

Saturday 13 and Sunday 14 November 2010 - Summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee

I. Opening remarks by the Chairman, Julio Miranda Calha (PT)

1. The Chairman, Julio Miranda Calha, opened the meeting and welcomed the members and speakers. He warmly thanked the Polish Delegation for hosting the meeting in Warsaw.

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [210 DSC 10 E Rev.1]

2. The draft Agenda was adopted without comments.

III. Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Riga, Latvia, on Sunday 30 May 2010 [153 DSC 10 E]

3. The Summary of the Meeting held in Riga was adopted.

IV. Procedure for amendments to the draft Resolution on Afghanistan towards Transition [251 DSC 10 E rev. 1]

4. The Chairman reminded the Committee that the deadline for introducing amendments to the draft Resolution Afghanistan towards Transition was Saturday 13 November 2010 at 13:00 and outlined the procedures for amending the draft Resolution.

V. Presentation by Bogdan Klich, Minister of National Defence, Republic of Poland, on Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Promoting International Stability – NATO Core Tasks after Lisbon Summit

5. Bogdan Klich situated his speech in the context of the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, where the NATO Member States would address questions of critical importance — not only for NATO, but also for international security in general. The new Strategic Concept, to be adopted in Lisbon, would address the three core tasks of the Alliance: collective defence, crisis management, and co-operative security.

6. The Minister placed especially strong emphasis on collective defence and pointed out that this topic was of special importance to the new Member States. He reminded the Committee that the specific sensibilities of Member States must be taken into account when developing ways to tackle these new challenges.

7. Mr Klich then addressed NATO's three core tasks in more detail. The task of collective defence remained vital, he argued. The key question was how to keep the balance between functions related to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and other necessary tasks. NATO had to have all instruments in place to defend its territory. He also underlined the importance of making Member States' citizens feel secure, as public support was critical for mission success, especially in Afghanistan. Measures for collective defence could be bolstered by, first, strengthening NATO's command structures and forces - particularly through training and exercises; and second, the drafting and regular updating of contingency plans; and, third, a much more evenly distributed NATO military infrastructure.

8. Mr Klich endorsed new transformation initiatives, to be agreed upon in Lisbon, including a package of critical capabilities that would ready the Alliance for current and future challenges. He also hoped that the process of consolidation would continue after Lisbon, but he was satisfied that NATO's agencies would be reduced from 14 to three.

9. Turning to crisis management, Mr Klich pointed to the increased importance of this task over the last decade. While crisis management operations took place at different levels of intensity, they almost always involved a civilian component. Hence, the Alliance needed to improve its co-operation with other actors, mainly the European Union (EU). In Afghanistan, he said, the current comprehensive approach provided a good roadmap and was starting to bring results. By the end of 2014, the Afghan Government would be ready to take over lead security responsibility throughout the country.

10. To provide security, the Alliance needed international partners. Thus, co-operative security was the necessary third core task of NATO, as partners contributed to Alliance operations in important ways. NATO-EU co-operation was indispensable. Good opportunities to improve this relationship existed, but he did not gloss over the challenges of overlapping membership. He proposed a new legal framework - an enhanced Berlin Plus Agreement. Political dialogue, more coherent capability development, and in-theatre co-operation were the most pressing issues, he said.

11. With regard to other important issues for the Alliance, the Minister noted the relationship with Russia, where he saw real chances to identify common interests, which could serve as platforms for better co-operation. Also, NATO should reaffirm its

open-door policy and continue co-operation with Georgia and Ukraine. Lastly, NATO should also interact more with major players outside established partnerships, such as China, India and Pakistan.

12. The Minister concluded his presentation by arguing that NATO Member States must shape a common vision of the future, taking into account the specific expectations of Member States and finding the right balance for all.

13. The debate following Mr Klich's presentation focused on NATO-EU co-operation, in particular: what an enhanced Berlin Plus Agreement could entail, NATO's role in cyber defence, specifically its relation to Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty, and future enlargement of the Alliance.

14. Mr Klich saw NATO-EU co-operation as a fundamental question before the Alliance. Security provided by both organisations should be complementary. Unnecessary duplication should be avoided, but he noted differences in understanding the term duplication. As opposed to certain other Member States, Poland did accept a degree of duplication, for example developing a planning and operational cell for EU missions. Capabilities autonomous from NATO and co-ordination in the field should also be enhanced in the EU. Progress on higher-level co-ordination between NATO and the EU was difficult, but he emphasized the positive role the NATO Parliamentary Assembly could play in this regard. Current step-by-step plans by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General were compatible and achievable.

15. The Minister was strongly in favour of putting cyber security — as well as missile defence and energy security — under the umbrella of Article 5. Poland would work hard for this.

16. He also favoured keeping the door open for new Member States, in particular for Georgia and Ukraine, even though he also noted the differences in their relationship with NATO.

VI. Presentation by General Mieczysław Cieniuch, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, on The Polish Military Contribution to NATO – Various Aspects

17. In his presentation, General Mieczysław Cieniuch gave the members of the Committee an overview of the scope and range of the Polish military engagement in NATO.

18. According to its Strategy for Engagement, Poland's focus lies on NATO and EU operations, the General asserted. Over the past decade Polish forces have participated in a variety of missions led by NATO, the EU, the United Nations (UN), and the Coalition in Iraq. Currently, Polish troops are engaged in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), Kosovo Force (KFOR), EU Force (EUFOR), NATO's 'Operation Active Endeavour', and in several observer missions. General Cieniuch gave an in-depth summary of Poland's participation in Afghanistan, where there are currently some 2,600 Polish troops — the seventh largest contingent.

19. The General went on to lay out in detail the various other Polish contributions to NATO as a whole, for example, its contribution to the NATO Response Force (a first priority for the Polish Armed Forces), modernisation efforts, participation in multinational contingents, training and exercise efforts, and its role in missile defence.

20. General Cieniuch also described Poland's efforts regarding the new Strategic Concept, where the country concentrated on defence capabilities and measures related to Article 5, clearly determined functions of the Alliance, military capabilities adequate to needs, and effectiveness of NATO within its mandated territory and beyond.

VII. Presentation by Stanisław Koziej, Head of the National Security Bureau on National Interests and the Alliance Strategy

21. Stanisław Koziej, in his presentation for the Committee, analysed the new Strategic Concept from the national interest of Poland.

22. He emphasised that in order to develop joint strategy, all Member States had to have their own strategies in place. He lauded the decision-making process in the Alliance, remembering how joint strategies were developed in the Warsaw Pact: developed in Moscow, strategies were merely distributed for implementation.

23. Mr Koziej argued that States first had to care for themselves, with external factors providing input as well — NATO being the most important one for Poland. His country saw the protection granted by Article 5 as the main reason for membership, but collective defence had not been as certain as the country would have liked. The new Strategic Concept should therefore be precise in formulating the interpretation of this Article, especially by referencing contingency plans, manoeuvres and exercises, as well as defensive infrastructure.

24. Mr Koziej saw missile defence as an answer to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery — often in the hands of rogue States, but in the future likely in those of terrorists, as well. Strategic deterrence with nuclear weapons made little sense in asymmetric relationships with rogue States or terrorists. Missile defence — which would not be effective in relations of parity — would be an ideal tool against nuclear blackmailing by such actors. In the future, a global

system of missile defence against such smaller threats was conceivable.

25. Mr Koziej argued that developing a co-operative system of security was the way forward in international security. However, he suggested that yet another security structure would not be helpful. Today, more loosely-coupled network structures held more promise. Systematic co-operation between NATO and the EU in what he called a 'security tandem' was key in this regard. A first step could be the establishment of a NATO-EU Security Council.

26. The debate following Mr Koziej's presentation centred on engagement with Russia on missile defence, the validity of keeping missile threats abstract and Russia's position in the European security structure; the need to bolster deterrence and defence in Europe; the necessity of adapting the European Security Strategy; and the specificities of the proposed NATO-EU Security Council.

27. Mr Koziej asserted that co-operation between NATO and Russia on missile defence was possible and indeed necessary. An integrated system was not feasible nor desired by both sides at this time. However, he positively noted that a Member of the Russian Delegation made it clear by his remarks that a dialogue 'in business terms' was possible. He fully agreed that the missile threat, to which the missile defence shield should speak, should be kept abstract. Missile defence was indeed a preventive solution — a step ahead of future asymmetric threats.

28. In terms of bolstering deterrence and defence, Mr Koziej recognised that certain threats affected some member States more than others. The ability of the Alliance to react rapidly to an emergency could be compromised by the need for consensus in all NATO decisions; decisions taken in advance through careful contingency planning could help break down this potential barrier and speed reaction time by NATO.

29. A NATO-EU Security Council could be the proper first step allowing the two organisations to become a real tandem. NATO and the EU needed realistic terms and high-level talks to proceed on this matter. Mr Koziej was also convinced of the necessity of updating the European Security Strategy, and underlined that, with the release of the new Strategic Concept, it was the EU's turn to adapt to current challenges. NATO-EU co-operation was in fact the most important challenge for Euro-Atlantic security relations — much more than threats from the outside.

VIII. Consideration of the draft General Report Preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for Transition [211 DSC 10 E] by Sven Mikser (Estonia), Acting General Rapporteur

30. Thanking the Committee's former General Rapporteur Frank Cook for his effort in producing the original draft Report, Acting General Rapporteur Sven Mikser (EE) introduced his presentation by noting that Afghanistan had faced a busy and difficult summer and fall of 2010. However, he argued that the troop surge meant that ISAF now could engage more thoroughly in a population-centric counter-insurgency strategy.

31. The draft Report deliberately focused on one crucial element of the NATO mission in Afghanistan: the preparation of the security forces to eventually take charge of their own security. He remained cautiously optimistic that the current strategy would be successful, while reminding the members that independent assessments of progress were extremely difficult.

32. Mr Mikser's main conclusion was that NATO's efforts to build Afghan security forces had made huge strides in the year 2010, thanks to two initiatives: the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and embedded partnering with Afghan units. Continuing these processes would be absolutely crucial to the larger strategy of eventually transitioning responsibility in the security sector to Afghan leadership.

33. Mr Mikser outlined in detail the achievements of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in its one year of existence. He stressed that the Training Mission was indeed able to credibly report progress in the task NATO had asked it to perform.

34. The Acting General Rapporteur also depicted the separate but related initiative of fostering embedded partnering. This integrated approach to mentoring is intended to provide Afghan units with the leaders they do not yet have. The mentoring teams stiffen the resolve of Afghan units in the field and lead by example, but they also serve as a crucial link to capabilities such as air support and medical evacuation, Mr Mikser said.

35. Concluding his presentation, Mr Mikser underlined three points. First, there was still a long way to go before Afghan forces are ready to independently provide security for Afghanistan. Second, progress in the training of the security forces can be undermined by setbacks in other parts of the international community's overall efforts, such as governance or justice reforms. Lastly, the Afghanistan mission is a long-term effort and it must be resourced appropriately. He particularly hoped that members of the Committee would encourage their governments to fulfil the crucial request for trainers.

36. The Report solicited a fruitful debate on Afghanistan and its security forces, turning on many crucial issues, among them the need for greater co-ordination of efforts, private security companies, the transition schedule, drone attacks in Pakistan, training of the police, and the various problems besetting the governance sector.

37. In addressing the comments and questions, Mr Mikser underlined a number of points important to him. For example, he hoped that when leaving districts handed over to Afghan forces, countries would redeploy to areas with higher risk. Also, he

pointed to potential as well as danger inherent in devolving power to regional actors and creating local security forces. Acknowledging that international co-operation had been a big issue, he believed that for the first time there was a good unified strategy in place. The Afghan National Police was still a concern in Afghanistan, he said, noting the trade-off between time invested in quality training and numbers of police trained.

38. There were no objections to the draft Report [211 DSC 10 E] and it was adopted unanimously.

IX. Presentation by Frank Boland, Director of Force Planning, Defence Policy and Planning Directorate, NATO, NATO Force Planning in an Era of Austerity

39. Frank Boland started by explaining the purpose of NATO's Force Planning, Defence Policy and Planning Directorate. The Directorate undertook force planning for all 28 NATO member States as well as for 18 of the Alliance's 22 partner nations. It determined the forces and capabilities required by NATO, coordinated national defence plans, assessed countries' actions in response to requirements, and remained responsive to new requirements.

40. Force planning was not an easy task — and certainly not in the current economic and financial crisis — the Director said. His office assessed nations' efforts in terms of their commitments made; it did not force any targets upon countries. Force planning in NATO was a cyclical process, based on ministerial guidance every two years. Mr Boland underlined that no other organisation had such a detailed and intrusive process.

41. NATO was reviewing its force planning process, with political guidance in place, Mr Boland told the Committee. A new process was needed, as the Alliance faced more extensive and increasingly different challenges. The review process meant that there was a five-year gap: the last force goals had been determined in 2008, but another set of goals would only be available in 2013.

42. The complexity of NATO operations had risen, especially with the mission in Afghanistan, Mr Boland asserted. The new Strategic Concept would provide guidance for a more comprehensive future force planning, including better civil-military interaction. However, he pointed out that it was unknown at this point whether this new approach would work as foreseen and whether NATO needed a more intrusive mechanism. The Member States would have to decide what kind of process they needed.

43. In the previous force planning process, the Ministries of Defence were the most important point of contact for the Directorate. In the future, however, more ministries would be directly involved, making the force planning more comprehensive and inclusive.

44. Alliance force planning faced a number of challenges, in Mr Boland's eyes: the need to find the right balance between Article-5 and discretionary operations; better NATO-EU co-ordination; the changing nature of NATO's engagement in international security; quantity and quality of defence spending; and usability of forces.

45. Mr Boland proceeded to give concrete examples of some of the challenges connected with NATO-EU co-ordination, logistics, and intelligence gathering. He ended his presentation by reminding the Committee that in this time of austerity, force planning would indeed tax the imagination, but it was here that parliamentary understanding of the complexity of force planning would be of crucial importance.

46. During the discussion, public access to force planning documents and the interaction with national ministries were topics of interest. Mr Boland replied that the questionnaire sent to Member States and the overall assessments were classified. However, Member States had been encouraged to reduce classification, especially regarding the executive summaries — with some success. However, it was a national decision entirely. In terms of co-operation with ministries, Mr Boland noted that there had been no resistance from new actors in the process. However, he had sometimes encountered a lack of understanding, but this was entirely understandable, as nations needed time to adjust.

X. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A fundamental NATO debate [212 DSCFC 10 E]

A. Draft report presentation by Raymond Knops (Netherlands), Rapporteur

47. Raymond Knops (NL) presented the final draft version of his report on the future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. He argued that this issue involved fundamental questions for NATO's present and future. As shown by the recent re-emergence of this issue in high-level policy debates this past year, political guidance — including parliamentary guidance — would be crucial for the Alliance to reach a sound and safe conclusion. To that end, he emphasised the need to maintain the positive momentum that has been generated in the areas of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

48. Mr Knops pointed to the broad support he had heard at the Assembly's Spring Session for the 'Global Zero' vision of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world. However, it is crucial, he said, to transform that noble ideal into a realistic objective by taking concrete steps. He called on the Assembly members to consider the issue and to provide thoughtful

feedback on what can be done in this Assembly and to their national legislatures.

49. Reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons was no easy matter, as there were strong arguments on both sides of the debate, Mr Knops said. Those in favour of the status quo argued that hosting US nuclear weapons was critical to burden-sharing and represented a crucial transatlantic security link. On the other side, many argue that the military necessity of non-strategic nuclear weapons had never been well-established, and that military logic there was vanished with the end of the Cold War.

50. Mr Knops reviewed some recent developments in the arms control debate, including the five principles presented by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which she, for example, had called for greater transparency from Russia on the location and numbers of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, he argued that the Alliance should do the same: taking the first step by revealing the location and numbers of its non-strategic nuclear stockpiles in Europe.

51. Overall, the report called for a strengthened commitment to reducing the number of nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons in particular. The November 2010 Lisbon Summit and the finalisation of NATO's new Strategic Concept offered a new launching point from which a review of the Alliance's deterrence capabilities and needs should be addressed. Regardless of this outcome, Mr Knops called for a co-ordinated public declaration of the numbers and locations of US nuclear weapons in Europe.

B. Further commentary by Simon Lunn, Senior Fellow, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Reform of Armed Forces (DCAF), and Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

52. Over the past 12 months, Simon Lunn had been in discussion with Ambassadors and Representatives at NATO Headquarters in order to gain insights into their thoughts on the nuclear policy-related elements of the upcoming new Strategic Concept. It had been somewhat of a surprise that nuclear weapons, and non-strategic nuclear weapons in particular, had emerged as such a contentious issue in the Alliance.

53. Mr Lunn began with an overview of the changed security context since the last Strategic Concept of 1999. He made three general observations: first, the make-up of the Alliance had changed with the enlargement to new nations on or close to Russia's border. Clearly, their inclusion under Article 5 and the attendant consideration of their security needs had changed the calculus of the Alliance's defence posture.

54. Secondly, he noted that there had been growing momentum for disarmament since the famous 'Global Zero' letter from the 'Four Great Statesmen' — Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz. The growing threat of nuclear proliferation was best addressed through an overall reduction of nuclear arms with the eventual goal of their complete elimination, they and others had argued. In this context, the signing of the New START Treaty had been welcomed by all parties and represented a very important first step towards the 'Global Zero' vision. Mr Lunn was now looking forward to further progress in this field.

55. Finally, there was the context of NATO's relationship with the Russian Federation. Mr Lunn reiterated that it was a partnership that, at times, could be difficult. Given Russia's huge non-strategic nuclear stockpile and the shared commitment to arms reduction, dialogue was of growing significance and importance. Mr Lunn noted that Russia's well-known position was that all nuclear weapons should return to their country of ownership. However, the non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe were, in fact, the Alliance's weapons — US warheads supported by European assets — which made repatriation far less clear-cut than the Russian proposal would suggest.

56. Turning to the outlook for the new Strategic Concept, Mr Lunn suggested that those hoping that the document reflected this change and movement on the Alliance's nuclear posture would be disappointed. Referring to Mr Knops' speech, Mr Lunn thought he was quite apt to state that the Alliance would maintain nuclear weapons as long as the latter existed. However, this presented clear problems of how to eliminate stockpiles globally. This would lead to serious questions of what should be NATO's nuclear posture, given that strategic deterrence was imperative.

57. Given that the new Strategic Concept would likely not change much in terms of the Alliance's nuclear posture, Mr Lunn suggested that the Concept would recommend a review of the deterrence needs and capacities of NATO. What remained to be seen was whether this review would be a narrow analysis of non-strategic nuclear weapons or a broader one that would take into account the overall deterrence and defence strategies that should inform this highly political issue. Again, the likelihood of maintaining the status quo meant that there would be a need for modernisation of some European platforms — thus, national parliaments would play a decisive role in the practical continuation of the Alliance's nuclear posture.

58. Finally, Mr Lunn agreed with Mr Knops' suggestion that greater transparency in terms of the numbers and locations of the non-strategic nuclear arsenal would be a great step forward toward 'Global Zero'. Thus, he thought encouraging that the political taboo of speaking about altering NATO's nuclear posture was slowly being lifted. Over the next 12 to 18 months national parliaments would have to seriously debate this issue, as the Alliance collectively engaged Russia in serious negotiations on reductions.

59. During the discussion, Assembly members questioned whether 'Global Zero' was a strategic necessity or simply a wishful vision. Some pointed out that the practicality of ensuring complete elimination and continued non-proliferation in a world with eight or ten or perhaps one day 20-nuclear States was far more complex than the duality of the Cold War era. The debate was

split. On one side some thought that nuclear weapons were crucial to transatlantic burden sharing and deterrence capabilities. Conversely, others believed that the reduction of nuclear weapons — linked to Russian reductions — was the best way forward to increase security by reducing external threats and to reach the goal of reduced nuclear reliance. Indeed, the latter group viewed 'Global Zero' as 'a necessary vision' that accorded with the wider defence and political goals of the Alliance.

60. Dialogue and partnership with Russia in the area of non-strategic nuclear weapons reductions was the other major policy issue discussed. While START was a first step, several Eastern members of the Alliance were vulnerable to attacks with non-strategic nuclear weapons. That said, the military logic of NATO's non-strategic nuclear weapons was questioned on most sides. Indeed, most members and speakers agreed that non-strategic nuclear weapons were of little to no military value — even during the Cold War, there was no intention of using them and even less of such a need today. Clearly, the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons was purely political: they were symbolic representations of the Alliance's shared commitments and of the transatlantic link. Some argued therefore that it was possible to reduce or eliminate these weapons without any loss to NATO's security, but greater political and defence linkages had to be established in their place to maintain cohesion.

61. Finally there was some debate about the benefits of transparency regarding the numbers and locations of NATO's non-strategic nuclear weapons. All agreed that greater transparency would be useful, but some doubted the wisdom of taking the first, unilateral step in this regard, fearing that Russia would not follow suit. How to increase transparency of non-strategic nuclear weapons, therefore, remained an issue to be resolved in future negotiations within the Alliance and with the Russian Federation.

62. The draft Report [212 DSCFC 10 E] was adopted without objection.

XI. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation Security at the Top of the World: Is there a NATO Role in the High North? [213 DSCTC 10 E] by Ragnheidur E. Arnadottir (Iceland), Rapporteur

63. Ragnheidur E. Arnadottir began by reviewing climatic changes occurring in the High North and their ramifications for economic and security matters. As the temperature had consistently risen in recent decades, Arctic ice had receded by 20% in Greenland. Difficult adjustments had resulted for the region's inhabitants, but new opportunities had also been presenting themselves. Chief among these was that the receding sea ice had opened new shipping lanes across Russia's Northern border and through the Northwest Passage above Alaska and Canada. Commercial vessels such as cargo and cruise liners were already beginning to traverse these once untouched waters. This raised concerns regarding the safety of such ships and their impact on the delicate environment.

64. In this context, the question had been raised about NATO's role in the High North. Ms Arnadóttir reiterated that the presence of five NATO members in the High North means that Article 5 had always extended NATO's presence to this region. Therefore, the concern was how NATO could best engage the concerns of these countries in support of the 'low tensions' in the High North. First and foremost, the Alliance's proven capabilities in co-ordinating disaster relief could be helpful in responding to contingencies requiring, for example, search and rescue operations, for which the current infrastructure in the High North was woefully inadequate.

65. Another major issue was the increasing accessibility of natural resources such as gas and petroleum — an estimated one-third of the world's resources were thought to be located in the High North. While Ms Arnadóttir emphasised that issues of border demarcation, access rights and the like fell under members States' national prerogatives, she noted that NATO could play a supporting role. Specifically, she argued, NATO should state clearly its support for international frameworks, such as the UN Law of the Sea or the Arctic Council. To this end, it was crucial that all Arctic countries participate in such discussions.

66. To maintain the region's low tensions, all agreed during the debate following Ms Arnadóttir's presentation that militarisation should be avoided. However, there were concerns that there had been some military build-up in the region. Ms Arnadóttir noted that most of these shifts of capabilities northwards were purely peaceful and represented a logical response to the region's growing importance. However, the risk of misinterpretation called for greater and sustained dialogue and co-operation amongst all parties to ensure that countries' increasing presence did not lead to increasing tensions.

67. During the discussion, several representatives of High North countries reiterated their governments' peaceful intentions in the High North as well as their commitment to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. One participant suggested the need for greater inclusion of other important actors such as the European Union, to help solidify a common and collective approach to the globally important trade routes. While there had been some misunderstandings and mixed signals regarding Russia's actions in the High North, all participants in the debate agreed that greater consultation would help reduce any disturbances to otherwise peaceful multilateral and bilateral relations.

68. The draft Report [213 DSCTC 10 E] was adopted without objection.

XII. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution Afghanistan towards Transition [251 DSC 10 E Rev.1] by Sven Mikser (Estonia), Acting General Rapporteur

69. Mr Mikser introduced the draft Resolution Afghanistan towards Transition, which urges Member States and Parliaments of

the Alliance as well as NATO to reaffirm their enduring and lasting commitment to assisting the government of Afghanistan in providing a secure and stable environment for its citizens. The Resolution also urges the Afghan authorities to redouble their efforts in this regard. The Resolution's recommendations focus in particular on actions to be taken in the sphere of security and governance.

70. Amendments were considered, addressing issues such as: the role of the international community, especially the United Nations; the Afghan First Policy that would shift procurement towards Afghan companies; the important role played by partner nations in securing Afghanistan; the pervasiveness of the drug trade; and the role of women in resolving the country's problems.

71. The draft Resolution on Afghanistan towards Transition [251 DSC 10 E Rev.1], thus amended, was adopted unanimously.

XIII. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers

72. The Chairman proceeded to the election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers, starting with the position of Chairman, as Mr Miranda Calha's mandate had expired. Joseph A. Day (Canada) was elected to the position and took over the Chair.

73. The following candidates were also elected:

Defence and Security Committee

Chairman	Joseph A. Day (CA)
Vice-Chairmen	Kursat Atilgan (TR)
	Julio Miranda Calha (PT)
General Rapporteur	Sven Mikser (EE)

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation

Chairman	Sir John Stanley (UK)
Rapporteur	Nicole Ameline (FR)

Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities

Vice-Chairperson Ragnheidur E. Arnadottir (IS)

Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council

Member Giorgio La Malfa (IT)

XIV. Discussion of Committee and Sub-Committee activities for 2011

74. The Director of the Committee summarised the current plans for Committee and Subcommittee activities for 2011.

XV. Any other business

75. A Member of the Committee suggested that missions regularly feature an initial, Delegation-only meeting to discuss any potentially sensitive political matters that could arise during the visit.

XVI. Date and place of next meeting

76. The date and place of the Committee's next meeting, in Washington, DC, was announced.

XVII. Closing Remarks

77. The meeting was adjourned by the Chairman.

* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.