Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21
FOU Alm.del Bilag 4
Offentligt
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14 October 2020
DOCUMENT
C-M(2020)0026 (DK-OVERVIEW)
NATO DEFENCE PLANNING CAPABILITY REVIEW 2019/2020
DENMARK
OVERVIEW
1.
The 2018-2023 Danish Defence Agreement remains extant, and assesses that
Denmark faces more serious threats than in any other period following the fall of the Berlin
Wall. In response to this, Denmark wishes to enhance its capacity for collective deterrence
and defence within NATO; to enhance its ability to participate in international military
operations and international stabilisation efforts for the purposes of, inter alia, fighting
terrorism, capacity building, and handling of irregular migration flows; to strengthen its ability
to contribute to the national security of Denmark, which includes increasing support to the
Danish National Police; and to enhance its ability to protect Danish society from cyber
threats and propaganda campaigns. Denmark considers NATO as the cornerstone of its
security and defence policy. It recognises, inter alia, that it may become a staging area for
reinforcements from other NATO Allies, and that, therefore, it must be able to receive, to
host and to protect these reinforcements. Denmark wishes to improve its ability to operate
with larger Allied army formations that can be deployed within NATO territory. Denmark
also wishes to: enhance its cyber defences; allocate more resources to the Danish Defence
Intelligence Service; and enhance its military presence and surveillance in the Arctic.
2.
In January 2019, a supplementary defence agreement was agreed in the Danish
Parliament, with broad cross-party support. This out-of-cycle political agreement provides
additional funding of DKK 1.5 billion (US$ 238.03 million) in 2023. Denmark indicates total
defence expenditure will reach 1.5 % of GDP in 2023. According to Denmark, it is politically
agreed that the premise of the next defence agreement will be the Wales Defence
Investment Pledge (DIP).
3.
In terms of capability development, Denmark plans, inter alia, to provide a medium
infantry brigade, with heavier elements and enhanced capabilities, by 2024, with the
capability to deploy roughly 4,000 soldiers in an independent formation. To accomplish this,
Denmark is investing in anti-tank capability, main battle tanks (MBT), indirect fire support,
ground-based air defence (GBAD), intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance, command and control, combat support (CS), and combat service support
(CSS) capabilities in the short term. Denmark also plans to improve the anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) capability of the Danish Navy, by upgrading the new maritime helicopters
with advanced sonar systems and anti-submarine torpedoes. Anti-air warfare capability will
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be enhanced with the delivery of long and short-range missiles. The capabilities of the
Danish Air Force will be enhanced by the replacement of their F-16s with F-35 fighter aircraft
until 2026. A fifteen-year capability development plan reflects the acquisition and
sustainment priorities of the Defence Agreement, and will provide continuity of planning past
2023, into the medium term.
4.
At the end of 2019, the strength of the Danish Armed Forces was 17,973 military
personnel, including 2,071 conscripts, supported by 4,759 civilians. As part of the Defence
Agreement, the Danish Armed Forces is reorganising and slimming-down higher staffs in
order to refocus personnel resources on operational capabilities. This is intended to
increase the operational force structure by approximately 1,100 full-time regular personnel
by 2024. The number of conscripts called up each year is some 4,200, and the intent is to
increase this number by up to 500 to meet yearly demands. Basic training lasts for four
months, and conscripts seeking employment following compulsory service will receive a
further advanced military training.
5.
The overall strength of the Danish Home Guard (HG) is about 550 permanently
employed personnel, 14,500 volunteers in the active structure, and some 30,000 personnel
in the reserve structure. The primary mission of the HG is homeland security, but it is also
used in support to the regular armed forces, in the reception and protection of Allied
reinforcing forces and for the protection of infrastructure. HG personnel also serve as
augmentees in international operations and missions, and defence capacity building
engagements.
6.
Denmark’s GDP growth
in real terms increased from 2.04% in 2017, to 2.39% in
2018 and was estimated to have been 2.37% in 2019. In 2020, GDP is projected to fall by
5.78%. The proportion of GDP devoted to defence decreased from 1.35% in 2009 to an
estimated 1.31 % in 2019, and is projected to be 1.47 % in 2020, 1.49 % in 2021 and 1.40
% in 2022, which is below the NATO guideline of 2%. In 2018, expenditure on major
equipment and associated research and development was 11.66% of total defence
expenditure. Expenditure on major equipment was estimated to have been 18.06% in 2019
and is forecast to be 22.35% in 2020, 24.04 % in 2021 and 19.55% in 2022, which straddles
the NATO guideline of 20%.
7.
Denmark makes regular contributions to operations, missions and engagements
abroad, generally commensurate with the size of its armed forces, and without caveats.
Denmark has offered land, maritime and air capabilities to the NATO Readiness Initiative.
8.
Allied Defence Ministers agreed that Denmark should give priority to the
development of: a heavy infantry brigade, including associated CS and CSS elements; joint
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities; and ASW capabilities. As
a stepping-stone to delivering the heavy infantry brigade by 2032, Denmark aims to enhance
its combat, CS and CSS capabilities by 2024 and plans to deliver a medium infantry brigade
by that year. NATO regards this as a positive step, especially given that until 2024, the
Danish medium infantry brigade has critical combat deficiencies, and is likely to be unusable
in practical terms in a high-end
conflict (given also that it is at 24 months’ notice).
However,
there are still no concrete plans to deliver all of the required heavy infantry capabilities,
including infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) with sufficient firepower and mobility, a key
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component of the brigade, and other shortfalls are anticipated to persist. The second
prioritised capability, JISR, will be partially met in qualitative terms, but will not be met in
quantitative terms. Denmark still has no plans to develop the long-range signal intelligence
(SIGINT) capability, or to acquire the two SIGINT aircraft requested by NATO, which is the
key component of the JISR prioritised capability. Denmark is also challenged to meet the
third capability priority, namely ASW. While the navy has funded plans to fit the flexible
support ships with an advanced towed sonar capability, this upgrade of ASW capability is
now not fully expected until 2028, six years later than requested. Also of pressing concern
is the lack of lightweight ASW torpedoes, until at least 2024, for the nine MH-60R Seahawk
maritime helicopters. Clearly, Denmark needs to commit significantly more effort, funds and
far greater resources to deliver all of three capability priorities. The lack of progress since
the previous Capability Review is of concern.
9.
Denmark is transforming its army to widen the spectrum of its operational
capabilities from battalion level and low-intensity operations to brigade level and high-end
warfighting operations. The Danish Army Command is responsible for developing, planning,
and generating land forces, and has been restructured to include: the 1
st
Mechanised
Infantry Brigade (1
st
Brigade); the 2
nd
Infantry Brigade (2
nd
Brigade); an engineer regiment;
an artillery regiment; a signals regiment; a logistic regiment; and an intelligence regiment,
as well as the Jutland Dragoons, the Royal Life Guard, the Guard Hussars and the Slesvig
Regiment of Foot. The Danish Division Headquarters (HQ) was transformed to become HQ
Multinational Division North (HQ MND-N), in Latvia and Denmark. Denmark’s land force
capability development priorities are focussed on delivering a medium brigade with its
enhanced capabilities by 2024 as an interim step towards providing the requested heavy
infantry brigade by 2032. In this respect, the Danish plan to supplement the CV-9035 IFVs
in the combat battalions with modern Leopard 2A/7 MBTs will increase the offensive, direct
fire capabilities in the brigade by 2024. The introduction of modernised MBTs, new artillery
and mortar systems, and plans to introduce GBAD and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as modern engineering and communications and
information systems are welcome. However, instead of introducing IFVs, Denmark intends
to replace its current armoured personnel carriers (APCs) with new APCs, which will fall
short of the direct fire capability requirements for medium infantry in the short term. In the
medium term, it is evident that Denmark will need to transform its incoming Piranha 5 APCs
to become IFVs with potent autocannons and anti-tank missiles, or procure new IFVs in
order to meet the firepower requirements for heavy infantry.
10.
Denmark can currently provide one heavy infantry battalion group, as a high-
readiness element of the medium infantry brigade in the NATO Capability Targets, albeit
with significant qualitative shortfalls. However, the requested medium infantry brigade is
provided at 24 months’ notice and
with numerous critical quantitative and qualitative
limitations in combat capability, CS and CSS at least until 2024. Given the number of
capability limitations including combat power, readiness and the low stocks of battle decisive
munitions (BDM), it remains to be seen whether Denmark will be able to meet the
requirement to develop a fully-capable heavy infantry brigade as requested by 2032. Until
these critical shortfalls are addressed, the operational utility of the Danish Army, in a high-
end conflict against a peer competitor, will remain constrained.
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11.
The naval staff has been transformed into a two-star Navy Command, responsible
for developing, planning, and generating naval forces. The Navy Command has three
subordinate naval squadrons: Arctic and Northern Atlantic; International Operations; and
National Operations. The naval surveillance centre and the training, technical and expert
centres are also organised under the three squadrons. Naval forces are either controlled
by the National Maritime Operations Centre, or by the Joint Arctic Command when in the
North Atlantic area. The composition of the ocean-going fleet is unchanged since the last
assessment. The core of the navy are three multi-role frigates and two flexible support
ships. They are supplemented by four ocean patrol vessels (OPVs) and three Arctic patrol
ships that are mostly dedicated to national operations patrolling the North Atlantic and the
Arctic. In the short term, the navy capability development priorities include the development
of ASW capabilities; delivery of an area air-defence capability; procuring a class of multi-
purpose vessels; preparing for the potential acquisition of SM-6 missiles; and studying the
requirements for a long-range joint-precision strike capability. The medium-term naval
capability development priorities are to develop an Arctic capability to replace the Thetis-
class OPVs; to develop a concept for maritime unmanned aerial systems; and further
develop the navy’s overall
ISR capabilities.
12.
The navy is a modern ocean-going force that is expected to meet most of the
requested quantitative NATO Capability Targets, but not until the medium term. In
qualitative terms, there are shortfalls in ASW (as mentioned above), above-water warfare,
maritime BDM stockpiles, mine countermeasures, and maritime situational awareness.
Some, but not all, of the shortfalls identified are being addressed by funding identified in the
Defence Agreement.
13.
The Royal Danish Air Force reorganised at the beginning of 2019, merging the Air
Staff and the Expeditionary Air Staff into a new Air Command, which includes a new National
Air Operations Centre. The air force structure also includes a new operations support wing,
a fighter wing, an air control wing, a helicopter wing, an air transport wing and a joint
movement and transportation organisation. The air force consists of 30 F-16 combat
aircraft, four C-130J medium-transport aircraft, 14 EH-101 Merlin medium transport and nine
MH-60R Seahawk tactical transport helicopters, eight AS-550 Fennec light transport
helicopters, and three CL-604 Challenger maritime ISR aircraft, plus one dedicated to VIP
and light transport. The introduction of 27 F-35 combat aircraft to replace the F-16 fleet,
over the period 2021-2026 will leave a
gap in Denmark’s deployable combat air capability in
the period 2022 to 2024. With the exception of F-16 crews, who are slightly below
requirements, all aircrews met Allied Command Operations Forces Standards for flying
hours. Aircrew-to-aircraft ratios meet NATO standards, except for the EH-101 fleet, which
is slightly below the required level.
14.
Denmark’s
relatively modern air force
will not provide all of the capabilities
requested in the aerospace-related NATO Capability Targets. For some of these targets,
there will be delays. For others targets, Denmark has no plans and no intent to provide the
requested capabilities in full. This applies particularly to the number of combat aircraft, the
deployable airbase activation modules, and the three air-to-air refuelling platforms requested
in the medium term. Crucially, it also has no plans to develop a long-range SIGINT capability
mentioned earlier.
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15.
The Danish Special Operations Command structure and capabilities have not
changed since the last Capability Review. Denmark can provide most of the special
operations forces contributions sought by the NATO Capability Targets, albeit with shortfalls
in quantity, quality and readiness, due in part to lack of organic or dedicated CS and CSS
capabilities. Enhancements in land mobility are ongoing. However, Denmark is still mostly
reliant upon other Allies to operate above the task unit level.
16.
Progress
in the implementation of Denmark’s
joint enabling NATO Capability
Targets has been generally moderate, although many shortfalls persist. Denmark provides
several of the quantitative forces and capabilities requested in the NATO Capability Targets,
and is expected to fully implement a few of its qualitative enabling requirements.
Denmark’s
focus rests on the provision of the required CS and CSS capabilities for its heavy infantry
brigade. However, this leads to a situation in which a significant number of joint and enabling
capabilities requested at a theatre-level will either not be provided, or only be available on
an ad-hoc basis and, in many cases, at a lower readiness than required. These shortfalls
include: reception, staging and onward movement; transport; supply; chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear capabilities; and medical capabilities.
17.
Denmark attaches high importance to a comprehensive approach for achieving
coherence among the actions of governmental, non-governmental and international actors
involved in stabilisation and reconstruction. Denmark is fully implementing its related
Capability Targets.
18.
Denmark is broadly resilient and has a clear structure for civil preparedness, where
responsibilities are clearly assigned. A number of sector-specific programmes are in place
and a cross-government body ensures coordination of civil preparedness, but its work would
benefit from an overarching framework for the implementation of the seven baseline
requirements.
19.
In sum, Denmark is making progress towards implementing the Defence Investment
Pledge, including a political commitment to spend 1.5% of GDP on defence in 2023, and to
exceed the 20% guideline for major equipment and associated research and development
before 2024. However, it is clearly not enough to
meet Denmark’s commitments.
Denmark
needs to further increase its defence spending in order to fully implement all of its NATO
Capability Targets.
20.
Progress is evident, and Denmark is expected to meet many of its NATO Capability
Targets, albeit with significant shortfalls in quantity, quality and readiness in the short term.
In the medium term, some of the shortfalls should be addressed by funding identified in the
Defence Agreement. In other cases, Denmark has no plans and no intent to provide certain
capabilities requested by the Alliance, which is most concerning. Until critical shortfalls in
combat power, readiness, and stocks of BDMs are addressed, the operational utility of the
Danish Armed Forces in a high-end conflict against a peer competitor, will remain
constrained.
21.
Allied Defence Ministers agreed that Denmark should give priority to the
development of: a heavy infantry brigade, including associated CS and CSS elements; JISR
capabilities; and ASW capabilities. The lack of progress since the previous Capability
Review is of concern. These developments lead to the conclusion that the Danish and the
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NATO defence planning priorities are misaligned. Denmark needs to fully implement all of
its NATO Capability Targets, in full and on time, with a special emphasis and urgency on all
three of the prioritised capabilities. Until it does so, other Allies may potentially have to pick
up part of Denmark’s fair share
of the Alliance burden.
Original: English
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