Ho Joon CHYUNGJong Tae KIMKhalid PASHTOONXhavit HALITIIsmail ISAKOVMigeddorj BATCHIMEGVice-Admiral Christian CANOVA,DeputyCommander, NATO Maritime Command,NorthwoodDr Alexander COOLEY,Professor of PoliticalScience, Barnard College, Columbia UniversityPatrick VAN EERTEN,Director of Operations andOffshore at Jumbo Shipping, RotterdamLieutenant General Petr PAVEL,Chief of theGeneral Staff of the Armed Forces, Czech RepublicDr Benjamin SCHREER,Deputy Head and SeniorLecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,School of International Political and StrategicStudies, College of Asia and the Pacific, AustralianNational UniversityDr Alexandr VONDRA,Minister of Defence,Czech RepublicHenrik BLIDDAL, DirectorPaul COOL, DirectorAndrea PRETIS, Co-ordinatorFevzi Doruk ERGUN, Research AssistantAhmad MEHDI, Research Assistant

5.TheMinister of Defence, Dr Alexandr Vondra,served as a foreign policy advisor toPresident Vaclav Havel, and later as Czech Ambassador to the United States (1997-2001), duringwhich time he oversaw the process of the Czech Republic’s integration into NATO, the chairmanpointed out.6.Dr Vondra highlighted the significance of the Prague NATO summit in 2002, which tookplace one year after the September 2001 attacks. Dr Vondra highlighted the summit as a test caseof Alliance solidarity. It was also an important Summit for two other reasons: firstly, it was decidedthat a NATO response force and capability package would be implemented; and secondly, NATOinvited seven new members to join the alliance.7.NATO remains the key project of the transatlantic family and a key priority is that it remainsstrong, Dr Vondra noted. At present, US attention is steering towards the Asia-Pacific region,whilst the EU’s priorities are anchored towards fiscal stability in the eurozone. In the context of ashifting geopolitical map, where domestic priorities are becoming increasingly important,Dr Vondra said that NATO’s mission and purpose must not be overshadowed. Dr Vondra also

warned against the idea of redefining NATO’s mission and that its traditional hard security rolemust be preserved for it to maintain its strategic rationale.8.Defence cuts made by NATO member states have been a cause for alarm, Dr Vondrastressed. However, Dr Vondra also highlighted that the military quality of individual NATO memberstates cannot be measured by the percentage of GDP spent on procurement alone. The case ofthe Czech Republic was also mentioned in this context: having lowered defence spending by 12%,complex defence review projects have been launched, leading to new military structures and moreefficient operational command systems. Dr Vondra mentioned that the case of the Czech Republichighlights that lower defence spending need not translate into less commitment to NATO collectivemissions. The country’s programme from 2013-2017 commits Czech troops to Afghanistanalongside improving military interoperability.9.Dr Vondra noted that as defence spending is reduced across NATO member states,multinational initiatives cannot replace national ones. It was also mentioned that NATO’s mostimportant asset is the role of its partners. NATO’s partnership policy is important in establishingsecurity co-operation. However, Dr Vondra noted that such partnerships are complementary notsubstitutive; the outsourcing of the collective defence commitment in a way which jeopardises itssecurity is unacceptable.10. Dr Vondra commented that the Alliance’s experience in Afghanistan was a good example ofthe merits of interoperability. However, he also said that counter-insurgency strategies are onlyone side of the coin in terms of the future of interoperability in the Alliance. He also mentioned thatintra-military exercises will likely increase over the years as interoperability needs to be developedin the field of conventional defence as well.11. In a spirited discussion following the presentation, a member questioned whether NATOshould make a more concerted effort to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Dr Vondraresponded by arguing that deterrence remains a central strategy of the Alliance but thatdevelopments in the Middle East will prove to be a major challenge to nuclear deterrence policy inthe future. Another member commented that despite the United States’ pivot towards Asia, NATOshould focus more on its defence capabilities, especially via increased common procurementstrategies. Dr Vondra responded by noting that he was very much in favour of commonprocurement citing the example of how over 30 years ago, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgiumagreed on the common procurement of their supersonic fighters with excellent outcomes as aresult. Dr Vondra also highlighted why harmonisation of acquisition cycles was a challenge tocommon procurement, explaining why some member states prefer unilateral procurementstrategies.

security of the allies, as well the Czech Republic’s military engagement in NATO operations, whichremains the most essential objective of the Armed Forces.14. Citing the policy document Structure of the Czech Armed Forces (2013-2015), he stated thatits main purpose is to cope with continuous defence budget cuts, while maintaining at least thecore capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces needed to meet the required level of ambition interms of fiscal austerity. Lieutenant General Pavel noted that austerity measures led to majorreorganisation strategies, the most important of which included the abolition of theoperational-tactical headquarter (HQ) and the establishment of administrative HQs of Land andAir Forces, located in Prague.15. Greater attention is now being paid to multinational co-operation, as part of NATO’sSmart Defence and Pooling and Sharing strategy established at the Chicago Summit.Lieutenant General Pavel commented that the Czech Republic is very active in co-operating withother Allies, participating in one quarter of entire Smart Defence projects, launched at Chicago.Such projects include: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons,multinational logistics and helicopters, and the Multinational Helicopter Training Centre.Lieutenant General Pavel also argued that it is increasingly important that current elites’ interest inNATO does not wane, that the stability and security that NATO brings should not beunderestimated and that burden sharing requires ever more interest and political will.

16.Vice-Admiral Christian Canovaoutlined how NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), asthe single maritime command in the new NATO Command Structure, views the future ofMaritime Security as part of NATO operations. He argued that as globalisation increases, thecapability to promote security across vital lines of communications is of paramount importance, aswas outlined at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit.17. NATO Maritime Command is currently conducting three major Maritime Operations. Theseinclude: Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in 2011; Operation Active Endeavour (OAE - 2001-…)and Operation Ocean Shield (2009-…). Vice-Admiral Canova argued that the responsibilities ofOUP were further bolstered in 2011 during the NATO operations in Libya. One of the keysuccesses behind NATO’s Libya operation was the ability of OUP and OAE to activatecommonality of procedures, the shared experience of interoperability and the proven relationshipsit had forged ahead of that crisis, allowing for rapid and integrated maritime response. However, itwas also noted that interoperability and maritime partnerships need to be pursued far beyond theestablished Alliance structure and NATO’s traditional areas of interest, especially given that futureoperations may need non-NATO members. Vice-Admiral Canova argued that this is being pursuedthrough Operation Ocean Shield where work with the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)includes exercises with Russia, Iran, India and China under the banner of the counter-piracymission. Vice-Admiral Canova argued that NATO will need to make the most of the equity in thiscollective security effort, if or when Ocean Shield comes to an end.18. Vice-Admiral Canova then went on to note that the maritime domain and the forcesattributed to operations are available to operationalise ideas such as Smart Defence and theConnected Forces’ Initiative. In particular, the Vice-Admiral stressed the need to further developNATO’s collective forces in two major fields: the scope of missions, from NEOs (Non-CombatantEvacuation Operations), through to humanitarian relief; and secondly, the ability to respond.

19. Vice-Admiral Canova concluded on the topic of counter-piracy. He noted that since 2009,NATO’s Maritime Command has succeeded in the field of counter-piracy. In particular, whereas in2009 there were 130 attacks in the Indian Ocean, this had fallen to 20 by 2012. Moreover,whereas in 2009 there had been 45 hijackings in the Indian Ocean, by 2012, this had fallen to 7.This has been partly related to the number of prosecutions taken place (in 2010, only 2% ofpirates were retained for prosecution, whereas in 2012 this had increased to 53%).20.Patrick van Eeerten,Director of Operations and Offshore at Jumbo Shipping, Rotterdam,then took the floor. In his presentation, he explained that NATO and the private shippingcommunity have used co-operative synergies to combat piracy. For the commercial shippingcommunity, the key concern at present is safety of personnel. Without ensuring their security,commercial shipping companies not only risk the safety of its personnel but also risk violatinginternational and national laws in areas of operation. Whilst the solution to maritime security maylie in diplomacy, commercial shipping companies are under pressure to act quickly. Given thatmodern piracy is a global phenomenon and that not all countries have modern navies, this has ledto the privatisation of maritime security. In particular, private security companies are playing anincreasingly important role today in providing security for vessels operating in dangerous waters.However, there remain major regulatory and legal restrictions on the use of private securitycompanies and Mr van Eeerten urged members that further efforts should be made to reach adiplomatic and political solution to the use of private security companies.21. This could be done in several ways by regulating both the transportation of the weapons andfacilitating the storage of weapons on board much like the current rules for bonded stores. A lot ofthe cost for the shipping companies now is in the transport of weapons as many flag States andPort States have, justifiably very strict regulations, but these regulations should be standardizedinternationally.22. During a discussion of both presentations, it was mentioned that NATO should adopt the sameapproach as the EU in extending its operational capabilities to increase certain prime onshoretargets (the EU has enhanced its operational capacity as part of EU operation Atalanta byextending targets to include on-land targets). The discussion focussed on why NATO had notadopted the same approach. It was also said that whilst the number of attacks have dropped offthe Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean that the territorial waters of Yemen have seen increases inattacks, which is a major cause for concern. The discussion then moved onto the consequences ofmilitary downsizing and impact on maritime security. This makes the case for privately armedsecurity forces more appealing to some. However, the question of regulation remains a thornylegislative issue. Finally, it was noted that 90% of pirates that are apprehended are subsequentlyreleased. This figure is a major reflection of the problems surrounding the lack of internationaltribunal courts for the successful prosecution of pirates. It was pointed out that this“catch-and-release” problem has dented military morale.

VIII. Consideration of the draft report of the Sub-Committee on Future Defence andSecurity Capabilities

The Challenge of Piracy: International Response and NATO’s

Role

[144 DSCFC 12 E] by Raymond Knops (Netherlands), Rapporteur23.Raymond Knopsbegan by noting several positive trends regarding piracy attacks offSomalia. Incidents have been increasing year by year. A total of 237 were reported in 2011.However, in the first half of 2012, they have decreased sharply. So far, the number is 71. Also,fewer ships have been hijacked and the number of hostages has decreased. Currently, ninevessels are in the possession of pirates with 154 crew members having been held hostage.Despite falling numbers, Mr Knops noted that this should not be an excuse for complacency.

24. Both the EU and NATO have been operationally involved in counter-piracy for over fouryears. The EU’s operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield have complementedeach other, with the EU mission being the more robust one. In particular, in March 2012, EUforeign ministers authorised an enhanced operations concept for Atalanta, with the approval of theSomali government, allowing for on-land attacks. Mr Knops added, however, that concerns lingerwith regard to possible collateral casualties. Whilst NATO could benefit from adopting the sameenhanced operational capacity, NATO and EU should not duplicate responsibilities in the fightagainst piracy.25. Operation Ocean Shield, although a smaller NATO mission, constitutes an opportunity forthe Alliance to define its role in the maritime domain and establish itself as a credible maritimesecurity provider.26. The speaker noted that three major political developments are worth noting with regard tothe ongoing fight against piracy off the Horn of Africa. Firstly, South Africa has now ratified thethInternational Maritime Organisation’s Djibouti Code of Conduct in May 2012, becoming the 19signatory. Secondly, a change of government in Somalia took place in 2012 which could furtherbolster NATO and EU’s mission in the fight against piracy, especially if the government can buildmore effective government structures. And thirdly, at the Second Istanbul Conference, membersof the international community have made dealing with the economic roots of piracy a key focus.27. The debate over the use of private armed guards is becoming an increasingly importantfeature of counter-piracy operations. It was argued that private security guards operate in anambiguous legal environment. At present, there is no consensus amongst national legislatures orviews within the Alliance and the EU on this matter, which could weaken international efforts.Moreover, the current legal grey zone surrounding use of private armed guards has been reflectedin differing national legislatures’ attitudes. Currently, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands areagainst their use, whereas Spain allows their use and Denmark licences private security guards onan ad hoc basis.28. During the discussion of the draft report, it was mentioned that one of the main problems inthe counter-piracy fight is the lack of a common doctrine. It was also noted that the threat of piracyis not limited to ransom. It was stressed that there was a real risk that piracy could evolve intoother forms of maritime terrorism, especially as part of wider attacks on logistical energy routes aswell as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers. Thirdly, it was noted that legal ambiguitiessurrounding private security contractors is a major problem. Finally, it was concluded that currentlack of international tribunals for the prosecution of pirates is a major problem, leading to a “catchand release” approach which effectively hinders successful prosecution of pirates. Given theproblem of effective court systems in host countries, pirates in Somalia, for example, are notsubject to the same rules of prosecution set out by convention.Mr Knops’ draft report

The Challenge of Piracy: International Response and NATO Role

[144 DSCFC 12 E] was adopted.

30. She noted that NATO must continue to adapt given the increasing complexity anddifferences between its different operations. Here the differences between Afghanistan and Libyawere provided as an indication that NATO needs to further expand the range of capabilities at itsdisposal in the future. Moreover, it was noted that whilst military success is a necessary feature ofNATO’s operations, it is not sufficient. As demonstrated in the Balkans, Afghanistan and now inLibya, the importance of the political and civil dimensions to NATO are becoming increasinglyimportant. Therefore, the overall approach taken toward the integration of civil and militaryelements of NATO’s doctrine is increasingly important. To this end, strengthening NATO’spartnership with the EU should be a major policy priority.31. During a discussion of the report it was mentioned that the ongoing Syria crisis is alsorevolving around the issue of air control. The discussion then moved on to fiscal constraints in theUnited States and the withdrawal of US forces from the European theatre. It was said by the USdelegation that European member’s lack of meeting the 2% defense threshold makes itincreasingly difficult for US politicians to defend US presence in Europe. In response, theRapporteur concluded that the case of Libya highlights how European NATO allies can succeedwith the United States acting from behind.Mrs Ameline’s draft report

Matching Capabilities to Ambitions: NATO Towards 2020

[145 DSCTC 12 E] thus amended, was adopted.

32. Committee members reviewed recent Committee activities, including a successful visit toFrance and Djibouti. The Chairman gave the floor toSir John Stanley(United Kingdom),Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation, whohighlighted the importance of Djibouti as a host to many military bases including those of France,United States, and the first Japanese overseas base since the Second World War. Moving on todiscussing planned visits for 2013, the Chairman mentioned a visit to Bahrain and Qatar inJanuary 2013, and a visit to Turkey in April 2013. The Committee was also informed thatnecessary approvals on visiting an American naval facility in Diego Garcia are being sought fromthe State Department and Department of Defence. Other planned visits include a joint committeemeeting with the Political Committee and the Economics and Security Committee in late-Februaryin Brussels, a joint visit of the Sub-Committee on Future Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) and theScience and Technology Committee to the Netherlands in April and a potential DSCFC visit toJapan in autumn.33. The Chairman mentioned two possible reports for next year, one focusing on strategicpartnerships, and the other on pooling and sharing. He then asked the committee about plannedreports for 2013. General RapporteurSven Mikser(Estonia) mentioned a report on Afghanistan intransition, whileJohn Shimkus(United States) argued that a report which covers military budgetissues, especially focusing on the prospects of the US military spending and how that would affectshared capabilities would be an important topic to focus on.Giorgio La Malfa(Italy) argued thatmore should be done on the Iranian nuclear programme and suggested that one committee orsub-committee should go to Israel to discuss the issue with the leadership and argued that theplanned meeting in Turkey could be extended to talk more about this issue. The Chairman

34.According toDr Cooley,although all neighbouring actors are committed to security andpeace in Afghanistan, in reality, regional powers also see the country as a means to achieve otherregional aims. The lack of a common regional forum for co-operation has a negative impact onAfghanistan’s security.35.Dr Cooley stressed that China is a crucial player in Afghanistan. It is the biggest economicinvestor in Afghanistan, having begun a US $ 4 billion project to develop the Aynak copper mine,won the rights to develop Amu Darya field and built the Central Asian pipeline throughnorthern Afghanistan. According to Dr Cooley, the main driving force for Chinese involvement is itsprimary security interest in stabilising its Western province of Xinjiang. This is to be achievedthrough insuring co-operation with and aiding development in neighbouring countries to avoidspill-overs into Xinjiang, striking hard against Uyghur separatism and connecting this region to itsneighbours through energy projects to secure energy supplies to feed the rising demand in China.China wants to stabilise northern Afghanistan, especially the Wakhan corridor to avoid spill-overs,and uses police training, dealing with local warlords and establishing partnerships amongPakistan, Afghanistan and itself to accomplish this aim.36.Dr Cooley then offered his views on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as aregional forum on Afghanistan. The country recently became an observer, and the organisationpromotes co-operation in the fields of strengthening border controls and implementing effectivecounter-narcotic operations. Yet, Dr Cooley notes that the organisation lacks substance andfurther enlargement remains problematic. China and Russia also have at times conflictingagendas; whereas China sees it as a means for its economic expansion, Russia prefers to limitChinese economic expansion in Central Asia and keep the organisation as a security-basedforum.37.Dr Cooley then went on to explain the perspectives of the Central Asian states, which aresignificant for the mission because all NATO countries are reverse transition from the area. Farfrom co-operation, militarisation and hardening borders define the current state of the region. Thewater sharing dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the proposed Rogham Damremains the biggest security tension. Moreover, tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistanwere worsened during the ethnic clashes in south Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The area is also the mosttrade-unfriendly region in the world as non-tariff barriers are very high, therefore implementing thenew Silk Road project is very challenging.38.According to Cooley, India has a real interest in stabilising Afghanistan. It wants to curbPakistan’s political influence and China’s economic influence in Afghanistan. It also tries topromote the establishment of a pipeline that would cross through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,Pakistan and India, although China’s stance on the issue is unclear and it is not certain thatTurkmenistan has enough gas to support this and other alternative projects. Dr Cooley concludedthat despite declared commitments, conflicting regional interests lower the effectiveness of co-operation in Afghanistan by regional states.39.In the following discussion, the roles of regional actors were further analysed. Dr Cooleycommented that growing instability would make China even more reluctant to intervene militarily in

the area as this would put China at the centre of focus and increase the risk of spill-overs into itsXinjiang region. China is also increasingly seeing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)presence as complimentary to its interests since the ISAF mission contains instability and helpssecure Chinese investments in the region. The Afghan delegation expressed their gratitudetowards India’s engagement but voiced their worries over the Indian-Pakistani rivalry, and howcontributions India makes in turn complicates Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan. Dr Cooleymentioned that the private sector is reluctant to commit to proposed pipeline projects, as the worldgas market outlook might change dramatically due to the development of shale gas in the nearfuture. He also argued that Washington is increasingly seeing India as a potentially valuablepartner in the region, not a proxy, and that the United States has been supportive of Chineseprojects in the region so far instead of competing with Beijing. Finally, Uzbekistan’s potential exitfrom the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) was discussed, and it was argued thatthis might give rise to the creation of more blocs within Central Asia and heighten securitytensions.

40.Following Mr Mikser’s presentation, the Committee engaged in a fruitful discussion. After adiscussion on early withdrawals, Mr Mikser commented that while the withdrawals have nothampered ISAF missions so far, if more states were to withdrawal early, this could jeopardizeconsolidating previously achieved gains. The continued prevalence of poppy production and drugtrafficking was discussed. Russia voiced its worries that once the ISAF withdrew, drug traffickingwarlords would move into the North and conduct their operations through Afghanistan’sneighbours in the northwest, including Russia. Committee members and the Rapporteur alsodiscussed their concerns over the increasing number of insider attacks, remaining problems withgovernance and human rights, the issues that future troop reductions of the Afghan NationalSecurity Forces (ANSF) might cause and the challenges related to warlords which may increasetheir power after ISAF’s withdrawal.Mr Mikser’s draft General Report

Afghanistan: Towards 2014 and Beyond

[143 DSC 12 E]was adopted by the committee.

XIII. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution on

Afghanistan:

Towards 2014 and Beyond

[143 DSC 12 E] by Sven MIKSER (Estonia), GeneralRapporteur41.After the Chairman explained the voting procedures for the amendment, the Rapporteurpresented his resolution. Ten amendments to the resolution were considered. First proposedamendment came from the Russian delegation which argued that all international militarypresence in Afghanistan after 2014 should have a legal basis in United Nations Security Councilresolutions. The Rapporteur countered by suggesting that bilateral treaties were also legitimatemeans under international law and the amendment was rejected in the subsequent voting.42.One other important amendment was raised by the German delegation, who suggestedthat “green on blue” attacks should be referred to as “insider attacks”. The German delegationargued that “green on blue” attacks only covered attacks on ISAF by ANSF personnel, whereasANSF fall victim to similar “insider attacks”, and hence the delegation wanted to use anall-inclusive terminology. The amendment was accepted by the committee.

XIV. Presentation by Dr Benjamin Schreer, Deputy Head and Senior Lecturer, Strategic andDefence Studies Centre, School of International Political and Strategic Studies,College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University on

NATO’s

Partnerships: Asia-Pacific

44.According toDr Schreer,NATO’s partnership with Asia-Pacific countries has beenbeneficial to NATO in two ways; these countries have provided political and military support toISAF in Afghanistan, and these partnerships have overlapped with NATO’s goal to establish aglobal network of reliable partners. The partners enjoy their co-operation with NATO since eachrelationship is individually tailored to fit the respective partner’s ambitions and provides them theability to shape decision making in NATO-led missions that the partners are involved in.45.Yet Dr Schreer argues that after Afghanistan, NATO might be reluctant to deepen its tieswith these countries. It is likely that European allies, already plagued by the economic crisis, willneed to commit more resources to securing their immediate neighbourhood as the United States’focus is shifting towards Asia. Moreover, Asia-Pacific partner states are increasingly focusing onpower shifts in their region. Other key actors, such as India and China, are reluctant to co-operatewith NATO, since it is an external military alliance.46.Therefore Dr Schreer argues that NATO should develop a vision for its engagement inAsia, deepen political security dialogue about regional security, establish ties with regionalmultilateral security institutions and increase public diplomacy efforts.47.In a spirited discussion following the presentation, one member raised the issue of howNATO can increase its counterterrorism role in South Asia. Dr Schreer underscored issues relatedto Pakistan and highlighted importance of deepening ties with India. He suggested that sinceforging such ties would take a long time, NATO should start as soon as possible.48.On another important discussion, a parliamentary guest raised the question of how theUnited States will reconcile its two roles as the biggest burden bearer of NATO and a key player inAsia-Pacific. Dr Schreer responded by suggesting that although it reorients its foreign policy, theUnited States will still maintain its presence in Middle East and other areas. He argued that insteadof abandoning these areas, the United States would look for different burden sharingarrangements and look for its partners to take the lead for their own security. He also argued thatthe United States still has not decided whether to compete or co-operate with China and is lookingfor ways to accommodate the rise of China.

Saturday 10 November 2012

Afghanistan: Ensuring a

Successful Transition

The

Czech Republic’s Priorities and Challenges after the Chicago Summit

The Czech Republic’s Armed Forces – Reform Priorities

and Contributions to Ongoing NATO Operations

NATO’s Role in Maritime Security and Counter-Piracy

The Challenge of Piracy: International Response and NATO’s

Role

The Challenge of Piracy: International Response and NATO Role

Matching Capabilities to Ambitions: NATO Towards 2020

Matching Capabilities to Ambitions: NATO Towards 2020

Sunday 11 November 2012

Afghanistan and NATO’s Drawdown of Forces, Regional

Dynamics and Their Impact on Security.

Afghanistan: Towards 2014 and Beyond

Afghanistan: Towards 2014 and Beyond

Afghanistan:

Towards 2014 and Beyond

Afghanistan: Towards 2014 and Beyond

NATO’s

Partnerships: Asia-Pacific

Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Security and Defence Co-operation

Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council