NPA, Alm.del - 2010-11 (1. samling) - Bilag 6: Optegnelser fra NATO-Rusland-mødet fra NPA-sessionen i Warszawa november 2010

Professor Rotfelddivided his analysis of NATO-Russia relations into four parts: the security6.threats; the role of NATO and its partners; the strategy should adopt towards Russia; and what wasto be done.7.Threats to security often sprang from instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. They wereincreasingly diverse and from non-conventional sources such as extremist activity and proliferationof nuclear technology. It was difficult to determine the geographical origin of such threats: theycould arise, for example, from Iran's nuclear ambitions, from Central or South Asia or from thesituation in the Korean Peninsula. In Europe, they could arise from political intimidation and fromunresolved regional disputes. External and internal threats from both military and civilian sourceswere sometimes difficult to distinguish: examples here were threats to energy security, andambiguous nuclear programmes. Professor Rotfeld noted the analysis done in this field by the newEuro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) chaired by Sam Nunn, Professor Ivanov, andWolfgang Ischinger.8.In terms of NATO partnerships, Professor Rotfeld noted that they were very desirable toprevent, to mitigate and to respond to security challenges. He saw a new role for a partnershipbetween NATO and the EU and thought that increased co-operation between NATO and the OSCEand the Council of Europe could also be valuable. The Alliance was evolving and had come toreflect a new type of relationship between the United States and Europe. NATO now had two

requirements: to recognise that it needs partners, and to develop a strong resolve to work withpartners and institutions as brothers-in-arms.9.With regard to strategy towards Russia, Professor Rotfeld stressed that NATO needed todefine a common approach to Russia, for instance as set out in the Albright NATO 2020 report onthe new strategic concept. NATO should leave the door open to new members of the Alliance butshould also seek to develop constructive relations with Russia. These steps were not incompatiblewith previous declarations such as the 1997 Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration. TheAlliance needed a two-track strategy of active engagement and co-operation with Russia forsecurity and deterrence.10. The US Administration’s US-Russia reset would be successful if it were reciprocated.Professor Rotfeld recalled the first principle of the Helsinki Final Act, on the right of sovereignStates to belong, or not to belong, to international organisations and to enter into, or not to enterinto, bilateral alliances. He recalled US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent observation thatNATO did not seek to challenge Russian security but wished to draw NATO and Russia closertogether. The sooner this happened, the better. He hoped that the present window of opportunitywould not be missed.11. In the final part of his presentation, Professor Rotfeld addressed the question of what was tobe done? There was no lack of procedures and no lack of documents or institutions, but both sidesneeded more mutual confidence and mutual trust. Russia needed to declare its wish forco-operation with NATO, and to respond to the invitation which NATO had offered. The Russianmilitary declaration of 2010 had emphasised threats from the United States and NATO action. Infact, Russia was enjoying more comfortable relationships with its Western neighbours than it hadfor 350 years. Cold War negotiating strategies had be dropped and adversarial negotiating styleshad to be left behind. Real steps needed to be taken to enhance common security, with a realcommitment to respect the principles of transparency.12. Professor Rotfeld thought that the time was ripe to look at reciprocal limitations onconventional forces and to redefine mutual threats and dangers. Mutual confidence had to be basedon respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The recent shift towards multilateralism and newpartnerships in US policy had provided new prospects for a better security system. The EASI hadproposed a Europe-North America security commission which would provide a fresh solution tounresolved security issues. Some core challenges had to be met. US-Russia relations had to becommitted to strategic co-operation. The security of States to the East of Europe needed to beguaranteed and frozen conflicts resolved. Professor Rotfeld concluded by saying that the creationof a genuine community between NATO and Russia was feasible but it was imperative to abandonoutdated mindsets.13.The Chairmanthanked Professor Rotfeld and introduced Professor Ivanov.

14.Professor Ivanovsaid that he shared many of Professor Rotfeld's sentiments. They wereboth diplomats who had been working in the field for some time. He might be considered toooptimistic, but he believed that NATO and Russia could co-operate, as they had many commoninterests. The experience of the past two decades was one of lost opportunities, but both sides hadstill reached out to each other. He had been directly involved in drafting some of key documentsduring that period, and he believed that the right choice had been made, in favour of dialogue withNATO in areas such as countering terrorism, limiting the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and military-to-military relations.15. The positions of NATO and Russia had not always coincided. For example, Russia hadopposed military action against the former Yugoslavia and had opposed the expansion of theAlliance. However, the political impetus had allowed the Rome Declaration to be signed in 2002.

President Putin had told the BBC in March 2000 that Russia could potentially join NATO, but only ifits interests were taken into account and if it was treated as an equal partner. That had been a clearpolitical signal.16. The events of 11 September 2001 had changed the political landscape and encouragedNATO-Russia co-operation, but not all of these hopes had been realised. The US and the UK hadneglected the opinions of Russia and some of their NATO Allies in invading Iraq. The US and itsAllies had embarked on establishing a unipolar world underpinned by NATO, which had madeco-operation with Russia impossible. The agreement on principles and values remained on paperalone, and NATO and Russia had not become partners. The events in the Caucasus inAugust 2008 demonstrated that there was still considerable distance between the two sides. Nowthe situation was different and there was a new chance to start again. The Obama Administrationhad embraced a policy of multilateralism and support for existing international institutions. It wasimportant that this should continue. The vector remains positive, although the results of theAmerican elections in November 2010 might slow down the progress.17. Professor Ivanov believed that Russians could learn a lot from their relations with Poland,which were now being revived and improved. The Russian leadership realised that the key toimproving relations with Poland lied in the recognition of the Katyn massacre. Moscow addressedthis sensitive problem with resolve and was able to achieve a swift breakthrough in its relations withPoland.18. Meaningful and specific dialogue between Russia and NATO countries was being conductedand there were genuine opportunities for co-operation under the Euro-Atlantic umbrella. It wasessential to focus not on editing existing declarations but to make them a reality. The statementsmade by the NATO Secretary General were encouraging. However, recent talk of “containment” bythe UK and France as a key element of their security strategy had been unhelpful and unclear,borrowing from the vocabulary of the Cold War. Suspicions inevitably arose. States in theEuro-Atlantic area needed to create a security community and end the division between differentblocs and zones. A common understanding of the security challenges was vital.19. There is no need for new documents or insitutions: the existing ones should be exploited toengage in real activity in specific spheres. Urgent negotiations were required on issues such asenergy security, missile defence, cyber security and the High North. NATO and Russia should notput off negotiations for fear of difficulty.20. Professor Ivanov also stressed the necessity to swiftly ratify the New START between the USand Russia. It was in the interests of the US and Russia to act against nuclear weaponsproliferation. He regretted that START II was not ratified when he was in office, and this had putback matters by a decade. The new treaty had to be ratified and both sides had to continue on thepath of nuclear disarmament.21.The Chairmanthanked Professor Ivanov for his presentation and opened the floor to debate.

crime. Russia shared many more concerns with Euro-Atlantic countries and could be seen as anequal partner, facing equal challenges and risks. There was a need for co-operation, transparencyand measures to boost confidence were all required. He asked both professors when they expectedRussia to join NATO.23. Professor Rotfeld thought that Russia had no interest in joining NATO, but that it would behappy to discuss everything else. Russia could not be made a NATO member against its will. Therecould be a new Euro-Atlantic security community of countries with shared interests without creatinga new institution.24. Professor Ivanov said that his presentation had reflected his emotions, rather than hisrhetoric: after all, he had had to defend to the Duma his policy on co-operation with NATO. He hadconsistently tried to get an answer from NATO on why NATO should enlarge, but none had beenforthcoming. Russia also needed to understand what NATO was doing. A joint NATO-Russiadocument on common threats would be proposed in Lisbon, and could provide a basis for betterunderstanding. He thought that threats could be resisted by combining NATO and Russia efforts.He would not live long enough to see Russia join NATO, but he would be satisfied if NATO andRussia forged a genuine partnership.25.Assen Agov(BG) hoped that differences between NATO and Russia could be resolved. Heset out some of his concerns frankly. Professor Ivanov had said that Russia was no threat to NATO,but members of the Assembly had seen what had happened in Georgia. Abkhazia and SouthOssetia were both under de facto occupation and there were new batteries of surface-to-air missilesin Belarus. The Black Sea fleet would be staying in its Ukrainian base for another 45 years. Russiawas building up forces in the region while NATO was cutting its forces and its weapons. DidProfessor Ivanov think that Russia would come back to negotiations on conventional forces inEurope and force levels in general? He wondered how confidence would be restored and whetherRussia would reduce its military presence in the Black Sea and solve the Caucasus conflicts.26. Professor Ivanov said that Mr Agov had touched on a number of complicated issues. Russiawas not a threat to NATO or to the US, and this had been made clear in many declarations. Eventsin Georgia had been a tragedy and President Saakashvili's takeover after the resignation ofPresident Shevardnadze had been illegitimate. Russia had withdrawn from Georgian territory andhad hoped to make good progress in negotiations with President Saakashvili, but the subsequentconflict had been started by Georgia. It was important to focus on the facts that were established bythe EU fact-finding mission. The rights of South Ossetia and of Abkhazia had not been respected.How could one trust a regime that took away autonomy from the region of Adjara? In terms of theBlack Sea, Russia posed no threat to Bulgaria or Turkey, and had no intention of increasing itsnaval forces in the region. Indeed, Russia sought economic and military co-operation. NATOcountries had refused to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty, and it was therefore understandable thatRussia needed a degree of reassurance. However, he hoped that the ongoing consultations wouldlead to ratification of this Treaty.27.Marek Opiola(PL) asked about NATO's new Strategic Concept and whether there would beany new mechanisms in relation to NATO and Russia.28. Professor Rotfeld explained that there were two documents on the new Strategic Concept.One of them, the Albright Report by the Expert Group, did not contain operational procedures butinstead concentrated on political philosophy. Half of NATO's 400 committees were due to bescrapped, but there would still be too many. Some existing institutions such as the NATO-RussiaCouncil had fundamental capacities which had not yet been used. NATO had to make better use ofits existing tools rather than creating new institutions. It was important to compile a joint catalogueof threats which would allow NATO and Russia to concentrate better on areas of shared interests.

29.Julio Miranda Calha(PT) had two questions on enlargement and missile defence systems.On the former, he pointed out that enlargement had not been forced and other countries hadwanted to join NATO. There had been an open door. He did not understand why the missiledefence systems were viewed as such a serious threat. Both of the issues were very important tothe Alliance and dialogue between NATO and Russia was essential.30. Professor Ivanov said that there was nothing new to be said on NATO enlargement. Russia'spositions remained unchanged. In any case, enlargement was now probably at an end and so wasnot a question of great importance for NATO or for Russia. Missile defence systems were muchmore complicated and more serious. At the end of the 1990s, the United States had indicated itsintention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Russia had indicated in turn thatit disagreed with this policy. However, the Bush Administration had withdrawn unilaterally from theTreaty despite widespread international support for its maintenance. If one side created newweapons, the other would inevitably follow suit, and it was important to avoid a new arms race. Thiscould be achieved by working on these new defence systems jointly. Delegations of experts shouldbe appointed to negotiate these and the Lisbon Summit would provide an incentive to begin suchnegotiations.31. Professor Rotfeld noted that there were three different US-Russia working groups onanti-missile defence at different levels dealing with very detailed areas where Russia might co-operate. Political declarations and support is one thing, but there there were many different reasonswhy agreement might not be reached due to disagreements on a very practical – economic andtechnological – level.32.Victor Zavarzin(RU), also a specialist in NATO-Russia negotiations, thought that suchnegotiations should move to practical co-operation. Relations at the parliamentary level should alsobe examined, particularly in the run-up to the Lisbon Summit. Russian parliamentarians were opento finding a good solution for the outcome of the NATO-Russia Council, and he thought that allparliamentarians would want the Lisbon Summit to take important decisions. He criticised the factthat Russian parliamentarians could not participate in the work of Assembly committees, andthought that this approach should be reconsidered. He also strongly disagreed with the text of thedraft Resolution on Georgia to be discussed at this Assembly session. He thought that theAssembly should find a time and a place to discuss all issues relating to the South Caucasus.33.Hendrik Jan Ormel(NL) considered it a privilege to have such discussions with two formerministers. He had three questions for them: what did they think of the effects of demographicchanges, low birth rates and internal migration in Russia; was the freedom of the Press in Russiathreatened by attacks on journalists; and what was the biggest threat to Russia: Iran, China, climatechange, or Islamic fundamentalism.34. Professor Ivanov thought that these questions were outside his remit as a professionaldiplomat but offered answers nevertheless. Demographic change, while not just a Russian issue,was a real crisis for Russia. Russia would begin to see the effects of demographic trends over thenext two decades, and the problems would last for years afterwards. They posed a threat toRussia's economic security, as Russia's vast natural resources were in Asian lands, which weredepopulating. Russia also had 12 million migrants, many of which were illegal and brought withthem threats from drug trafficking and organised crime. He was not optimistic that the issue wouldbe resolved, but the government does what it can. He condemned recent attacks on journalists inRussia, and thought that they should have protection in law against violent crimes committedagainst them as a result of their professional activities. The greatest threat to Russia, identified byits Security Council, came from the South, in the forms of extremism and drug trafficking. Russianeeded to co-operate with Europe to counter these threats.

35.Sergio De Gregorio(IT) recognised the need to move to real co-operation, and said that thestrategic partnership must become concrete. Italy and France were both playing their part in thisrespect. Russia was co-operating with NATO to meet the challenges from Afghanistan, and Russiawas also a key player in possible settlements in the Middle East and Iraq. He asked what bothprofessors expected the outcome of the Lisbon Summit to be.36. Professor Rotfeld noted the Albright NATO 2020 report, and also referred to the StrategicConcept document, presently under negotiation by heads of government, which would translate thepolitical philosophy of the Albright report into normative language. He believed that the finaldocument should emphasize both active engagement in broad security threats while maintainingthe relevance of collective defence. With regard to relations woth Russia, the document shouldrecognise that common threats should be faced in a common way. The catalogue of commonthreats had already been prepared and would allow pragmatic and concrete operational discussionson the way forward.37. Professor Ivanov foresaw two major elements to the Lisbon Summit. First, the political will tobuild partnership relations and second, progress on specific issues such as missile defencesystems and Afghanistan. NATO and Russia must demonstrate that their involvement inAfghanistan is not about drawing spheres of influence but about jointly meeting common threats.38.Vahit Erdem(TR) asked Professor Ivanov about the conflict between Russia and Georgia.He noted that the six-point agreement which had been reached in 2008 was not being implementedin full, particularly in terms of humanitarian access and the withdrawal of Russian forces, andwondered what the main obstacle to full implementation of the agreement was.39. Professor Ivanov argued that in 2008 there had been no war between Russia and Georgia.Rather, Russia had acted to protect its peace-keeping troops in South Ossetia while Georgia hadengaged in military action against its own people. Like any civil war, the conflict in Georgia was anopen wound and it was impossible to say how long it would take to heal. One should focus on thecreation of an atmosphere of trust rather than on specific points of certain documents.40.Imants Liegis(LV) said that it was good to hear talk of a likely breakthrough at the LisbonSummit. He took note of what had been said about relations between Poland and Russia andemphasized the need to find areas where agreement could be reached. Latvia had a goodrelationship with Russia on the transport of non-military goods through Riga to Afghanistan andwondered if Russia would build on this relationship.41. Professor Ivanov remained an optimist and reiterated his remark that Russia and NATOcountries should not shy away from difficult themes in their relationships. The Lisbon Summit wouldallow further negotiations on the transit of goods through Russia to Afghanistan.42. Professor Rotfeld said that relations between Poland and Russia had been seen by many asan example of bad relations, but that this was a misleading perception. The last 20 years had seenbetter relations between the two countries than any period in the last millennium. The main problemhad been mistrust and lack of confidence. There was now a chance to change things.NATO-Russia relations could be much better than they were without new structures.43.Hugh Bayley(UK), referring to Professor Ivanov’s remarks about containment by France andthe UK, said that the UK recognised that the US and Russia had reduced stocks of nuclearweapons substantially, as had the UK itself, keeping only a minimum nuclear deterrent capability.He did not believe that Russia posed a threat in that respect. He wanted to know about closereconomic co-operation between the West and Russia and wondered about the progression ofnegotiations for Russia's potential membership of the OECD.

44. Professor Ivanov had not meant to single out France and the United Kingdom as using ColdWar concepts, because his remarks had also applied to Russia. He remarked that 50% of Russia'strade was with Member States of the European Union, and he was proud to have negotiated animportant agreement between Russia and the EU on economic co-operation. He thought that suchco-operation should be accelerated and given a legal basis. Russia's membership of the OECD wasprogressing well, but he was concerned about its application to join the World Trade Organization.Russia saw itself as part of a global community, and it was therefore absurd that it was not yet amember of the WTO, just as it was absurd that the US could not withdraw the Jackson-Vanikamendment, which was a relic of the Cold War. He was optimistic about joining the WTO, and hewanted good and reliable co-operation with the EU on energy security, transport logistics,environmental protection and food security.45.Ragnheidur E. Arnadottir(IS) noted that the Defence and Security Committee was focusingon the High North: she was the Rapporteur for its report on NATO's role there. There were fiveNATO members in that region, but it was recognised to be in everyone's interests that there shouldbe low tension and low levels of militarisation. She wondered how Professor Ivanov viewed NATO'srole in the region and its potential for co-operation with Russia.46. Professor Ivanov said that Norway was another country where Russia had developedexcellent relations: he had worked hard to negotiate an agreement on the Russia-Norway seaborder. His personal opinion was that the Arctic should be left to the Arctic nations themselves andNATO had no direct role in this region.47.VI.The Chairman thanked both speakers.Any other business