TABLE OF CONTENTSGLOSSARY OF MAIN ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................I.II.III.INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1MARITIME CHALLENGES: OLD AND NEW ......................................................................... 1NATO’S ROLE IN MARITIME SECURITY ............................................................................. 4A.COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AT SEA................................................................................ 4B.MARITIME PARTNERSHIPS AND NAVAL DIPLOMACY............................................. 5C.MARITIME CRISIS RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT ................................................ 6D.MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 6E.RETHINKING NATO’S MARITIME STRATEGY ........................................................... 8F.US SEA POWER: AN INDISPENSABLE DIMENSION OF THE ALLIANCE’SMARITIME SECURITY ............................................................................................... 11THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE IN MARITIME SECURITY............................................. 12A.FROM A WEB OF INITIATIVES IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN TO THEDEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED MARITIME POLICY..................................... 13B.MARITIME SURVEILLANCE: A KEY PILLAR OF THE IMP AND A TESTINGGROUND FOR CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION ...................................................... 14C.GENERATION OF NAVAL ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES ......................................... 15D.EUNAVFOR–SOMALIA: THE FIRST CSDP NAVAL OPERATION ............................ 16TOWARDS GREATER INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION ............................................. 17A.NATO-EU CO-ORDINATION ..................................................................................... 18B.CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ................... 19C.CO-ORDINATION WITH NEW PARTNERS............................................................... 19D.CO-ORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR .................................................... 20E.CO-OPERATING TO BUILD AN IMPROVED MARITIME PICTURE .......................... 20

1.Seventy percent of the surface of the Earth is covered by water, 90% of global trade andabout half of the world’s oil are transported by sea. Maritime areas also provide a vital dimensionof Europe’s economy. It is estimated that 90% of the European Union (EU)’s external trade and40% of internal trade is transported by sea. Some 350 million passengers and about 3.5 billiontons of cargo per year pass through European seaports and the European waterways including anumber of chokepoints such as the English Channel, the Danish Straits and the Strait of Gibraltar.2.Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the protection of the world’s maritime routeshas come to be seen as an essential dimension of security. A number of recent high-profilemaritime events, such as the terrorist attack against the USS Cole in 2000, the attack against theFrench oil tanker Limburg in 2002, and the piracy boom off the coast of Somalia, have confirmedthe necessity and urgency of tackling the maritime dimensions of the new threats and challengesthat have emerged in the post-Cold War globalised security environment.3.Many of the current threats in the maritime domain – terrorism, proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD), illegal trafficking in drugs, people and arms, piracy – are of atransnational or global nature, and therefore require a concerted approach.4.Maritime security is not a new issue for NATO and the European Union. Both organisationshave already developed a number of policies and tools to tackle maritime threats. However, theyare currently reviewing their contributions and considering greater roles in the future. This reportproposes to examine these processes and the issues they raise for each organisation individually,as well as for relations between them and with other relevant actors.5.The first chapter provides an overview of current maritime threats and the challenges theypose in terms of Euro-Atlantic and international security. The second chapter examines how NATOand the EU are addressing these threats and what future steps are envisaged. The final chapterdiscusses issues of co-ordination and co-operation.

6.Traditionally, maritime strategists have been concerned with the threat of interstateconfrontation, i.e. with naval power as a pillar of national defence and capability. For instance,during the Cold War, the US Navy’s main task, as defined in the Maritime Strategy adopted in themid-1980s, was to deter attacks, and, in the event that deterrence failed, be prepared to engage inand win a war against the Soviet Union’s Navy.7.Traditional military security concerns at sea have not disappeared today, and maintainingtraditional seapower will thus remain a key objective for Allied navies. The 2007 US MaritimeStrategy recognises that “while war with another great power strikes many as improbable, thenear-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements ofnational power” and that “defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain theindisputable ends of seapower”. With the emergence of new naval powers, such as China andIndia, and the proliferation of military technology – including for instance torpedoes –, competition

for domination of the world’s seas is a real concern. The risk of confrontation at sea cannot beexcluded either. The Georgia war in the summer of 2008 provided a recent and vivid1demonstration of the use of naval assets in an armed conflict on the European continent .8.However, today’s maritime challenges go beyond the narrow conception of defence in ascenario of interstate conflict. They are more diverse, complex, unpredictable, and intertwined.9.First, since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the threat posed by international terrorismhas gained a new dimension. Incidents such as the USS Cole and Limburg attacks havedemonstrated that terrorists are interested in and capable of using the maritime domain to achievetheir objectives. Preventing terrorists from attacking at or from the sea and from crossing maritimeborders has thus become a major preoccupation for European and North American governments.Particular attention has been given to addressing the vulnerability to terrorist attacks of sea-basedcritical energy infrastructure and of maritime flows of energy resources. One should also mentionthe threat that “terror mining” in large harbours such as Rotterdam, Antwerp or New York, couldpose to maritime trade.10. A second and related threat is the use of maritime routes by terrorists or state actors for theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction material and technology.11. Third, the increase in the illegal movement of drugs, human beings and arms as well as thegrowing flow of illegal immigrants, particularly from Africa to Europe, has raised the problem ofeffective maritime governance and border control, in particular on the porous maritime borders.12. Fourth, the dramatic upsurge in incidents of piracy and armed robbery off the coast ofSomalia in recent years has shown that this “old” threat is far from extinct. Especially where onefinds extreme state weakness and attacks take place along vital maritime trade routes, piracy can2pose a threat not only in terms of local or regional security, but also international security . Thesituation in Somalia has also raised the spectre of a possible collusion of interests between piratesand terrorists. Other unstable regions, such as the Niger Delta, also continue to face significantpiracy problems.13. Fifth, the survival of the oceanic environment itself is increasingly endangered by marinepollution – either accidental or intentional – and by the depletion of marine resources caused byillegal fishing and overfishing, with possibly catastrophic local, regional and global effects.14. Lastly, the potential opening of navigable waterways in the High North due to global warmingis raising concerns about renewed geopolitical rivalry in an area that harbours vast and untapped3natural resources . Climate change also increases the prospect of natural disasters, such ashurricanes and tsunamis, with potentially devastating consequences in insular and coastal areas.1

Early on in the conflict, ships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet were deployed off the coast ofAbkhazia and into the Georgian port of Poti in support of Russia’s military actions. Georgian authoritiesreported that the Russian Navy sank several ships at anchor in Poti. There were also reports ofincidents at sea between Russian and Georgian ships. Russian authorities charged NATO withcontributing to increased regional tensions in the Black Sea. They expressed concern about thedelivery of humanitarian assistance to Georgia by several NATO Allies using military vessels, as wellas about the presence of other NATO ships in the area. Four NATO ships were indeed deployed to theBlack Sea at the end of August 2008 but in the context of a long-scheduled visit to Romania andBulgaria, which NATO authorities consistently stated bore no relationship to the conflict in Georgia.For an in-depth study of the recent upsurge in piracy worldwide, and particularly off the coast ofSomalia, see the 2009 General Report of this Committee “The Growing Threat of Piracy to Global andRegional Security” [169 CDS 09 rev. 1].On this issue, please see the comprehensive analysis in the Report by Ragnheidur Arnadottir (Iceland)for the Defence and Security Committee’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security

15. In the post-Cold War security environment, the sources of threats as well as their targetshave thus become more diverse. Threats from non-state actors at sea, be it terrorists, pirates, ororganised crime, have gained increasing prominence. Additionally, maritime threats posechallenges not only in terms of naval power and dominance, but also in terms of economic welfare,protection of the environment, and the integrity of our societies.16. It is this constellation of so-called asymmetric or irregular threats at sea that the concept ofmaritime security – as opposed to traditional naval defence – aims to encompass. The mainobjectives of maritime security strategies are thus to prevent the use of maritime spaces for illegalactivities and to secure the movement of people and the flow of vital resources on the world’sseas.17. As such, maritime security is not a new task for navies. Securing vital sea lines ofcommunication has always been a key objective for major naval powers. However, as theinventory above demonstrates, new threats have emerged and older threats pose new challengesand require new responses.18. Many of the challenges identified above are not exclusively maritime challenges, and cantherefore not be addressed exclusively through a maritime response. Similarly, many of thesechallenges are not – or not exclusively – of a military nature, and thus require a combination ofmilitary and other tools. These threats are also global in character and therefore necessitate aco-ordinated response, as no one state has sufficient resources to address them all alone. Theyalso provide a good illustration of the globalisation of security, that is the necessity for states totackle threats at their source, often in faraway theatres, in order to defend their own security. Thisin turn requires the capacity to mobilise and project naval power in support of crisis prevention,response or management efforts.19. While each maritime threat poses distinct challenges, threats are often interconnected. InSomalia for instance, the combination of weak maritime governance, a legacy of illegal fishing, asurge in piracy, and possible links with terrorism, creates a complex and particularly dangerousenvironment.20. The situation in Somalia also demonstrates how a maritime threat which has partiallydeveloped in territorial waters can have implications for global security. Adequate maritimegovernance and law enforcement capacity at sea is therefore essential in preventing andaddressing maritime security threats. Management of the high seas poses a different challenge,as the imperative of security has to be balanced against the principle of freedom of navigation.Both NATO and the EU have an interest in being able to carry maritime operations on the highseas but also close to the coast, which can require different capabilities. Thus, operations close tothe coast often involve the use of smaller battle units and patrol vessels able to operate in shallowwater.21. The current threat environment thus calls for new thinking and a shift in strategic approach.Securing the maritime domain today requires a broad approach that isinter-agency,bringingtogether the whole spectrum of relevant national institutions – navy, coast guard, customs, police,etc.;co-operative,through bilateral, regional or multinational initiatives; andcomprehensive,takinginto account the roots of maritime threats at sea as well as on land.22. National policies and the structure of naval forces have had to adapt to these new realitiesand requirements. Navies have had to assume new roles and tasks, while taking into account theCo-operation, "Security at the Top of the World: Is There a NATO Role in the High North?" [213DSCTC 10 E].

23. While during the Cold War, NATO’s contribution to maritime security was understood mainlyin the context of collective defence, the changing security environment has led the Alliance to takeon a broader array of tasks in the maritime domain, ranging from confidence-building andpartnership to higher-end maritime interdiction, counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations. Forthis, NATO can rely on a number of existing assets and structures.24. NATO’s integrated military command structure indeed includes several maritimecomponents. Two Allied Maritime Commands ([A]MC) are tasked with developing andimplementing the maritime elements of NATO’s policies and operations. MC Northwood,United Kingdom, reports to Joint Forces Command Brunssum, while MC Naples, Italy, is assigned4to Joint Forces Command Naples .25.The Alliance also maintains multinational integrated maritime forces, which make up thecore of NATO’s maritime capability and are permanently available to provide maritime support toAlliance operations. These forces include the two Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) andthe two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Maritime Groups (SNMCMGs). SNMG1 andSNMCMG1 are usually deployed in the Eastern Atlantic and report to MC Northwood, whereasSNMG2 and SNMCMG2 are usually deployed in the Mediterranean and report to MC Naples.However, all maritime groups are available, if required, for deployment in other areas. Whilespecialising in mine-clearing activities, the SNMCMGs also perform many of the same functions asthe SNMGs.26.The four Standing Maritime Groups are normally placed under the command of either MCNorthwood or MC Naples. In addition, five on-call High Readiness Maritime Headquarters areavailable to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), to take over command andcontrol of a naval operation whenever NATO deems it necessary. These include four nationalheadquarters (Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, France) and one multinational US-led headquarters(Striking Forces NATO), based in Naples.27. Other NATO bodies – the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood and the Transport PlanningGroup under NATO’s Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee – also support the Alliance’smaritime policy; in particular, they provide an essential link to the commercial shipping industryand other civilian maritime assets, providing for exchanges of information, advice and assistance,as well as for the development of plans for civil shipping support to maritime operations.

29. In a context where threats are increasingly global in nature, the ability to deploy militaryforces in faraway theatres has gained greater prominence. As part of its broader transformationagenda, NATO has thus put a strong emphasis on developing highly ready capabilities, which canbe deployed quickly wherever necessary. The Alliance’s flagship project in this area is the NATOResponse Force (NRF). The NRF aimed to provide the Alliance with a highly ready andtechnologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special forces components, capableof performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations, and which could startto deploy at a five days’ notice and sustain itself for up to 30 days. The SNMGs and SNMCMGsprovide the core maritime component of the NRF. Command and control of this maritimecomponent rotates every six months among the five High Readiness Maritime Headquarters.30. Additionally, with the emergence of new asymmetric threats from non-state actors, collectivedefence has taken on a broader meaning. This has also resulted in new tasks for the Alliance inthe maritime domain, as illustrated by Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). OAE is the Alliance’sonly Article 5 operation. It was launched following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, as oneof the eight collective defence measures decided by the Alliance in support of the United States.The Operation’s main goal is to detect and deter terrorist threats through a NATO maritimepresence in the Mediterranean. OAE has evolved significantly over the years. Its mandate wasextended in March 2004 to cover not only the Eastern Mediterranean, but the entire internationalwaters of the Mediterranean Sea. The Operation has also performed a number of additionalcounterterrorist tasks, such as escorting merchant ships through the Strait of Gibraltar betweenMarch 2003 and May 2004, and supporting the Greek authorities in securing the 2004 OlympicGames. OAE’s rules of engagement were also strengthened in April 2003 to include compliantboarding of suspicious vessels (i.e. the ability to board ships with the consent of the ship’s masterand of the flag state). Since October 2004, OAE was reconfigured into an information-based andintelligence-led operation, focusing on gathering and processing information to target specificvessels of interest rather than patrolling.31. Several important achievements can be attributed to Active Endeavour. First, it has fosteredinformation-sharing, including with other law enforcement agencies, as well as with commercialshipping companies. Second, Active Endeavour has provided a very useful tool to enhancepractical co-operation and interoperability with a number of Alliance partners. Thus, at varioustimes, Ukraine and Russia have contributed assets, and Albania – before accession –, Algeria,Georgia, Israel and Morocco have supported the Operation. Third, although OAE focuses onterrorist threats, the ongoing presence of NATO ships in the Mediterranean and the data collectedhave also helped national authorities deal with other criminal activities at sea, including illegaltrafficking in drugs, people and arms.32. The OAE’s sustainability will depend on the Allies’ continued commitment to the objectives ofthe mission, on the ongoing confidence in the added value of the Operation – including itscontribution to the fight against terrorism, but also the additional benefits in terms of co-operationwith partners and combating other criminal activities -, as well as on the willingness of Alliedgovernments to contribute the required assets to support the Operation.

34. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been engaged in several non-Article 5 maritimecrisis response and crisis management operations, including demining and disaster relief. In June1999, the Alliance deployed a combined force comprising 11 mine hunters/sweepers and asupport ship to the Adriatic Sea to clear ordnance jettisoned during the Kosovo campaign. Theoperation, named Allied Harvest, lasted 73 days. In total, 93 pieces of ordnance were located andcleared in a 1,041 square nautical miles-wide area. NATO’s SNMCMGs also regularly conductHistoric Ordnance Disposal operations along European coasts to clear waters from mines andaircraft bombs from World War II. Mine countermeasures remains an essential capability for Allied7and partner navies today, both in support of military operations and in response to potential “terrormining”.35. NATO’s response to Hurricane Katrina in the United States in September 2005 provides anillustration of the use of the Alliance’s maritime assets in support of a disaster relief operation. Themaritime and air components of the NATO Response Force were activated on this occasion toprovide strategic lift for assistance donated by NATO and partner nations through the Euro-AtlanticDisaster Response and Co-ordination Centre.

36. NATO also contributes to maritime security through operations aimed at enhancing andenforcing security at sea. NATO has thus taken an increasingly active role in securing maritimeflows along vital sea lines of communication and combating illicit activities at sea, thereby movinginto the area of maritime law enforcement. Three types of maritime security operations have beendeployed in recent years.Maritime interdiction37. From June 1992 to October 1996, the Alliance was tasked with enforcing a UN-mandatedembargo on all merchant traffic in the Adriatic Sea to and from the former Federal Republic ofYugoslavia. Over the duration of this operation, which was conducted jointly with the WesternEuropean Union (WEU) starting in June 1993, over 74,000 ships were challenged, nearly 6,000boarded and inspected and nearly 1,500 diverted to ports for inspection.Counterterrorism38. NATO’s flagship operation in this category is OAE, as mentioned in paragraphs 30 to 32above.

Counterpiracy39. In October 2008, in response to a request from the UN Secretary General, NATO DefenceMinisters decided to deploy three ships from SNMG2 to contribute to counterpiracy operations offthe coast of Somalia. As part of this Operation code-named Allied Provider, NATO ships providedescort to World Food Programme and African Union convoys and conducted deterrence patrols.The Operation was terminated on 12 December 2008 when NATO handed over to theEU operation Atalanta.40. At the beginning of March 2009, NATO Allies decided on a second contribution tocounterpiracy efforts in Somalia. Operation Allied Protector was conducted from April toAugust 2009 with ships from both SNMGs participating in turn. On 17 August 2009, theNorth Atlantic Council adopted an enhanced mandate and launched the new operation OceanShield.41. Ocean Shield aims to provide a longer-term NATO contribution to counter-piracy efforts. LikeNATO’s previous operations, Ocean Shield is tasked with deterring, defending against anddisrupting pirate activities in the area. However, the Operation’s mandate includes more robustrules of engagement, as well as a new task of assisting with regional capacity building uponrequest. Allies decided in February 2010 to extend the Operation until the end of 2012.42. Counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia have already provided a number ofvaluable lessons for future maritime operations. A lot of experience has been gained in particularin terms of co-ordination and co-operation between various national and multinational efforts.Co-operation at the tactical level between NATO and EU naval deployments has also beenremarkable in many ways, and has certainly benefited from the participation of navies from manyof the same nations in both operations, as well as from the geographical proximity of bothoperational headquarters in Northwood, a solution that could perhaps be used again in the eventof other concurrent deployments. Another key lesson from operations in Somalia is the importanceof an early and active outreach, public diplomacy and engagement policy towards governments inthe region in order to promote broad political support and establish an enabling operationalenvironment for naval operations.43. However, Ocean Shield, along with other national and multinational naval deployments in theregion, continues to face a number of difficult political and operational challenges. Despite thesignificant international naval presence in the region, pirate attacks have continued to intensify.Pirates have also demonstrated their ability to adapt their techniques and shift their area ofoperation to evade measures taken by foreign navies. Meanwhile, maintaining political will andsustaining levels of naval assets committed to the counterpiracy mission has been a challenging9exercise. For instance, Ocean Shield continues to rely on assets from the two SNMGs . Airsurveillance assets have proved crucial to mission success, but this capability needs to be furtherdeveloped. Greater use of helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles as wellas satellite imagery, has helped navies improve coverage and response times, especially wheninformation has been shared and used in co-ordinated actions.44. The challenges that counterpiracy operations have encountered in turn raise the question ofan “exit strategy”. It is widely acknowledged that defeating piracy off the coast of Somalia willrequire a long-term effort and that the main solution is a land-based political solution.Counterpiracy operations can only provide a partial deterrent.8

45. The last strategic document adopted by the Alliance specifically on maritime security anddefence is the 1984 Maritime Strategy. The 1999 Strategic Concept does not include any explicitmention of piracy or other maritime threats by non-state actors; the closest reference is astatement that “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature,including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vitalresources”. Similarly, the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) only includes a referenceto the threat posed by the disruption of the flow of vital resources as one of the main risks orchallenges for the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years.46. Maritime security has received increased attention within the Alliance in recent years. TheMilitary Committee’s Guidance for the military implementation of the CPG of September 2008identified the need for a study on maritime security operations as a potential future task for theAlliance. More recently, the April 2009 Multiple Futures study completed under the auspices ofNATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and which aims to inform discussions amongAllied governments on future threats – particularly in view of the new Strategic Concept –, includesseveral references to maritime security, both in the context of non-combat missions relating toconflict prevention, resolution and consequence management, and in relation to the need toenhance the Alliance’s expeditionary capabilities. The study thus calls for the development of“a comprehensive maritime strategy to address the threats to Alliance security on the maritimecommons presented by demographic shifts, energy scarcity, organised crime, technology-savvyadversaries, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD”.47. The development of a Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept and a newAlliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council in the spring of2009. The AMS aims to provide a long-term framework for NATO’s role and missions in themaritime domain over the next 20-30 years, as well as guide the development of new capabilities.In contrast, the MSO Concept would provide immediate operational guidance on the use of Alliednaval forces in support of maritime security operations. Both documents are expected to be10finalised in 2010 in conjunction with discussions on the new Strategic Concept .48.Like the new Strategic Concept, the AMS and the MSO Concept need to take into accountthe evolving security environment, including the new maritime threats and challenges, and identifythose that are relevant for Alliance security and where the Alliance can add particular value.Alliance documents have repeatedly recognised that NATO has a role to play in securing vital sealines of communication. The emergence of new threats in the maritime domain makes this roleeven more relevant, a fact that the new Strategic Concept is likely to acknowledge.49.The report of the Group of Experts led by Ambassador Madeleine Albright contains severalreferences to the disruption of critical maritime supply routes as one of the threats NATO has tocope with. Similarly, the Assembly’s contribution to the new Strategic Concept emphasisesNATO’s added value in this area: “Sea lanes of communication are a critical component of theglobal economy, moving the vast majority of the world’s goods from producer to consumer.Disruptions in this communication represent a threat to the overall economic well-being of themembers of the Alliance. No one state has the ability to patrol the world’s oceans, but the Alliancehas considerable experience in co-ordination and standardisation that can be brought to bear onthis problem.”

50.The AMS and MSO Concept will also have to draw lessons from previous maritimeoperations and in particular from Active Endeavour and the various counterpiracy operations.Allies will need to decide how they see the future of these operations. They will also need toassess the likelihood and usefulness of similar maritime operations in the future, and decidewhether these provide a sufficiently compelling case for an active NATO role. The Rapporteur hasargued in the past and continues to believe that NATO’s role in combating piracy is bound toremain a limited and occasional contribution in support of broader objectives. In contrast, NATO’scontribution to the fight against terrorism is significantly more substantial and central to theAlliance’s objectives, and OAE remains a symbolically important and operationally useful elementof these efforts. The evolution of OAE into an information-based intelligence-led operation alsoprovides a potentially useful model for future maritime surveillance activities. The Group of Expertsthus calls upon NATO to “agree on specific surveillance mission areas that underpin Article 5,such as those related to illegal attacks on shipping, WMD proliferation and terrorist activities”.51. More broadly, maritime security operations, such as counterterrorism, counterpiracy,anti-trafficking or counter-proliferation operations, raise a number of questions which the new AMSand the MSO Concept will need to address. First, because they lie at the crossroads of defenceand law enforcement, these operations raise particular political and legal issues. They also raisequestions in terms of the specific capabilities required to perform these missions. Finally,enforcement-type missions are also the ones where NATO navies are most likely to have tointeract, co-ordinate and co-operate with civilian actors, and therefore raise the question of civil-military co-ordination.52.Counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden provide a good illustration of all these issues:at the political level, nations had to decide whether it was politically appropriate for NATO asa defence Alliance to intervene in its first ever counterpiracy mission; Allies also later neededto decide whether it was justified for NATO to maintain a separate mission along the othertwo multilateral deployments in the region, the US-led CTF 151 and the EU operationAtalanta;legally, as discussed at great length in the Rapporteur’s previous report for this Committee(169 CDS 09 E), the NATO mission was not well-equipped to deal with the issues ofdetention and prosecution of pirates; more broadly, the navies of certain NATO nations, suchas Spain or Germany, are constitutionally barred from performing law enforcement duties;additionally, international law limits the possibility for foreign navies to intervene in theterritorial waters of another State; all these elements obviously places restrictions on thetypes of missions NATO can be called on to perform at sea;in terms of capabilities, navies engaged in counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somaliahave had to adjust their strategy progressively, as pirates have extended their area ofoperation; the greater use of aerial surveillance assets has helped enhance maritimesituational awareness and reduce response times;finally, the nature of the mission was such that NATO – and other naval operations – havehad to co-operate closely with a broad range of civilian actors, including the shippingcommunity, UN agencies, Somali authorities, etc.

53. These different issues underline the need for Allied governments to agree on a commonvision of NATO’s role in law enforcement type maritime missions. This will not be an easy task andNATO as an organisation obviously cannot – and should not – impose any model on its memberstates. Any common vision will need to take into account the diversity of Allies’ legal frameworks,expertise and available capabilities. This should not be based on the lowest common denominator,but rather on ways in which national resources can be leveraged in order to provide for a strongerand more effective collective response to maritime challenges.54. One such way is for individual nations to consider how they can enhance co-ordination andco-operation between all maritime actors at the national level (navies, coast guards, civilian law

enforcement actors, etc.), in order to promote a genuine interagency approach to maritimesecurity. NATO can provide a useful forum for nations to share their experience in this regard.55. Other key issues for the future maritime strategy relate to the so-called “comprehensiveapproach”. Many of the challenges that the Alliance faces today, such as terrorism or WMDproliferation, are multifaceted, and may have a maritime dimension in addition to other dimensions.This therefore requires NATO to develop an approach to tackling these challenges which is able totake into account all these different dimensions in a comprehensive manner.56. Conversely, the Alliance might find itself in a situation where it needs to tackle severalmaritime challenges simultaneously as part of one operation. This is already partly the case in theMediterranean. OAE is specifically a counterterrorism operation. However, as mentioned above,through its presence at sea and the data collected, the operation has also helped nationalauthorities tackle other criminal activities in the region. This experience could be built upon in orderto enhance NATO’s ability, in future operations, to deal with multiple threats.57. As NATO will likely not be the sole player in any of these types of operations, it also needs toimprove its ability to co-ordinate and co-operate with other actors. Lessons learned from otheroperations – including in Afghanistan – in implementing a comprehensive approach in close co-ordination with other actors need to be included in any future maritime strategy. This issue isdiscussed further in the following chapter.58. Taking all this into account, future tasks for the Alliance in support of maritime security willprobably not be very different from what it does already today, but the Alliance needs to develop

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ways it can perform these tasks more efficiently and effectively :contributing to collective deterrence and defence;promoting confidence and trust in the maritime domain; an important area for future efforts inthis field would be the High North/Artic region;pursuing an active naval diplomacy and developing the maritime dimension of NATO’spartnerships;contributing more actively to capacity building and security sector reform in the maritimedomain;strengthening co-operation with civilian actors (shipping industry, civilian maritime lawenforcement bodies), as well as with other international actors in the maritime domain(International Maritime Organisation, European Union) and multinational initiatives(particularly the numerous US-led maritime initiatives);enhancing maritime situational awareness in the Euro-Atlantic area, but also in theatres ofoperations;continuing to deter and defend against transnational threats (terrorism, WMD proliferation)through maritime presence and targeted or comprehensive multi-threat maritime securityoperations; in this regard, a more targeted role could be envisaged for the Alliance, notablyin contributing to the protection of vital sea lines of communication and maritime12chokepoints ; this is in line with the mention in the 1999 Strategic Concept and the 2006CPG of the disruption of flows of vital resources as a potential threat to Alliance security, and

59.As NATO updates its objectives, tasks and procedures for maritime activities andoperations, it will also need to play an active role in assisting Allied navies with updating andtesting their capabilities. An excellent illustration of this is the recent NRF exercise “BrilliantMariner” organised in the North and Baltic Seas in April 2010, which brought together6,500 military personnel from 10 NATO nations and one partner country (Sweden). The exerciseinvolved 31 warships (including an aircraft carrier, frigates, tankers and mine countermeasurevessels), 4 submarines and 28 aircraft.60.To be credible, the Alliance’s new maritime strategy also needs to be supported byadequate capacities and assets. The ongoing impact of the financial and economic crisis hasforced spending cuts across all government departments, including defence, in many NATOcountries. While national defence reviews are obviously justified and necessary, NATO nationsalso need to ensure that individual decisions on military spending and capabilities do notnegatively impact on the Alliance’s overall capacity to act, including in the maritime domain. IfAllies agree that NATO needs to be ready to perform the broad range of tasks described above,they also need to ensure that the Alliance has the capabilities collectively to perform these.61.In the current economic climate and with ageing naval capabilities in many countries, it istherefore more important than ever to co-ordinate and harmonise decisions on defence spending,procurement and investment. Maritime situational awareness in particular has proved to be a keycapability for maritime operations from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden. The Rapporteurwould thus agree with the statement in the Group of Experts’ report that: “[a] new level of securemaritime situational awareness is called for by changing risks around the periphery of NATO andin the High North, Gulf, Indian Ocean and other areas. NATO should harmonise investments insuch surveillance platforms as unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft, land-basedradars, surface and subsurface vessels, and robotic systems.”62.Given the diversity of NATO’s potential missions at sea, it is also important to maintain anappropriate mix of so called “blue-water” capabilities – mainly aircraft carriers and other shipssupporting a nation’s expeditionary capability at sea – and “brown-water” capabilities – smallerships which can operate in littoral environments. In other words, Allied navies collectively must becapable of both projecting globally if necessary and acting locally. In this regard, US sea powerbrings an indispensable and unique capability to the Alliance’s maritime dimension.

Seapower”, this document, which, for the first time was developed and agreed jointly by thethree sea services – the Navy, the Coast guard and the Marines – recognises that no single nationcan alone ensure safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain, and that acomprehensive and co-operative approach is therefore necessary.65. It should be noted, however, that co-operation through formal alliance structures such asNATO is only one of the tools for implementing this co-operative strategy. US authorities have alsopromoted the concept of Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP, also referred to as the“Thousand Ship Navy”), a voluntary self-organised network of willing partners committed topromoting maritime security co-operation. The GMP is not based on any formal support structureor binding agreements, nor does the United States officially seek any leadership role inimplementing the concept.66. It is somewhat difficult, however, to separate the GMP concept entirely from existing US-ledinitiatives in the maritime domain. Among these, one could mention the “partnership stations”established in Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean or in the Pacific, which provide aframework for maritime security capacity-building in those regions. The US Fifth Fleet’s CombinedMaritime Forces, which operate in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea andthe Indian Ocean, and include the counterterrorist Combined Task Force 150, the counterpiracyCombined Task Force 151 and the capacity-building Task Force 152, provide another example ofvoluntary co-operation frameworks aimed at enhancing regional and, by extension, global maritimesecurity. Lastly, one could also refer to the Proliferation Security Initiative, another US-led initiativewhich aims to prevent WMD proliferation through joint efforts to identify and stop suspectshipments.67. As in other areas, US and NATO initiatives in the field of maritime security are largelycomplementary and mutually reinforcing. Many NATO nations also participate in US-led initiatives.These often go beyond what NATO is mandated and able to do, given the geographical andfunctional limitations of its mandate and current resources. Nevertheless, there is also somedegree of overlap, as illustrated for instance by the parallel deployments of NATO naval assetsand of Combined Task Force 151 off the coast of Somalia. As NATO defines its own maritimestrategy, it is therefore important to take into account existing multinational initiatives, to which notonly the United States but also a number of other NATO Allies already participate, and identifythose areas where NATO can add value. This does not mean giving precedence in all instances toexisting US-led initiatives. In order to fulfil its mandate, NATO needs a specific and distinctmaritime strategy, which cannot be solely an extension of US Strategy. While NATO’s futurestrategy is likely to focus on enhancing the planning and conduct of maritime operations, it alsoneeds to recognise, as stated in the US strategy that “trust and co-operation cannot be surged” intimes of crisis but have to be built up progressively. Creating an enabling environment is thereforeessential. This means in particular developing the maritime dimension of NATO’s partnerships, aswell as promoting co-operation with a broader range of stakeholders including the shippingindustry and relevant international organisations.

68. The three EU key strategic documents are the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS, and the 2010 Internal Security Strategy. Thesedocuments do not specifically address maritime security as such, but deal with several threats withpotential maritime dimensions: terrorism, WMD proliferation, climate change, illegal migration andorganised crime. Thus, the 2008 Report refers to climate change as a threat multiplier withmaritime implications, as it “can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones andresources previously inaccessible”, a prospect particularly relevant for the Arctic region. Both theESS and the 2008 Report also include a direct reference to piracy as “a new dimension of

organised crime”. The 2008 document also links piracy to state failure. However, piracy does notfeature in the list of key threats, but rather as one consideration for EU efforts to build stabilitybeyond its borders.69. Additionally, all three documents indirectly refer to the possible maritime dimension of theEU’s partnerships with its neighbours, particularly with countries of the Southern rim of theMediterranean, on issues such as maritime safety and migration. Lastly, the 2008 Report points tomaritime surveillance as one of the key capability for EU military missions.70. There is however no overarching EU maritime strategy or policy. As a result of thedistribution of competences within the EU – the three pillars in pre-Lisbon EU treaties –, the Unionhas addressed maritime security challenges from different angles. Various regional and EU-wideinitiatives exist in different sectors. In an effort to rationalise and interlink these initiatives, the EU ispursuing the development of an Integrated Maritime Policy of the Union. This, however, includesonly limited security dimensions. In parallel, as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy14(CSDP) , the EU has sought to enhance its ability to generate naval assets and capabilities forparticipation in crisis management operations. These efforts culminated in the deployment of thefirst EU naval operation off the coast of Somalia.

71. The EU has developed a web of various initiatives and institutions to address some of themaritime security challenges identified in Chapter II above. EU agencies and programmes have1516been set up to deal for instance with marine pollution and safety , and with illegal fishing . Thesehave been supported also by the numerous regional and multilateral initiatives put in place among17groups of EU member states, for instance in the field of counternarcotics .72. EU policies have gone farther in the control of the Union’s external borders. The leadEU body in this field is the European Agency for the Management and Operational Co-operation atthe External Borders (FRONTEX). FRONTEX provides risk analysis and research; co-ordinatesoperational co-operation between EU members; assists members in training and operationsamong others; and supports joint return operations of illegal migrants. Since 2007,Southern member states have established, in partnership with FRONTEX, the European PatrolsNetwork, which allows them to share operational information and co-ordinate patrols on theSouthern maritime borders of the Union.73. Only recently, however, has the EU sought to bring together the various initiatives existing inthe maritime domain. This effort started with the adoption by the European Commission inOctober 2007 of the Blue Paper on an Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP). The IMP’s main objectiveis to provide a unifying framework for the EU’s and member states’ existing initiatives in themaritime domain, build synergies and develop tools that will improve the coherence, effectiveness14

Further to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)is now referred to as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This report will thus use thelatter designation.The lead EU agency in this field is the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).The Common Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) is the EU agency in charge of promoting the highestcommon standards for control, inspection and surveillance under the Common Fisheries Policy.One could mention two initiatives which, although not formally part of the EU institutional framework,are loosely affiliated with it: the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N), whichcollects intelligence from its seven participating countries (France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal,Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom) and co-ordinates their response; and theCentre deCo-ordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée(CeCLAD-M), which serves as a focal pointfor bilateral intelligence sharing between EU member states and North African countries.

and visibility of existing policies. The IMP thus proposes to better integrate current national,regional and EU institutions dealing with maritime affairs; to provide tools to enhance collectivemarine knowledge, maritime surveillance and the management of maritime spaces; to improve thequality of sectoral policies with a maritime component – including transport, environment, energy,industry, employment, research, fisheries, external relations, among others; and to complementEU-wide initiatives with tailored solutions for regional seas. Indeed, at the regional level, aBaltic Sea Strategy has been in place since June 2009; a strategy for the Atlantic Arc will bepresented in June 2011; and other regions, such as the Black, North and Mediterranean Seas, arealso considering developing such maritime strategies.74. However, the IMP is concerned mostly with boosting economic development in maritime andcoastal areas, promoting a sustainable use of maritime resources and protecting the marineenvironment. The security dimensions of the IMP are fairly limited and the military dimensionsquasi-inexistent.

75. The IMP’s initiatives on maritime surveillance arguably provide the most direct contribution tothe EU’s maritime security. The Union’s objective in this field is gradually to promote “a moreinteroperable surveillance system to bring together existing monitoring and tracking systems” atthe national, regional and EU levels, thus allowing the different authorities involved in maritimesurveillance to harvest the information each of them gathers in their respective sector, therebyallowing them to perform their task in a more effective and cost-efficient manner.76. The primary objective of the integration of maritime surveillance is to enhance the EU’scapacity to secure its maritime borders against illegal migration, illegal trafficking and other illicitactivities at sea. This initiative will provide an important element of the future European Border18Surveillance System (EUROSUR) .77. However, the long-term goal is also to establish a framework which will allow member statesand the EU to share information on activities at sea which have an impact not only on bordercontrol as such, but also, more broadly, on maritime safety and security, the marine environment,fisheries control, trade and economic interests, as well as general law enforcement and defence.Information shared within this framework will thus be accessible to a broad base of interested usercommunities.78.An important priority for future EU efforts at integrating maritime surveillance will be greater19information exchange between civilian and military authorities . The European Defence Agency(EDA) has been tasked with studying CSDP-relevant aspects of maritime surveillance and howthese relate to other civilian dimensions as part of an integrated EU approach. The EDA’s “WisePen” team of five Vice-Admirals delivered its final report on 26 April 2010. The report rejectsradical changes that would lead to “a monolithic or hierarchical system of systems”, but ratherpoints out that it will be possible to increase maritime domain awareness through inexpensive and18

EUROSUR aims to integrate existing national land, air and sea border surveillance systems togetherwith new tools developed at the EU level in order to provide, by 2015, a common framework – adecentralised “system of systems” – which will allow member states and EU agencies to achieve fullsituational awareness at the EU’s Southern and Eastern borders, and to increase the reactioncapability of border patrols.For instance, space generated data (satellites) can be useful for both civilian and military aims, e.g.monitoring of maritime traffic, sea pollution, fight against illegal activities at sea, but also support tonaval operations. The EU is developing in partnership with the European Space Agency its ownoperational capability for Earth observation through the Global Monitoring of Environment andSecurity (GMES) programme. The first satellites are expected for launch in 2011-2012.

technologically-feasible incremental steps that would lead to a “widely spread, loosely coupledfederated system”. The report also includes a number specific steps: defining core concepts, suchas security or safety; strengthening informal information exchanges; increasing participating to the20NATO-initiated Maritime Security and Safety Information System ; exploiting the full potential ofthe Schengen Agreement in the maritime domain; moving towards a culture of providinginformation along the principle of “need to share” as opposed to “need to know”; and pursuingmore active surveillance.79.The EU Council also tasked the Commission in November 2009 to develop follow-up policyoptions for implementation of an integrated approach to maritime surveillance, includingappropriate civil and military aspects. The Commission is expected to present a roadmap by theend of 2010, which would be further detailed in 2011 to take into account lessons learned fromvarious initiatives and from CSDP operations. The “Wise Pen” recommendations are expected toserve as an important starting-point in this matter.80.Future recommendations will have to address a number of ongoing challenges andobstacles, including the multiplicity and diversity of user and operator communities, the technicallimitations and limited interoperability of existing systems, as well as legal barriers. Priority shouldalso be given to avoiding duplication with initiatives developed in other frameworks, and inparticular within NATO.

81. Developments regarding the maritime dimension of CSDP have taken place in parallel to theadoption of the IMP, but are largely disconnected from it. In 2004, the EU translated the politicalobjectives set out in the ESS into operational requirements with the Headline Goal 2010.According to this document, the EU should be able “to respond with rapid and decisive actionapplying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations21covered by the Treaty on the European Union” , and “retain the ability to conduct concurrentoperations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement”.82. Maritime capabilities naturally play a role in EU crisis management. The Headline Goal forinstance sets strategic lift, including strategic sea lift, as a key capability to support futureEU operations. In 2005, the EU commissioned a Maritime Dimension Study to explore themaritime mission spectrum of the CSDP, available forces for rapid response and force deploymentprocesses. As a result of the Study, the EU Military Staff adopted a Maritime Rapid ResponseConcept; according to this Concept, the EU should be able “to generate the necessary capabilityfrom the full maritime capability spectrum, including the necessary C2 [command and control]arrangements, within the Rapid Response timeframe of 5-30 days to enable the delivery of thenecessary effects in the EU’s response to a crisis”. Given member states’ limited maritime assetsand increasing maritime burdens, the Concept recognises that “the key to unlocking the potentialin maritime rapid response and the timely delivery of maritime effects is the flexible utilisation ofthe necessary Member State capabilities and capacities, and maximising the time available toreact”. Priority is thus given to enhancing and accelerating the force identification and generationprocess. One key measure in this regard is the establishment of a Maritime Rapid ResponseDatabase of potentially available assets and capabilities, from which the EU could draw in theevent of a crisis.

84. The EU’s counterpiracy operation off the coast of Somalia, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, is the first23naval operation deployed under the CSDP . EUNAVFOR-Atalanta was launched inNovember 2008. Its mission is to provide protection to ships carrying food aid to Somalia for theWorld Food Programme and generally to vulnerable merchant vessels, and to deter, prevent anddisrupt acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. The operation’s mandate wasextended on 14 June 2010 until December 2012. Its operational area was also expanded to coverthe area out to the Seychelles archipelago. From the end of March 2010, two objectives were alsoadded to the mission’s mandate: controlling Somali ports where pirates are based, and“neutralising” mother ships.85. The EU also created the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) in Northwood,UK, which provides a link with the shipping community. Mariners operating in the area are able toregister on MSCHOA’s website and receive guidance on piracy and international activities in theregion.86. EUNAVFOR’s main achievements include the protection of food aid deliveries, theestablishment of active and effective communication with the shipping industry, the developmentof a close co-ordination with other naval operations in the region, and the conclusion of legalagreements with Kenya and the Seychelles, allowing for arrested pirates to be transferred to thesecountries to be prosecuted. On this latter point, there are, however, indications that the Kenyanlegal system is reaching its limits, and the United Nations Security Council is therefore considering24possible alternative options for prosecuting pirates.87. The recent decision to extend EUNAVFOR’s mandate to allow it to target mother ships andpirate bases on land addresses two of the key weak points of earlier efforts. Furthermore, theoperation has recently had success with detaching special protection personnel on board deliveryships, increasing air support and improving communications. Generally, EUNAVFORdemonstrated the EU’s ability to deploy in a reasonable timeframe and run a complex maritimeoperation successfully. However, EUNAVFOR faces similar challenges as NATO’s Ocean Shield,particularly in terms of matching resources with ambitions. As of 27 September 2010, 10 ships and3 Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft were deployed as part of the operation.

For more details, see the 2009 General Report of this Committee “The Growing Threat of Piracy toGlobal and Regional Security” [169 CDS 09 rev. 1].It is interesting to note, however, that several precedents exist of naval operations in the framework ofthe Western European Union: "Operation Cleansweep" to clear mines from the Strait of Hormuzfollowing the Iran-Iraq war in 1987-1988; enforcement of the sea blockade on goods from Iraq andKuwait during the 1990 Gulf War; and monitoring of the embargo against the former Yugoslavia in theAdriatic in 1992-1996.Recognising that the prosecution and detention of arrested pirates continues to pose legal andpractical difficulties, the UN Security Council in its resolution 1918 of 27 April 2010 tasked theUN Secretary General to propose possible options for the future. In a report published on 26 July 2010[S/2010/394], he analyses the advantages and disadvantages of seven options, includinglocal/national, regional and international solutions.

88. Besides its naval presence through EUNAVFOR, the EU also takes a broader approach toaddressing the root causes of piracy off Somalia by supporting the peace and reconciliation25process of the Transitional Federal Government, training Somali security forces , providingsupport for the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), financing initiatives to enhancegovernance, education and rural development in Somalia, as well as the protection of criticalmaritime routes in the region. Also beyond Somalia, the EU is involved in active engagement withlocal partners, for example by training the coast guard in Yemen and supporting the creation of ananti-piracy centre in that country.89. Operations off the coast of Somalia have indeed demonstrated the need to address thepiracy challenge and its root causes in a comprehensive manner. In this regard, given the broadspectrum of EU actions in Somalia, EUNAVFOR will provide an interesting test of the EU’s abilityto co-ordinate Community and CSDP tools, and important lessons learned for current efforts tofuse the civilian and military dimensions of EU initiatives in the field of maritime policy andsurveillance.90. Since the adoption of the IMP in 2007, the EU has thus engaged valuable efforts to integratethe different dimensions of its maritime policy. The Lisbon Treaty, which abolishes the division ofEU policies into three pillars and establishes bridges between areas of community competenceand those for which member states retain the primary responsibility, provides a favourableframework for these efforts. An important step was taken by EU Foreign Ministers, at their meetingin Luxembourg on 26 April 2010, when they decided to invite the EU High Representative,together with the Commission and member states, “to undertake work with a view to preparingoptions for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain, includingthe possible establishment of a Task Force”. As the very cautious wording of the decisionsuggests, adoption of an EU maritime strategy is still a long way ahead. However, the processlaunched with the Luxembourg decision should help the EU define better its objectives, prioritiesand level of ambition in the maritime domain. This should give greater coherence to the three maincomponents of EU efforts: the civilian dimension (mainly the IMP), the civil-military dimension(CSDP support to civilian efforts, notably in the field of maritime surveillance), and the militarydimension.91. A lot remains to be done, to realise the EU’s potential in addressing maritime security threatswithin the EU’s borders and beyond. In this regard, it is significant that two of the key threatsidentified in the ESS – terrorism and WMD proliferation – are currently largely absent from theEU’s maritime policies, although, arguably, efforts to develop an integrated maritime surveillancecapability would contribute to addressing these challenges as well. In this regard, it will beimportant to harmonise the future EU maritime strategy with the ESS, as called for in the EU26Foreign Ministers’ decision . At the same time, the EU will need to take into account existingefforts within other organisations, particularly NATO, as discussed in the following chapter.

maritime security, which addresses all dimensions of the threats (including their root causes) andmobilises all relevant stakeholders (national agencies, private sector, international partners, etc.).The main added value of international co-ordination and co-operation in response to maritimethreats lies in providing enhanced maritime domain awareness – by allowing for the sharing ofinformation from a variety of sources – and greater response capacity – by pooling togetherresources.93. As both NATO and the EU envisage greater roles in the maritime domain, they shouldconsider ways in which they can contribute to the co-ordination of international efforts to enhanceglobal maritime security. Several avenues for greater co-ordination and co-operation can bementioned here.

94. Over the years, the Rapporteur has had ample opportunities to discuss the issue ofNATO-EU co-ordination in various areas and is well aware of the political blockages which preventthe establishment of a genuine strategic partnership between the two organisations. Theyear 2009 has brought a number of new developments on the NATO and the EU sides, whichcould, if utilised properly, provide new momentum for unfreezing the current status quo. In thisrespect, one can only welcome the bold proposals the NATO Secretary General has put forwardfor practical co-operation (including in the field of maritime security), as well as for a solution to27ongoing political obstacles . The EU should be encouraged to reciprocate NATO’s positive stepswith a view to taking NATO-EU relations further in accordance with the agreed framework. Theremarkable level of co-ordination established at the tactical level between the NATO and EUoperations off the coast of Somalia is also an encouraging sign that practical co-operation canwork despite political blockages.95. As NATO and the EU currently seek to (re-)define their respective roles in the field ofmaritime security, the danger is great that these processes will be conducted separately in acompletely unco-ordinated manner. EU and NATO countries only have one set of naval forces.Particularly in the current context of strained resources, neither organisation can afford to engagein a “virility contest”, which would likely lead to the adoption of unrealistically ambitious goals andto unnecessary duplication.96. NATO and EU are progressively moving closer in the type of tasks and activities they seekto undertake. With EUNAVFOR, the EU has demonstrated its ability to conduct a maritimeoperation far away from its borders. Meanwhile, NATO is considering a more active role in lawenforcement-type maritime security operations, as well as in maritime security sector reform andcapacity-building. It is therefore urgent to look for possible synergies, and focus on the bestpossible use of member states’ limited maritime assets in a context of renewed maritimechallenges. Both NATO and the EU should be encouraged to enhance institutional co-operationfurther by using agreed modalities.97. Maritime surveillance in particular is one area where co-ordination is possible and desirable.It is striking for instance that NATO and the EU both operate in the Mediterranean – withFRONTEX and Active Endeavour –; yet, these efforts are barely co-ordinated. In its November2009 conclusions on this issue, the EU Council emphasised “the need to take into accountpotential areas for co-operation as appropriate with third countries, as well as with relevantorganisations” [such as the United Nations, the International Maritime Organisation, NATO andothers]. This should be one of the key guiding principles for the work currently completed by theEuropean Commission and the EDA on maritime surveillance.

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98. Several international organisations – and notably the IMO – have for years been fosteringboth international and regional efforts to enhance maritime security. Given the breadth of itsmembership, the IMO provides an indispensable forum for addressing the global nature ofmaritime threats and promoting a global response. Notably, the Organisation has promoted effortsto enhance the international legal framework and harmonise national legislations. Counterpiracyoperations off the coast of Somalia have demonstrated that an imperfect legal framework canhamper international efforts to combat maritime threats. They have also shown that problemsoften lie less with the international legal framework as such than with national implementation.99. The IMO has also provided a useful framework to co-ordinate donor assistance andcapacity-building projects in specific regions. A recent example of this is the Djibouti Code ofConduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in theWestern Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, which aims to provide a framework for fosteringco-operation between states of the region.100. Regional initiatives have been developed in other parts of the world as well, and in manycases, they provide an adequate response to localised maritime challenges. However, the globalnature of threats also requires a broader response. Future efforts to enhance maritime security arethus likely to rely on a mix of regional and international initiatives. In either case, a global forum,such as the IMO, where lessons learned from regional experiences can be shared, will continue toplay an essential role.101. Both NATO and the EU have developed links with the IMO in the context of their operationsoff the coast of Somalia. These should be built upon in order to move from ad hoc to moresystematic co-ordination and co-operation. This is in line with the emphasis put by both NATO andthe EU on the need to adopt a comprehensive approach to security challenges. It is alsoparticularly important if NATO and the EU engage more actively in capacity-building in themaritime domain and support to regional organisations – particularly the African Union –, ascurrent operations off the coast of Somalia seem to suggest. To avoid duplication of efforts, it istherefore essential to take into account existing efforts and use available co-ordination tools,notably the IMO framework.

102. The global nature of maritime threats has already led NATO and the EU to reach out to arange of partners in order to develop concerted action. Understandably, efforts have focused onenhancing co-ordination and co-operation with neighbours and traditional partners. These effortscould be taken even further. Co-operation with Russia in particular could receive greater attention.Thus, Russia has indicated an interest in stepping up co-operation with NATO on counterpiracy.Including Russia in maritime security initiatives in the Baltic Sea would also be a welcome step toincrease trust and confidence.103. As NATO and the EU seek to play more active roles in the maritime domain, they are likelyto come into contact with an ever broader range of potential partners. Operations off the coast ofSomalia here again provide an interesting precedent, where European and North American navies28are developing links and mechanisms for tactical co-ordination with the Chinese and Indiannavies among others, and sailing alongside ships from Iran. These contacts also need to be

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105. Addressing current maritime challenges also requires greater engagement with the privatesector, and specifically the shipping community. Significant progress has already been achievedfor instance in encouraging information-sharing, streamlining the reporting of incidents, enhancingtracking and communications systems, and fostering compliance with best practices forself-protection and contingency planning. However, more can be done in all these areas: too manydifferent lines of reporting remain; several tracking systems are still used in parallel; andcompliance with best management practices is far from universal. NATO and the EU should alsoconsider ways in which the frameworks they have established for co-operation with the shippingindustry – notably the NATO Shipping Centre and the EU’s MSCHOA – can be used moreeffectively in their efforts to enhance maritime security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

106. As efforts intensify to create greater synergies between the various maritime playersmentioned above, one of the key objectives and priorities should be to achieve a better “maritimepicture”. Improved maritime domain awareness is a first and indispensable step towardsenhancing the collective response to maritime challenges.107. One priority is to address current gaps in the type of information collected on maritime flows.Currently, only commercial ships over 300 tons are required to use Automatic IdentificationSystem (AIS) transponders. Requiring smaller vessels to use this technology, which broadcastsbasic information on a ship’s destination and cargo, would facilitate the development of acomprehensive picture of maritime traffic. Indeed, these smaller ships are widely considered asthe ones most likely to be used to support illicit activities at sea.108. There also remain many obstacles and barriers to information-sharing. These include:political barriers, connected with the reluctance to share information with certain actors;legal barriers, such as data protection laws, legal restrictions regarding the sharing ofinformation obtained from commercial sources or from criminal investigations, etc. (thisraises the broader issue of the adequate balance between government and security interestson the one hand, and private and commercial interests on the other);cultural barriers and issues of classification of information; andtechnical barriers, such as the use of non-compatible or non-interoperable systems.109. Nevertheless, initiatives are spreading at the regional and international levels to increaseinformation-sharing on maritime flows and activities. Both the EU and NATO are taking an activerole in these efforts, with a number of very positive experiences. Counterpiracy operations in theGulf of Aden are a case in point. The EU’s MSCHOA and its Mercury web-based information-sharing tool have been able to break down barriers and foster exchanges between the military andthe shipping industry.110. The key challenge now is to link these disparate efforts; not to create a new overarchingstructure, but to ensure that different systems can operate together in various formats. This

requires a better integration of maritime surveillance systems at all levels: nationally, through abetter interconnection of the systems operated by various agencies; regionally, by linking togethernational systems; and internationally, by providing tools to interlink national and regional systemsas needed. Enhancing the global maritime picture also requires tools to fuse information fromdifferent sources: data collected from maritime surveillance operations, vessel-tracking systems,satellite-monitoring systems, and others.111. Achieving these objectives will necessitate a number of political, legal and technicalchanges. Most importantly, moving towards greater information-haring requires a cultural shiftfrom a “need to know” to a “need to share” mentality, as underlined in the EDA’s “Wise Pen”Team’s report. This, in turn, can only be achieved if adequate safeguards are put in place toguarantee the confidentiality of the information shared through these systems. Trust andconfidence in the process are indispensable conditions for bringing about this cultural shift. Shouldthere be any suspicion that the information shared can be accessed and used for malignpurposes, the credibility of the process would be irreversibly compromised.