1. The Chairman,Jan Arild Ellingsen(NO), Vice-Chairman and Acting Chairman, opened the meeting of the Science andTechnology Committee and regretted that the Committee Chairman Michael Mates (UK) had decided to retire from his positionin the British Parliament and hence would not be a member of NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) any longer.Furthermore, he thanked the Polish delegation for their outstanding job in preparing the NATO PA Annual Session in Warsaw.2.Both, the draft Agenda [222 STC 10 E] and the Summary of the Meeting of the Science and Technology Committeeheld in Riga, Latvia, on Sunday 29 May 2010 [159 STC 10 E] were adopted unanimously.3. The Chairman explained the procedure for submitting amendments to the draft ResolutionPartnering with Russia on WMDSecurity and Missile Defence[245 STC 10 E] by David Scott (US), General Rapporteur.

II. Presentation by H.E. Ambassador Jacek Bylica, Head of NATO WMD Non-Proliferation Centre on

NATO’s Policies

and Activities in the field of WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

4.H.E. Ambassador Jacek Bylicabegan by discussing the current policies in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Facing a new security environment, NATO adopted a Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing theProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear(CBRN) Threats in 2009. Its four major messages were the following: first, the Alliance would not seek anymore to solely protectits forces, but also its territories and populations against WMD and CBRN threats. Second, the policy addressed the threedimensions of prevention, protection and preparedness for recovery should the Alliance suffer a WMD attack or a CBRN event.Third, the so-called Comprehensive Approach was a political, civilian and military one. Finally, the paper would stress theimportance of reaching out to formal or informal partner countries and, hence, would treat these issues as joint common threats.5. In terms of practical co-operation in the field of WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the Ambassadorpointed at NATO’s WMD Non-Proliferation Centre’s annual conferences (the last one was held in May 2010 in Prague, the nextone would be held in Bergen in June 2011) and the last CBRN Workshop with participants from various NATO member andnon-member states. Currently, the Centre plans to organize a workshop on the role of parliaments in the field of WMD armscontrol, disarmament and non-proliferation together with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces(DCAF).6. Finally, when talking about NATO’s future nuclear policy, M. Bylica suggested that the Alliance would probably take amiddle approach between continuity with nuclear deterrence due to enduring uncertainty of the international environment, andchange due to the Global Zero “Zeitgeist”, the fact that terrorists could not be deterred by nuclear weapons and the financialcrisis. While embracing the long-term goal of Nuclear Zero, the NATO would remain a nuclear alliance as long as othercountries possess nuclear weapons. The crucial challenge would be to define the appropriate mix between nuclear forces,conventional forces and missile defences.7. After the presentation, a British delegate asked about the new Russia ’s Nuclear Doctrine. The speaker said that officialstatements accompanying the publication of this doctrine seem to have suggested the lowering of the threshold of the use ofnuclear weapons. Ambassador Bylica also noted that Russia had a considerably supremacy vis-à-vis NATO in terms of tacticalnuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Furthermore, the problems arising from growing energy production based on nucleartechnology and the difficulty to discern military from civilian use of nuclear material and facilities were discussed.

III. Presentation by Lukasz Kulesa, Deputy Director, Strategic Analyses Department, National Security Bureau, on

Missile Defense: A View from Poland

8. In the beginning,M. Kulesaexplained the difference between the “old” and the “new” US missile defence (MD) plans forEurope. While the plan of the Bush Administration was based on a silo-based interceptor base in Poland and an X-BandTracking Radar in the Czech Republic, the one proposed by the Obama Administration is a phased adaptive approach withemphasis on the protection against short range, medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles, relying predominantlyon sea-based capabilities. Possible scenarios for its use could be to defend against hostile missile launches coming from theMiddle East as well as against accidental launches. The overall idea would be that all Allies could plug into the US systemeasily. NATO’s Secretary General was a stout supporter of this idea and it would be up to the New Strategic Concept to make1/5

MD a core mission for the Alliance.9. M. Kulesa suggested that MD could become a “new glue” for the Alliance , although some caveats that would need to betaken into consideration: First, MD would only be one among several elements addressing NATO’s threat spectrum. Second, itcould create the illusion that NATO’s territories were a 100 percent protected by MD, which would never be the case. Third,although the probability of a retaliatory strike by the Alliance would be improbable, nuclear deterrence would still need to be atNATO’s disposal. Fourth, several related issues had to be addressed, e.g. that the command and control system would need tobe based on predetermined scenarios and MD would remain flexible according to the nature of the threat.10. The current US proposal, M. Kulesa explained, was directed against medium and intermediate range missiles, whichRussia does not possess according to the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty. Although Russia ’s position towardsMD plans for Europe remained ambiguous, Russian participation in common MD would bring political advantages. While jointNATO-Russian command and control system was hardly feasible, data exchange as well as consultation on the development ofthe MD systems would be realistic.11. The Chairman asked M. Kulesa how the Polish people would perceive a prospective MD shield. He responded that theearlier MD proposal – widely perceived as more controversial – enjoyed the support of roughly 1/3 of the Polish population. Thepublic support has increased, however, in the wake of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. MD ifstill widely supported in Poland as it is regarded as a manifestation of the Article 5 commitment. A Turkish delegate asked aboutthe reliability of the proposed system in terms of an interception success rate of MD tests. M. Kulesa said that SM-3 missiles –the cornerstone of the phase-adaptive approach – have a satisfactory performance record in tests. Nevertheless, the US MissileDefense Agency still has much work to do to ensure the reliability of its MD capabilities in tests that resemble combat situationsas realistically as possible.12. A Russian delegate noted that Russia would welcome an explicit reassurance that that Europe’s MD system would not bedirected against Russia. M. Kulesa answered that the proposed system is tailored to in a manner that make it inefficient againstRussia ’s nuclear forces. Any substantial modification would not be unnoticed. Asked about the remarkable change inperception of the two MD proposals (by President Bush and President Obama), M. Kulesa replied that while the general politicalrelationship between the West and Russia has improved, the principal reason for this difference in perception lies in differenttechnical characteristics of the two proposals: the phase adaptive approach clearly focuses on threats originating in the MiddleEast.

IV. Consideration of the Draft General Report

Nuclear/WMD Proliferation and Missile Defence: Forging a Strategic

Partnership with Russia

[223 STC 10 E] by David Scott (United States ), General Rapporteur13. M. Scott introduced the draft General Report by presenting its main idea: a genuine partnership between NATO andRussia in well-proven areas of co-operation such as nuclear security and disarmament. The Alliance should take a pragmaticapproach instead of relying on grand projects. However, the notion of Global Zero could well serve as a long-term vision.14. Furthermore, the co-operation framework could also include biological and chemical security as well as missile non-proliferation and missile defense. Building up MD systems would not contradict the vision of Global Zero, M. Scott pointed out. Itwould be a second line of defence as long as the non-proliferation system was not robust enough and not every nation wouldseriously engage on the path down to Global Zero.15. Finally, the General Rapporteur presented the updates that were made to the draft report since the Spring Session inRiga, e.g. on the ratification of the New START by the US Senate and the Russian Duma or the new round of sanctions againstIran.16. A Lithuanian delegate questioned the prospect of NATO-Russian co-operation without the same base of values. Amember from Poland also raised doubts about Russia ’s intentions, particularly in the light of Russia ’s new military doctrine. ARussian delegate believed that the people of Russia essentially share the same values as other European, and the Rapporteurpointed out that one does not need to agree on precisely the same values to move forward in the field of WMD non-proliferation,disarmament and missile defense.17. Furthermore, a Lithuanian delegate called into question the feasibility of Global Zero. A Russian delegate noted that theconcept of Global Zero should not be regarded as absolutist and immovable. For instance, he argued that nuclear weaponsmight be used to destroy large asteroid that could collide with the Earth. A German delegate doubted that development ofmissile defence systems, that will never be completely reliable, could actually contribute to the Global Zero vision. In hisresponse, the Rapporteur reiterated his position that a long-term vision was indispensable for co-operation and the success ofthe New START would constitute an important step forward. Co-operation on the basis of trustandverification would be thekey. The Chairman has suggested including a paragraph on disarmament verification and confidence building measures andgave an example of the 2007 UK-Norwegian agreement in this area. The Rapporteur agreed to make respective amendments inhis report.18.The draft General Report on

Nuclear/WMD Proliferation and Missile Defence: Forging a Strategic Partnership with

V. Presentation by Avi Schnurr, President, The Electric Infrastructure Security (EIS) Council, on

Electromagnetic

Pulse (EMP) and related risks to Critical Infrastructures

19.Avi Schnurrinformed the Committee Members about a potentially immense, but not yet sufficiently acknowledged threatposed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) strikes. They could either occur in a natural way in the form of solar flares or by nucleardetonations above the atmosphere. EMPs could cause major electronic blackouts with immeasurable damage to country’selectronic grids with severe consequences for their extremely vulnerable infrastructure (computers, financial systems, etc.). M.Schnurr suggested that electricity could be out for months or years because the grid would need to be assembled completelyanew since its components would melt.20. On the positive side, many studies on that phenomenon had been conducted in the recent years by US official bodies, andthe dangers were now better understood and preventable by upgrading and protecting national electric grids. On the politicallevel awareness of electric infrastructure security had risen and an inaugural summit was taking place in London inSeptember 2010 to set up a new security framework for the US and Europe.21. Having been asked if the urgency of the EMP threat was well understood, M. Schnurr answered that it would be arelatively new subject and democracies would usually tend to respond only after being hit by a catastrophe and not in advance.However, the potential damage of a severe EMP strike was too significant to ignore preventive measures, M. Schnurr warned.

VI. Consideration of the Draft Report of the Sub-Committee on

Energy And Environmental Security: A Sustainable

Energy Strategy for the Alliance

[224 STCEES 10 E] by Philippe Vitel (France ), Rapporteur22.Philippe Vitel(FR) introduced the major tenets of the Sub-Committee’s report. As energy security constituted acontended topic within the Alliance, it would be necessary to put it higher on NATO’s agenda and include it in the new StrategicConcept. The linkage between energy and security is undeniable, as most recently demonstrated by the agreement betweenthe Russian Federation and Ukraine which included gas prices and the extension of the Russian naval presence in Crimea inthe same package. The energy vulnerability of some of the Allies, whether genuine or imagined, has very real implications ontheir foreign and security policies as well as on broader geopolitical climate NATO finds itself in. While NATO should not beinvolved in energy supply negotiations, it could serve as an important venue to promote the principle of solidarity which couldtranslate into specific actions on a national or EU level. The discussion, exchange of views and joint statements within NATO onenergy security are extremely valuable, even if they do not lead to specific NATO policies.23. The Rapporteur underscored the importance of linking environmental issues and “green” energy production to this topic.From a strategic point of view, M. Vitel said, this would make NATO member countries less dependent on external energysupplies. He called for the reformation of our energy and environment policies based on energy efficiency and the developmentof environmental-friendly sources of energy. Subsequently, Committee members discussed the issues of protecting energyinfrastructure and the link between conflicts, poverty and energy supply.24.The draft report on

A sustainable Energy Strategy for the Alliance

[224 STCEES 10 E] was adopted with minorchanges.

VII. Consideration of the Draft Special Report

Climate Change: Post-Copenhagen Challenges

[225 STC 10 E] by PierreClaude Nolin (Canada ), Special Rapporteur, Presented by Andrzej Galazewski (Poland ), Vice-Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security25.Andrzej Galazewski(PL) introduced the report by referring to the wake-up call caused by the heat-induced wildfires inRussia this summer to underline the importance of discussing climate change issues in the Committee. He called for aninternational discussion that was disassociated from emotions, bias and single events. Instead, it should be conducted in anobjective and science-based manner, which would add to broader public and political support.26. However, the necessity to contain the consequences of climate change, M. Galazewski said, would come at aninopportune time. The global economic and financial crisis and the lack of political will by some countries would constituteobstacles to further progress in this field. The report, based on the results of the 2007 IPCC Report among other sources,assessed the Copenhagen Conference and the prospects for a future Post-Kyoto treaty with legally binding emission reductiontargets. There is a long list of obstacles that render reaching an international and legally binding climate treaty in 2010 an almostimpossible task. Other avenues, such as national, regional or more targeted programmes need to be explored. That said, thereport urges to keep pushing for a post-Kyoto treaty. It is important to keep this objective on the agenda because the process ofnegotiations is valuable in itself. It could help to achieve at least some tangible progress in specific areas, such as clarifying the

functioning of specific mechanisms dealing with financial support, technology transfer, national progress verification, anddeforestation.27. M. Galazewski ended his speech by underlining the potential of NATO member states to lead in the field of emissionreduction, particularly in regards of the European’s commitment to reduce them by 30% by 2020. In the subsequent discussion,the Turkish members expressed their disappointment in the results of the Copenhagen Summit and believed that the reportshould not have focused on it. However, the British, American, French and Canadian delegates suggested that the analysis offailures was necessary and that the draft report assessed the Copenhagen results and offered options for the future in anobjective and balanced manner.28.The draft Special Report on

Climate Change: Post-Copenhagen Challenges

[225 STC 10 E] was unanimouslyadopted without modification.

VIII. Consideration of Amendments and vote on the Draft Resolution

Partnering with Russia on WMD Security and

Missile Defence

[245 STC 10 E] by David Scott (United States ), General Rapporteur29. General Rapporteur David Scott introduced briefly the Resolution onPartnering with Russia on WMD Security and MissileDefence.The Committee considered the draft report and discussed several amendments submitted by the Polish, Turkish,Lithuanian, Russian and Norwegian delegates. The majority of amendments were acceptable to the Committee.30.The draft Resolution

Partnering with Russia on WMD Security and Missile Defence

[245 STC 10 E], as amended,was adopted.

NATO’s Policies

and Activities in the field of WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Missile Defense: A View from Poland

Nuclear/WMD Proliferation and Missile Defence: Forging a Strategic

Partnership with Russia

Nuclear/WMD Proliferation and Missile Defence: Forging a Strategic Partnership with

Russia

Electromagnetic

Pulse (EMP) and related risks to Critical Infrastructures

Energy And Environmental Security: A Sustainable

Energy Strategy for the Alliance

A sustainable Energy Strategy for the Alliance

Climate Change: Post-Copenhagen Challenges

Climate Change: Post-Copenhagen Challenges

Partnering with Russia on WMD Security and

Missile Defence

Partnering with Russia on WMD Security and Missile Defence

Science and Technology Committee

Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security

Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council