INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 1GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL...................... 1A. AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MAIN ISSUES AND CHALLENGES............. 2B. ELECTIONS ................................................................................................................. 5C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS ................................................................. 9D. SECURITY, RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION........................................... 10LOCAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES ............................................................................ 11RULE OF LAW CHALLENGES.......................................................................................... 13A. CORRUPTION ........................................................................................................... 13B. JUSTICE REFORM .................................................................................................... 15C. DRUGS ...................................................................................................................... 16THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE INAFGHANISTAN: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES................................................................. 17

1.The year 2010 was marked by a number of milestone events in Afghanistan: the conveningof a PeaceJirgato discuss reconciliation and reintegration; stepped-up military activity in theSouthern provinces and the start of a transition towards full Afghan responsibility for security; andparliamentary elections on 18 September 2010.2.At an international conference held in London on 28 January 2010, Afghan authorities andrepresentatives of the international community renewed “their mutual commitment towards helpingAfghanistan emerge as a secure, prosperous and democratic nation”. They emphasised that “theAfghan Government and the international community are entering into a new phase on the way tofull Afghan ownership”. This mutual pledge was repeated at the Kabul Conference on20 July 2010, as summarised in the title final communiqué of the conference: “A RenewedCommitment by the Afghan Government to the Afghan People, A Renewed Commitment by theInternational Community to Afghanistan”.3.One of the central elements in this transition towards full Afghan ownership is theconsolidation of governance, both at the local and central levels. Governance in Afghanistan facesmany difficult challenges. Presidential elections held in August 2009 demonstrated the ongoingweakness of central governance. The development of sustainable local institutions has laggedbehind. The establishment of the rule of law also continues to be hampered by the slow pace ofjustice reform, pervasive corruption and the strength of the illicit drug trade.4.The international community’s approach to governance in Afghanistan has evolved over thepast nine years. The initial focus has been on building up central institutions. However, effortshave often suffered from a lack of strategic vision, limited resources and insufficient co-ordination.Many of the initial shortcomings have been progressively corrected, and current strategies providea sound basis for moving forward.5.However, whether decisive progress is achieved in consolidating governance will dependboth on the Afghan authorities’ determination to implement difficult reforms and on theinternational community’s ongoing resolve to support political and military processes.6.This report provides an overview of some of the key governance challenges that Afghanistanfaces today and of the measures that Afghan authorities and the international community havetaken over the past nine years to address them, and attempts to sketch a few limited proposals todeliver on the mutual commitments undertaken in London and Kabul.7.Information provided in this report builds upon previous reports by the NATO ParliamentaryAssembly’s Committees on Afghanistan, as well as on the findings of a visit of a NATO PAdelegation to Afghanistan in April 2010. Your Rapporteur hopes to continue this important study in2011, and examine also a number of additional issues, such as, in particular, the role of politicalparties, NGOs and civil society in support of governance.

The President and the government10. The President, as the Head of State and government as well as the country’sCommander-in-Chief, is by far the most powerful political figure in the Afghan State. He is directlyelected every five years, for a maximum of two terms. The government is mainly an administrativebody with little formal authority independent from the President.11. The President’s powers extend substantially into the legislative and judiciary realm. He canadopt regulations that are not contrary to the letter and the spirit of the law, issue legislativedecrees during recesses of the Lower House (WolesiJirga)of the National Assembly, and assumebroad powers in a state of emergency. Furthermore, the President can call referenda on importantnational questions. He also appoints one third of the members of the Upper House(MeshranoJirga)of the National Assembly, thus having substantial influence over the make-up ofone legislative body.12. With regards to the judiciary, the President approves the appointment of judges upon aproposal by the Supreme Court; he also appoints candidates to the Supreme Court with theendorsement of the Lower House.The National Assembly13. Afghanistan has a bicameral Parliament; the directly elected, 249-memberWolesi Jirgaandthe indirectly elected, 102-memberMeshrano Jirga,constitute the National Assembly. Theprovincial councils and district councils, as the sub-national government institutions of Afghanistan,each select one third of the members of the Upper House, and the President appoints theremaining one third.14. The National Assembly’s main responsibilities are to legislate and to oversee the Presidentand the government. However, the National Assembly is constrained in the exercise of thesepowers in important ways. Most significantly, the extensive legislative powers in the hands of thePresident indirectly undermine the role of the National Assembly as the country’s main legislativebody. Furthermore, the President can veto bills, a veto which the Lower House can only overwritewith a two-thirds majority. The government can also require that the National Assembly prioritisetreaties and development plans that it considers require urgent consideration.15. The Lower House has to approve or reject presidential appointments and can express a voteof no confidence in the government’s ministers. Its power over the President, however, is limited.Impeachment of the President, for example, requires a complex procedure.The Supreme Court16. The Supreme Court is the country’s highest judicial authority. It controls judicial budgets andappoints, disciplines and promotes judges from the lower courts. It also exercises limited powersof judicial review. Lower courts and the government are the only institutions able to challenge theconstitutionality of a law before the Supreme Court. Individual complaints regarding violations of

fundamental rights can only be made to an Independent Human Rights Commission, which canthen decide to refer them to the courts.17. It is still however unclear how the division of labour between the Supreme Court and thenewly established Independent Commission for Oversight of Implementation of the Constitution(ICOIC) will work.18. To resolve disputes before them, the courts must apply the Constitution and the laws ofAfghanistan. However, the Constitution also makes clear that Islamic jurisprudence will be used toadjudicate cases if provisions in the Constitution or other Afghan laws do not provide sufficientground for them to rule on the case. Depending on whether the ruling affectsSunniorShiaMuslims, eitherHanafi– aSunnilegal tradition –, orShiajurisprudence, will be used.2.Checks and balances: a more assertive National Assembly

19. The relationship between the National Assembly and the President has grown increasinglytesty over the past few years. While the National Assembly’s powers are limited bothconstitutionally and in practice, it has shown signs that it does not want to be a rubber stamp forgovernment policies. The Lower House has become a key forum for various individuals andgroups, particularly for the non-Pashtun ethnic minorities, to influence presidential decisions.20. Major standoffs between the Parliament and President have recently taken place over thenomination of Cabinet members, revision of the electoral law, and establishment of the ICOIC.21. An area in which the hands of the National Assembly are far more tied-up is budgetaryoversight. While the Upper House comments on and the Lower House approves, amends orrejects the State budget and the separate budget for development programs, the Parliament’sactual influence on these financial matters is severely limited. First, the international donorcommunity provides the funds for the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s budget. Second,budgetary oversight suffers from a lack of parliamentary expertise and resources.22. Observers note that the National Assembly is showing signs of improved performance andhas demonstrated that it has the potential to become an effective check on the power of theexecutive. The constitution of the newly elected Parliament will show whether this proves to be adurable trend. Questions remain, however, regarding the representative character of theAssembly, the democratic credentials of some of its members – including suspicions of corruption–, as well as, most importantly, the Parliament’s capacity and resources. The National Assemblyon a whole is only staffed by about 275 Afghans, with only a small research group. It is thus forcedto rely to a large extent on information from the very ministries it is supposed to oversee.Additionally, the absence of a functioning party system means that a party apparatus cannot makeup for this shortcoming.3.The absence of a functioning party system

26. Animated discussions took place during the drafting of the Constitution regarding the statusof Islam. The Constitution reflects the uneasy compromise between radically divergent views. Itrecognises Islam as the State religion, but also provides that non-Muslims are free to exercisetheir religion and perform their rituals within the bounds of the law. While no reference is made toshari’a,no law can be contrary to Islam.27. The recent controversy over the Shiite Personal Status Law shows that concerns over thestatus of Islam in the Constitution are real, and that conflicts of interpretations are bound to arisebetween on the one hand, Afghanistan’s constitutional commitment to international human rightstreaties and to gender equality before the law, and, on the other hand, the provision that no lawshall contravene the tenets and provisions of Islam.5.Ethnic diversity2

28. The Constitution also sought to balance the need to consolidate national unity against therecognition of the ethnic, linguistic, tribal and religious diversity of the country. For instance, it barsthe President and the government from using their positions for linguistic, sectarian, tribal,religious or partisan purposes. At the same time, it also prohibits the creation of political partiesbased on ethnicity.29. A genuine effort has been made to integrate different ethnicities in government and theadministration. Security institutions, and particularly the Afghan National Army, also provide a3good model of ethnic diversity. Key positions in government, however, are increasingly dominatedby Pashtuns. In this context, the Parliament plays a key role in reflecting the country’s diversityand providing a counterweight to a Pashtun-dominated administration.6.Administrative capacity

The Parliament launched this process in June 2009, judging that there were too many parties in thecountry. Despite a deadline extension, when the re-registration period ended in June 2010, only 2 ofthe 110 recognised Afghan parties had successfully re-registered, with about a dozen applicationspending.The law aimed to regulate various issues relating to family law within the Shi’a community ofAfghanistan, which represents some 10% of the population. The initial draft adopted by the Parliamentin February 2009 denied Shi’a women the right to leave their homes except for "legitimate" purposes;forbade women from working or receiving education without their husbands' consent; permitted maritalrape; favoured males in the family with regards to child custody, divorce and inheritance rights.Following an international outcry, some of the most problematic provisions, such as the one restrictingwomen’s freedom of movement, were removed from the text.On this issue, see the General Report of the NATO PA’s Defence and Security Committee “Preparingthe Afghan National Security Forces for Transition”, 211 DSC 10 E, which nevertheless points to thefact that, whereas the composition of the Afghan National Army is roughly equivalent to that of thepopulation as a whole, Tajiks still tend to be overrepresented in the higher ranks, while Hazaras feelthat they “face a glass ceiling". In addition, only 2 or 3% of the ANA are from the south.

30. Building up administrative capacity is a key challenge for strengthening central and localgovernance. Yet, efforts in this field have long ignored the scale of the challenge. Some progresshas nevertheless been achieved in recent years both in training a new cadre of civil servants andin setting new standards for reducing corruption and enhancing the quality of public administration.31. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) plays acentral role on both accounts. It has started harmonising and institutionalising job descriptions,standardizing the pay system, and implementing a merit based promotion system. It has also sped4up the recruitment of new civil servants.32. Afghan institutions, with the support of international partners, have also stepped up initiativesto train civil servants at all levels of administration. New programmes put greater emphasis ontraining local administrators in the provinces and districts. Other programmes aim to strengthenthe capacity of the IARCSC and the Afghan Civil Service Institute, its training body, to manage andimplement civil service support programmes. International donors have also sought to consolidateand better co-ordinate existing programmes, under the leadership of the IARCSC.33. Many challenges remain at all levels, however. Implementing structural reform in publicadministration and building up a competent, effective and appropriately staffed civil service willrequire a sustained long-term endeavour, an endeavour that is fundamental to the success of allother stabilisation and reconstruction efforts: combating corruption, enhancing the effectiveness ofcentral and local governance, and spreading security across the country. Indeed, a key element indefeating the insurgency and winning hearts and minds is providing a competent government thatis able to address the needs of its citizens and deliver reliable services. Recent internationalstrategies have sought to better take into account this link between governance and security, andto ensure that efforts to put in place governance structures are conducted in conjunction withmilitary operations.

37. An Independent Election Commission (IEC) was responsible for organising the elections, butwas extensively supported through technical assistance and capacity building by theUnited Nations Development Programme’s Electoral and Legal Capacity for Tomorrowproject (UNDP/ELECT). Additionally, an Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was temporarilyset up to deal with complaints and challenges arising from the elections. The ECC was composedof five members, two Afghans – nominated respectively by the Afghan Independent Human RightsCommission and the Supreme Court –, and three internationals – appointed by theSpecial Representative of the UN Secretary-General. The Head of the ECC was selected amongthese three international members.The campaign38. Campaigning was de facto restricted by widespread insecurity. Of the 41 candidatesregistered for the presidential election, only 29 were still in the race on election day. Over3,000 candidates competed for the 420 provincial council seats. Over 80% of these candidates ranas independents. In fact, only three parties were visible and active:Jumbish-i-Milli(led by GeneralRashid Dostum),Hezb-i-Wahdat(a Shia party) and the United National Front (a coalition led byformer President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Speaker of theWolesi JirgaYunus Qanooni). Ratherthan political parties, support for specific candidates relied mostly on powerbrokers, communitycouncils, patronage networks and local political blocs based on family, tribal or ethnic ties.President Karzai’s main competitor was Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a former Foreign Minister andprominent member of the Northern Alliance, backed by the United National Front.The election39. According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, election day was the mostviolent day in Afghanistan in 15 years. As many as 31 persons were killed and 79 injured in some300 incidents. According to the IEC, voting took place at 6,167 polling centres, while some800 polling centres were deemed too unsafe to open. The turnout – estimated at about 38,8% –was far lower than in the 2004 presidential elections – 80% - and the 2005 parliamentary andprovincial elections – 50%.40. Allegations of widespread fraud surfaced immediately after the polls closed. The ECCreceived over 2,500 complaints. Nevertheless, the IEC decided to release preliminary results on16 September 2009. According to these preliminary results, Mr Karzai had won 54.6% of the voteand Dr Abdullah 27.75%. Following an audit of a sample of suspect ballot boxes in 10% of pollingstations (representing close to 25% of votes), the ECC found that about 1 million Karzai votes and200,000 Abdullah votes could be considered fraudulent. This resulted in an adjustment of votesthat gave Mr Karzai 49.67% and Dr Abdullah 30.59% of the votes. With Mr Karzai’s score nowbelow the required 50% threshold, a run-off election was scheduled for 7 November 2009.41. On 1 November, however, Dr Abdullah decided to withdraw from the second round, citingdoubts that a second round would fulfil conditions for a fair election. The IEC cancelled the run-offthe following day, declaring Mr Karzai the winner.42. The process of post-election certification of the provincial councils was also protracted, withthe last outstanding results established on 26 December 2009.

Assessment of the election43. Local and international observers denounced deeply flawed elections, including massivefraud on election day. While ballot stuffing, particularly in favour of the incumbent, was the mostwidespread form of fraud, campaigning at polling stations, multiple voter registration, proxy andunderage voting and other technical deficiencies also undermined the good conduct of theelection.44. The IEC was heavily criticised by observers for its lack of independence, transparency,accountability and credibility. According to the EU Election Observation Mission, IEC staffers likelyengaged in election fraud themselves.45. Also according to observers, the ECC was established too late to be able to adequatelyperform its role and did not possess sufficient institutional weight to influence the IEC’s decisionssubstantially. The unclear division of labour and mutual suspicion between the IEC and the ECCalso led to a high level of confusion regarding audit and recount procedures.46. International observers also identified a number of shortcomings in the implementation ofelection regulations. The lack of a reliable, complete and accurate voter register led to numbers of6registered voters that were likely inflated. The criteria and procedure for vetting candidates werenot followed strictly, resulting in a failure to bar ineligible candidates from running. The mediacoverage was largely biased in favour of the incumbent, and the government’s decision to banjournalists from reporting election day violence undermined freedom of speech. The lack ofregulation and transparency in campaign financing was also seen as problematic. Finally, allobservers lamented the fact that many women were de facto disenfranchised.2.2010 parliamentary elections75

47. Elections for the Lower House of Parliament , initially set for 22 May 2010, were postponeduntil 18 September 2010 in recognition of the logistical difficulties which could affect theorganisation of the elections. Parliamentary elections are held according to the singlenon-transferable voting system. Each province forms a multi-candidate constituency. The numberof seats allocated to each constituency varies from 2 to 33 depending on the province’spopulation.48. Following last year’s experience, the parliamentary elections were seen as an important testand an opportunity to restore public confidence in the electoral process and the institutions. Anamended election law was adopted in April 2010 following clarifications and assurances from theAfghan government, after the initial draft had caused strong objections in the Parliament and in theinternational community.49. Several measures were also taken with regard to the IEC. In February 2010, theCommission decided not to rehire some 6,000 persons who worked at polling stations wheresignificant fraud was committed in 2009. Fraud-mitigation measures were also implemented in thepolling centres where most irregularities took place. The appointment of Fazel Ahmed Manawi tohead the IEC was also widely saluted. Overall, however, these measures only very partiallyaddress the major flaws revealed during the presidential elections.5

50. Campaigning was again severely restricted because of the worsening security situation. Fourcandidates were killed in the pre-election period. Ultimately, 2,502 candidates ran for theWolesiJirga,down from 2,707 in 2005. Only 31 ran on party platforms. On the positive side, the presenceof women in certain provinces increased, with some even vying for seats not exclusively allotted tofemale candidates. In the run up, 36 candidates were excluded because of links with illegal armedgroups and 40 because they did not resign from civil service positions in time. Management of thetechnical aspects of the pre-election process by the IEC was also generally assessed positively.The electoral timetable was kept on track, recruitment and training of personnel was completedsuccessfully, the security assessment of polling stations was conducted effectively, and the finallist published one month before the election. Of the 6,835 polling centres originally foreseen by theIEC, 5,897 were deemed safe enough to open and 5,510 actually opened on election day.51. Violence was again high on election day. According to ISAF, close to 400 insurgent attackstook place, a third more compared with the 2009 elections. Some 30 people were killed in theseincidents.52. Partial results were released by the IEC on 20 October. According to this data, about 4.3million valid votes were cast on election day, or an estimated turnout of 37.7%. If this figure isconfirmed, this would be one point lower than the 2009 elections, and the lowest turnout in Afghan8elections post-2001.53. While it is still too early to tell how these elections compare with previous ones, it is clear thatsignificant fraud has taken place. Over 3,600 complaints have been filed with the ECC, over half ofwhich have been classified as priority A, meaning they can potentially change the outcome of the9vote. The IEC decided on 3 October to invalidate the votes of 11 polling centres in differentprovinces and ordered a recount in 63 other polling centres. This comes in addition to previousinvalidation of part or all of the votes from 141 polling centres and recounts in 202 polling centres.

10

Some 1.3 million votes were considered by the IEC to be invalid. The way complaints andrecounts are managed will provide an important indication as to the reliability and credibility of theelection process. It is therefore essential that this process is conducted efficiently, effectively andin a fully transparent manner.54. The announcement of final results, originally expected by 30 October, will likely bepostponed to a later date. However, even before these final results are announced, the conduct ofparliamentary elections has confirmed the need for long-term electoral reform. The Afghangovernment itself has recognised this and pledged at the Kabul Conference in July 2010 to initiatean electoral reform strategy within six months. This will be a very challenging yet necessaryprocess, and your Rapporteur hopes that it will be conducted in close co-operation with relevantinternational institutions, with a view to incorporating the wide-ranging recommendations putforward following both the 2009 and 2010 elections. According to the UN, the following issuesshould feature on the agenda for long-term electoral reform: the legal framework, the sustainabilityof the electoral calendar, the currently temporary nature of the ECC, the creation of a single8

However, as the IEC itself emphasizes, turnout figures are far from reliable, and different methodshave been used to calculate turnout in successive elections.In contrast to the 2009 elections, most complaints will be adjudicated at the provincial level by thenewly established provincial ECC offices.In a statement released on 20 October, UNAMA concluded that “[t]he number of votes invalidated andidentified by the IEC point to considerable fraud and electoral irregularities on election day”; however, italso commended the IEC for its handling of the post-election process, noting that “[t]he IEC has shownsignificant improvements in the management of the post-polling day process and we commend themfor this. The IEC has identified irregularities and has been committed to ensuring the process istransparent. We further recognise the thorough review they have undertaken prior to announcing thepreliminary results.”

55. The Afghan Constitution commits the government to observe the UN Charter, the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties which Afghanistan hasratified. It explicitly recognizes a number of fundamental rights for its citizens, including the right tolife, liberty and respect for human dignity, freedom of expression, prohibition of torture, the right toa fair trial, and non-discrimination. The Constitution established the Independent Human RightsCommission of Afghanistan (AIHRC) with the mandate to monitor respect for human rights as wellas to foster and protect it.56. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, the government of Afghanistan, in partnership with theinternational community, has achieved a number of major steps towards the protection of humanrights. These have included:adapting Afghanistan’s legal framework to match the commitments undertaken under thenew Constitution and international treaties;establishing institutions responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights, andputting in place monitoring and reporting mechanisms; the remarkable work accomplished,in particular, by the AIHRC should be saluted;implementing capacity-building initiatives for these new institutions;developing strategies and specific benchmarks for future efforts, including objectives set inthe Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the National programme for humanrights and civic responsibilities presented at the Kabul Conference.57. Several other positive developments have taken place. Thus, 6 million children were enrolledin primary schools in 2008 (of which 2 million were girls), up from only one million under theTaliban. The media landscape has also progressively expanded, and access to the internet isgrowing rapidly.58. Significant measures have also been adopted to promote gender equality and women’srights. These have included improved access to education, literacy campaigns, greater1213representation of women in political institutions and public administration , adoption of aNational Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan and of a law on the elimination of violenceagainst women, implementation of various measures to protect women from violence, etc. TheMinistry of Women Affairs spearheads these efforts within the Afghan government.59. Nevertheless, the protection of human rights in Afghanistan continues to face daunting14challenges on many accounts :discrepancies still exist between legislation on the one hand, and the Constitution andAfghanistan’s international obligations on the other;11

See the UN Secretary General’s report of 14 September 2010 “The situation in Afghanistan and itsimplications for international peace and security”, A/64/911.A minimum of two female representatives on average from each of the 34 provinces must be electedinto the Lower House, i.e. a minimum of about 68 members. In the Upper House, 50 % of themembers appointed by the President must be female, i.e. 17 members. 25% of provincial council seatsare also reserved for women.Legally, at least 25% of members of Parliament must be women. According to official Afghan statistics,5.4% of all judges, 9.4% of all prosecutors and 21,5% of all civil servants (excluding the Ministry ofDefence) are women (2009 data).On all these challenges, see the remarkably candid and lucid report submitted by the Afghangovernment to the UN Human Rights Council as part of the Universal Periodic Review,A/HRC/WG.6/5/AFG/1, 24 February 2009.

respect of human rights by several state institutions remains a problem; use of violence,torture and arbitrary detention by law enforcement bodies is of particular concern;structural weaknesses within the justice sector mean that access to justice for all, the right tofair trial, and equal treatment for all before the law, are not guaranteed;the critical condition of prisons and detention centres, and the treatment of detainees, areparticular concerns;corruption continues to undermine respect for human rights;the ongoing insecurity across Afghanistan also seriously restricts the enjoyment offundamental rights;freedom of the media continues to be restricted by insecurity, but also by intimidation andharassment from certain state institutions;human rights related bodies continue to lack capacity to perform their functions; this includesin particular a very weak role of civil society organisations;monitoring mechanisms also need to be strengthened;awareness of human rights among the population remains limited, and education andtraining insufficient.

60. A lot remains to be done in particular to promote women’s rights, including further improvingaccess to education for women and girls, and addressing the widespread occurrence of underagemarriages, forced marriages and domestic violence. The adoption of the Shiite Personal StatusLaw, even in the amended version, was widely seen outside Afghanistan as a setback for women’srights.61. It is therefore essential for Afghanistan’s international partners to support the government inits efforts to implement the commitment it has undertaken to enhance the protection of humanrights and women’s rights in particular, while at the same time remaining vigilant. In particular, thecurrent discussion on national reconciliation should not come at the expense of the fundamentalrights that the Constitution guarantees to all Afghan citizens. Conversely, it is critical that theinternational civilian and military presence in Afghanistan be seen as exemplary in their respect forhuman rights and the rule of law.

62. The challenging security situation and the persistent presence of an active insurgency inparts of the country remain the most serious obstacles to the establishment of governance andrule of law across Afghanistan. While military efforts continue, with a renewed focus on the Southin particular, a key challenge for enhancing governance is to reconcile and reintegrate elements of15the insurgency.63. The past year has seen a new momentum towards reintegration and reconciliation, and amultiplication of contacts with representatives of the insurgency both by Afghan authorities and byinternational partners. Reconciliation and reintegration featured prominently in President Karzai’sinauguration speech in November 2009 and again at the London Conference, where PresidentKarzai outlined a peace and reintegration programme. The London Conference welcomedreinvigorated reintegration efforts, as well as plans to hold a peacejirga.64.The Consultative PeaceJirgawas held in Kabul on 2-4 June 2010 with some161,600 representatives. Despite criticism regarding the representative character of thejirga,the15

convening of this forum was in itself a success. Insurgent attacks did not succeed in disrupting themeeting.65. Participants endorsed President Karzai’s initiative to seek a lasting end to the conflict bypeaceful means, and called for the development of a national strategy. They stressed that “nopeace efforts should bring to question the achievements made so far and its legal values”, and seta number of principles, which should form the framework of talks with insurgents. These include inparticular: a commitment by insurgents to renounce violence and dissociate themselves fromAl Qaeda and other terrorist groups; a just peace which can guarantee the rights of all citizens,including women and children, and an equal application of the law to all citizens; guaranteedprotection and safety for those who join the peace process. In addition, they called for theliberation of detainees wrongfully imprisoned, and the removal of insurgent leaders from UNblacklists.66. As a result of the Consultative PeaceJirga,a 70-member High Peace Council (HPC) wasset up in September 2010 with broad responsibilities in leading the reconciliation process. Thereare already numerous reports of an intensification of contacts with different insurgent groups,including, most recently, official confirmation of contacts between high-level representatives of theTaliban and high-level Afghan officials.67. Building on the London commitments, an Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme(APRP) was presented in April 2010, and endorsed “in principle” at the Kabul Conference inJuly 2010. The APRP is a very complex and wide-ranging programme. It will be Afghan-led andfunded through the peace and reintegration trust fund launched at the London conference, towhich donors have pledged over USD 200 million. The plan focuses mostly on low- and possiblymid-level insurgents through different reintegration measures, including enrolment into communitysecurity initiatives or the ANSF, as well as community-based, literacy, vocational training, de-radicalisation, and public works and agricultural programmes.68. If past reintegration programmes are any indication, implementation of this new plan is likelyto face difficult challenges. Critics have already raised questions regarding bureaucraticcomplexity, risk of abuse, and insufficient funding. So far very little money has been spent, andonly several hundred insurgents have reintegrated this year. However, with the official start of theAPRP on 28 September 2010, it is hoped that the initiative will gain traction. It is essential to buildon the momentum created by the peaceJirgaand the Kabul conference, and deliver on thecommitments that will help convince insurgent fighters that the APRP is a credible and attractiveprocess. In particular, Afghan institutions need to demonstrate their ability to manage thisambitious programme in an efficient and accountable manner, and international partners need todeliver on – and possibly augment – their pledges to the trust fund. The success of thereintegration programme will also partly depend on progress achieved on reconciliation.

71. Below the central level, the country is divided into 34 provinces and 365 districts. Provincialand district governors are appointed by the President while the Constitution provides for the directelection of provincial, district, village and municipal councils.72. All provinces and districts have designated governors; similarly mayors have been appointedin major municipalities. In certain key provinces – notably Helmand –, new governors have beenable to achieve measurable improvements in disrupting the narcotics trade, improving localeconomies and increasing local support for the government.73. However, the ability of local governments to function effectively – particularly at the districtand municipal levels – is severely circumscribed by the security situation, the insurgency’soperation of parallel governance structures, corruption, as well as by the dearth of trainedpersonnel and essential resources such as communications systems, vehicles and offices.74. The situation is even more challenging regarding local councils. Elections have so far onlybeen held for provincial councils in 2005 and 2009. The organisation of district council electionshas been hampered by the non-resolution of the issue of delimitation of boundaries. Municipalelections are also yet to be organised.75. The situation is slowly improving, however, thanks to a greater focus by international and17Afghan authorities on strengthening local governance. President Karzai has announced plans tohold district council elections nationwide in the spring of 2011. He also mentioned the prospect ofa direct election of mayors in all municipalities, although a concrete time has not been set.76. Established in August 2007, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) hasplayed a key role in:screening candidates for local offices, including provincial and district governors, policechiefs and other key local officials;helping extend the reach of the official government locally; andhelping enhance the quality and effectiveness of local administration, including throughregular assessments of governors’ performance, and training of local officials.77.The Community Development Councils (CDCs) are widely seen as another successfulexperiment in local empowerment and ownership. Established with the support of the Ministry ofRural Rehabilitation and Development under the National Solidarity Programme, the CDCs aim toprovide a forum for local communities to decide on development projects for their area. Some22,000 CDCs have been created thus far; a total of 30,000 are planned. The establishment ofCDCs has helped tie communities to the government, thereby increasing their trust in and relianceon official structures.78. The adoption in March 2010 of the Sub-National Governance Policy (SNGP) marks anothermajor step towards enhanced local governance. The policy envisions strengthening provincialcouncils' oversight powers and empowering them to approve provincial development plans andprovincial budgets before their submission to the central government. It also introduces abudgeting process at the provincial level, which grants provincial councils powers to create their17

own alternative budget for their respective areas. The SNGP also clarifies the roles of sub-nationalentities. Finally, it calls for district council and municipal council elections by March 2011 and givesmunicipal councils powers to enact legislation, approve annual budgets, and set tax rates.79.At the Kabul Conference, the Afghan government committed to implementing the SNGPwithin 12 months “in a phased and fiscally sustainable manner”, to strengthening local institutionalcapacity and to developing sub-national regulatory, financing and budgetary frameworks.80. Nevertheless, the development of local governance in Afghanistan continues to face anumber of serious challenges:The powers of local councils are limited and ill-defined. In particular, they have very limitedcontrol over local budgets. In this sense, they neither provide an effective local decision-making body nor a strong check to the powers of governors. Implementation of the Sub-national Governance Policy will hopefully help address some of these issues. It should benoted also that, through their power to select members of the Upper House, provincial anddistrict councils can exert significant influence over legislative affairs at the central level. Thedirect election of governors could be envisaged in the long term as a way to enhance therepresentative character and democratic legitimacy of local institutions, as well as strengthenthe partnership between governors and local councils.Local authorities have to compete with many other parallel structures at the local level. Someof these are traditional informal forms of local governance (the traditionalshurasandjirgas,who act as consultative decision-making bodies, as well as fora for settling disputes). Othersare formal institutional structures, such as the CDCs. While CDCs provide a usefultemporary forum in the absence of proper district and municipal councils, a clear andadequate division of labour will have to be worked out once elected local councils are finallyformed.Most worryingly, local authorities also face an ongoing challenge from Taliban-sponsoredinstitutions, including shadow governors and a competing justice system.Local authorities – particularly at the district level – also continue to lack adequate capacityand resources, including financial resources. Addressing this challenge will require inparticular diverting resources away from the Taliban’s taxation scheme towards a legaltaxation system in support of legitimate local authorities.

84. Also in November 2009, two of the sitting ministers and three former ministers wereinvestigated for charges for corruption, and were not reappointed to the new cabinet presented inDecember.85. The issue of corruption featured prominently on the agenda of the London Conference,which set a number of priority measures to be adopted within tightly-defined timeframes:empowering the High Office of Oversight to investigate and sanction corrupt officials, andlead the fight against corruption, through decree within one month;during 2010, establishing a statutory basis for related anti-corruption bodies, including theMajor Crimes Task Force (MCTK) and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal, guaranteeing theirlong-term independence;enhancing the effectiveness of the senior civil service appointments and vetting process andrevising the civil service code. This will include, by the time of the Kabul Conference,identifying the top-level civil service appointments;the intention of the President to issue a decree prohibiting close relatives of Ministers,ministerial advisers, Members of Parliament, Governors and some Deputy Ministers fromserving in customs and revenue collection departments throughout government;as a priority during 2010, adopting comprehensive legislation agenda to make Afghan lawsconsistent with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), including theAnti-Corruption Penal Code, to expand provisions related to asset declaration; andinviting Afghan and other eminent experts to participate in an independent Ad HocMonitoring and Evaluation Mission which will develop clear and objective benchmarks forprogress; and prepare periodic reports on national and international activity.

86. A first set of measures were adopted by presidential decree on 18 March 2010. Theseinclude in particular a strengthened mandate for the High Office of Oversight for CounteringCorruption and stricter rules for the registration of assets owned by government officials.Additionally, the Afghan government announced a significant increase in police salaries (the basepay is now USD165 per month).87. However, implementation of other commitments undertaken in London has lagged behind.New deadlines were set at the Kabul Conference regarding the MCTK and the Anti-CorruptionTribunal, the revision of Afghanistan’s legislation in accordance with the UNCAC, and theestablishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. Further commitments were alsospelled out with a view to expanding audits of government activities, and publishing the assetdeclarations of senior officials on an annual basis. Given the current pace of reform, significantimprovements are likely to be slow, and can only succeed through a still more determinedcommitment by the highest spheres of the Afghan government.

88. Justice reform, although a key component of the establishment of the rule of law, has onlyreceived limited attention in the first years of the post-Taliban transition. As a result, and as notedin the UN Secretary General’s March 2010 report on Afghanistan, “[t]he formal justice systemremains beyond the reach of many Afghans.”89. Several obstacles have hampered reform on the Afghan side, including lack of capacity andweak leadership of the reform; at times difficult relations and bureaucratic battles between theMinistry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office; and the influenceexerted by known criminal figures over the power structures.90. The international community has also approached justice reform in a piecemeal fashionrather than through a coherent strategic approach. Initiatives have only addressed parts ofproblem, focusing largely on the formal justice sector while largely ignoring informal structures,and giving priority to national-level and centrally-led initiatives. Additionally, justice reform hasbeen implemented largely in isolation from other security sector reform initiatives.91. Justice reform was only given greater priority starting in 2005. The adoption in June 2008 ofthe Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and of the National Justice Strategy was amajor step in enhancing the coherence of local and international efforts. The National Programmefor Law and Justice for All, announced in July 2010, is expected to further refine these policies.This document should include four main components: according to the Afghan government, “[t]hefirst three components are concerned with the ability of justice institutions to deliver justiceservices to the people, including through: (i) Improving physical infrastructure and equipment andconducting administrative and organizational reform to improve service delivery; (ii) finalizingcommentaries for Civil and Penal Codes, reviewing and revising laws and optimizing the law-making processes, and the simplification of operational processes; and (iii) Creating a dedicatedpolice force tasked with providing security to judges and other justice personnel. The fourthcomponent aims at improving access to justice to the Afghan people through a range of initiatives,including: (i) Addressing the urgent need to link informal and formal justice systems; (ii) Creating19legal awareness; (iii) Promoting legal aid; and (iv) Improving criminal punishments.” Oncecompleted, these documents will provide an adequate framework for implementing justice reform.At the Kabul Conference, the Afghan government committed to a number of specificimplementation benchmarks relating in particular to the legal framework, access to legal aid, andthe coherence of strategies and policies.92.However, progress has been slow and many challenges remain. These include:serious problems regarding the independence of the judiciary and corruption of judges;lack of capacity;lack of access to justice for large parts of the population;difficulties relating to the variety of stakeholders responsible for different components of thejustice sector: Ministry of Justice, Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry ofDefence (responsible for military courts and high security detention facilities), NationalSecurity Directorate (with its own affiliated court system and special detention centres); andlimited progress in prison reform.

93. Limited access to the formal justice system and concerns regarding corruption, delays, costsand, more broadly, the inefficiency of the judiciary, have led many Afghans to resort to informaljustice for dispute resolution through local elders andshuras.While this often provides a usefulalternative or complement to the formal justice sector, particularly for simple low-level cases, onlylimited progress has been achieved in integrating both systems. Afghan authorities are stillworking to develop a draft policy on the integration of the formal and traditional systems, which willneed to be aligned with the National Programme for Law and Justice for All. The KabulConference communiqué calls upon Afghan authorities to start implementation of this policy in thenext twelve months.94. Parallel Taliban-sponsored justice poses another more serious challenge to theestablishment of the rule of law throughout Afghanistan. Given the current weaknesses of theformal justice system, Taliban justice is often seen as quicker, more reliable and less corrupt.Implementation of justice reform should thus be seen not only as a governance issue but also as asecurity priority.

95. The persistent strength of the illicit drug economy in Afghanistan continues to pose a seriouschallenge to the establishment of the rule of law across the country. The value of the drug tradeoriginating in Afghanistan was estimated at around USD$2.8 billion in 2009, or 26% of GDP.According to the World Bank, the country’s narco-economy employs over 1.6 million people.Afghanistan alone accounts for over 90% of the world’s supply of opiates.96. Nevertheless, some progress has been achieved in recent years. In 2009, the UNODCreported a drop in poppy cultivation by one third over the previous two years. The number ofpoppy-free provinces reached 20 out of 34 in 2009 - from 13 in 2007 and only six in 2006. Theevolution of the situation in Helmand has been particularly striking. Poppy cultivation theredecreased by one-third between 2008 and 2009.97. UNODC data for 2010 shows less positive developments across Afghanistan than in theprevious year: overall stabilisation of the land area under poppy cultivation, number of poppy-freeprovinces, stabilisation in Helmand and negative trends in a number of central and northernprovinces. Only opium production declined sharply to half the levels of 2009. However, accordingto the UNODC, this was due mainly to the occurrence of diseases in major growing areas thataffected opium plants at a late stage of plant development.98. These positive trends witnessed in 2009 were due to a combination of factors, includingweather conditions, market trends and better governance. In 2010, while plant diseases led to amajor drop in production, this also brought prices to a hike. The UNODC warns that “the currenthigh sale price of opium in combination with a lower wheat price may encourage farmers to goback to opium cultivation.”99. While eradication has slowed down following the US government’s decision to discontinue itsprogramme, the increased focus on alternative livelihood and agricultural and economic supportprogrammes in rural areas should be welcomed. These policies seek to encourage and facilitate along-term transition towards licit economic activities. Thus, according to an independent study by20Cranfield University in the United Kingdom , the “food zone programme” implemented by thegovernor of Helmand with financial and technical assistance from the United Kingdom and theUnited States, helped reduce opium cultivation by 37% in the area covered by the programmeacross six districts in Central Helmand. Opium crops were mostly replaced by cereal crops. Theprogramme included anti-poppy awareness raising campaigns, the distribution of wheat seed and20

fertilizer to farmers, and law enforcement activities including eradication. The US government’sGood Performers Initiative also rewards poppy-free provinces with additional agricultural andeconomic support.100. At the London Conference in January 2010, Afghan authorities committed to stepping uptheir efforts and updating the National Drugs Controls Strategy. The Kabul conference welcomedthese efforts. However, few new specific commitments were undertaken, beyond declarations ofintent.101. Recent gains need to be consolidated. This will require a combination of local, national andinternational efforts. Law enforcement should obviously remain a key priority. In this regard,capacity building of Afghan counter-narcotics law enforcement forces should receive sustainedattention. Coalition efforts to target facilities and traffickers known to support the insurgencyshould also continue, in close partnership with Afghan security forces. Strengthened localgovernance has proved a key factor and needs to receive continued attention and support fromKabul as well as from the international community. Similarly, crop substitution and alternativelivelihood programmes need to form an essential part both of counterinsurgency efforts, and of theAfghan government’s long-term development agenda. ISAF (International Security AssistanceForce) nations should further support efforts in this area, particularly by contributing qualifiedcivilian agricultural experts to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). As recent negative trendsin Badakhshan and Nangarhar show, it is also important to spread efforts across all regions, ratherthan focus excessively on problematic regions. Projects aimed at long-term structural change andjob creation should also be preferred to short-term cash-for-work programmes. Finally, continuingto engage Afghanistan’s neighbours in Central Asia, Russia and Iran – particularly throughUNODC-led initiatives – is also essential, as reaffirmed by Kabul Conference participants.

The persistent instability and insecurity have limited the ability of the international community, andin particular of civilian agencies, to support governance-building efforts across the country,particularly in those areas most affected by the insurgency. The re-emergence of the Taliban as amajor threat after 2006 further complicated the joint Afghan and international venture to increasethe quality of governance.Facing the challenge: Adjusting international strategies103. As a result of these different challenges and shortcomings, the international community’sapproach to governance has focused largely on building central institutions to the detriment oflocal governance. It has also heavily focused on building up the security sector to the detriment ofother areas of governance. Additionally, the military has had to take the lead in many areas,including certain aspects of governance and development.104. As we know now, initial strategies have tended to underestimate the scale of the challengeand of the efforts needed to stabilize and reconstruct the country. International efforts haveprogressively been adjusted along three main lines: clearer and more focused strategies andobjectives; a greater focus on governance, supported by increased resources; and a betterco-ordination of efforts.Clearer and more focused civil and military strategies and objectives in support ofgovernance105. International strategies for Afghanistan have been progressively reviewed and refined at aseries of major international conferences. Broadly speaking, these reviews have aimed to betterconnect international and national efforts in the three main areas of security, development andgovernance; to complement broad long-term objectives with specific, time bound, verifiablecommitments; and to draw the path towards a transition to Afghan lead in all areas. As part ofthese reviews, the international community has recognised the need to better address thechallenges of governance.106. A major step in this process was the adoption in April 2008 of the Afghan NationalDevelopment Strategy (ANDS), which laid out the government’s development plans for 2008 to2013. The ANDS acknowledged the central importance of rapidly improving the country’sgovernance structures. The ANDS remains still today the main roadmap for Afghan andinternational efforts. It provides a comprehensive framework for a largely Afghan-led and Afghan-owned state-building and reconstruction strategy.107. At this year’s London Conference, the Afghan government committed itself again toimproving governance across Afghanistan, with an international promise of a better co-ordinatedand resourced civilian effort and an increase in the transparency and effectiveness of aid. Thesegoals were reaffirmed and detailed further during this summer’s Kabul Conference. In particular,the Afghan government presented 23 national priority programmes, including 6 programmes21focusing on governance , which provide a blueprint for action and reform in the next three years.

108. The military contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan was alsore-assessed on several occasions to take into account the need for a more coherent and focusedeffort. The current strategy is based on the so-called Comprehensive Approach, i.e. an approachthat integrates security, development and governance to deliver maximum effect and benefits tothe Afghan population.109. The adoption of former ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal’s counterinsurgencystrategy in 2009 and the strengthening of NATO’s civilian presence in Afghanistan, have helpedfurther refine NATO’s strategy. The main tenets of the new strategy include:moving away from an enemy-centric approach to a population-centric approach, i.e. focusingon delivering security in population centres;developing a genuine partnership with Afghan security forces with a view to a progressivetransition towards full Afghan responsibility for security provision across the country;providing a favourable environment in which legitimate Afghan authorities will be in a positionto deliver governance and development; andpromoting a regional approach.

110. Overall, this approach thus aims to better integrate the imperatives of governance anddevelopment into the military planning process, in order to ensure a seamless transition from the“clear” phase – which aims to clear the area from insurgents militarily – to the “hold” phase – whichfocuses on establishing enduring local control over the area.111. Planned in close consultation with Afghan authorities, ongoing operations in Marjah andNad Ali in Helmand province and in Kandahar, all Taliban stronghold areas, provide clear cases ofimplementation of the new strategy. However, progress has been slow in Marjah, and operationsin Kandahar have been repeatedly pushed back and scaled down. Military and civilian officialshave been calling for patience, stressing that the full impact of new troop deployments and ofoperations in Helmand and Kandahar would be felt over time.More resources for governance112. Over the years, the scope of the UNAMA’s (United Nations Assistance Mission inAfghanistan) mandate was broadened, more emphasis placed on institution-building, and fundingaugmented. UNAMA gained new roles in supporting elections, building up the judicial system andthe rule of law, and co-ordinating overall efforts. However, only in 2008 was the central role of theUN in leading and co-ordinating international efforts recognized more clearly, and UNAMA’sauthority strengthened accordingly. This included a push to enlarge UNAMA’s presencethroughout the country, play a bigger role in Afghan-led reconciliation, and improve governance.Aid pledges from international donors have also progressively increased.113. The strengthening of NATO’s civilian pillar in Afghanistan is also aimed at supporting thegreater focus on building governance, particularly at the local level. The military surge is indeed22being complemented by a civilian surge in many provinces. Efforts are co-ordinated at the centrallevel thanks to a reinforced mandate for NATO Senior Civilian Representative’s (SCR).A better co-ordination of efforts114. The 2006 London Conference established a Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board(JCMB), consisting of Afghan and international actors, in order to provide coherence of nationaland international efforts. Calls for greater co-ordination intensified over the course of 2007, but the22

concept of a ‘super-envoy’, who would have represented not only the UN, but also the EU and thecivilian side of NATO, had to be abandoned due to Afghan reluctance. Nevertheless, severalpositive steps have been taken over the last years with a view to enhancing co-ordination at alllevels: among the military, among civilian institutions, between civilian and military efforts, andbetween international and Afghan efforts. These have included: strengthening UNAMA’s mandate;placing a far greater share of U.S. troops under ISAF command, and rethinking ISAF’s commandstructure; and increasing the mandate of the top NATO civilian official. The greater level andquality of the coordination between the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, EUSpecial Representative, ISAF Commander and NATO Senior Civilian Representative, are alsowidely seen as a very positive development.115. The JCMB’s role was progressively strengthened with a view to better monitoring theimplementation of joint commitments, thereby increasing both co-ordination of efforts andaccountability. The Kabul Conference thus provides for Board meetings to take place every fourmonths in order to take stock of progress, identify gaps and address obstacles to implementation.116. In recent years, priority has also been given to consolidating the Afghan lead over all aspectsof reconstruction. President Karzai’s inaugural speech in November 2009, the London Conferencein January 2010, the Consultative PeaceJirgaand the Kabul Conference in July 2010 markedmajor steps in the process of transition towards greater Afghan leadership, also referred to as the“Kabul process”. The Kabul process aims to lay the foundations for a renewed partnershipbetween Afghanistan and its international partners. It relies on a mutual commitment: on the onehand, a renewed commitment by the Afghan government to guarantee security and deliverconcrete benefits to its citizens, and on the other, a pledge by international partners to realign theirassistance to advance Afghanistan’s priorities.117. Thus, at the London Conference, donors pledged to channel 50% of development aidthrough the Afghan government within two years. This aimed to address one of the main criticismsof international assistance in Afghanistan: that delivering an overwhelming share of the aidthrough international channels actually contributed to undermining the development of Afghangovernance and administrative capacity. Nevertheless, this objective was made conditional uponimproved government capacity and performance, including improved financial management andbudget execution, reduced corruption, and the development of a financing strategy with theattending government capacity for such a strategy. In addition, in Kabul, donors also expressedtheir readiness to align 80% of their aid behind Afghanistan’s own priorities within two years.The way forward118. Undoubtedly, partners in Afghanistan have acknowledged the vital importance ofstrengthening governance in conjunction with spreading security and promoting economicdevelopment. The emphasis on this sector has increased, and relevant institutions have beengiven a firmer mandate and greater resources. The combination of a more coherent and Afghan-led effort in support of the National Development Strategy, and of NATO’s new counterinsurgencystrategy, provide a genuine opportunity for decisive progress, including on strengtheninggovernance.119. However, decisive progress will depend both on the Afghan authorities’ ability to deliver onits reform commitments and on the continued resolve of coalition partners to contribute necessarypersonnel – military and especially civilian. On both these accounts, 2010 has provided a mixedpicture.120. On the side of Afghan authorities, the Consultative PeaceJirgaand the Kabul Conferenceprovided important demonstrations of the government’s willingness to take full responsibility for thecountry’s future course. With the adoption of the national priority programmes, significant progress

has also been achieved in refining the broader objectives of the National Development Strategy.However, elections in 2009 and 2010 have also shown the ongoing fragility of the situation, andthe immensity of the challenge that Afghanistan faces in establishing sustainable structures ofgovernance.121. On the side of Afghanistan’s international partners, the military and civilian surge and carefulpreparations for intensified operations in Southern Afghanistan have aimed to retake the initiativefrom the insurgency. However, shortcomings of the electoral process and challenges encounteredin the campaign in the South have put to the test the stated resolve to stay the course.122. In the current context, the greatest danger lies in premature disengagement. Allies need tocontinue to give the current strategy time to bear fruits, only fine-tuning it whenever necessary.The trend towards increased Afghan lead, which almost necessarily implies a diminishinginternational role and fewer resources, needs to be managed with great care. Further steps takenin this process must be based on a thorough and realistic assessment of progress.123. To achieve decisive progress, Afghan authorities need to pursue current efforts to implementthe time-bound, specific, result-oriented commitments taken at the London and Kabulconferences. Two areas should receive particular attention: stepping up efforts to eradicatecorruption; and initiating an in-depth review of election laws, taking into account the lessonslearned from the presidential and parliamentary elections, and recommendations from competentinternational bodies. Implementation of the national priority programmes also needs to be23supported by complementary efforts at the local level.124. NATO Allies in turn need to step up support for Afghan capacity-building efforts in the field ofgovernance, with a view to enhancing the government's ability to deliver services to its population.They should focus specifically on the following priority areas: justice, civil service and publicadministration, public finances and local governance. In addition, Allied government andparliaments should support the newly elected parliament as it takes up its duties.125. Progress in the implementation of the mutual commitments undertaken in London and Kabulneeds to be assessed through a thorough review process. Provided that conditions are met,delivering on the London commitment to channel a greater share of international assistancethrough Afghan institutions is essential. Finally, recent efforts to enhance the coherence ofinternational assistance in support of Afghan governance need to continue.__________