

Saturday 13 and Sunday 14 November 2010 - Summary of the meeting of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security

I. Opening remarks

1. The Chairperson, Jo Ann Emerson (US), opened the meeting by welcoming members and speakers and by thanking the Polish delegation for its hospitality and efficient organisation of the Session. The draft Agenda of the meeting [206 CDS 10 E rev. 1] and the Summary of the meeting held in Riga, Latvia, on 30 May 2010 [151 CDS 10 E] were adopted.

II. Presentation by Akbar Ayazi, Associate Broadcasting Director for the Afghan, Pakistani, Iranian and Iraqi Services, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), on Political Landscape of Afghanistan?

2. Akbar Ayazi provided a grim picture of the current state of governance in Afghanistan. He argued that Afghans do not trust the central government, which is perceived as dominated by power brokers subservient to NATO and who monopolise resources. He added that traditional leaders and power brokers at lower levels of governance actively work against the government. In his view, moving away from this situation requires greater transparency, building the capacity of key individuals for governance, and a proper management of resources. The influence of traditional leaders or power brokers must also either be neutralised or brought to work in support of governance.

3. Sub-national authorities are corrupt, do not provide services, and even work against the national level, Mr Ayazi regretted. They lack resources, the ability to manage resources, and qualified personnel. In addition, elected officials are not perceived as representative. Meanwhile, the insurgents' "shadow government" is sometimes more functional than the legitimate government. People refer to it out of fear, necessity or even out of choice in those areas where national or sub-national governance does not exist or is dysfunctional.

4. According to Mr Ayazi, while holding parliamentary elections in a relatively calm and secure atmosphere could be seen in itself as a success, the low turnout also confirmed the sustained frustration of the population with the process and with governance in general. Significant discrepancies in representation between provinces and ethnic groups due to irregularities and the fact that many polling stations remained closed because of security concerns, heighten the risk that results might not be seen as legitimate. Afghans are already rapidly losing trust in their institutions.

5. Mr Ayazi argued that the insurgency includes different groups. The Taliban themselves can be subdivided in three categories: the hardcore Taliban, who identify with al-Qaeda, the Jihadists, and the followers. A second group comprises what Mr Ayazi labelled as "angry people", i.e. victims of injustice, of NATO and Afghan operations, or simply individuals who have been excluded from the establishment. A third group includes power brokers and drug lords who work both for and against NATO and the Afghan government.

6. According to Mr Ayazi, with the exception of hardcore Taliban, all other insurgents can be reconciled and reintegrated into society. However, he pleaded for a different approach to reconciliation, arguing that the Peace Council does not have the credibility required to succeed in this task. Instead he called for the inclusion of respected tribal leaders, leaders of civic groups and organisations, as well as prominent and trusted members of Parliament. He also stressed that reconciliation should be conducted directly rather than through third parties. Mr Ayazi insisted that completing the process of reconciliation and reintegration is vital for the success of the process of transition to full Afghan responsibility. Past experience showed that transition to a weak government and unprepared Afghan security forces would be disastrous, and leave the door open for the interference of powerful neighbours. Mr Ayazi also warned that most Afghan soldiers remained loyal to the warlords who introduced them rather than to the institution of the Afghan National Army.

7. Mr Ayazi argued that some 70% of the Afghan population still support NATO's presence in the country. However, he urged NATO to address the most problematic shortcomings in its current approach. First and foremost, NATO and the international community need to free Afghanistan from the power brokers who have taken the nation hostage and benefit from the current system. International assistance, he warned, does not reach those populations that most need it, but often ends up in the hands of intermediaries, or, worse, the insurgency. Fifty percent of insurgent revenues come from international assistance funds, Mr Ayazi claimed. NATO also needs to help make the Afghan National Security Forces more representative of the population, by including more Pashtuns from the South. Mr Ayazi concluded that NATO had no other choice than to work with the current government, which its nations have endorsed and to which there is no good alternative. However, he urged NATO nations to demand greater accountability from its Afghan counterparts.

III. Consideration of the draft Special Report Governance Challenges in Afghanistan [209 CDS 10 E] presented by Vitalino Canas (Portugal), Special Rapporteur

8. Presenting his report on Governance Challenges in Afghanistan, Vitalino Canas (PT) argued that improving governance is key to Afghanistan's future. While developments throughout 2010 have been uneven, he was confident that the new phase of partnership which Afghanistan and the international community have entered, could set Afghanistan on the right path towards transition.

9. The report points to four main challenges at the central level of government: the overall balance of power; elections; human rights and women's rights; and reintegration and reconciliation. Mr Canas argued that on all four aspects, there has been visible progress; however, much remained to be done. Although it recently demonstrated a more assertive role, the Parliament's powers remain constrained. While the conduct of parliamentary elections showed improvements compared with the 2009 presidential election, final results had still not been announced. A large number of complaints have been filed and 1.3 million votes invalidated. Asked about long-term electoral reform in Afghanistan, Mr Canas suggested that one place to start from was to strengthen the party system. Mr Canas also noted the significant progress achieved with regard to human and women's rights since the fall of the Taliban regime. Yet, many serious problems remain. Lastly, Mr Canas argued that it was now clear that there was no way forward without drawing in at least some elements of the insurgency. However, he warned that reconciliation would be a long process, and continuing to exert strong military pressure on the insurgency remained essential. The workings of the High Peace Council needed to be supported, but also carefully monitored in order to avoid Afghanistan backsliding on human rights, he argued. Mr Canas also stressed that reconciliation needed to take place between the Afghan people; while the international community can assist and facilitate this process, it also needs to keep a low profile.

10. Mr Canas emphasised that while priority has been given to building central institutions, local governance was what made a difference to the daily lives of most Afghans. He noted the progress achieved recently thanks to the active role of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, and successful experiments in local empowerment and ownership, such as the Community Development Councils. Local powers, however, remain very limited and ill-defined. Additionally, parallel structures, including Taliban-sponsored institutions, are widespread.

11. Corruption, deficient justice reform and the persistent illicit drug economy are three serious challenges which prevent the establishment of effective rule of law, Mr Canas argued. Widespread corruption undermines Afghan governance both directly and indirectly. Afghan people do not get the government services they are entitled to, and at the same time international donors bypass the government, which indirectly weakens administrative capacity. Most Afghans do not have access to the formal justice system, and thus turn to informal justice or Taliban-sponsored courts as alternatives. The year 2010 has seen mixed developments in terms of opium cultivation and production. Providing better local governance and alternative livelihood options to farmers can lead to progress, Mr Canas maintained.

12. Mr Canas regretted that international efforts had initially suffered from the lack of a clear long-term strategy and division of labour, limited resources and a narrow mandate, shortcomings that have since been partially addressed. The combination of a more coherent and Afghan-led effort, and of NATO's new counterinsurgency strategy, provide a genuine opportunity for decisive progress, including on strengthening governance, he argued. However, this will require that Afghanistan and its international partners each deliver on the mutual pledges undertaken at the July 2010 Kabul Conference; in particular, Afghan authorities need to demonstrate their ability to deliver on their reform commitments, and Allies need to step up efforts to build Afghan capacity in the field of governance, thus helping the government strengthen its ability to deliver services to the population.

13. Lord Jopling (UK) suggested updates and corrections to the following paragraphs:

- paragraph 71: the number of districts should be changed from 364 to 365;
- paragraph 72: there was no evidence of reduced violence in Helmand;
- paragraph 75: no district election have been held in Afghanistan;
- paragraph 82: should refer to Transparency International's 2010 Index.

The Special Rapporteur agreed to include these changes in the final version of the report.

The draft Special Report [209 CDS 10 E], thus amended, was adopted.

IV. Activities in 2010 and 2011 presented by the Chair and Sub-Committee Chair

14. The Chairperson reported on the visit of the Committee to Washington, D.C., and Missouri in July 2010. Lord Jopling briefed the Committee on the participation of a small delegation to NATO's disaster response exercise in Armenia in September 2010. Enzo Bianco (IT) provided a brief summary of the visit of the Sub-Committee to Belgrade in October 2010, and Marc Angel (LU) reported on the key findings of the Rose-Roth Seminar which was held in Skopje also in October.

15. The following tentative programme of Committee activities was adopted for 2011:

Report	General Report	Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance	Special Report
Preliminary titles of the reports	The terrorist threat to the Alliance ten years after 9/11	The development of international criminal justice from the ICTY to the ICC	Governance challenges in Afghanistan

Visits		- Bosnia and Herzegovina (joint with ESCEW)- The Netherlands (joint with DSCTC)	Special seminar on Afghanistan in London (joint with DSCFC, ESCTER, STCEES)
Time of the visits		- May- July	September

16. Several members of the Committee suggested that the Committee could also consider joining the visit that two other Committees are planning to China, as issues discussed during this visit would no doubt also be relevant for the CDS Committee. The visit to China could replace one of the planned activities, for instance the joint seminar in London – which, in any event, would be open to all members, regardless of Committee affiliation. Other members noted that it was important to provide a clear rationale for a visit to China, and pointed to the potential cost of such a visit.

V. Presentation by Beata Gorka-Winter, Security Programme Coordinator at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, on NATO-EU Co-operation in the 21st Century: Different Identities, Common Responsibility

17. Beata Gorka-Winter emphasised that the EU and NATO are indispensable partners, because they share and promote the same values of stability, good governance, the rule of law and respect of human rights, both within their own societies and beyond their borders. These values are today being challenged, and this situation makes the EU-NATO partnership even more important, she argued. In her view, the three following trends provide the main rationale for NATO-EU co-operation in the 21st century: the rise of powers which are still far from accepting democratic norms and standards but which are gaining greater political influence; the rising number of failed or failing States; and the risks created by unreasonable governments and non-State actors.

18. Neither organisation can deal with these issues alone, Ms Gorka-Winter stressed. Both NATO and the EU have developed unique skills and complementary capabilities in areas such as crisis management, stabilisation and peace-building. Thus, both organisations should contribute to the so-called “comprehensive approach”, which aims to integrate military and civilian instruments in responding to crises. Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a successful example of NATO-EU co-operation in crisis. Current financial constraints are another reason why NATO and the EU cannot afford to go it alone any longer. Lastly, both organisations have global interests and share the ambition to extend their reach globally.

19. Traditional fears that the development of an EU military capacity might weaken NATO are no longer relevant, Ms Gorka-Winter insisted. The United States is shifting its focus to the Broader Middle East and welcomes greater European involvement. The key to unblocking NATO-EU co-operation today lies in a resolution of the Turkish-Cypriot conundrum, Ms Gorka-Winter emphasised. In addition, she called on NATO and EU member States to adopt a “two-track thinking” when developing new capabilities: all future military efforts or investments undertaken by States which are members of both organisations should serve both institutions, she stressed.

20. Answering a question from a delegate, Ms Gorka-Winter argued that the Berlin Plus Agreement had been successfully implemented in the Western Balkans. However, the Agreement was no more adapted to an environment, in which foreign operations are increasingly complex and involve both civilian and military elements. The idea of “reverse Berlin Plus”, i.e. NATO access to some of the EU’s civilian capabilities, was not satisfactory either. In Ms Gorka-Winter’s view, NATO and EU countries need to go beyond this strict military-civilian division, and develop both pillars within each organisation in a way that allows them to be more effective on the ground.

VI. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance The Western Balkans, 15 Years After Dayton: Achievements and Prospects [208 CDS DG 10 E], presented by Marc Angel (Luxembourg), Rapporteur

21. The Rapporteur emphasised that his draft report reflected a cautious optimism about developments in the region, recognising the impressive progress achieved so far, while pointing to remaining challenges. He stressed that NATO and EU nations and governments of the region share a historic responsibility to complete the full integration of the region into the Euro-Atlantic space. To this end, NATO and EU governments need to keep the perspective of accession credible, while the Balkan countries need to assume full responsibility to finish the transformation they embarked upon 15 years ago. This transformation includes reconciliation between States but also between different communities.

22. The creation of a zone of security in which the prospect of armed conflict has become unacceptable, the consolidation of independent States, justice for the crimes committed during the war, and the development of regional co-operation, are four of the greatest achievements in the past 15 years in the region, Mr Angel argued.

23. The international community’s record in the region is uneven, with clear successes, such as the stabilisation of the security situation and progress in defence reform, but also less successful endeavours, particularly in conflict prevention. Nevertheless,

Mr Angel stressed how the Balkans have transformed the United Nations, NATO and the EU.

24. The consolidation of truly multiethnic institutions and reconciliation are two major remaining challenges in the Balkans, Mr Angel emphasised. While most countries have attempted to increase the representation of minorities in State institutions and better protect their rights, these changes in legislation have not led to a sincere acceptance of and commitment to multiethnic societies. Similarly, while the reconciliation process has seen positive developments, resolving remaining issues, such as missing persons, genocide cases before the International Court of Justice and the capture of war criminals still at large, is essential.

25. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo also continue to pose difficult challenges. Elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2010 provided a mixed picture. Mr Angel called for the speedy formation of a government, in order to start addressing the real economic and social problems the country faces. In addition, the discussion on constitutional reform should be kept separate from daily politics. Mr Angel also called on the EU and NATO to continue to encourage focused targeted progress in specific areas.

26. Recent developments in Kosovo have also been mixed. Mr Angel insisted that efforts needed to focus on addressing the needs of the Kosovo population, regardless of ethnicity, i.e. the rule of law, security and economic development. Secondly, he called on Pristina and Belgrade to seize the opportunity for a historic reconciliation, and urged the EU to make full use of its leverage in order to create the conditions for an agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. Lastly, he stressed that the unity and clarity of international action in Kosovo need to be preserved, and KFOR and EULEX must continue to be perceived as neutral and legitimate partners by Pristina, Belgrade and all ethnic groups in Kosovo.

27. The Rapporteur indicated that, following comments made in Riga, he would make a number of linguistic adjustments to the English version of the report in paragraphs 9, 15 and 57. He would also update the figures on the Bosnian elections based on the final results published on 2 November 2010. Several other amendments were also suggested to the report:

- footnote 9: mention Belgrade's position regarding the Ahtisaari plan in addition to that of Kosovo Albanians, NATO, the EU and others;
- paragraph 48: call on the EU to reciprocate NATO's positive steps towards enhanced NATO-EU co-operation;
- paragraph 50: clarify why Serbia does not currently seek NATO membership;
- paragraph 61: clarify that the International Court of Justice recognised that Serbia has not committed genocide;
- paragraph 69: take note of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the population of Republika Srpska supports the Dayton Accords;
- paragraph 86: take note of Belgrade's concerns regarding the transfer of responsibility for cultural and religious sites from KFOR to the Kosovo police; and
- include a reference to the sub-regional agreement on arms control as another successful regionally-owned initiative.

The Rapporteur agreed to include these changes in the final version of the report.

The draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance [208 CDS DG 10 E], thus amended, was adopted.

VII. Presentation by EJ Hogendoorn, Horn of Africa Project Director, International Crisis Group, Nairobi, on Is Devolved Security the Answer for Somalia?

28. Assessing efforts towards Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Somalia, EJ Hogendoorn argued that local and international attempts to create a strong unified national army loyal to a unitary centralised State based in Mogadishu, have so far been unsuccessful. He cited several reasons for this. While the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is treated by international partners as the sole government in Somalia, it only controls a very small share of territory, essentially seven districts of Mogadishu and a number of areas along the border. With some 8,000 soldiers from the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed in the country and tasked to protect the TFG, the latter has no incentive to promote SSR. Despite significant international assistance, Somali forces are poorly led, motivated and resourced, and remain largely ineffective.

29. Somalia's clan structure adds another layer of complication. Other clans fear that the government clan will dominate the army and use the latter as a tool to dominate them. The TFG is seen as corrupt and has been unable to articulate a compelling vision for Somalia and rally support for a cross-clan national army. This clan factor has also affected international assistance towards SSR. Thus, data from the EU Training Mission for Somalia, one of the most sophisticated attempts to build cross-clan units with a budget of some 5 million euros, shows that NCO recruits trained in 2010 overwhelmingly come from the ruling Hawiye clan. The TFG's inability to rally and co-ordinate other clans has created a space for al-Shabaab, which, with a core strength of 5,000 to 10,000 fighters, has been able to coerce and dominate each individual clan.

30. Thus, Mr Hogendoorn argued that, rather than supplying the troops necessary to defeat al-Shabaab, both the African Union and the UN should focus on assisting Somali clans to act collectively to defend against al-Shabaab. He suggested that a devolved security structure might provide a more effective solution to Somalia's collective action problem than current efforts to create a centralised unified army. This could follow the British model of recruitment and organisation or the US model of the State-based National Guard. Somali security forces would be largely drawn from and build upon existing militias. However, in order to avoid strengthening inter-clan rivalry and warfare, devolved security forces would need to be based on existing multi-clan local administrations in Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, etc. The role of the Federal Ministry of Defence and General Staff would be to co-ordinate these units in campaigns of mutual interest, such as defeating al-Shabaab.

VIII. Consideration of the draft General Report Maritime Security: NATO and EU Roles and Co-ordination [207 CDS 10 E], presented by Lord Jopling (United Kingdom), General Rapporteur

31. The General Rapporteur explained that the revised report includes a number of updates and clarifications, in particular with regards to NATO's role. It also adds a new emphasis on enhancing maritime surveillance as a key priority. Given the reliance of Western economies and societies on the sea, maintaining freedom of navigation and security at sea is crucial, he stressed. While traditional security concerns cannot be excluded in the long run, new non-traditional threats and challenges, such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, illegal trafficking in drugs, people and arms, and piracy, have also emerged. This evolving security environment requires a new approach, which needs to be inter-agency, co-operative and comprehensive.

32. According to the General Rapporteur, NATO's contribution to maritime security is four-fold:

- collective defence, including at sea;
- maritime partnerships and naval diplomacy;
- crisis management and response, including demining, ordinance disposal and disaster response; and
- maritime security operations, such as counterterrorism and counter-piracy, which combine elements of law enforcement and traditional security operations.

33. As NATO discusses its future role in support of maritime security, the Rapporteur emphasised the following key priorities:

- encourage co-ordination and co-operation between all maritime actors at the national level;
- connect NATO's actions at sea with its other activities, in order to address multi-faceted security challenges in a comprehensive manner;
- ensure that several maritime challenges can be addressed simultaneously as part of one operation;
- improve the ability to co-ordinate and co-operate with other actors;
- avoid a uniform model, as well as the lowest common denominator;
- continue assisting Allied navies with updating and testing their capabilities;
- maintain the capability to project globally but also to act locally; and
- co-ordinate and harmonise defence spending, procurement and investment.

34. The EU is also slowly assuming bigger role in the maritime domain, the General Rapporteur noted, mostly through the development of an Integrated Maritime Policy and support for regional initiatives. The EU's contribution to maritime security specifically focuses on maritime surveillance, the generation of naval capabilities and assets and counter-piracy. The Rapporteur argued that one of the EU's key assets is its ability to implement a comprehensive approach that includes both civilian and military tools at sea and on land. However, he also pointed out that, although the EU High Representative has been tasked with preparing options for a possible maritime security strategy of the EU, this is still a long way ahead.

35. Lord Jopling concluded his presentation by emphasising that international co-ordination and co-operation provide added value through enhanced maritime domain awareness and greater response capacity. He called on NATO and the EU to avoid duplication at all costs, enhance co-ordination and co-operation with other international organisations and regional initiatives, reach out to new partners in tackling maritime challenges, and develop links with the private sector. He also urged NATO and EU nations to co-operate more closely to build an improved maritime picture at the national level (among relevant national agencies), as well as at regional and international levels.

36. The following issues were raised in the discussion:

- problems arising from the payment of ransoms to pirates, and ways to co-operate with the insurance community to address these;
- the implications of the opening of passageways in the High North and the need for coastal States to prepare for potential maritime disasters and incidents;
- possible sources of political and military tensions in the Arctic;
- the need for the Committee to look at other maritime challenges, such as dealing with disasters at sea, or maritime pollution;
- the respective roles of the United Nations and regional organisations in addressing maritime challenges; and
- Korea's commitment and contribution to international efforts to combat piracy.

The draft General Report [207 CDS 10 E] was adopted.

IX. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution Incorporating UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security into NATO's New Strategic Concept and into Alliance Policies and Practices [232 CDS 10 E], presented by Lord Jopling (United Kingdom), General Rapporteur, and Ulla Schmidt (Germany)

37. Ulla Schmidt (DE) introduced the draft Resolution, emphasising that ten years after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, a lot still remains to be done to address sexual violence against women in conflict, but also to give women a greater role in peace processes and conflict resolution. Ms Schmidt stressed that parliaments have an important role to play in this regard, by taking concrete action, following up on the commitments undertaken in UNSCR 1325, and supporting the important steps NATO has already taken to implement UNSCR 1325.

38. Two amendments were submitted by the delegations. Amendment 1 (Luczak) was rejected and Amendment 2 (Luczak) was withdrawn.

The draft Resolution [232 CDS 10 E] was adopted unanimously.

X. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution The Situation in Georgia [254 CDS 10 E], presented by Lord Jopling (United Kingdom), General Rapporteur

39. Lord Jopling explained the rationale for this draft Resolution: recognise Georgia's good progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration; reaffirm NATO's open door policy as heads of State and government prepare to meet in Lisbon; emphasise that the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an issue of ongoing concern for the Assembly and negatively affects security and stability in Europe; and take into account new developments since the Assembly last adopted resolutions on Georgia, including the 30 May 2010 local elections, the adoption of the State Strategy to engage populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the presentation of the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, and the consolidation of positions on the ground.

40. With this in mind, the draft Resolution recognises the progress achieved by Georgia on the path towards NATO and EU integration, while identifying key remaining challenges. It also reaffirms the Assembly's support for NATO's open door policy and that NATO's door is open to Georgia, and reaffirms the Assembly's position on the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that is:

- support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia;
- refusal to endorse the revision of the status quo by violent means, and in particular forced movements of population;
- support for the full implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement;
- support for the Geneva Process, as the only forum bringing together all parties in the conflict; and
- support for the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the need for the EUMM to be given access to the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

41. Two amendments were submitted by the delegations. Amendment 1 (Charalambopoulos) was accepted with an oral amendment by the General Rapporteur to modify paragraph 13.a. to read "to reverse the results of what has been described as ethnic cleansing by the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia as well as by other international documents and allow the safe and dignified return of all internally displaced persons to their homes;", and include a new paragraph 13.c. to read "to ensure access to international humanitarian aid to those affected;". Amendment 2 (Ormel) was also adopted with an oral amendment by the General Rapporteur to include the new paragraph after 13 instead of after 14.

Following the votes on individual paragraphs, the draft Resolution [254 CDS 10 E], thus amended, was adopted, with one abstention.

XI. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers

Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security
Vice-Chairman Marc Angel (LU)

Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance
Vice-Chairperson Jane Cordy (CA)
Rapporteur Lucio Malan (IT)

All other re-eligible Committee and Sub-Committee Officers were re-elected.

Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council
Full member Ulla Schmidt (DE)

XII. Any other business and final remarks

42. The Chairperson informed members that Andrius Avizius will be replacing Ruxandra Popa as Director of the Committee, once she takes up her new functions as Deputy Secretary General for Policy. She expressed her gratitude to Ms Popa for her exceptional contribution throughout these years.

43. She thanked the Polish Delegation and their staff for organising a successful Session in Warsaw and closed the meeting.

* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.