Udenrigsudvalget 2019-20
URU Alm.del Bilag 186
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The Rise of an Illiberal China in a Liberal World Order
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Takeaways from event at Hudson Institute
Wednesday 19 June at 9:15 am
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11:00 am
The pa elists dis ussed Chi a’s i reasi gl illi eral prope sities a d ho the are halle gi g the
liberal Western values of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and market economic structures.
Key take-aways:
Tarun Chhabra, Brookings: Liberalism’s inherent features of transparency and citizen-elected
democracies undermine its viability against authoritarian models
Philippe Le Corre, Harvard: China speaks to European narratives of historic greatness such as
Gree e’s a ie t i ilizatio a d Portugal’s histori e pire that are ig ored the EU
Patrick Cronin, Hudson Institute: North and Southeast Asia are less inclined to opposing China
and its illiberalism because many regional countries are not fully committed to liberal values
Evan Feigenbaum, Carnegie: China comes out of a region where history and nationalism shapes
foreign policy thinking more than communist party structures
Summary:
Tarun Chhabra
discussed the vulnerability of liberal democracy and the role of technology and
authoritarian economic structures in undermining liberal democracy. He argued that China is not
imposing Han cultural hegemony and pointed out that the rise of illiberalism is taking place in Western
democracies such as the United States as well. China has helped make the world safe for authoritarian
regimes. There is not a grand strategy behind it, but that does not change the significant consequences
of Chi a’s e pa di g role i the orld. De o ra is the e eptio i a orld here authoritaria is is
the default regime. Inherent features in liberalism reduces its ability to survive at a time when
authoritarianism can use technological developments and economic state support to undermine the
openness of liberal societies as well as the barriers to monopolies and state sponsored capitalism of
market economies.
Philippe Le Corre
discussed
Chi a’s
engagement in Europe, which has been characterized by a mix of
offering opportunity and approaching the region strategically. Chinese policies have undermined
European unity and revived old authoritarian alliances, for example between Eastern European
ou tries a d states i the for er So iet U io . The EU’s respo se has ee to a e Chi a a s ste i
rival based on the experience that China undermines European liberal political and economic values, but
we have yet to see if the EU can push back at Chinese influence. China has built power bases in
European countries by means of economic investments and strategic political thinking. It is playing a
long strategic game that plays into nor
ati e ele e ts of Europe’s
history that have been neglected by
the EU. For e a ple, Chi a plugs i to Gree e’s i ilizatio al histor a d Portugal’s i perial past.
Patrick Cronin
dis ussed Southeast a d East Asia’s respo se to Chi a’s illi eralis , poi ting
out that
Ho g Ko g’s future a ilit to preser e its de o ra a d hu a rights is a lit us test of the resilie e
and long-ter
stre gth of Chi a’s authoritaria is . I Ho g Ko g, the streets ha e o a ta ti al
victory, but Taiwan demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party succeeds in subversing liberal
democracy, utilizing its openness and transparency. Northeast and Southeast Asian countries do not
are a out Chi a’s illi eralis .
However, they are interested in a rules-based order because this will
benefit the weaker powers at a time of growing Chinese influence.
The are orried a out Chi a’s
 URU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 186: Endelig arbejdsrapport m.m. fra dansk sekunderet forsker ved Hudson Institute
power, but they do not wish to confront China themselves and are instead expecting the United States
to do that job. The Southeast Asian countries are too small to stand up to China, but a big democracy
like Japa is also relu ta t to talk a out Chi a’s illi eralis . The pro le is the U ited States has trou le
finding assistance in confronting China. At the same time, China provides much needed public goods and
investments in East and Southeast Asia. We sometimes overlook opportunities for partnering up with
countries because we conflate populist tendencies with authoritarianism. Our attitude towards the
Philippines is a good example. Indonesia is also a promising partner we overlook, although it is a
democracy with a very independent China policy and considerable influence in Asia.
Evan Feigenbaum
discussed China’s
e erge e i the li eral order, poi ting
out that China is a
revisionist but not a revolutionary power. China accepts the forms of liberal order such as the
institutions, but not the norms of liberal order. China is born into an Asian region where historical
memory and nationalism rather than ideology drives international relations and foreign policy. For
example, Chinese ideas on territorial unity and sovereignty come from this experience and not from
communism. As a result, these characteristics would remain part of Chinese policies even if the Chinese
Communist Party no longer ruled China. Foreign policy traditionalism is more important than
o
u is i Chi a’s i ter atio al relatio s.
Some of the Chinese policies that we criticize are features
of numerous liberal societies. For example, state-owned enterprises are wide-spread in liberal
democracies. The problem with the Chinese ones is that they are run by the Chinese Communist Party.
When looking at Asia it becomes clear that liberal institutions are not as entrenched as we think, and it
is quite difficult for liberal powers to get a foothold that consolidates liberal principles. However, China
does not provide an alternative model. Instead, China provides economic and social incentives that
result in arrangements that sidestep liberal norms.