NPA, Alm.del - 2010-11 (1. samling) - Bilag 7: Referater fra komitémøder og plenarmøde fra NPA-sessionen i Warszawa november 2010

V. Presentation by Bogdan Klich, Minister of National Defence, Republic of Poland, on Collective Defence, CrisisManagement and Promoting International Stability – NATO Core Tasks after Lisbon Summit5. Bogdan Klich situated his speech in the context of the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, where the NATO Member Stateswould address questions of critical importance — not only for NATO, but also for international security in general. The newStrategic Concept, to be adopted in Lisbon, would address the three core tasks of the Alliance: collective defence, crisismanagement, and co-operative security.6. The Minister placed especially strong emphasis on collective defence and pointed out that this topic was of specialimportance to the new Member States. He reminded the Committee that the specific sensibilities of Member States must betaken into account when developing ways to tackle these new challenges.7. Mr Klich then addressed NATO’s three core tasks in more detail. The task of collective defence remained vital, he argued.The key question was how to keep the balance between functions related to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and othernecessary tasks. NATO had to have all instruments in place to defend its territory. He also underlined the importance of makingMember States’ citizens feel secure, as public support was critical for mission success, especially in Afghanistan. Measures forcollective defence could be bolstered by, first, strengthening NATO’s command structures and forces - particularly throughtraining and exercises; and second, the drafting and regular updating of contingency plans; and, third, a much more evenlydistributed NATO military infrastructure.8. Mr Klich endorsed new transformation initiatives, to be agreed upon in Lisbon, including a package of critical capabilities thatwould ready the Alliance for current and future challenges. He also hoped that the process of consolidation would continue afterLisbon, but he was satisfied that NATO’s agencies would be reduced from 14 to three.9. Turning to crisis management, Mr Klich pointed to the increased importance of this task over the last decade. While crisismanagement operations took place at different levels of intensity, they almost always involved a civilian component. Hence, theAlliance needed to improve its co-operation with other actors, mainly the European Union (EU). In Afghanistan, he said, thecurrent comprehensive approach provided a good roadmap and was starting to bring results. By the end of 2014, the AfghanGovernment would be ready to take over lead security responsibility throughout the country.10. To provide security, the Alliance needed international partners. Thus, co-operative security was the necessary third coretask of NATO, as partners contributed to Alliance operations in important ways. NATO-EU co-operation was indispensable.Good opportunities to improve this relationship existed, but he did not gloss over the challenges of overlapping membership. Heproposed a new legal framework - an enhanced Berlin Plus Agreement. Political dialogue, more coherent capabilitydevelopment, and in-theatre co-operation were the most pressing issues, he said.11. With regard to other important issues for the Alliance, the Minister noted the relationship with Russia, where he saw realchances to identify common interests, which could serve as platforms for better co-operation. Also, NATO should reaffirm its1/7

open-door policy and continue co-operation with Georgia and Ukraine. Lastly, NATO should also interact more with majorplayers outside established partnerships, such as China, India and Pakistan.12. The Minister concluded his presentation by arguing that NATO Member States must shape a common vision of the future,taking into account the specific expectations of Member States and finding the right balance for all.13. The debate following Mr Klich’s presentation focused on NATO-EU co-operation, in particular: what an enhanced Berlin PlusAgreement could entail, NATO’s role in cyber defence, specifically its relation to Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty, andfuture enlargement of the Alliance.14. Mr Klich saw NATO-EU co-operation as a fundamental question before the Alliance. Security provided by both organisationsshould be complementary. Unnecessary duplication should be avoided, but he noted differences in understanding the termduplication. As opposed to certain other Member States, Poland did accept a degree of duplication, for example developing aplanning and operational cell for EU missions. Capabilities autonomous from NATO and co-ordination in the field should also beenhanced in the EU. Progress on higher-level co-ordination between NATO and the EU was difficult, but he emphasized thepositive role the NATO Parliamentary Assembly could play in this regard. Current step-by-step plans by the EU HighRepresentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General were compatible and achievable.15. The Minister was strongly in favour of putting cyber security — as well as missile defence and energy security — under theumbrella of Article 5. Poland would work hard for this.16. He also favoured keeping the door open for new Member States, in particular for Georgia and Ukraine, even though he alsonoted the differences in their relationship with NATO.

VI. Presentation by General Mieczylaw Cieniuch, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, on The PolishMilitary Contribution to NATO – Various Aspects17. In his presentation, General Mieczylaw Cieniuch gave the members of the Committee an overview of the scope and rangeof the Polish military engagement in NATO.18. According to its Strategy for Engagement, Poland’s focus lies on NATO and EU operations, the General asserted. Over thepast decade Polish forces have participated in a variety of missions led by NATO, the EU, the United Nations (UN), and theCoalition in Iraq. Currently, Polish troops are engaged in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO TrainingMission-Iraq (NTM-I), Kosovo Force (KFOR), EU Force (EUFOR), NATO’s ‘Operation Active Endeavour’, and in severalobserver missions. General Cieniuch gave an in-depth summary of Poland’s participation in Afghanistan, where there arecurrently some 2,600 Polish troops — the seventh largest contingent.19. The General went on to lay out in detail the various other Polish contributions to NATO as a whole, for example, itscontribution to the NATO Response Force (a first priority for the Polish Armed Forces), modernisation efforts, participation inmultinational contingents, training and exercise efforts, and its role in missile defence.20. General Cieniuch also described Poland’s efforts regarding the new Strategic Concept, where the country concentrated ondefence capabilities and measures related to Article 5, clearly determined functions of the Alliance, military capabilitiesadequate to needs, and effectiveness of NATO within its mandated territory and beyond.

VII. Presentation by Stanislaw Koziej, Head of the National Security Bureau on National Interests and the AllianceStrategy21. Stanislaw Koziej, in his presentation for the Committee, analysed the new Strategic Concept from the national interest ofPoland.22. He emphasised that in order to develop joint strategy, all Member States had to have their own strategies in place. Helauded the decision-making process in the Alliance, remembering how joint strategies were developed in the Warsaw Pact:developed in Moscow, strategies were merely distributed for implementation.23. Mr Koziej argued that States first had to care for themselves, with external factors providing input as well — NATO being themost important one for Poland. His country saw the protection granted by Article 5 as the main reason for membership, butcollective defence had not been as certain as the country would have liked. The new Strategic Concept should therefore beprecise in formulating the interpretation of this Article, especially by referencing contingency plans, manoeuvres and exercises,as well as defensive infrastructure.24. Mr Koziej saw missile defence as an answer to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means ofdelivery — often in the hands of rogue States, but in the future likely in those of terrorists, as well. Strategic deterrence withnuclear weapons made little sense in asymmetric relationships with rogue States or terrorists. Missile defence — which wouldnot be effective in relations of parity — would be an ideal tool against nuclear blackmailing by such actors. In the future, a global2/7

system of missile defence against such smaller threats was conceivable.25. Mr Koziej argued that developing a co-operative system of security was the way forward in international security. However,he suggested that yet another security structure would not be helpful. Today, more loosely-coupled network structures heldmore promise. Systematic co-operation between NATO and the EU in what he called a ‘security tandem’ was key in this regard.A first step could be the establishment of a NATO-EU Security Council.26. The debate following Mr Koziej’s presentation centred on engagement with Russia on missile defence, the validity ofkeeping missile threats abstract and Russia’s position in the European security structure; the need to bolster deterrence anddefence in Europe; the necessity of adapting the European Security Strategy; and the specificities of the proposed NATO-EUSecurity Council.27. Mr Koziej asserted that co-operation between NATO and Russia on missile defence was possible and indeed necessary. Anintegrated system was not feasible nore desired by both sides at this time. However, he positively noted that a Member of theRussian Delegation made it clear by his remarks that a dialogue ‘in business terms’ was possible. He fully agreed that themissile threat, to which the missile defence shield should speak, should be kept abstract. Missile defence was indeed apreventive solution — a step ahead of future asymmetric threats.28. In terms of bolstering deterrence and defence, Mr Koziej recognised that certain threats affected some member States morethan others. The ability of the Alliance to react rapidly to an emergency could be compromised by the need for consensus in allNATO decisions; decisions taken in advance through careful contingency planning could help break down this potential barrierand speed reaction time by NATO.29. A NATO-EU Security Council could be the proper first step allowing the two organisations to become a real tandem. NATOand the EU needed realistic terms and high-level talks to proceed on this matter. Mr Koziej was also convinced of the necessityof a updating the European Security Strategy, and underlined that, with the release of the new Strategic Concept, it was theEU’s turn to adapt to current challenges. NATO-EU co-operation was in fact the most important challenge for Euro-Atlanticsecurity relations — much more than threats from the outside.

VIII. Consideration of the draft General Report Preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for Transition [211 DSC10 E] by Sven Mikser (Estonia), Acting General Rapporteur30. Thanking the Committee’s former General Rapporteur Frank Cook for his effort in producing the original draft Report, ActingGeneral Rapporteur Sven Mikser (EE) introduced his presentation by noting that Afghanistan had faced a busy and difficultsummer and fall of 2010. However, he argued that the troop surge meant that ISAF now could engage more thoroughly in apopulation-centric counter-insurgency strategy.31. The draft Report deliberately focused on one crucial element of the NATO mission in Afghanistan: the preparation of thesecurity forces to eventually take charge of their own security. He remained cautiously optimistic that the current strategy wouldbe successful, while reminding the members that independent assessments of progress were extremely difficult.32. Mr Mikser’s main conclusion was that NATO’s efforts to build Afghan security forces had made huge strides in the year2010, thanks to two initiatives: the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and embedded partnering with Afghan units. Continuingthese processes would be absolutely crucial to the larger strategy of eventually transitioning responsibility in the security sectorto Afghan leadership.33. Mr Mikser outlined in detail the achievements of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in its one year of existence. Hestressed that the Training Mission was indeed able to credibly report progress in the task NATO had asked it to perform.34. The Acting General Rapporteur also depicted the separate but related initiative of fostering embedded partnering. Thisintegrated approach to mentoring is intended to provide Afghan units with the leaders they do not yet have. The mentoringteams stiffen the resolve of Afghan units in the field and lead by example, but they also serve as a crucial link to capabilitiessuch as air support and medical evacuation, Mr Mikser said.35. Concluding his presentation, Mr Mikser underlined three points. First, there was still a long way to go before Afghan forcesare ready to independently provide security for Afghanistan. Second, progress in the training of the security forces can beundermined by setbacks in other parts of the international community’s overall efforts, such as governance or justice reforms.Lastly, the Afghanistan mission is a long-term effort and it must be resourced appropriately. He particularly hoped that membersof the Committee would encourage their governments to fulfil the crucial request for trainers.36. The Report solicited a fruitful debate on Afghanistan and its security forces, turning on many crucial issues, among them theneed for greater co-ordination of efforts, private security companies, the transition schedule, drone attacks in Pakistan, trainingof the police, and the various problems besetting the governance sector.37. In addressing the comments and questions, Mr Mikser underlined a number of points important to him. For example, hehoped that when leaving districts handed over to Afghan forces, countries would redeploy to areas with higher risk. Also, he

IX. Presentation by Frank Boland, Director of Force Planning, Defence Policy and Planning Directorate, NATO, NATOForce Planning in an Era of Austerity39. Frank Boland started by explaining the purpose of NATO’s Force Planning, Defence Policy and Planning Directorate. TheDirectorate undertook force planning for all 28 NATO member States as well as for 18 of the Alliance’s 22 partner nations. Itdetermined the forces and capabilities required by NATO, coordinated national defence plans, assessed countries’ actions inresponse to requirements, and remained responsive to new requirements.40. Force planning was not an easy task — and certainly not in the current economic and financial crisis — the Director said.His office assessed nations’ efforts in terms of their commitments made; it did not force any targets upon countries. Forceplanning in NATO was a cyclical process, based on ministerial guidance every two years. Mr Boland underlined that no otherorganisation had such a detailed and intrusive process.41. NATO was reviewing its force planning process, with political guidance in place, Mr Boland told the Committee. A newprocess was needed, as the Alliance faced more extensive and increasingly different challenges. The review process meantthat there was a five-year gap: the last force goals had been determined in 2008, but another set of goals would only beavailable in 2013.42. The complexity of NATO operations had risen, especially with the mission in Afghanistan, Mr Boland asserted. The newStrategic Concept would provide guidance for a more comprehensive future force planning, including better civil-militaryinteraction. However, he pointed out that it was unknown at this point whether this new approach would work as foreseen andwhether NATO needed a more intrusive mechanism. The Member States would have to decide what kind of process theyneeded.43. In the previous force planning process, the Ministries of Defence were the most important point of contact for theDirectorate. In the future, however, more ministries would be directly involved, making the force planning more comprehensiveand inclusive.44. Alliance force planning faced a number of challenges, in Mr Boland’s eyes: the need to find the right balance betweenArticle-5 and discretionary operations; better NATO-EU co-ordination; the changing nature of NATO’s engagement ininternational security; quantity and quality of defence spending; and usability of forces.45. Mr Boland proceeded to give concrete examples of some of the challenges connected with NATO-EU co-ordination,logistics, and intelligence gathering. He ended his presentation by reminding the Committee that in this time of austerity, forceplanning would indeed tax the imagination, but it was here that parliamentary understanding of the complexity of force planningwould be of crucial importance.46. During the discussion, public access to force planning documents and the interaction with national ministries were topics ofinterest. Mr Boland replied that the questionnaire sent to Member States and the overall assessments were classified. However,Member States had been encouraged to reduce classification, especially regarding the executive summaries — with somesuccess. However, it was a national decision entirely. In terms of co-operation with ministries, Mr Boland noted that there hadbeen no resistance from new actors in the process. However, he had sometimes encountered a lack of understanding, but thiswas entirely understandable, as nations needed time to adjust.

X. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A fundamental NATO debate [212 DSCFC 10 E]A. Draft report presentation by Raymond Knops (Netherlands), Rapporteur47. Raymond Knops (NL) presented the final draft version of his report on the future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons inEurope. He argued that this issue involved fundamental questions for NATO’s present and future. As shown by the recent re-emergence of this issue in high-level policy debates this past year, political guidance — including parliamentary guidance —would be crucial for the Alliance to reach a sound and safe conclusion. To that end, he emphasised the need to maintain thepositive momentum that has been generated in the areas of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.48. Mr Knops pointed to the broad support he had heard at the Assembly’s Spring Session for the ‘Global Zero’ vision ofeliminating all nuclear weapons from the world. However, it is crucial, he said, to transform that noble ideal into a realisticobjective by taking concrete steps. He called on the Assembly members to consider the issue and to provide thoughtful

feedback on what can be done in this Assembly and to their national legislatures.49. Reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons was no easy matter, as there were strong arguments on both sides of thedebate, Mr Knops said. Those in favour of the status quo argued that hosting US nuclear weapons was critical to burden-sharing and represented a crucial transatlantic security link. On the other side, many argue that the military necessity ofnon-strategic nuclear weapons had never been well-established, and that military logic there was vanished with the end of theCold War.50. Mr Knops reviewed some recent developments in the arms control debate, including the five principles presented by USSecretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which she, for example, had called for greater transparency from Russia on the locationand numbers of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, he argued that the Alliance should do the same: taking thefirst step by revealing the location and numbers of its non-strategic nuclear stockpiles in Europe.51. Overall, the report called for a strengthened commitment to reducing the number of nuclear weapons and non-strategicnuclear weapons in particular. The November 2010 Lisbon Summit and the finalisation of NATO’s new Strategic Conceptoffered a new launching point from which a review of the Alliance’s deterrence capabilities and needs should be addressed.Regardless of this outcome, Mr Knops called for a co-ordinated public declaration of the numbers and locations of US nuclearweapons in Europe.B. Further commentary by Simon Lunn, Senior Fellow, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Reform of Armed Forces(DCAF), and Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)52. Over the past 12 months, Simon Lunn had been in discussion with Ambassadors and Representatives at NATOHeadquarters in order to gain insights into their thoughts on the nuclear policy-related elements of the upcoming new StrategicConcept. It had been somewhat of a surprise that nuclear weapons, and non-strategic nuclear weapons in particular, hademerged as such a contentious issue in the Alliance.53. Mr Lunn began with an overview of the changed security context since the last Strategic Concept of 1999. He made threegeneral observations: first, the make-up of the Alliance had changed with the enlargement to new nations on or close toRussia’s border. Clearly, their inclusion under Article 5 and the attendant consideration of their security needs had changed thecalculus of the Alliance’s defence posture.54. Secondly, he noted that there had been growing momentum for disarmament since the famous ‘Global Zero’ letter from the‘Four Great Statesmen’ — Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz. The growing threat of nuclearproliferation was best addressed through an overall reduction of nuclear arms with the eventual goal of their completeelimination, they and others had argued. In this context, the signing of the New START Treaty had been welcomed by allparties and represented a very important first step towards the ‘Global Zero’ vision. Mr Lunn was now looking forward to furtherprogress in this field.55. Finally, there was the context of NATO’s relationship with the Russian Federation. Mr Lunn reiterated that it was apartnership that, at times, could be difficult. Given Russia’s huge non-strategic nuclear stockpile and the shared commitment toarms reduction, dialogue was of growing significance and importance. Mr Lunn noted that Russia’s well-known position wasthat all nuclear weapons should return to their country of ownership. However, the non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europewere, in fact, the Alliance’s weapons — US warheads supported by European assets — which made repatriation far less clear-cut than the Russian proposal would suggest.56. Turning to the outlook for the new Strategic Concept, Mr Lunn suggested that those hoping that the document reflected thischange and movement on the Alliance’s nuclear posture would be disappointed. Referring to Mr Knops’ speech, Mr Lunnthought he was quite apt to state that the Alliance would maintain nuclear weapons as long as the latter existed. However, thispresented clear problems of how to eliminate stockpiles globally. This would lead to serious questions of what should beNATO’s nuclear posture, given that strategic deterrence was imperative.57. Given that the new Strategic Concept would likely not change much in terms of the Alliance’s nuclear posture, Mr Lunnsuggested that the Concept would recommend a review of the deterrence needs and capacities of NATO. What remained to beseen was whether this review would be a narrow analysis of non-strategic nuclear weapons or a broader one that would takeinto account the overall deterrence and defence strategies that should inform this highly political issue. Again, the likelihood ofmaintaining the status quo meant that there would be a need for modernisation of some European platforms — thus, nationalparliaments would play a decisive role in the practical continuation of the Alliance’s nuclear posture.58. Finally, Mr Lunn agreed with Mr Knops’ suggestion that greater transparency in terms of the numbers and locations of thenon-strategic nuclear arsenal would be a great step forward toward ‘Global Zero’. Thus, he thought encouraging that thepolitical taboo of speaking about altering NATO’s nuclear posture was slowly being lifted. Over the next 12 to 18 monthsnational parliaments would have to seriously debate this issue, as the Alliance collectively engaged Russia in seriousnegotiations on reductions.59. During the discussion, Assembly members questioned whether ‘Global Zero’ was a strategic necessity or simply a wishfulvision. Some pointed out that the practicality of ensuring complete elimination and continued non-proliferation in a world witheight or ten or perhaps one day 20-nuclear States was far more complex than the duality of the Cold War era. The debate was

split. On one side some thought that nuclear weapons were crucial to transatlantic burden sharing and deterrence capabilities.Conversely, others believed that the reduction of nuclear weapons — linked to Russian reductions — was the best way forwardto increase security by reducing external threats and to reach the goal of reduced nuclear reliance. Indeed, the latter groupviewed ‘Global Zero’ as ‘a necessary vision’ that accorded with the wider defence and political goals of the Alliance.60. Dialogue and partnership with Russia in the area of non-strategic nuclear weapons reductions was the other major policyissue discussed. While START was a first step, several Eastern members of the Alliance were vulnerable to attacks with non-strategic nuclear weapons. That said, the military logic of NATO’s non-strategic nuclear weapons was questioned on mostsides. Indeed, most members and speakers agreed that non-strategic nuclear weapons were of little to no military value —even during the Cold War, there was no intention of using them and even less of such a need today. Clearly, the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons was purely political: they were symbolic representations of the Alliance’s shared commitments and ofthe transatlantic link. Some argued therefore that it was possible to reduce or eliminate these weapons without any loss toNATO’s security, but greater political and defence linkages had to be established in their place to maintain cohesion.61. Finally there was some debate about the benefits of transparency regarding the numbers and locations of NATO’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. All agreed that greater transparency would be useful, but some doubted the wisdom of taking thefirst, unilateral step in this regard, fearing that Russia would not follow suit. How to increase transparency of non-strategicnuclear weapons, therefore, remained an issue to be resolved in future negotiations within the Alliance and with the RussianFederation.62. The draft Report [212 DSCFC 10 E] was adopted without objection.

XI. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operationSecurity at the Top of the World: Is there a NATO Role in the High North? [213 DSCTC 10 E] by Ragnheidur E.Arnadottir (Iceland), Rapporteur63. Ragnheidur E. Arnadottir began by reviewing climatic changes occurring in the High North and their ramifications foreconomic and security matters. As the temperature had consistently risen in recent decades, Arctic ice had receded by 20% inGreenland. Difficult adjustments had resulted for the region’s inhabitants, but new opportunities had also been presentingthemselves. Chief among these was that the receding sea ice had opened new shipping lanes across Russia’s Northern borderand through the Northwest Passage above Alaska and Canada. Commercial vessels such as cargo and cruise liners werealready beginning to traverse these once untouched waters. This raised concerns regarding the safety of such ships and theirimpact on the delicate environment.64. In this context, the question had been raised about NATO’s role in the High North. Ms Arnadóttir reiterated that thepresence of five NATO members in the High North means that Article 5 had always extended NATO’s presence to this region.Therefore, the concern was how NATO could best engage the concerns of these countries in support of the ‘low tensions’ in theHigh North. First and foremost, the Alliance’s proven capabilities in co-ordinating disaster relief could be helpful in respondingto contingencies requiring, for example, search and rescue operations, for which the current infrastructure in the High North waswoefully inadequate.65. Another major issue was the increasing accessibility of natural resources such as gas and petroleum — an estimated one-third of the world’s resources were thought to be located in the High North. While Ms Arnadottir emphasised that issues ofborder demarcation, access rights and the like fell under members States’ national prerogatives, she noted that NATO couldplay a supporting role. Specifically, she argued, NATO should state clearly its support for international frameworks, such as theUN Law of the Sea or the Arctic Council. To this end, it was crucial that all Arctic countries participate in such discussions.66. To maintain the region’s low tensions, all agreed during the debate following Ms Arnadóttir’s presentation that militarisationshould be avoided. However, there were concerns that there had been some military build-up in the region. Ms Arnadottir notedthat most of these shifts of capabilities northwards were purely peaceful and represented a logical response to the region’sgrowing importance. However, the risk of misinterpretation called for greater and sustained dialogue and co-operation amongstall parties to ensure that countries’ increasing presence did not lead to increasing tensions.67. During the discussion, several representatives of High North countries reiterated their governments’ peaceful intentions inthe High North as well as their commitment to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. One participant suggested the needfor greater inclusion of other important actors such as the European Union, to help solidify a common and collective approach tothe globally important trade routes. While there had been some misunderstandings and mixed signals regarding Russia’sactions in the High North, all participants in the debate agreed that greater consultation would help reduce any disturbances tootherwise peaceful multilateral and bilateral relations.68. The draft Report [213 DSCTC 10 E] was adopted without objection.