NPA, Alm.del - 2010-11 (1. samling) - Bilag 5: Komité-rapporter fra NPA-sessionen i Warszawa november 2010

1.In recent years NATO Allies had to tackle a number of issues that have challenged thecohesion of the Alliance. The new Strategic Concept of the Alliance which is currently beingupdated will be an important document that will map out NATO’s strategic direction for the futureand reaffirm the commitment of the Allies to each others security. However, it remains adocument that reflects the least common denominator among the Allies. Thus, how NATO, as analliance, will develop will depend to a large degree on how the member States will interpret andimplement the Strategic Concept in an operational context. This report presents a compilation ofthe issues of the last five years that have tested the Alliance. A good part of the shortcomings inAfghanistan are now being addressed and Alliance cohesion has considerably improved.Nonetheless, other issues have meanwhile arisen. Taking stock of the lessons learned allowsNATO Allies to look forward and enable the Alliance to meet current and future security threats.

2.Afghanistan is NATO’s most important operation. Afghanistan remains a considerablemilitary, as well as political, challenge for the Allies and for NATO as an organisation. It is thelitmus test for Alliance cohesion and for the ability of NATO Allies to generate the political will tocounter threats to their security that emanate from beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.3.Afghanistan has highlighted the issue of Alliance solidarity, as manifested in discussionsabout risk sharing among NATO member States. In the early days certain NATO Members feltthey were in the more volatile and dangerous regions. They have repeatedly pointed out thatother Allies are failing to carry their “fair share” of burdens and risks insofar as they have not beenforthcoming in the provision of forces in southern Afghanistan while continuing to resist calls byNATO to do so. Only after repeated appeals have other Allies deployed combat forces to assistthe International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).4.In contrast, countries reluctant to deploy troops in the more insecure parts of Afghanistanhave rejected such criticisms, pointing out that the deployment of national contingents is the resultof an earlier (political) agreement among NATO Allies. The issue has somewhat subsided, as thesecurity situation has become more fragile in the previously more secure parts of Afghanistan andas Allies have increased their military contributions. Other Allies which have already withdrawn orhave announced to withdraw their troops in the near future have signaled that they will continuetheir assistance by other means, including increased assistance in reconstruction anddevelopment. However, that reconstruction and development efforts can only succeed if there issecurity on the ground.5.As national military contingents have been operating under different rules of engagement,the effectiveness of ISAF in Afghanistan has been severely constrained by ‘national caveats’ –operational restrictions imposed by individual member States on their armed forces deployed inthe country. These caveats have limited the ability of NATO commanders to deal with thebroadest spectrum of operations, from peacekeeping to counter-insurgency operations. Thoughsome progress has been made over time in persuading NATO members to reduce or abandonexisting national caveats and adopt more flexible rules of engagement, they continue to limit theeffectiveness of NATO forces in Afghanistan.6.Allies have also differed about the nature of the engagement in Afghanistan and as to theright mix of military and non-military instruments required for the country’s successfultransformation. There are ongoing debates over the proper balance between combat andreconstruction missions among Allies and within Allied nations. Some governments, especially theUS, emphasise the need for NATO forces to be prepared for combat operations and have

considered that ISAF must be able and willing to undertake the full gamut of operations, rangingfrom peacekeeping to combat operations against the Taliban and other armed groups. OtherAllies had originally considered the mission in Afghanistan as predominantly a non-military one.Thus, they saw ISAF primarily as a peacekeeping operation with no, or only very little combatoperations and have been reluctant to commit their troops to counter-insurgency operations.7.These different approaches to the mission in Afghanistan have weakened the cohesionamong NATO Allies. One independent commentator suggested to the Sub-Committee onNATO Partnerships Members in October 2009 that European militaries have become “de factopeacekeeping forces and have only limited war fighting capabilities”. A former senior US militarycommander bemoaned that a number of mid-level American officers no longer regard their Alliedcomrades as equal and the acronym “ISAF” is now dubbed “I saw Americans Fight”. While thisview is clearly exaggerated, it nonetheless points to a crisis of confidence among NATO forces,which can have a serious negative impact on the Alliance as a whole.8.With approximately 41,500 ISAF troops, in addition to US troops serving independently ofthe Alliance, the US remains by far the most important troop contributor. The UK and Germany,the second and third largest troop providers, account for slightly under 10,000 troops and4,500 troops on the ground, respectively. Moreover, not all troops deployed to Afghanistan havebeen trained for combat operations and most of the troops provided by non-US countries are non-combatant training units.9.More generally, although NATO member nations continue the transformation of their armiesinto leaner, more flexible and more mobile forces, the process of modernising the “static” armies ofthe Cold War is time consuming and still continuing. Budgetary constraints and different politicalpriorities in NATO member nations have also slowed down the process. What is more, someNATO member nations also lack the historic experience of expeditionary forces.10. Indeed, NATO’s greatest and continuing challenge in Afghanistan has been obtainingcommitments — mostly in the form of troops, but also logistics, equipment, and financialcontributions — from the member States. Commitments have all too often been provided in apiecemeal manner.When US President Barack Obama asked the Allies to provide10,000 additional troops to supplement the American troop increase of 30,000 only a few NATOmember countries followed suit, and those who did provided only limited increases.11. In addition to not providing the necessary military forces, NATO nations have also fallenshort on new commitments of troops to train the Afghan army and police force, as well as civilianexperts to help the establishment of fledgling institutions. Efforts to train the Afghan NationalPolice (ANP) have been underfinanced and understaffed. Likewise, the legal system remains veryweak because few capable lawyers and attorneys have been trained. Overall, the development ofa professional judicial system has lagged because of insufficient financial assistance and technicalexpertise. Furthermore, there has been very little progress towards a consensus on how toaddress the growth of poppy production in Afghanistan. NATO Allies could not agree uponwhether or not ISAF forces should play a role in poppy destruction. The ANP, which is responsiblefor destroying poppy fields and opium laboratories, remains riddled with problems. In contrast, thetraining of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been far more successful; however, problemsremain, including drug abuse, a lack of discipline and military know-how and a disregard for theprotection of the population. In addition, there is still a shortage of trainers. According to GeneralWilliam Caldwell, Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, who addressed NATO’sMilitary Committee in late September 2010 approximately 1,000 specialised trainers are neededfor the mission in Afghanistan to be a success.12. It is regrettable that it has taken almost nine years - and several revisions of the Alliance’sstrategy in Afghanistan - before real, tangible progress started to be made. From the outset,

NATO's military footprint had been too small to secure Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistanand the intensity of the current insurgency is the direct consequence of the failure of the US-ledcoalition to seize the opportunity to secure and stabilise Afghanistan after the quick victory overthe Taliban in late 2001. The lack of a firm and shared international commitment to Afghanistan,the limited number of troops on the ground, as well as insufficient financial resources and delays indistributing them left a political vacuum which allowed the Taliban to regroup.13. This early failure can partly be traced back to the Iraq war, which diluted the focus onAfghanistan. The preoccupation with the war in Iraq prevented Afghanistan from receiving theattention and resources that were needed to rebuild the country's infrastructure and society.Failing to take advantage of a sweeping desire among Afghans for help from outside, the US andits Allies deployed only 8,000 troops, primarily US troops, in a combat role in early 2002. Duringthe first 18 months of the intervention, the US-led coalition deployed no peacekeepers outsideKabul, leaving the security of provinces like Helmand to local Afghans.14. In 2003, the Iraq war was the most divisive issue in the NATO Alliance in recent history. Inthe public’s perception at least, the rift among NATO Allies over the war in Iraq threatened toundermine the unity of NATO itself as reflected by former US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’sremark that the 'mission determines the coalition'. On the political level, the Iraq war complicatedpolicy co-ordination among the Allies, as some governments were reluctant to follow theleadership of the Bush Administration. Moreover, the detention policy came under intensecriticism, which was heightened by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The negative impact on thereputation of the US administration increased the general scepticism regarding the rationale forthe “War on Terror”.15. The January 2010 Afghanistan conference in London managed to establish a clear strategyfor operations in Afghanistan. This strategy draws on three main points. The first ismilitarytransition:the US and other Allies and partners have agreed to transfer control of the firstprovinces to Afghan national authorities by the end of 2010, and of the whole country within fiveyears. The Afghan army and police will thus be expanded to reach, respectively, 171,600 and134,000 personnel by October 2011. The second point iscivilian transition,as reflected in theappointment of Mark Sedwill, previously the British Ambassador to Afghanistan, as NATO’s SeniorCivilian Representative. Thecivilian transitionwill draw upon a “civilian surge”, i.e. an increase ofcivilian experts on the ground in Afghanistan who will support governance and economicdevelopment. Thecivilian transitionwill also allow development assistance to be increasinglychannelled through the Afghan government as well. Measures shall be taken to tackle corruption,including the creation of an independent Office of High Oversight and an international Monitoringand Evaluating Mission. The third point isreconciliation and reintegration.Money from aninternational fund will be used to provide former militants, who have renounced violence and given1up links with al Qaeda, with alternative careers and land .16. NATO and its partners are on the right track after the London Conference. It is now crucialto implement the ambitious policies presented in late January 2010. Only then will it be possible topass on leadership to the Afghan people, via military and civilian transition, as well as throughreconciliation and reintegration.

17. NATO's commitment to the Afghanistan operation has been affected by dwindling politicalsupport throughout the member countries.18. In the Netherlands, the government collapsed in February 2010 after the ruling coalitionfailed to reconcile deep divisions within the cabinet that had emerged over the demand to againextend military operations in Afghanistan. While the Dutch pullout from Afghanistan may not havean imminent effect on the commitments of other Allies, it is likely to increase the debate in manycountries about timetables and exit strategies. Although most NATO members have renewed theircurrent commitments to Afghanistan, the medium and long-term commitment is unclear. In somecountries, calls for the withdrawal of troops are becoming louder.19. According to the “Transatlantic Trends” survey, published by the German Marshall Fund(GMF) in September 2010, European countries are less optimistic about the possibility of successin Afghanistan than the US. In the US 51% of the population is optimistic about stabilising thesituation in Afghanistan while only 23% of Europeans feel the same way. Both of thesepercentages are decreasing. US optimism is down by 5% and EU optimism has decreased by 9%since 2009. As the GMF survey revealed, more than half of West Europeans want to see theirtroops being withdrawn from or reduced in Afghanistan with Poland being highest on the scale(77%) and Turkey lowest (with 47%). Support for NATO’s operation in Afghanistan has alsostarted to decrease in the United States where 41% wish their troops to come home or to besubstantially reduced. “Transatlantic Trends” survey also showed that majorities (59%) in11 European countries and the United States (60%) still believe that NATO is essential for theirsecurity. The exception is Turkey, where only 30% believe NATO is essential. Pluralities in boththe US and other NATO countries believe that they should continue to be active in internationalaffairs and they support the Alliance. Sixty-two percent of the 11 European nations would alsosupport a NATO role outside Europe, whereas 32% prefer NATO to focus on Europe itself. In theUS, support is much larger with 77% saying that NATO should act outside Europe, if necessary.However, while the general appreciation of NATO is encouraging, continued public support forNATO cannot be taken for granted. NATO Member governments must better explain NATO’sstrelevancy in the 21 century to their citizens. National and international surveys demonstrateclearly that the public at large, and particularly the post-Cold-War generation, has only a veryvague, if any, knowledge of NATO and its missions. Others question the need to invest in defenceafter the end of the Cold War or view NATO primarily as a protector against Russia. Many peoplehave difficulties relating NATO to the new global security threats (particularly as other actors, suchas the EU, have become engaged in the security field. Structures are complicated and it is difficultfor the layman to understand the differences between, for exemple, the efforts of the EU, NATO,and the UN in Afghanistan.20. It would appear that Allied governments have not explained well enough the compellingnational security reasons to remain in Afghanistan. Many citizens do not believe that Afghanistanposes a direct threat to their security and they therefore increasingly question the rationale forNATO’s military engagement. Also, government narratives have changed over time and differedamong Member countries. Over the last nine years, publics in some NATO countries havebelieved that they are in Afghanistan to fight al Qaeda, others believed that it was to develop orrebuild the country, some believed that it was a stability operation. Some NATO countries viewedengagement in Afghanistan as full combat, and others still believe that it is to institute Westernvalues in the society. Public diplomacy was not made easier when the strategy on the ground -and the role of ISAF – has been continually changing since 2001. Moreover, the swift collapse ofTaliban rule over Afghanistan and the lack of knowledge of the country’s complexities led tooveroptimistic expectations of what can be achieved. Governments, international organisationsand NGOs thought that it was possible to rebuild the country in a relatively short term. As

progress has been piecemeal and the international community’s engagement in Afghanistanexperienced setbacks, criticism of the mission has increased.21. The opposition in NATO member countries also stems in part from budget realities recentlymagnified by the global financial and economic crisis which has had a severe impact on allmember governments’ budgets. The additional costs of the recently expanded operations alsoplay a role in generating resistance against the continuation of the mission. The financial costs ofthe engagement are increasingly questioned, particularly as stories about waste and corruption bythe Afghan government increase. The proliferation of new international actors, including NGOs,corporations, and the arrival of global digital and real-time technologies has made publicdiplomacy more difficult for governments and organisations such as NATO. Governments arecompeting with other information sources; in the digital age, top-down communication patterns areincreasingly being replaced by people-to-people and peer-to-peer relationships and networks.NATO Headquarters in Brussels has responded to the challenge by increasingly using new mediatools, the internet, and social networks, but its resources are very limited.

22.NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is also both a catalyst and a test for NATO'sadaptation to a changing security environment. There is broad agreement that NATO needs to beready to meet today’s security challenges emanating from internationally active terrorist groups,maritime piracy, cyber security and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) andtheir means of delivery. There is also an understanding that NATO needs to address securitychallenges which emanate from outside the Euro-Atlantic region. The Strategic Concept which iscurrently being discussed is expected to address these issues. However, whether NATO will bewilling to engage in future operations like Afghanistan remains uncertain. Some Allies are morecautious about advocating a more global approach for the Alliance. They argue that NATO isalready stretched beyond its capabilities and do not want the Alliance run the risk of becoming a“global intervention force”. Rather than engaging in operations far outside the Euro-Atlantic regionthe Alliance should focus on its core function, that is, providing security and stability in thegeographic Euro-Atlantic region.23. Some argue that only the UN has the mandate to address global security issues and that amore globally active role for NATO would risk deteriorating relations, or even generate newconflicts with other international actors.24. As security is today defined in broader terms that include non-military security issues, NATOAllies agree that there is a need for closer co-operation with other international actors, particularlywith the European Union. Closer co-operation between NATO and the EU is essential fordeveloping a “comprehensive approach” to crisis management and operations, which requires theeffective application of both military and civilian means.25. The European Union is increasingly a credible and relevant actor in crisis management: it isnow engaged in the Balkans as well as in Afghanistan, the South Caucasus and off the Somalicoast to prevent piracy. As well, the EU may use NATO command capabilities under the Berlin2Plus framework. OperationConcordiain the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia andEUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina are both European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) missions that have taken over NATO operations. The success of these missions provethat the Berlin Plus mechanism works well.

26. Nevertheless, there is significant room for enhanced co-operation in these regions. Non-EUNATO member states have criticised the belated engagement of the EU in Afghanistan andquestioned its performance in the country, particularly the work of EUPOL-Afghanistan (the EU’spolice mission, which started in 2007). Although on-the-ground co-ordination between the twoorganisations has improved, as the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia havedemonstrated, there is still no overarching framework that allows for true strategic dialogue andco-operation as such. Countries which are both members of NATO and the EU continue to facethe dilemma of devoting sufficient attention and resources to both organisations.27. What is more, despite the progress in developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) and the new Lisbon Treaty, EU member states differ on some of the most importantforeign and security policy issues, including Russia, energy and Afghanistan. Therefore, theLisbon Treaty, which has introduced some structural and procedural changes within the EU, maynot significantly improve Europe’s ability to act as a coherent player that is able to make full use ofits substantial political, economic and security resources.28. In addition to co-operating more with international organisations, Allies recognise thatpartnerships are an increasingly important part of NATO’s approach to complex challenges inregions on the periphery of Europe and beyond. Therefore, NATO is working with countriesoutside the Euro-Atlantic area through multilayered military-to-military co-operation programmes(i.e. Partnership for Peace - PfP - programme) and to enhance the civilian contribution tointernational security. These formal partnerships have been extended countries from NorthernAfrica and the Middle East (Mediterranean Dialogue - MD) and the Gulf region (IstanbulCo-operation Initiative - ICI). The partnerships comprise a large spectrum of co-operativeactivities that engage partner states in interoperability, security governance, defence reforms,defence education, the fight against small arms and light weapons proliferation as well as a rangeof other activities in the civil-military domain.29. The broadening and deepening of NATO’s partnerships promotes co-operation, confidenceand stability, as well as enlarging the capacities of members and partners to address new securitychallenges. Not all partners aspire to NATO membership, but they often make significantcontributions to NATO missions. Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations are well outside thebounds of the potential enlargement of the Alliance as defined in Article 10 of its Treaty, and arenot involved in NATO’s formal partnership programmes. Formal mechanisms have meanwhilebeen put in place to ensure that their voice is heard in NATO’s political deliberations on operationsin Afghanistan. ISAF meetings, including at Ministerial level, now involve all troop contributingnations. However, NATO should look beyond the operation in Afghanistan and should furtherdevelop its mechanisms for consultation and co-operation with Non-NATO Troop ContributingNations30. Some Allies prefer that NATO’s new tasks should be reflected in its structures, e.g., by theformalisation of its relations with “partners across the globe”, or “contact countries”, such asAustralia and Japan, which make significant contributions to NATO missions. Other Allies,however, are not in favour of engaging in formal partnerships with “contact countries”, amongothers, because they are concerned that NATO could develop into a global security organisation.Some also fear that formal engagements with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area may riskdrawing NATO Allies into possible conflicts outside the Euro-Atlantic region that do not directlyimpinge on the security of the Allies.

31. The Allies must ensure that their armed forces have the capabilities necessary to achievethe Alliance’s objectives in Afghanistan and Kosovo, defend NATO’s territory from bothconventional and non-conventional threats, and continue to ensure that the Article 5 guarantee isan executable deterrent. Despite the emphasis on the need to make Allied forces moreexpeditionary, flexible, and deployable, and despite the targets agreed to by member states,significant shortfalls remain in the capabilities required by the Alliance to fulfil its commitments.32. Allied defence budgets were already constrained before the economic crisis. Over the pastdecade, the average non-US NATO member defence budget was approximately 1.4% of GDP. In2008, only Bulgaria, France, Greece, Turkey, the UK and the US spent over the informal NATOguideline of 2% of their GDP on defence. Some member states use two-thirds of their defencebudgets for personnel costs, leaving only limited resources for the necessary modernisation of themilitary, including the overdue improvements of (strategic) airlift capabilities and moderntelecommunications systems.33. The huge difference in defence spending and the limitations this has put on NATOcapabilities has generated criticism among some Allies. A prime example of continuing difficultiesin force generation is the fate of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a driving engine of NATO’smilitary transformation. The NRF is a highly-ready and technologically advanced force comprisedof land, air, sea and special forces components that the Alliance can quickly deploy whereverneeded. The NRF was originally planned to comprise 30,000 soldiers. However, because NATOAllies did not meet their financial commitments, the NRF had to be rearranged so that it nowconsists of a core element, the Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) consisting of 13,000 militarypersonnel, and a response force pool to which member nations can commit troops on a voluntarybasis. NATO Allies also disagreed on whether the NRF should only be used for high-intensityoperations or whether it could be used for lower-intensity operations as well.34. Frequent pleas, especially from the US, that the Allies spend the recommended 2% of GDPon defence have all too often been ignored. There is a question from the US as to whether theAllies are willing to commit the necessary resources for their common security. From a USperspective, the Allies are falling short of their promises and Europe in particular is seen to bedivided and inward-looking, making only grudging contributions to the common effort. Forexample, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned in early April 2010 that NATO is facing"very serious, long-term, systemic problems" and that “under-funded defence budgets areundermining shared security goals”. In this context, Mr Gates criticised Europe for “demilitarizingtoo much since the end of the Cold War” and commented that European countries have “grownaverse to military force” and have failed to invest in weapons and equipment.35. Defence spending among NATO Allies has been declining over the past decade, and theglobal financial and economic crisis will not allow for much room, if any, to increase defencespending. To the contrary, a number of NATO Allies have already announced further, in somecases drastic, cuts in their defence budgets. This includes some of the larger Allies, like the UK.RUSI, the London-based security think-tank, forecasts a decrease in defence spending in the UKof 10-15% between 2010 and 2016, as recommended by the Institute for Public Policy Research3(IPPR) report on UK defence spending . These trends have already slowed down thetransformation of NATO’s military forces.36. Even when the current economic downturn will be overcome, longer term demographictrends will put pressure on NATO Allies to muster the necessary financial resources, as well as3

military personnel, for the Allies common security. Additional financial resources for militaryprocurement are not likely to be forthcoming as this demographic shift and its financial implicationsintensify. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen considers that ‘managing the effectsof the financial crisis (…) will be one of the defining issues of the next few years for all ourgovernments’. He stressed that ‘we must prioritise on what we really need – in a nutshell, on whatwe can actually deploy, where and when we need it (…) we need to approach this as an Alliance.If we have a coherent approach, we can retain the essential capabilities we need, avoid pointlessiduplication, and buy together what we couldn’t afford individually.’ This means renewed emphasison spending wisely. The global financial and economic crisis and the longer-term demographictrends also constitute an opportunity for restructuring. It will be crucial to eliminate duplication andto create synergies.37. More military spending is not always needed, but a more comprehensive approach includingcivilian components is indispensable. Moreover, burden-sharing between NATO Allies appearseven more relevant in the context of an economic crisis. The current principle applied is that ‘costslie where they fall’, meaning that countries that intervene on the ground bear all costs during theoperations. There has been a lot of discussion on the need to replace the current financingagreement by a more effective, fairer one but no progress has been made thus far. While itappears likely that the text of new Strategic Concept will also mention the issue of commonfinancing, the Allies still need to reach political agreement on it and implement it.

38. The new Strategic Concept is scheduled to be agreed upon at the next NATO Summit inLisbon in November 2010 and is likely to endorse the continuation of NATO’s Open Door policy.Membership is open to any European country able and willing to fulfil the commitments andobligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. There is unanimitythat the prospect of NATO - and EU - membership is particularly significant for promoting stabilityin Europe. Allies share a general view that the realisation of a “Europe whole and free” requiresthe inclusion of – or at least association with - all European countries into Euro-Atlantic structures,namely into NATO and the EU. The NATO accession process typically goes through four mainpre-stages: Partnership for Peace (PfP), Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), IntensifiedDialogue (ID) and Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Bosniaand Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were invited to the Intensified Dialogue stage. As oftoday, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro are part of the MAP. InApril 2010, NATO Foreign Ministers decided that Bosnia and Herzegovina will join the MAP once itachieves the necessary progress in its reform efforts.39. While there is a general agreement on the continuation of NATO’s Open Door policy, Allieshave differed over the accession of individual applicant countries. At present, Georgia,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia arecountries that have applied for membership. However, the lack of consensus amongst the Allieswas evident at the NATO Summit in Bucharest. During the Summit Alliance leaders invitedAlbania and Croatia to join the Alliance, and extended the promise of membership to Georgia andUkraine but could not agree on opening the MAP to these two countries. Separately, the Heads ofState and Government also agreed to invite the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia tobecome a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s nameis reached with Greece. The new Ukrainian government has decided that it will not pursue furtherintegration with NATO, preferring to focus on its immediate foreign relations with the RussianFederation and the EU. On 15 July 2010, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has signed alaw on the fundamental principles of the country's domestic and foreign policy stipulating thecountry's non-aligned status as a basic principle of foreign policy. The document says Ukraine willnot join military and political alliances, but will participate in the improvement and development of a

European system of collective security and will continue constructive co-operation with NATO andother military and political blocks in matters of mutual interest. However, military-to-militaryco-operation between NATO and Ukraine continues on a high level. Serbia, Moldova and Belarushave not indicated the wish to apply for NATO membership in the near future.40. Some NATO and EU member countries currently suffer from “enlargement fatigue” primarilydue to the fact that the inclusion of new Member countries has been more cumbersome,time-consuming and expensive than generally anticipated. Moreover, one of the applicantcountries, Georgia, faces significant domestic challenges which it needs to address before joining.Georgia, which remains one of the front-runners among Partner countries in reforming its military,civilian, and economic systems, is hampered by domestic concerns, including the instability linkedto its inability to successfully address the ‘frozen conflicts’ over Ossetia and Abkhazia. WhileNATO’s Open Door policy remains unchanged, applicant countries need to make progress onmeeting the criteria for future membership. That said, relations with Russia prove to be a mainconcern for some member countries regarding Georgia and Ukraine’s potential NATOmembership.

VII. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA41. Russia is a crucial, if sometimes difficult, partner for the Alliance. There is generalagreement that NATO and Russia share a host of common security concerns, including stability inthe Euro-Atlantic region, the stabilisation of Afghanistan, the prevention of WMD proliferation andtheir means of delivery, terrorism, as well as maritime piracy.42. While there is unanimity that there can be no lasting stability in Europe without Russia, Alliesdiffer with regard to the conduct of NATO policy toward Russia. New NATO Member states, manyof which were once under Soviet rule, and some other Allies have been more vocal in expressingcriticism of Russia’s heavy-handed approach to its immediate neighbours, including interference indomestic issues through economic, political and other means of coercion. These Allies have alsobeen more concerned about Russia’s foreign policy which they perceive as increasingly assertive,and at times provocative. A case in point is the increasing number of reports of Russian aircraftflying across the Barents Sea over to the North Sea and violating NATO Allies’ airspace.43. Further, the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 accentuated some of the differencesamong NATO Allies. All Allies strongly condemned the Russian military incursion as a“disproportionate” response to Tbilisi's attempt to regain control over South Ossetia by militaryforce. NATO members also condemned the decision of the Russian Federation to recognise theindependence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a contravention of fundamental OSCE principlesand United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The Georgia war raised concerns among NATOmember states that a direct military confrontation is still possible in Europe. As a result, NATO’scommitment to the territorial defence of member states received increased attention. Critics innew Member states questioned whether NATO still has the capability to defend against a directmilitary attack. They also suggested that NATO focuses too much on Afghanistan and risksignoring other, more important, tasks, particularly territorial defence.44. Some of the new Member States also felt that after the Georgia conflict, other Memberstates moved too quickly in normalising relations with Moscow. They wondered if other Allies weremore interested in securing their own economic (and energy) benefits from a good bilateralrelation with Russia at the possible expense of the Allies’ shared security and economicwell-being. Most recently, Moscow’s purchase of sophisticated warships from one Ally has beencriticised by other NATO member nations as they fear that it could enable Moscow to mount moreaggressive actions against its neighbour states. New Member states also tend to have morecritical views of Russia’s domestic developments than other Allies. New Allies, particularly those

who are geographically close to Russia, are also more vocal in their criticism of Moscow’sapproach to declare regions surrounding Russia as its “sphere of influence”, thereby diminishingthe sovereignty and the security interests of its immediate neighbours. Due to the US-Russiareset and the prioritisation of NATO-Russia relations under Secretary General RasmussenNATO-Russia relations have improved lately, at least on the rhetorical level. Moscow has alsoshown increased co-operation on Iran and NATO Allies have signalled their willingness to co-operate with Russia on missile defence. Other issues will, however, remain contentious betweenRussia and the Alliance, including the occupation of parts of Georgia proper as well as Moscow’srecognition of the so-called independence of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia. A strong, closer NATO-Russia relationship is of key importance for both sides. TheAllies therefore need to seek further engagement and pragmatic collaboration in areas of commoninterest, whilst reassuring that their security will be defended.

VIII. THE WAY AHEAD45. The new Strategic Concept of the Alliance that is currently being prepared is an importantdocument that will shape NATO’s future policy. Your Rapporteur hopes that the updated conceptwill also reflect the lessons learned from Afghanistan. Afghanistan has taught the Allies, as wellas the international community, some very important lessons. The Alliance has learned that whilethe military aspect is critical to conduct operations successfully, the application of military meansalone is insufficient to solve crisis and conflicts. Engagements like Afghanistan need acomprehensive approach where military, political and civilian as well as economic efforts areco-ordinated. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, NATO needs to work more closely with civilianpartners on the ground and at the political level, and it especially needs to work more closely withthe EU and the UN.

46. NATO and the EU have gradually developed their relationship. There is co-operation inthe field, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, as well as off the Horn of Africa. Moreover, NATO andEU officials meet regularly at different levels to discuss issues of common interest, such asCapabilities (in the NATO-EU Capability Group), terrorism and WMD proliferation. However, thereis little, if any, policy co-ordination between NATO and the EU. Most meetings are a mereexchange of information and produce only marginal results. Co-ordination now largely relies oninformal mechanisms. Informal staff-to-staff dialogue works reasonably well and the informalcontacts should be enhanced as much as possible.47. As long as formal NATO-EU relations are limited to “Berlin-Plus” real progress can onlybe co-ordinated through capitals of NATO and EU member states. Therefore, NATO-EUrelations must be expanded on the political level. The EU and NATO need regular discussions,at all levels, on the entire spectrum of common security interests and not onlyBosnia and Herzegovina as it is the case today. Close co-operation between NATO and theEuropean Union is an important element in the development of an international “ComprehensiveApproach”.48. Eventually, NATO and the EU will need a new security agreement that maps out the areas ofresponsibilities and co-operation. While a new, comprehensive NATO-EU agreement may notbe reached in the short term, both organisations should improve their co-operation with regardto operations. NATO and the EU need to develop a real two-way street. All EU MemberStates should be able to participate in NATO-EU co-operation. The EU should better involvenon-EU Allies in CSDP activities. Therefore, as the NATO Secretary General has suggested, theEU should sign a new security agreement with Turkey which would also include arrangementsbetween Turkey and the European Defence Agency (EDA). To that end, NATO Parliamentarians

should encourage their governments to initiate steps which would allow member states of bothorganisations to make progress in these areas.49. The comprehensive approach requires close co-operation with other organisations involvedin civilian reconstruction. To avoid friction in continuing and future operations, the Allies shouldestablish a small civilian capacity at NATO Headquarters to interface effectively with thesepartners.50. Training is an area, where NATO has a lot to offer and where its capabilities should bestrengthened. A number of joint training centres already exist, such as the Joint Warfare Centre(JWC) in Stavanger (Norway) or the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz (Poland).Expanding NATO’s training capabilities would be cost-effective; expanding joint trainingcapabilities would also help to improve NATO’s relationships with other partners, including theUnited Nations with which it has gradually developed co-operation after the Cold War. There hasbeen close co-operation between the two organisations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but also indisaster response, for example during the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. NATO has become a keypartner for the UN in peacekeeping. Moreover, training of the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF) has become a key element for the stabilisation of the country. Afghanistan hasdemonstrated that training is crucial. The sooner local forces can provide security, the higher thechances of stabilisation will be successful and the earlier NATO Allies and partners candisengage. Training needs to be included from the beginning – but the NATO training efforts inAfghanistan only begun in 2008. The NATO Secretary General has recently expressed the hopeiithat the Alliance will set up a “standing training capacity” . Your Rapporteur fully supports such adevelopment.51. The comprehensive approach requires close co-operation with other organisations involvedin civilian reconstruction. To avoid friction in continuing and future operations, the Allies shouldestablish a small civilian capacity at NATO Headquarters to interface effectively with thesepartners.52. The Strategic Concept should send out a clear vision for Allies to guide the reform of theirarmed forces to make them more effective and more deployable. The issue of a fair sharing of theburdens has been a continuous issue among the Allies in the past and is likely to remain one inthe future. The global financial and economic crisis has the potential to exacerbate existingdifferences and slow down the transformation of NATO’s military forces. To achieve moreefficiency in defence spending requires improved co-operation among Allies and particularlybetween NATO and the EU. By reducing duplication and improving transparency bothorganisations, and their member states, will be better able to address shortfalls in a co-ordinatedmanner. As a concrete measure, NATO and the EU should co-ordinate their capabilitydevelopment processes. While significant differences of the defence planning processes ofNATO and the EU may limit possible gains, there are certain steps that can be undertaken tonarrow the gap. For a start, co-ordination between NATO’s Allied Command Transformation(ACT) and the EU’s European Defence Agency (EDA) could be improved. ACT has begun todevelop an informal relationship with the EDA, but the dialogue is limited.53. Moreover, the Allies should strive to make improvements in transatlantic defence industrialco-operation. To this end, it will be necessary to reform existing export control regimes. Providinggreater transparency can often be the first step towards an open market. EDA is a welcomedevelopment which can also have a positive effect on the Alliance. The financial constraintsthat NATO Member states are experiencing can produce political impetus for more co-operationon the defence markets.54. Another way to strengthen Allied capability is increased pooling of capabilities. Poolingprovides an organisational and legal framework to organise training, maintenance, logistics but

also the operation of the aircrafts, in a more efficient and effective way. The current MultinationalStrategic Airlift Capability (SAC) and Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) serve as usefulexamples for this type of co-operation. Another example for pooling among NATO member statescould be a creation of multinational helicopter wing. There may also be room for possibleco-operation with the EU, which has recently established a European Air Transport Command andis planning to create a European Air Transport Fleet.55. The update of the Strategic Concept will not change the fundamentals of the Alliance andthe commitment to collective defence is the most powerful signal of solidarity among NATOmember states.Another fundamental is NATO’s consultation process: maintaining thetransatlantic security dialogue and joint decision making remain essential. This applies toparticularly to Afghanistan, which has put Alliance cohesion to the test. It is unclear, how thesituation will develop; there has been progress, but there are also increasing calls for an end to themission in Afghanistan. US President Obama has announced another policy review at the end ofthe year. NATO Allies share a general view that the slow, conditions-based, phasing out of USand Allied troops from Afghanistan can begin in mid-2011. It is unclear, however, against whichbenchmarks, or criteria, “success” will be measured. The Allies must make clear that they have along-term interest in the region. Therefore, NATO Allies should continue, and where possible,strengthen their commitments to Pakistan. Moreover, the Allies need to pursue a consistent policyand co-ordinate their activities towards Afghanistan as well as towards Pakistan.

56. This report has addressed topics that have tested the Alliance over the last years. WhileAlliance cohesion has meanwhile improved, reviewing these issues is a necessary and importantstep towards enabling the Alliance to meet future security challenges and avoid costly repetitionsof past mistakes57. Taking stock of NATO’s policies and engagements is also necessary as Alliance cohesion islikely to be tested again in the future. In particular, some of the previously contested issues mayreappear on NATO’s agenda in a different context. In Afghanistan, the international community isnow more “in sync” and the training of ANSF forces is making progress. However, though thefocus is now strongly on building up Afghan institutions and capabilities it is obvious that neitherthe government in Kabul nor the ANSF will be able to provide the level of security that is necessaryfor the stabilisation of the country. Will the Allies and the international community providesufficient military and non-military assistance until the Afghans can take over? As some Allies planto substitute their military engagement by non-military assistance, will Afghans gradually be able tofill the gap and, if not, will other Allies step in? The question of securing non-military assistanceneeds to be discussed. Moreover, even though there is agreement for the need of a politicalsolution, there are conflicting, if not contradictory, views on whether and how to negotiate withTaliban forces. Finally, corruption remains a serious challenge; Transparency International’s 2010Corruption Perception Index identifies Afghanistan the third country perceived to be most corrupt(176 out of 178 countries). Will Allies – and their publics – be willing to continue footing the bill forbuilding up government structures that do not meet our standards?58 In addition, the economic and financial crisis will put additional strain on the Allies. Thereport suggests that closer NATO-EU co-operation is absolutely necessary to avoid duplication. Itis, however, unclear at this point if the two organisations and their Member states will be able toovercome the continuing political impasse. Moreover, the emergence of new powers will alsohave an impact on global and regional security issues. It would be in the interest of all Allies toco-ordinate their policies so that these new global players can proactively engage in meetingtoday’s and tomorrow’s security challenges. It is likely to take considerable time and effort for theAllies to co-ordinate their policies towards these emerging powers.

59. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has successfully adapted to a constantly changingsecurity environment. The Alliance has been crucial in consolidating peace and democracy acrossEurope and in managing crises both in the Balkans and “out-of-area”. The new Strategic Conceptwill be an important document that will give a clear view of NATO’s future evolution. However, it isimportant to note that the cohesion among Allies will eventually depend on the political will ofMember states to co-ordinate their security policies through NATO and on their ability to ensurethat the resources match NATO missions. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly can make ameaningful contribution to help prepare the Alliance for a constantly changing securityenvironment. It plays a significant role in linking NATO with the public and in bringing itsexperience into national parliamentary debates. NATO and the NATO PA should thereforecontinue to deepen their co-operation to better communicate with the general public to enhancetheir understanding of the Alliance’s policies and missions.