

FORSVARSMINISTERIET  
DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



Udleveret den 24. august 2015

## **Overblik over den danske militære indsats i Irak**

Beslutningsforslag B123 vedtaget den 2. oktober 2014 indeholder tre militære bidrag til bekæmpelsen af ISIL: et F-16 kampflybidrag, et kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag og et stabsofficersbidrag.

Beslutningsforslag B122 vedtaget den 27. august 2014 gav desuden mulighed for at yde transportstøtte med et C-130J transportfly i bekæmpelsen af ISIL. Mandatet for transportflybidraget er nu udløbet.

### **F-16 kampflybidraget**

Bidraget, der er placeret på al-Jaber luftbasen i Kuwait, består af syv kampfly, hvoraf tre er i logistisk reserve, samt for tiden ca. 90 personer, herunder fem personer, der er placeret ved luftoperationscentret (Combined Air Operations Center, CAOC) i Qatar.

Missionens formål og opgave er at bidrage til den amerikansk ledede koalition i kampen mod ISIL i Irak. De danske F-16 har været indsat i det centrale, vestlige og nordlige Irak. Den seneste tid har operationerne i større grad været fokuseret i det vestlige og nordvestlige Irak.

De danske fly er indsat til støtte for den irakiske regering og de irakiske og kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrker og indgår som en del af koalitionsens samlede luftindsats i Irak. Der er fra dansk side ikke indlagt nogen geografiske begrænsninger for, hvor de danske fly kan indsættes i Irak.

Kampflybidraget har pr. 23. august 2015 gennemført i alt 989 flyvninger fordelt på 488 missioner. Der er anvendt i alt 443 bomber.

Da danske F-16 har i den seneste tid overvejende gennemført missioner i Ninawa og Al Anbar provinserne. Måltyperne for de gennemførte angreb har været personel, bygninger og materiel, som ISIL anvender.

Siden det danske kampflybidrag blev deployeret til Kuwait i starten af oktober 2014, har i alt seks hold været udsendt. Det nuværende hold seks består af knap 90 personer, fordelt på otte piloter, ca. 30 mekanikere (herunder klarmeldere, våbenspecialister, elektronikmekanikere og flymekanikere generelt) og ca. 50 andre medarbejdere, herunder detachementschefen og hans stab, militærpoliti, bevogtning, efterretning, missionsplanlæggere m.fl.

F-16 flyene gennemfører normalt to missioner med hver to fly seks dage om ugen. De danske fly deltager både i overvågnings- og indhentningsmissioner og i offensive missioner, hvor flyene eksempelvis indsættes som direkte luftstøtte til styrker på landjorden, eller hvor flyene angriber på forhånd udpegede og godkendte militære mål. Flyene kan også få til opgave at patruljere i luften med det formål at undersøge bestemte objekter eller steder på jorden. Hvis der i denne sammenhæng identificeres militære mål kan flyene beordres til at angribe disse.

Alle indsættelser af danske fly koordineres, planlægges og godkendes af et særligt dansk eksperthold, det såkaldte Mission and Target Approval Authority– hold (MTAA), der er udstationeret ved CAOC' en i Qatar. Holdet består af personer med relevante kompetencer inden for flyoperationer, efterretninger og humanitær folkeret. Ekspertholdet har til opgave at godkende samtlige danske F-16-missioner inden de udføres med henblik på at tilsikre, at de danske kampfly kun indsættes mod militære mål og efter bedste evne undgå, at der sker utilsigtede følgeskader i forbindelse med bombningerne.

I holdet indgår ligeledes den såkaldte Red Card Holder, som er en officer, der på Danmarks vegne kan sige nej til en opgave, som fx vil overskride de magtanvendelsesregler, som de danske fly er underlagt. Formålet er at tilsikre, at de danske kampfly kun indsættes mod militære mål, og at opgaverne ligger inden for rammerne af mandatet samt efter bedste evne at undgå, at der sker utilsigtede følgeskader i forbindelse med bombningerne.

Der foretages altid en grundig vurdering af risici for følgeskader i forbindelse med udvælgelsen af mål , og hvis grundlaget ikke er godt nok, gennemføres missionerne ikke. De efterretninger, som måludpegningen er baseret på, skal være valideret fra flere forskellige kilder, ligesom piloten altid har mulighed for at afbryde missionen og korrigere, hvis tingene udvikler sig anderledes en forventet. Samtidig er piloterne gennem deres uddannelse trænet i at undgå følgeskader. Desuden anvendes der udelukkende ammunitionstyper, der kan ramme mål på jorden med stor præcision, således at risikoen for utilsigtede følgeskader begrænses.

Forsvaret har oplyst, at der ikke er modtaget meldinger om eller indikationer på, at der har været civile tab i forbindelse med de danske bombninger.

Ud over den humanitære folkeret er bidraget underlagt magtanvendelsesreglerne for missionen, samt eventuelle begrænsninger fastsat i Forsvarets direktiver. Reglerne i den humanitære folkeret vil altid have forrang.

Missionen forløber hidtil som planlagt. Alle de danske bomber er præcisionsstyrede, hvilket vil sige, at de styres mod deres mål af enten laser eller GPS.

I henhold til gældende mandat (B123) er det danske F-16 bidrag indtil videre udsendt i 12 måneder frem til primo oktober 2015.

### **Kapacitetsopbygningsbidraget**

Formålet med kapacitetsopbygningsbidraget er at vejlede og uddanne irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker for derved at skabe forudsætningerne for, at irakerne selv kan gennemføre operationer med henblik på at bekæmpe ISIL.

Det danske kontingent er udsendt til Al-Asad luftbasen i det vestlige Irak og består af ca. 120 trænere, sikringsfolk, logistikere m.v. Selve træningen gennemføres i samarbejde mellem danske og amerikanske soldater, og de to bidrag er fuldt ud integrerede. Kontingentet er underlagt en amerikansk chef, mens den danske forsvarschef bevarer fuld kommando over de danske styrker.

Samlet set har det danske træningsbidrag på Al Asad indtil videre har været med til at udanne over 1.400 irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker. Der gennemføres primært infanteriuddannelse i grundlæggende færdigheder, herunder våbenbetjening og bykamp. Desuden undervises der bl.a. i imødegåelse af vejsidebomber samt i krigens love.

Siden det danske træningsbidrag ankom til Al Asad i januar, har der været perioder, hvor det har været vanskeligt at sikre en kontinuerlig tilgang af irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker, der har kunnet deltage i træningen. Den vigtigste forklaring på dette er, at de irakiske soldater har været indsat i kampen mod ISIL og derfor ikke har kunnet frigives til at deltage i træningen. Al-Asad basen ligger midt i et område, hvor ISIL står stærkt, og i komplekse krigssituationer, som den i Irak, er det desværre ikke altid muligt at kontrollere de vilkår, som vores soldater arbejder under.

Gennem de seneste par måneder har der dog været en stabil tilgang af irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker, men erfaringen har dog vist, at der kan ske justeringer i sådanne planer, og at der kan opstå ændringer i træningssituationen med meget kort varsel – både til det værre og til det bedre.

Forsvaret har løbende været i kontakt med den amerikansk ledede koalition omkring udfordringerne, og der er fra amerikansk side løbende blevet lagt pres på den irakiske hærledelse for at sikre tilgangen af nye enheder. Forsvaret har naturligvis sammen med koalitionens fokus på også fremadrettet at sikre den bedst mulige anvendelse af det danske træningsbidrag.

Ud over det nuværende kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag på al-Asad har Forsvaret tidligere (november 2014 til februar 2015) udsendt et hold på 28 personer, som sammen med britiske soldater trænede kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrker i al-Sulaymaniyah-provinsen i det nordlige Irak. Kombinationen af de to bidrag medfører, at Danmark har bidraget til at træne både kurdiske og irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker.

Aftalen mellem den amerikansk ledede koalition og den irakiske regering er, at der gennemføres udannelse af irakiske enheder på fire kendte lokaliteter i Irak:

- Besmayah (syd for Bagdad)
- Taji (nord for Bagdad)
- Erbil (Kurdistan)
- Al Asad (Al Anbar-provisen)

I henhold til mandatet (B123) er der ikke fastsat noget sluttidspunkt for det danske træningsbidrag.

### **Stabsbidraget**

Der er i øjeblikket udsendt ca. 15 danske stabsofficerer i koalitionens regionale stabshovedkvarterer i Kuwait, Qatar og Irak. Stabsbidraget bidrager til planlægning og gennemførelse af de militære operationer i Irak.



Beslutningsforslag nr. B 123

Folketinget 2013-14

---

Fremsat den 30. september 2014 af udenrigsministeren (Martin Lidegaard)

## **Forslag til folketingsbeslutning**

om

### **yderligere dansk militært bidrag til støtte for indsatsen mod ISIL**

Folketinget meddeler sit samtykke til, at et yderligere dansk militært bidrag – efter anmodning fra den irakiske og den amerikanske regering – stilles til rådighed for den inter-

ationale indsats til støtte for Iraks militære indsats mod terrorbevægelsen ISIL og for at bistå myndighederne i Irak med at beskytte civilbefolkningen mod alvorlige overgreb.

## Bemærkninger til forslaget

I. Terrororganisationen Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) udgør en alvorlig trussel mod befolkningerne i Irak, Syrien og det øvrige Mellemøsten og udgør også en voksende risiko for dansk og international sikkerhed. ISIL truer i særdeleshed Iraks stabilitet og integritet som sammenhængende stat samtidig med, at gruppen skaber sig et frirum, hvorfra den bl.a. kan planlægge og gennemføre terrorangreb i regionen og resten af verden.

I samarbejde med lokale bevæbnede sunni-arabiske grupper med rødder i Iraks tidligere regerings- og sikkerhedsstrukturer har ISIL i perioden fra januar 2014 til august 2014 taget kontrollen over store dele af det vestlige og nordvestlige Irak. Samtidig har ISIL gennem bl.a. pres og trusler formået at få flere lokale sunnistammer til at deltage i kampene mod de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker og de shiamuslimske militser, ligesom gruppen har formået at tiltrække såkaldte ”foreign fighters”. ISIL råder over betydelige militære og økonomiske midler, der indtil videre har gjort organisationen i stand til også at gennemføre større og længerevarende offensive operationer.

ISIL har systematisk begået massive overgreb, herunder massehenrettelser. FN's sikkerhedsrådsresolution 2178 af 24. september 2014 og resolution 2170 af 15. august 2014 fordømmer ISIL og de grove overgreb mod civile og alvorlige krænkelse af menneskerettighederne. Siden ISIL intensiverede sine angreb i Irak i juni i år, er hundredetusindvis fordrevet. FN anslår, at ca. 1,8 millioner irakere er blevet fordrevet siden årets begyndelse, heraf omkring 600.000 alene i august. Knap halvdelen af de internt fordrevne er flygtet til det kurdiske selvstyreområde. Samtidig gør kamphandlingerne og ISIL's tilstedeværelse det svært for humanitære aktører at opnå adgang til de nødlidende i konfliktområderne.

ISIL har udnyttet den udbredte utilfredshed med Iraks centralstyre blandt landets sunni-arabiske mindretal. Utilfredsheden bunder bl.a. i den forhenværende al-Maliki-ledede regerings uforsonlige linje over for det sunni-arabiske mindretal og den manglende vilje til at inddrage landets kurdere og sunnier i den politiske proces. Den 8. september 2014 godkendte det irakiske parlament en ny og mere inklusiv samlingsregering under ledelse af premierminister al-Abadi. Det er forhåbningen, at lokale sunni-arabiske grupper støtte til ISIL på sigt vil vige til fordel for en i højere grad repræsentativ regering med en mere inddragende politik.

ISIL's fremgang i Irak er bl.a. en konsekvens af svage nationale sikkerhedsstrukturer. Dannelsen af en bredere sammensat regering styrker grundlaget for en effektivisering og styrkelse af landets sikkerhedsstyrker. Hvis de irakiske styrker skal blive i stand til at nedkæmpe ISIL og genetablere territorial kontrol, er der samtidig et akut behov for omfattende international støtte til militær træning, uddannelse og rådgivning.

Den irakiske regering udsendte gennem FN's sikkerhedsråd den 25. juni 2014 en generel appel til det internationale samfund om assistance i kampen mod ISIL. For at standse ISIL's fremmarch i Irak og med henvisning til den forværrede humanitære situation i Irak, iværksatte USA den 8. august 2014 målrettede luftangreb på anmodning fra den irakiske regering. Samtidig iværksattes humanitære indsatser til hjælp af yazidi-mindretallet og andre udsatte grupper såvel som våbenstøtte til de kurdiske myndigheder. Efterfølgende har USA sammen med en række lande fra regionen siden den 22. september 2014 tillige indledt luftoperationer imod ISIL i Syrien.

Den indledende amerikanske og internationale indsats har bidraget til at afhjælpe den humanitære krise og gjort det muligt for irakiske og kurdiske styrker i nogen udstrækning at håndtere ISIL's offensiv, herunder at generobre områder, som ISIL tidligere havde overtaget. Udover at yde humanitær bistand stillede Danmark et C-130J transportfly til rådighed for den amerikansk-ledede operation i Irak, jf. B122.

Der vurderes at være behov for yderligere støtte til Iraks kamp mod ISIL, herunder for, i overensstemmelse med princippet om Responsibility to Protect, at bistå myndigheder i Irak med at beskytte civilbefolkningen mod alvorlige overgreb.

II. Danmark var med bl.a. transportfly-bidraget blandt de første lande til at støtte den amerikansk-ledede indsats mod ISIL. Det har været vigtigt for Danmark, at kampen mod ISIL har opbakning fra så bred en kreds af lande som muligt, herunder ikke mindst landene i regionen, samt at der gennemføres en bredspektret indsats til imødegåelsen af ISIL. Efter USA den 8. august 2014 iværksatte militær støtte til kampen mod ISIL, har man parallelt arbejdet for at samle en bred, international koalition mod ISIL for at sikre, at bekæmpelsen af ISIL er bredt forankret og nyder opbakning fra regionen.

Danmark deltog som ét af 10 lande i et møde på amerikansk initiativ om den fremtidige strategi for bekæmpelsen af ISIL i forbindelse med NATO-topmødet i Wales den 5. september 2014. Danmark deltog også i den internationale konference om fred og sikkerhed i Irak med deltagelse af 26 lande og 3 internationale organisationer i Paris den 15. september 2014 samt i en særlig debat i FN's sikkerhedsråd den 19. september 2014.

FN's sikkerhedsråd understregede i en formandskabsudtalelse den 19. september 2014, at ISIL udgør en stor regional trussel og opfordrede det internationale samfund til yderligere at styrke og udvide støtten til den irakiske regering i kampen mod ISIL og relaterede terrorgrupper. Med henvisning til den tidligere fremsatte appel fra den 25. juni 2014 samt den hastigt voksende koalition mod ISIL genfremsatte den irakiske regering i brev af 20. september 2014 til FN's sikkerhedsråd anmodningen om støtte og gav sit udtrykkelige samtykke til, at USA leder den samlede internationale indsats mod ISIL. I sin tale til FN's generalforsamling den

26. september 2014 kom Iraks præsident igen med en stærk appel til det internationale samfund om at fortsætte støtten til den irakiske regering med at yde beskyttelse til Iraks udsatte civilbefolkning og støtte bekæmpelsen af ISIL.

USA har den 25. september 2014 fremsat en konkret anmodning om yderligere danske bidrag til den internationale koalitions indsats mod ISIL med henvisning til militære behov af hastende karakter. Anmodningen omfatter bidrag til luftoperationer i form af informationsindhentning og luftangreb i Irak, samt stabsbidrag til koalitions hovedkvarterer. Da koalitionen luftangreb mod ISIL vil have størst varig effekt, når de kombineres med opbygning af de irakiske og kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrkers kapacitet, så de bedre bliver i stand til at bekæmpe ISIL på jorden og på sigt tage vare på egen sikkerhed, anmodes der tillige om støtte til kapacitetsopbygning af de kurdiske og irakiske styrker.

En samlet dansk plan til bekæmpelse af ISIL vil bestå af diplomatiske, civile og militære bidrag samt humanitære midler til afhjælpning af den humanitære krise, som ISIL har afstedkommet. Hermed afspejler det danske bidrag, at kampen mod ISIL kræver en bredspektret indsats for varig fred og stabilitet i regionen.

III. Det militære bidrag består af tre dele: Et F-16 kampflybidrag, som vil omfatte op til i alt ca. 140 personer. Et stabsbidrag bestående af op til ca. 20 personer. Og endeligt et kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag, inkl. logistikbidrag, som forventes at omfatte op til i alt ca. 120 personer.

Det danske styrkebidrag vil bestå af fire operative F-16 kampfly samt op til tre F-16 kampfly i logistisk reserve. Bidraget vil bl.a. indeholde forbindelses- og stabsofficerer ved relevante hovedkvarterer. F-16-bidraget vil omfatte op til i alt ca. 140 personer, idet det præcise antal bl.a. vil afhænge af den konkrete placering og kommandostruktur. Derudover vil der i forbindelse med etableringen af styrkebidraget på en luftbase i regionen være behov for midlertidig udsendelse af yderligere personer til udpakning, opstilling, etablering af kommunikationsforbindelser og værksteder mv. De danske fly vil kunne indsættes i det fulde spektrum af luftoperationer inden for irakisk territorium, hvilket kan indebære deltagelse i såvel informationsindhentning som offensive luftoperationer. Den luftmilitære indsats forventes koordineret af USA. F-16 bidraget udsendes foreløbigt i op til 12 måneder, idet forlængelse vil kunne komme på tale, jf. afsnit IX.

Endvidere vil det danske styrkebidrag bestå af et stabsbidrag på op til ca. 20 personer, som vil indgå i koalitionen hovedkvarterer i og uden for regionen, herunder muligvis i Irak. Stabsbidraget vil bl.a. skulle bidrage til planlægning og gennemførelse af de militære operationer i Irak.

Det danske militære bidrag vil desuden bestå af kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag med henblik på kapacitetsopbygning (rådgivning, træning og uddannelse mm.) af irakiske og kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrker forventeligt i regionen, herunder i Irak. Opgaverne vil være rettet mod brigadeniveau og under. Der foreligger endnu ikke en konkret tidsplan for kapacitetsopbygningsindsatsen, men et dansk bidrag forventes at ville indgå i en britisk eller amerikansk ramme. I tilknytning til

kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag vil der være behov for udsendelse af logistikbidrag. Kapacitetsopbygningsbidraget inkl. logistikbidraget forventes at omfatte op til i alt ca. 120 personer afhængig af opgaver mv.

De danske militære bidrag forventes at være under operativ kontrol af amerikanske myndigheder, men den danske forsvarschef bevarer fuld kommando.

IV. En bred gruppe af lande støtter den amerikansk-ledede indsats mod ISIL. Over 50 lande, heraf mere end 10 fra regionen, yder militær, humanitær, politisk og anden støtte til Irak og koalitionen. Omkring 20 lande bidrager militært gennem direkte kampstøtte og militær træning, ved tilvejebringelse af våben, ammunition og andet udstyr, eller med logistisk støtte. Udover USA bidrager Storbritannien, Frankrig, Nederlandene, Belgien, Australien, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi-Arabien, de Forenede Arabiske Emirater og Qatar til luftoperationerne mod ISIL.

V. FN opgraderede i august 2014 krisen i Irak til den højeste humanitære krisekategori. Mange familier er flygtet med kort varsel og er i en desperat situation. To dage efter ISIL's indtagelse af Mosul i juni bevilligede Danmark sammenlagt 20 mio. kr. til UNHCR's og WFP's akutresponser. Som reaktion på den seneste fordrivelsesbølge i Irak i august har Danmark desuden den 26. august 2014 bevilliget sammenlagt 15 mio. kr. til Dansk Flygtningehjælp, Røde Kors i Danmark og Red Barnets humanitære indsatser i det nordlige Irak. Der er ydet yderligere to millioner kroner til Beredskabsstyrelsens bidrag til etablering af en lejr for op mod 20.000 internt fordrevne. Sammenlagt har Danmark bidraget med 49,2 mio. kr. til humanitære indsatser i Irak i 2014.

VI. Det folkeretlige grundlag for det danske bidrag er et samtykke fra Irak.

Den irakiske udenrigsminister har i brev af 25. juni 2014 til FN's generalsekretær understreget, at Irak står overfor en alvorlig trussel fra ISIL. På den baggrund opfordrer Irak FN's medlemsstater til efter nærmere aftale med den irakiske regering at yde støtte til Irak med henblik på at bekæmpe ISIL og beskytte irakisk territorium og befolkning.

Under den internationale konference om fred og sikkerhed i Irak, der blev afholdt i Paris den 15. september 2014 med Irak og Frankrig som værter, gav de deltagende lande, herunder Danmark, deres tilsagn om at støtte den irakiske regering i kampen mod ISIL med alle nødvendige midler, herunder passende militær assistance. Landenes støtte skal ydes i overensstemmelse med Iraks behov og folkeretten.

I forlængelse heraf har den irakiske regering i et brev af 20. september 2014 til FN's sikkerhedsråd anmodet om og givet sit udtrykkelige samtykke til, at USA leder den internationale indsats med henblik på at rette angreb mod ISIL's tilholdssteder for at fjerne den aktuelle trussel mod Irak, beskytte den irakiske befolkning samt udruste de irakiske styrker til at genvinde kontrollen med Iraks grænser.

USA har den 25. september 2014 anmodet Danmark om yderligere bidrag til den internationale indsats.

På baggrund af Iraks brev til FN's sikkerhedsråd og den amerikanske anmodning har Danmark, med forbehold for

parlamentarisk godkendelse, tilbudt Irak yderligere dansk assistance, som beskrevet ovenfor. Den irakiske udenrigsminister har hilst den tilbudte danske militære assistance velkommen.

Det danske bidrag vil være undergivet folkeretten, herunder den humanitære folkeret.

Indsættelse af danske F-16 fly i offensive luftoperationer mod ISIL-mål i Irak betyder efter regeringens opfattelse, at Danmark indtræder på Iraks side, sammen med de øvrige militært aktive koalitionslande, i den væbnede konflikt mod ISIL i Irak.

VII. Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE) har givet følgende trusselsvurdering for koalitionsstyrkerne:

Generelt set kan sikkerhedssituationen lokalt ændre sig meget hurtigt i hele Irak. Truslen fra ISIL mod koalitionsstyrker i områder og byer, som er kontrolleret af ISIL, er MEGET HØJ. Truslen fra beskydning af helikoptere og fly, der befinder sig i nærheden af kamphandlinger i hele Irak, er HØJ under 5.000 meter (AGL). Truslen fra beskydning af alle luftfartøjer, der flyver i irakisk luftrum, er generelt MIDDEL under 5.000 meter (AGL). FE vurderer videre, at truslen fra beskydning af luftfartøjer, der flyver over 5.000 meter (AGL) i hele Irak, er LAV. Truslen fra indirekte og direkte beskydning i Irak er HØJ i områder med kamphandlinger. I områder, hvor der ikke foregår direkte kamphandlinger, herunder Bagdad by, er truslen fra indirekte og direkte beskydning MIDDEL. I områder, som ikke er truet af ISIL, er truslen fra indirekte og direkte beskydning LAV. Terrortruslen i Irak, herunder truslen fra tilbageholdelser, kidnapninger og IED'er, er HØJ. Truslen fra civile uroligheder i Irak er MIDDEL. Truslen fra angreb med improviserede kemiske våben i Irak er MIDDEL i områder med kamphandlinger og i områder kontrolleret af ISIL. I andre områder er truslen fra angreb med improviserede kemiske våben LAV. Truslen fra spionage i Irak er HØJ. Truslen fra de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker er LAV. Dog vurderer FE, at truslen fra insiderangreb blandt de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker er MIDDEL. Truslen for terror rettet mod Forsvaret i Danmark er MIDDEL.

VIII. Da det danske militære bidrag vil indgå i en indsats, hvor der forudses anvendt militære magtmidler, forelægges

sagen for Folketinget under henvisning til Grundlovens § 19, stk. 2, med anmodning om, at Folketinget giver sit samtykke til udsendelse af det danske bidrag, som beskrevet ovenfor.

IX. Regeringen vil løbende vurdere det danske bidrags sammensætning med henblik på at sikre en effektiv opgaveløsning. Såfremt det skulle vise sig hensigtsmæssigt at justere eller forlænge bidraget væsentligt, eller såfremt der skulle ske en væsentlig ændring i forhold til de i afsnit III beskrevne opgaver, vil regeringen rådføre sig med Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn herom eller om nødvendigt på ny forelægge sagen for Folketinget.

X. De forventede meromkostninger forbundet med udsendelsen af et kampflybidrag i op til et år, er behæftet med betydelig usikkerhed som følge af usikkerheden om indsættelsesvarighed samt typer af missioner og mål mv.

Forsvaret anslår, at de samlede meromkostninger forbundet med udsendelse af et kampflybidrag i op til et år vil kunne udgøre mellem 110–135 mio. kr., eksklusiv ammunitionsforbrug. Der er betydelig usikkerhed om det forventede ammunitionsforbrug, da det afhænger af hvilke missioner og mål, de danske fly tildeles samt varigheden af styrkebidragets indsættelse.

Forsvaret anslår, at meromkostningerne forbundet med udsendelse af et stabsbidrag på op til ca. 20 personer, som vil indgå i koalitionsens hovedkvarterer i og uden for regionen, vil kunne udgøre op til ca. 15 mio. kr. for et år.

Meromkostningerne forbundet med udsendelse af et dansk kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag, inklusiv logistikbidrag, vil afhænge af størrelsen af det danske bidrag og de opgaver, der skal løses i regi af koalitionen. Forsvaret anslår, at de forventede meromkostninger ved de mulige bidrag på dette område samlet set vil kunne udgøre op til ca. 120 mio. kr. for et år. De konkrete meromkostninger vil afhænge af bidragets endelige sammensætning, opgaven, indsættelsesvilkår, samarbejdspartnere mv.

Meromkostningerne forbundet med udsendelsen afholdes inden for Forsvarets eksisterende økonomiske ramme på § 12.



# ISIS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq Map

## from 23/07/2015 to 30/07/2015


Crisis Response and Operational Coordination (MD CROC)

### IRAQ:

- 1 - Turkish airstrike targeted PKK bases throughout Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces in Iraqi Kurdistan (24-26/07/2015)
- 2 - Two suicide attackers detonated explosives at a public swimming pool in Tuz Khurmatu, at least five civilians (29/07/2015)
- 3 - Twenty-two members of Iraq's security forces, believed to have been Iraqi soldiers and Shia militia fighters from the Popular Mobilisation Forces, were killed during a double suicide car bomb attack in Fallujah (24/05/2015)
- 4 - A source in the Iraqi police announced on Wednesday that the outcome of the explosion, which occurred at Martyrs Bayaa area south of Baghdad, ended at 18 dead and 31 wounded (23/07/2015)

### SYRIA:

- 5 - Turkish F-16 strike hits positions near Azaz (23/07/2015)
- 6 - The helicopters attacked after midnight areas in al- Zabadani, accompanied by violent clashes between the local rebels and Islamist faction against the Fourth Division and Hezbollah around al- Zabadani (29/07/2015)



### Legend

- National capital
- Governorate capitals
- Other places
- Recent events
- IS training camp
- Main road network
- Syrian regime airstrikes / barrel bombs
- Iraqi Aviation airstrikes
- Turkish Aviation airstrike
- Main Places under ISIS control
- Places contested

### Area of Control (as of 08 July 2015)

- Controlled by Islamic State (IS)
- Autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq
- Controlled by Syrian rebels
- Controlled by Syrian/Iraqi regime
- Kurds (YPG and allies)
- alliance of Kurdish, Arab tribes and Syriac communities

AIRSTRIKES /AIRDROP	2015 JUL				Country	AIRSTRIKES /AIRDROP	2015 JUL				Country
	23-24	25-26	27-28	29 JUL			23-24	25-26	27-28	29 JUL	
Kobane	6	9	2		Syria	Mosul	6	4	3	1	Iraq
Al Hasakah	9	7	17	2	Syria	Sinjar	2	3	7	1	Iraq
Aleppo		2	3		Syria	Tal Afar	3	2	2	1	Iraq
Ar Raqqah	3				Syria	Fallujah	3	7			Iraq
Habbaniyah		3	2		Iraq	Haditha	1	1	1	1	Iraq
Hawija			1		Iraq	Balji	2	1	3		Iraq
Qaim	1	1	1		Iraq	Makhmur	6	4	5		Iraq
Rutbah			1		Iraq	Ramadi	4	10	10	3	Iraq
Dayr Az		1			Syria	Tuz		4			Iraq
Idlib				1	Syria	Al Asad		1			Iraq
						Habbaniyah	2	3	2	1	Iraq

### Airstrikes (Operation Inherent Resolve)

- US and EU Member states do airstrikes in Iraq and Syria
- US and Arab allies do airstrikes in Syria

\*certain countries did not disclose the location of their airstrikes

Disclaimer: this map does not reflect the official opinion of the European Commission or other European Union institutions. Neither the European Commission / European External Action Service nor any person or company acting on the behalf of the European Commission / European External Action Service is responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained in this map.

Production carried out by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre with the support of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

[Home](#) | [News](#) | [News Articles](#) | [One year in, officials assess anti-ISIL progress](#)

## One year in, officials assess anti-ISIL progress

By Air Force Master Sgt. Sonny Cohrs, U.S. Air Forces Central Command



After a year of intense fighting, U.S. military officials in Iraq have said that the coalition's progress against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is "significant." The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) announced that coalition forces have destroyed more than 11,000 ISIL weapons and supplies, and captured more than 11,000 ISIL fighters. The coalition also reported that it has destroyed more than 11,000 ISIL weapons and supplies, and captured more than 11,000 ISIL fighters. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. William Marlow)

1  
2  
3  
[Previous](#)

[Next](#)

**Share**



**SOUTHWEST ASIA, Aug. 7, 2015** – On Aug. 8, 2014, coalition aircraft conducted the first airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. A year later, senior leaders have had a chance to reflect on the progress thus far and how it shapes the future of Operation Inherent Resolve.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter said in late July that bolstering Iraq's security forces and building moderate, vetted Syrian opposition forces is essential to enabling the two countries to defeat ISIL and work to establish peace within their own countries.

"We can help them. We can enable them. We can train them. We can equip them. We can support them," he said. "But we can't substitute for them. Because we don't live here ... we can't keep them beaten. Only the people who live here can keep them beaten."

While coalition air power patrols the skies, ground forces continue to train and equip vetted local forces in Iraq. About 3,550 American personnel are in Iraq, helping to build partner capacities and assisting with ongoing operations.

Training for new Syrian forces is still in the early stages, but Carter views it as a "critical and complex part" of counter-ISIL efforts.

The air campaign continues to have success in striking ISIL facilities, vehicles and equipment, and it enables both the Iraqi Security Forces as well as anti-ISIL fighters in Syria, according to U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Kevin Killea, the chief of staff for Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve.

"In my opinion, this is not the same fight as it was when it started, and I look at that based on the effects that we have had on ISIL," Killea said.

"They are much more territorial -- meaning they're defending more than they are on the offensive. Their attacks are smaller, they are more focused, and they're less enduring, and all you have to do is look at the gains that have been made on the ground recently to see ... there is an effect, and there is progress," he said.

Unlike ISIL, Killea said, the coalition works to address and minimize the possibility of collateral damage and civilian casualties.

"We have struck ... staging areas and destroyed multiple ISIL armored personnel carriers and other vehicles," he explained. "Coalition forces have also focused on destroying ISIL [roadside bomb] facilities. Airstrikes have gone a long way to degrade ISIL's ability to mount large offensive attacks, as well as reducing their ability to openly control towns and cities, where they so often inflict terror on those civilian populations."

Air Force Lt. Gen. C.Q. Brown Jr., commander of the combined force air component, said American troops and their coalition partners have conducted more than 5,900 airstrikes since the start of Operation Inherent Resolve. The airstrikes are intended to limit ISIL's freedom of movement, Brown said, while constraining its ability to reinforce its fighters and degrading its command and control.

"Our coalition air power enables [anti-ISIL] ground forces in Iraq and Syria," he said. "The faster [ISIL] falls, the sooner innocent civilians can return to a peaceful way of life."

The general also commended the coalition on its ability to make precise strikes against ISIL targets while minimizing collateral damage on the ground and restricting freedom of movement for ISIL. Of the 20,000-plus coalition munitions used against ISIL in the last year, 99 percent of them were precision-guided, Brown said.

"Coalition airstrikes are the most precise in the history of warfare," he said. "Conducting strikes in heavily populated areas where [ISIL] hides can present a challenge, but our coalition pilots are well disciplined and our weapon systems are extremely accurate."

Once the ISIL members are flushed out into the open by advancing anti-ISIL fighters, they are once again susceptible to

coalition targeting, Brown added.

He said coalition forces can redirect the enemy's advances or retreats, forcing them to travel discreetly or risk coalition airstrikes.

"Even our combat air patrols - merely the presence of coalition aircraft in an area - also affect their freedom of movement," Brown explained. "And one year into this coalition effort to rid the world of these [ISIL] terrorists, the team can be proud of what they've accomplished. Their hard work and sacrifice have already saved countless lives and we will not stop until we have defeated this barbaric enemy."

# UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

[Home](#) | [News](#) | [News Articles](#) | [Coalition leaders assess BPC program, ISF development](#)

## Coalition leaders assess BPC program, ISF development

CJTF - Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs



Coalition members participate in a building partner capacity conference at Camp Taji, Iraq, July 22, 2015. The conference brought together senior leaders to assess Iraqi security force training programs at BPC sites across the country. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Charles M. Bailey)

Share



**CAMP TAJI, Iraq, Aug. 5, 2015** – Since January, more than 60 coalition partners from around the world have joined Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to help Iraq defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Leaders from the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Iraq, a component of CJTF-OIR, recently met to assess the current training model for Iraqi security forces, and to develop lasting solutions in the building partner capacity mission.

Among the topics discussed were the length of instruction, capturing lessons learned in training through a comprehensive assessment program, and leadership development.

For an army currently engaged in a war, the opportunity to send units for longer training isn't easy. Iraqi leaders have to balance keeping troops available to fight ISIL and sending them to train at one of the five coalition-led BPC sites across Iraq.

Capturing lessons learned from both combat and training to improve the readiness of the ISF was one of the most heavily discussed topics, along with the need for strong leadership within the ranks.

“An effective assessments regime is the mark of a healthy learning organization,” said a coalition officer who oversees ISF development. “Any gains we make in the field of assessments, especially when it directly involves our Iraqi partners, is a step in the right direction.”

Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Green, command sergeant major of CJFLCC-I, said that leadership comes with an obligation.

“Anybody assuming a position of authority or responsibility has to meet the competencies required of that position,” Green said. “The most important part of enhancing leadership is providing an example of 'what right looks like,' and mentorship.”

One of the ways that CJFLCC-I accomplishes this mission is by pairing ISF leaders with coalition leaders during training.

“By way of example and coaching, we look to enhance leadership skills,” Green said.

The conference highlights the coalition’s commitment to the BPC mission in Iraq as security forces fight to defeat ISIL. Nearly 11,000 ISF and Peshmerga forces have been trained at the BPC sites, with approximately 1,100 currently in training.

## The Terror Strategist

# Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State

By Christoph Reuter

An Iraqi officer planned Islamic State's takeover in Syria and SPIEGEL has been given exclusive access to his papers. They portray an organization that, while seemingly driven by religious fanaticism, is actually coldly calculating.

Aloof. Polite. Cajoling. Extremely attentive. Restrained. Dishonest. Inscrutable. Malicious. The rebels from northern Syria, remembering encounters with him months later, recall completely different facets of the man. But they agree on one thing: "We never knew exactly who we were sitting across from."

In fact, not even those who shot and killed him after a brief firefight in the town of Tal Rifaat on a January morning in 2014 knew the true identity of the tall man in his late fifties. They were unaware that they had killed the strategic head of the group calling itself "Islamic State" (IS). The fact that this could have happened at all was the result of a rare but fatal miscalculation by the brilliant planner. The local rebels placed the body into a refrigerator, in which they intended to bury him. Only later, when they realized how important the man was, did they lift his body out again.

Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was.

But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state. It is a folder full of handwritten organizational charts, lists and schedules, which describe how a country can be gradually subjugated. SPIEGEL has gained exclusive access to the 31 pages, some consisting of several pages pasted together. They reveal a multilayered composition and directives for action, some already tested and others newly devised for the anarchical situation in Syria's rebel-held territories. In a sense, the documents are the source code of the most successful terrorist army in recent history.

Until now, much of the information about IS has come from fighters who had defected and data sets from the IS internal administration seized in Baghdad. But none of this offered an explanation for the group's meteoric rise to prominence, before air strikes in the late summer of 2014 put a stop to its triumphal march.

For the first time, the Haji Bakr documents now make it possible to reach conclusions on how the IS leadership is organized and what role former officials in the government of ex-dictator Saddam Hussein play in it. Above all, however, they show how the takeover in northern Syria was planned, making the group's later advances into Iraq possible in the first place. In addition, months of research undertaken by SPIEGEL in Syria, as well as other newly discovered records, exclusive to SPIEGEL, show that Haji Bakr's instructions were carried out meticulously.

Bakr's documents were long hidden in a tiny addition to a house in embattled northern Syria. Reports of their existence were first made by an eyewitness who had seen them in Haji Bakr's house shortly after his death. In April 2014, a single page from the file was smuggled to Turkey, where SPIEGEL was able to examine it for the first time. It only became possible to reach Tal Rifaat to evaluate the entire set of handwritten papers in November 2014.

"Our greatest concern was that these plans could fall into the wrong hands and would never have become known," said the man who has been storing Haji Bakr's notes after pulling them out from under a tall stack of boxes and blankets. The man, fearing the IS death squads, wishes to remain anonymous.

## The Master Plan

The story of this collection of documents begins at a time when few had yet heard of the "Islamic State." When Iraqi national Haji Bakr traveled to Syria as part of a tiny advance party in late 2012, he had a seemingly absurd plan: IS would capture as much territory as possible in Syria. Then, using Syria as a beachhead, it would invade Iraq.

Bakr took up residence in an inconspicuous house in Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo. The town was a good choice. In the 1980s, many of its residents had gone to work in the Gulf nations, especially Saudi Arabia. When they returned, some brought along radical convictions and contacts. In 2013, Tal Rifaat would become IS' stronghold in Aleppo Province, with hundreds of fighters stationed there.

It was there that the "Lord of the Shadows," as some called him, sketched out the structure of the Islamic State, all the way down to the local level, compiled lists relating to the gradual infiltration of villages and determined who would oversee whom. Using a ballpoint pen, he drew the chains of command in the security apparatus on stationery. Though presumably a coincidence, the stationery was from the Syrian Defense Ministry and bore the letterhead of the department in charge of accommodations and furniture.

What Bakr put on paper, page by page, with carefully outlined boxes for individual responsibilities, was nothing less than a blueprint for a takeover. It was not a manifesto of faith, but a technically precise plan for an "Islamic Intelligence State" -- a caliphate run by an organization that resembled East Germany's notorious Stasi domestic intelligence agency.

This blueprint was implemented with astonishing accuracy in the ensuing months. The plan would always begin with the same detail: The group recruited followers under the pretense of opening a Dawah office, an Islamic missionary center. Of those who came to listen to lectures and attend courses on Islamic life, one or two men were selected and instructed to spy on their village and obtain a wide range of information. To that end, Haji Bakr compiled lists such as the following:

List the powerful families.

Name the powerful individuals in these families.

Find out their sources of income.

Name names and the sizes of (rebel) brigades in the village.

Find out the names of their leaders, who controls the brigades and their political orientation.

Find out their illegal activities (according to Sharia law), which could be used to blackmail them if necessary.

The spies were told to note such details as whether someone was a criminal or a homosexual, or was involved in a secret affair, so as to have ammunition for blackmailing later. "We will appoint the smartest ones as Sharia sheiks," Bakr had noted. "We will train them for a while and then dispatch them." As a postscript, he had added that several "brothers" would be selected in each town to marry the daughters of the most influential families, in order to "ensure penetration of these families without their knowledge."

The spies were to find out as much as possible about the target towns: Who lived there, who was in charge, which families were religious, which Islamic school of religious jurisprudence they belonged to, how many mosques there were, who the imam was, how many wives and children he had and how old they were. Other details included what the imam's sermons were like, whether he was more open to the Sufi, or mystical variant of Islam, whether he sided with the opposition or the regime, and what his position was on jihad. Bakr also wanted answers to questions like: Does the imam earn a salary? If so, who pays it? Who appoints him? Finally: How many people in the village are champions of democracy?

The agents were supposed to function as seismic signal waves, sent out to track down the tiniest cracks, as well as age-old faults within the deep layers of society -- in short, any information that could be used to divide and subjugate the local population. The informants included former intelligence spies, but also regime opponents who had quarreled with one of the rebel groups. Some were also young men and adolescents who needed money or found the work exciting. Most of the men on Bakr's list of informants, such as those from Tal Rifaat, were in their early twenties, but some were as young as 16 or 17.

The plans also include areas like finance, schools, daycare, the media and transportation. But there is a constantly recurring, core theme, which is meticulously addressed in organizational charts and lists of responsibilities and reporting requirements: surveillance, espionage, murder and kidnapping.



For each provincial council, Bakr had planned for an emir, or commander, to be in charge of murders, abductions, snipers, communication and encryption, as well as an emir to supervise the other emirs -- "in case they don't do their jobs well." The nucleus of this godly state would be the demonic clockwork of a cell and commando structure designed to spread fear.

From the very beginning, the plan was to have the intelligence services operate in parallel, even at the provincial level. A general intelligence department reported to the "security emir" for a region, who was in charge of deputy-emirs for individual districts. A head of secret spy cells and an "intelligence service and information manager" for the district reported to each of these deputy-emirs. The spy cells at the local level reported to the district emir's deputy. The goal was to have everyone keeping an eye on everyone else.

Those in charge of training the "Sharia judges in intelligence gathering" also reported to the district emir, while a separate department of "security officers" was assigned to the regional emir.

Sharia, the courts, prescribed piety -- all of this served a single goal: surveillance and control. Even the word that Bakr used for the conversion of true Muslims, *takwin*, is not a religious but a technical term that translates as "implementation," a prosaic word otherwise used in geology or construction. Still, 1,200 years ago, the word followed a unique path to a brief moment of notoriety. Shiite alchemists used it to describe the creation of artificial life. In his ninth century "Book of Stones," the Persian Jabir Ibn Hayyan wrote -- using a secret script and codes -- about the creation of a homunculus. "The goal is to deceive all, but those who love God." That may also have been to the liking of Islamic State strategists, although the group views Shiites as apostates who shun true Islam. But for Haji Bakr, God and the 1,400-year-old faith in him was but one of many modules at his disposal to arrange as he liked for a higher purpose.

### The Beginnings in Iraq

It seemed as if George Orwell had been the model for this spawn of paranoid surveillance. But it was much simpler than that. Bakr was merely modifying what he had learned in the past: Saddam Hussein's omnipresent security apparatus, in which no one, not even generals in the intelligence service, could be certain they weren't being spied on.

Expatriate Iraqi author Kanan Makiya described this "Republic of Fear" in a book as a country in which anyone could simply disappear and in which Saddam could seal his official inauguration in 1979 by exposing a bogus conspiracy.

There is a simple reason why there is no mention in Bakr's writings of prophecies relating to the establishment of an Islamic State allegedly ordained by God: He believed that fanatical religious convictions alone were not enough to achieve victory. But he did believe that the faith of others could be exploited.

In 2010, Bakr and a small group of former Iraqi intelligence officers made Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir and later "caliph," the official leader of the Islamic State. They reasoned that Baghdadi, an educated cleric, would give the group a religious face.

Bakr was "a nationalist, not an Islamist," says Iraqi journalist Hisham al-Hashimi, as he recalls the former career officer, who was stationed with Hashimi's cousin at the Habbaniya Air Base. "Colonel Samir," as Hashimi calls him, "was highly intelligent, firm and an excellent logistician." But when Paul Bremer, then head of the US occupational authority in Baghdad, "dissolved the army by decree in May 2003, he was bitter and unemployed."

Thousands of well-trained Sunni officers were robbed of their livelihood with the stroke of a pen. In doing so, America created its most bitter and intelligent enemies. Bakr went underground and met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Anbar Province in western Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian by birth, had previously run a training camp for international terrorist pilgrims in Afghanistan. Starting in 2003, he gained global notoriety as the mastermind of attacks against the United Nations, US troops and Shiite Muslims. He was even too radical for former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi died in a US air strike in 2006.

Although Iraq's dominant Baath Party was secular, the two systems ultimately shared a conviction that control over the masses should lie in the hands of a small elite that should not be answerable to anyone -- because it ruled in the name of a grand plan, legitimized by either God or the glory of Arab history. The secret of IS' success lies in the combination of opposites, the fanatical beliefs of one group and the strategic calculations of the other.

Bakr gradually became one of the military leaders in Iraq, and he was held from 2006 to 2008 in the US military's Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib Prison. He survived the waves of arrests and killings by American and Iraqi special units, which threatened the very existence of the IS precursor organization in 2010, Islamic State in Iraq.

For Bakr and a number of former high-ranking officers, this presented an opportunity to seize power in a significantly smaller circle of jihadists. They utilized the time they shared in Camp Bucca to establish a large network of contacts. But the top leaders had already known each other for a long time. Haji Bakr and an additional officer were part of the tiny secret-service unit attached to the anti-aircraft division. Two other IS leaders were from a small community of Sunni Turkmen in the town of Tal Afar. One of them was a high-ranking intelligence officer as well.

In 2010, the idea of trying to defeat Iraqi government forces militarily seemed futile. But a powerful underground organization took shape through acts of terror and protection rackets. When the uprising against the dictatorship of the Assad clan erupted in neighboring Syria, the organization's leaders sensed an opportunity. By late 2012, particularly in the north, the formerly omnipotent government forces had largely been defeated and expelled. Instead, there were now hundreds of local councils and rebel brigades, part of an anarchic mix that no one could keep track of. It was a state of vulnerability that the tightly organized group of ex-officers sought to exploit.

Attempts to explain IS and its rapid rise to power vary depending on who is doing the explaining. Terrorism experts view IS as an al-Qaida offshoot and attribute the absence of spectacular attacks to date to what they view as a lack of organizational capacity. Criminologists see IS as a mafia-like holding company out to maximize profit. Scholars in the humanities point to the apocalyptic statements by the IS media department, its glorification of death and the belief that Islamic State is involved in a holy mission.

But apocalyptic visions alone are not enough to capture cities and take over countries. Terrorists don't establish countries. And a criminal cartel is unlikely to generate enthusiasm among supporters around the world, who are willing to give up their lives to travel to the "Caliphate" and potentially their deaths.

IS has little in common with predecessors like al-Qaida aside from its jihadist label. There is essentially nothing religious in its actions, its strategic planning, its unscrupulous changing of alliances and its precisely implemented propaganda narratives. Faith, even in its most extreme form, is just one of many means to an end. Islamic State's only constant maxim is the expansion of power at any price.

### The Implementation of the Plan

The expansion of IS began so inconspicuously that, a year later, many Syrians had to think for a moment about when the jihadists had appeared in their midst. The Dawah offices that were opened in many towns in northern Syria in the spring of 2013 were innocent-looking missionary offices, not unlike the ones that Islamic charities have opened worldwide.

When a Dawah office opened in Raqqa, "all they said was that they were 'brothers,' and they never said a word about the 'Islamic State,'" reports a doctor who fled from the city. A Dawah office was also opened in Manbij, a liberal city in Aleppo Province, in the spring of 2013. "I didn't even notice it at first," recalls a young civil rights activist. "Anyone was allowed to open what he wished. We would never have suspected that someone other than the regime could threaten us. It was only when the fighting erupted in January that we learned that Da'ish," the Arab acronym for IS, "had already rented several apartments where it could store weapons and hide its men."

The situation was similar in the towns of al-Bab, Atarib and Azaz. Dawah offices were also opened in neighboring Idlib Province in early 2013, in the towns of Sermada, Atmeh, Kafr Takharim, al-Dana and Salqin. As soon as it had identified enough "students" who could be recruited as spies, IS expanded its presence. In al-Dana, additional buildings were rented, black flags raised and streets blocked off. In towns where there was too much resistance or it was unable to secure enough supporters, IS chose to withdraw temporarily. At the beginning, its modus operandi was to expand without risking open resistance, and abduct or kill "hostile individuals," while denying any involvement in these nefarious activities.

The fighters themselves also remained inconspicuous at first. Bakr and the advance guard had not brought them along from Iraq, which would have made sense. In fact, they had explicitly prohibited their Iraqi fighters from going to Syria. They also chose not to recruit very many Syrians. The IS leaders opted for the most complicated option instead: They decided to gather together all the foreign radicals who had been coming to the region since the summer of 2012. Students from Saudi Arabia, office workers from

Tunisia and school dropouts from Europe with no military experience were to form an army with battle-tested Chechens and Uzbeks. It would be located in Syria under Iraqi command.

Already by the end of 2012, military camps had been erected in several places. Initially, no one knew what groups they belonged to. The camps were strictly organized and the men there came from numerous countries -- and didn't speak to journalists. Very few of them were from Iraq. Newcomers received two months of training and were drilled to be unconditionally obedient to the central command. The set-up was inconspicuous and also had another advantage: though necessarily chaotic at the beginning, what emerged were absolutely loyal troops. The foreigners knew nobody outside of their comrades, had no reason to show mercy and could be quickly deployed to many different places. This was in stark contrast to the Syrian rebels, who were mostly focused on defending their hometowns and had to look after their families and help out with the harvest. In fall 2013, IS books listed 2,650 foreign fighters in the Province of Aleppo alone. Tunisians represented a third of the total, followed by Saudi Arabians, Turks, Egyptians and, in smaller numbers, Chechens, Europeans and Indonesians.

Later too, the jihadist cadres were hopelessly outnumbered by the Syrian rebels. Although the rebels distrusted the jihadists, they didn't join forces to challenge IS because they didn't want to risk opening up a second front. Islamic State, though, increased its clout with a simple trick: The men always appeared wearing black masks, which not only made them look terrifying, but also meant that no one could know how many of them there actually were. When groups of 200 fighters appeared in five different places one after the other, did it mean that IS had 1,000 people? Or 500? Or just a little more than 200? In addition, spies also ensured that IS leadership was constantly informed of where the population was weak or divided or where there were local conflict, allowing IS to offer itself as a protective power in order to gain a foothold.

### The Capture of Raqqa

Raqqa, a once sleepy provincial city on the Euphrates River, was to become the prototype of the complete IS conquest. The operation began subtly, gradually became more brutal and, in the end, IS prevailed over larger opponents without much of a fight. "We were never very political," explained one doctor who had fled Raqqa for Turkey. "We also weren't religious and didn't pray much."

When Raqqa fell to the rebels in March 2013, a city council was rapidly elected. Lawyers, doctors and journalists organized themselves. Women's groups were established. The Free Youth Assembly was founded, as was the movement "For Our Rights" and dozens of other initiatives. Anything seemed possible in Raqqa. But in the view of some who fled the city, it also marked the start of its downfall.

True to Haji Bakr's plan, the phase of infiltration was followed by the elimination of every person who might have been a potential leader or opponent. The first person hit was the head of the city council, who was kidnapped in mid-May 2013 by masked men. The next person to disappear was the brother of a prominent novelist. Two days later, the man who had led the group that painted a revolutionary flag on the city walls vanished.

"We had an idea who kidnapped him," one of his friends explains, "but no one dared any longer to do anything." The system of fear began to take hold. Starting in July, first dozens and then hundreds of people disappeared. Sometimes their bodies were found, but they usually disappeared without a trace. In August, the IS military leadership dispatched several cars driven by suicide bombers to the headquarters of the FSA brigade, the "Grandsons of the Prophet," killing dozens of fighters and leading the rest to flee. The other rebels merely looked on. IS leadership had spun a web of secret deals with the brigades so that each thought it was only the others who might be the targets of IS attacks.

On Oct. 17, 2013, Islamic State called all civic leaders, clerics and lawyers in the city to a meeting. At the time, some thought it might be a gesture of conciliation. Of the 300 people who attended the meeting, only two spoke out against the ongoing takeover, the kidnappings and the murders committed by IS.

One of the two was Muhannad Habayebna, a civil rights activist and journalist well known in the city. He was found five days later tied up and executed with a gunshot wound to his head. Friends received an anonymous email with a photo of his body. The message included only one sentence: "Are you sad about your friend now?" Within hours around 20 leading members of the opposition fled to Turkey. The revolution in Raqqa had come to an end.

A short time later, the 14 chiefs of the largest clans gave an oath of allegiance to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. There's even a film of the ceremony. They were sheiks with the same clans that had sworn

their steadfast loyalty to Syrian President Bashar Assad only two years earlier.

## The Death of Haji Bakr

Until the end of 2013, everything was going according to Islamic State's plan -- or at least according to the plan of Haji Bakr. The caliphate was expanding village by village without being confronted by unified resistance from Syrian rebels. Indeed, the rebels seemed paralyzed in the face of IS' sinister power.

But when IS henchmen brutally tortured a well-liked rebel leader and doctor to death in December 2013, something unexpected happened. Across the country, Syrian brigades -- both secular and parts of the radical Nusra Front -- joined together to do battle with Islamic State. By attacking IS everywhere at the same time, they were able to rob the Islamists of their tactical advantage -- that of being able to rapidly move units to where they were most urgently needed.

Within weeks, IS was pushed out of large regions of northern Syria. Even Raqqa, the Islamic State capital, had almost fallen by the time 1,300 IS fighters arrived from Iraq. But they didn't simply march into battle. Rather, they employed a trickier approach, recalls the doctor who fled. "In Raqqa, there were so many brigades on the move that nobody knew who exactly the others were. Suddenly, a group in rebel dress began to shoot at the other rebels. They all simply fled."

A small, simple masquerade had helped IS fighters to victory: Just change out of black clothes into jeans and vests. They did the same thing in the border town of Jarablus. On several occasions, rebels in other locations took drivers from IS suicide vehicles into custody. The drivers asked in surprise: "You are Sunnis too? Our emir told me you were infidels from Assad's army."

Once complete, the picture begins to look absurd: God's self-proclaimed enforcers on Earth head out to conquer a future worldly empire, but with what? With ninja outfits, cheap tricks and espionage cells camouflaged as missionary offices. But it worked. IS held on to Raqqa and was able to reconquer some of its lost territories. But it came too late for the great planner Haji Bakr.

Haji Bakr stayed behind in the small city of Tal Rifaat, where IS had long had the upper hand. But when rebels attacked at the end of January 2014, the city became divided within just a few hours. One half remained under IS control while the other was wrested away by one of the local brigades. Haji Bakr was stuck in the wrong half. Furthermore, in order to remain incognito he had refrained from moving into one of the heavily guarded IS military quarters. And so, the godfather of snitching was snitched on by a neighbor. "A Daish sheik lives next door!" the man called. A local commander named Abdelmalik Hadbe and his men drove over to Bakr's house. A woman jerked open the door and said brusquely: "My husband isn't here."

But his car is parked out front, the rebels countered.

At that moment, Haji Bakr appeared at the door in his pajamas. Hadbe ordered him to come with them, whereupon Bakr protested that he wanted to get dressed. No, Hadbe repeated: "Come with us! Immediately!"

Surprisingly nimbly for his age, Bakr jumped back and kicked the door closed, according to two people who witnessed the scene. He then hid under the stairs and yelled: "I have a suicide belt! I'll blow up all of us!" He then came out with a Kalashnikov and began shooting. Hadbe then fired his weapon and killed Bakr.

When the men later learned who they had killed, they searched the house, gathering up computers, passports, mobile phone SIM cards, a GPS device and, most importantly, papers. They didn't find a Koran anywhere.

Haji Bakr was dead and the local rebels took his wife into custody. Later, the rebels exchanged her for Turkish IS hostages at the request of Ankara. Bakr's valuable papers were initially hidden away in a chamber, where they spent several months.

## A Second Cache of Documents

Haji Bakr's state continued to work even without its creator. Just how precisely his plans were implemented -- point by point -- is confirmed by the discovery of another file. When IS was forced to rapidly abandon its headquarters in Aleppo in January 2014, they tried to burn their archive, but they ran into a problem similar to that confronted by the East German secret police 25 years earlier: They had too

many files.

Some of them remained intact and ended up with the al-Tawhid Brigade, Aleppo's largest rebel group at the time. After lengthy negotiations, the group agreed to make the papers available to SPIEGEL for exclusive publication rights -- everything except a list of IS spies inside of al-Tawhid.

An examination of the hundreds of pages of documents reveals a highly complex system involving the infiltration and surveillance of all groups, including IS' own people. The jihad archivists maintained long lists noting which informants they had installed in which rebel brigades and government militias. It was even noted who among the rebels was a spy for Assad's intelligence service.

"They knew more than we did, much more," said the documents' custodian. Personnel files of the fighters were among them, including detailed letters of application from incoming foreigners, such as the Jordanian Nidal Abu Eysch. He sent along all of his terror references, including their telephone numbers, and the file number of a felony case against him. His hobbies were also listed: hunting, boxing, bomb building.

IS wanted to know everything, but at the same time, the group wanted to deceive everyone about its true aims. One multiple-page report, for example, carefully lists all of the pretexts IS could use to justify the seizure of the largest flour mill in northern Syria. It includes such excuses as alleged embezzlement as well as the ungodly behavior of the mill's workers. The reality -- that all strategically important facilities like industrial bakeries, grain silos and generators were to be seized and their equipment sent to the caliphate's unofficial capital Raqqa -- was to be kept under wraps.

Over and over again, the documents reveal corollaries with Haji Bakr's plans for the establishment of IS -- for example that marrying in to influential families should be pushed. The files from Aleppo also included a list of 34 fighters who wanted wives in addition to other domestic needs. Abu Luqman and Abu Yahya al-Tunis, for example, noted that they needed an apartment. Abu Suheib and Abu Ahmed Osama requested bedroom furniture. Abu al-Baraa al Dimaschqi asked for financial assistance in addition to a complete set of furniture, while Abu Azmi wanted a fully automatic washing machine.

### Shifting Alliances

But in the first months of 2014, yet another legacy from Haji Bakr began playing a decisive role: His decade of contacts to Assad's intelligence services.

In 2003, the Damascus regime was panicked that then-US President George W. Bush, after his victory over Saddam Hussein, would have his troops continue into Syria to topple Assad as well. Thus, in the ensuing years, Syrian intelligence officials organized the transfer of thousands of radicals from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to al-Qaida in Iraq. Ninety percent of the suicide attackers entered Iraq via the Syrian route. A strange relationship developed between Syrian generals, international jihadists and former Iraqi officers who had been loyal to Saddam -- a joint venture of deadly enemies, who met repeatedly to the west of Damascus.

At the time, the primary aim was to make the lives of the Americans in Iraq hell. Ten years later, Bashar Assad had a different motive to breathe new life into the alliance: He wanted to sell himself to the world as the lesser of several evils. Islamist terror, the more gruesome the better, was too important to leave it up to the terrorists. The regime's relationship with Islamic State is -- just as it was to its predecessor a decade prior -- marked by a completely tactical pragmatism. Both sides are trying to use the other in the assumption that it will emerge as the stronger power, able to defeat the discrete collaborator of yesterday. Conversely, IS leaders had no problem receiving assistance from Assad's air force, despite all of the group's pledges to annihilate the apostate Shiites. Starting in January 2014, Syrian jets would regularly -- and exclusively -- bomb rebel positions and headquarters during battles between IS and rebel groups.

In battles between IS and rebels in January 2014, Assad's jets regularly bombed only rebel positions, while the Islamic State emir ordered his fighters to refrain from shooting at the army. It was an arrangement that left many of the foreign fighters deeply disillusioned; they had imaged jihad differently.

IS threw its entire arsenal at the rebels, sending more suicide bombers into their ranks in just a few weeks than it deployed during the entire previous year against the Syrian army. Thanks in part to additional air strikes, IS was able to reconquer territory that it had briefly lost.

Nothing symbolizes the tactical shifting of alliances more than the fate of the Syrian army's Division 17. The isolated base near Raqqa had been under rebel siege for more than a year. But then, IS units defeated

the rebels there and Assad's air force was once again able to use the base for supply flights without fear of attack.

But a half year later, after IS conquered Mosul and took control of a gigantic weapons depot there, the jihadists felt powerful enough to attack their erstwhile helpers. IS fighters overran Division 17 and slaughtered the soldiers, whom they had only recently protected.

### What the Future May Hold

The setbacks suffered by IS in recent months -- the defeat in the fight for Kurdish enclave Kobani and, more recently, the loss of the Iraqi city of Tikrit, have generated the impression that the end of Islamic State is nigh. As though it, in its megalomania, overreached itself, has lost its mystique, is in retreat and will soon disappear. But such forced optimism is likely premature. The IS may have lost many fighters, but it has continued expanding in Syria.

It is true that jihadist experiments in ruling a specific geographical area have failed in the past. Mostly, though, that was because of their lack of knowledge regarding how to administer a region, or even a state. That is exactly the weakness that IS strategists have long been aware of -- and eliminated. Within the "Caliphate," those in power have constructed a regime that is more stable and more flexible than it appears from the outside.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may be the officially named leader, but it remains unclear how much power he holds. In any case, when an emissary of al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahiri contacted the Islamic State, it was Haji Bakr and other intelligence officers, and not al-Baghdadi, whom he approached. Afterwards, the emissary bemoaned "these phony snakes who are betraying the real jihad."

Within IS, there are state structures, bureaucracy and authorities. But there is also a parallel command structure: elite units next to normal troops; additional commanders alongside nominal military head Omar al-Shishani; power brokers who transfer or demote provincial and town emirs or even make them disappear at will. Furthermore, decisions are not, as a rule, made in Shura Councils, nominally the highest decision-making body. Instead, they are being made by the "people who loosen and bind" (ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd), a clandestine circle whose name is taken from the Islam of medieval times.

Islamic State is able to recognize all manner of internal revolts and stifle them. At the same time, the hermitic surveillance structure is also useful for the financial exploitation of its subjects.

The air strikes flown by the US-led coalition may have destroyed the oil wells and refineries. But nobody is preventing the Caliphate's financial authorities from wringing money out of the millions of people who live in the regions under IS control -- in the form of new taxes and fees, or simply by confiscating property. IS, after all, knows everything from its spies and from the data it plundered from banks, land-registry offices and money-changing offices. It knows who owns which homes and which fields; it knows who owns many sheep or has lots of money. The subjects may be unhappy, but there is minimal room for them to organize, arm themselves and rebel.

As the West's attention is primarily focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks, a different scenario has been underestimated: the approaching intra-Muslim war between Shiites and Sunnis. Such a conflict would allow IS to graduate from being a hated terror organization to a central power.

Already today, the frontlines in Syria, Iraq and Yemen follow this confessional line, with Shiite Afghans fighting against Sunni Afghans in Syria and IS profiting in Iraq from the barbarism of brutal Shiite militias. Should this ancient Islam conflict continue to escalate, it could spill over into confessionally mixed states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon.

In such a case, IS propaganda about the approaching apocalypse could become a reality. In its slipstream, an absolutist dictatorship in the name of God could be established.

URL :

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html>

Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:

Interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi: 'The Liberation of Tikrit Is Very Encouraging' (04/03/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/iraqi-prime-minister-al-abadi-discusses-gains-over-islamic-state-a-1027059.html>

Proxy War in Yemen: Saudi Arabia and Iran Vie for Regional Supremacy (04/03/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/saudi-arabia-and-iran-fighting-proxy-war-in-yemen-a-1027056.html>

Caliphate Under Pressure: Is Islamic State in Trouble in Iraq? (03/26/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/reconquest-of-tikrit-in-iraq-shows-islamic-state-weaknesses-a-1025138.html>

Medieval Fantasies? Islamic State Pursues Apocalyptic Logic (03/19/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-islamic-state-strategy-to-draw-west-into-final-battle-a-1024438.html>

A Threat to Europe: The Islamic State's Dangerous Gains in Libya (02/23/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-advance-in-libya-could-present-threat-to-europe-a-1019976.html>

Daughters of Jihad: The German Women of Islamic State (02/13/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/a-wave-of-women-are-leaving-germany-to-join-islamic-state-a-1017571.html>

The Belgium Question: Why Is a Small Country Producing So Many Jihadists? (01/27/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/belgium-muslim-youth-turning-toward-jihad-in-large-numbers-a-1015045.html>

Terror Expert Louise Shelley: 'Islamic State Is a Diversified Criminal Operation' (01/06/2015)

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/terror-expert-shelley-speaks-of-islamic-state-business-model-a-1011492.html>

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2015

All Rights Reserved

Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH







VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO

# International Operations

## Danish Defence

### Week 34/2015

2015-08-20








# Deployed Danish Forces in NATO Operations 222

VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO

2015-08-20





# Deployed Danish Forces in United Nations Missions 51

VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO

2015-08-20





VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO

# Deployed Danish Forces in Coalitions 241

2015-08-20





Nyheder Viden om Temaer Job Uddannelse Om os Kontakt

Generelt Historie I tal Indland Materiel Opgaver Organisation Udland Forsvarsmuseer

Søg

Forside > Viden om > Udland > IRAK



Menu

Operation Inherent Resolve

Hvad er ISIL?

Generelt

Historie

I tal

Indland

Materiel

Opgaver

Organisation

Udland

Adenbugten

Afghanistan

FN

IRAK

Nyheder

Tidslinje

Kosovo

Mali

Militærmanual

Monumentet

NATO Reponse Force

Post til udsendte

Traktater

Forsvarsmuseer



## Danmarks bidrag til støtte i kampen mod ISIL

### Operation Inherent Resolve

Terrorbevægelsen ISIL (også benævnt DAESH) har systematisk begået overgreb og massehenrettelser i Irak og FN anslår, at flere millioner irakere er fordrevet fra hus og hjem, som følge af ISIL's fremmarch.

USA har samlet opbakning fra over 50 lande i en international koalition, der skal bekæmpe ISIL i Irak og Syrien.

Den 27. august 2014 giver Folketinget sit samtykke til, at et dansk militært bidrag stilles til rådighed. Bidraget bliver en del af den samlede internationale indsats til støtte til Iraks militære indsats mod terrorbevægelsen ISIL og for at bistå myndighederne i Irak med at beskytte civilbefolkningen mod alvorlige overgreb.

Det danske bidrag består i første omgang af et C-130J-transportfly (Hercules) med mandskab, der foreløbig frem til årsskiftet 2014/15, skal løse transportopgaver til støtte for den amerikanskledede operation i Irak. Opgaverne inkluderer, som udgangspunkt, transport af personel, våben, ammunition, materiel og forsyninger til de irakiske og kurdiske styrker samt øvrige samarbejdspartnere.

Den 2. oktober bliver det ligeledes ved en folketingsbeslutning vedtaget at udbygge bidraget. Det udvidede militære bidrag består af tre dele:

1. Et F-16 kampflybidrag, der omfatter ca. 140 personer.
2. Et stabsbidrag bestående af op til ca. 20 personer
3. Et kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag, inkl. logistikbidrag, som omfatter op til ca. 120 personer. Dette bidrag benævnes Building Partner Capacity (BPC) under Operation Inherent Resolve.

#### F-16 kampflybidrag

Det danske styrkebidrag består af fire operative F-16 kampfly samt op til tre F-16 kampfly i logistisk reserve. Bidraget omfatter forbindelses- og stabsofficerer ved relevante hovedkvarterer. F-16-bidraget vil omfatte op til i alt ca. 140 personer, og er afhængig af den konkrete placering og kommandostruktur. F-16 bidraget er foreløbig udsendt i op til 12 måneder.

I forbindelse med etableringen af styrkebidraget, er der midlertidigt udsendt yderligere personer til udpakning, opstilling, etablering af kommunikationsforbindelser og værksteder mv.

De danske fly er indsat i det fulde spektrum af luftoperationer inden for irakisk territorium, hvilket indebærer deltagelse i såvel informationsindhentning som offensive luftoperationer.

#### Stabsbidrag

Gruppen hedder på arabisk "al-dawlat al-islamiyya fi al-Iraq wa as-sham", som betyder Den Islamiske Stat i Irak og Levanten. Deraf kommer navnet ISIL, som gruppen kaldte sig, før den udråbte et kalifat sidst i juni under navnet Islamisk Stat.

IS er ikke en stat og det er således ukorrekt at kalde terrorbevægelsen for IS (Islamisk Stat).

Terrororganisationen vil derfor benævnes ISIL eller DAESH og den samlede indsats i bekæmpelsen af denne for "Operation Inherent Resolve"

#### Links

Beslutningsforslag B-122

Beslutningsforslag B-123

### Kapacitetsopbygning

Det danske militære kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag inklusive logistikbidrag er på i alt ca. 120 personer. Bidraget er udsendt med henblik på kapacitetsopbygning (rådgivning, træning og uddannelse mm.) af irakiske og kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrker i Irak. Opgaverne løses i samarbejde med amerikanske samarbejdspartnere og det danske kontingent vil være underlagt en amerikansk chef, mens den danske forsvarschef bevarer fuld kommando over de danske styrker.

### Træningen deles op i forskellige faser.

1. Først trækkes enheder på skift ud af kampen, når operationstempoet tillader det, for at modtage et træningsforløb på 3-4 uger med fokus på individuelle færdigheder, lederskab og feltøvelse. Herefter sendes de tilbage i kamp.
2. I anden omgang kommer enhederne tilbage til træningsfaciliteten i 6-8 uger, hvor de trænes i enhedsramme med fokus på samvirkeøvelser og operationsplanlægning og føring af operationer. Herefter sendes enheden tilbage i kamp.
3. For at opbygge en varig træningskapacitet ved irakerne etableres et træningscenter, hvor der gennemføres træning af irakiske trænere, der sidenhen skal overtage træningen af de irakiske enheder.

Træningsindsatsen indeholder træningsopgaver på brigadeniveau og under. Den dækker både irakiske og kurdiske styrker i Irak. Opgaven foregår på faste træningsfaciliteter ved enheder, der ikke er direkte indsat i kamphandlinger. Stabsbidraget og det luftmilitære bidrag planlægges indsat i op til et år og træningsbidraget indledningsvis i op til to år. Landmilitære bidrag er blot nogle af virkemidlerne.

### ISIL fakta:

ISIL er en trussel såvel regionalt som globalt. ISIL skaber humanitære kriser og store menneskelige lidelser.

Danmark indgår i en koalition bestående af en række lande, hvis indsats mod ISIL er nødvendig, og ikke er rettet mod nogen etniske eller sekteriske grupper.

ISIL's ekstreme ideologi, terrorisme, ambitioner og tilsidesættelse af international regler udgør en alvorlig trussel mod Irak og Syrien, men også mod andre lande overalt på kloden.

Danmark er en del af en stærk global koalition på en lang række lande, hvis indsats mod ISIL er nødvendig, og ikke er rettet mod nogen etniske eller sekteriske grupper.

Koalitionsstyrkernes militære indsats har til formål at gøre det muligt for de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker at bremse ISIL's fremrykning og at kunne iværksætte modangreb for at genoprette kontrollen med og herredømmet over irakisk territorium.

Kampen mod ISIL er en langvarig indsats på en lang række områder. Fly- og landmilitære bidrag er blot nogle af virkemidlerne.

Sidst opdateret 24-02-2015 - kl. 13:54

# Fighter Wing Skrydstrup



*Opes Foris Vires Domi – Styrken ude, kraften hjemme*

De danske F-16 Fighting Falcon har base ved Fighter Wing Skrydstrup på Flyvestation Skrydstrup. Udover den almindelige træning og uddannelse af piloter, udgør de 30 operative F-16 Fighting Falcon også det danske afvisningsberedskab.

## Afvisningsberedskabet

24 timer i døgnet, 365 dage om året, står fire F-16-fly klar til inden for maksimalt 15 minutter at gå i luften som det danske afvisningsberedskab. Hvis uidentificerede fly overskrider de danske grænser, går to F-16-fly i luften for at inspicere det uidentificerede fly og eventuelt eskortere det ud i internationalt luftrum. Flyene kan også inspicere civile fly, som har tekniske problemer. De kan eksempelvis se, om landingshjulene er kommet ordentligt ned og derefter give piloten besked.

## Luftrumspatroljering

For at være medlem af NATO skal et land kunne håndhæve sin suverænitet i luften. Nogle medlemslande har imidlertid ikke de nødvendige ressourcer, herunder kampfly. Derfor skiftes de øvrige NATO-lande til at løse de såkaldte air policing-opgaver ved at patruljere det givne lands luftrum og virke som landets afvisningsberedskab. I 2009 patruljerede danske F-16-fly for eksempel luftrummet over Estland, Letland og Litauen samt Island. Fra den 1. september til den 31. december 2011 stod danske F-16-fly igen for patruljeringen af det baltiske luftrum.

## Observationer og havmiljøovervågning

Med den avancerede LANTIRN-pod kan F-16-flyene også bruges til andet end at kaste bomber og affyre missiler. Pod'en har både en fintfølende infrarød sensor og et videokamera med høj opløsning. Den giver muligheden for, at de danske

F-16-fly kan indgå i internationale operationer ved at levere billeder og observationer til landstyrkerne. Herhjemme bliver pod'en brugt til havmiljøovervågning, når F-16-fly indimellem afløser Challenger-flyene på denne opgave.





# Fighter Wing Skrydstrup



*Opes Foris Vires Domi – Styrken ude, kraften hjemme*

## Internationale operationer

De danske F-16-kampfly bliver efter politisk ønske indsat i internationale operationer. Det skete senest i Operation Operation Unified Protector over Libyen.

Den startede den 19. marts 2011, hvor flyveforbudszo-  
nen over Libyen trådte i kraft, og det danske bidrag til  
den internationale koalition gik i luften. Med FN-mandat i  
hånden bad Folketinget Flyvevåbnet om at stille med F-  
16-kampfly til at støtte oprettelsen og opretholdelsen af  
en flyveforbudszone over Libyen. På Sigonella basen i  
Sicilien var der udstationeret seks F-16 fly og cirka 110  
mand fra Fighter Wing Skrydstrup. Missionen blev afslut-  
tet 31. oktober 2011.

Fighter Wing Skrydstrup holder til på  
Flyvestation Skrydstrup og har cirka  
700 ansatte.

Fighter Wing Skrydstrup råder over  
30 operative F-16-fly. Flyene forde-  
les mellem Fighter Squadron 727 og  
730 (også kendt som Eskadrille 727  
og 730) efter behov. 13 af flyene har  
to sæder og egner sig derfor godt til  
uddannelse af nye piloter.

Fighter Wing Skrydstrup  
Lilholtvej 2  
DK-6500 Vojens  
+45 7454 1340  
fsnskp@mil.dk  
[www.forsvaret.dk/wksp](http://www.forsvaret.dk/wksp)



# Flyvevåbnet



## F-16 Fighting Falcon

F-16 Fighting Falcon er et alsidigt 'multi-role'-kampfly. Det betyder, at flyet både kan kæmpe imod andre fly i luften samt gennemføre præcisionsbombning af mål på jorden. Kampflyene fungerer til dagligt som "luftens politi" i Danmark og udgør afvisningsberedskabet, der konstant er klar til at rykke ud til uidentificerede fly i dansk luftrum.

F-16-flyet fløj første gang i 1974, og i 1980 blev flyet en del af det danske forsvar. I dag har Flyvevåbnet 30 operative F-16-fly samt et antal i reserve. Kampflyet findes i både en enkelt- og tosædet version. Den tosædede bruges især til omskoling af piloter, men har samme kamp-egenskaber som den enkelt-sædede version.

Kampflyene er løbende blevet opdateret og har senest gennemgået den omfattende "Mid-life Up-date", der især har udviklet flyets sensorpakke og gjort det muligt for piloten at benytte GPS- og laserstyrede præcisionsvåben med større effekt. Desuden er der tilføjet udstyr til netværksbaserede operationer, hvilket betyder, at flyene nu er i stand til at modtage radar-informationer fra andre enheder – eksempelvis fra andre fly eller skibe.

F-16-flyene bruges også til rekognoscering og overvågning. Det foregår med den såkaldte LANTIRN-pod, der fastgøres under maven på flyet. Den kan tage billeder med et 25 megapixel digitalkamera, og har også en fint-følede infrarød sensor.

De danske F-16-fly kan efter politisk ønske indsættes i internationale operationer og har blandt andet støttet NATO-soldaterne i Afghanistan. Her var de indsat i direkte kamphandlinger, men udførte også *show of force*, hvor flyenes blotte tilstedeværelse lagde en dæmper på fjendens kampvilje. Senest blev fire F-16-fly samt to i reserve indsat til at deltage i FN-missionen - senere NATO-missionen - i Libyen fra marts til november 2011 – kaldet Operation Unified Protector

Flyene har også flere gange udført air policing-opgaver i de baltiske lande og Island, da disse lande ikke har et afvisningsberedskab. Senest fra september til og med december i 2011 over de baltiske lande.

F-16 Fighting Falcon hører under Fighter Squadron 727 og 730 (også kendt som Eskadrille 727 og 730), der holder til hos Fighter Wing Skrydstrup.



# Flyvevåbnet

## F-16 Fighting Falcon



**Fabrik:** Lockheed Martin Texas USA  
**Type:** Jager/jagerbomber  
**Motorer:** 1 stk. Pratt & Whitney F100-  
PW200 jetmotor med 11.340 kg. trykkraft.  
**Længde:** 14,32 m  
**Højde:** 5,01 m  
**Spændvidde:** 9,14 m  
**Tomvægt:** 5.443 kg.

**Fuldvægt:** 12.245 kg.  
**Marchastighed:** 833 km/t  
**Max-hastighed:** 2.376 km/t  
**Rækkevidde:** 1.296 km  
**Tophøjde:** 20.000 m.  
**Bevæbning:** 20 mm. M61A1 Vulcan ma-  
skinkanon samt bomber, raketter og missi-  
ler.



[Nyheder](#) [Viden om](#) [Temaer](#) [Job](#) [Uddannelse](#) [Om os](#) [Kontakt](#)

[Internationale](#) [Nationale](#) [Øvrige](#) [Døgnrapporten](#) [Nyhedsbrev](#)

Søg

[Forside](#) > [Nyheder](#) > [Internationale](#)



Menu

Internationale

tek

Nationale

Øvrige

Døgnrapporten

Nyhedsbrev

## Mission Update - RDAF F-16 Operation Inherent Resolve

De danske F-16-fly, der er udsendt som bidrag til Operation Inherent Resolve, har siden seneste opdatering 11. august fløjet 12 missioner og anvendt 14 bomber.

18-08-2015 - kl. 18:37

Missionerne, som de danske fly har deltaget i, har været offensive, og de danske fly har i den forløbne periode deltaget i missioner i Ninawa, Salah Al Din og Al Anbar provinserne. Målene for bomberne har været fjendtlige våbenstillinger og bygninger anvendt af ISIL.

De danske fly har fløjet Close Air Support-missioner (CAS), hvor flyene er indsat som luftstøtte til styrker på landjorden. Her vil flyene patruljere over et bestemt område, hvorefter de vil kunne blive indsat af koalitionen, når der er behov for støtte. Luftstøtten vil variere afhængig af, hvad der er behov for. Det kan både dreje sig om overvågningsopgaver og bombninger af mål.

De danske fly har også gennemført Air Interdiction-missioner. Her gennemføres et specifikt angreb mod et på forhånd defineret mål, hvor flyene flyver direkte til målet, anvender bomber og flyver retur. Ved disse missioner har målene for bomberne været bygninger.

På de missioner, hvor de danske F-16 ikke har anvendt våben, har de bidraget med overvågning og indhentning af efterretninger. På sådanne overvågningsmissioner er flyene dog altid klar til at anvende våben, hvis der er behov for det.

Siden første mission den 16. oktober 2014, har det danske bidrag i alt fløjet 476 missioner og anvendt 425 bomber. Alle de danske bomber er præcisionsstyrede, hvilket vil sige, at de styres mod deres mål ved hjælp af enten laser eller GPS.

Læs mere om koalitionen gennemførte angreb hos US Central Command: [www.centcom.mil](http://www.centcom.mil)

Fakta:

Det danske F-16 bidrag til Operation Inherent Resolve består af syv fly (hvoraf tre er i logistisk reserve) og op til ca. 140 mand. Lige nu er ca. 90 mand udsendt.

Udover F-16 bidrager Danmark også med et 120 mand stort bidrag fra Hæren, som skal uddanne og vejlede de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker i bl.a. skydning, førstehjælp, føring og stabsarbejde.

## Irak hold 2 godt i gang

De danske soldater har uddannet 126 irakiske soldater den første måned. Kampen mod ISIL kræver, at der er irakiske soldater ved frontlinjen hele tiden, men mange sendes fortsat til Al Asad for at blive uddannet af de danske soldater.

20-08-2015 - kl. 10:09

Tekst og foto: Kaptajn Simone, presseofficer, Inherent Resolve, hold 2

Hold 2 blev ved ankomsten til Al Asad-basen i Irak kastet direkte i arbejdet. Det første hold irakiske soldater afsluttede deres uddannelse efter få dage, og siden da har danskerne uddannet i alt 126 irakiske soldater.



Det danske bidrag har uddannet 126 irakiske soldater på en måned.

De irakiske skytter, som var bedre end gennemsnittet, har fået et videregående skydekursus. Her formåede skytterne at skyde og ramme plet på op til 300 meter, og sluttesten blev skudt på 200 meter med tilfredsstillende resultater. Den bedste skytte fik overrakt et særligt diplom af chefen for det danske bidrag, oberstløjtnant Thomas Ø. Knudsen og hædret foran alle sine kollegaer.

Soldaterne på Hold 2 oplever generelt stor interesse og motivation hos de irakiske soldater, og i det hele taget har mødet mellem danske og irakiske soldater været en positiv oplevelse.



De irakiske skytter bestod skydetesten med tilfredsstillende resultater.

Et hold Irakiske soldater har netop gennemført basisuddannelse i brug af mortar, og et andet har færdiggjort træning i imødegåelse af vejsidebomber, til dagligt kaldet counter-IED (improvised explosive devices). IED'er er en af de helt store udfordringer, de irakiske soldater i øjeblikket står overfor i kampen mod ISIL.



Træningen af de irakiske soldater slutter med en parade, hvor soldaterne får overrakt et diplom for endt uddannelse.

Undervisningen i stabstræning er også blevet gennemført og afsluttet for de irakiske officerer. Træningen blev rundet af med en parade og overrækkelse af diplomer for gennemført uddannelse. Ind til nu har trænerne undervist 50 til 80 irakiske soldater ad gangen. De danske soldater er gearet til at træne op til 400 ad gangen med alle trænere og tolke indsat. På grund af de igangværende kampe mod ISIL er det svært at forudsige, hvor mange irakiske soldater, der kan undværes ved frontlinjen og dermed afsætte tid til uddannelse. Dog forventes den nuværende situation på Al Asad at ændre sig inden længe, da en stor gruppe irakiske soldater har meldt deres ankomst. Træningen af dem vil komme til at strække over en længere periode.

Det danske bidrag til Inherent Resolve

Bidraget består af 120 mand, der bistår i uddannelsen af de irakiske soldater, så de kan stå

stærkere i kampen mod ISIL. De danske soldater træner blandt andet irakerne i skydning, førstehjælp, våben-kendskab, imødegåelse af vejsidebomber og stabstræning.

Med enkelte undtagelser afholdes der hver dag uddannelse i de forskellige discipliner.

---

Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando - Danneskiold Samsøes Allé 1 - 1434 København K - Telefon: +45 7284 0000 - E-mail: [VFK@mil.dk](mailto:VFK@mil.dk) - [For ansatte i forsvaret](#)





Vi samler statistik ved hjælp af cookies for at forbedre brugeroplevelsen

Vi begynder dog først, når du har accepteret det.

[Ja tak til cookies](#)

[Nej tak til cookies](#)

[Læs mere om cookies](#)



**Hæren**  
Gardehusarregimentet



Nyt fra husarerne i Irak

10-08-2015 - kl. 13:24

Nu er vi 65 husarer, som udgør halvdelen af holdet på Operation Inherent Resolve hold 2, ved at være faldet til i vores nye omgivelser.



Vi bor på Al Asad Airbase ca. 180 km vest for Baghdad. En lejr som på sit højeste husede 20.000 amerikanske soldater under Operation Iraqi Freedom. Det er vi ikke i nærheden af mere og det irakiske forsvar har ikke haft ressourcer til at vedligeholde basen, så nogle steder kører man rundt i en spøgelsesby.

Vi bor dog rigtig godt og den primitive måde, som hold 1 boede på med feltrationer og sanktionering på badevand ser ud til at være forfaldet. Nu er der aircondition, når vi arbejder indenfor, hvor vi spiser og hvor vi sover. Med dagstemperaturer på 45-48 grader betyder det en del, at vi kan sove ordentligt og være effektive i

vores planlægningsarbejde. Som Kenneth fra et af træningsholdene sagde, "Der er rigtige toiletter, AIRCON, der bliver serveret mad, vi kan vaske tøj i en vaskemaskine og trådløst internet, så i forhold til sidst jeg var udsendt og lå i Armadillolejren i Afghanistan, så er det luksus det her." Ca. 30 af os husarer gennemfører træning af soldater fra den irakiske hær og vi har allerede haft nogle gode oplevelser og dannet os vores eget indtryk af, hvordan vi skal gribe uddannelsen af de irakiske soldater an.



De er blevet trænet i skydning, førstehjælp, panserværnsvåben og stabstræning. De irakiske soldater har været rigtig imødekommende og interesseret i den træning, som vi har tilbudt dem.

Endpoint Security by Bitdefender

This page is safe



Den anden halvdel af os husarer udgøres af SECFOR. De bor sammen med den amerikanske enhed, som de varetager sikringen af lejren sammen med.



Her til at starte med har de fået overdraget sikringen af lejren sammen med amerikanske soldater, som har været hernede i lidt længere tid, så de har sat vores SECFOR ind i alle detaljerne omkring sikkerheden, så vi kan føle os trygge i lejren.

Vi føler os trygge og vi glæder os til at uddanne endnu flere irakiske soldater, så de kan gøre en forskel til fordel for det fremtidige Irak.

Fortsat god sommer derhjemme.

Tilbage