Erhvervs-, Vækst- og Eksportudvalget 2018-19 (1. samling)
ERU Alm.del Bilag 22
Offentligt
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Personen ønsker at være anonym (Finanstilsynet kender personens identitet).
Jeg har med interesse læst, at tilsynet søger synspunkter i forhold til generelle corporate governance
spørgsmål. Der er opstillet to spørgsmål:
Er der behov for andre corporate governance-tiltag i den finansielle sektor? Hvis ja, hvilke? Ja skift til, at
hver bank/pensionsselskab skal tegne en forsikring der dækker bestyrelse og ledelse.
Stop alle de reguleringer der ikke er til gavn for andre end de jurister og økonomer der ansættes i kontrol
funktionerne. Det er ikke til gavn for nogen, bremser mulig forretningsudvikling fordi det binder alle udvik
lingsressourcer til lovreguleringsopgaver, og det giver ekstra omkostninger til kunderne.
Stop at det er staten der i sidste ende skal garanter sektoren Det vil give en helt anden ledelse, og gøre
“kollektivet” fri. Finanssektoren vil dermed ligestilles med den Øvrige private sektor, hvilket måske også vi
give et helt andet syn på at en bank er et A/S og dermed sat i verden for at tjene penge til aktionærerne.
Det bliver mere “ærligt” på den måde.
Er det muligt, at styrke virksomhedernes governance med andre tiltag end regulatori- ske? Hvis ja, hvilke?
Nej der vil altid være brodne kar, og uanset hvor mange regler der stilles op, vil der være områder man
ikke får dækket af. Vi har brug for et mere aktivt tilsyn, der kan vejlede og være med til at sikre sund udvik
ling, fremfor at komme som revisorer med den løftede pegefinger i 11 time inden boet skal gøres op. Tilsy
nets ansatte skal være “gamle rotter” fra faget, de ved hvor de skal lede, hvad de skal lede efter og hvor
dan. Dermed sikres et retvisende billede af sektoren.
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Jeg har arbejdet i branchen siden 1981 dvs. har været med fra de første bankkrak i 80’erne til nu. Jeg har
set hvordan sektoren har ændret sig markant i den tid, indenfor alle områder.
Ingen tvivl om at forandring er nødvendigt, og jeg er bestemt tilhænger af udvikling. Hvad der dog undrer
mig er det skift i kompetencer der er sket i perioden, et skift, jeg oplever som en af kerneudfordringerne i
branchen. Tidligere tiders “ordentlighed” er afløst af share holder value og da vi ikke i vores velfærdsstat
kan tåle at nogen lider tab, hvis/når det går galt, har vi sikret at alle i meget stort omfang er garanteret af
fællesskabt. I realiteten er det derfor stort set uden konsekvens for ledelsen at køre en
bank/pensionsselskab i sænk. “ingen kvaler, naboen betaler”. Det er dybt usundt, og utænkeligt i alle an
dre brancher.
Tidligere var det “normalen” at den Øverste ledelse havde faguddannelse, og at den øverste ledelse havde
“gået hele vejen” om man så kan sige. Bankuddannelsen var grundig, præget af ordentlighed og respekt for
rådgivning om spørgsmål, der har stor indflydelse på kundernes muligheder og liv. Med afsæt i en meget
grundig grunduddannelse blev man enten “ali round filial” medarbejder, eller man specialiserede sig inden
for forskellige emner som fx. kredit, pension, erhverv. Naturligvis var der også akademikere ansat i hoved
kontorsfunktioner, som fx. jurister og Økonomer der stod for datidens compliance og økonomi/regnskab.
Men det var ikke dem der fik det sidste ord.
Fordelingen var måske 80/20 da jeg begyndte i branchen, dvs. 80 % faguddannede og 20 % akademikere. i
dag er min påstand, at det er omvendt, det er mere reglen end undtagelsen at møde bankledelse rødder fra
en bankfilial, og brancheuddannelsen. Der ledes gennem power point, på baggrund af enorme mængde
dataanalyser, med afsæt i enten en universitetsuddanelse eller en CBS grad. Ikke at der er noget galt med
disse uddannelser, vi har brug for dem, udfordringen i forhold til ledelse af en bank/pensionsselskab er dog,
at virkeligheden som regel ikke passer ind i teorierne. Det betyder, at den sunde fornuft ikke længere fyl
der, og der ikke længere er samme føling med hvad der sker på “gulvet”. Viden om kerneforretningen op
nået gennem egen erfaring, er derfor ikke længere tilstede blandt ledergrupperne. Jagten på indtjeningen
til aktionærerne har taget førerpladsen, hvilket betyder at banker/pensionsselskaber ikke længere er rådgi
vere idag er de sælgere med hårde KPI’ere og skarp opfølgning. Sådan er virkeligheden for et A/S vi bry
der os blot ikke om det når det er en bank det er meget få der accepterer at penge er en vare der har en
pris, på lige fod med brødet hos bageren. Derfor min tanke om forsikring fremfor tilsyn og regningen til
fællesskabet.
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ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Finanstilsynet
[email protected]
Vodvaron
Erc.cj
Ansvadi
Fremtid
Høringssvor til Finanstilsynets diskussionspapir af 22maj 2017
Fit & Proper-reglerne og klimarelaterede finansielle risici
1oste port E, asal
DK-toooAarhusC
Tel
+
86 6
0444
wwwvedk
www.ansiarlrqfremttd.dk
D 3.juIi
2017
R LatsJeflsen
E
Ije(ve.dk
Vi vil gerne takke for muligheden for at komme med synspunkter i forhold til Finanstilsynets
diskussionspapir omkring Fit & Proper-reglerne. Det er positivt at der åbnes bredt op for
synspunkter i forhold til en videreudvikling af det relevante tilsyn. Vores hovedsynspunkt
er
uændret
i
forhold til vort brev til Erhvervsministeren af 4. januar 2017, at lovgivning
om
klimarelaterede risici bør implementeres med tilstrækkeligt tilsyn i Danmark.
Generel baggrund
Baggrunden for vore synspunkter er vores erfaringer fra de seneste fire års arbejde med
at
rejse pensionsopspareres bekymring for, at pensionskasser og -selskaber ikke tilstrækkeligt
tog hensyn til klimarelaterede risici i forvaltningen af deres pensionsopsparing.
Da Finanstilsynets diskussionspapir flere steder refererer til britisk regulering har vi spurgt
advokater hos ClientEarth’s Londonkontor om baggrundsinformation. ClientEarth har en
generel juridisk interesse i klimaregulering herunder hvordan dette adresseres i finansiel
regulering. Information fra et internt arbejdsdokument fra ClientEarth har informeret nogle
afsynspunkterne udtrykt i dette høringssvar. ClientEarth har en interesse i udviklingen
dette område i Europa, som relevante anledninger viser sig.
Vi har desuden forespurgt hos Sarah Barker fra det australske advokatfirma MinterEllison,
da hun er kendt som en global juridisk kapacitet i forhold til juridisk ansvar i forbindelse
med klimarelaterede finansielle risici. Vi vedlægger en række juridiske notater, som
Mintertllison har offentliggjort i denne forbindelse.
Globalt kan meget af det nuværende arbejde med klimarelaterede finansielle risici
føres
tilbage til en rapport, der blev udgivet i 2011 af aktører i Londons finansmiljø. I rapporten
sammenlignes klimarelaterede finansielle risici (dengang kaldet “kulstofboblen”) med
dot.com-boblen omkring 2000 og kreditboblen omkring 2008:
“ln the past decade investors have suffered considerable value destruction following the
mispricing exhibited in the dot.com boom and the more recent credit crunch. The carbon
bubble could be equally serious for institutional investors including pension beneficiaries
and the value lost would be permanent.”1
-
Denne rapport fra 2011 har givet anledning til meget forskelligartet aktivitet siden fra
kreativt kunsteriske divestmentkampagner, der refererer til rapportens data, men ikke
dens
anbefalinger til tilsynsmyndigheder, til højtkvalificeret finansielt analysearbejde som de
Rapport Carbonlracker Initiative
2011.
http://www.carbontracker.org/wp
content/uploads/2014/09/Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2-1. pdf
tilgået. 30.6.17
Side 1
Leaton, James: Unburnable Cotton —Are the world’s financial mørkets
corrylny
o
carbon bubble?
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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netop offentliggjorde TFCD anbefalinger2. Det har dog endnu ikke givet anledning til
internationalt orienteret videnskabelig forskning inden for det erhvervsøkonomiske felt
finansiering.3 Dette er så påfaldende, at tidsskriftet Climatic Change, hvis redaktør prof.
Michael Oppenheimer også var en koordinerende lead author for den nyeste statusrapp
ort
fra FNs klimapanel, for nyligt har publiceret forskning herom4.
1. Overordnede synspunkter
1. Virksomhedens ansvar ift. klimarelaterede finansielle risici bør placeres eksplicit.
Det er vort klare synspunkt, at ansvaret for klimarelaterede finansielle risici bør fremgå
udtrykkeligt og eksplicit af en opdateret dansk fit&proper-regelsæt, for alle typer af
finansielle virksomheder. Vi ser dette som en naturlig erhvervsmæssig implementering af
Regeringens politik om, at Danmark nationalt skal bidrage til indfrielse af den ambitiøse
målsætning i Klimaaftalen fra Paris.
2. Scenarieanalyse kan benyttes
i
forbindelse med klimarelaterede finansielle risici.
Uagtet hvilken politisk holdning man måtte have til klimavidenskaben, divestmentkam
pagner eller brændselsfrie energiteknologiers evne til kommercielt at udkonkurrere
brændselsbaserede, så kan klimarelaterede finansielle risici fagligt benyttes som et muligt
scenarium i evaluering af eksisterende og evt, reviderede fit&proper-regler. Et sådant
scenarie kunne fx være at der 2022 sker en væsentlig realisering af klimarelaterede
finansielle risici i den globale finansielle sektor.5
Rimeligvis må det være et kriterie for velfungerende fit&proper-regler, at de forebygg
er, at
et sådant scenarie påvirker danskerne og det danske finansielle system negativt. Dette
kan
evt, også betyde hvis man mener, at det at have et ansvar indebærer, at et ansvar skal
kunne gøres gældende at det skal sikres at et ansvar skal kunne placeres, hvis der alligevel
indtræder negativ påvirkning af danskerne og det danske finansielle system, som
følge af,
at ansvaret ift. klimarelaterede finansielle risici ikke er blevet løftet.
2. Synspunkter om klïmarelaterede finansielle risici i forhold til
enkeltafsnit i diskussionpapiret
2.2 Detaljeret kortlægning af kompetencer og ansvar ift. klimarelaterede
finansielle risici
(jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.2). Tommelfingerreglen: “Det der bliver målt bliver gjort”
må formodes at gælde her som i så mange andre sammenhænge. At få kortiagt hvilke
ansvarsområder, der findes i forhold til forskellige risici herunder navnlig klimarelaterede
finansielle risici må formodes at styrke fokus på at disse bliver håndteret.
Hvor ansvaret for klimarelaterede finansielle risici bør beskrives udtrykkeligt i en
kortlægning af ansvaret og det bør sikres at den, der har dette ansvar, har relevante
kvalifikationer til behandle klimarelaterede finansielle risici inden for sin
risikohåndteringsfaglighed. Det kan her bemærkes at for fx forsikringsselskaber påvirker
2
aktiver? Betydningen af et begrænset carbonbudget for værdien af kul-, olie- og gasselska
ber”,
Finans/In vest
(5)2015 p. 30-37
Diaz-Rainey, I., Robertson, B. & Wilson, C.: “Stranded research? Leading finance journals
are
silent on climate change”
Cilmatic Change
(2017) 143: 243. doi:10.1007/s10584-017-1985-1
Den tekniske supplementsrapport fra TCFD konkretiserer brugen af scenarier yderligere.
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-technical-supplement/ tilgået 30.6.17
https:J/www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-recommendations-report/ tilgået 30.6.17
I
den danske litteratur findes denne
artikel: Jensen, Lars N. (2015): “Bør der regnes
p strandede
Side 2
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klimarelaterede finansielle risici påvirker både aktiv- og passivside. Der bør være et samlet
ansvar for behandlingen af klimarelaterede risici på både aktiv- og passivside. Såfremt der
benyttes forskellige antagelser på aktiv og passivside må kortlægningen vise, hvem der har
ansvar for at der benyttes et forsigtighedsprincip i disse antagelser.
Det kan evt, overvejes om kompetencegivende efteruddannelsesforløb kan være relevante
i
denne sammenhæng, hvor også kursusbeskrivelser kan hjælpe med at definere hvilket
kompetenceniveau der forventes for at varetage ansvaret med klimarelaterede finansielle
risici.
(jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.3) Ud fra de britiske erfaringer kan det synes relevant
allerede på interviewstadiet at forholde sig til opmærksomheden på klimarelaterede
finansielle risici.
(jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.5) Det kan endvidende synes relevant at føre løbende tilsyn
med at tidligere godkendte personer fastholder deres fit&proper-niveau i forhold til
klimarelaterede finansielle risici, som det kendes fra andre ansvarsfyldte erhverv som fx
piloter.
(jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.7)
I den globale juridiske debat om klimarelaterede finansielle risici citeres Graeme Samuel
den tidligere leder af the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission af og til for at
skulle have sagt: ‘Nothing focuses the mmd like the spectre of personal liability’
Nogle vil muligvis mene, at diskussionspapiret rummer en selvmodsigelse, når der skrives at
risikoen for strafansvar vil gøre det vanskeligt at tiltrække kvalificerede
ledelsesmedlemmer, i hvert fald hvis der med kvalificeret menes en person som
samvittighedsfuldt og kompetent sikrer at virksomheden håndterer sine klimarelaterede
finansielle risici. Hvis personer, der ikke har til hensigt at samvittighedsfuldt og kompetent
at håndtere sådanne risici måtte vælge at søge til mindre regulerede brancher, hvor der er
mindre mulighed for at påføre skade på danskernes penge og det danske finansielle system,
så må dette vel anses for ønskværdigt ud fra et samfundsmæssigt perspektiv.
Hvis man som et fiktivt eksempel forestillede sig, at en bestyrelsesformand på en general
forsamling i sin beretning udtrykkeligt sagde: “Loven kræver, at vi som bestyrelse har pligt
til at passe på jeres penge. Vi traf dog på det første bestyrelsesmøde efter vi blev valgt en
beslutning om at ignorere den lovgivning. Som konsekvens af den beslutning er jeres penge
nu væk.” I dette tilfælde vil en almindelig retsintuition sige, at det bør være muligt at gøre
et ansvar gældende.
Retspraksis synes dog at indikere, at domstolene inden for den gældende regulering har
ganske svært ved at skelne mellem et uheldigt udfald inden for en almindeligt fornuftigt
udfaldsrum (som næppe bør føre til sanktion) og beslutninger, der indebærer udfaldsrum
der rummer uansvarligt negative udfald (som måske nærmere bør føre til sanktion). Det
kan derfor synes relevant at arbejde videre i retning af objektive kvantitative kriterier, der
kan hjælpe domstolene med at identificere de sidstnævnte typer tilfælde. Måske kunne det
indebære at reguleringen skulle angive at et signifikansniveau i en identificeret relevant
statistisk test på virksomheden data skal tolkes som et bevis ud over enhver rimelig tvivl.
En sådan regulering kunne evt. kalibreres på sager fra dotcomboblen og kreditboblen, og
fremadrettet indikere den acceptable risiko i forhold til klimarelaterede finansielle risici.
Politisk bør en sådan kalibrering reflektere Regeringens politik om, at Danmark nationalt
skal bidrage til indfrielse af den ambitiøse målsætning i Klimaaftalen fra Paris.
2.7 Ansvar i forbindelse med klimarelaterede finansielle risici
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2.1 Medlemsindflydelse og kompetencer i ledelsen
(jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.;) “Bør medlemmernes indflydelse udøves gennem et
repræsentantskab?” er et spørgsmål tilsynet stiller. Hvis alternativet er direkte medlems
indflydelse på en generalforsamling er svaret nej.
Generelt er det et stort problem, at danskerne ikke interesserer sig nok for deres pension.
Hvis den begrænsede interesse der er derefter skal via et repræsentantskab vil det gøre
signalerne til ledelserne fra medlemmerne endnu svagere. Hvis en direkte dialog med
medlemmerne opleves som ubehagelig af ledelsen kan det jo netop være udtryk for at den
har haft elementer af det group think, som tilsynet ellers (jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.5)
foreslår at løse med antropologer, adfærdspsykologer eller lignende. Disse udmærkede
fagligheder har imidlertid ikke hånden på kogepladen som medlemmerne har. Der findes
eksempler på medlemsejede både forsynings- og forsikringsselskaber, hvor medlemsind
flydelsen og -kontrollen via repræsentantskaber er blevet så svag, at betegnelsen “herre
løse penge” er passende, og hvor der som følge heraf synes at have fundet værdidestruk
tion sted.
Det kan ikke udelukkende at en ufokuseret værdidestruerende ledelse, hvis en sådan måtte
findes, vil have lettere ved at sove i fred, hvis den på en retorik om kompetence via et
repræsentantskab undgår kritiske spørgsmål fra medlemmerne. At der kan være behov for
at styrke myndighedernes tilsyn bør ikke være et argument for at svække medlemmernes
tilsyn, tværtimod.
Det er vigtigt at udtrykkeligt sikre kompetencer i forhold til klimarelaterede finansielle risici
som en nødvendig faglig kompetence blandt de økonomisk faglige bestyrelsesmedelmmer.
Medlemsvalgte bestyrelsesmedlemmer kan supplere økonomisk faglige bestyrelses
medlemmer i forhold moral, sund fornuft, ejerforankring og bredere samfundsinteresser.
2.8 Corporate governance generelt
(jf. diskussionspapirets afsnit 2.8) For at undgå misforståelser er det væsentligt at påpege at
klimarelaterede finansielle risici hører hjemme inden for betragtninger om det risikojuste
rede afkast. Det er således separat fra de ESG-spørgsmål som blandt andet reguleres af UN
Guilding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Direktivet om ikke-finansiel rapporte
ring, ÅRL §99a mv. De klimarelaterede finansielle risici kan dog mindskes ved at sikre at
ejede selskaber ikke benytter kontanter til at bygge ny infrastruktur til udvinding og
transport af fossile brændsier. Nogle har det synspunkt at aktivt ejerskab kan stoppe en
sådan brug af ejernes kontanter.
Jf. afsnittet ovenfor om medlemsindflydelse gør et stærkt medlems-/ejerdemokrati med
direkte medlemsindflydende på en generalforsamling (dvs, ikke via et repræsentantskab) et
andet tiltag til at styrke virksomhedens governance end et regulatorisk tiltag. Det har vist
sig også at kunne nå visse resultater, når det gælder klimarelaterede finansielle risici.
Hvis relevant står vi gerne til rådighed for yderligere dialog
i
forhold til ovennævnte. Ellers
er det vort håb, at disse betragtninger i sig selv kan bidrage til at sikre, at finansielle
virksomheder ledes af tilstrækkeligt egnede og hæderlige personer, også når det gælder
håndteringen af klimarelaterede finansielle risici.
Med venlig hilsen
Thomas Meinert Larsen, talsmand AnsvarligFremtid
Lars Jensen Senioranalytiker, VedvarendeEnergi
Side 4
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Bank of England eyeballs the financial sector
on climate risk
Sarah Barker (Special Counse4 Melbourne) and Maged Girgis (Partner, Sydney) analyse the impact of
recent regulatory developments on cilmate change risk management and disciosure for Australian
financial services sector participants.
2017
a step-change in climate risk integration and disciosure?
Even before we have reached its mid-point, 2017 is shaping up as a watershed year for the management
and disciosure of financial tisks associated with climate change. The first 6 months of this year have seen
the following significant deveiopments:
in January, the World Economic Fowm’s annual Global Risks Report rated four risks associated
with cilmate change Çextreme weather events’, man-made environmental disasters’, ‘natural
disasters and ‘a failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation’) within the top 10 risks to the
global economy (see here).
In February, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA)
signalied a significant shift in
its position on the relevance of climate change risk to the financial sector. In a speech entitled
‘Australia’s New Horizon: Cllmate Change Challenges & Prudential Risk’, APRA Board Member
Geoft Summerhayes made clear that ali APRA-regulated entities must recognise that climate
change has evolved from a non-financial’ issue to one that presents foreseeable and material
financial risks. Moreover, Mr Summethayes emphasised that a failure to do so may expose
directors of asset owners, asset managers, banks and insurers to a clalm they have breached
their duties (see our Alen here).
in March, the world’s largest investor, BlackRock (with assets under management of US$5.1
trillion) issued its 2017-2018 Engagement Priorities including
climate risk disciosure in
accordance with the Recommendations of the G20 Financial Stability Boards Bloomberg
Taskforce on Climate-reiated Financial Disclosures(draft recommendations here, with the final
recommendations to be presented to the G20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany in July). This was
followed by specific guidance on BlackRock’s intended engagement with investee companies on
climate risk, including a ciear warning that it will vote against management
and the re-election
of directors if they fail to constructively engage with this issue (see our Alert here).
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In April, the Australian Senate Economics Refetences Commiffee issued its report of the lnquiry
into Carbon Risk Disclosure in Australia (Carbon Risk: A Burning lssue’). The report included
strong recommendations that both the Australian Securities & lnvestments Commission and ASX
provide further guidance to corporations and their directors on the disciosure of the financial risks
associated with climate change (here).
In May, the majority of shareholders in the world’s largest listed energy corporation, ExxonMobil,
voted against management to instead support a resolution requiring the company to assess and
disclose the risk to its financial performance and prospects associated with climate change (see
for example the Proxy Vote Bulietin issued by BlackRock here).
And now, in June, the Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority has released a document
entitled ‘The Bank of England Response to Climate Change’
MEl 393005691
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While each of these developments are significant in their own right, the report issued by the Bank
of
England Prudential Regulation Authority in June is particularly noteworthy.
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority announces examination of banking sector
elimate risk exposures
Following its seminal report into the lmpact of Climate Change on the lnsurance Sector in Septembe
r
2075
the Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority has now served notice of ts intention to
examine the impacts of climate change on ali financial sector participants, and to financial stability
more
broadly. In a report entitled The Bank of England Response to Climate Change’ (the Report)
the Bank
emphasized two primary channels by which climate change may impact upon monetary and financial
stability:
Physical risks climate and weather-related events, such as droughts, floods and storms, and
sea-level rise. This includes both the direct impacts of such events, and secondary
consequences such as the disruption of global supply chains. The Bank warned that these
impacts may undermine financial stability, both directly and indirectly from higher insurance
claims, portfolio losses, sentiment shocks and defaults on loans, through to system-wide impacts
such as economic disruption, lower productivity, and increasing sovereign default risk.
Economic transition risks are the financial risks which can result from the process of
adjustment towards a lower-carbon economy. The Bank cautioned that changes in climate policy,
technology or market sentiment could prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of
assets, and indeed cause sharp changes in valuations (or ‘stranded assets’). The speed at which
such re-pricing occurs is uncertain but could impact on financial stability via changes to the value
of investment portfolios or bank balance sheets through reduced collateral values, or by affecting
business models of borrowers. The financial risk from an abrupt transition to a lower-carbon
economy may increase if portfolios are flot aligned with climate targets. The Bank warned that
this implies the reallocation of tens of trillions of dollars of investments’.
-
The Report also noted the Bank’s continued monitoring of a second-order risk that of litigation
arising
from the failure to effectively manage these physical and economic transition risks.
The Report articulated the Bank’s dual-track response to these risks:
• first, by firm-level research and engagement in the insurance and banking sectors; and
second, by working to enhance financial system resilience by supporting an orderly market
transition to a low carbon economy. In doing so, the Bank is giving specific emphasis to the
Recommendations of the Michael Bloomberg-led taskforce of the G20 Financial Stability Board:
the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (above).
How do the cautions from the Bank of England’s report resonate in Australia?
The Bank of England’s report contains prescient warnings for Australian financial sector participan
ts.
First, ‘stranded asset’ risk exposure is particularly relevant to an economy whose stock exchange
is
dominated by companies in the mining, energy and financial services sectors. This was brought
into
sharp focus by a recent report by S&P Dow Jones, BarometerofFinancial Matkets’ Carbon Efficienc
y
(b)
that rated the ASX5O as having the greatest stranded asset risk exposure of any major
international share index. This comes at a time when Australian banks are already facing pressure
on
their long-term credit ratings, with agency concerns over the susceptibility of their credit profiles
to
adverse shock.
Secondly, the Bank of England’s report follows an explicit statement of expectation by our own prudentia
l
regulator, APRA, that the integration and disclosure of the financial risks associated with climate
change
is necessary to discharge the duty of due care and diligence by directors of financial services
corporations (above).
For these reasons alone, any corporation in the Australian financial services sector should consider
the
Bank of England’s report as part of its broader analysis of climate risks on its financial performa
nce and
prospects.
MnterEIlison
I
CommerciaI-n-Confldence
MEl 39300569_I
Page 2
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0008.png
I
So what to do? Leading international expertise and next steps
So what do these developments mean for the corporate governance, risk management and disclosur
e in
the Australian financial services sector?
In short, it is now beyond doubt that cilmate change cannot be consigned to a corporate compliance,
public relations or niche social interest’ silo. Its impact on balance sheet items and forward-looking
risk
and strategy must be reconsidered, in an integrated manner, in the light of contemporary economic
realities. This is critical not only for directors, who sign-off on both financial accounts and narrative
managerial statements, but accounting and risk advisors.
MinterEllison has been at the forefront of thought leadership in this area and is unique amongst
ts peers
in viewing climate change through a corporations and securities law ens (rather than an environmental’
lens), for a number of years. lnsights from investment market partners, and our work with institution
s
ranging from the Bank of England and European Union to the UNEP Financial Initiative have provided
our
financial services clients with tools to efficiently integrate cilmate risk management into corporate
governance and strategy. It is expertise that we would be pleased to share as you consider the
practical
implications of these developments for your organisation’s corporate governance and risk managem
ent.
Please do not hesitate to contact Sarah Barker (Special Counsel, Corporate, Melbourne) or Maged
Girgis
(Partner, Financial Services, Sydney) (below) if we can assist.
Maged Girgis
Partner
Sydney
1+61 2 9921 4410
£ [email protected]
Sarah Barker
Special Counsel
Melbourne
1+613 8608 2168
E [email protected]
MinterEllison CommerciaI-in-Confdence
ME_I 39300569_I
Page 3
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0009.png
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1955659_0010.png
3/7/2017
Why is APRAs position on climate change risk ali over the papers? And how should we respond?
i
I
Why is APRA’s position on climate change risk ali
over the papers? And how should we respond?
Dear First Name
As has been heavily covered in the financial press, there has been a significant shift
in
APRÄs position on the televance of climate change risk to the financial sector. In recent
a
keynote speech to the Insurance Council of Austraha entitied
‘Australla’s New Horizon:
Cilmate Change Challenges & Prudential Risk’,
Mr Geoff Summerhayes (Executive
Board
Member of APRA) stated:
APRA-reguiated entities can no longer treat climate change as ‘non-financiat
issue, or one that wit only crystailise in the distant future. Associated risks extend
far beyond the physical (ecological) realm to economic transition risks fregulatory.
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different scenarios, and over different time horizons. This inciudes the sub-2C
transition scenario around which the Paris Agreement (ratified by Austraha in
November 2016) is anchored. The Recommendations of the G20 Financial
Stability Board’s Taskforce on Ciimate-related Financial Disclosures
fTCFD),
reieased on 14 December 2016, provide ciear guidance in this regard.
• A failure to proactively govern the financial risks associated with climate change,
flow, can present significant litigation exposures for corporations and their
directors.
investors increasingly expect corporations to appiy a sophisticated and robust
approach to modeting of the potential impacts of climate-related risks under
technoiogical and societal). Many of these risks are financial in nature, foreseeab
le
and material and are actionable now by Australian banks, insurers, asset owners
and asset managers.
Ifl dealing with these risks,
scenario planning is the new norm
at. Markets and
Implications and next steps
Mr Summerhayes’ statement is the first by an Austrahan corporate or prudential regulator
to cleariy position climate change as a materiai financial risk. But whilst it may signal
a
significant shift in domestic prudential practice, in reality it merely more closeiy aligns
our
regulatory environment with that of other corporate or prudential regulators, treasuries
and
stock exchanges around the world.
For a number of years, MinterEflison has been at the forefront of thought ieadership
in this
area and is unique amongst our commerciai iaw peers in viewing the risks associate
d with
climate change as 0 corporate and securities law (rather than ‘environmentai’)
isue.
MinterEiiison has extensively advised clients institutions from the Bank of England
and
European Union to the UNEP Financiai lnitiative across the flnanciai services sector
on
integrating climate risk management into corporate governance and strategy. it
is
expertise that we would be pleased to share as you consider the practicai implicatio
ns of
this shift in APRA policy for your organisation’s corporate governance and risk
management.
The fut transcript of Mr Summerhayes speech is available here. You will also find
below
links to a selection of the Alerts that MinterEtison has published on corporate
governance
issues associated with climate risk in recent years.
(a) lnstitutionai lnvestment, Corporate Governance and Cllmate Change: What
Is a
http://www.mintereilison.com/SnapshotFiles/80443621-2b2f-49f6-b2da-671 bBed52f8O/Subscriber.snap
shot
1/2
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0011.png
3/7/2017
point for institutionai investors? (here)
(c) Ciimate change beyond property damage: Prudential Regulation Authority Report
emphasises appiled risks for the insurance sector (here)
Why is APRAs position on climate change risk ali over the papers? And how should we respond9
Tmstee To Do? (available here)
(b) From ethical crusade to financial mainstream: is cilmate change reaching a tipping
(d) A new
COP
on the beat heightened expectations for corporate sustainabitty
governance and disciosure (here)
fe) Straining at the Floodgates International Developments in Climate Risk Disclosure &
Litigation (here)
We have also prepared a briefing paper on APRA’S new approach to cilmate risk
governance that you may find useful to circulate to your board and executives. We would
be pleased to provide that briefing paper upon your request. Please do not hesitate to
contact us If we can assist.
Sarah 8arker
Special Counsel
T +61 3 8608 2928
email me read my bio
Maged Girgis
Partner
T +61 29921 4410
email me read my bio
deveiopments, firm news, and invitations to events and legal briefings that may be of interest to
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sought before applying
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3/7/2017
Institutional investment, corporate governance and climate change: what is a trustee to do? Publications Be Informed
MinterEllison
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Be Inforrned
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Publications
Institutional investment, corporate governance and climate
change: what is a trustee to do?
27 January 2015
Recent publicity surrounding the exclusion or divestiture of stocks in carbon-intensive
industries shows that leading investors are reviewing the financial risks (and
opportunities) associated with climate change. However, with debate on cllmate change
often pitched around ideological poles, many superannuation fund trustees are
struggling to translate these developments into prudent governance practice, consistent
with their statutory and general law duties. This articie boks beyond the politicab debate
to consider what recent developments on climate change mean for the legal obligations
of fund trustees, and the implications for boardroom practice. In doing so, they note that
focus on the outcomes of investment (or divestment) decisions may have obscured the
key legal issue that of diligent process.
contacts
Maged Girgis
Sarah
Barker
Related Services
comorate
COmPehOfl and Market
Fonds Management
Superannuation
Related Industries
FinanaI Seroces
Change
is
occurring,
in
two
contexts: science and
economics
Institutional stakeholder viewpoint
The relationship between climate change issues and financial wealth continues to
rapidly, and radically, evolve.
Historically, climate change was often regarded as an ethical issue for investors a
‘non-financial environmental externality’ that was secondary to, and largely inconsistent
with, the investment imperative to maximise financial returns.
Over the past decade, more funds have applied an integrated Environmental, Social
and Governance fESG) approach in which ‘responsible’ investment practices have
been applied to generate both positive external outcomes and benchmark financial
returns.
More recently, however, the financial risks and opportunities presented by climate
change have become a mainstream issue for the investment community. Debates over
‘stranded asset’ exposures (eg the MF, OECD, WorldBank)and asset divestitures play
out in the financial press. Recognised economic and financial institutions warn of the
significant economic consequences of climate change. And, globally, we are witnessing
a surge in political and regulatory interventions in an attempt to deal with climate
change and the resulting community concerns.
These developments ilbustrate that, increasingly, market stakeholders view the financial
risks (and opportunities) associated with climate change as extending beyond its
potential physical impacts, toencompass market, reputational and legal issues, such as:
• community and reputational risk which can quickly and significantly affect
investment value (take for example, the speed and impact of the anti-coal seam gas
campaign in NSW)
• litigation against investee companies for first or third party damage (eg. damage to
third parties due to a firm’s failure to adapt to climate change tisks, or damage to
company itself via shareholder derivative action due to cosUloss of value from the
failure to adapt)
• new laws or policy devebopments that may result in rapid re-pricing of assets (eg.
intergovernmental agreements on emissions restrictions)
-
closure or restriction of markets (eg. Chinese Government’s tariff
on Austrabian
thermal and coking coal (later revoked upon settlement of the FTA))
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• technology quickly developing towards lower carbon emissions (eg. developments in
battery storage technology, rapid uptake of distributed energy solutions particularly
in emerging markets, rapid uptake of electric vehicles)
• relative cost competitiveness between fossil and renewable energy sources
• oil and gas price fluctuations (eg. high prices impacting on the relative cost
competitiveness of alternatives such as electric vehicles, low prices reducing the
viability of capex an unconventional fossil fuel reserves such as oil tar sands, shale
fracking)
• inaccurate business modelling of medium to long term projects (eg. unrealistically
low internal price on carbon)
• maladaptive short-term strategies, ie. investments that may deliver short-term
economic gains but exacerbate vulnerability to potential climate change related
issues in the medium-long term (eg. locking in capital-intensive infrastructure in a
carbon-intensive business, ignoring ‘stranded asset’ risks)
• exploiting opportunities to increase market value across asset classes (eg. active
engagement with investee companies around climate change exposures and
strategies, recognition of market value perceptians around energy-efficiency for real
estate / infrastructure, lowet costs of capital and insurance).
Institutional investment, corporate governance and climate change: what is a trustee to do? Publicatio
ns Be Informed MinterEllison
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Many of these factors are driven by evolving societal, governmental and market
perceptions which go beyond the potential physical impacts of climate change.
However, irrespective of their saurce, these factors present both material financial risks
and oppartunities, which must be actively considered in the pursuit of wealth-based
interests.
Developments
ifl
governance Iaw
The last few years have also seen the legislature, regulators and the courts hold
directars and trustees to higher standards of professionalism and pro-activity to satisfy
their duties of due care, skill and diligence.
The Superannuation Industiy Supe,vision Act flow holds trustees to the standard of the
‘prudent superannuation trustee’ rather than merely the ‘ordinary prudent person’.
Further, APRA, ASIC and the ASX continue to revise their guidance on expected
standards of governance. Finally, findings against directors in cases such as Centro
and James Hardie have reinforced the caurts’ view that ‘due care and diligence’
requires directors to be both informed and engaged, and to actively monitor corporate
implementation of strategic plans and policies.
Together, these develapments have the patential to sigfilficantly impact the way in
which trustees and their ditectors approach the governance of their funds. Regardless
of a trustee’s personal, moral ar idealogical views on the reality of climate change, it
simply cannot ignore the financial risks associated with the issue discussed above.
But does this mean that a trustee is now duty-bound to ensure that asset valuations
consider these financial risks? Are they already reflected in market price valuations?
Are the relevant risks measurable with sufficient certainty? Shauld funds exit from
investments in exposed sectors, or is that an over-reaction? What does it mean for
competing pressures around risk talerance, value growth, dividend yield, liquidity and
diversification? When is it ‘material’? And is it really an issue for trustee boards at alI, ar
one that should be left for their cansultants and investment managers?
What
do these developments mean
for
trustees
in practice?
Fiduciary duties
In short, the sharp evalution in the relationship between climate change and financial
wealth suggests that, as with any material financial risk, an inactive, reactive ar passive
approach to its governance may be inadequate to discharge a trustee’s duties of due
cate and diligence in pursuit of the best interests of fund beneficiaries.
It is the process of information gathering and deliberation that is critical to satifying the
duty of due care and diligence. The decision that results from that ptocess, to divest ar
nat to divest, or to exclude ar nat to exclude, is nat the determinative issue. Rather, the
relevant inquiry is whether, in their aversight af fund performance against ts abjectives,
a trustee is apprapriately informed and engaged with relevant risks and apportunities,
has saught expert advice where apprapriate, has applied independent judgment to the
matters at hand, and has constructively evaluated the strategic consequences of
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Institutional investment, cotporate governance and climate change: what is a trustee to do?
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material ssues using methodologies and assumptions that are appropriate for their
forward-looking purpose.
Publications
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Be Informed
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MinterEllison
So what does this mean in the context of climate change issues and the fossil fuel
divestiture debate? lt is not to say that trustees are duty-bound to decarbonise their
portfolios. or that environmental sustainability must be universally prioritised. Nor does
it suggest that trustees of open’ funds must reconsider the nature of their fund
beneficiaries’ collective ‘best interests’ and extend them to incorporate external, ethical,
moral or ideological goals. But it does mean that boards must actively engage with the
impact of these financial risks and opportunities on their portfolios.
On the one hand, a knee-jerk, blanket directive to exclude mining, resource or utility
companies from the investment universe may fall short of minimum standards of
diligence. On the other, so may a governance approach that is entrenched in the denial
or ignorance of the financial risks and opportunities associated with climate change, or
a ‘strategic management’ approach that such risks do flot require action without
regulatory direction.
In practice, there is simply no substitute for trustee engagement with and evaluation of
any economic or strategic issues that may materially affect the performance of their
fund. As demonstrated by recent developments, climate change is increasingly
becoming one such issue.
Misleading disciosure and
reporting
Risks or opportunities associated with climate change also present challenges for
disclosure and reporting obligations. Trustees must ensure that their investment
practices continue to accurately reflect the fund’s stated beliefs, oblectives and public
commitments.
There is a growing disconnect between ideological commitments to ‘sustainability’ and
the investment strategies required to implement them. Over-statement of the
‘responsible’ characteristics of an investment option or policy, or ineffectual policy
implementation, may expose the trustee and directors to claims that they have misled
their fund beneficiaries or the market.
Ttustees are required to consider not only whether their Statement of lnvestment
Beliefs recognises the risks or opportunities of climate change, but also how these
beliefs are implemented. Are they reflected in investment policies, strategies,
mandates, incentive structures and practices? What performance metrics are applied,
measured and evaluated? And how does management, and in turn the board, monitor
processes and performance on point?
A starting point for diligent govemance
Many trustees are overwhelmed by the scale and complexity of the governance
challenge at hand. To simplify the process, a number of preliminary questions can be
asked. The following list is not intended to cover al! aspects of risk under the trustee
and directors’ duties and related obligations, or as a replacement for legal advice in a
particular context. However, trustees may find it useful as a ready reference.
• Have your trustee board, General Counsel and Company Secretary received
specific training on their statutory and fiduciary duties in the light of recent
legislative updates and Court decisions?
=
Do your trustee board, General Counsel, CIO, asset/fund
managers, analysts
and consultants receive up-to-date, specific and appropriately-qua!ified briefings
on the financial risks associated with climate change?
• Has a review been conducted on current portfolio exposures to climate change
risks including emissions profiles and stranded asset risks?
• Does your Statement of Investment Beliefs include a recognition of financial risks
or opportunities associated with cflmate change? How are those lnvestment Beliefs,
or any other public commitments around environmental sustainability,
implemented? How are they reflected in investment policies, mandates, incentive
structures and practices? What hedging options are available? What are the
different implications across fixed income, equities and direct ownership asset
classes? What valuation and performance metrics are applied, measured and
evaluated? And how does the board monitor processes and performance on point?
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Institutional investment, corporate governance and climate change: what is a trustee to do?
-
Publications
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Be Informed
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What does your trustees’ Directors & Officers Insurance policy cover, and
exclude, in the context of governance failures around climate change risks and
opportunities?
MinterEllison
Author(s) Maged Girgis. Sarah Barker
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From ‘ethical crusade’ to financial mainstream
climate change reaching a tipping point for
institutional investors?
22 iUNE 2015
is
Sarah Barker (Special Counsel, Melbourne) and Maged Girgis (Partner, Sydney] report an
international developments that are raising the bar an climate change investment risk management.
Fossil fuel exclusions and financial best interests
The issue of fossil fuel divestiture’ continues to noisily occupy column space in the finandal press.
Confined by word limits, the debate an point is aften simplistic and polar presented as a binary
choice between maximisrng financial returns, and the enviranmental ethics of investing in sectors
with a significant carbon footprint (primarily through the combustion affossil fuels).
Consistent with the binary positioning of the debate, the divestment ar exclusion affossil fuel
related assets by institutional investors has largely been explained by reference to ‘maral’ ar ‘ethical
grounds. For philanthropic foundations and private endowments (such as the high-profile
Rockefeller Foundation), and faith-based or educational institutions fsuch as the Uniting Church in
Australla, Stanford and Oxford Universities) a decision whether to divest ar otherwise can be
relatively straightforward, as the interests oftheir stakeholders are more readily ascertainable. In
contrast, open industry, retail and corporate funds and retail investment houses would have
difficulty substantiating an ethically-based’ divestment ar exclusion in the absence of a clear
mandate in the funds governing rules ar direction from the member corpus, as this may conflict with
obligations to prioritise financial interests.
The potential conflict has been steadily eroded in recent times, with the recognition af the material
financial risks (and opportunities) associated with climate change. Leading mainstream brokers and
advisers such as Citi, Towers Watson, HSBC and Mercer have published reports recognising the risk
of
fossil fuel asset stranding’ due to shifts in emissians regulation and renewables technologies.
Industry funds including HESTA ($29 billion under management see
j) and Local Government
Super t$7.4 billion under management see here) have announced policies to negatively screen
investments in thermal coal (and, for LGS, other ‘high carbon sensitive’ activities such as tar sands
mining and coal-fired electricity generatars) based an the bestfinancial interests of members.
However, no retail ar sovereign wealth funds have follawed suit. Until flow.
Last week, the world’s largest savereign wealth fund, the US$902 billion Narwegian Government
Pension Fund Global, announced that it would divest ar exclude investments in companies who
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themselves or through other operations [that] they control base 30% or more oftheir activities on
coal, and/or derive 30% of their revenues from coal’ (see here).
Simila rly,
French insu rance
giant AXA
announced that it would exclude
‘mining companies deriving over50% oftheirturnoverfrom coal
mining and electric utilities deriving over 50% of their energy from thermal coal plants
(see jjj).
These exclusions policies represent a significant inflection point in the fossil fuel divestiture debate,
with both funds making an express link between climate change and theirfinancial ri5k/returns.
Beyond ‘divestiture’
new norms of engagement
The examples set by AXA and the Norwegians do nat mean that, overnight, funds should adopt a
herd mentality to divest ar exclude assets in carbon-intensive industries. Any such knee-jerk reaction
would itself be inconsistent with trustees’ fiduciary duties. Such a complex issue demands diligent
consideration of both portfolio impacts and treatments (from asset allocations to sectoral tifts,
engagement, hedging and beyond). Many institutional investors have in fact determined, upon due
deliberation, that
it
is not in their beneficiaries’ best financial interests to divest from ar exclude fossil
fuel assets. Often, funds prefer to keep
‘a
seat at the table’, and engage with investee companies on
the relevant commercial risks and opportunities.
However, a decision to engage’ cannot be seen as a passive strategy. The bar on ‘active ownership’
by mainstream investors is being raised, with leading funds have been increasing pressure on both
investee companies and asset managers to proactively manage climate change risks. For example:
• In the current northern hemisphere reporting season, asset owners are engaging with portfolio
companies on the topic of climate change at unprecedented rates. More and more, general
corporate assurances around ‘sustainability’, and plans to incrementally reduce operational
emissions, are failing to satisfy investor demands. A proactive, substantive approach to climate
risk governance is increasingly required with evidence that its implications for medium-long term
strategy have been duly considered and meaningfully disciosed. It is important to remember that
this is not just from ‘ethical’ shareholder activists, but also from mainstream institutional investors
whose concerns remain squarely centred on risk and return. In April and May, special shareholder
resolutians were passed at the AGMs of oil giants Shell, BP and Statoil requiring them to stress test
their forward strategies against potential climate change futures endorsed by the International
Energy Agency. Notably, these resolutions were passed with a resounding majority of 98.3, 99.8
and
99.9%
of the shareholdervote, respectively. In each case, less than
3.5%
of votes were
withheld.
• In the United States, a letter co-signed by more than
60
large institutional investors (representing
USD1.9 trillion in assets under management) has been sent to the Chair and Commissioners of the
Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC) (see here).
The letter expresses concern that oil and gas
companies are not disciosing sufficient information’ about ‘carbon asset risks’1 in their statutory
filings with the SEC and requests the SEC to address these deficiencies in direct correspondence
with the filing companies.
• In addition to the divestiture actions discussed above,
in
recent months two ofthe world’s largest
institutional investors, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund and US$305 billion Californian
pension fund CaIPERS, have announced statements of expectation for portfolio companies
These risks inciude, but are flot limited to, the risk of capital expenditures an high cost unconventional’ oil
and gas projects, increasing global regulation of carbon emissions, and the possibility of reduced global
demand for oil in the medium term.
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fNorway) and external investment managers (CaIPERS) on the integration of cllmate change issues
into standard financial risk assessment processes.
Co n cl
US
Ion
Ihere is significant momentum behind the recognition ofthe financial risks and opportunities
associated with climate change over current investment horizons. Ihis momentum is not driven only
by ethical shareholder groups but also by leading mainstream institutions who are proactively
engaging with these associated valuation, risk management and disciosure issues. Arguably, this
represents a tipping point that trustees would be ill-advised to ignore.
June 2015
Maged Girgs
Partner
Sydney
T +61 299214410
E [email protected]
Sarah Barker
Speciar Counsel
Melbourne
T +61 3 8608 2168
[email protected]
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Alert Cilmate change beyond property damage:
Prudential Regulation Authoraty report emphasises
appiled risks for the insurance sector
11 November 2015
which have significant potential implications for investment and general underwriting activities.
The recent Bank of England Prudential Regulation
Authority’s
report, ‘lmphcations of Chmate Change for
the Insurance Sector’, highlights two categories of risk that have received hille aftention to date but
There has been significant commentary in the financial press about the Bank of England Prudential
Regulatory Authority (PRA)s report on The lmpact of Cllmate Change on the UK Insurance Sector
(Report), launched by Bank Governor Mark Carney at Lloyds of London on 29 September.
The Report reptesents a strong warning by the UKs prudential regulator on the significant potential
impacts of cllmate change on both the investment and general underwriting activities of insurers, and on
the stability of the financial system more broadly. Whilst it purports to provide an initial risk assessment’
for the UK US$2 trillion financial services sector, ts implications are likely to resonate across what is a
globalised industry.
Beyond the physical
The Report identifies three broad channels of systemic risk for the insurance sector associated with
cllmate change physical risks, transition risks and liability risks which it warns ‘present a substantial
challenge to the business model of insurers’.1
The majority of the analysis focuses on the physical risks, which the PRA classifies as ‘first-order risks
which anse from weather-related events, such as floods and storms. They comprise impacts directly
resulting from such events, such as damage to property, and also those that may anse indirectly through
subsequent events, such as disruption of global supply chains or resource scarcity.’2 Such physical risks
tend to be well-understood by Australian general insurers, who face regular underwriting exposures from
extreme weather events such as bushfires, floods and storms.
The other risk channels identified in the Report transition and liability risks reflect the rapid evolution
of climate change into a significant financial risk, with systemic impacts across the global economy far
beyond direct physical damage. These risks are extremely significant for both investment and general
underwriting activities. However, they have received little attention within the Australian insurance sector
to date. So what are these ‘under-considered’ risks, and what are their key implications for Australian
institutions?
Transition Risks
The PRA ciassifies financial ‘transition’ risks as those which could anse from the global economy’s
inexorable transformation to a lower-carbon norm. The Report notes:
2
PRA Report, page 5.
PRA Report, page 4.
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The lntergovernmental Panel on Cllmate Change (IPCC) estimates that maintaining a greater than
66% probabiity of keeping human-induced warming within the globally agreed goal of 2°C would
require total global carbon emissions from 2077 onwards to be less than around 1,000 GtCO2.
Keeping within this ‘2°C carbon budget’ would require a significant shift in the trajectory ofcarbon
emissions at current rates, the entire budget would be fu/ly used within the next 25 years.3
The Report expiains that the transition risks for insurance firms primariiy relate to ‘stranded assets’ in their
nvestment portfolios the potentialre-pricing of carbon-intensive financial assets, and the speed at
which any such re-pricing might occur.’ Such assets inciude the equities and bonds of both ‘firms that
may be impacted directly by regulatony limits on their abiity to produce or use fossil fuels, ([including]
coal, oil and gas extraction companies, and conventional utilities)’, and those with energy-intensive
operations that may be significantly impacted by any increase in energy costs (inciuding those in the
‘chemicals, forestry and paper, meta/s and mining, construction and industrial production’ sectors).4
it is important to note that the portfolio transition risks identified in the Report are conceptually distinct
from those arising from recent high-profile ‘fossil fuel divestment’ campaigns. The latter campaigns have
prompted many faith-based, educational and private endowments to exclude investments in companies
with carbon-intensive operations or outputs from their portfolios based primarily on ethical,
environmentai grounds. in contrast, the Bank of England analyses the risks associated with climate
change through a singularly economic lens, emphasising the need to manage the portfolio risks of a
potentially rapid re-pricing of carbon-intensive assets. The PRA’s approach echoes that increasingly
adopted by ieading international institutions, such as the Norwegian sovereign weaith fund, French
insurance giant AXA and superannuation funds such as HESTA, LGS, Calprs and Calstrs, who have ali
recently committed to divesting from carbon-intensive equities on squarely financial grounds.
The economic risks (and opportunities) associated with climate change continue to rapidiy and radicaily
evolve. Many corporations and their investor asset owners stili struggle to conceive ciimate change as
a material financial issue, rather than a non-financial environmental externality. The PRA Report provides
an unequivocai message that a failure to respond to the dynamic financial risk landscape presents a
serious risk to their firms. It reflects the view that a proactive, substantive approach to cllmate risk
governance is increasingly required with evidence that its implications for medium-long term strategy
have been duly considered and meaningfuiiy disclosed. And it goes even further to suggest that a
failure to do so is potentially actionable.
Liability risks
The last risk channel identified in the Bank of England’s Report is that of liability risks, in the form of
increased liability exposure under third-party iiabiiity policies such as professionai indemnity and directors’
and officers’ insurance. Such risks ‘ar/se from [third] parties who have suffered loss and damage from the
physical or transition risks from climate change seeking to recover losses from others [the insured] who
they believe may have been responsible.’5
This category of risk has received the ieast attention in the weeks foiiowing the release of the Bank’s
Report. It may, however, prove to be the most significant, given ts low profile within the Australian
insurance industry to date.
The Report identifies the potential for third-party liability claims against insured entities in three broad
categories:
a.
failure to mitigate claims alleging that ‘insured parties are responsib/e for the physical impacts of
cl/mate change, for example through emissions of greenhouse gases, and therefore can be held
directly liable for loss or damage to third parties’;
b.
failure to adapt claims alleging that ‘insured parties have flot sufficiently accounted for cl/mate
change risk factors in their acts, omissions or decision-making. In principle, this could apply to a
tange of cllmate change-related risk factors, flot just those from physical risks such as storms and
PRA Report, page 7.
PRA Report, page 7.
PRA Report, page 57.
Climate change beyond property damage: 8ank of EngPand report emphasses apphed risks for the insurance sector
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floods, but the governance of economic or financial issues that are mater/al to corp orate risk or
return.’ The PRA emphasises that such claims may be formulated under prevailing corporate and/or
tort laws;
c.
failure to disciose or comply claims alleging that insured parties ‘have flot sufficiently disclosed
information relevant to cl/mate change, have done so in a manner that is misleading, or have
otherwise not complied with cl/mate change-related legislation or regulation.’ The Report suggests
that this may be ‘one of the quickest’ categories of cialm to evolve.6 This has indeed been borne out
in international regulatory activity following the publication of the PRA’s report. Perhaps most
significantly, in November 2015 the New York Attorney-General announced that it was investigating
whether a number of corporations in the energy and resources sector had made misleading
disciosures concerning climate change risks and their potential impacts on the companies’
businesses. These investigations have led to settlements (under an Assurance of Discontinuance)
being reached with at east one corporation listed on the NYSE, under which the corporation agreed
to modify its disclosures going forwards.
The Report conciudes that:
‘The PRA views legal liabiity risks from cl/mate change as an area that may evolve adversely;
firms are encoura ged to consider ali aspects of this risk and be forward-looking in their
approach.’7
Further action
Minter Ellison has been at the forefront of thought Ieadership on climate change liability risks. Our cross
divisional reports on fiduciary liability exposures for inaction on risks associated with cilmate change
(such as Institutional investment, corporate governance and cl/mate change: what is a trustee to do?;
From ‘ethical’ crusade to financial mainstream: is cllmate change reaching a tipping point for institutional
investors?; and The first class action salvo? Breach of duty clalm filed against fiduciary trustees of coal
company pension fund) have been nationally and internationally recognised. We would be delighted to
share these leading publications with you upon request.
A full copy of the Bank of England’s Report is available here. For further analysis of the technical aspects
of the report and its particular ramifications for the Australian financial services and insurance sector,
please contact Sarah Barker.
6
PRA Report, page 59.
pi Report, page 64.
Page 3
Climate change beyond property damage: Bank of England
report
emphasises applied isks for the nsurance
sector
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ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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i4
A new COP on the beat heightened
expectations for corporate sustainability
governance and disciosure
June 2016
Sarah Barker
(Special Counsel, Melbourne) and
Maged Girgis (Partner,
Sydney) examine international
developments that are raising the bar on corporate governance, and disclosure
of,
risks and opportunities
associated with cilmate change.
Background economic and regulatory evolution
You may have noticed a subtle change in the emphasis of your morning coffee read. The financial press
has begun to devote serious column space to the issue of ‘cllmate change’. So why this mainstream
nterest on what was, historically, an issue consigned to the ‘environmental fringe’?
In short, leading market stakeholders have begun to recognise that issues associated with ciimate
change present significant economic and financial risks (and opportunities) over both long- and shorter
term investment horizons, which cannot be ignored.
Such risks and opportunities anse not only from the physical impacts of climate change (which include an
increase in extreme weather events, and ‘gradual onset impacts such as the increase in global average
temperatures, rising sea levels due to water expansion and ice melt, and alteration of regional
precipitation patterns), but associated regulatory, technological and societal responses.
This was recently underscored by the World Economic Forum in its 2076 Global Risks
Report,
in which
‘A failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation’was rated as having the top impactof alI current
risks to the global economy.
The Paris Agreement settied at the Conference of Parties
(COP)
on 12 December 2015 has been
recognised as a strong signal of the direction of market travel. The significance of that Agreement should
flot be underestimated. It represents a commitment by the Governments of 196 signatory countries to a
goal of limiting the ‘increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial
levels’ and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 7.5 °C above pre-industriallevels’. And,
perhaps most significantly, a commitment by those governments to shift the global economy to an
emissions plafform of net zero by the middle of this century.
In order to meet the Paris goals, each country will need to significantly reduce its ‘business as usual’
emissions and the global economy, which has been heavily reliant on fossil fuel combustion since the
industrial revolution, will need to transform, at scale and with speed.1 The impacts are likely to be felt
across ali asset classes and industrial sectors, but in particular by carbon-intensive industries.
As a result, the corporate regulatory landscape from reporting regulations to litigation trends is now
shifting to keep up with these developments. So what exactly does this suggest for corporate governance
and disclosure in Australia?
-
Policy & regulatory reform corporate disciosure
Historically, the inherent uncertainty in the scope, distribution and timing of the future impacts of climate
change have led many corporations to disclose relevant risks via broad, high level or boilerplate
See for exampe European Commi5son, COM(2016) 110 Final, Brussels 3 February 2016.
MinterEllis on
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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w
language. Such disclosures are rarely decision-useful for investors, and are increasingiy recognised as
potentially presenting a misleading picture of a company’s financial position.
To this end, regulators and private litigants have begun to demand that climate change-related
dsciosures are both specific to the performance indicator on which they may impact, and to account for
uncertainty via stress-testing across the range of plausible climate futures.
Internationally, regulators are increasingly issuing specific (and often binding) guidance on the
disciosures. For example:
On 1 April 2016, the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disciosure (Chaired by Michael
Bloomberg) released ts Phase / Report and Public Consultation. The Taskforce has been tasked
by the G20 Financial Stability Board to assess what constitutes effective and efficient disciosure
of climate-related issues, to:
fa)
support informed investment credit and insurance-underwriting decisions about reporting
companies; and
(b)
enabie a variety of stakeholders to understand the concentration of carbon-related assets
in the financial sector and the financial system’s exposure to climate —related risk.
The Phase I Report specifically identifies the need for disciosures pertaining to the near-,
medium- and long-term impacts of climate-related financial risks by al! actors in the investment
supply chain, from corporations to asset owners. The Taskforce is due to provide its final report
by the end of 2016. Whiist its recommendations are ‘voluntary’, they are likelyto seta baseline
for international disciosure expectations;
From I January 2016, under the French Energy & Ecology Transition Law2, ali French asset
managers, insurers and pension funds must report on how they integrate ‘environmental, social
and governance’ (ESG) issues into their investment processes. The French Treasury’s
lmplementation Decree prescribes the information that must be included in that report inciuding:
engagement policies (and assessment of their implementation) and methodologies
appiied in the companies’ analysis of climate risk and its resuits; and
specific information regarding the projected impacts of (amongst other things):
changes in the availability and price of natural resources and the consistency of
their expioitation with climate and environmental goais;
the coherence of capital expenditure issues with low carbon strategies, and in
particular for actors involved in the Uevelopment offossil fuel resources, the
underlying hypothesis supporting such expenditures;
any policy risk related to the implementation of domestic and international climate
targets; and
measures of past, current or future greenhouse gas emissions directly or indirectly
associated with emitters included in the investment portfolio, inciuding the way the
measure is used for risk analysis;3 and
in October 2015, the World Federation of Exchanges (the peak association of international stock
exchanges, ofwhich the ASX is a member) issued its Model Guidance on Reporting ESG
Information to Investors A Voluntary Too! for Stock Exchanges to Guide Issuers. The Guidance
identifies 34 ESG metrics that should be included in reports of listed entities as material drivers of
financial performance. These inciude 10 metrics that are directly referable to ssues associated
with climate change, including direct and indirect GHG emissions and carbon intensity (emissions
relative to revenue). More than 20 of the Federation’s 64 international exchanges have already
incorporated the Model Guidance into their exchange rules.
These international regulatory developments do not of course comprise ‘the law in Australia. However,
they certainly indicate the direction of trave! of our own governance and disclosure laws. These
developments are also likely to influence both our regulators and, in the event of litigation in relation to
corporate disclosure, the courts.
Corporations would be well-advised to have regard to these trends, now, to minimise regulatory and
litigator scrutiny in that shift
2
Sec Article 173-VI.
Based an the (unofficial) English translation of the Implementation Decree by the
2 Investing Initiutive
available here.
Page 2
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Prevailing ‘general’ disclosure Iaws
litigation
Even in the absence of specific ‘climate change risk reporting’ guidance, allegations of misleading
disciosure of risks associated with climate change are being increasingly interrogated under prevailing
‘general’ disclosure laws. For example:
On 4 November 2015, the New York Attorney-General issued a subpoena to oil producer
ExxonMobil as part of an investigation into whether its regulatory filings had misrepresented the
financial risks to their business from climate change.4 By April 2076, more than 20 US-State
Attorneys-General had joined this investigation.
On 9 November, the Attorney-General announced the resolution of similar investigations into
Peabody Energy. The Attorney-General determined that Peabody had contravened State
misleading disciosure laws5 by filing annual reports that mis-represented the potential impact of
emissions regulations on its business, and selectively disciosing only favourable International
Energy Agency energy and fuel-mix projections from a range of scenarios.6 The Attorney
General’s investigation was settled pursuant to an ‘Assurance of Discontinuance’, in which
Peabody Energy did not admit or deny the allegations of breach.
These claims, whilst untested before the courts, provide a stark demonstration of the potential capacity of
prevailing corporations and securities laws to apply in relation to corporate governance and disclosure of
risks associated with climate change. In particular, they evidence a growing recognition that issues
associated with climate change can give rise to material financial risks and opportunities of such
breadth and significance that failure to properly disclose them to the market warrants regulatory
intervention.
This is not to say that risks associated with climate change will be material to every corporation in every
context. However, given the broader financial market recognition of climate change as a material driver
of financial risk, it is increasingly difficult for a company Board to presume that climate change will not
have a material impact on the company’s business.
Any such conclusion must be supported by a robust process of assessment in the circumstances of the
company. Directors are expected to apply due care and diligence to this task to appropriately educate
themselves as to relevant issues, proactively inquire where information is lacking or contradictory,
continually monitor and reconsider material issues in the face of evolving market conditions, and to
actively apply independent judgment in a critical evaluation ot relevant matters. For business strategy and
performance projections, in particular, a default to historical norms on climate change are simply
incapable of accurately conveying prospective market risk/return.
Shareholder activism
but not as you know it
Where corporations have been slow to recognise the potential significance of climate-related financial
exposures, they are increasingly subject to ‘forceful stewardship’ by institutional investors.
Over the last few years, there has been a significant increase in shareholder activism on corporate
disclosure of climate change risks: flot only by ‘activist shareholders’ seeking to advance their external
agendas, but mainstream, institutional investors with a genuine demand for decision-useful information on
what they consider to be a material financial risk issue.
ln some of the most high profile examples, in 2015 special shareholder resolutions were passed by oil
giants Shell, BP and Statoil requiring them to stress test their forward strategies against potential climate
change futures endorsed by the International Energy Agency. These resolutions were both supported by
the board and passed at the companies’ AGMs with a resounding majority of 98.3, 99.8 and 99.9% of
the shareholder vote, respectively. Similar resolutions were passed, again by significant majorities, at the
2016 AGM’s of multi-national resource companies such as Anglo American, Rio Tinto and Glencore.
However, this is flot only a European phenomenon. The US Securities & Exchange Commission recently
refused a petition by the boards of ExxonMobil and Chevron to keep similar resolutions off the ballots at
their AGM’s on 25 May.
‘ExxonMobil, ‘ExxonMobil to Hold Media Call on New York Attorney General Subpoena’ (News release, 5 Novembe
r 2015).
Article 23-A, Section 352
et seq.
of the New York General Business Law (the ‘Martin Act’) and Section 63(12)
of the New York Executive Law.
6
Attorney General of the State of New York Environmental and Investor Protection Bureaus, Ifl the Matter
of Investigation by Eric T
Schneiderman, Attorney General of the Stote of New York of Peobody Energy Corporation, Respondent, Assuranc
e 15-242.
Page 3
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The resolutions failed to attract the support of either management or a majority of shareholders.
However, each was supported with an unprecedented 38 and 41% (respectively) of the vote. Supporters
inciuded institutional heavyweights with more than US$10 trillion in total assets under management, such
as the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund, the New York State Common Retirement Fund, Calpers and
Hermes Equity Services. The Wall Street Journal characterised the vote as: “an indication that more
mainstream shareholders like pension funds, sovereign-wealth funds and asset managers are starting to
take more seriously the threat ofa global weaning from fossi! fu&s.’7
Cioser to horne, shareholders have also begun to file clirnate risk-focused resolutions with companies
listed (or dually listed) in Australia, particularly in the resources (BHP and Rio Tinto) and financial services
(CSA, ANZ) sectors. Although the Rio Tinto resolution, tabled in ts dual 2016 AGM’s in April (London)
and May (Brisbane), is the only one to have passed, the other resolutions have been intluential in
prompting corporations to disclosure further detail around their recognition and management of risks
associated with cilmate change. This has the effect of raising the disclosure bar for other corporations in
their sectors, as investors seek comparable, decision-useful information.
Getting started: five priority areas for director focus
So what can directors and senior executives do in practice in the face of the complex issues associated
with cilmate change? We suggest below a set of questions that may be a useful starting point for
interrogation of this issue:
1. What are the risk (and opportunity) drivers to our business associated with climate change? Look
beyond direct greenhouse emissions to susceptibility to physical impacts including extreme weather
events (both for plant, infrastructure and supply chains), water scaroity, heat stress, drought etc;
transition risks (inciuding reputational and stranded asset and commodity price risks); and liability
risks.
2. What are the potential financial impacts of these drivers under a range of plausible cilmate change
scenarios, in the short, medium and longer term? Consider: what stress-testing do we conduct under
what climate scenarios? What actions are we taking to manage and mitigate these risks, and to
develop resilience in our operations? How are these risks integrated into our strategic planning
assumptions, commercial hurdle rates and risk management frameworks?
3. What does our business model look like in a net zero economy? What is our transition plan, over
what time frame?
4. What analysis has been performed, and by whom? How does the board oversee climate risk
management?
5. What statements do we make about future growth and business plans in our annual reports or
broader market statements? On what assumptions are these predictions based? Would they be
materially impacted under any plausible climate scenario? If so, how do our disclosures note this?
Whilst the above list is necessarily high-level and general, we would be pleased to provide specific advice
on those governance steps likely to satisfy a director’s duty of due care and diligence in their corporation’s
unique context.
Minter Ellison has been at the fore front of international thought leadership on the implications of climate
change for corporate governance, insurance, institutional investment and disciosure. Wo would be
delighted to share other recent Client Alerts on point with you upon request. Please contact Sarah Barker
and Maqed Girgis.
Bradley Olsen nd Nicole Freeman, Exxon, Chevron Shareholders Narrowly Reject Climate-Change Stress
Tests, Walt Street Journal, 25 May
2016.
Page 4
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0029.png
Straining at the floodgates international
developments in climate risk disciosure and
litigation
November 2016
[DJevelopment of the common law, as a response to changed conditions, does flot come like a bolt out of a clear sky.
Invariably the clouds gather first, often from different quarters, indicating with increasing obviousness what is coming.
Lord Justice Nichoils, Re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liq) [200512 AC 680, [33]
In our recent Alert
A
New
COP
on the Beat Heightened Expectations for Corporate Sustainability
Governance & Disclosure (available here) we examined international developments raising the bar on
corporate governance and disciosure of financial risks associated with climate change. Ihese regulatory
signals continue to solidify.
In this Alert, Sarah Barker (Special Counsel) and Maged Girgis (Partner) discuss a number of notable
regulatory investigations in Europe and the United States, and consider what they suggest for the
direction of corporate regulation and litigation in Australia.
Standard securities Iaws applied to dynamic economic realities
In recent months, international regulators have continued their application of general securities laws to
the disclosure of climate-related risks.
In the UK, the Financial Reporting Council has opened an exam ination into the adequacy of risk
disclosures made the annual reports of two oil and gas exploration companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange, Cairn Energy Pic and SOCO International Plc. The investigations, which were prompted by
ccm plaints filed by public-interest law firm Client Earth, focus on whether the two companies failed to
inform the market about material economic transition risks. and physical risks, relevant to the companies’
strategies and business models in breach of their disclosure obligations under the UK Companies Act
2006.
Whilst it may be tempting to dismiss such complaints as predictable activism by environmental interest
groups, with little basis in corporate law, this would be both dangerous and inaccurate. Certainly, the
ment of the complaints warranted reporting in publications from the Financial Times to The Accountant.
In addition, the Client Earth complaint co-incided with a call to the G20 by 130 large institutional investors,
representing US$l3triIIion in assets under management, for greater regulatory scrutiny of climate risk
disclosure (see here).
The mainstream credence of such claims is being borne out across the Atlantic, with reports emerging
last month that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is investigating whether ExxonMobil’s
annual reports present a true and fair view of its financial position.
The investigation reportedly focuses on two issues: first, whether ExxonMobil’s annual reports accurately
convey the extent of the risk to its business from climate change (including regulatory and technological
risks) and second, whether balance sheet materially overstates the value of its proven oil reserves, which
MinterEllison
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0030.png
have flot been adjusted despite a fall in oil commodity prices of around 60% since 20141. This lies in
contrast to the revaluations of other oil and gas majors, who have responded by writing US $50 biflion off
the stated value of their reserves. ExxonMobil’s shares slumped by 1.5% upon the report, wiping more
than US$5.3 billion from its market value.
Whilst not driven solely by climate risk-related factors, the reserve revaluation aspect of the SEC’s
investigation is of particular interest given one of the key economic transition risks associated with climate
change: that tossil fuels may be rapidly re-priced as the global economy recalibrates to a low-carbon
norm, with booked reserves becoming unrealisable at historical valuations.
This risk has only been compounded with the Paris Agreement coming into force from 4 November 2016,
under which l97countries(includingAustralia, Brazil, China, Japan, lndia, Korea, Taiwan, Russia, the
US and the major economies within Europe) have agreed to introduce policies to limit global warming to
no more than 2°C above pre-industrial average temperatures.
A number of leading institutional reports, from the analysis of Carbon Tracker to that of the Climate
Institute and the International Energy Agency, have calculated that the achievement of the <2°C goal will
require a significant proportion of ‘proven’ fossil fuel reserves currently sitting on corporate balance sheets
to remain in the ground, implying marked devaluation (or, in extreme cases, the writing-off) of those
assets as Paris commitments are implemented.
The SEC’s investigation into ExxonMobil’s reserve valuation assumptions provides a stark illustration of
the need to ensure that valuation assumptions and methodologies remain current as Paris-driven
emissions reductions targets come into force.
It should be emphasised that the developments in the UK and US do not involve the application of any
new to disclosure guidelines or regulations. Rather, it illustrates the capacity of general, generic rules
around misleading disclosure, and universal corporate obligations to ensure that market disclosures
present a true and fair view of both a company’s historical performance and its prospects, to apply in a
dynamic economic risk environment.
Having said this, specific rules and regulation which mandate specific disclosure on climate change
associated risks are proliferating internationally. As discussed on an earlier Alert in our series (available
here), these include:
the French Energy & Ecology Transit/an Law (Article 173 —VI) (applicable to asset managers,
pension funds and insurers from January 2016);
the voluntary standards suggested by the G20 Financial Stability Board Taskforce on Cilmate
related Financial Disciosures, chaired by Michael Bloomberg (due for release in December 2016);
the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 2014 recommendation that companies disclose
material exposure to economic, environmental and social sustainabiity risks; and
Model Guidance of the global peak-body of stock exchanges, the World Federation of Exchanges
(of which the ASX is a member) issued in October 2015. The WFE guidance, entitled
Reporting
ESG Information to lnvestors A Voluntary Too! for Stock Exchanges to Guide Issuers, identifies
34 ESG metrics that should be included in reports of listed entities as material drivers offinancial
performance, including 10 metrics that are directly referable to issues associated with climate
change. More than 20 of the Federation’s 64 international exchanges have already incorporated
the Model Guidance into their exchange rules.
These international regulatory developments do not of course comprise the law in Australia. However,
they certainly telegraph the potential direction of our own governance and disclosure laws. These
developments are also Iikely to influence both our regulators and, in the event of litigation in relation to
corporate disciosure, the courts.
From a range between $US80 and $115 per barrel during 2011-2014, to a range largely between US$40 and US$60 per barrel
since the start of 2015.
Page 2
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0031.png
-
Implications for disciosures by Australian firms?
It is clear that the international regulatory environment on climate risk disclosure is moving rapidly around
us. This is not to say the relevant issues are unfamiliar to Australian securities laws.
The Corp orations Act and ASX Listing Rules already require the disclosure of information necessary to
present a true and fair view of a corporation’s performance and prospects, inciuding material forward
looking risks.
More specifically, in direct parallel to the SEC’s investigation of ExxonMobil, in June 2015 the Australian
Securities & lnvestment Commission
(ASIC)
announced that asset valuations and impairments
particularly in the extractives industries would be a primary focus area for its review of annual reports
(see Guidance Note 15-139MR here).
-
Only this month, ASIC re-issued its guidance on forward-looking statements in the mining and resources
industry (such as production targets, forecast financial information and income-based valuations). The
guidance gives specific emphasis to the necessity for reasonable grounds for any forecasts, with
disciosure of underlying methodologies and assumptions to allow users to assess their reasonableness
(see Information Sheet 214, here). The high-profile cases involving the boards of Centro and James
Hardie evidence the preparedness of Australian courts’ to hold a corporation’s directors liable for
misleading statements in their statutory disciosures.
So what does this mean for annual reporting in Australia more broadly?
In short, it is clear that cllmate change is no longer an issue that can be consigned to a corporate
compliance or public relations silo. It’s impact on balance sheet items and forward-looking risk and
strategy must be reconsidered, in an integrated manner, in the light of contemporary economic realities.
This is critical not only for directors, who sign-off on both financial accounts and narrative managerial
statements, but accounting and risk advisors.
MinterEl!ison has been at the forefront of international thought leadership on the implications of climate
change for corporate governance, insurance, institutional investment and disciosure. We would be
delighted to share other recent Cilent Alerts on point with you upon request. Please contact
Sarah Barker
and
Maged Girgis.
Page 3
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0032.png
s.
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MinterEllison
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0033.png
atp=
Til Finanstilsynet
30.
juni
2017
Bidrag til Finanstilsynets diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-reglerne i gode tider
Baggrund
Finanstilsynet har den 22. maj 2017 offentliggjort sit diskussionspapir Fit & proper-reglerne
i gode tider
og i den forbindelse anmodet om bidrag og synspunkter.
Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspensions bidrag:
Arbejdsmarkedet Tillægspension (ATP) er oprettet ved lov, ATP-loven, der sammen med
bekendtgørel
ser mv. udstedt i henhold til loven regulerer ATP’s virksomhed.
ATP-loven indeholder Fit and proper-regler svarende til reglerne for finansielle virksomheder
i lov om
finansiel virksomhed, ligesom det er Finanstilsynet, der forestår fit and proper vurderingen.
ATP adskiller
sig dog fra øvrige finansielle virksomheder ved, at bestyrelsen og repræsentantskabet for ATP
udpeges
af Beskæftigelsesministeren efter indstilling fra arbejdsmarkedets parter. Formanden udpeges af
repræ
sentantskabet. Der er således en række særlige forhold, der gør sig gældende for ATP i relation
til emnet
for diskussionspapiret.
ATP finder, at diskussionspapiret berører et meget vigtigt emne og kan tilslutte sig, at der
er behov for
øget fokus på ledelsesmedlemmers kompetencer og byder på den baggrund det særlige danske
krav om
et grundkursus til nye bestyrelsesmedlemmer i finansielle virksomheder velkommen. Ligeledes kan
ATP
tilslutte sig, at der i bestyrelser i finansielle virksomheder bør være stor fokus på bestyrelsens selvevalu
e
ring i forhold til at vurdere, om bestyrelsen besidder de rette kompetencer.
Endvidere finder ATP, at der bør være fokus på nøglepersonernes kompetencer i relation
til de opgaver
de varetager. ATP finder derfor som foreslået i diskussionspapiret, at det kunne være relevant
med spe
cifikke kompetencekrav for nøglepersoner fx uddannelseskrav eller krav om minimumserfaring
indenfor
specifikke fagområder. Såfremt reglerne om udpegelse af nøglepersoner og fit & proper
vurdering af
disse tillige vil skulle gælde for alle finansielle virksomheder, vil der være meget stor forskel
på størrelsen
og kompleksiteten af de virksomheder, der omfattes af reglerne. Dette bør eventuelle nye regler
afspejle,
ATP imødeser en videre fremtidig dialog om dette vigtige emne.
Med venlig hilsen
Christian Hyk
Direktør
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
1955659_0034.png
DANMARKS
NATIONALBANK
Finanstilsynet
Pr. e-mail: governanceftnet.dk
Karsten Bhltoft
Vicedirektør og chef for
Finansiel Stabilitet
FINANSIEL STABILITET
Telefon: 3363 6363
Fax:
3363 7103
Havnegade 5
1093 København K
Telefon: 3363 6363
www.nationalbanken.dk
nationalbanken@
nationalbanken.dk
SVAR PÅ FINAPISTILSYNETS DISKUSSIONSPAPIR OM ‘FIT & PROPER”
REGLERNE
5ag 165033
Dokumentnr.: 1642384
30juni 2017
Nationalbanken forholder sig ikke specifikt til de enkelte aspekter af “fit &
proper” reglerne, som Finanstilsynet fremhæver i sit diskussionspapir. Nati
onalbanken mener mere overordnet, at det er afgørende, at ejernes og le
delsens fulde ansvar for en forsvarlig drift af et kreditinstitut fastholdes. EU
reglerne om “fit & proper” giver en vis fleksibilitet for medlemslandene. Der
bør efter Nationalbankens opfattelse ikke indføres danske regler el/er prak
sis, som generelt udvider Fin anstilsynets “fit & pro
per1’ opgaver i forhold til i
dog.
Finanstilsynet har offentliggjort et diskussionspapir, der rejser en række
spørgsmål om fordele og ulemper ved mulige ændringer af gældende
regler og Finanstilsynets praksis i relation til vurderingen af ledelsesmed
lemmers og visse nøglepersoners egnethed og hæderlighed, “fit &
pro
per”. Reglerne om “fit & proper” udgør en det af de samlede krav til ledel
se og styring af kteditinstitutter,
som følger af CRD
IV.
Diskussionspapiret skal bl.a. ses i lyset af den igangværende revision af
henblik på yderligere harmonisering af tilsynspraksis inden for EU. Natio
nalbanken finder det positivt, at Finanstilsynet inviterer interesserede
parter til at afgive synspunkter om udviklingen af reguleringen på dette
område.
Nationalbanken bemærker overordnet, at det er afgørende, at “fit & pro
per” vurderinger fra Finanstilsynet ikke praksis mindsker ejetnes incita
ment til at forholde sig til instituttets ledelse og risikostyring. Der må så
ledes ikke herske tvivl om de grundlæggende “corporate governance”
principper:
EBA’s retningslinjer om “fit & proper” vurderingen, der foretages med
Side 1 af 2
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Det er instituttets ansvar at udpege og ansætte de rette ledelsesmed
lemmer. Ledelsen er ansvarlig for at varetage ejernes interesser og sikre,
at instituttet til stadighed er robust og levedygtigt og ikke påtager sig
risici, som ledelsen ikke kan overskue. Med den nordiske tostrengede
governance model er det direktionen, som har det daglige ansvar for le
delsen af instituttet, mens bestyrelsen har det overordnede strategiske
ansvar og skal kunne give direktionen kvalificeret modspil. For ejere, in
vestorer og tilsyn er det essentielt, at instituttets rapportering, i form af
regnskaber, risikorapportering, mv., er retvisende.
Disse “corpotate governance” principper udgør sammen med EU
reglerne om, at ejere og kreditorer i alle tilfælde bærer tabene, hvis insti
tuttet ikke længere er levedygtigt grundlaget for, at kreditinstitutter
faktisk drives som privat ansvarlig virksomhed.
Det er således vigtigt, at der i tilsynsmyndighedernes praksis vedrørende
“fit & proper” vurderinger bliver lagt vægt på proportionalitet og konkre
te vurderinger. Praksis i Danmark bør være i overensstemmelse med de
europæiske retningslinjer og dermed understøtte en harmoniseret til
synspraksis inden for EU (single rule book’). Nationalbanken finder det
imidlertid ikke nødvendigt at indføre danske regler eller praksis, som ud
videt Finanstilsynets “fit & propér” opgaver i forhold til i dag.
Nationalbanken bemærker, at det fortsat øgede fokus på detailregulering
af ledelse og styring af institutterne kan have den utilsigtede konsekvens,
at bestyrelsen har større opmærksomhed på opfyldelse af de formelle
krav end på at løfte det strategiske ansvar.
Ud fra en generel betragtning vurderer Nationalbanken, at der i opbyg
ningen af et robust fælleseuropæisk regelværk for kreditinstitutterne er
tre hovedelementer, som er centrale for at sikre den finansielle stabilitet,
og som derfor først og fremmest skal være på plads:
Der skal stilles krav, der sikrer, 1) at institutterne har en solid og retvi
sende kapitaldækning, 2) at de har en sund likviditetsstyting og stabil fi
nansiering, og 3) at de i sidste ende kan afvikles uden store negative
konsekvenser for den finansielle stabilitet og samfundsøkonomien.
Med venlig hilsen
Karsten Biltoft
Side 2 af 2
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Aktionærforen
ing
Finanstilsynet
Århusgade 110
2100 København ø
Att.: Vicekontorchef Rigmor Ansdal
Amagertorv 9 3. sal
DK-1010 København K
4582 1591
[email protected]
Dansk
21.juni 2017
Kommentarer til diskussionspapiret “Fit & proper-reglerne i gode tider”
finanstilsynet har fremlagt et diskussionspapir, Fit & proper-regleme i gode tider, der efter
Dansk Aktionærforenings vurdering indeholder relevante og væsentlige spørgsmål.
Dansk Aktionærforening er grundlæggende enig med Finanstilsynets direktør i, at det er
bestyrelse og direktion i den enkelte virksomhed, der har ledelsesansvaret.
Overordnet finder Dansk Aktionærforening, at muligheden for brug af interviews i
forbindelse med fit & propper-godkendelser vil være nyttigt og vil kunne bidrage til, at der
ikke foretages rene skrivebordsvurderinger. Det skal ske ud fra en proportionalitets- og
risikobaseret betragtning, men blot muligheden for, at tilsynet kan invitere til et interview vil
have en opstrammende effekt. Adgangen til brug af interviews skal også omfatte
direktionsmedlemmer.
Ligeledes kan Dansk Aktionærforening støtte anvendelse afbetingede fit &
propergodkendelser, hvilket kan give mere realitet i tilsynets godkendelsespraksis, samt
skærpe virksomhedernes fokus på affijælpning af specifikke mangler.
Nedenfor er der fremført synspunkter knyttet til de enkelte afsnit i finanstilsynets
diskussionspapir. Synspunkterne følger strukturen og dermed nummereringen i
finanstilsynets diskussionspapir.
Under pkt. 2.1 Kompetencer i ledelsen rejser tilsynet en række spørgsmål bt.a.:
Vil
en styrkelse af
bestyrelsens
og direktion
ens
faglige kompetencer kunne medvirke til at
sikre, at ledelsen ifinansietle virksomheder har
en
hensigtsmæssig risikoadfærd?
Formentlig kttn i begrænset omfang.
Manglende faglig kompetence vil kunne medføre at ledelsen på grund af uvidenhed påfører
virksomheden store risici, men oftest vil en uhensigtsmæssig risikoadfærd være baseret på en
generel for høj risikovillighed og overoptimistiske forventninger.
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Aktionærforen
ing
Er der behov for tilpasning afFinanstilsynets processer og praksis?
Generelt er der for meget skrivebordsgodkendelse. Stikprøver bør anvendes i større omfang,
jfr. nedenfor.
Under pkt. 2.2 Kortlægning af kompetencer og ansvar rejser tilsy’net en række spørgsmål
bl.a.:
Skal der være større fokus på form og omfang af bestyrelsernes selvevaittering og
Finanstilsynets løbende kontrol afselvevalueringerne?
Der bør udarbejdes vejledende retningslinjer for selvevalueringerne.
Vil kort/ægning af kompetencer og ansvar i ledelsen kunne medvirke til at sikre, at ledelsen i
finansielle virksomheder har en hensigtsmæssig risikoadfærd?
En kortlægning af kompetencer og ansvar for direktionen vil være hensigtsmæssig.
For bestyrelsen vil alene en kortlægning afkompetencer være formålstjenligt, mens en
kortlægning og dermed en fordeling af ansvarsområder vil risikere at reducere bestyrelsens
kollektive ansvar.
Ved sammenligninger med forholdene i Storbritannien skal man være opmærksom på, at de
der har en anden bestyrelsesmodel end den danske.
Under pkt. 2.3 Anvendelse af interviews i forbindelse med fit &proper-vurderinger rejser
tilsynet en række spørgsmål bl.a.:
Hvordan bidrager interviews til Finanstilsynetsfit & proper-vurdering? Tilfarer interviews
en værdi, som ikke opnås gennem virksomheders rekrutteringsproces?
Som nævnt indledningsvis vil muligheden for at foretage interviews have en generel
opstrammende virkning på kvaliteten af ledelsesmedlemmer. Tilsynet vil således kunne få en
yderligere vurdering af de faglige kompetencer
ikke
mindst hos bestyrelsesmedlemmer,
hvilket kan være et nyttigt supplement til de redegørelser, som tilsynet har modtaget.
I relation til direktionsmedlemmer vil virksomhedens rekrutteringsproces som udgangspunkt
være afgørende.
Skal Finanstilsynet indgå i virksomhedens rekrutteringsproces?
Nej!
Vil anvendelsen afin terviews i forbindelse med fit & proper—vttrderinger kunne medvirke til
at sikre, at ledelsen ifinansielle virksomheder har en hensigtsmæssig risikoadfærd?
Dansk
2
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Aktionærforening
Næppe!
Under pkt. 2.4 Betinget fit & proper-godkendelse rejser titsynet en række spørgsmål bl.a.:
I hvilke situationer er betingedefit & pmper-godkendelser hensigtsmæssige?
Ved specifikke kompetencemangter. Herved vil virksomheden fa mulighed for at afhjælpe
disse.
Hvilke fordele er
der ved at
anvende betingedefit & proper-godkendelser?
Er et mere fleksibelt instrument, der fx kan bruges i situationer, hvor tilsynet er i tvivl om
hvorvidt de oplyste kompetencer er tilstrækkelige.
Vil
anvendelsen afbetingedefit & proper-godkendelser kunne medvirke til at sikre, at
ledelsen ifinansielle virksomheder har en hensigtsmæssig risikoadfærd?
Dansk
Næppe risikoadfærd er primært et proper-problem, hvor betingede godkendelser ikke er
velegnede.
Under pkt. 2.5 Praktisk fit & proper-tilsyn som led i det løbende tilsyn rejser tilsynet bl.a.
spørgsmålet, om det skat deltage i bestyrelsesmøder eller lignende interne møder i de
finansielle virksomheder. Dette må bestemt frarådes.
Under pkt. 2.8 Corporate Governance rejser tilsynet bl.a. følgende spørgsmål:
Er der behovfor andre corporate governance-tiltag i den finansielle sektor?
To forslag til overvejelse:
1. Resultatkontrakter bør udformes. så de giver holdbare resultater fx ved at indarbejde
claw back vilkår.
2. Åremålsansættelse af administrerende (ordførende) direktør. Dette kunne indebære
indebære, at en person maksimalt kan ansættes som adm. direktør i en ftnansiel
virksomhed i to perioder af fx fem eller fire år.
Med venlig hilsen
Dansk Aktionærforening
Leonhardt Pihl
Direktør
3
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Att. Finanstilsynet
finanstilsynet har den 22. maj 2017 offentliggjort et diskussionspapir omkring fit & Proper. DI har følgende
bemærkninger til høringen.
Ad. første sporgsmålsboks (“Kompetencer
i
ledelsen”)
• Finanstilsynets nuværende praksis forekommer hensigtsmæssig og afbalanceret.
Ad. anden spørgsmåtsboks (“Kortlægning afkompetencer og ansvarsområder”)
• DI er umiddelbart betænkelig ved, at der indføres krav om meget detaljeret kortlægning afkompe
tencer og ansvar i ledelserne i de finansielle virksomheder, hvis det som anført i notatet, medfører
ændringer i det selskabsretlige princip om, at ansvaret for virksomhedens ledelse og drift påhviler
henholdsvis bestyrelsen og direktionen som kollektive ledelsesorganer. En sådan detaljeringsgrad fo
rekommer ikke at være proportional.
Ad. tredje spørgsmålsboks (“Anvendelse af interviews i forbindelse med tit & proper-vurderinger”)
• Generelt betænkelig ved at finanstilsynet bliver inddraget i virksomhedernes rekrutteringsproces så
direkte, som via forudgående interviews. DI kan støtte notatets bemærkninger om, at interviews må
forventes at være forbundet med et øget ressourceforbrug både hos det pågældende ledelsesmedlem
eller nøgleperson, den relevante virksomhed og Finanstilsynet, samt at godkendelsesprocessen vil
blive forlænget. Dl er endvidere enig i notatets bemærkning om, at den viden, der opnås gennem in
terviews, ikke altid er objektiv konstaterbar. Derved kan en sådan viden vise sig vanskelig at anven
de i en juridisk afgørelse om ledelsesmedlemmets egnethed.
Ad. fjerde spørgsrnålsboks (“Betinget tit & proper-godkendelse”)
• Ingen kommentarer.
Ad. femte sporgsmåtsboks (“Praktisk tit & proper-tilsyn som led i det løbende tilsyn”)
• DI anser det tvivlsomt, om det vil tilføre merværdi at afholde bestyrelsesmøder med Finanstilsynets
tilstedeværelse, og om en evt. merværdi står mål med ulemperne. Dl er enig i notatets bemærknin
ger, bl.a. om. at bestyrelsesmøder med Finanstilsynets tilstedeværelse nemt kan fa en proforma
lignende karakter, der ikke giver et retvisende billede af bestyrelsens faktiske virke.
Ad. sjette spørgsmålsboks (“Udvidelse af
tit
& proper-vurdering af nøglepersoner”)
• DI stiller sig tvivlsom over for, om det er proportionalt at udvide hvilke noglepersoner. der under-
lægges en tit & proper-vurdering, fra i dag alene at gælde noglepersoner i gruppe 1-
forsikringsselskaber og SIFI’eret til fremadrettet at gælde alle finansielle virksomheder.
Ad. syvende spørgsrnålsboks (“Reaktioner og straf’)
• DI kan ikke støtte et skærpet sanktionsregime af præcis de grunde, der er anført i notatet. Et skærpet
sanktionsregime kan nemt få den modsatte effekt end den, der er tilsigtet (øge incitamentet til at tage
ansvar), og det kan blive sværere at tiltrække kvalificerede ledelseskandidater. da disse vil søge over
i mindre regulerede sektorer.
Med venlig hilsen
Cheflonsulent
Morten Qvist Fog
00
Dansk
Industn
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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FA takker for det fremsendte diskussionspapir “Fit & proper-reglerne i gode tider”.
Hermed nedenfor FA’s overordnede bemærkninger tit det udsendte diskussionspapir.
FA bakker naturligvis op om princippet om, at finansielle virksomheder bor ledes af tilstrækkeligt
egnede og hæderlige personer. hvilket det også er FA’s opfattelse. at de generelt bliver. Virksomhe
derne i den finansielle sektor har påtaget, og påtager sig fortsat, et stort ansvar for at sikre dette,
hvilket er til gavn både for virksomhederne selv og samfundet, som selvfølgelig har en stor interes
se i, at den finansielle sektor fungerer fornuftigt. På samme måde bakker FA også op om gældende
regler om egnethed og hæderlighed. da disse kan være med til at sikre en ansvarlig og effektiv drift
af de ftnansielle virksomheder, som finanstilsynet også har anført i diskussionspapiret.
FA er enig i, at det er afgørende, at Finanstilsynet ved sit tilsyn med de finansielle virksomheder
sørger for at respektere ledelsesretten i de enkelte virksomheder. Når Finanstilsynet således anfører
i diskussionspapiret, at det er “vigtigt for Finanstilsynet, at bestyrelse og direktion har ledelsesan
svaret”, er FA derfor også enig heri. Og dette er endog et princip, som FA opfordrer finanstilsynet
til at fastholde og sikre, ikke mindst i praksis.
Som også anført i diskussionspapiret skal der foretages en
tit
& proper-vurdering af ledelsesmed
lemmer såvel ved indtræden i ledelsen og løbende herefter. Dette sker på baggrund af en ansøgning
indsendt af den pågældende virksomhed eller ledetsesmedlemmet selv. Der foretages her en konkret
vurdering i forhold til den enkelte stilling, og vurderingen foretages igen i forbindelse med eventu
elt senere stillingsskift inden for ledelsen. Finanstitsynet stiller i denne sammenhæng bøje krav til
ledelsen, og særligt til medlemmer af direktionen. På denne baggrund er det fKs opfattelse, at det
tilsyn. der føres fra Finanstilsynets side er endog meget grundigt og konkret baseret. Den nødvendi
ge sikring af ovennævnte principper må derfor anses for at være tilstrækkeligt og forsvarligt vareta
get inden for rammerne af nugældende regler og praksis. Af hensyn til respekten for ledelsesretten
bør tilsynet ikke efter FA’s opfattelse på nuværende tidspunkt skærpes yderligere. Generelt mener
FA. at der løbende er sket en stor professionalisering af både bestyrelser og direktioner i de finan
sielle virksomheder, og at kompetenceniveauet generelt er højt og også tilstrækkeligt højt.
Med hensyn til en yderligere skærpelse aftilsynet i form af nye krav om detaljeret kortlægning af
kompetencer og ansvar i ledelseme i de finansielle virksomheder samt anvendelse af interviews i
forbindelse med fit & proper-vurderinger er det ligeledes FA’s opfattelse dels, at et tilstrækkeligt og
højt kompetenceniveau aLLerede er tit stede og sikret af de gæLdende regler og dels, at der med ind
førelse af yderligere skærpet tilsyn er stor risiko for en uacceptabel indgriben i virksomhedernes
ledelsesret. Herudover ville yderligere tilsyn og interviews af de enkelte ledelsesmedlemmer medfø
re endnu større administrative byrder for virksomhederne end dem, der allerede er påført dem.
I forhold til muligheden for udvidelse af sanktionsmuligheder ved manglende efterkommelse af
finanstilsynets fit & proper-afgørelser, forekommer sådanne ikke nødvendige. Som også anført i
diskussionspapiret ville skærpede straffebestemmelser kunne medføre, at ledelsesmedlemmer ville
fa et forringet incitarnent til at påtage sig et ansvar for at undgå strenge straffe. ligesom det ville
gøre det sværere for virksomhederne at tiltrække de mest kvalificerede kandidater til ledelsespo
sterne. Dette ville gå direkte imod formålet med tit & proper-regleme, idet det alt andet lige ville
betyde en lavere grad af egnethed i ledelseme.
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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I det hele taget er det. i forhold til de i diskussionspapiret nævnte forslag tit yderligere tiltag fra Fi
nanstilsynets side til sikring af tilstrækkelig egnethed og hæderlighed i de finansielle virksomheders
ledelse, FA’s opfattelse, at man bor være yderst opmærksom på at sikre den enkelte virksomheds
ledelsesret. De finansielle virksomheder må allerede med gældende regler og praksis af hensyn til
ovennævnte principper tåle et detaljeret og ressourcekrævende tilsyn på flere punkter og i flere
situationer. FA bakker som nævnt op om princippet om, at finansielle virksomheder bør ledes af
tilstrækkeligt egnede og hæderlige personer, men det er samtidig finanstilsynets konstante ansvar, i
forbindelse med tilsynet hermed, at sikre en rimelig balancegang imellem dette princip og princip
pet om virksomhedernes egen ledelsesret.
Med venlig hilsen
Jacob Skovholm
Juridisk konsulent
Finanssektorens Arbejdsgivërforening
Amaliegade 7
1256 København K
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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tztt0
2100 København 0
Sendt til [email protected]
F I NAN 8
DANMARK
Evaluering af gældende regler og praksis på fit
& proper-området er nødvendig, for der laves ny
regulering
Resumé
Hørcngssvar
3juli2017
Finanstilsynet hat offentliggjort et diskussionspapir om fit & proper-regleme i gode tider.
Finans Danmark er enig i. at det er et meget vigtigt emne. For det har stor betydning både for
virksomhederne og samfundet i øvrigt at sikre, at de finansielle virksomheder drives bedst muligt.
I kølvandet på finanskrisen er der taget en lang række initiativer både nationalt og internationalt
for at adtessere de problemer, som finanskrisen kastede lys over. Finans Danmark mener, at ef.
fekteme af disse initiativer hvoraf nogle har været i kraft i mindre end et år bor evalueres, før
flok ur 570979-vl
der træftès beslutning om nye initiativer. Det hænger også godt sammen med det arbejde, rege
ringen har sat i gang om eftersyn af den finansielle regulering med henblik på at aftlække. hvor
vidt der i den tinansielle regulering er en fornuftig balance mellem de administrative byrder og de
samfundsmæssige gevinster.
Finans Danmark skal i øvrigt understrege vigtigheden af. at initiativer på området skal have fokus
på fagligheden hos ledelsesmedlemmerne. Ansvaret for den egentlige ledelse og drift af institut
terne skal forblive i virksomhederne, mens tilsynet varetages af Finanstilsynet. De initiativer, der
vedtages. bor iagttage det gmndprincip.
FinIns t)onmark
Aniolieuucle 7
125t, Kobenliavn Is
www.finanscbimuack dk
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Diskussionspapir om ilt & proper-reglerne i go
de tider af 22. maj 2017
Finanstilsynet har deri 22. maj 2017 offentliggjort et diskussionspapir som opfølgning på tilsynets
konference i november 2016 om
tit
& proper-regleme i gode tider. Formålet er at rejse en debat
om. hvordan Finanstilsynet skal tilrettelægge tilsynet med tit & proper-regleme fremadrettet.
Diskussionspapiret er inddelt i en række emner, som Finans Danmark vil forholde sig til enkeltvis
nedenfor. Diskussionspapiret giver dog anledning til nogle generelle bemærkninger.
Der er tale om et særdeles vigtigt emne. Det er således både i samfundets og virksomhedernes
egen interesse at sikre, at de finansielle virksomheder drives bedst muligt. Finanstilsynet skriver.
at det er erfaringerne fra den seneste flnanskrise med bestyrelsessvigt og manglede kompeteneer
hos ledelserne, der var baggrunden for konferencen i november 2016 og nu diskussionspapiret.
Finanstilsynet nævner, at der er taget en række initiativer med henblik på at sikre stærkere cor
porate govemance. men at Danmark håndterer disse krav anderledes og til dels mindre indgriben
de end i en række nabolande og i forhold til internationale vejledninger.
Finans Danmark er ikke bekendt med, at der
af bankerne
efter at der for alvor er kommet fokus på ledelsen
har været rejst sager om bestyrelsessvigt og manglende kompetencer hos ledelseme.
Og da der allerede er vedtaget meget regulering på området, herunder blandt andet ledelsesbe
kendtgorelsen i 2011. selvevalueringer og krav til bestyrelseme i 2012 samt en række govemance
krav som følge afCRD IV, har Finans Danmark vanskeligt ved at se. at der på nuværende tids
punkt er behov for yderligere.
Finans Danmark støtter naturligvis ambitionen om, al de danske finansielle virksomheder skal
ledes bedst muligt, og Finans Danmark har også forholdt sig positivt i forhold til den regulering,
der er vedtaget, herunder blandt andet kravet om grundkursus for bestyrelsesmedlemmer, som
blev indført fra 1januar 2017. Men samtidig skal man også være opmærksom på, at en række af
initiativerne på govemanceområdet er så nye, at effekterne endnu ikke har vist sig i praksis. Ef
fekterne bor evalueres, inden der iværksættes yderligere reguleringsmæssige initiativer.
Finans Danmark skal i den forbindelse erindre om initiativet om eftersyn af deri t’rnansielle regule
ring, der følger afregeringsgmndlaget, og som har til formål at afdække. hvorvidt der i den tinan
sielle regulering er en fornuftig balance mellem de administrative byrder og de samfundsmæssige
gevinster.
Finans Danmark skal samtidig opfordre til, at de endelige retningslinjer på området fra EBA og
ESMA aft’entes, så der sikres overensstemmelse, og overimplementering undgås.
Endelig skal Finans Danmark understrege vigtigheden af, at man ikke i ønsket om at sikre betryg
gende ledelse af de frnansielle virksomheder fastsætter regulering, der griber ind i den egentlige
ledelse af virksomhederne. Det er bestyrelsen og direktionens ansvar at lede og drive virksomhe
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deme. og det er Finanstilsynets opgave at føre tilsyn. Finans Danmark finder det væsentligt at liol
de fast i dette grundprincip.
Kompetencer
i ledelsen
Finans Danmark støtter det øgede fokus, der er kommet på direktions- og bestyrelsesmedlemmers
faglige kompeteneer. I forbindelse med arbejdet med grundkursus for bestyrelsesmedlemmer blev
der også i kommissoriet lagt vægt på. at kurset skulle fokusere på faglige kompeteneer. mens der
ikke indgår krav
001
undervisning vedrørende bestvrelsesmedlemmemes personlige kompeteneer.
Finans Danmark lægger stor vægt på. at der sondres mellem faglige og personlige kompetencer. I
forhold til faglige kompeteneer kan der opstilles læringsmål mv.. mens de personlige kompeten
cer i højere grad er subjektive og en del af den rekrutteringsproees. der sker i virksomheden. Dette
bør der ikke ske regulering af.
Derudover er der mange andre væsentlige kompeteneefelter end de faglige og personlige kompe
teneer, som medlemmer af ledelsen bør besidde herunder blandt andet et “generalisthlik”. I de
virksomheder, der har et nomineringsudvalg, er det én af dette udvalgs opgaver at afdække alle
relevante kompeteneer hos medlemmer af og kandidater til bestyrelsen. Denne opgave var i øvrigt
også en afbaggrundene for at etablere nomineringsudvalget.
Kravet om grundkursus for bestyrelsesmedlemmer trådte i kraft I. januar 2017. og Finans Dan
mark mener, at man bor afvente effekten af dette krav, før der i øvrigt overvejes nye initiativer på
området.
Såfremt Finanstilsynet vurderer, at en virksomhed er udfordret i forhold til kompeteneer i ledel
sen, har Finanstilsynet allerede med de nugældende regler mulighed for at tage en dialog med
bestyrelsesfonranden, formændene for de forskellige bestyrelsesudvalg samt relevante fagansvar
lige ledere.
Kortlægning af kompeteneer og ansvar
Kortlægning af kompeteneer og ansvar er allerede i dag en vigtig forudsætning for det løbende
arbejde i nomineringsudvalgene (i de virksomheder, der har et sådant) og ledelseme i ovrigt. Men
selvom man kortlægger individuelle kompeteneer, er det afgørende at fastholde det grundlæggen
de princip om. at en bestyrelse ftogerer som et kollektivt organ, hvor medlemmerne
tdsaoio,en
skal besidde de nødvendige kompetencer til at drive virksomheden forsvarligt. De enkelte med
lemmer skal således ikke bære et individuelt ansvar for enkeltområder, selvom de besidder særli
ge kompetencer på det pågældende område.
Selvevaluering er i øvrigt et vigtigt værktøj for virksomhederne i forbindelse med kortlægning af
kompetencer, og Finanstilsynet har tidligere udstedt retningslinjer for, hvilke forhold bestyrelser
ne som minimum bør forholde sig til i evalueringen af deres viden og erfaring og disses sammen
hæng med virksomhedens forretningsmodel. For at sikre de bedste og mest retvisende evaluerin
ger bor de individuelle evalueringer fastholdes som et internt værktøj til virksomhedens eget brug
også henset til, at nodvendige kompetencer både fagligt og personligt vil afhænge af den kon
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krete virksomhed og ledelsens sammensætning i øvrigt. De overordnede konklusioner afevalue
ringeme vil derimod kunne anvendes af Finanstilsynet som led i tilsynsvirksnmheden.
Anvendelse af interviews i forbindelse med
fit
& proper-vurderinger
Finans Danmark anerkender vigtigheden afgnindige tït & proper-vurderinger. og vi mener, at den
proces, der er i dag, giver Finanstitsynet mulighed t’or at efterprove de objektive krav, der stilles i
henhold til lov om finansiel virksomhed. Finans Danmark stiller samtidig spørgsmålstegn ved,
hvilke forhold tilsynet mener, at interviews kan afdække, og som ikke kan afdækkes efter den
nuværende fremgangsmåde. Det synes at være forhold af mere subjektiv og personlig karakter
forhold som efter Finans Danmarks vurdering rettelig bor indgå i virksomhedernes rekmtterings
proces. De personlige kompetencer kan ikke stilles på formel, og det bør være den enkelte virk
somheds beslutning, hvitke personlige kompetencer de enkelte ledelsesmedlemmer bor besidde,
da dette også vil afhænge meget af den enkelte virksomheds øvrige forhold, herunder virksomhe
dens kultur og holdninger.
Man skal endvidere være opmærksom på. at interviews som led i tït & proper-vurderingerne vil
være ressourcekrævende. Det vil dels t’orlænge godkendelsesprocessen. ligesom det vil stilte sær
lige krav til de medarbejdere, der skal gennemføre interviewsene, athængig at hvilke l’orhold
Finanstilsynet ønsker belyst. Brug af interviews gør alt andet lige vurderingerne mere subjektive.
og det bringer Finanstilsynet meget tæt på rekwtteringsprocessen. Dette kan give udfordringer,
hvis det på et senere tidspunkt måtte vise sig nødvendigt at rejse sager i forhold til de pågældende
personer.
Betinget tit &
proper-godkendelse
Finans Danmark ser en række udfordringer ved betingede godkendelser. De ledelsesmedlemmer,
der rekrutteres. bør besidde de nødvendige kvalifikationer— om ikke andet, så når de har gennem
ført grtindkurset for bestyrelsesmedlemmer. Hvis der opereres med betingede godkendelser, kan
der stilles spørgsmålstegn ved ansvarst’ordelingen i en bestyrelse, hvor der både er betingede og
thldt ud godkendte medlemmer, ligesom det er vigtigt for en virksomhed at have vished om. at
ledelsen er endeligt t’astlagt.
Praktisk tit & proper-tilsyn som led i det løbende tilsyn
Finanstilsynet har allerede i dag adgang til alle dokumentet vedrørende virksomhederne hertin
der bestyrelsesmateriale og -protokol. Der stilles strenge krav til dokumentationen afbestyrelses
møderne, og der er således allerede i dag fuld gennemsigtighed i forhold til ledelsen af virksom
hederne.
Hvis Finanstilsynet deltager i bestyrelsesmoder
i
virksomhederne, rejser der sig en række meget
principielle spørgsmål; herunder hvilken rolle tilsynet har på møderne, om tilsynsmedarbejderen
har handtepligt, hvis medarbejderen vurderer, at bestyrelsen træffer en beslutning på for
kerUufuldstændigt grundlag eller i strid med regler eller politikker, hvordan man forholder sig til
det efterfølgende ansvar, hvis noget går galt kan en beslutning siges at være godkendt af Finan
stilsynet, hvis tilsynets repræsentant har deltaget i mødet. Derudover vil deltagelse i et enkelt
møde alene give et ojebtiksbillede af, hvordan bestyrelsen fungerer. Hvis det, der ønskes observe
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ret, et bestyrelsesmedlemmernes deltagelse på mødet, vil det jo ofte afhænge af de sager. der et på
dagsordenen.
Finanstilsynet har netop tit opgave at føre tilsyn med virksomhederne. Det er Finans Danmarks
opfattelse, at tilsynet kommer alt for tæt på den egentlige drift af virksomhederne. hvis tilsynet
skal deltage i bestyielsesmoderne. Der er således en risiko for, atjo mere man involverer sig i
driften af den enkelte virksomhed, jo vanskeligere bliver det at ageretilsynsmyndighed. Dette kan
hverken være i virksomhedernes. Finanstilsynets eller samfundets interesse.
Fit & proper-vu rdering af noglepersoner
Der er indført krav om fit & proper-vurdering afnøglepersoner i Stft-institutter som opfølgning
på den politiske aftale om SlEt’er. Kravet gælder for noglepersoner. der er ansat efter 1. januar
2017. Der var ikke i forbindelse med behandlingen af lovforslaget drøftelser om at udvide person
kredsen til at omfatte nøglepersoner i ikke-SIFI-institutter. Fordi reglerne er så nye, er det endnu
ikke muligt at sige noget om erfaringerne med de nye krav
herunder hvad effekten har været.
Det står dog klart, at der er tale om en omfattende proces for de medarbejdere, der bliver omfattet.
ligesom det også er indgribende i forhotd til de pågældendes familiemedlemmer, idet der gælder
særlige regler for eksponeringer.
Finans Danmark mener derfor, at der ikke på nuværende tidspunkt er grundlag for at udvide kred
sen af personer. der skal omfattes af fit & proper-vurderingerne.
Reaktioner og straf
Finans Danmark ser ikke noget behov for yderligere skærpelse afstratbestemmelserne. Finans
Danmark henviser til det arbejde, der blev gennemført af Udvalget om bodesanktioner på det
finansielle område, der afgav betænkning ijuni 2016. Der var i den forbindelse omfattende drot
telser af behovet for skærpelse afstraftëne i lov om finansiel virksomhed,
og
det resulterede i en
lovændring pr. 1. januar 2017, der har til formål at fastsætte et nyt bodeniveau.
Finans Danmark skal samtidig henvise til, at udgangspunktet i dansk ret ved valg af ausvarssub
jekt i særlovgivningen er, at tiltalen rejses mod den juridiske person.
Corporate governance
Finans Danmark ser ikke på nuværende tidspunkt behov for øvrige initiativer på området og skal i
den forbindelse henvise til den undersøgelse fra CBS. som også nævnes i diskussionspapirets
afsnit 2.8. Undersøgelsen konkluderer, at virksomheder kan få
svært
ved at tiltrække de rette kan
didater til bestyrelseme som følge af omfattende krav til bestyrelsesmedlemmeme.
Finans Danmark ser frem til at blive yderligere inddraget, såfremt Finanstilsynet overvejer at
ændre gældende regler eller praksis i relation tit fit & proper.
Med venlig hilsen
Fiinans
uanniark
AiuI&eade 7
I
1256 Kobenhan K
www finansdanrnarkUI(
ERU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 22: Diskussionspapir: Fit & proper-regler i gode tider
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Helene V. Gronfeldt
Direkte
+45 3370 L060
Mail hvg6?fida dk
ej)
Fjnans t)anmark
Amaliegade 7
[256 Kobenlian K
WWW.fInRflSdanitiark
dk