disturbingly still, this rhetoric reflects a steadily growing and
ever‑more rigidly enforced orthodoxy within the alliance which holds
political support by individual NATO members for retaining and even
expanding NATO’s nuclear weapons capability as a test of loyalty and
unity. As comprehensively examined in Kjølv Egeland’s paper “Spreading
the Burden: How NATO Became a ‘Nuclear’ Alliance”,
36
the nuclear‑
armed NATO members have long sought to shift the moral and political
responsibility for holding weapons of mass destruction onto the alliance
as a whole, and have largely succeeded in recent years. Although the North
Atlantic Treaty makes no mention of nuclear weapons, NATO was officially
dubbed a “nuclear alliance” in 2010, and this deliberate embedding of
nuclear weapons in the alliance’s identity has steadily continued in the
decade since. As Egeland observes, this embedding serves two purposes:
First, the nuclearisation of NATO’s organisational identity has
allowed pro-nuclear actors to justify costly nuclear modernisation
programmes and indefinite deployments as contributions to alliance
“solidarity” and “cohesion”. Second, the nuclearisation of NATO’s
organisational identity has undercut the potential for intra-alliance
resistance to nuclear orthodoxy. Once defining NATO as a “nuclear”
alliance, pressure for denuclearisation might seem as “anti-NATO”.
37
33
“Lifting Cap on Nuclear Weapons Is ‘Ultimate Insurance Policy’”, ITV, 16 March 2021.
34
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,
NATO, 2010.
35
Speech by the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, at the 16th annual NATO Conference on
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, 10 November 2020.
36
Kjølv Egeland, “Spreading the Burden: How NATO Became a ‘Nuclear’ Alliance”,
Diplomacy and
Statecraft,
volume 31, number 1, 2020, pp. 143–67.
37
Ibid, pp. 144–5.
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Indeed, NATO members which do not possess nuclear weapons, and which
might wish to explore – or even just discuss – alternative approaches and
more effective steps towards disarmament, come under attack from their
allies for exactly this reason. The explicit branding of NATO as a “nuclear
alliance” in 2010 in fact came about as an effort by the United States to
discredit and obstruct the then German government’s push to have the
US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany withdrawn.
38
The experience of
the Netherlands in making its decision to participate in the negotiations
on the TPNW (the only NATO member to do so) provides a more recent
example of this ugly phenomenon.
39
NATO states that possess
nuclear weapons
NATO states that host US
nuclear weapons
Members of NATO’s
Nuclear Planning Group
France, United Kingdom, United States
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States (i.e. all NATO
members with the exception of France)
Cold War decision-making
At a meeting in Paris in 1966, defence ministers from NATO
member states decide to establish NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
Credit: NATO
38
Ibid. 158–9.
39
Ekaterina Shirobokova, “The Netherlands and the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”,
The Nonproliferation Review,
volume 25, issues 1–2, 2018, pp. 37–49.
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NATO Nuclear-Armed States
United States
CURRENT ARSENAL
5,550 nuclear weapons (1,800 deployed)
For decades, US leaders have spoken loftily about a need to eliminate
nuclear weapons.
40
The new US president, Joe Biden, himself said in
2017 (when vice president) that “as the only nation to have used nuclear
weapons, we bear a great moral responsibility to lead the charge” to a
world without nuclear weapons, “because that is the only surety we have
against the nightmare scenario becoming a reality”.
41
The United States
asserts its progress to this end frequently, noting, for example, that it “has
reduced [its] nuclear stockpile by over 85 per cent since the height of the
Cold War and deployed no new nuclear capabilities for over two decades”.
42
But a review of US activity, policy, and budgets reveals a different story.
In fact, the United States is not only taking steps to modernise its existing
arsenal, but is also building entirely new weapons, moving the world
further away from the professed US and NATO goal of a nuclear‑weapon‑
free future, and contravening disarmament‑related obligations and
commitments under the NPT and other international law.
43
In doing so, it
is contributing to a nuclear arms race that poses a threat to global security.
Today, the United States possesses an estimated 5,550 nuclear weapons,
of which approximately 1,800 are currently deployed (more than any other
country), ready to be launched from land‑based missiles, submarines,
and aircraft.
44
It is the only state to have used its nuclear weapons in
war, and the only state to deploy its nuclear weapons on foreign soil. The
substantial reduction in non‑operational US stockpiles since the end of the
Cold War belies the increase in the destructive capabilities and “usability”
of the operational arsenal,
45
and the US failure to pursue meaningful
disarmament portends a crisis of increasing urgency.
The United States spends more on its nuclear‑weapon programme than
all other countries in the world
combined.
In 2020, it spent an estimated
$37.4 billion, up from $35.8 billion in 2019 (adjusted for inflation). This
means that, during the worst global pandemic in a century, the United
States increased its spending on nuclear weapons by $1.6 billion from the
previous year.
46
Over the next 30 years, the United States plans to continue
modernising its arsenal at a total projected cost of around $2 trillion.
47
The word “modernise” is a euphemism given that the plans include
developing wholly new weapons and delivery systems, such as a new class
of nuclear‑powered ballistic missile submarine, a new nuclear‑capable
40
Daryl Kimball, “JFK’s American University Speech Echoes through Time”,
Arms Control Today,
2013.
41
Remarks by the US vice president, Joe Biden, Washington, DC, 11 January 2017.
42
Nuclear Posture Review,
US Department of Defense, February 2018, p. v.
43
See, for example, Greg Mello and Trish Williams-Mello, “United States”, in Allison Pytlak and
Ray Acheson (editors),
Assuring Destruction Forever,
Reaching Critical Will, 2020 edition, p. 109.
44
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, FAS, March 2021 update.
45
Hans M. Kristensen, “NNSA Nuclear Plan Shows More Weapons, Increasing Costs, Less
Transparency”, FAS, 30 December 2020.
46
Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Susi Snyder,
Complicit: 2020 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending,
2021.
47
Kingston Reif with Alicia Sanders-Zakre,
US Nuclear Excess: Understanding the Costs, Risks, and
Alternatives,
Arms Control Association, April 2019.
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strategic bomber, a new long‑range air‑launched cruise missile, and a
new nuclear-capable fighter-bomber.
48
In its most recent Nuclear Posture
Review, published in 2018, the United States highlighted its ongoing plans
to replace the existing version of the B61 gravity bomb (including those in
Europe) with a newly developed B61‑12 guided nuclear bomb.
49
The review
further promised new nuclear‑armed sea‑launched cruise missiles to
modify existing sea‑launched ballistic missiles in a manner that provides
for “low‑yield options”.
50
A new W93 submarine‑launched warhead is
planned as a third redundancy in submarine‑launched warheads.
51
Further, the United States plans to replace existing intercontinental
ballistic missiles with a new land-based missile, the “Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent”, at enormous cost.
52
This project also involves
replacing the W78 warhead on the existing missiles with a new W87‑1
warhead. The introduction of the W87-1 is a key justification, in turn, for
increasing production of new plutonium warhead cores, or pits.
53
In 2018,
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that it
will produce at least 30 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory in
New Mexico, where annual production previously had been capped at 20
pits, as well as at least 50 more plutonium pits per year at the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina, which has never before produced plutonium
pits.
54
A review of NNSA’s current plans suggests that its actual plans are
for even more pits, at even greater cost, than previously disclosed.
55
This
is all despite the fact that 20,000 fully functional pits are in storage at the
Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. The production of new plutonium pits
poses a danger to communities and lands surrounding production sites.
56
Moreover, the Nuclear Posture Review expanded the role of nuclear
weapons in US security policy. It contemplates using nuclear weapons
in response to non‑nuclear threats, stating that nuclear weapons “are
essential … to the deterrence of both nuclear and non‑nuclear aggression
… and will be so for the foreseeable future”.
57
Lowering the threshold
for using nuclear weapons against various non‑nuclear threats, from
conventional weapons to cyber‑attacks, increases the risk that nuclear
weapons will be used, particularly if other countries follow suit.
58
Further,
the review reversed the 2010 declaration that the United States would not
use nuclear weapons against non‑nuclear‑armed NPT states parties that
are in compliance with their non‑proliferation obligations.
59
48
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists,
volume 77, number 1, 2021, pp. 43–63.
49
Nuclear Posture Review,
US Department of Defense, February 2018.
50
“Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons”, Congressional Research Service, updated March 2021.
51
“Trump Team’s Case for New Nuke Cites Risks in Current Arsenal”,
Roll Call,
29 July 2020.
52
“Ground Based Strategic Deterrent: High Risk, No Reward”, FAS, 2021.
53
“NNSA Nuclear Plan Shows More Weapons, Increasing Costs, Less Transparency”, FAS, 2020.
54
“Weapons and Waste: Safety, Security and Savings”, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, April 2021.
55
“NNSA Announces Huge Cost Increase for Mysterious LANL Plutonium Warhead Project”,
Los Alamos Study Group, 28 April 2021.
56
“Nuclear Waste”, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability.
57
Nuclear Posture Review,
US Department of Defense, February 2018, p. vi.
58
“The Trump Administration’s ‘Wrong Track’ Nuclear Policies”,
Arms Control Today,
March 2018.
59
Nuclear Posture Review Report,
US Department of Defense, April 2010.
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On a number of occasions during the presidency of Donald J. Trump, the
United States made explicit or implied threats to use nuclear weapons
against North Korea and, arguably, Iran.
60
It also withdrew from the 2015
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“Iran Deal”), the 1987 Intermediate‑
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty.
Yet the United States has argued that it is the TPNW, rather than its own
nuclear weapon activities, that is “harmful to international peace and
security”.
61
Together with other nuclear‑armed states, it has issued
joint statements disparaging the treaty in various international forums,
claiming to be committed to disarmament goals under the NPT while
asserting that the TPNW will undermine disarmament.
62
In addition
to urging states not to join the treaty, it has even – under the previous
administration – urged states that have already joined it to withdraw
their ratifications and accessions.
63
(At the time of publication, the new
administration had not yet made any formal statement on the TPNW.)
United Kingdom
CURRENT ARSENAL
225 nuclear weapons (120 deployed)
In March 2021, the United Kingdom announced that it will increase
the maximum size of its nuclear arsenal and reduce the information it
provides about it.
64
Having consistently committed itself over the past
decade to reducing its stockpile to a maximum of 180 warheads by the
mid‑2020s, the United Kingdom has now raised this limit to 260, an
increase of over 40 per cent. At the same time, it will no longer release
operational stockpile, deployed warhead, or deployed missile numbers.
Eminent international lawyers, as well as the UN secretary‑general,
65
have
concluded that these developments contravene the United Kingdom’s
disarmament obligations under the NPT: “The announcement by the UK
government of the increase in nuclear warheads and its modernisation of
its weapons system constitutes a breach of the NPT Article VI.”
66
Under
the NPT, the United Kingdom is legally obliged to “pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. It is not doing so.
For many years, the government has touted reductions in the size of its
nuclear arsenal as evidence of its compliance with this obligation. For
example, it told an NPT conference in 2019 that it “has a strong track
record in fulfilling our [Article VI] commitments. Since our Cold War peak
60
“Trump Goes after Iran on Twitter: ‘You Will Suffer Consequences’”, Vox, 23 July 2018.
61
“The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Well-Intentioned Mistake”, remarks by
Christopher Ford, US Department of State, at the University of Iceland, Reykjavík, 30 October 2018.
62
See, for example, the joint statement by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 22 October 2018.
63
“US Urges Countries to Withdraw from UN Nuke Ban Treaty”, Associated Press, 22 October 2020.
64
“Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development,
and Foreign Policy”, UK Cabinet Office, 16 March 2021; Dan Sabbagh, “Cap on Trident Nuclear Warhead
Stockpile to Rise by More than 40%”,
The Guardian,
16 March 2021.
65
Remarks by the chief spokesperson of the UN secretary-general, New York, 17 March 2021.
66
“Legality under International Law of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Policy as Set out in the 2021
Integrated Review”, legal opinion by Christine Chinkin and Louise Arimatsu, April 2021.
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we have reduced the size of our nuclear forces by well over 50 per cent. The
number of operationally available warheads is now no more than 120 and
we will reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile to no more than 180
by the mid‑2020s.”
67
Like other NPT nuclear‑armed states, it has insisted
that slow or intermittent progress on reducing the number of nuclear
weapons is still in compliance with Article VI. It is clear, however, that
increasing
the size of an arsenal cannot be anything but non‑compliance.
The United Kingdom once told an NPT conference that it wants a world
without nuclear weapons “but we need to proceed to it carefully”.
68
With
this latest decision, it is proceeding in the opposite direction.
Members of the NPT have long recognised that transparency and open
communication are key requirements both for implementing the treaty
and for reducing the risks of nuclear weapons being used. As the United
Kingdom put it to its NPT partners, “dialogue and transparency will be
critical in promoting the confidence required to reduce the risk of nuclear
conflict”,
69
and “our transparency about our arsenal and declaratory
policy all contribute to the UK being a responsible nuclear‑weapon
state”.
70
Now the United Kingdom has decided that it will provide
less
information and
less
transparency about its arsenal. By its own argument,
this will diminish the confidence required to reduce the risk of nuclear
conflict, and make further progress on disarmament more difficult.
The United Kingdom has argued that its decision to increase its arsenal
is both justified by national security concerns and permissible under the
NPT. In doing so, it has opened the way for other nuclear‑armed states
to take similar steps. Before this move, China was the only NPT nuclear‑
armed state believed to be quantitatively increasing its nuclear arsenal. By
arguing that Article VI of the NPT does not prevent a nuclear‑armed state
from increasing its nuclear arsenal to meet its perceived national security
requirements, the United Kingdom has essentially granted a licence to
other nuclear‑armed states to increase their stockpiles arbitrarily. If this
argument were to be generally accepted, it would constitute a grave and
substantial weakening of the NPT.
The NPT is not just a piece of paper; it is a living, evolving community
of nations dedicated to fulfilling the aims of the treaty for national and
collective security. Over the half‑century of the treaty’s existence, its
members have worked together to interpret and implement its provisions
effectively. These agreements are recorded in the outcome documents of
the NPT’s review conferences, held every five years. The most recent of
these, the “action plan” adopted by the 2010 review conference, contains
a number of relatively specific and detailed steps to make progress on
nuclear disarmament.
71
The United Kingdom has consistently reiterated
its support for this action plan; in 2018 it said “we support the fullest
implementation of all its recommendations and we call on all states
parties to continue working towards that end”.
72
67
Statement by the United Kingdom to the NPT preparatory committee, New York, 2 May 2019.
68
Statement by the United Kingdom to the NPT preparatory committee, New York, 2 May 2014.
69
Statement by the United Kingdom to the NPT preparatory committee, New York, 2 May 2019.
70
Statement by the United Kingdom to the NPT preparatory committee, Vienna, 4 May 2017.
71
Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, adopted in New York.
72
Statement by the United Kingdom to the NPT preparatory committee, Geneva, 24 April 2018.
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Not negotiating
A Japanese paper crane, symbolising peace, sits on the empty desk of
the United Kingdom during the TPNW negotiations in 2017.
Credit: ICAN/Clare Conboy
But the United Kingdom’s decisions to increase its nuclear arsenal
and reduce transparency are in direct contradiction of several of the
recommendations. Action 1 commits members “to pursue policies that
are fully compatible with the [NPT] and the objective of achieving a world
without nuclear weapons”; action 2 requires members to apply “the
principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in relation to
the implementation of their treaty obligations”; and action 3 commits
the nuclear-armed states “to undertake further efforts to reduce …
all types of nuclear weapons”. Action 5 requires the nuclear‑armed
states “to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear
disarmament”, including by engaging to “further enhance transparency
and increase mutual confidence”.
These agreed actions were the result of difficult negotiations, involving
concessions and compromises from all sides, as well as resourcefulness,
persistence, and dedication to the mission of the NPT. By unilaterally
discarding them, the United Kingdom has gravely damaged trust among
the NPT membership – not just with those countries with differing
priorities and political orientations to its own, but also with its own allies,
many of which worked hard to bridge gaps and broker the agreements. The
United Kingdom has now made it much harder to reach agreement at the
forthcoming NPT review conference, scheduled to be held early in 2022,
even as a deteriorating global security environment demands a united and
strong NPT community more than ever.
The United Kingdom has attempted to justify its decision by arguing
that the international security environment requires a larger nuclear
arsenal in order to maintain “credible deterrence”. The foreign secretary,
Dominic Raab, defending the decision, told the media that the country
needs nuclear weapons because they are “the ultimate guarantee, the
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ultimate insurance policy against the worst threat from hostile states”.
73
By arguing in this way – characterising nuclear weapons as a guarantee
against security threats, and claiming that an increased threat requires
more nuclear weapons, regardless of treaty commitments – the United
Kingdom is in effect encouraging other countries to consider acquiring
nuclear weapons themselves, either disregarding their NPT obligations, or
withdrawing from the treaty entirely. As the United Kingdom itself told its
NPT partners in 2017, “we must uphold and strengthen the NPT because
of, not despite, the complex security challenges that we all face”.
74
“[The United Kingdom’s plans] could have a
damaging impact on global stability and efforts
to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons.”
Chief spokesperson for the UN secretary-general
The United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons system, known as “Trident”,
comprises four submarines that can each carry up to eight missiles; each
missile, in turn, can carry up to five nuclear warheads; and each warhead
has a destructive potential around eight times greater than that of the
atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.
75
At any given time, at
least one nuclear‑armed submarine is on patrol at sea. All four submarines
are stationed at Her Majesty’s Naval Base, Clyde, at Faslane on the Gare
Loch, around 40 kilometres from Glasgow, Scotland’s largest city. The
warheads are manufactured and serviced at two sites in Berkshire –
Aldermaston and Burghfield – and are routinely transported on public
roads.
76
According to NATO, the United Kingdom has “extended its nuclear
forces … to the protection of NATO Allies since 1962”.
77
Work has begun on the construction of the new Dreadnought class
submarines to replace the existing Vanguard class. The UK parliament
voted in 2007 to begin the process of replacing Trident, and in 2016 it
voted to build the new submarines. Contracts for designing them have
been awarded to BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, and Babcock Marine. The
United Kingdom currently leases its Trident II D5 missiles from the
United States, an arrangement that is set to continue. A “life extension”
programme for the missiles aims to ensure that they are usable up until
the early 2040s. Work on replacing the existing warheads has also begun,
despite no decision having been taken on this by the UK parliament.
According to calculations by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the
total cost for replacing Trident will ultimately be at least £205 billion.
78
This estimate does not include the cost of the additional warheads
envisaged by the government in its plans announced in March 2021.
73
“Lifting Cap on Nuclear Weapons Is ‘Ultimate Insurance Policy’”, ITV, 16 March 2021.
74
Statement by the United Kingdom to the NPT preparatory committee, Vienna, 3 May 2017.
75
“Scrap Trident: No Replacement, No New Warheads”, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
76
Janet Fenton, “United Kingdom”, in Allison Pytlak and Ray Acheson (editors),
Assuring Destruction
Forever,
Reaching Critical Will, 2020 edition, p. 98. See also the Nukewatch UK website.
77
“NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces”, NATO.
78
“Scrap Trident: No Replacement, No New Warheads”, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
France
CURRENT ARSENAL
290 nuclear weapons (280 deployed)
Despite diplomatic statements in favour of a world free of nuclear
weapons, France appears determined to retain its nuclear forces for
decades to come. According to its defence and national security strategic
review of 2017, maintaining nuclear weapons “over the long term” is
essential.
79
France has made little recent progress in reducing the number
of nuclear weapons in its arsenal and continues to invest heavily in their
modernisation and renewal.
80
Like other nuclear‑armed states, it has
strongly opposed the TPNW since its adoption in 2017.
81
France’s relationship with NATO has always been tumultuous. While it
withdrew from the alliance’s integrated military command in 1966, the
contribution of French nuclear forces to NATO’s overall “deterrence”
was officially recognised in the Ottawa declaration of 1974,
82
and France
reinstated NATO’s integrated command structures in 2009, with president
Nicolas Sarkozy declaring: “Nothing stands in the way of our participation
in NATO’s military structures.”
83
Yet, as a sign of its independence, France
remains a non-member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
In 2012, French president François Hollande appointed the former foreign
minister Hubert Védrine to “present an assessment of the consequences
of France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command and to suggest
ways in which France could exercise greater influence within the Atlantic
alliance”.
84
One of the key recommendations was that “France has no
reason to oppose the elimination of NATO’s last tactical or non‑strategic
nuclear weapons, which are outmoded [US] gravity bombs dropped from
aircraft. Such a move would do nothing to reduce the alliance’s deterrent
capability”.
85
Though the president “largely approved” the report, France
has remained silent on the question of US nuclear weapons in Europe.
The declaration issued by leaders attending the NATO Summit in Brussels
in 2018 revealed a possible shift in the role of French and UK nuclear
forces in the alliance. It stated: “The independent strategic nuclear forces
of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and
contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.”
86
The word
“significantly” had not appeared in the Warsaw communiqué of 2016.
87
France’s discourse on NATO has evolved since the arrival of Emmanuel
Macron to the presidency in 2017. “What we are currently experiencing
is the brain death of NATO,” he said in 2019, urging greater European
79
Defense and National Security Strategic Review,
French Ministry of Defense, 2017.
80
See Hans M. Kristensen, “France”, in Allison Pytlak and Ray Acheson (editors),
Assuring Destruction
Forever,
Reaching Critical Will, 2020 edition, p. 49.
81
See, for example, the joint statement by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 22 October 2018.
82
“Declaration on Atlantic Relations”, North Alantic Council, Ottawa, 19 June 1974, para. 6.
83
“The French White Paper on Defence and National Security”,
Foreign Affairs,
January 2009.
84
Hubert Védrine, “The Consequences of France’s Return to NATO’s Integrated Military Command, on
the Future of Transatlantic Relations, and the Outlook for the Europe of Defence”, 2012.
85
Ibid.
86
Brussels Summit Declaration, Brussels, 11–12 July 2018.
87
Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Warsaw, 8–9 July 2016.
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
responsibility for defence and less reliance on the United States.
88
In 2020,
he proposed the “Europeanisation” of French nuclear forces: “I would like
strategic dialogue to develop with our European partners that are ready
for it on the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in our collective
security. European partners which are willing to walk that road can be
associated with the exercises of French deterrence forces.”
89
France spent roughly 11 per cent of its total military budget on nuclear
weapons in 2020. Its 2020 defence bill allocated €4.7 billion for its
nuclear forces. The law does not break down the costs within this line
item but does state that it includes annual costs for nuclear warheads,
modernisation and renewal of nuclear‑capable cruise missiles,
submarine‑launched missiles, and submarines. Not included in the
deterrence budget are costs associated with the Rafale aircraft, which can
be used to launch nuclear weapons. According to a military programming
law voted on in 2018, the total amount that France will spend on its
nuclear forces from 2021 to 2025 is €27.85 billion.
90
ICAN Paris Forum
Hundreds of students and campaigners, mostly from NATO states,
attend a forum in France in 2020 to discuss the TPNW.
Credit: ICAN/Orel Kichigai
88
Steven Erlanger, “Macron Says NATO Is Experiencing ‘Brain Death’ Because of Trump”,
New York
Times,
7 November 2019.
89
Speech on defence and deterrence strategy, 7 February 2020.
90
Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Susi Snyder,
Complicit: 2020 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending,
2021.
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NATO Non-Nuclear-Armed States
All non‑nuclear‑armed NATO members participate to varying degrees
in the alliance’s decision‑making on nuclear weapons as members of
the Nuclear Planning Group, which “acts as the senior body on nuclear
matters in the Alliance”, reviewing and setting NATO’s nuclear policy
“in light of the ever‑changing security environment”.
91
The group takes
decisions by consensus, and generally meets at the level of defence
ministers. Only France has opted not to participate in the group.
One of the most controversial aspects of NATO’s nuclear policy is the
continued deployment of US nuclear weapons on European soil. According
to NATO, its “nuclear deterrence posture relies on nuclear weapons
forward‑deployed by the United States in Europe, as well as on the
capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned”.
92
Although
not officially confirmed, five non-nuclear-armed NATO states – Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey – are thought to host around
100 US B61 nuclear gravity bombs between them on their territories,
93
an
arrangement that has been in place for several decades despite widespread
public opposition – including regular, often disruptive, protests at a
number of the bases where the weapons are stored.
Under the arrangement, the host states provide aircraft equipped to carry
the US nuclear bombs in a conflict, which “are available for nuclear roles
at various levels of readiness”.
94
However, the United States “maintains
absolute control and custody” of the bombs,
95
and their use in war would
require the authorisation of the US president.
Illegal weapons
As the TPNW enters into force in January 2021, an action is held at
Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands, where US nuclear bombs are stored.
Credit: Susi Snyder
91
“Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)”, NATO.
92
“NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces”, NATO.
93
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists,
volume 77, number 1, 2021, pp. 43–63.
94
“NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces”, NATO.
95
Ibid.
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While there has been a significant reduction in the number of US nuclear
weapons deployed in Europe since the end of the Cold War – from a peak
of approximately 7,300 weapons in 1971
96
– little progress has been made
in recent years, and there is no plan in place to withdraw the remaining
bombs, even though they remain a source of tension within the alliance. In
fact, “NATO is working on a broad modernisation of the nuclear posture in
Europe that involves upgrading bombs, aircraft, and the weapons storage
system”.
97
Beginning in 2022, the current B61‑3 and B61‑4 bombs are to
be replaced with new B61‑12 bombs, which have “increase[d] accuracy”.
“[W]ithin the next five years the United States
could withdraw the tactical weapons it deploys
in Europe with no negative consequences for
NATO unity and the security of Europe.”
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy
Political support for the deployments remains “fragile”,
98
particularly
in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, where the issue has been a
frequent subject of debate, including in the parliaments. Many politicians
and political parties have, over the years, pledged their support for the
removal of the weapons. However, debate has been hampered by state‑
enforced secrecy surrounding the deployments. Politicians who have
publicly confirmed the presence of the bombs, including two former
Dutch leaders, have been threatened with prosecution. Ruud Lubbers,
the prime minister of the Netherlands from 1982 to 1994, said: “I would
never have thought those silly things [nuclear bombs] would still be there
in 2013 … I think they are an absolutely pointless part of a tradition in
military thinking.”
99
His predecessor, Dries van Agt, the prime minister
from 1977 to 1982, confirmed that the bombs “are there and it’s crazy
they still are”.
100
According to one US analyst, “secrecy about US nuclear
weapons deployments in Europe does not exist to protect the weapons
from terrorists, but only to protect politicians and military leaders from
having to answer tough questions about whether NATO’s nuclear‑sharing
arrangements still make sense today”.
101
Repeated security breaches at the bases have shone a spotlight on the
deployments. In May 2021, for example, the Bellingcat site revealed that
“some service members have been using publicly visible flashcard learning
apps – inadvertently revealing a multitude of sensitive security protocols
about US nuclear weapons and the bases at which they are stored”.
102
96
Hans M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, briefing to the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC, 1 November 2019.
97
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
98
Pia Fuhrhop, Ulrich Kühn, and Oliver Meier, “Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw US Nuclear
Weapons from Europe”,
Arms Control Today,
October 2020.
99
“US Nuclear Bombs ‘Based in Netherlands’ – Ex-Dutch PM Lubbers”, BBC, 10 June 2013.
100
“Former Prime Minister Van Agt Also Confirms Volkel Nuclear Weapons”, NU.nl, 12 June 2013.
101
Jeffrey Lewis of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, as quoted in Foeke Postma,
“US Soldiers Expose Nuclear Weapons Secrets Via Flashcard Apps”,
Bellingcat,
28 May 2021.
102
Ibid.
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In its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012, NATO committed to
seek to create the conditions and consider options for “further reductions
of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO [i.e. US nuclear
gravity bombs stationed in Europe]”.
103
It also noted the future possibility
of an alliance decision to reduce NATO’s reliance on these weapons. Fully
withdrawing the bombs from Europe – in line with the new international
norm set by the TPNW – would be a significant contribution towards
disarmament, signalling a shift away from security postures based on
the threat of mass destruction, and creating opportunities for progress in
removing Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployment also.
According to scholars at the University of Hamburg’s Institute for Peace
Research and Security Policy, “within the next five years the United States
could withdraw the tactical weapons it deploys in Europe with no negative
consequences for NATO unity and the security of Europe”.
104
Notably, US
nuclear weapons have already been withdrawn from three NATO states:
Canada, Greece, and the United Kingdom.
In addition to the five host states, at least seven other non-nuclear-
armed NATO members provide practical, conventional support for the
deployment of US nuclear bombs in Europe (the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Romania). According to NATO:
To support the US nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe, the
Allies provide capabilities and infrastructure; dual-capable aircraft
are central to this effort, but supporting contributions are also
important and allow a larger number of Allies to participate in the
nuclear burden-sharing arrangements. An excellent example of this
are the so-called SNOWCAT Missions, in which allied fighters escort
dual-capable aircraft if called on for a nuclear mission. NATO is
seeking, always, the broadest possible cooperation and participation
in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.
105
Under SNOWCAT – an acronym for “Support of Nuclear Operations With
Conventional Air Tactics” – NATO members that do not host B61 nuclear
bombs on their soil are also invited to participate in the annual “Steadfast
Noon” nuclear strike exercise, where host states practise using the bombs
(but not with live weapons).
106
The most recent such exercise was held
at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands in October 2020 and involved more
than 50 aircraft from across the alliance.
107
Participants in Steadfast Noon
exercises have included eastern European states such as Poland and the
Czech Republic, according to witnesses.
108
In the past, NATO has generally
been tight‑lipped about these exercises given the political sensitivity
of the nuclear strike mission, particularly in western European states.
However, it now appears to be increasing the mission’s public profile.
103
“Deterrence and Defence Posture Review”, NATO, 2012, para. 11.
104
“Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Europe”,
ACT,
2020.
105
“NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World”, speech by the NATO deputy secretary general,
Rose Gottemoeller, at the University of Oslo, 9 September 2019.
106
The SNOWCAT participants include the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway,
Poland, and Romania (in addition to the host states, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
107
“Sec. General Visits Dutch Airbase Hosting NATO Deterrence Exercise”, NATO, 16 October 2020.
108
“NATO Nuclear Exercise Underway with Czech and Polish Participation”, FAS, 17 October 2017.
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Nuclear Weapon Host States
Do you think US nuclear weapons should be removed
from your country’s territory, or should they stay?
109
57%
83%
74%
58%
Belgium
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
g
Remove
g
Unsure
g
Stay
NATO states that currently host US nuclear
weapons on their territories
NATO states that previously hosted US nuclear
weapons on their territories
NATO states that forbid stationing of nuclear
weapons on their territories at all times
NATO states that forbid stationing of nuclear
weapons on their territories in peacetime
Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Turkey
Canada, Greece, United Kingdom
Iceland, Lithuania
Denmark, Norway, Spain
g
BELGIUM –
Around 10–15 US B61 nuclear bombs are stored at
Kleine Brogel
Air Base,
in the Flemish province of Limburg in Belgium, for delivery by Belgian
F-16 aircraft.
110
In 2019, with plans afoot to replace the F-16s with F-35 aircraft, the
foreign affairs committee of the Belgian federal parliament approved a motion
directing the government “to draw up, as soon as possible, a roadmap aiming at
the withdrawal of nuclear weapons on Belgian territory”.
111
The following month,
however, the motion was narrowly defeated in the chamber of representatives, with
66 parliamentarians in favour and 74 against.
112
Nonetheless, given the closeness
of the vote and the backing of a number of the parties that comprise the new
coalition government, this issue is unlikely to disappear from the political agenda.
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 57 per cent of Belgians want the weapons to be
removed, with only 23 per cent wanting them to stay and the remainder unsure.
113
109
For more detailed poll results for Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, see “NATO Public Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, January 2021. For Germany, see “Greenpeace Survey on Nuclear Weapons
and Nuclear Weapons Treaty”, Greenpeace, July 2020.
110
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
111
“Belgium Narrowly Rejects Removal of US Nuclear Weapons”,
Brussels Times,
17 January 2020.
112
Ibid.
113
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, January 2021. Poll commissioned by ICAN.
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g
GERMANY –
Around 10–15 US B61 nuclear bombs are stored at
Büchel Air Base,
in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate, for delivery by Tornado aircraft.
114
In April 2020, the German defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer,
announced that Germany’s fleet of Tornado aircraft would be replaced, including
with 30 F-18 aircraft certified to carry US nuclear bombs.
115
This prompted a public
debate on the merits of continuing to host US nuclear weapons on German soil.
Rolf Mützenich, the chair of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) parliamentary group
in the Bundestag, said that “it is about time that Germany in the future excludes the
deployment” of nuclear weapons.
116
The defence minister clarified that a decision
on the procurement of new aircraft would not be taken until after the parliamentary
election to be held in September 2021. In its programme for the election, the
SPD said that it supports, in the context of US–Russian negotiations, “the aim
of finally withdrawing and destroying the nuclear weapons stationed in Europe
and Germany”.
117
The Green Party, in its manifesto of principles, said that it is
committed to “a Germany free of nuclear weapons and thus a swift end to nuclear
participation”.
118
A Kantar poll commissioned by Greenpeace in 2020 found that
83 per cent of Germans want the US nuclear weapons to be removed, with only
13 per cent wanting them to stay and the remainder unsure.
119
ITALY –
Around 20–30 US B61 nuclear bombs are stored at
Aviano Air Base,
in
the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region of Italy, and around 10–15 are at
Ghedi Air Base,
in
the Lombardy region, for delivery by Italian Tornado aircraft.
120
In 2015, Italian police
arrested two suspected terrorists for planning an attack against the Ghedi base.
121
They were convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The base facilities
are currently being enlarged and upgraded. The Italian air force is in the process of
acquiring F-35A joint strike fighters to replace the Tornado aircraft. Thirteen have
already been delivered. Italy’s Five Star Movement – the political party with the
greatest number of seats in the current parliament – opposes in its platform the
presence of US nuclear weapons in Italy, viewing them as a threat to the safety of
Italians living near the bases.
122
However, it has not yet taken any concrete steps
in this legislature towards removing the weapons. A number of parliamentarians
from other political parties, including the Democratic Party and some smaller left-
wing parties, also favour withdrawal of the weapons. A YouGov poll in 2020 found
that 74 per cent of Italians want the weapons to be removed, with only 9 per cent
wanting them to stay and the remainder unsure.
123
NETHERLANDS –
Around 10–15 US B-61 nuclear bombs are stored at
Volkel
Air Base,
in the North Brabant province of the Netherlands, for delivery by Dutch
F-16 aircraft.
124
The NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, visited the base
in October 2020 at the start of the “Steadfast Noon” nuclear strike exercise,
describing it as “an important test for the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent”.
125
Over the
past decade, the Dutch parliament has adopted a number of motions calling on the
Dutch government to work for the removal of US non-strategic nuclear weapons
from Europe, and more specifically for an end to Dutch participation in nuclear-
sharing by ensuring that the new aircraft that replace the F-16s do not have a
114
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
115
“Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Europe”,
ACT,
2020.
116
“It Is Time for Germany to Exclude Stationing in the Future”,
Der Tagesspiegel,
3 May 2020.
117
“The SPD’s Future Programme”, 9 May 2021.
118
“‘To Respect and to Protect’: Change Creates Stability”, Greens, p. 95.
119
“Greenpeace Survey on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Treaty”, Greenpeace, July 2020.
120
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
121
“US Nuclear Weapons Base in Italy Eyed by Alleged Terrorists”, FAS, 22 July 2015.
122
“Five Star Movement Goes to See 20 US Atomic Bombs in Italy”, Beppe Grillo, 25 February 2016.
123
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, January 2021. Poll commissioned by ICAN.
124
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
125
“Sec. General Visits Dutch Airbase Hosting NATO Deterrence Exercise”, NATO, 16 October 2020.
g
g
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“nuclear task”.
126
In 2019, the government announced that it would seek to “identify
opportunities together with [NATO] allies to achieve the withdrawal of all Russian
and US sub-strategic nuclear weapons from all over Europe – from the Atlantic to
the Urals”.
127
It added that “the moment of modernisation of the nuclear weapons
located in Europe would be a logical starting point to take steps in that direction”.
A recent legal battle aimed at compelling the declassification of documents
relating to the presence of US nuclear bombs in the Netherlands, while ultimately
unsuccessful, drew considerable public attention to the issue.
128
A YouGov poll in
2020 found that 58 per cent of Dutch people want the weapons to be removed,
with only 23 per cent wanting them to stay and the remainder unsure.
129
g
TURKEY –
Around 20–30 US B61 nuclear bombs remain at
Incirlik Air Base,
in the
Adana province of Turkey, although it is possible that Turkey’s nuclear mission has
been “mothballed”, according to the Federation of American Scientists.
130
Given
the deterioration of US–Turkish relations in recent years, including as a result of
unilateral military action by Turkey in Syria, and in light of the political instability
and attempted coup in Turkey in 2016, many members of the US foreign policy and
defence establishment have questioned the suitability of Turkey as a host state
for US nuclear bombs.
131
In 2019, US officials indicated that the United States was
reviewing “emergency nuclear weapons evacuation plans”.
132
While it appears that
a number of bombs have recently been removed from Turkey, some remain.
133
ICAN is not aware of any recent public opinion polling on Turkish attitudes towards
the stationing of US nuclear bombs in Turkey.
A Dangerous and Destabilising Trend
NATO’s retrograde movement away from its disarmament goals and
towards an ever‑tighter embrace of nuclear weapons has dangerous and
far‑reaching consequences for the security of the alliance.
First, NATO’s tightening embrace of nuclear weapons directly threatens
the security of members by raising the risks of nuclear weapons being
used. NATO’s support for the modernisation of its members’ nuclear
arsenals, and its tendency to envision and explore new nuclear weapons,
capabilities, and missions, naturally provokes arms racing among its
nuclear‑armed rivals, and makes it easier for them to justify their own
expansion and modernisation programmes. The phenomenon of arms
races has been widely studied, is well understood, and was successfully
combatted during the height of the Cold War with the negotiation of a
series of bilateral nuclear arms control treaties between the US and Soviet
Union – to the security benefit of both parties, and to NATO overall. To
re‑engage in a nuclear arms race at this point – given the lived experience
of NATO members during the Cold War – defies rational analysis.
126
“Overview Motions on Nuclear Disarmament Adopted by the Dutch Parliament Since 2010”, PAX,
25 March 2020.
127
“Dutch Government Sets a (Qualified) Timeline to End the Nuclear Task”, PAX, 8 July 2019.
128
“US Nuclear Weapons in Netherlands”, National Security Archive, 15 January 2021.
129
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, January 2021. Poll commissioned by ICAN.
130
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
131
Steven Pifer, “It’s Time to Get US Nukes out of Turkey”,
The National Interest,
30 October 2019;
Steve Andreasen, “Let’s Get Our Nuclear Weapons out of Turkey”,
Los Angeles Times,
11 August 2016.
132
See David E. Sanger, “Trump Followed His Gut on Syria. Calamity Came Fast”,
New York Times,
14 October 2019.
133
“United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2021.
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Second, it undermines NATO’s security by encouraging proliferation of
nuclear weapons. As noted in chapter 1, the alliance has long recognised
the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons; this motivates NATO
members’ strong support for the NPT and safeguards system, and their
active involvement in international efforts to ensure that Iran’s nuclear
programme remains peaceful. Yet by constantly insisting on the necessity
of retaining nuclear weapons to assure its security, and by using a
deteriorating security environment as justification to modernise, refine,
and develop its members’ nuclear arsenals, and to defer or abandon
nuclear disarmament commitments, NATO is sending three deeply
counterproductive messages to non‑nuclear‑armed states outside the
alliance, some of which are facing acute security challenges of their own.
These messages are: 1) nuclear weapons are a legitimate, effective, and
morally acceptable means of addressing threats to national security,
and may even be indispensable; 2) a deteriorating security environment
and increasing regional instability can be controlled with more, better,
newer, smaller, or more usable nuclear weapons; and 3) security concerns
override international law and humanitarian principles: treaty obligations
and political commitments need not stand in the way of using nuclear
weapons to try to solve security problems.
It is hard to imagine a more effective way of undermining the NPT and
NATO’s own non‑proliferation priorities. Moreover, this “do as we say,
not as we do” hypocrisy corrodes trust with NATO partners and creates
friction in the NPT review process, further complicating the achievement
of NATO’s non‑proliferation goals, such as universal adherence to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.
134
Third, by nailing its nuclear colours to the mast and enforcing a rigid
orthodoxy among its membership in favour of a fundamental and
permanent role for nuclear weapons in ensuring the alliance’s security,
NATO is cutting off options and painting itself into a strategic corner.
NATO members are constrained and discouraged from exploring
alternative approaches to security and effective steps towards nuclear
disarmament; perspectives are narrowed, opportunities are passed by,
and potential pathways to improving cooperation and partnerships
with those outside the alliance are closed off. Such a trend would be a
strategic disadvantage for any alliance; for an alliance of democratic states
“founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law”
135
and committed to protecting freedom, it is a dangerous and
self-defeating weakness.
134
“Additional Protocol”, IAEA.
135
North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, preamble.
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3
A New
Global Norm
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
is now a permanent part of international law,
and enjoys broad global support. NATO’s hostility
towards it is directly contrary to its own interests.
he harmful effects of the trend within NATO outlined in the previous
chapter – modernising nuclear arsenals, hardening rhetoric in
favour of nuclear weapons, and stifling discussion and dissent – are
most clearly manifested in the relationship of NATO with the 2017 Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. From the outset, NATO has been
adamantly opposed and hostile to this treaty
136
– an approach that has not
only put NATO members on the wrong side of an important new global
humanitarian and security norm, but has also strained relationships
with NATO partners and other states, created tensions in the NPT, and
sown needless division worldwide. NATO’s stance on the TPNW is both
unnecessary and directly contrary to NATO’s own security interests.
The objective of the TPNW is the same as that professed by NATO: ending
the nuclear weapons threat by totally eliminating nuclear weapons. The
differences therefore concern only the means by which this objective is to
be achieved. Yet NATO has reacted to the TPNW as if it were some kind of
dangerous assault on its core values, if not a threat to its very existence.
136
See statement by the North Atlantic Council on the TPNW, 20 September 2017.
T
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The reasons given for NATO’s opposition to the TPNW range from dubious
and strained to utterly preposterous – what the former Canadian foreign
minister Lloyd Axworthy has aptly described as “phoney baloney”
137
– but
all have the air of having been retroactively concocted to justify what is in
essence a reflexive, visceral reaction.
138
This is especially the case for the arguments that are circular and
self-fulfilling: NATO opposes the TPNW because it is “divisive” (it is only
divisive because NATO opposes it) and because “it has not been signed
by any state that possesses nuclear weapons”
139
(i.e. we will not sign it
because we have not signed it). This reaction is hard to reconcile with
NATO’s stated values, aims, and objectives as an alliance of democratic
states, especially given the fact that the TPNW emerged from a process in
which almost all NATO members were involved.
Achieving the TPNW
The Humanitarian Initiative
With the exception of France, all NATO members participated to varying
degrees in the “humanitarian initiative”
140
which provided the foundations
and impetus for the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. The initiative
comprised a series of statements and conferences intended to refocus the
disarmament debate on the devastating harm that nuclear weapons cause
to people and the environment, as opposed to abstract, state‑centred
security concepts, which had long dominated the international discourse
on this issue. It had its roots in the final document of the NPT review
conference of 2010, which expressed “deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”.
141
“All states must intensify their efforts to
outlaw nuclear weapons and achieve a
world free of nuclear weapons.”
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and other states in 2012
Among the chief architects of the initiative was NATO member Norway.
Having played an instrumental role in the humanitarian‑based process
that led to the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008,
Norwegian officials believed that a similar process should be pursued for
137
“The Threat of Nuclear Weapons with Lloyd Axworthy”, Uncommons podcast, 26 November 2020.
138
See chapter 6 for a detailed examination of the myths and misconceptions surrounding the TPNW.
139
Speech by the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, at the 16th annual NATO Conference on
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, 10 November 2020.
140
For an overview of the humanitarian initiative, see, for example, Alexander Kmentt,
“The Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW”, Toda Peace Institute, February 2021.
141
Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, p. 19.
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nuclear weapons.
142
The government worked to build broad international
support for the idea, and funded a number of research institutes and
non‑government organisations, including ICAN, that shared its vision.
143
Together with NATO allies Denmark and Iceland, Norway was one of the
early signatories to a series of joint statements on “the humanitarian
dimension of nuclear disarmament” delivered at NPT meetings and in
the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. In 2012, the three NATO
members, along with several other states, called for intensified efforts “to
outlaw nuclear weapons and achieve a world free of nuclear weapons”.
144
Norwegian initiative
Delegates representing 127 states meet in Oslo, Norway, in 2013
for the first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
Credit: Norway MFA
In March 2013, Norway hosted the first of three major intergovernmental
conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons,
145
which
brought together states, UN agencies, the Red Cross, and civil society
organisations to examine the widespread, persistent devastation that
even a single nuclear weapon detonation could inflict today, as well as
the inability of relief agencies to provide any meaningful assistance to
victims. The conference proceeded despite resistance from Norway’s
142
See, for example, statement delivered by Espen Barth Eide, the deputy defence minister of Norway,
to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, on 17 February 2009.
143
Kjølv Egeland, “Oslo’s ‘New Track’: Norwegian Nuclear Disarmament Diplomacy, 2005–2013”,
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament,
volume 2, issue 2, 2019, pp. 468–490.
144
“Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament”, delivered in the First
Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 22 October 2012.
145
Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, Norway, 4–5 March 2013.
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nuclear-armed allies in NATO, which, along with Russia and China,
chose not to participate.
146
However, all of NATO’s non‑nuclear‑armed
members, with the exception of Bulgaria, did participate.
147
All but a few NATO states also attended the second conference on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, hosted by Mexico in February
2014, which cemented the idea that the prohibition of nuclear weapons is
a necessary precondition for their elimination, based on experience with
other categories of indiscriminate weapons.
148
It was hailed as “a point
of no return” in the process to outlaw nuclear weapons. By the third
conference, hosted by Austria in December 2014, the United States and
the United Kingdom had changed tack and decided to engage with the
process, sending delegates to Vienna. France was the only NATO state not
represented.
149
At the conclusion of the conference, Austria launched a
diplomatic pledge that enabled states to formalise their commitment to
work together to fill the gap in international law by cooperating “in efforts
to stigmatise, prohibit, and eliminate nuclear weapons”.
150
One hundred
and twenty‑seven states would endorse it – but none from NATO.
151
“A point of no return”
One hundred and forty-six states attend the second conference
on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, in Nayarit, Mexico, in 2014.
Credit: ICAN
146
Joint statement issued by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States ahead
of the Oslo conference in March 2013.
147
Revised list of participants, 5 March 2013.
148
See, for example, “Nayarit – A Point of No Return”, ICAN, April 2014.
149
List of participants in the Vienna conference, 8–9 December 2014.
150
“Humanitarian Pledge”, Austrian foreign ministry.
151
List of states that endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge, Austrian foreign ministry.
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Participation in Humanitarian Conferences 2013–14
Oslo Conference
Albania
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Montenegro*
Netherlands
North Macedonia*
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
* Not a NATO member at the time of the conferences.
Nayarit Conference Vienna Conference
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Treaty Negotiations
As the idea of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons gained traction,
resistance from the nuclear‑armed states within and beyond NATO grew
stronger. In October 2016, ahead of a vote in the UN General Assembly’s
First Committee to secure a mandate for negotiations on a “legally
binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their
total elimination”,
152
the United States warned its allies in NATO that
“the effects of a nuclear weapons ban treaty could be wide ranging”.
153
It
urged them “to vote against negotiations on a nuclear weapons treaty ban,
not to merely abstain. In addition, if negotiations do commence, we ask
allies and partners to refrain from joining them.”
154
All NATO members
complied with the US request except for the Netherlands, which abstained
from voting on the resolution and, under pressure from its parliament
and public,
155
opted to join the negotiations. (Albania, Estonia, and Italy
voted yes on the resolution in the UN General Assembly but subsequently
informed the UN secretariat that they had intended to vote no.
156
)
As negotiations for the TPNW commenced at the UN headquarters in New
York on 27 March 2017, the newly appointed US ambassador to the United
Nations, Nikki Haley, held a small demonstration outside the General
Assembly hall to register her country’s objections: “Today, when you see
those walking into the General Assembly to create a nuclear weapons ban,
you have to ask yourself, are they looking out for their people? Do they
really understand the threats that we have?”
157
The United Kingdom and
France spoke, too. Though the United States had insisted that all NATO
states attend the demonstration, several were notably absent, including
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Spain.
158
Entry into Force
In October 2020, as the TPNW neared its 50th ratification (the threshold
required for its entry into force), the United States made a last‑ditch
attempt to prevent the treaty from becoming a permanent part of
international law. In an extraordinary diplomatic move, it urged states
that had already joined the treaty to withdraw their ratifications:
“Although we recognise your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the
[TPNW], we believe that you have made a strategic error and should
withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.”
159
However, no
state complied with this request, nor did any other NATO member publicly
support the call for a mass withdrawal from the TPNW. It entered into
force three months later, on 22 January 2021.
152
“Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations”, draft resolution L.41, adopted on
27 October 2016 with the support of 123 states.
153
“US Pressured NATO States to Vote No to a Ban”, ICAN, 1 November 2016.
154
Ibid.
155
“Dutch Parliament: The Netherlands Needs to Negotiate an International Nuclear Weapons Ban
Treaty”, PAX, 28 April 2016.
156
Official records for 68th plenary meeting of UN General Assembly, New York, 23 December 2016.
157
Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladstone, “United States and Allies Protest UN Talks to Ban Nuclear
Weapons”,
New York Times,
27 March 2017.
158
States that attended the demonstration outside the UN General Assembly hall on 27 March 2017.
159
“US Urges Countries to Withdraw from UN Nuke Ban Treaty”, Associated Press, 22 October 2020.
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It was the same week as Joe Biden’s inauguration as US president.
His administration’s deputy assistant secretary for arms control,
verification, and compliance, Alexandra Bell, said prior to joining the
US state department that “the TPNW is here to stay”
160
and the United
States should “create the space for discussion on shared goals” with
TPNW supporters.
161
She also remarked that the treaty’s entry into force
“demonstrates a growing demand from countries around the world to
finally see significant steps toward disarmament”.
162
“The reaction of NATO countries, in particular
the United States, [to the TPNW] has been
excessive; the technical objections they raise
are strained. The real objection is that the
treaty bans the production, use, and handling
of nuclear weapons without exception.”
163
Hans Blix, former IAEA director general
Dutch participation
Karel van Oosterom, the ambassador of the Netherlands to the
United Nations, speaks during the TPNW negotiations in June 2017.
Credit: ICAN
160
See tweet by Alexandra Bell on 8 May 2020.
161
Alexandra Bell, “Global Non-Proliferation Regime”, in Jon Wolfsthal (editor),
Blundering Toward
Nuclear Chaos: The Trump Administration after Three Years,
Global Zero, May 2020.
162
“Nuclear Weapons Will Soon Be Banned under International Law”, Truthout, 27 October 2020.
163
Sophie Taylor, “Interview with Dr Hans Blix: The Most Important Lesson in Diplomacy Is Not to
Humiliate”, European Leadership Network, 23 January 2019.
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What Is the TPNW?
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was negotiated and adopted
at the United Nations in 2017 with the support of
122 states.
It is the first globally
applicable treaty that categorically prohibits nuclear weapons; the first to put
in place a framework for verifiably and irreversibly eliminating nuclear-weapon
programmes; and the first to establish an obligation to assist victims of the use and
testing of nuclear weapons, and to remediate contaminated environments.
164
The treaty strengthens the global taboo against using and possessing nuclear
weapons by filling a major gap in international law. Prior to its entry into force,
nuclear weapons were the only weapons of mass destruction not subject to a
global prohibition treaty, despite the catastrophic, widespread, and persistent harm
that they inflict. The TPNW is based on the rules and principles of international
humanitarian law, which stipulate that the right of parties to an armed conflict to
choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited, that weapons must be
capable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants, and that weapons
causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited.
Article 1
of the TPNW outlaws a wide range of nuclear-weapon-related activities.
States parties must never develop, test, produce, acquire, stockpile, transfer, use,
or threaten to use nuclear weapons. They are also forbidden from hosting another
state’s nuclear weapons on their territories or assisting or encouraging anyone
else to engage in any prohibited activities. Under
Article 4,
nuclear-armed states
can opt to eliminate their weapons before joining the treaty, in which case an
international authority must independently verify this. Alternatively, they can opt to
join the treaty and eliminate their weapons in accordance with a time-bound plan.
The treaty also includes a mechanism for ending the practice of “nuclear sharing”.
Any state may join the TPNW at any time. Support for the treaty will continue to
increase over time as its norms become more deeply entrenched and pressure to
conform to them intensifies. Some states that were initially reluctant to come on
board – whether because they feared the opprobrium of their allies or they clung
to the misguided belief that nuclear weapons bring security – will feel compelled to
reassess their position as the treaty’s membership grows larger, and as more and
more of their parliamentarians and citizens demand action. Under
Article 12,
states
that have joined the TPNW are required to encourage all other states to join it, with
the goal of attracting “universal adherence”.
164
See Tim Wright,
How the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Works,
ICAN, 2021.
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Monolithic Opposition, Forced Conformity
Some NATO members have said that they are not willing or ready to
commit to a total prohibition of nuclear weapons immediately. All
NATO members naturally wish to ensure that NATO military planning,
cooperation, and interoperability are not hampered by nuclear
disarmament measures. Among NATO members, a range of opinions and
prognoses on a new treaty like the TPNW is to be expected, and robust
discussion of the pros and cons, prospects and consequences, would
presumably be welcomed and encouraged. But this has not happened.
Instead, NATO has essentially imposed a blanket ban on engagement
with and support for the TPNW by alliance members. Rather than taking
advantage of the diversity of its membership to explore how the TPNW
might best fit in with and contribute to NATO objectives and priorities, the
alliance has closed ranks and adopted a stance of monolithic opposition –
an approach more reminiscent of the Cold War Soviet bloc than one suited
to a community of democratic states.
Throughout the history of NATO, members of the alliance have taken
different approaches to weapons and strategy issues, and have variously
argued for greater and lesser roles for nuclear weapons in NATO security
doctrines. As the NATO 2030 Reflection Group notes, “as befits a
community of sovereign democratic states, NATO has never been able to
achieve complete harmony”.
165
The first NATO strategic concepts did not
explicitly give a role to nuclear weapons, at the insistence of Denmark,
which argued that NATO should “refrain from using language ‘that could
be argued to stand in the way of an effective ban on nuclear war’”.
166
Individual member states have adopted a variety of different policies
concerning the degree of their involvement with NATO’s nuclear
weapons. Some host US nuclear weapons on their territories under
the so-called “nuclear sharing” arrangement (Belgium, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey); others do not. Some allow transit
or deployment of nuclear weapons without restriction; others only
in wartime (Denmark, Norway, Spain), and others not at all (Iceland,
Lithuania). Some participate in annual nuclear weapons training exercises
to prepare to use nuclear weapons through Support of Nuclear Operations
With Conventional Air Tactics, or SNOWCAT; others do not.
167
Around half
of NATO’s members do not have any nuclear role within the alliance at all,
other than participating in the Nuclear Planning Group
168
– while France,
although it is one of the three nuclear‑armed members of the alliance,
does
not
participate in the Nuclear Planning Group.
169
This variety is paralleled in the realm of conventional weapons. All NATO
members except for the United States have joined the 1997 Anti‑Personnel
Mine Ban Convention and most have joined the 2008 Convention on
165
NATO 2030: United for a New Era,
NATO, 2020, p. 20.
166
Kjølv Egeland, “Spreading the Burden: How NATO Became a ‘Nuclear’ Alliance”,
Diplomacy and
Statecraft,
volume 31, issue 1, 2020, pp. 143–167.
167
SNOWCAT participants include the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland,
and Romania. The nuclear weapon host states, as well as the United Kingdom and the United States,
also contribute non-nuclear aircraft to support nuclear strike missions.
168
Hans M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, briefing to the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC, 1 November 2019.
169
“Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)”, NATO.
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Cluster Munitions – both treaties that comprehensively outlaw certain
weapons that remain in use in the armed forces of other NATO allies.
In neither the nuclear nor the conventional setting has this variety of
opinions, stances, and policies caused any fundamental strategic or
operational problem to the alliance. On the contrary, the ability and
willingness of individual NATO members to explore and adopt different
approaches over time, according to their circumstances and interests,
and the evolution of alliance policy through constant vigorous debate as
strategic and political circumstances shift and norms develop, should be
viewed as strengths of the alliance. As the Reflection Group concludes:
Allies have occasionally disagreed in the past over interests and
values, sometimes straining the Alliance. Yet another key to NATO’s
success is that it has been resilient in the face of many challenges
because Allies do not deviate, even under strained circumstances,
from an inviolable commitment to defending each other’s security.
170
There is therefore nothing to justify NATO’s monolithic opposition to the
TPNW. The same flexible approach taken by the alliance on participation
in nuclear weapons activities and membership of conventional weapons
treaties should be applied to the TPNW. NATO members should be free
– indeed, encouraged – to engage with the treaty and its community of
states parties. Those members willing to do so should join the TPNW now;
those not yet ready should be open to discussing pathways to joining, and
in the meantime should engage constructively with the treaty in support of
achieving the common objective it shares with NATO.
No Legal Barrier to Joining
Nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty
171
– the foundation document of
the NATO alliance – bars a NATO member from joining the TPNW, and
nothing in the TPNW bars a state party from remaining in an alliance with
a nuclear‑armed state, so long as it refrains from assisting, encouraging,
or inducing that state to possess or use nuclear weapons.
172
Indeed, the
negotiators of the TPNW took care in the drafting process to ensure that
states parties could continue to cooperate militarily with nuclear‑armed
states in conventional operations. Any NATO member that joins the TPNW
would, however, be obliged to disavow the notion of protection from an
ally’s nuclear weapons and abstain from all nuclear‑weapon‑related
activities in order to comply with Article 1. Furthermore, a NATO member
that hosts US nuclear weapons on its territory when it joins the TPNW
would need to ensure their “prompt removal” under Article 4.
According to the
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor
published by Norwegian
People’s Aid: “States parties to the TPNW can remain in alliances and
military cooperation arrangements with nuclear‑armed states, and can
continue to execute all operations, exercises, and other military activities
together with them in so far as they do not involve nuclear weapons.
170
NATO 2030: United for a New Era,
NATO, 2020, p. 20.
171
North Atlantic Treaty, adopted on 4 April 1949, entered into force on 24 August 1949.
172
See, for example, “Nuclear Umbrella Arrangements and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School, June 2018. Note that many of the
points in this section apply also to non-NATO states that are in “nuclear umbrella arrangements”.
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Participation in ‘nuclear burden-sharing’ and other nuclear-related
military activities, however, would need to be discontinued.”
173
Two
former NATO secretaries general and dozens of past leaders and foreign
and defence ministers from NATO states concur that alliance membership
and adherence to the TPNW are compatible: “As [TPNW] states parties,
we could remain in alliances with nuclear‑armed states … But we would
be legally bound never under any circumstances to assist or encourage our
allies to use, threaten to use, or possess nuclear weapons.”
174
“States parties to the TPNW can remain in alliances
and military cooperation arrangements with
nuclear-armed states … Participation in ‘nuclear
burden-sharing’ and other nuclear-related military
activities, however, would need to be discontinued.”
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor,
2020
NATO’s current policy on nuclear weapons is based largely on the Strategic
Concept adopted by consensus at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal,
in 2010,
175
as well as the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012.
176
It also comprises various earlier and more recent alliance statements,
including those issued by the North Atlantic Council on the TPNW in
2017 and 2020.
177
At the same time as expressing support for nuclear
disarmament, the Strategic Concept states: “Deterrence, based on an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core
element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of
nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As
long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”
178
While all NATO members have endorsed this position, the Strategic
Concept does not establish any legal obligations, nor do statements issued
by the North Atlantic Council. There is no legal requirement that NATO
members remain in a so‑called “nuclear umbrella” arrangement with
their nuclear‑armed allies. They are free to adopt for themselves, at any
time, a non‑nuclear defence posture. The entry into force of the TPNW in
January 2021 should provide renewed motivation to do so. As TPNW states
parties, NATO members would be legally bound to distance themselves
from any alliance statements that endorse the retention or potential
use of nuclear weapons. Such positioning would not be entirely without
precedent: NATO members have a long history of adopting independent,
divergent positions on nuclear weapons, as noted above, including
through the use of “opt‑out” footnotes in alliance statements.
173
“The Prohibition on Assisting, Encouraging, or Inducing Prohibited Activities”,
Nuclear Weapons
Ban Monitor,
Norwegian People’s Aid, 2020.
174
“Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, 21 September 2020.
175
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,
NATO, 2010.
176
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,
endorsed at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012.
177
“North Atlantic Council Statement on the TPNW”, NATO, 20 September 2017; and “North Atlantic
Council Statement as the TPNW Enters into Force”, NATO, 15 December 2020.
178
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,
NATO, 2010.
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The conclusion that NATO members face no legal impediment to becoming
TPNW states parties has been confirmed by the government of Norway.
In 2018, the foreign minister informed the parliament that “there is no
legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying the [TPNW]”.
179
(This was the conclusion reached also by the Norwegian Academy of
International Law.)
180
Steven Hill, who served as chief legal counsel to the
NATO secretaries general Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Jens Stoltenberg
from 2014 to 2020, has noted that the North Atlantic Treaty does not
mention nuclear weapons, nor does it mention nuclear deterrence:
“Rather, the obligations in the North Atlantic Treaty are formulated
in general terms, and do not commit Allies to a particular means of
achieving desired outcomes.”
181
He has stressed, however, that while
“a particular course of action might be a legally available option” it could
have “potential political ramifications”, given the “heavy weighting” that
political commitments carry.
182
Nevertheless, from a legal perspective,
joining the TPNW and remaining a member of NATO are compatible.
“[T]here is no legal obligation barring Norway
from signing or ratifying the [TPNW].”
Ine Eriksen Søreide, foreign minister of Norway, 2018
Endorsing Nuclear Doctrines
By endorsing various alliance statements, all NATO members have
indicated their support for the possession and potential use of nuclear
weapons, with no alliance member having yet adopted a non‑nuclear
defence posture (though some have made clear their unwillingness to host
nuclear weapons on their territories, whether in peacetime or wartime).
183
All 27 non‑nuclear‑armed NATO members are considered to be under
a so‑called “nuclear umbrella” – an arrangement whereby a nuclear‑
armed state agrees to possess and potentially use nuclear weapons on
behalf of another state, and that other state consents to, or acquiesces
to, this “protection”.
184
Such an arrangement is inconsistent with the
TPNW’s object and purpose and with Article 1. (Note that not all alliances
with nuclear‑armed states involve a “nuclear umbrella” arrangement.
For example, US allies Thailand and the Philippines do not claim to be
protected by US nuclear weapons, and both are TPNW states parties.)
In the preamble to the TPNW, states parties express their concern about
“the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security
concepts, doctrines, and policies”. They also put forth the view that “any
179
Record of the meeting of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) on 14 November 2018.
180
Gro Nystuen, Kjølv Egeland, and Torbjørn Graff Hugo, “The TPNW and Its Implications for Norway”,
Norwegian Academy of International Law, September 2018.
181
Steven Hill, “NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Chatham House, 2021.
182
Ibid.
183
Denmark, Norway, and Spain do not allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories
in peacetime, and Iceland and Lithuania do not allow them at all. See Stein-Ivar Lothe Eide,
A Ban on
Nuclear Weapons: What’s in It for NATO?,
International Law and Policy Institute, 2014.
184
See
Nuclear Umbrellas and Umbrella States,
International Law and Policy Institute, 2016.
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use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules
of international humanitarian law”. Given that a “nuclear umbrella”
arrangement depends on the continued existence of nuclear weapons and
their potential use, it is clearly contrary to the TPNW’s object and purpose.
According to the Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic:
“A state may not base its security on an ally’s nuclear arms while being
party to a treaty with the explicit goal of total elimination.”
185
Under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, a state party must never under
any circumstances assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited under the treaty. NATO’s non‑nuclear‑armed
members, by accepting the notion of protection from an ally’s nuclear
weapons, are encouraging that ally to possess and – in extreme
circumstances – use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on their behalf.
TPNW parties “must renounce existing nuclear umbrella arrangements,
but the TPNW does not require them to abandon existing, long‑standing
security alliances”, the International Human Rights Clinic has concluded.
“While it might face political opposition from its nuclear‑armed allies, a
NATO member state would not violate its legal obligations to the alliance if
it withdrew from the nuclear umbrella associated with NATO.”
186
Assisting Prohibited Activities
TPNW states parties may participate in joint military operations involving
nuclear‑armed states provided that they in no way assist, encourage,
or induce anyone to engage in activities prohibited under the treaty. As
is the case with other humanitarian disarmament treaties, such as the
1997 Anti‑Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions, “mere participation” in a joint operation with a state
possessing the prohibited weapons is not a violation.
187
In the context of
the mine ban treaty, it is well established that a state party can lawfully
participate in joint military activities with a mine‑possessing state, so
long as there is no “nexus” between the state party’s actions and the use
of prohibited weapons by the state not party.
188
NATO members have, for
example, engaged in numerous operations with the United States even
though it has declined to join the mine ban treaty. Under the TPNW, NATO
states could continue to engage in most of the alliance’s current activities.
According to the
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor,
the kinds of activities
that would contravene Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW include assisting
with nuclear bombing raids, for instance with conventional air tactics,
during a conflict; participating in exercises that involve the simulated
use of nuclear weapons; participating in strike exercises that amount to
threatening to use nuclear weapons; participating in the annual Steadfast
Noon exercise, where states practise the use of B61 nuclear weapons
stationed on the territories of NATO non‑nuclear‑armed states; providing
185
“Nuclear Umbrella Arrangements and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”,
International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School, June 2018.
186
Ibid.
187
Stuart Casey-Maslen,
Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties Volume 1: The Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction,
Oxford University Press, 2015, para. 1.71.
188
Ibid.
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significant logistical and technical support to, for example, a submarine
specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons; gathering and sharing
intelligence with a nuclear‑armed state to knowingly identify targets
for a temporally proximate use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
participating in nuclear planning, including where it involves a general
readiness for hypothetical future use of nuclear weapons; and allowing
the testing of missiles on one’s territory that are specifically designed to
deliver nuclear warheads or are nuclear‑capable.
189
Hosting Nuclear Weapons
Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW prohibits states parties from allowing “any
stationing, installation, or deployment” of another state’s nuclear
weapons on their territory or at any other place under their jurisdiction
or control. (No similar prohibition exists under the NPT.) As noted
above, five NATO members are believed to host a total of roughly 100 US
nuclear gravity bombs on their territories. In order to comply with the
TPNW, these states may either end this practice before becoming TPNW
states parties or ensure the removal of the weapons in accordance with
Article 4(4). This provision stipulates that a state party that hosts another
state’s nuclear weapons must “ensure the prompt removal of such
weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined
by the first meeting of States Parties”. (That meeting is scheduled to take
place in Vienna in 2022.) Upon the removal of the weapons, the state party
must submit a declaration to the UN secretary-general confirming that it
has fulfilled its obligations under Article 4 of the treaty.
Ending a Counterproductive Approach
As the previous section showed, there is much about the TPNW for
NATO members to consider, discuss, and indeed contribute to in terms
of advancing their collective security and reducing the risks posed by
nuclear weapons. NATO’s current approach of blanket dismissal of and
hostile non‑engagement with the TPNW is contrary to the alliance’s
own interests, and will only make achieving its security goals more
difficult. Monolithic opposition to the TPNW, and enforced political
conformity on the view of the TPNW as a threat and danger to the alliance,
only constrains NATO’s options, cutting off opportunities to explore
pathways to reinvigorating nuclear disarmament, exacerbating tensions
in the NPT, and alienating potential partners. As the history of NATO
shows, such an approach is simply unnecessary. The best way for NATO
members to defend each other’s security – and promote international
peace and stability – is to support the prohibition and, wherever possible,
throw their weight behind the new global norm by joining the TPNW,
strengthening barriers against proliferation and working to eliminate
nuclear weapons.
189
“The Prohibition on Assisting, Encouraging, or Inducing Prohibited Activities”,
Nuclear Weapons
Ban Monitor,
Norwegian People’s Aid, 2020.
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NATO States’ Adherence to Bans on Other Weapons
Biological
Weapons
Convention
Albania
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Montenegro
Netherlands
North Macedonia
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
4
4
4
4
4
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4
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4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Chemical
Weapons
Convention
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Anti-Personnel Convention
Mine Ban
on Cluster
Convention
Munitions
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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4
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“[On 22 January 2021] the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons entered into force. I call on all
states to support the goal of this treaty.”
António Guterres, UN secretary-general, 2021
Open for signature
The UN secretary-general speaks at a signing
ceremony for the TPNW on 20 September 2017.
Credit: ICAN/ Darren Ornitz
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4
Benefits of
Joining the Ban
By joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, NATO members can help to
strengthen barriers against proliferation and
open up pathways for disarmament.
ATO’s reflexive opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons has focused the attention of alliance members
almost exclusively on the perceived problems and shortcomings
of the treaty. As discussed in the previous chapter, and examined further
in chapter 6, these objections are variously misconceived, exaggerated,
or entirely baseless. But regardless of the accuracy of criticisms of the
TPNW, the obsessive negative focus on the treaty within NATO has
prevented any substantive consideration of its benefits, including what
it can potentially offer the alliance. There has been almost no discussion
within NATO – at least on the public record – of how the TPNW might be
able to assist NATO members in pursuing the alliance’s stated objective of
reducing and eventually eliminating the security threats posed by nuclear
weapons. NATO members also do not appear to have examined how the
obligations on addressing nuclear harm in the TPNW could align with
the humanitarian and sustainable development objectives of many NATO
members, and the beneficial contributions NATO members could make to
this structure of work.
N
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Strengthening Non-Proliferation
One reason for this lack of discussion is the view held in NATO of the
TPNW as purely a disarmament treaty – and a treaty suspected (wrongly)
of being aimed at disarming NATO in particular. But the key aim of the
TPNW is to build and entrench a robust new global norm against nuclear
weapons: a comprehensive prohibition, free of the exceptions and double
standards of the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty. This aim encompasses
both disarmament and non‑proliferation elements. By stigmatising and
delegitimising nuclear weapons, the TPNW is strengthening barriers
against proliferation, and thereby increasing NATO’s security.
Each NPT non‑nuclear‑armed state that joins the TPNW is not only
committing to a total prohibition of nuclear weapons, without exception
or qualification, but is also undertaking additional practical obligations
beyond those in the NPT, including more onerous withdrawal provisions
and (in many cases) legally locking in safeguards provisions above those
required by the NPT.
190
In addition, while Article II of the NPT prohibits
non‑nuclear‑armed states parties from “manufactur[ing] or otherwise
acquir[ing] nuclear weapons”, the treaty contains no explicit ban on steps
leading up to manufacture. The TPNW addresses this potential legal deficit
by prohibiting its states parties from “developing” nuclear weapons – a
concept that encompasses any of the actions and activities intended to
prepare for manufacture, such as relevant research, computer modelling
of weapons, and the testing of key components.
191
“[The TPNW] serves as a new instrument
of non-proliferation, augmenting the
existing Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
192
Bill Perry, former US secretary of defence
Each non-NATO state that joins the TPNW is therefore increasing NATO’s
security.
The actions of a number of NATO members to actively discourage
other states from joining the TPNW are thus counterproductive and
contrary to the interests of the alliance. Even if no NATO member is willing
to join the TPNW in the short term, it is clearly in the alliance’s interest
to encourage other states to join. But in fact there are good reasons for
NATO members to join too. The first of these reasons is obviously that
other states are more likely to join the TPNW if NATO members do so
themselves; NATO states leading by example and joining the treaty would
provide a tremendous boost to universalisation efforts.
Second, NATO members joining the TPNW would send a powerful signal
of genuine commitment to pursuing nuclear disarmament and good
faith in implementing NPT obligations. This would provide an important
190
See chapter 6 for more details on the often-misunderstood safeguards provisions of the TPNW.
191
“The Prohibition on Developing, Producing, Manufacturing, or Otherwise Acquiring Nuclear
Weapons”,
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor,
2020.
192
William J. Perry, “Why the United States Should Support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
22 January 2021.
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relief valve for nuclear arms race pressure. As noted in chapter 2, NATO’s
increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons over recent years is feeding a
classic arms race cycle, as rivals respond with increasing nuclear capacities
of their own, which in turn prompts further NATO steps. Note that this
signal of commitment can be sent in stages: not all NATO members
need join the TPNW at once; those that do not possess nuclear weapons
themselves would be obvious candidates to go first.
Third, such a signal will significantly lessen tensions in the NPT. Many
members of NATO have worked hard over many years in the NPT review
process to find common ground and develop practical pathways forward
for implementing the disarmament obligations of the treaty – only to
have their efforts crushed and credibility destroyed by the inability or
unwillingness of their nuclear-armed allies to follow through. Recent
efforts led by NATO members and partners, such as the Stockholm
Initiative,
193
are designed along similar lines as past disappointments
(such as the “step‑by‑step approach”, “building blocks approach”,
and “progressive approach”), and are thus greatly disadvantaged from
the outset by this lack of credibility and trust. Joining the TPNW offers
these states the chance to rebuild their credibility with the wider NPT
community of non‑nuclear‑armed states, and to take steps on their
own behalf towards reducing, and ultimately ending, the overall reliance
of NATO on nuclear weapons. This will facilitate their role as effective
bridge‑builders in helping to repair relations between nuclear‑armed
and non‑nuclear‑armed states in the NPT, and will greatly increase
opportunities for finding common ground for renewed cooperation and
progress on implementing all aspects of the NPT, including through the
kinds of steps envisioned in the Stockholm Initiative.
Fourth, NATO members joining the TPNW will directly facilitate progress
towards nuclear disarmament by starting to dismantle some of the
obstacles and disincentives that NATO has put in its own way. As non‑
nuclear‑armed NATO members join the TPNW and categorically reject
the option of using nuclear weapons in their defence, the nuclear‑armed
members of the alliance will have steadily less reason – and face less
pressure – to modernise and augment their arsenals to continue to provide
“extended deterrence”. There will also be steadily decreasing need and
justification for providing extended nuclear deterrence, and maintaining
the explicit identity of NATO as a “nuclear alliance”, in order to prevent
other members from deciding to pursue their own nuclear arsenals.
Developing the Disarmament Machinery
One of the innovative features of the TPNW is its approach to verification
of nuclear disarmament. Often incorrectly described by critics as being
weak or even non‑existent,
194
the verification provisions in Article 4 of
the TPNW require the negotiation of a legally binding, time‑bound plan
for “the verified and irreversible elimination” of the nuclear-weapon
programme of the state party or states parties concerned. Negotiating
such a plan will obviously be a daunting technical and political challenge,
especially if the plan involves more than one nuclear‑armed state (which
193
“Stockholm Initiative”, Alliance for Multilateralism.
194
See chapter 6 for further details on why this characterisation is incorrect.
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would be a likely scenario, given the apparent reluctance of NATO and
other nuclear‑armed states to consider unilateral disarmament). There is
therefore a great deal of preparatory work that will be required to explore
possible modalities, set out technical and operational parameters, and
determine the standards by which the TPNW states parties will ultimately
evaluate a proposed elimination plan for approval.
Whether or not any NATO nuclear‑armed state is prepared to join the
TPNW in the short term, it would clearly be in NATO’s interest to be
involved in this preparatory work, helping to develop the machinery
that will be used to ensure that any disarmament carried out pursuant
to the treaty is verified to a standard acceptable to NATO, and meets
its criteria for irreversibility. In this sense, by joining the TPNW early
in its development and working alongside other states parties, non‑
nuclear‑armed NATO members can act as a kind of “advance guard” for
the eventual accession of their nuclear‑armed allies. They can work to
ensure that the treaty regime develops in a way that supports NATO’s
non‑proliferation interests and wider security needs, and can help to
shape the disarmament machinery in a way that offers the best chance of
securing the confidence and eventual accession of their nuclear-armed
allies, as well as other nuclear‑armed states.
NATO members would have much to bring to this effort, having already
started important work on verification,
195
and being in a unique position
to understand, represent, and defend the interests and concerns of
nuclear‑armed states that are not yet ready to join the TPNW themselves.
The constructive engagement of NATO members with building the TPNW
regime will also help to heal rifts and restore trust in the NPT, and provide
a further demonstration of NATO’s commitment to pursuing its goal of a
world free of nuclear weapons.
Addressing Harm from Nuclear Weapons
The TPNW also offers NATO members a structured means of participating
in the assistance of individuals affected by past nuclear use and testing,
and efforts to remediate environmental damage. This work under the
TPNW could benefit individuals and communities in states that are NATO
members or NATO partners – such as Algeria and Kazakhstan, which are
grappling with the legacies of nuclear testing and are supporters of the
TPNW – as well as those in other states worldwide. Through implementing
these obligations, states can work to better address affected people’s
rights and needs, respond to environmental contamination, and support
sustainable development in affected countries.
196
These overarching goals
will align with the humanitarian and development priorities of many
NATO members. Articles 6 and 7 of the TPNW – on victim assistance,
environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance
– provide the first international framework for responding to the ongoing
humanitarian, human rights, and environmental consequences of the past
use and testing of nuclear weapons.
195
For example, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV).
196
See Matthew Bolton and Elizabeth Minor, “Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and
Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: An Introductory Review”,
Global Policy,
2021.
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The detonation of more than 2,000 nuclear devices in the territories of
what are now 15 countries continue to affect people and places,
197
as do
the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Physical and mental
health effects as well as socio-economic impacts persist. These harms
have had gendered dimensions, including the disproportionate impact on
women and girls acknowledged in the preamble of the TPNW. Indigenous
peoples have also been disproportionately affected by nuclear weapon
activities. This, too, is acknowledged in the TPNW. Some communities
are still displaced from nuclear testing on their land. Locations around
the world remain unsafe and contaminated by nuclear detonations,
and standards of remediation have varied. Many communities are still
seeking responses to the harm that they have identified these activities
to cause. Their demands range from the release of information and
recognition, through health and social support, to financial compensation.
Furthermore, the extent of the harm caused and the responses required
may not have been fully or recently assessed in many states, or
information may not be available.
198
The TPNW’s obligations on victim assistance, environmental remediation,
and international cooperation and assistance provide an opportunity to
better assess and address these impacts. They give a structure for the
international community to focus and collaborate on these issues. This
policy architecture offers the potential to address a broad range of harms
and to aspire to strong standards of response.
UK nuclear testing
At the negotiations for the TPNW in March 2017, Sue Coleman-
Haseldine, a Kokatha elder, describes the ongoing harm to Indigenous communities in
Australia as a result of nuclear tests and related experiments.
Credit: ICAN/Frode Ersfjord
197
The 15 countries and territories where nuclear devices have been tested are Algeria, Australia,
China, French Polynesia (non-self-governing territory administered by France), India, Kazakhstan,
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United States,
and Uzbekistan. See data in ibid.
198
For a general overview see ibid.
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The framework of responsibility for implementation created by Articles 6
and 7 emphasises collective and collaborative action among TPNW
states parties to support affected states parties with victim assistance
and environmental remediation. Articles 6(1) and 6(2) place the primary
responsibility with affected states parties to provide adequate assistance
to individuals harmed by past use and testing, and to take steps towards
the remediation of contaminated environments under their jurisdiction
or control. This approach recognises the sovereignty and existing
responsibilities of affected states parties.
To support them, Article 7 on international cooperation and assistance
sets out the right of these states parties to seek and receive assistance –
and requires parties in a position to do so to provide technical, material,
or financial assistance. Article 7 highlights that assistance can also
be provided through UN agencies, the Red Cross, non-government
organisations, and other international, regional, and national institutions.
This framework therefore gives any state joining the TPNW the
opportunity to make a positive contribution. It focuses not on liability,
but on practical action to respond to the challenges facing individuals,
communities, and their environments.
199
How NATO Members Could Contribute
States parties to the TPNW will be agreeing on the first steps towards
implementing victim assistance and environmental remediation at the
first meeting of states parties in Vienna in 2022.
200
Given the nature of
nuclear weapons’ impacts (which are wide ranging and complex) and how
they have been tested (which has involved secrecy), implementation will
be a long‑term and progressively realised task, as the legacies, harms,
and how they should be responded to are assessed and become better
understood by states parties.
As programmes of work develop and proceed, NATO members have an
opportunity to participate in these new, structured efforts to address
ongoing harm from nuclear weapons, and contribute to a community of
practice through which standards can be raised for affected communities.
NATO members should follow these processes and consider how they may
be able to support affected communities through expertise and funding.
Some ways that NATO members might be able to contribute at this early
stage of the TPNW’s implementation can already be identified, based on
their knowledge, expertise, and other resources.
The initial actions outlined in this section are all ones that NATO states
could take in the short to medium term. They could be taken by states as
parties to the TPNW – but many of these actions could also be undertaken
before states become party to the treaty, in order to engage constructively
with TPNW states parties and their work to address the humanitarian and
environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, and as a positive step
towards joining the treaty.
199
See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, “A ‘Light for All Humanity’: The TPNW and the Progress of
Humanitarian Disarmament”,
Global Change, Peace, and Security,
volume 30, issue 2, 2018, pp. 163–86.
200
For analysis and recommendations on how this could be structured, see Bonnie Docherty, “From
Obligation to Action: Advancing Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation at the First Meeting
of States Parties to the TPNW”,
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament,
2020.
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Vienna conference
Karipbek Kuyukov (right), an artist and survivor of Soviet nuclear
testing in Kazakhstan, speaks to the Hiroshima survivor Setsuko Thurlow at the Vienna
conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in 2014.
Credit: ICAN
Survivor Inclusion
One key and immediate way in which NATO members could contribute
to victim assistance and environmental remediation would be to support
survivor inclusion in work to address nuclear harm. The implementation
of Articles 6 and 7 under the TPNW must centre the knowledge and
requirements of affected communities as a starting point, and facilitating
affected communities’ participation will be crucial.
“[The TPNW] contains strong commitments to
assistance of the victims of nuclear weapon
use and testing, and to the remediation of
contaminated environments.”
201
International Committee of the Red Cross
Providing assistance to activities for inclusion, including through
UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, or support
to non‑government organisations – including survivors’ organisations
– would be beneficial both to affected communities and towards effective
implementation. Such assistance could include, for example, funding
outreach and attendance at meetings. It could also involve supporting
survivors and survivor‑led organisations with other work such as
community‑level research and advocacy activities.
201
“2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, ICRC, January 2021.
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US nuclear testing
Abacca Anjain-Maddison of the Marshall Islands – where the
United States tested 67 nuclear weapons between 1946 and 1958 – speaks during
the closing session of the TPNW negotiations in July 2017.
Credit: ICAN/Ralf Schlesener
Experience with Other Treaties
The structure of obligation and support in Articles 6 and 7 of the TPNW is
based on the approach to victim assistance and land clearance developed
under the 1997 Anti‑Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and
the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
202
Almost all NATO
members are party to these treaties, and many have played important
roles in supporting implementation of these obligations. For example,
NATO members have taken on coordination roles and led the work of
committees on victim assistance and clearance issues, to help push
forward meaningful work within these treaties.
203
NATO members have
also provided substantial funding to mine action over past decades,
helping to finance crucial humanitarian responses to the harmful legacies
of the use of anti‑personnel landmines and cluster munitions. These
countries have included, notably, the United States, which is not a party to
either the APMBC or the CCM but is the largest donor to the sector.
204
202
Bonnie Docherty, “A ‘Light for All Humanity’: The TPNW and the Progress of Humanitarian
Disarmament”,
Global Change, Peace, and Security,
volume 30, issue 2, 2018, pp. 163–86.
203
See the records of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions.
204
“Support for Mine Action”,
Landmine Monitor,
2020.
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Many NATO members will therefore already be well placed to contribute
positively to the structure of work in the TPNW on victim assistance and
environmental remediation, given their experiences from contributing
to the APMBC and the CCM. These states will also appreciate why these
positive obligations are a crucial part of the response to nuclear weapons
contained in the TPNW. Similar to parallel provisions in previous treaties
addressing weapons that have caused unacceptable humanitarian harm,
Articles 6 and 7 of the TPNW are a key component of responding to the
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons: this requires
both preventing future harm through prohibition and elimination and
responding to the harm caused by past actions.
205
Many NATO members could therefore make a useful contribution to
developing the structure and plans for implementation of this area of
the TPNW if they became states parties, based on their experience of
implementing similar provisions in the APMBC and the CCM (alongside
other TPNW states parties that also have these experiences). NATO
members may also be able to share useful experiences on, for example,
which mechanisms for providing financial assistance or technical
expertise have worked well in the past, and which have not. They could
also bring their insights on developing a positive and collaborative culture
of work and elaborating effective plans of action, or provide particular
thematic expertise – for example, on how age‑ and gender‑sensitive
assistance can be implemented.
Information Sharing
Some NATO members will have specific information or technical
experiences to share based on their undertaking or participating in
nuclear tests, and their subsequent responses towards affected people
and environments. Three NATO states – France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States
206
– previously tested nuclear weapons on their own or
others’ territories (including colonised countries that subsequently gained
independence, and currently non‑self‑governing territories). The United
States also used nuclear weapons in Japan in 1945. The TPNW framework
as a whole obliges all states parties to consider what more could be
done for populations and environments harmed by nuclear weapons.
Article 7(6) of the TPNW highlights that any states parties that have tested
nuclear weapons have a responsibility to assist affected states with victim
assistance and environmental remediation.
In order to develop effective and holistic responses to the ongoing impacts
of past nuclear weapons use and testing, information sharing on policy
responses from states that tested nuclear weapons (or have affected
populations) would be valuable. Such information can assist states in
looking at the results and effectiveness of different approaches, as well
as the gaps where more work could be done. This could be beneficial
to affected people in NATO states that have tested nuclear weapons,
including the personnel who worked at test sites, but it would also provide
205
Bonnie Docherty, “Completing the Package: The Development and Significance of Positive
Obligations in Humanitarian Disarmament Law”, in Treasa Dunworth and Anna Hood (editors),
Disarmament Law: Reviving the Field,
Routledge, 2020.
206
Some Canadian military personnel also participated in nuclear tests.
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valuable information for other TPNW states parties that are developing
responses for victim assistance and environmental remediation
(including to address the legacies of nuclear testing by NATO states).
On victim assistance, some NATO members have already implemented
programmes or legislation responding to physical health impacts from
nuclear testing, mostly related to payments to individuals whose health
was affected by their proximity to nuclear tests.
207
These approaches
could be beneficial to examine – particularly to analyse the shortcomings
and gaps they have left for affected people, and how these could be
addressed from a rights‑based perspective under the TPNW.
208
Other state
responses have included providing funding for independent research,
and to care and well‑being services and memorialisation undertaken by
non‑government organisations.
209
These steps have generally been taken
following concerted advocacy by affected people, including both civilian
communities and veterans, which continues.
On environmental remediation, NATO members that have tested
nuclear weapons have all carried out some work towards addressing
resultant contamination. They could therefore share information on
their approaches and technical standards, which would be useful for the
assessment and consideration of affected states parties to the TPNW,
and towards developing a constructive conversation about how people
and environments can be better protected from nuclear legacies. NATO
members that have not tested nuclear weapons but have expertise
in nuclear safety and contamination issues from the civilian sector
could also usefully contribute experience and information to these
conversations, as well as technical assistance.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France could also consider
what other information, such as research, assessments, or data on impacts
and contamination, they could share in the context of implementation
of the TPNW with states parties who have populations or areas affected
by past testing by these states. Any information that can be released and
could be beneficial to affected communities, particularly from a public
health or environmental perspective, should be shared.
Participating in the implementation of the victim assistance and
environmental remediation framework could contribute towards goals
of humanitarian response and sustainable development that many NATO
members will share. As the programme of work on victim assistance and
environmental remediation develops under the TPNW, more opportunities
to participate and assist with information, expertise, and resources will
arise. Work in this area should benefit affected communities globally –
including populations in states that are NATO members and partners.
207
For an overview, see Nate Van Duzer and Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Policy Approaches Addressing
the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”,
Global Policy,
2021.
208
To take one example, the structure of the French compensation programme (CIVEN) had led
to very few awards being given, with little transparency, prompting a change in criteria from 2020.
Nevertheless, it is still very challenging for affected people from Algeria and French Polynesia in
particular to access, for issues ranging from translation to lack of access to the medical and other
documentation needed to state their cases. See, for example, Jean-Marie Collin and Patrice Bouveret,
“Radioactivity under the Sand: The Waste from French Nuclear Tests in Algeria”, ICAN France and
Observatoire des Armaments,
2020, and “The Mururoa Files”, Interprt and Princeton University, 2021.
209
See, for example, the work of the Nuclear Community Charity Fund, funded by a grant from the UK
government following campaigning by the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association.
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History of Nuclear Testing
g
UNITED STATES –
The United States conducted
1,030 nuclear tests
between
1945 and 1992, roughly half of the global total. Most were in Nevada, and many
were in the Pacific, at Bikini and Enewetak atolls in the Marshall Islands and
Kiritimati Island in Kiribati. A number of tests were also conducted in Alaska
(Amchitka Island), Colorado, Mississippi, and New Mexico.
210
UNITED KINGDOM –
The United Kingdom conducted
45 nuclear tests
between
1952 and 1991: 12 tests (and hundreds of so-called “minor trials”) at Maralinga, Emu
Field, and the Montebello Islands in Australia; nine tests at Kiritimati and Malden
islands in Kiribati; and 24 tests in Nevada (conducted with the United States).
211
FRANCE –
France conducted
210 nuclear tests
between 1960 and 1996: 17 tests
at Reggane and In Ekker in Algeria; and 193 tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa
atolls in French Polynesia in the Pacific.
212
g
g
Nuclear-free and independent Pacific
More than a hundred people, mostly students
from across the Pacific (including from the Marshall Islands), march through the
streets of Suva, Fiji, in 2020 in support of the TPNW.
Credit: Youngsolwara
210
“The United States’ Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO.
211
“The United Kingdom’s Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO. Note that the 24 UK tests conducted
in Nevada are not included in the US total.
212
“France’s Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO.
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“The legacy of nuclear testing is
nothing but destruction.”
213
António Guterres, UN secretary-general
Marshall Islands
The United States conducts a nuclear
test at Enewetak Atoll in 1951.
Credit: US Government
213
Message on the International Day against Nuclear Tests, 29 August 2019.
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5
Support for the
Ban within NATO
While NATO as an alliance remains firmly
opposed to the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, there is strong and growing
support for it within many NATO states.
hrough various statements, NATO has presented a “consensus”
position on the TPNW.
214
On the surface, alliance members appear
united in their opposition to the treaty: no NATO state has yet signed
or ratified it, and all consistently vote against the annual UN General
Assembly resolution promoting it.
215
Beneath the surface, however,
attitudes among NATO states towards the TPNW, and towards nuclear
weapons in general, vary markedly. While three NATO states continue to
invest in major upgrades to their nuclear arsenals – and plan to retain
them for many decades to come
216
– others are deeply frustrated by the
lack of recent progress on disarmament. And some have, on occasion,
spoken positively about the TPNW, despite the alliance’s hardline stance.
T
214
See especially “North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, NATO, 20 September 2017; “North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force”, NATO, 15 December 2020.
215
The most recent such resolution is UN General Assembly resolution 75/40, “Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, adopted on 7 December 2020.
216
See, for example, Allison Pytlak and Ray Acheson (editors),
Assuring Destruction Forever,
Reaching
Critical Will, 2020 edition.
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The growing tide of political support for the TPNW in many NATO states
– and the mounting public pressure for action – suggests that it is only
a matter of time before one or more of these states take steps towards
joining the treaty. No doubt, they will encounter push‑back from certain
allies; but as sovereign states they are free to determine their own position
on nuclear weapons, just as they do on a wide range of other foreign policy
and defence issues. Ultimately, governments are accountable to their
citizens and cannot indefinitely ignore the democratic will.
The signs of growing support for the TPNW within NATO states are
numerous. Parliaments, including in Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain,
have conveyed their broad support and called for executive action. Opinion
polls in 11 member states have shown overwhelming public endorsement.
Political parties of various hues have entrenched support for the TPNW in
their platforms and manifestos. More than a thousand parliamentarians
across the alliance have pledged to work to bring their respective countries
on board. Hundreds of civil society organisations, including Red Cross
national societies, have voiced support. More than 50 former leaders and
foreign and defence ministers from 20 NATO states have implored current
leaders to “show courage and boldness” and join the treaty. Around 400
cities and towns, including several national capitals, have promoted
adherence to the treaty. All of this points to a major movement for change
across the alliance and dissatisfaction with the status quo.
“[The TPNW] has placed nuclear
disarmament in the limelight and created
a broad momentum for disarmament.”
The Netherlands, 2017
When the Netherlands participated in the negotiation of the TPNW in
2017 – against the express wishes of the United States, which had urged
all NATO members not to participate
217
– it acknowledged that the treaty
had “placed disarmament in the limelight and created a broad momentum
for disarmament”.
218
This is a sentiment expressed by senior politicians
and policymakers in several NATO states. Others, too, have acknowledged
the strong international and community‑level support for the TPNW.
For example, Canada’s now‑deputy prime minister, Chrystia Freeland,
commented at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2018: “The
popularity of [the TPNW] speaks to the desire of countries, activists, and
communities to accelerate the work toward disarmament.”
219
Notably, NATO’s full suite of talking points on the TPNW have not been
universally embraced by its members. In some NATO states, for example,
officials have refrained from adopting the line that the TPNW undermines
the NPT, instead accepting the widely held view that the two treaties are
complementary. As the Norwegian government put it in 2018: “There are
217
See “United States Non-Paper: ‘Defense Impacts of Potential United Nations Nuclear Weapons Ban
Treaty’”, North Atlantic Council, 17 October 2016.
218
Explanation of vote by the Netherlands following the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017.
219
Address by Chrystia Freeland, then-foreign minister of Canada, to the high-level segment of
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 February 2018.
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no grounds for asserting that the [TPNW] is contrary to the provisions
of the NPT on disarmament under international law.”
220
This was the
conclusion reached also by the research services division of the German
federal parliament, or Bundestag, in a paper examining the issue in detail
in January 2021: “The TPNW does not undermine the NPT; it is part of
a common nuclear disarmament architecture.”
221
Policymakers and
international lawyers have also concluded that NATO members face no
legal barrier to joining the new treaty – a position confirmed by Norway’s
foreign minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, in parliament in 2018: “There is no
legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying the TPNW.”
222
Norwegian public opinion
Thousands march in Oslo in 2017 in support of the TPNW
and in celebration of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to ICAN.
Credit: ICAN/Ralf Schlesener
Beyond the alliance members themselves, many NATO “partners” in
Europe and across the globe support the TPNW. Indeed, three such
partners – Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand – are among the leading
proponents of the treaty, having spearheaded its negotiation in 2017. Their
national positions reflect their deep concern at the catastrophic harm that
nuclear weapons inflict, a clear-headed assessment of global security
challenges, and a firm belief that the TPNW will be a catalyst for progress
in eliminating the world’s most destructive weapons.
220
“Review of the Consequences for Norway of Ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, Norwegian government, 28 November 2018.
221
“On the Legal Relationship between the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty and
Non-Proliferation Treaty”, research services division of the German Bundestag, January 2021.
222
Record of the meeting of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) on 14 November 2018.
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Signs of Change: At a Glance
g
BELGIUM –
The coalition government formed in 2020 has committed to explore
how the TPNW “can give new impetus to multilateral nuclear disarmament”.
223
CANADA –
The deputy prime minister has said that the popularity of the TPNW
“speaks to the desire of countries, activists, and communities to accelerate the
work toward disarmament”.
224
FRANCE –
The National Assembly’s foreign affairs committee has advised the
government to “mitigate its criticism” of the TPNW, acknowledging the desire of
TPNW supporters “for more balanced global governance”.
225
GERMANY –
The research services division of the federal parliament, or
Bundestag, has said that the TPNW in no way undermines the NPT.
226
ICELAND –
The prime minister has pledged to work for Iceland’s ratification of the
TPNW,
227
and a motion with this aim has been tabled in the parliament.
228
ITALY –
The parliament has instructed the government “to explore the possibility”
of becoming a TPNW state party in a way that is compatible with Italy’s NATO
obligations,
229
and the foreign minister has pledged support.
230
NETHERLANDS –
The parliament has called on the government to work to
increase support for the TPNW among NATO states,
231
and the government has
said that the treaty “has placed disarmament in the limelight and created a broad
momentum for disarmament”.
232
NORWAY –
The government has confirmed that the TPNW is not contrary to the
NPT,
233
and nor is there any legal obligation barring Norway from ratifying it.
234
Furthermore, the Norwegian Labour Party has declared that “it should be a goal for
Norway and other NATO countries to sign the nuclear ban treaty”.
235
SPAIN –
The foreign affairs committee of the Congress of Deputies has welcomed
the TPNW “as an effort to move towards peace, security, and disarmament”,
236
and
the government has made a political pledge to sign the TPNW.
237
g
g
g
g
g
g
g
g
223
“Belgian Government Shifts Stance on TPNW”, ICAN, 1 October 2020.
224
Address by Chrystia Freeland, then-foreign minister of Canada, to the high-level segment of
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 February 2018.
225
Report issued on 11 July 2018.
226
“On the Legal Relationship between the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty and
Non-Proliferation Treaty”, research services division of the German Bundestag, 2021.
227
“Iceland”, ICAN Parliamentary Pledge.
228
“Proposed Parliamentary Resolution on the TPNW”, Althingi.
229
“Italian Parliament Instructs Italy to Explore Possibility of Joining the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, ICAN,
20 December 2017.
230
“Italy”, ICAN Parliamentary Pledge.
231
“Dutch Parliament Asks for More Concrete Steps in Nuclear Disarmament”, PAX, 21 November
2018.
232
Explanation of vote by the Netherlands following the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017.
233
“Review of the Consequences for Norway of Ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, Norwegian government, 28 November 2018.
234
Record of the meeting of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) on 14 November 2018.
235
“Norwegian Labour Party Opening Up Towards TPNW Signature”, ICAN, 28 April 2021.
236
“Spanish Parliament Welcomes TPNW”, ICAN, 21 December 2020.
237
“Could Spain Be First NATO State to Sign Nuclear Ban Treaty?”, ICAN, 6 December 2018.
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g
UNITED KINGDOM –
In Scotland, where all UK nuclear weapons are based, the
first minister has said that “[a]n independent Scotland would be a keen signatory
[to the TPNW] and I hope the day we can do that is not far off”.
238
UNITED STATES –
The state legislatures of California, Oregon, and New Jersey
have passed resolutions calling on the US government to sign and ratify the
TPNW,
239
as have dozens of US cities, including Washington, DC.
240
In addition, a
bill to direct the United States to ratify the TPNW is before the US Congress.
241
g
Public Opinion
Opinion polls conducted in 11 NATO states – Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and
the United Kingdom – have shown overwhelming public support for
joining the TPNW, with few people opposed to the idea. Furthermore,
people support joining the treaty even if their country were the first in
NATO to do so. Polls have also shown majority backing for the withdrawal
of US nuclear weapons from bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands. With the TPNW’s recent entry into force, it is likely that
popular support for the treaty will only increase in the coming years.
According to the former leaders and ministers from 20 NATO states who
signed an open letter in support of the TPNW in 2020, joining the treaty
would be “an uncontroversial and much‑lauded move” given “the very
broad popular support in our countries for disarmament”.
242
“The popularity of [the TPNW] speaks to the
desire of countries, activists, and communities
to accelerate the work toward disarmament.”
Canada, 2018
Demonstrations, petitions, and other citizen‑led initiatives in NATO states
provide further evidence of widespread support for the TPNW. A petition in
Germany, for example, has garnered more than 100,000 signatures,
243
and
around a hundred events took place there in January 2021 in celebration
of the TPNW’s entry into force. Many prominent and influential people
have voiced their support, including academics, celebrities, and religious
leaders. Two UK archbishops and 29 bishops, for example, penned a letter
in 2020 calling on their government to join the TPNW, saying that it would
give hope “to all people of goodwill who seek a peaceful future”.
244
238
“First Minister Endorses the Scottish Women’s Covenant on the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Scottish
Branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 18 January 2021.
239
“California Supports the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, ICAN, 29 August 2018.
240
“Washington DC Joins ICAN Cities Appeal”, ICAN, 18 March 2019.
241
Nuclear Weapons Abolition and Economic and Energy Conversion Act of 2021, introduced by
Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia, 26 April 2021.
242
“Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, 21 September 2020.
243
“Sign the UN Nuclear Weapons Ban!”, ICAN Germany.
244
“Church Leaders Urge UK Government to Sign UN Anti-Nuclear Treaty”,
The Observer,
15 November 2020.
ICAN
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Opinion Polling
Should your country join the TPNW?
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Iceland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
United Kingdom
77%
74%
78%
67%
68%
86%
87%
78%
78%
89%
59%
g
Yes
g
Unsure
g
No
g
BELGIUM –
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 77 per cent of Belgians believe that
their country should join the TPNW, with just 11 per cent opposed.
245
Furthermore,
66 per cent believe that Belgium should be among the first NATO states to join
even if it faced pressure from allies not to do so. The poll also found that 57 per
cent of Belgians want US nuclear weapons removed from Belgian territory.
CANADA –
A Nanos poll in March 2021 found that 74 per cent of Canadians
believe that their country should join the TPNW, with just 14 per cent opposed.
246
Furthermore, 73 per cent think that Canada should join the treaty even if, as a
NATO state, it might come under pressure from the United States not to do so.
DENMARK –
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 78 per cent of Danes believe that
their country should join the TPNW, with just 7 per cent opposed.
247
Furthermore,
65 per cent believe that Denmark should be among the first NATO states to join
even if it faced pressure from allies not to do so.
FRANCE –
An Ifop poll in 2018 found that 67 per cent of French people believe
that their country should sign the TPNW, with 33 per cent opposed to signing.
248
g
g
g
245
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, 19 February 2021.
246
Poll commissioned by the Hiroshima Nagasaki Day Coalition, the Simons Foundation Canada, and
the
Collectif Échec à la guerre,
2021.
247
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, 19 February 2021.
248
“The French, Military Spending, and the Elimination of Atomic Weapons”, Ifop poll, 2018.
Commissioned by
Le Mouvement de la Paix, La Croix,
and
Planète Paix.
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g
GERMANY –
A YouGov poll in 2019 found that 68 per cent of Germans believe that
their country should join the TPNW, with just 12 per cent opposed.
249
Furthermore,
a Kantar poll in 2020 found that 83 per cent of Germans want US nuclear weapons
removed from German territory.
250
ICELAND –
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 86 per cent of Icelanders believe
that their country should join the TPNW, with just 3 per cent opposed.
251
Furthermore, 75 per cent believe that Iceland should be among the first NATO
states to join even if it faced pressure from allies not to do so.
ITALY –
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 87 per cent of Italians believe that their
country should join the TPNW, with just 5 per cent opposed.
252
Furthermore, 76 per
cent believe that Italy should be among the first NATO states to join even if it faced
pressure from allies not to do so. The poll also found that 74 per cent of Italians
want US nuclear weapons removed from Italian territory.
NETHERLANDS –
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 78 per cent of Dutch people
believe that their country should join the TPNW, with just 7 per cent opposed.
253
Furthermore, 68 per cent believe that the Netherlands should be among the first
NATO states to join even if it faced pressure from allies not to do so. The poll also
found that 58 per cent want US nuclear weapons removed from Dutch territory.
NORWAY –
A Respons Analyse poll in 2019 found that 78 per cent of Norwegians
believe that their government should join the TPNW, with 9 per cent opposed and
13 per cent unsure.
254
Among those who support joining the treaty, 85 per cent
believe that Norway should join even if we were the first NATO state to do so, with
5 per cent opposed to such a move and 10 per cent unsure.
SPAIN –
A YouGov poll in 2020 found that 89 per cent of Spaniards believe that
their country should join the TPNW, with just 4 per cent opposed.
255
Furthermore,
78 per cent believe that Spain should be among the first NATO states to join even
if it faced pressure from allies not to do so.
UNITED KINGDOM –
A Survation poll in January 2021 found that 59 per cent
of Britons believe that their country should join the TPNW, with just 19 per cent
opposed.
256
A YouGov poll conducted ahead of the treaty’s adoption in 2017 found
that 75 per cent of Britons believed that their country should participate in the
negotiations, with 9 per cent opposed and 16 per cent undecided.
257
g
g
g
g
g
g
249
“Public Opinion in EU Host States Firmly Opposes Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, 24 April 2019.
250
Poll commissioned by Greenpeace, 2020.
251
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, 19 February 2021.
252
Ibid.
253
Ibid.
254
“Survey: Eight out of Ten Labor Voters Support a Nuclear Ban”,
Dagsavisen,
2 April 2019.
255
“NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN, 19 February 2021.
256
“Majority Support UK Signing up to International Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Survation, January 2021.
Commissioned by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
257
“Scientists Welcome Adoption of Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Scientists for Global Responsibility,
7 July 2017.
ICAN
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Political Developments
Parliamentary Resolutions
Parliaments in a number of NATO states have adopted resolutions calling
on their governments to explore the possibility of joining the TPNW or
to build greater support for it within NATO. In 2017, for example,
Italy’s
parliament adopted a resolution instructing the government “to explore
the possibility” of becoming a TPNW state party “in a way compatible with
[Italy’s] NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states”,
258
and in 2018 the
Netherlands’
parliament called on the government to
re‑examine the treaty and work to increase support for it among NATO
members.
259
The Dutch parliament also sought legal advice on the
domestic legislative requirements of becoming a state party. The foreign
and defence ministers responded that no changes would be needed to
existing Dutch legislation if the Netherlands were to adhere to the TPNW,
but additional implementing legislation would be needed.
260
In late 2020, the foreign affairs committee of
Spain’s
Congress of Deputies
passed a resolution welcoming the TPNW “as an effort to move towards
peace, security, and disarmament”.
261
It had passed a similar resolution
in 2017 ahead of the treaty’s adoption at the United Nations, in which it
called on the government to approve the new treaty.
262
Around the same
time, the foreign affairs committee of the Catalan parliament had also
passed a resolution calling on the Spanish government to participate in the
UN negotiations and support the treaty’s adoption.
263
In
Iceland,
a group of parliamentarians proposed a motion in 2018 that
the parliament “resolves to entrust the government with ensuring that
Iceland accedes to the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”,
264
and the matter was referred to the foreign affairs committee.
A number of organisations, including ICAN and the Icelandic Red Cross,
made submissions in support of the draft motion,
265
but no decision was
taken. The motion was reintroduced in 2020 and remains on the agenda.
As of June 2021, draft motions in support of the TPNW are also on the
agenda in
Portugal
266
and
Germany,
267
among other places.
258
“Italian Parliament Instructs Italy to Explore Possibility of Joining the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, ICAN,
20 December 2017.
259
“Dutch Parliament Asks for More Concrete Steps in Nuclear Disarmament”, PAX,
21 November 2018.
260
“Dutch Government: Only Politics Stands in the Way of Joining the TPNW”, PAX, 8 March 2019.
261
“Spanish Parliament Welcomes TPNW”, ICAN, 21 December 2020.
262
Official bulletin of the Cortes Generales, Congress of Deputies, 28 February 2017, p. 11.
263
Official bulletin of the Parliament of Catalonia, 13 July 2017, p. 11.
264
“Proposal for a Parliamentary Resolution on the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, Althingi.
265
Submissions received by the Althingi in relation to the TPNW resolution.
266
Motion introduced by the Greens on 27 January 2021 recommending that the government “create
the necessary conditions for the ratification of the nuclear weapon ban treaty”.
267
Motions were tabled in the German federal parliament by Die Linke and the Greens on 12 February
2021 calling on the German government to join the TPNW.
70
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
In January 2020, a parliamentary motion in
Belgium
to direct the
government to withdraw US nuclear weapons from Belgian territory and
join the TPNW was narrowly defeated, with 66 parliamentarians in favour
and 74 against.
268
The closeness of the vote was unnerving for opponents
of the treaty, as it demonstrated the real possibility – indeed the likelihood
– that similar motions in Belgium and other NATO states will succeed in
the future as support for the treaty increases over time.
“[T]here is broad support among the Dutch public
for a Dutch signature under this treaty. [The House]
calls on the government to work to increase the
support for [the TPNW] among NATO countries …”
House of Representatives, the Netherlands, 2018
In 2018,
Norway’s
parliament asked the government to review the
consequences of becoming a TPNW state party. The government issued a
report stating that Norway could not join the treaty “without coming into
conflict with our membership in NATO”,
269
but this claim has been widely
rejected by Norwegian scholars and civil society organisations,
270
and the
foreign minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, conceded in 2018 that “there is no
legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying the [TPNW]”.
271
There has also been parliamentary activity in all three nuclear‑armed
NATO states. In 2018, for example, the foreign affairs committee of
France’s
National Assembly adopted a report recommending that the
government “mitigate its criticism” of the TPNW “to show that we
understand and take into account the concerns of states and their desire
for more balanced global governance”.
272
In the
United States,
the state
legislatures of California,
273
Oregon,
274
and New Jersey
275
have passed
resolutions in support of the treaty, and a draft bill is currently before
the US House of Representatives to direct the US to ratify it.
276
In the
United Kingdom,
an early day motion calling on the government to sign
the TPNW and “bring forward a credible and timetabled plan for the
disarmament of the UK’s nuclear weapons” was tabled in the parliament
in November 2020. More than 70 parliamentarians have signed it.
277
268
See Alexandra Brzozowski, “Belgium Debates Phase-Out of US Nuclear Weapons on Its Soil”,
Euractiv, 17 January 2020.
269
“Review of the Consequences for Norway of Ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, Norwegian government, 28 November 2018.
270
See, for example, Gro Nystuen, Kjølv Egeland, and Torbjørn Graff Hugo,
The TPNW and Its
Implications for Norway,
Norwegian Academy of International Law, September 2018.
271
Record of the meeting of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) on 14 November 2018. This is a view
expressed also by politicians from the Liberal Party, Centre Party, and Socialist Left Party.
272
Report issued on 11 July 2018.
273
“California Supports the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, ICAN, 29 August 2018.
274
“Oregon Supports Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility, 24 June 2019.
275
New Jersey Assembly resolution 230, passed on 23 May 2019.
276
Nuclear Weapons Abolition and Economic and Energy Conversion Act of 2021, introduced by
Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia, 26 April 2021.
277
“Entry into Force of Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, early day motion tabled on
2 November 2020.
ICAN
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Legislative action
In 2019, ICAN campaigners discuss the TPNW with Eleanor Holmes
Norton, who represents the District of Columbia in the US House of Representatives.
She has introduced a bill directing the United States to sign and ratify the treaty.
Party Platforms and Agreements
Several political parties in NATO states have formalised their support for
the TPNW in their platforms, and the TPNW has been a topic of debate
in talks among political parties working to form coalition governments.
In
Belgium,
for example, seven political parties reached a coalition
agreement in 2020 that included a commitment to explore “how the
UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can give new impetus
to multilateral nuclear disarmament”.
278
Four of the seven parties had
previously expressed their support for the treaty: the French-speaking
(PS) and Dutch‑speaking (Vooruit) socialists, and French‑speaking
(Ecolo) and Dutch-speaking (Groen) greens.
279
The government
declaration opens the door for Belgium to engage more constructively with
the TPNW, setting a positive example for other NATO states to follow.
In
Spain
in 2018, as part of a deal with the Podemos Party, the government
led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party made a political pledge to sign
the TPNW.
280
The agreement was brokered between the Spanish prime
minister, Pedro Sanchez, and the leader of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias.
However, no action has yet been taken.
278
“Belgian Government Shifts Stance on TPNW”, ICAN, 1 October 2020.
279
As indicated by their vote on the parliamentary resolution in January 2020.
280
“Could Spain Be the First NATO State to Sign the Nuclear Ban Treaty?”, ICAN, 6 December 2018.
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In April 2021, the Norwegian Labour Party – the largest party in the
current parliament – expressed qualified support for the TPNW, declaring
that “it should be a goal for Norway and other NATO countries to sign the
nuclear ban treaty”, while emphasising the political challenges in doing
so.
281
Several other political parties in
Norway
have also indicated their
support for the treaty, including the Liberal, Christian Democratic, Centre,
Socialist Left, Green, and Red parties.
282
The goal of negotiating a new
treaty to outlaw nuclear weapons was a key aim of the previous Labour
government from 2010 until its defeat in 2013.
283
The next Norwegian
parliamentary election will be held in September 2021.
An election will also take place in
Iceland
that month. The Left-Green
Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, and Pirate Party support accession
to the TPNW. In the
Netherlands,
where an election was held in March
2021, the Democrats 66 party, which won the second‑greatest number of
seats, has expressed its commitment to Dutch accession to the treaty, as
have the Labour Party, Socialist Party, GroenLinks, and Christian Union.
284
In
Italy,
the Five Star Movement – the largest party in the current
legislature – has voiced in‑principle support for Italy’s accession.
“Disarmament and arms control mean greater
global security for all … Germany’s accession
to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons and the strengthening of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty are part of this.”
German Greens, 2020
In 2020, the Greens in
Germany
formalised their position in support of
joining the TPNW and bringing “a swift end” to the hosting of US nuclear
weapons on German territory. “Disarmament and arms control mean
greater global security for all,” the party said in its manifesto of principles.
“Germany’s accession to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons and the strengthening of the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty
are part of this.”
285
The Social Democratic Party adopted a programme
in May 2021 indicating support for Germany’s participation in the first
meeting of states parties to the TPNW. It also said that the treaty “brings
further momentum to efforts for a world free of nuclear weapons”.
286
The
TPNW has been debated in the German federal parliament,
287
while the
state parliaments of Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, and Rhineland-Palatinate
have formalised their support, urging the federal government to join it.
288
281
“Norwegian Labour Party Opening Up Towards TPNW Signature”, ICAN, 28 April 2021.
282
“Norway”, ICAN. See tweet by Tim Wright on 5 June 2021.
283
Kjølv Egeland, “Oslo’s ‘New Track’: Norwegian Nuclear Disarmament Diplomacy, 2005–2013”,
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament,
volume 2, issue 2, pp. 468–490.
284
“March 2021 Dutch Election Outcomes and Nuclear Weapons”, PAX, 24 March 2021.
285
“‘To Respect and to Protect’: Change Creates Stability”, Greens, p. 95.
286
“The SPD’s Future Programme”, 9 May 2021.
287
Aktuelle Stunde debate in the German federal parliament on 29 January 2021.
288
“ICAN Cities Appeal and State Resolutions”, ICAN Germany.
ICAN
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Canada’s
New Democratic Party has repeatedly urged the Liberal
government to sign the TPNW, calling out its “failure to take bold action
on nuclear disarmament”.
289
The Green Party included a pledge to join
the TPNW in its election platform in 2019,
290
and the Bloc Québécois – the
third‑largest party in the parliament – has also declared its support.
291
Moreover, not all Liberal parliamentarians agree with their government’s
stance. “The world is unquestionably safer without nuclear weapons,
and Canada should sign on to the [TPNW],” said Nathaniel Erskine‑
Smith, a Liberal MP, in 2021. “We know we aren’t going to see the end of
the possession of nuclear weapons in the short term, but it is incredibly
important that the world stigmatises and delegitimises the use of these
weapons and the possession of these weapons going forward.”
292
He has
also noted that Canada would not need to abandon its membership of
NATO in order to join the TPNW, “so, just for the sake of playing nice, we
do seem to be taking a position that is inconsistent with our values”.
293
“An independent Scotland would be a keen
signatory [to the TPNW] and I hope the day
we can do that is not far off.”
Nicola Sturgeon, Scottish first minister, 2021
In Scotland, where all of the
United Kingdom’s
nuclear weapons are
stationed on submarines, the governing Scottish National Party has
been a vocal supporter of the TPNW. The party’s leader, Nicola Sturgeon,
who serves as Scotland’s first minister, wrote in 2020 that “the Scottish
government is firmly opposed to the possession, threat, and use of nuclear
weapons”, and “I have called on the UK government to sign and ratify the
treaty”.
294
Ahead of the treaty’s entry into force in January 2021, she said:
“An independent Scotland would be a keen signatory [to the TPNW] and I
hope the day we can do that is not far off.”
295
289
“New Democrats Call on Liberals to Sign the TPNW”, New Democratic Party, 22 January 2021.
290
Honest, Ethical, Caring Leadership: Election Platform 2019,
Green Party, 2019.
291
See “Why Hasn’t Canada Signed the UN Nuclear Ban Treaty?”, Canadian Foreign Policy Institute, 19
November 2020.
292
Yasmine Ghania, “MPs Urge Canada to Sign UN Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons”, National
Observer, 21 January 2021.
293
“The Threat of Nuclear Weapons with Lloyd Axworthy”, Uncommons podcast, episode 55,
26 November 2020.
294
Letter to ICAN dated 16 July 2020.
295
“First Minister Endorses the Scottish Women’s Covenant on the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Scottish
Branch Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom media release, 18 January 2021.
74
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Individual Commitments
By adding their names to ICAN’s Parliamentary Pledge,
296
more than
a thousand parliamentarians in NATO states, including members of
the European Parliament and sub‑national parliaments, have made a
commitment to work to bring their respective countries on board the
TPNW. Notable pledge‑takers include the Icelandic prime minister, Katrín
Jakobsdóttir; the Italian foreign minister, Luigi Di Maio; the Belgian
deputy prime minister, Petra de Sutter; and the Green Party’s candidate
for German chancellor in the September 2021 election, Annalena Baerbock.
As of June 2021, the Parliamentary Pledge has been signed by around
70 members of parliament and senators in Canada; 150 members of
Germany’s Bundestag; 40 per cent of all Icelandic parliamentarians;
70 members of Italy’s Chamber of Deputies; 30 French parliamentarians;
and 60 members of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, along with
dozens of members of the Scottish and Welsh parliaments.
PARLIAMENTARY PLEDGE
We, the undersigned parliamentarians, warmly welcome the adoption of the
UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a significant step towards
the realisation of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We share the deep concern
expressed in the preamble about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
that would result from any use of nuclear weapons and we recognise the
consequent need to eliminate these inhumane and abhorrent weapons. As
parliamentarians, we pledge to work for the signature and ratification of this
landmark treaty by our respective countries, as we consider the abolition
of nuclear weapons to be a global public good of the highest order and an
essential step to promote the security and well-being of all peoples.
The list of parliamentarians who have taken the pledge is at
pledge.icanw.org.
In 2019, 25 German federal parliamentarians formed a cross-party
working group to take forward their pledge to promote Germany’s
adherence to the TPNW.
297
The Green Party parliamentarian Katja Keul,
one of the group’s initiators, said: “The long-term goal must be that
Germany joins the nuclear weapons ban treaty.”
298
The group meets
regularly and works to keep all parliamentarians apprised of developments
relating to the treaty. “The discussions we host seek to inform about
the debate, and aim to convince our yet undecided peers that a nuclear
weapons ban is the right step to take,” said Ralf Kapschack, another
of the group’s co‑founders, representing the Social Democratic Party.
Kathrin Vogler of The Left, also a co-founder, has rejected the often-
cited argument that Germany’s membership of NATO is a “roadblock” to
ratification of the TPNW. That is just an “excuse”, she said.
296
“Parliamentarians”, ICAN.
297
“New Cross-Party Working Group to Support TPNW in German Parliament”, ICAN,
13 September 2019.
298
“Parliamentary Group Established for a Nuclear Weapon Ban”, Kathrin Vogler, 12 September 2019.
ICAN
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
The working group provides the deliberative space and strategic thinking
required to move Germany closer to becoming a TPNW state party, and
could serve as a model for parliamentarians in other NATO states wishing
to see greater engagement with the treaty.
TPNW Parliamentary Group in Germany
“Parlamentskreis Atomwaffenverbot” – the Parliamentary Group for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons – is an all-party group in Germany promoting the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and advocating for Germany’s ratification. It is
open to all members of the German Bundestag associated with democratic political
parties. Founded in 2019, the group comprises 45 German MPs, including party
members of CDU/CSU, SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, and Die Linke.
In its roughly semi-annual meetings, the group informs fellow parliamentarians
on the debate around the TPNW and discusses possible benefits of a German
ratification. The most recent event was attended by two distinguished guests:
Niels Annen, minister of state of the German foreign ministry, who provided
valuable insights on ministerial policy objectives, and Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm,
ICAN, who contributed persuasive arguments on the importance of the TPNW. In
the future, the group seeks to also engage with politicians on regional and local
levels to build a strong coalition supporting a nuclear weapons ban.
Katja Keul,
MP for Bündnis90/Die Grünen
Kathrin Vogler,
MP for Die Linke
Ralf Kapschack,
MP for the SPD
Support of Cities
Around 400 cities and towns in NATO states have joined the chorus of
support for the TPNW, including the capitals of France (Paris),
Germany
(Berlin), Luxembourg (Luxembourg), the Netherlands (Amsterdam),
Norway (Oslo), and the United States (Washington,
DC).
By endorsing
the ICAN Cities Appeal, councils have called on their respective national
governments to sign and ratify the TPNW based on their firm belief “that
our residents have the right to live in a world free from … the grave threat
that nuclear weapons pose to communities throughout the world”.
299
Washington, DC, was among the first cities in the world to endorse the
appeal in 2019. It adopted a resolution calling on the US Congress and
president to embrace the TPNW “and make nuclear disarmament a
centrepiece of our national security policy”.
300
More than 40 other US cities
and towns have also endorsed it as of June 2021. In Belgium, the number
of endorsing cities and towns is around 70; in France, 45; in Germany, 120
(including all 16 state capitals); in Italy, 40; and in Norway, 50.
299
“ICAN Save My City”, ICAN.
300
“Washington, DC”, ICAN.
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Cities remain targets for nuclear attacks, with a single nuclear weapon
capable of destroying a large metropolitan area, killing and injuring more
than a million people. Thus, it is only natural that mayors and other city
officials would feel compelled to speak out. As one city councillor remarked
in 2019 when Oslo endorsed the appeal: “Cities can make a difference
and contribute to a world free of nuclear weapons, just as cities are at the
forefront of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”
301
In 2018, more
than 150 Belgian mayors signed a letter to the Belgian government and
parliament calling for Belgium’s signature and ratification of the TPNW.
302
Many mayors in NATO states are active members of the Hiroshima‑based
Mayors for Peace network, which promotes adherence to the TPNW.
303
CITIES APPEAL
Our city/town is deeply concerned about the grave threat that nuclear weapons
pose to communities throughout the world. We firmly believe that our residents
have the right to live in a world free from this threat. Any use of nuclear weapons,
whether deliberate or accidental, would have catastrophic, far-reaching, and
long-lasting consequences for people and the environment. Therefore, we
support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and call on our
national government to sign and ratify it.
Gent,
Belgium
Montreal,
Canada
Toronto,
Canada
Vancouver,
Canada
Lyon,
France
Paris,
France
Berlin,
Germany
Cologne,
Germany
Munich,
Germany
Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
Amsterdam,
Netherlands
Rotterdam,
Netherlands
Bergen,
Norway
Oslo,
Norway
Barcelona,
Spain
Edinburgh,
United Kingdom
Leeds,
United Kingdom
Manchester,
United Kingdom
Denver,
United States
Honolulu,
United States
Los Angeles,
United States
Philadelphia,
United States
San Francisco,
United States
Washington, DC,
United States
The full list of several hundred towns and cities around the world that have
endorsed the ICAN Cities Appeal can be found at
cities.icanw.org.
301
“City of Oslo”, ICAN.
302
“Belgium”, ICAN.
303
“Initiatives”, Mayors for Peace.
ICAN
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Red Cross and Red Crescent
Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies in many NATO states have
promoted universal adherence to the TPNW, just as they have for other
treaties based on the rules of international humanitarian law. At a meeting
in Turkey in 2017, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
adopted a resolution “call[ing] on all states to promptly sign, ratify, or
accede to, and faithfully implement the [TPNW]”.
304
Co‑sponsors of the
resolution included the Red Cross or Red Crescent national societies in
Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Turkey. The resolution hailed the “historic adoption” of the
TPNW as “an essential step” towards the total elimination of nuclear
weapons and expressed alarm at “the increasing risk that nuclear weapons
will again be used by intent, miscalculation, or accident”.
“The [TPNW] articulates the end-state and
benchmark against which all efforts towards
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
must now be judged.”
International Committee of the Red Cross, 2021
In an appended action plan, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement
committed to taking action to urge states that did not participate in the
TPNW negotiations “to adopt planning, policy, and military practices
that will not undermine the [TPNW] and that will enable them to adhere
to the treaty”.
305
Moreover, states associated with but not in possession
of nuclear weapons should be encouraged to “engage in dialogue
with nuclear‑weapon states on steps that will diminish the role and
significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts”.
In June 2018, ahead of a NATO Summit in Brussels, the Red Cross national
societies in nine NATO states – Belgium, Croatia, Canada, France, Iceland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom – launched a
joint appeal to their leaders “to use the Summit to urgently reduce the
growing risks of nuclear weapon use and to promote fulfilment of long-
standing commitments to nuclear disarmament”.
306
They stressed that the
TPNW and NPT share the same goal: “a world free of nuclear weapons in
light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences”.
Other major humanitarian organisations based in NATO states have
also supported the TPNW, most notably Norwegian People’s Aid, which
publishes the annual
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor.
307
304
“Working Towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: 2018–2021 Action Plan”, resolution
adopted by the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
Antalya, Turkey, 10–11 November 2017.
305
Ibid. “Action Plan on the Non-Use, Prohibition, and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 2018–2021”.
306
Letter addressed to the heads of government of Belgium, Croatia, Canada, France, Iceland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom, 25 June 2018.
307
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor,
2020.
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Former Leaders
Fifty‑six former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and
defence ministers from 20 NATO states, along with Japan and South Korea,
released an open letter in September 2020 imploring current leaders
to “show courage and boldness” and join the TPNW.
308
They warned
that the risks of nuclear weapons being used, “whether by accident,
miscalculation, or design”, are increasing, and described the TPNW as
“a beacon of hope in a time of darkness”.
The signatories included two former NATO secretaries general (Javier
Solana of Spain and Willy Claes of Belgium) and the former UN secretary‑
general Ban Ki‑moon of South Korea. The
New York Times
described the
letter as “one of the highest-profile endorsements of the treaty since it
was completed more than three years ago”.
309
It demonstrates that, even
in countries that currently oppose the TPNW, high‑level support exists.
Open Letter by Past Leaders
21 September 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic has starkly demonstrated the urgent need for greater
international cooperation to address all major threats to the health and welfare
of humankind. Paramount among them is the threat of nuclear war. The risk of
a nuclear weapon detonation today – whether by accident, miscalculation, or
design – appears to be increasing, with the recent deployment of new types of
nuclear weapons, the abandonment of long-standing arms control agreements,
and the very real danger of cyber-attacks on nuclear infrastructure. Let us heed the
warnings of scientists, doctors, and other experts. We must not sleepwalk into a
crisis of even greater proportions than the one we have experienced this year.
It is not difficult to foresee how the bellicose rhetoric and poor judgment of
leaders in nuclear-armed nations might result in a calamity affecting all nations
and peoples. As past leaders, foreign ministers, and defence ministers of
Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey – all countries that
claim protection from an ally’s nuclear weapons – we appeal to current leaders
to advance disarmament before it is too late. An obvious starting point for the
leaders of our own countries would be to declare without qualification that
nuclear weapons serve no legitimate military or strategic purpose in light of the
catastrophic human and environmental consequences of their use. In other words,
our countries should reject any role for nuclear weapons in our defence.
By claiming protection from nuclear weapons, we are promoting the dangerous
and misguided belief that nuclear weapons enhance security. Rather than
enabling progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons, we are impeding it
and perpetuating nuclear dangers – all for fear of upsetting our allies who cling
to these weapons of mass destruction. But friends can and must speak up when
friends engage in reckless behaviour that puts their lives and ours in peril.
308
“Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, 21 September 2020.
309
Rick Gladstone, “Former Leaders Urge Ratification of Treaty Barring Nuclear Weapons”,
New York
Times,
21 September 2020, p. 10.
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Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way, and a race for disarmament
is urgently needed. It is time to bring the era of reliance on nuclear weapons to a
permanent end. In 2017, 122 countries took a courageous but long-overdue step
in that direction by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – a
landmark global accord that places nuclear weapons on the same legal footing as
chemical and biological weapons and establishes a framework to eliminate them
verifiably and irreversibly. To date, our countries have opted not to join the global
majority in supporting this treaty. But our leaders should reconsider their positions.
We cannot afford to dither in the face of this existential threat to humanity. We
must show courage and boldness – and join the treaty. As states parties, we could
remain in alliances with nuclear-armed states, as nothing in the treaty itself nor in
our respective defence pacts precludes that. But we would be bound never under
any circumstances to assist or encourage our allies to use, threaten to use, or
possess nuclear weapons. Given the very broad popular support in our countries
for disarmament, this would be an uncontroversial and much-lauded move.
The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the
spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal
taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations
that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s negotiation – the United States,
Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China – apparently view it as a licence
to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing
heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to
come. This is patently unacceptable.
The prohibition treaty adopted in 2017 can help end decades of paralysis in
disarmament. It is a beacon of hope in a time of darkness. It enables countries to
subscribe to the highest available multilateral norm against nuclear weapons and
build international pressure for action. As its preamble recognises, the effects of
nuclear weapons “transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human
survival, the environment, socio-economic development, the global economy,
food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a
disproportionate impact on women and girls”.
With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe
and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction
is beyond our imagination. All responsible leaders must act now to ensure that the
horrors of 1945 are never repeated. Sooner or later, our luck will run out – unless
we act. The nuclear weapon ban treaty provides the foundation for a more secure
world, free from this ultimate menace. We must embrace it now and work to bring
others on board. There is no cure for a nuclear war. Prevention is our only option.
Lloyd Axworthy,
former foreign minister of Canada
Ban Ki-moon,
former UN secretary-general and foreign minister of South Korea
Jean-Jacques Blais,
former defence minister of Canada
Kjell Magne Bondevik,
former prime minister and foreign minister of Norway
Ylli Bufi,
former prime minister of Albania
Jean Chrétien,
former prime minister of Canada
Willy Claes,
former NATO secretary general and foreign minister of Belgium
Erik Derycke,
former foreign minister of Belgium
Joschka Fischer,
former foreign minister of Germany
Franco Frattini,
former foreign minister of Italy
Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir,
former foreign minister of Iceland
Bjørn Tore Godal,
former foreign minister and defence minister of Norway
Bill Graham,
former foreign minister and defence minister of Canada
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Hatoyama Yukio,
former prime minister of Japan
Thorbjørn Jagland,
former prime minister and foreign minister of Norway
Ljubica Jelušič,
former defence minister of Slovenia
Tālavs Jundzis,
former defence minister of Latvia
Jan Kavan,
former foreign minister of the Czech Republic
Alojz Krapež,
former defence minister of Slovenia
Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis,
former foreign minister and defence minister of Latvia
Aleksander Kwaśniewski,
former president of Poland
Yves Leterme,
former prime minister and foreign minister of Belgium
Enrico Letta,
former prime minister of Italy
Eldbjørg Løwer,
former defence minister of Norway
Mogens Lykketoft,
former foreign minister of Denmark
John Mccallum,
former defence minister of Canada
John Manley,
former foreign minister of Canada
Rexhep Meidani,
former president of Albania
Zdravko Mršić,
former foreign minister of Croatia
Linda Mūrniece,
former defence minister of Latvia
Fatos Nano,
former prime minister of Albania
Holger K. Nielsen,
former foreign minister of Denmark
Andrzej Olechowski,
former foreign minister of Poland
Kjeld Olesen,
former foreign minister and defence minister of Denmark
Ana Palacio,
former foreign minister of Spain
Theodoros Pangalos,
former foreign minister of Greece
Jan Pronk,
former defence minister (ad interim) of the Netherlands
Vesna Pusić,
former foreign minister of Croatia
Dariusz Rosati,
former foreign minister of Poland
Rudolf Scharping,
former defence minister of Germany
Juraj Schenk,
former foreign minister of Slovakia
Nuno Severiano Teixeira,
former defence minister of Portugal
Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir,
former prime minister of Iceland
Össur Skarphéðinsson,
former foreign minister of Iceland
Javier Solana,
former NATO secretary general and foreign minister of Spain
Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen,
former defence minister of Norway
Hanna Suchocka,
former prime minister of Poland
Szekeres Imre,
former defence minister of Hungary
Tanaka Makiko,
former foreign minister of Japan
Tanaka Naoki,
former defence minister of Japan
Danilo Türk,
former president of Slovenia
Hikmet Sami Türk,
former defence minister of Turkey
John N. Turner,
former prime minister of Canada
Guy Verhofstadt,
former prime minister of Belgium
Knut Vollebæk,
former foreign minister of Norway
Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza,
former foreign minister of Spain
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Separately, the former
Norwegian
statespeople who signed the open letter
– Kjell Magne Bondevik, Bjørn Tore Godal, Thorbjørn Jagland, Eldbjørg
Løwer, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, and Knut Vollebæk – penned opinion
articles for the
Aftenposten
newspaper (see below) setting out the case for
Norway’s accession to the TPNW. “As former members of government,
we fully understand the various considerations that a NATO country like
Norway must take into account,” they wrote in September 2020. “But in
our opinion there is more room to manoeuvre in NATO than we are using
today. We should have a national policy where nuclear weapons are not a
legitimate, effective, or desirable means of defence for anyone.”
310
In an interview in November 2020, the former
Canadian
foreign minister
Lloyd Axworthy – one of six Canadians to sign the open letter – criticised
his country’s stance on the TPNW, noting that the government had
employed many “phoney‑baloney arguments” to dismiss the treaty.
“Not only are we not participating [in the TPNW], but we’re also being
almost a kind of cheerleader for the nuclear powers. That’s not the side
we should be on,” he said. “We shouldn’t just simply hide under a kind of
blanket notion that we have to show fealty [to the United States]. We’re
an independent country.” He urged the Canadian government to stop
relying on US leadership, and instead “stand up for the rest of the world
who aren’t nuclear powers but would be decimated if [a nuclear war] took
place”. Being a member of NATO does not mean that Canada is required to
accept the cold war concept of nuclear deterrence, he argued.
311
“[The TPNW] offers powerful support to those
arguing against modernising and expanding
nuclear arsenals, actions that will now fail
to follow the international law that most
countries have agreed to live by.”
Bill Perry, former US secretary of defence
In the
United States,
the former defence secretary Bill Perry has been a
vocal proponent of the TPNW, describing its entry into force as a “major
milestone” in addressing nuclear dangers. “For 75 years, we have allowed
the idea of mass destruction to be normalised as a necessary component
of our international security strategy,” he wrote in the
Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists
in January 2021.
312
“[W]e must recognise that nuclear
weapons are, as [the former US president] Ronald Reagan described them,
‘totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly
destructive of life on Earth and civilisation’.” He criticised the United
States and other nuclear-armed states for failing to fulfil their obligations
under the NPT – “a failure which the ban treaty is working to correct”.
310
“We Cannot Leave This Threat to Our Children and Grandchildren. Ban Nuclear Weapons
Now!”,
Aftenposten,
21 September 2020; “The Ban Will Engage Nuclear-Armed States”,
Aftenposten,
26 September 2020.
311
“The Threat of Nuclear Weapons with Lloyd Axworthy”, Uncommons podcast, 26 November 2020.
312
William J. Perry, “Why the United States Should Support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
22 January 2021.
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TPNW supporter
Bill Perry, a former US secretary of defence, has hailed the
TPNW’s entry into force as a “major milestone”.
Credit: US Department of Defense
He said that the TPNW “rightly establishes abolition as the standard
that all nations should be actively working to achieve, rather than an
indeterminate future goal”:
It creates a bold vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world, shifting
our focus to the inhumane impact of these weapons and proclaiming
a global consensus to address this existential issue. The ban treaty
strives to bring our global perception of nuclear weapons closer in line
with their terrible reality and formally enshrines the necessity of their
total elimination for the good of humanity.
While the treaty alone is not sufficient to bring about the end of
nuclear weapons, it establishes key ideals necessary to push us
further up the mountain. It offers inspiration to combat the sense of
hopelessness that many feel when confronting this daunting problem.
It serves as a new instrument of non-proliferation, augmenting the
existing Non-Proliferation Treaty. It offers powerful support to those
arguing against modernising and expanding nuclear arsenals, actions
that will now fail to follow the international law that most countries
have agreed to live by. The treaty won’t end nuclear weapons any
time soon, but it represents an important step in that direction.
In concluding his article, he said that the United States “prides itself on
being a nation of trailblazers; let us be the first nuclear-armed nation to
blaze this new trail toward the top of the nuclear‑free mountain”.
313
In
France,
Paul Quilès, a former defence minister, and Bernard Norlain,
a retired air force general, have urged the French government “to adopt
a constructive attitude towards the [TPNW]”.
314
313
Ibid.
314
“Do Not Make Europe a Future Nuclear Battlefield”,
La Croix,
13 September 2018.
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High-Level Norwegian Appeal
We know how important NATO is for Norway’s security. We know that three NATO
countries have nuclear weapons, and that this is part of the alliance’s defence
concept. In terms of international law, however, the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons does not contradict the North Atlantic Treaty. If Norway adheres
to the TPNW, we can still be allied with nuclear-armed states. But we would be
obligated to not assist or encourage our allies with the use, threat of use, or
retention of nuclear weapons.
As former members of government, we fully understand the various considerations
that a NATO country like Norway must take into account. But in our opinion there
is more room to manoeuvre in NATO than we are using today. We should have a
national policy where nuclear weapons are not a legitimate, effective, or desirable
means of defence for anyone. Not for Russia, China, or North Korea. Not for allies.
Not for us. We can create acceptance for this among our allies.
We also have to work in NATO for a renewed push in nuclear disarmament. The
world’s nuclear-armed states must be pressured and helped to negotiate the
mutual reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. NATO cannot solve the
nuclear weapon problem alone. But NATO can lead. The world has become too
dangerous to live with these weapons. We are deeply concerned that they will
soon be used again. Thus it is urgently necessary to get rid of them.
The TPNW will be an important contribution on the way there. There is no
contradiction between engaging the nuclear-armed states and signing this treaty.
With the TPNW as a foundation, Norway and the UN majority will be able to
influence them with gravitas, direction, and credibility. As former prime ministers
and foreign and defence ministers, we know how Norway for decades has sought
to engage the nuclear-armed states. But the trend is going in the wrong direction.
Armament is picking up speed, tensions are rising, and the risk of use is increasing.
The time has come to think anew. Today’s situation is untenable. From our time in
government, we understand how difficult it is to ask questions around the value of
nuclear deterrence in NATO. But the nuclear weapons threat we are now facing is
making such an initiative imperative. We can be loyal NATO allies and still distance
ourselves from the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on our behalf.
Until now, the international community has focused mostly on non-proliferation and
arms control, where nuclear weapons are given value and the logic is that nuclear
deterrence as a system should continue. The TPNW challenges the umbrella
states’ ambivalence around nuclear weapons. We cannot continue to be advocates
at the same time for both the abolition and retention of nuclear weapons. The
treaty asks us to choose: yes or no to nuclear weapons. Norway’s answer must
be no. By saying no thank you to nuclear deterrence and yes to the ban treaty,
Norway will help pave the way for negotiations on disarmament, whether this
happens outside or inside the treaty.
Kjell Magne Bondevik,
former prime minister and foreign minister of Norway
Bjørn Tore Godal,
former foreign minister and defence minister of Norway
Thorbjørn Jagland,
former prime minister and foreign minister of Norway
Eldbjørg Løwer,
former defence minister of Norway
Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen,
former defence minister of Norway
Knut Vollebæk,
former foreign minister of Norway
This is an abridged translation of the former Norwegian leaders’ articles in the
Aftenposten.
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NATO Partners
Beyond NATO states, the TPNW also enjoys a high degree of support
among the alliance’s officially designated “partners”,
315
a majority of
which participated in the treaty’s negotiation in 2017 and voted in favour
of its adoption.
316
Five NATO partners have already ratified the treaty –
Austria, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malta, and New Zealand – while a number
of others have signed it or taken other steps towards becoming parties.
Cooperation between NATO states and TPNW states parties is already a
reality and will steadily become more common over time.
ADOPTING THE TPNW
Twenty-three NATO partners voted to adopt the TPNW at the United Nations on
7 July 2017, with no NATO partner abstaining from the vote or voting against it.
Afghanistan
Algeria
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Colombia
Egypt
Iraq
Ireland
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Malta
Mauritania
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
New Zealand
Qatar
Sweden
Switzerland
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Austria
NATO and Austria “actively cooperate in peace‑support operations,
and have developed practical cooperation in a range of other areas”,
with Austria having joined the Partnership for Peace framework in 1995
and the Euro‑Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.
317
Austria played a
leading role in the negotiation of the TPNW and in the humanitarian‑
based process that preceded it. In an address to the United Nations ahead
of the TPNW’s opening for signature in September 2017, Austria said:
“Today, we often hear that nuclear weapons are necessary for security.
This narrative is not only wrong, it is dangerous. The new treaty provides
a real alternative: a world without nuclear weapons, where everyone is
safer.”
318
Austria ratified the TPNW on 8 May 2018. The foreign minister,
Alexander Schallenberg, said in 2019: “With every additional signature
and ratification, states send a very powerful signal that having a say on
nuclear weapons is not exclusive to states who possess them. The security
of all our citizens is equally important and equally at risk.”
319
Austria will
host the first TPNW meeting of states parties in Vienna in 2022.
315
“Partnerships: Projecting Stability through Cooperation”, NATO.
316
Vote on draft TPNW, 7 July 2017.
317
“Relations with Austria”, NATO.
318
Statement by Sebastian Kurz, the then-minister of foreign affairs of Austria, to the UN General
Assembly, New York, 19 September 2017.
319
Statement by Alexander Schallenberg, minister of foreign affairs of Austria, on the occasion of the
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2019.
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Humanitarian conference
In 2014, Austria, a NATO partner, hosted the third in a
series of intergovernmental conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons. All NATO members, with the exception of France, participated.
Credit: ICAN
Ireland
Ireland cooperates with NATO “in a variety of areas”, according to the
NATO website.
320
Cooperation focuses on developing military capabilities
and improving the interoperability of the Irish armed forces with those
of NATO member states and other partners. Ireland joined NATO’s
Partnership for Peace programme and the Euro‑Atlantic Partnership
Council in 1999.
321
It was instrumental in the negotiation of the TPNW in
2017. In its opening statement to the negotiating conference, it said that
“we are not just writing a new and complementary treaty here, we are
taking the opportunity to write a new history and in so doing to create a
new, more stable, more secure, and more equal future for all”.
322
It has
described the TPNW as “ground‑breaking”,
323
urging “states who have
not yet joined the treaty to do so”.
324
Ireland ratified the TPNW on 6 August
2020, the 75th anniversary of the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
The foreign minister, Simon Coveney, said that the treaty “honours the
memory of the victims of nuclear weapons” and responds to the repeated
calls by survivors to eliminate nuclear weapons.
325
320
“Relations with Ireland”, NATO.
321
Ibid.
322
Statement by Ireland to the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit
Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Elimination, New York, 27 March 2017.
323
Statement by Simon Coveney, foreign minister of Ireland, to the UN General Assembly, New York,
23 September 2017.
324
Statement by Ireland to First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 12 October 2020.
325
Simon Coveney, “Risk of Nuclear Catastrophe Is Unacceptably High”,
Irish Times,
6 August 2020.
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Kazakhstan
NATO and Kazakhstan “actively cooperate on democratic, institutional,
and defence reforms, and have developed practical cooperation in many
other areas”, according to the NATO website.
326
Kazakhstan joined the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 – a forum that was succeeded
in 1997 by the Euro‑Atlantic Partnership Council. Practical cooperation
with NATO began when Kazakhstan joined the Partnership for Peace
programme in 1995.
327
According to Kazakhstan, the adoption of the TPNW
in 2017 “demonstrates vividly” that a majority of states are becoming
“increasingly impatient” at the lack of progress by nuclear‑armed states
in eliminating their arsenals.
328
Kazakhstan’s foreign minister, Mukhtar
Tileuberdi, has called on states to join the TPNW “as a tribute to all those
affected by the use and testing of nuclear weapons around the globe”.
329
Kazakhstan ratified the TPNW on 29 August 2019, the 70th anniversary of
the first Soviet nuclear test carried out at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test
site in Kazakhstan. From 1949 to 1989, an estimated 456 Soviet tests were
conducted in Kazakhstan, with devastating long‑term consequences for
human health and the environment.
330
Upon the break‑up of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited approximately 1,400 Soviet nuclear
warheads, which it subsequently relinquished,
331
recognising that its
security was best achieved through disarmament.
Malta
Malta first joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 1995 but
suspended its participation in 1996. It reactivated its membership in
2008.
332
According to the NATO website, “Malta recognises that it can
help address emerging security challenges and contribute to international
peace, security, and stability” through this programme.
333
Malta ratified
the TPNW on 21 September 2020. In a press release, the foreign ministry
said that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is “a guiding
principle of Malta’s foreign policy” and its ratification is testament to its
commitment to global disarmament, which is “crucial to securing a safer
future for all and for future generations”.
334
Malta’s foreign minister,
Evarist Bartolo, said in February 2021 that the TPNW has “strengthened
the global norm against the worst weapons of mass destruction”,
and it is “our duty to promote the benefits of such treaty, help fight
misconceptions about it, and ensure that its obligations are adhered to”.
335
326
“Relations with Kazakhstan”, NATO.
327
Ibid.
328
Statement by Kazakhstan to First Committee of UN General Assembly, New York, 11 October 2019.
329
See declaration of Kazakhstan pursuant to Article 2 of the TPNW, submitted to the UN Secretary-
General on 19 February 2021.
330
Ibid.
331
Ibid.
332
“Relations with Malta”, NATO.
333
Ibid.
334
Press release issued by foreign ministry of Malta, 21 September 2020.
335
Statement by Evarist Bartolo, foreign minister of Malta, at the high-level segment of the
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 22 February 2021.
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New Zealand
NATO and New Zealand “are strengthening relations to address shared
security challenges”, according to the NATO website, with New Zealand
making “valuable contributions to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan and
in the fight against piracy”.
336
NATO and New Zealand have been engaged
in dialogue and cooperation since 2001.
337
New Zealand is also part of the
“Five Eyes” intelligence alliance with three NATO members (Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Australia. New Zealand
ratified the TPNW on 31 July 2018, describing its decision as “a logical
step for New Zealand given our long‑standing policy opposing nuclear
weapons”.
338
New Zealand’s prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, has urged
“all others to join with us in ratifying this landmark treaty as a necessary
step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.
339
According to
New Zealand, the TPNW is “the most ambitious legal pathway currently
available to advance nuclear disarmament”.
340
While acknowledging that –
in the short term at least – “there will be limits to the reach and normative
influence of our treaty”, it has noted that this was the case also for the
early efforts to proscribe chemical and biological weapons.
341
Other NATO Partners
Two NATO partners have signed but not yet ratified the TPNW: Algeria and
Colombia. The Algerian foreign minister, Sabri Boukadoum, announced
in 2020 that
Algeria
intends to ratify the treaty “in the very short coming
time”,
342
while
Colombia’s
foreign ministry has indicated that “the
internal legislative process leading to [Colombia’s] eventual ratification is
pending”.
343
Mongolia,
which is also a NATO partner, said in 2020 that it
“is continuing [its] internal process towards joining the [TPNW]”
344
and
plans to become a state party in the near future.
After voting in favour of the adoption of the TPNW in July 2017, NATO
partner
Sweden
warmly welcomed “the fact that at last we have a treaty
prohibiting nuclear weapons, the only weapon of mass destruction
not prohibited until now”.
345
“Though nuclear weapons are not likely
to disappear soon,” Sweden said, “we are convinced that the norm
against the use and possession of nuclear weapons will be strengthened
by this treaty.”
346
The following month, the then‑US secretary of
336
“Relations with New Zealand”, NATO.
337
Ibid.
338
Press release issued by the then-foreign minister of New Zealand, Winston Peters, “New Zealand
to Join New Nuclear Disarmament Treaty”, 14 May 2018.
339
Video message by the prime minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, on the occasion of the 75th
anniversary of the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 6 August 2020.
340
Statement by New Zealand to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York,
22 October 2019.
341
Statement by New Zealand to the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to
Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Elimination, New York, 28 May 2017.
342
Statement at the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly to Commemorate and
Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 2 October 2020.
343
“Colombia”, ICAN.
344
Statement by Mongolia to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 9 October 2020.
345
Explanation of vote delivered by Sweden on 7 July 2017, New York.
346
Ibid.
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defence, James Mattis, urged Sweden not to join the TPNW,
347
and the
Swedish government ultimately acquiesced. It announced, based on the
recommendation of a government inquiry led by a former diplomat, that
it would not pursue ratification of the TPNW “at the present time”.
348
However, it has not “closed the door to a future signing; for example, the
issue may end up in a new light after the [NPT] review conference”
349
to be
held in 2022. Margot Wallström, who was Sweden’s foreign minister at the
time of the TPNW’s adoption, expressed regret after leaving office that she
had not managed to convince her government to be among the first states
to join the landmark treaty.
350
In May 2021, her successor, Ann Linde, said
that the TPNW’s entry into force “constitutes a significant development in
multilateral nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation”,
351
and Sweden
will participate in the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW in Vienna
in 2022 as an observer.
352
“Though nuclear weapons are not likely to
disappear soon, we are convinced that the
norm against the use and possession of nuclear
weapons will be strengthened by [the TPNW].”
Sweden, 2017
According to the Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic,
“from a legal perspective, Sweden’s security arrangements should not
be viewed as barriers to its joining the TPNW. If it became party to the
new instrument, Sweden could not allow its military involvement with
states not party that possess nuclear arms to rise to the level of assistance
prohibited by the TPNW, but it could maintain its relations with NATO and
the [European Union] and continue to participate in joint operations and
exercises. Sweden’s experiences as a party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the
Convention on Cluster Munitions have demonstrated its ability to work
within such parameters.”
353
Speaking in the European Parliament in 2019,
NATO’s deputy supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, General
Sir James Rupert Everard, expressed puzzlement at the suggestion that
Sweden’s accession to the TPNW might impede its continued cooperation
347
“US Secretary of Defense Warns Sweden against Stopping Nuclear Weapons”,
Svenska
Dagbladet,
30 August 2017.
348
See “The Government’s Continued Work for Nuclear Disarmament”, Swedish foreign ministry, 12
July 2019. This decision reflected the recommendations of a report prepared by the former Swedish
diplomat Lars-Erik Lundin, which was widely criticised by civil society. See, for example, “Disappointing
Report from the Swedish Inquiry into Joining Nuclear Ban Treaty”, ICAN, 18 January 2019.
349
“Dishonest to Compare Us with Donald Trump: Reply from Margot Wallström on the Nuclear Ban”,
Aftonbladet,
17 July 2019.
350
Remarks delivered in a webinar on “Nuclear Disarmament at UN75” on 16 December 2020.
351
“Can Disarmament Be Revived? An Interview with Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde”,
Arms Control Today,
May 2021.
352
“Statement of Foreign Policy 2021” delivered by Ann Linde, Swedish foreign minister, Stockholm,
24 February 2021.
353
Bonnie Docherty, “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Its Compatibility with
Sweden’s Security Arrangements”, SLMK and WILPF Sweden, June 2018.
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with NATO.
354
The former Swedish foreign minister Hans Blix has also
dismissed this claim, arguing that Sweden’s possible need for cooperation
in a crisis situation “would certainly be matched by a corresponding need
at NATO”.
355
Nevertheless, the Swedish defence forces have argued that all
military exercises and operations involving nuclear‑armed states include
an “implicit nuclear dimension”.
“[F]rom a legal perspective, Sweden’s
security arrangements should not be viewed
as barriers to its joining the TPNW.”
International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School
In NATO partner
Switzerland,
both houses of parliament instructed
the government in 2018 to proceed with signature and ratification of
the TPNW “without delay”.
356
This had been prompted by a petition
signed by more than 25,000 citizens.
357
The government responded in
2019 by announcing that it would “examine in depth” the possibility
of Switzerland’s accession.
358
The foreign minister, Ignazio Cassis, said
in March 2021 that “there will be no problem in joining this treaty” if
concerns expressed by some other states about the treaty’s impact on the
NPT are “abandoned”.
359
Like Sweden, Switzerland has decided to attend
the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW as an observer.
360
In
Finland,
also a NATO partner, three of the five political parties that
form the current coalition government have expressed their support for
joining the TPNW: the Social Democratic Party, the Green League, and
the Left Alliance.
361
The Finnish foreign minister, Pekka Haavisto, is one
of more than 50 parliamentarians in Finland who have pledged to work
for their country’s accession.
362
In May 2021, the city of Helsinki urged
the government to join the treaty.
363
The foreign affairs committee of the
Finnish parliament issued a statement in 2018 recommending that the
government “continue to analyse the contents of the treaty”.
364
It noted
that the treaty “supports and complements” the NPT, as well as the
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
354
“High-Ranking NATO Chief: No Link between Sweden’s Cooperation with NATO and Ratification of
the UN Ban on Nuclear Weapons”, SLMK, 21 February 2019.
355
Ibid.
356
“The Swiss Parliament Calls for Immediate Accession to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons”, ICAN Switzerland.
357
Ibid.
358
“The Federal Council Determines the Further Procedure for the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition
Treaty”, media release of the Federal Council, 3 April 2019.
359
Response to questions in the Federal Assembly, 16 March 2021.
360
Tweet by Swiss Security Policy on 21 April 2021.
361
Erkki Tuomioja, “It Is Time to End Our Reliance on Nuclear Weapons”, European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2 November 2020.
362
“Finland”, ICAN Parliamentary Pledge.
363
“Finland”, ICAN Cities Appeal.
364
“The Government’s Inquiry: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, report issued by
the foreign affairs committee of the Finnish parliament, 2018.
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TPNW negotiations
Bayani S. Mercado, the head of the Philippines’ delegation to the
TPNW negotiating conference, delivers a statement in June 2017.
Credit: ICAN
Other US Allies
In addition to New Zealand, two other states designated as “major non‑
NATO allies” of the United States are parties to the TPNW: Thailand and
the Philippines. Furthermore, Brazil, which is also a major non‑NATO
ally, is a TPNW signatory.
Thailand
was one of the first states to ratify the
TPNW in 2017.
365
It has said that the treaty “truly reflects a global call to
rid the world of these terrible weapons”.
366
The
Philippines
ratified it in
February 2021, following the concurrence of its Senate.
367
It has hailed the
treaty as “a landmark agreement that fortifies the nuclear disarmament
architecture” and “delegitimises once and for all the use of nuclear
weapons”.
368
Brazil
was the first state to sign the TPNW, which is now
“under consideration by the Brazilian national congress with a view to its
ratification”.
369
It has described the treaty’s adoption as “an evolutionary
leap for the disarmament and non‑proliferation regime”, which “has
significantly raised the moral barrier against these weapons”.
370
365
See “US Relations with Thailand”, US Department of State. See also “Thailand”, ICAN.
366
Statement by Thailand at a high-level event to commemorate the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2019.
367
See “US Relations with the Philippines”, US Department of State. See also “Philippines”, ICAN.
368
Statement by the Philippines at a high-level event to commemorate the International Day for the
Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2019.
369
See “US Relations with Brazil”, US Department of State. See also “Brazil”, ICAN.
370
Statement by Brazil at a high-level event to commemorate the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2019.
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ICAN Paris Forum
More than 300 students, activists, and artists, mostly
from NATO states, gather in Paris in February 2020 for a two-day forum
on “How to Ban the Bomb and Influence People”.
Credit: ICAN/Orel Kichigai
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6
Myths and
Misconceptions
Much of the opposition to the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, including
from NATO states, is based on myths and
misconceptions, as well as deliberate falsehoods.
G
iven that a number of influential states in world affairs remain
wedded to their nuclear arsenals, the TPNW has always been a
controversial treaty, and has attracted a great deal of commentary
and criticism. While some of the criticism has been made in good faith and
is based on genuine and well‑informed analysis, much of the opposition
– including, regrettably, from several NATO member governments – is
based on myths, misconceptions, and sometimes deliberate falsehoods
intended to mislead. This chapter examines and corrects the most
common and prominent misconceptions about the TPNW that have
appeared in publications, statements, and other material from NATO
itself, its member governments, and NATO‑connected institutions.
371
371
For a more detailed response to common criticisms of the TPNW, see Gro Nystuen, Kjølv Egeland,
and Torbjørn Graff Hugo,
The TPNW: Setting the Record Straight,
Norwegian Academy of International
Law, 2018. For answers to common questions about nuclear weapons, see Richard Lennane,
Let’s Be
Realists: Eleven Answers to Common Questions about Nuclear Weapons,
ICAN, 2020.
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Relationship to the NPT
A frequent claim in NATO circles is that the TPNW is incompatible with
and undermines or damages the NPT. It is rarely spelled out in detail
exactly how this undermining or damage would occur – perhaps because
the claim quickly falls apart when examined. It is important to recall that a
key motivation of the states that negotiated the TPNW was to take forward
the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations of Article VI of
the NPT. This intention is clearly stated in the preamble of the TPNW:
Reaffirming
that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all
its aspects under strict and effective international control,
Reaffirming also
that the full and effective implementation of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the
cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime,
has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security …
Before examining any further aspects, the first step is therefore to
consider
what possible interest
any TPNW state party would have in
undermining or damaging the NPT. All the states that advocated,
promoted, pursued, and negotiated the TPNW are states parties to the
NPT. None has ever questioned the role or importance of that treaty;
their dissatisfaction stems only from the failure of some states to fully
implement it. TPNW states parties are fully committed to the NPT and,
as NATO states also claim, want to see it fully implemented. They view
the TPNW not just as compatible with and complementary to the NPT but
as a tool specifically designed to implement a key part of it. Article VI of
the NPT legally obliges all states parties to pursue “effective measures”,
including additional legal instruments, to achieve nuclear disarmament.
372
TPNW states parties see the new treaty as doing precisely this – just
as the non‑proliferation and “peaceful uses” pillars of the NPT have
been augmented by additional legal instruments, such as safeguards
agreements and the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty.
Speaking in Geneva in 2018, the UN secretary-general, António Guterres,
flatly rejected the claim that the TPNW undermines the NPT, stressing
that the two treaties are “fully compatible” and complementary.
373
This,
too, was the conclusion of the Norwegian government in its review in 2018
of the consequences for Norway of ratifying the TPNW: “[T]here are no
grounds for asserting that the [TPNW] is contrary to the provisions of the
NPT on disarmament under international law.”
374
The research services
division of the German federal parliament, in a detailed paper examining
this issue, wrote in January 2021: “The TPNW does not undermine the
NPT; it is part of a common nuclear disarmament architecture.”
375
Turning to the specific alleged incompatibilities or contradictions, one
argument appears to be that the TPNW “contradicts” the NPT because
372
Thomas Hajnoczi, “The Relationship between the NPT and the TPNW”,
Journal for Peace and
Nuclear Disarmament,
volume 3, issue 1, 2020, pp. 87–91.
373
Remarks at the University of Geneva at the launch of the UN secretary-general’s disarmament
agenda, 24 May 2018 (comments made in French following the prepared statement).
374
“Review of the Consequences for Norway of Ratifying the TPNW”, Norway, 28 November 2018.
375
“On the Legal Relationship between the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty and
Non-Proliferation Treaty”, research services division of the German Bundestag, 2021.
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the TPNW prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons, while the NPT
allows the five “nuclear-weapon states” to retain them (pending the
implementation of Article VI). Leaving aside the question of whether and
to what extent the NPT actually does “permit” the indefinite possession
of nuclear weapons,
376
this argument is quickly shown to be absurd
by looking at the relationship between other pairs of older and more
recent disarmament treaties dealing with the same weapon. The 1925
Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of biological and chemical weapons
in warfare, but not their possession. The more comprehensive 1972
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) prohibit the possession of biological and chemical
weapons respectively. Nobody claims that the BWC and CWC “contradict”
or are “incompatible with” the Geneva Protocol. Rather, the BWC and
CWC are seen as a natural evolution, building on and expanding the
norm established by the older treaty. Similarly, Amended Protocol II
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) “allows”
(i.e. does not prohibit) possession of anti‑personnel landmines; the
1997 Anti‑Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) does prohibit
possession. Again, nobody claims these instruments are contradictory or
incompatible, or that the APMBC “undermines” the CCW.
There is no logic to the claim that a treaty‑based prohibition should
only be put in place once nuclear weapons have almost been eliminated.
This was not the approach taken for other types of indiscriminate
weapons – large stockpiles of which still existed at the time that they
were comprehensively outlawed. Based on the history of other weapon
prohibition treaties, the TPNW is certainly not “premature”. Prohibition
comes first and destruction will follow, not the other way around.
Another common claim is that the TPNW will supersede, and thus weaken,
the NPT. This is simply not the case. Article 18 of the TPNW states:
The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations
undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international
agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are
consistent with the Treaty.
While this could be taken to mean that TPNW states parties would be
exempt from their obligations under the NPT where those are inconsistent
with the TPNW, it is difficult to imagine some circumstance in which
implementing a specific NPT obligation would somehow be inconsistent
with the TPNW, given the intentional consistency and complementarity
between the two treaties. Certainly, no concrete example has been
provided by critics of Article 18. Even in the case that an NPT nuclear‑
armed state were to join the TPNW and attempt to retain its nuclear
weapons, Article 18 would not apply since possession of nuclear weapons,
while arguably permitted by the NPT for nuclear‑armed states, is
(thankfully) not an
obligation
of the NPT. In short, Article 18 means that
TPNW states parties cannot use adherence to other treaties as an excuse
for non‑compliance with the TPNW.
377
376
Most NPT states parties consider that the treaty does not permit the five “nuclear-weapon
states” to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, even if Article VI does not specify any time limit for
implementation. For example, the Non-Aligned Movement regularly states that “the indefinite extension
of the [NPT] does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon states of their nuclear
arsenals. Any such assumption is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”.
377
“TPNW: Implications for Sweden’s Imports and Exports of Nuclear Material”, SLMK, August 2018.
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Safeguards Obligations
The safeguards provisions of the TPNW have been a particular focus for
criticism, almost all of which is either factually incorrect or irrelevant.
The jumping-off point for much of the criticism is the fact that the TPNW
does not oblige its states parties to conclude an Additional Protocol with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is true, and indeed
it can legitimately be argued – and has been by some supporters of the
TPNW – that not requiring an Additional Protocol is a shortcoming of
the treaty, or at least a missed opportunity. But from this grain of truth,
opponents of the TPNW, including NATO members, to their discredit, have
spun an elaborate confection of mischaracterisations, false equivalences,
and outright lies about the safeguards provisions of the TPNW. They have
maintained and repeated these misconceptions even after they have been
comprehensively rebutted by legal experts,
378
which suggests that the
arguments are not being made in good faith.
“[T]he TPNW does not weaken the existing
safeguards regime … The approach taken by
the TPNW is similar to that of the NPT … It is
also important to note that the TPNW actually
goes further than the NPT with regard to
nuclear possessor states parties …”
379
International Committee of the Red Cross
The fundamental point about the TPNW safeguards provisions is that they
are
at least as strong as those of the NPT,
and in some important respects
stronger.
380
While some might have liked them to be stronger still, they are
in no way a step backwards from the NPT, nor do they somehow weaken
or undermine the NPT’s safeguards provisions. The key to this is the
provision in Article 3(1) of the TPNW that each state party without nuclear
weapons “shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of
this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that
it may adopt in the future”. This means that any state joining the TPNW
that has an Additional Protocol is obliged to keep it, or replace it with a
stronger instrument; the TPNW cannot be used as a means of escaping or
downgrading safeguards obligations. Note that this obligation holds even
if the state concerned should withdraw from the NPT: the TPNW makes
the NPT safeguards regime
more
robust, not less.
It is therefore hard to see why any state that is satisfied with the NPT’s
safeguards provisions should find those of the TPNW unacceptable.
Revealingly, much of the criticism comes from those who apparently
378
See Eirini Giorgou, “Safeguards Provisions in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”,
Arms Control Law,
11 April 2018; and Gro Nystuen, Kjølv Egeland, and Torbjørn Graff Hugo,
The TPNW:
Setting the Record Straight,
Norwegian Academy of International Law, 2018.
379
“Safeguards and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, ICRC, April 2018.
380
Among other things, the TPNW requires safeguards for all its states parties, while the NPT does
not oblige the five nuclear-armed states parties to conclude safeguards agreements.
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have not read the text of the NPT, or who are simply repeating talking
points they have been given, without knowledge of the actual provisions
of the treaty. Whether deliberately or out of ignorance, TPNW critics
frequently confound the legally binding obligations of the NPT itself with
the agreements reached in the successive review conferences of the treaty,
and compare these agreements unfavourably with the legally binding
provisions of the TPNW. These apples‑and‑oranges comparisons are at
best misguided and at worst disingenuous. Like the NPT, the TPNW will
also have meetings and review conferences at which states parties will
develop agreements on strengthening and improving the implementation
of the treaty, including the safeguards provisions. If NATO members
genuinely wish to take practical steps to strengthen the global safeguards
regime, including by expanding adherence to the Additional Protocol,
they would be best served by
joining the TPNW
so that they can contribute
as states parties to shaping agreements to develop and strengthen
implementation of its safeguards provisions.
Verifying Disarmament
Critics often claim that the TPNW “lacks verification” or involves
“unverified disarmament”. Either through ignorance, or in a deliberate
attempt to mislead, verification of nuclear disarmament is conflated
with verification of non-proliferation (i.e. safeguards – see above) in
order to compare the TPNW unfavourably to the NPT. As a quick reading
of the actual texts of the two treaties will reveal, the reality is that the
TPNW explicitly requires verification for any and all disarmament
procedures conducted pursuant to it, while the NPT contains
no provision
for verification of disarmament whatsoever.
Therefore, whatever criticisms
might be levelled at the disarmament verification provisions of the TPNW,
they are evidently far ahead of those of the NPT.
Article 4(2) of the TPNW obliges a state party that possesses nuclear
weapons to destroy them “in accordance with a legally binding, time‑
bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State
Party’s nuclear‑weapon programme, including the elimination or
irreversible conversion of all nuclear‑weapons‑related facilities”.
Unverified disarmament is therefore not permitted by the treaty, and it is
simply incorrect to claim otherwise.
There are of course legitimate questions about how effective the
verification provisions to be negotiated in accordance with Article 4 would
be, and whether, for example, different nuclear-armed states might be
held to different verification standards. But the process is always under
the control of the TPNW states parties, which are collectively responsible
for approving each disarmament plan. The approach of the TPNW is
essentially to let the nuclear‑armed state propose the best means of
eliminating its weapons, but require it to satisfy the entire membership of
the treaty that its plan is verifiable and irreversible.
This approach is pragmatic and flexible, but it also means that for any
states, including NATO members, that are concerned about possible lax
verification standards and incomplete disarmament, the best move is to
join the TPNW
in order to ensure that elimination plans that do not meet
their standards are not approved.
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Unilateral Disarmament
An increasingly common line of objection to the TPNW among NATO
member states is that unilateral nuclear disarmament would reduce
NATO’s security. A related concern is that pressure to join the TPNW falls
“unfairly” on democratic, open societies rather than on authoritarian
regimes. As the North Atlantic Council statement on the TPNW put it: “A
world where the states that challenge the international rules‑based order
have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world.”
381
This argument is simply a
non sequitur.
Whatever one may think of the
security implications of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the question
is irrelevant because the TPNW
does not require unilateral disarmament.
Again, criticism of the TPNW is based on what opponents assume it says,
or have been led to believe it says, rather than what it does say. Nowhere in
the treaty is there any requirement for unilateral disarmament. The TPNW
certainly allows for unilateral disarmament – and many states parties, as
well as ICAN, would encourage it – but the treaty negotiators were well
aware of the security concerns of nuclear‑armed states, and carefully
designed the treaty to facilitate coordinated, simultaneous accession by
two or more possessor states.
The elimination plan required by Article 4 can be negotiated jointly by
the states concerned to ensure that verification, irreversibility, and
other security assurances are guaranteed to a mutually satisfactory level.
Indeed, one way of looking at the disarmament provisions of the TPNW
is simply as a legal framework and supervisory mechanism for bilateral
or plurilateral disarmament negotiations among nuclear‑armed states.
A nuclear‑armed state must decide before accession whether it wishes to
pursue unilateral or plurilateral disarmament – it cannot join the treaty
and then wait for another nuclear‑armed state to join before proceeding to
disarm – but it is free to make this decision according to its interests.
So it is clear that supporting the TPNW does not in itself constitute any
kind of endorsement of or commitment to unilateral disarmament.
But there is another important reason that opposition to unilateral
disarmament is a poor excuse for NATO members to refuse to join
the TPNW: most members of NATO do not need to consider unilateral
disarmament because
they do not possess nuclear weapons
(and as
non‑nuclear‑armed states parties to the NPT are already prohibited from
acquiring them). While the situation may be more complicated for the five
NATO members that host nuclear weapons on their territory under the
“nuclear‑sharing” arrangement, the majority of NATO states can join the
TPNW
today
without being required to engage in nuclear disarmament at
all – unilateral or otherwise.
381
“North Atlantic Council Statement as the TPNW Enters into Force”, NATO, 15 December 2020.
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7
Towards a Non-
Nuclear Alliance
While total elimination of nuclear weapons may
remain a distant goal, envisioning and planning
for NATO as a “non-nuclear alliance” should
begin now – in line with the new global norm.
ATO currently labels itself a “nuclear alliance”. But if it should
one day reach its long‑standing goals of full implementation
of the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty and global nuclear
disarmament, it will necessarily be a “non‑nuclear alliance”. This is the
natural end‑point of NATO’s own declared policy, and would surely be
a great achievement for the alliance and for global security. NATO as a
non‑nuclear alliance would be something for its members to celebrate
and cherish: a demonstration that true security is based on humanitarian
principles. Yet rather than openly aspiring to achieving such status, and
discussing how it might look and function, NATO seems to be actively
avoiding – even suppressing – any consideration of the possibility.
In his speech in Prague in 2009, the US president Barack Obama famously
said: “I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek
the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”
382
Critics –
including ICAN – have subsequently lamented the lack of action to take
N
382
Remarks in Prague, the Czech Republic, on 5 April 2009.
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forward this commitment,
383
but at least it was clearly and unambiguously
stated as an aspiration: a distinct, well-defined vision. In contrast, nobody
in NATO is stating clearly and with conviction NATO’s commitment to
becoming a non‑nuclear alliance, or even vaguely pondering it.
“Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under
way, and a race for disarmament is urgently
needed. It is time to bring the era of reliance on
nuclear weapons to a permanent end.”
More than 50 past leaders and ministers from 20 NATO states
Instead, as discussed in chapter 2, there are persistent efforts within
NATO to ever more deeply entrench nuclear weapons within the alliance’s
core identity. Total and unquestioning commitment to NATO as a
“nuclear alliance”, now and forever, is seen as a test of loyalty. The issue
is viewed as starkly binary: you are either for nuclear weapons and for
NATO, or against nuclear weapons and against NATO. As discussed in
chapter 3, this artificial dichotomy results in defensive, knee-jerk policy
reactions to developments such as the TPNW that do not actually threaten
NATO interests, and in fact have much to offer in terms of advancing
NATO security goals (chapter 4). Overall, NATO’s approach to nuclear
disarmament has been dangerously counterproductive and short‑sighted.
As the NATO 2030 Reflection Group concluded:
[T]he Alliance would benefit from adopting a long-term perspective
and re-embracing the vision of NATO from earlier decades – as a
preventative tool to shape its environment rather than primarily
an instrument for managing crises once they have already broken
out. This proactive mentality should permeate how Allies think
about strengthening NATO’s political role, cohesion, and unity, and
consultation and decision-making for the coming decade.
384
As NATO convenes to consider the NATO 2030 plan and the longer‑term
future of the alliance, it is time for members to shake off the restrictions
of reactive, short‑term thinking about nuclear weapons, and instead to
re‑embrace the vision of nuclear disarmament as a preventative tool for
shaping NATO’s security environment. While total elimination of nuclear
weapons may remain a distant goal, envisioning and planning for NATO as
a non‑nuclear alliance should begin now.
This will require a deliberate, decisive conceptual shift away from the
reflexive assumption that anything that goes against nuclear weapons
necessarily goes against NATO, and from the all‑or‑nothing mindset
that holds NATO as one‑hundred‑per‑cent in favour of, invested in,
and committed to nuclear weapons right up until the point that they are
somehow magically eliminated. The new conceptual approach should
383
See, for example, Tim Wright, “Hope and Hype of Hiroshima Can’t Conceal Obama’s Dismal
Record on Nuclear Disarmament”,
The Guardian,
27 May 2016.
384
NATO 2030: United for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group
Appointed by the NATO Secretary General,
NATO, 25 November 2020, p. 22.
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
be more realistic and graduated, accepting that even while certain NATO
members retain nuclear weapons, NATO can consider, discuss, develop,
and implement serious steps to gradually but steadily diminish both their
legitimacy and the role they play in the alliance.
Towards 2030
Even if NATO continues to function as a “nuclear alliance” in the short
term, NATO members should recognise and embrace the fact that they can:
g
Work to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defence and security policies
and doctrines, as they have already agreed to do in the NPT review process;
Take steps to lower the risk of inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear
weapons, including taking all weapons off high alert;
Freely and openly discuss and explore the possible shape and implications of
an eventual totally non-nuclear alliance, including the role of the non-nuclear-
armed NATO states in achieving and maintaining it;
Encourage and facilitate discussion and exploration of a diversity of national
positions and policies on nuclear weapons among the members;
Strengthen the global norm against nuclear weapons by supporting the
TPNW and abandoning baseless criticisms of it, engaging constructively
with TPNW states parties, and encouraging states outside NATO – whether
partners, rivals, or others – to join it;
Join the TPNW themselves, beginning with all 27 of the non-nuclear-armed
members of NATO.
385
g
g
g
g
g
None of these steps would compromise NATO’s security; all are compatible
with the North Atlantic Treaty. There is no reason not to start taking them.
If NATO members are sincere and serious about reducing the security
threats posed to them by nuclear weapons, and achieving their goal of
global nuclear disarmament, they must begin. They must work to bring
the alliance into line with the new legal standard set by the TPNW and
supported by much of the international community.
As NATO formulates its goals and strategies for 2030 and beyond, it
should seize the opportunity to set out a clear vision for its future as
a non‑nuclear alliance, “where nuclear weapons are not a legitimate,
effective, or desirable means of defence for anyone. Not for Russia,
China, or North Korea. Not for allies. Not for us.”
386
385
As noted in chapter 3, any non-nuclear-armed NATO member that joins the TPNW will be obliged
to disavow the notion of protection from an ally’s nuclear weapons and refrain from engaging in,
assisting with, or encouraging all nuclear-weapon-related activities prohibited under Article 1.
386
Comment by six former Norwegian statespeople: Kjell Magne Bondevik (prime minister and
foreign minister), Bjørn Tore Godal (foreign and defence minister), Thorbjørn Jagland (prime minister
and foreign minister), Eldbjørg Løwer (defence minister), Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (defence minister),
and Knut Vollebæk (foreign minister). “We Cannot Leave This Threat to Our Children and Grandchildren.
Ban Nuclear Weapons Now!”,
Aftenposten,
21 September 2020.
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
United Nations
One hundred and twenty-two states vote
to adopt the TPNW on 7 July 2017.
Credit: ICAN/Ralf Schlesener
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Annex
Treaty on the
Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons
The States Parties to this Treaty,
Determined
to contribute to the realization of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Deeply concerned
about the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and
recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons,
which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never
used again under any circumstances,
Mindful
of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear
weapons, including from any nuclear‑weapon detonation by accident,
miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the
security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to
prevent any use of nuclear weapons,
Cognizant
that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons
cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave
implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic
development, the global economy, food security and the health of current
and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and
girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation,
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Acknowledging
the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and
the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear‑weapon‑free world,
which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national
and collective security interests,
Mindful
of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the
victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those
affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,
Recognizing
the disproportionate impact of nuclear‑weapon
activities on indigenous peoples,
Reaffirming
the need for all States at all times to comply with
applicable international law, including international humanitarian law
and international human rights law,
Basing themselves
on the principles and rules of international
humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an
armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited,
the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the
rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the
use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment,
Considering
that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the
principles and rules of international humanitarian law,
Reaffirming
that any use of nuclear weapons would also be
abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public
conscience,
Recalling
that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for
armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,
Recalling also
the first resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions
which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons,
Concerned
by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued
reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines
and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on
programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of
nuclear weapons,
Recognizing
that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons
constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement
and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the
irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons,
and determined to act towards that end,
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Determined
to act with a view to achieving effective progress
towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
Reaffirming
that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects under strict and effective international control,
Reaffirming also
that the full and effective implementation of the
Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the
cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation regime,
has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security,
Recognizing
the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear‑
Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the
nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation regime,
Reaffirming
the conviction that the establishment of the
internationally recognized nuclear‑weapon‑free zones on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned
enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear
non‑proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective
of nuclear disarmament,
Emphasizing
that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination,
Recognizing
that the equal, full and effective participation of both
women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment
of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting
and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear
disarmament,
Recognizing also
the importance of peace and disarmament
education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and
consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and
committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty,
Stressing
the role of public conscience in the furthering of the
principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination
of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken
by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, other international and regional organizations, non‑
governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians,
academics and the hibakusha,
Have agreed
as follows:
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Article 1
Prohibitions
1.
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a)
Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire,
possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Treaty;
Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its
territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Article 2
Declarations
1.
Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for
that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:
(a)
Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its
nuclear‑weapon programme, including the elimination
or irreversible conversion of all nuclear‑weapons‑related
facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that
State Party;
Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns,
possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its
territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that
are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.
(b)
(c)
2.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such
declarations received to the States Parties.
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Article 3
Safeguards
1.
Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply
shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into
force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant
instruments that it may adopt in the future.
Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not
apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive
safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of
such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry
into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall
enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force
of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter
maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional
relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2.
Article 4
Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons
1.
Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or
controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
and eliminated its nuclear‑weapon programme, including the
elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear‑weapons‑
related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for
it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority
designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose
of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear‑weapon
programme. The competent international authority shall report to
the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient
to provide credible assurance of the non‑diversion of declared
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the
absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State
Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence
within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that
State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18
months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party.
That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these
safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant
instruments that it may adopt in the future.
Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses
or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
shall immediately remove them from operational status, and
destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to
be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance
with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and
irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear‑weapon
programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
of all nuclear‑weapons‑related facilities. The State Party, no later
than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State
Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent
international authority designated by the States Parties. The
plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international
authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States
Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in
accordance with its rules of procedure.
3.
A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of
the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State
as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later
than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to
in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force
no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these
safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant
instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry
into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State
Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this
Article.
Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory
or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned,
possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt
removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a
deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties.
Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that
State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this
Article.
Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report
to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the
progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under
this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.
The States Parties shall designate a competent international
authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible
elimination of nuclear‑weapons programmes, including the
elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear‑weapons‑
related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this
Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made
prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which
paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States
Parties to take any decisions that may be required.
4.
5.
6.
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Article 5
National implementation
1.
2.
Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement
its obligations under this Treaty.
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative
and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions,
to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its
jurisdiction or control.
Article 6
Victim assistance and environmental remediation
1.
Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its
jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear
weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian
and human rights law, adequately provide age‑ and gender‑
sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical
care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide
for their social and economic inclusion.
Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or
control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing
or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the
environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.
The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without
prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under
international law or bilateral agreements.
2.
3.
Article 7
International cooperation and assistance
1.
2.
Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to
facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall
have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from
other States Parties.
Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical,
material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by
nuclear‑weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of
this Treaty.
Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for
the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
3.
4.
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5.
Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through
the United Nations system, international, regional or national
organizations or institutions, non‑governmental organizations
or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral
basis.
Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have
under international law, a State Party that has used or tested
nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have
a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States
Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental
remediation.
6.
Article 8
Meeting of States Parties
1.
The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and,
where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with
regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in
accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures
for nuclear disarmament, including:
(a)
(b)
The implementation and status of this Treaty;
Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible
elimination of nuclear‑weapon programmes, including
additional protocols to this Treaty;
Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the
provisions of this Treaty.
(c)
2.
The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the
entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties
shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.
The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure
at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure
of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total
elimination, shall apply.
Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as
may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this
request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.
After a period of five years following the entry into force of this
Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene
a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress
in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences
at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise
agreed by the States Parties.
3.
4.
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5.
States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the
United Nations system, other relevant international organizations
or institutions, regional organizations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental
organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States
Parties and the review conferences as observers.
Article 9
Costs
1.
The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences
and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by
the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating
therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of
assessment adjusted appropriately.
The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under
Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty
shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United
Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
The cost related to the implementation of verification measures
required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the
destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
and the elimination of nuclear‑weapon programmes, including the
elimination or conversion of all nuclear‑weapons‑related facilities,
should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.
2.
3.
Article 10
Amendments
1.
At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party
may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed
amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties
and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal.
If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of
the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that
they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal
shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review
conference, whichever comes first.
A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree
upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a
majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall
communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.
2.
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3.
The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that
deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the
amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments
of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at
the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any
other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of
ratification or acceptance of the amendment.
Article 11
Settlement of disputes
1.
When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating
to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties
concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement
of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the
parties’ choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of
the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the
States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their
choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure,
in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the
Charter of the United Nations.
2.
Article 12
Universality
Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty
to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of
universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.
Article 13
Signature
This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United
Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.
Article 14
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.
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Article 15
Entry into force
1.
This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has
been deposited.
For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of
the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date
on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
2.
Article 16
Reservations
The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
Article 17
Duration and withdrawal
1.
2.
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty,
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give
notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of
the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If,
however, on the expiry of that 12‑month period, the withdrawing
State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall
continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any
additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.
3.
Article 18
Relationship with other agreements
The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations
undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international
agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are
consistent with the Treaty.
 FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 89: ICAN-rapporten "A NON NUCLEAR ALLIANCE – Why NATO members should join the UN ban on Nuclear Weapons", fra FORBYD ATOMVÅBEN - ICAN i Danmark
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Article 19
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated
as the Depositary of this Treaty.
Article 20
Authentic texts
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of
this Treaty shall be equally authentic.
DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and
seventeen.
114
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 FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 89: ICAN-rapporten "A NON NUCLEAR ALLIANCE – Why NATO members should join the UN ban on Nuclear Weapons", fra FORBYD ATOMVÅBEN - ICAN i Danmark
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A NON-NUCLEAR ALLIANCE
Hibakusha
Fujimori Toshiki and Setsuko Thurlow, survivors
of the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima, speak to the media
following the adoption of the TPNW.
Credit: ICAN/Ralf Schlesener
ICAN
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 FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 89: ICAN-rapporten "A NON NUCLEAR ALLIANCE – Why NATO members should join the UN ban on Nuclear Weapons", fra FORBYD ATOMVÅBEN - ICAN i Danmark
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“The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
can help end decades of paralysis in disarmament. It
is a beacon of hope in a time of darkness. It enables
countries to subscribe to the highest available
multilateral norm against nuclear weapons and build
international pressure for action … We must show
courage and boldness – and join the treaty.”
More than 50 past leaders and foreign and defence ministers from
20 NATO states, including two past NATO secretaries general