NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2010-11 (1. samling)
NPA Alm.del Bilag 5
Offentligt
POLITICAL220 PCNP 10 E rev. 1Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
SUB-COMMITTEE ONNATO PARTNERSHIPS
NATO AND CONTACT COUNTRIES
REPORT
JOSELUISARNAUT (PORTUGAL)RAPPORTEUR AD INTERIM
International Secretariat
13 November 2010
Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS ..........................................................1
II. ORIGINS AND FRAMEWORK OF GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP ......................................1III. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATO AND ITS CONTACT COUNTRIES 2A. THE AUSTRALIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP ...........................................................3B. THE JAPAN-NATO RELATIONSHIP....................................................................4C. THE NEW ZEALAND-NATO RELATIONSHIP .....................................................5D. THE SOUTH KOREA-NATO RELATIONSHIP .....................................................6IV. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................7
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1.Partnerships, initiated after the end of the Cold War, are a key element of the transformationof the Alliance. NATO co-operation with partner countries, especially with countries outside theEuro-Atlantic area, reflects the transition of the Alliance in the last decades. Although territorialdefence of the Euro-Atlantic member countries remains the primary task of NATO, the Alliance isalso able to project security and stability beyond its borders. The Sub-Committee on NATOPartnerships has already addressed the formalised relations with non-member countries in thepast. This short paper focuses NATO’s evolving links with Contact Countries or Partners acrossthe Globe. The report concentrates on four countries, which have so far made the most significantcontributions to NATO operations: Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.
I.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS
2.Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has developed formalised arrangements withcountries that do not aspire membership but want to work with NATO. The most relevant in thiscontext are the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), theMediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI). In addition, theAlliance also co-operates with countries which do not participate in these formal structures. ThesePartners across the Globe or Contact Countries have no uniform level of involvement with theAlliance, but share similar strategic interests and values.3.Partnerships are among the greatest success stories of the Alliance and reflect its transitionfrom an organisation founded for the territorial defence of its member countries to a highly flexiblesecurity organisation able to project security and stability beyond its borders in order to face thestglobal threats of the 21 century.4.Many of today’s security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, international terrorism,failed states, cybercrime or maritime piracy are no longer confined to the Euro-Atlantic region butare global in nature. In response to new security challenges, NATO has significantly beenextending both its geographical reach and range of operations. NATO militaries are deployed inAfghanistan, off the Horn of Africa, in the Mediterranean, in Iraq, Sudan, Congo and other parts ofthe world.5.While NATO remains the world’s most successful and most powerful security organisation, itcannot successfully address these threats alone. NATO forces are already stretched to the limitsand the global financial and economic crisis does not allow for an increase of their capabilities.Moreover, both the NATO PA’s Proposals for a New Strategic Concept and the Analysis andRecommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, presented thisspring, highlighted the notion that building security requires political, economic, and socialdimensions in addition to military force. As primarily a military and political organization, NATOmust collaborate with a mix of partners to ensure comprehensive security through economicreconstruction, political reconciliation, improved governance, and the strengthening of civil society.Security, therefore, can only be achieved through close co-operation with countries that share thesame goals, face the same challenges, and possess significant military support capabilities.
II.
ORIGINS AND FRAMEWORK OF GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
6.The Alliance has gradually developed co-operation with countries that are not formal partnercountries since the early 1990s. Reflecting their willingness to increase co-operation, the Alliesestablished a set of general guidelines on relations with Contact Countries in 1998, though thesedid not translate into a formal institutionalisation of relations.
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7.Co-operation in Afghanistan has been the key driver for the rapid development of NATO’srelationships with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region in the last few years. ContactCountries like Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea (ROK – South Korea) and Singaporeare now troop contributors to the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan.By far the most numerically significant contributions are made by Australia. New Zealand, for itspart, leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamiyan province. South Korea hascontributed medical and engineering support to the PRT of Parwan province. Japan has been amajor donor nation, both in Afghanistan and in the Balkans.8.NATO Summit declarations have included broad recognition of the value of the contributionsof non-member countries. The 2004 Istanbul Summit welcomed continued Partner participation inoperations and Allies declared that they would “seek the earliest possible involvement by troopcontributing nations in the decision-shaping process”.9.The 2006 Riga Summit devoted special attention on partnerships and advanced NATO’srelations with interested Contact Countries. On the practical level, the Allies agreed to increasethe operational relevance of NATO’s co-operation with both its formal partners and other partnersacross the globe. In this context, the Allies decided to open participation in NATO’s activities withPfP, ICI and MD countries to interested Contact Countries. The Summit also reaffirmed theAlliance’s intent to “call ad hoc meetings as events arise with those countries who contribute to orsupport our operations and missions politically, militarily and in other ways and those who arepotential contributors, considering their interest in specific regions where NATO is engaged. Thiswill be done using flexible formats for consultation meetings of Allies with one or more interestedpartners (...) and/or interested Contact Countries, based on the principles of inclusiveness,transparency and self-differentiation”.10. These steps were reinforced by decisions at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which defined aset of objectives for these relationships and created avenues for enhanced political dialogue.Annual work programmes - Individual Tailored Co-operation Packages of Activities (TCPA) - werefurther established. These encompass a range of activities such as joint exercises and operations,language training and advice, and information exchange. Co-operation with Contact Countriesshould be mutually beneficial and reciprocal and individual Contact Country can choose its level ofengagement with NATO according to its interests. Generally speaking, the participation of ContactCountries in Alliance operations follows formal approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Oncetheir participation is approved, it is subject to financial and technical agreements, worked outbetween each troop-contributing country and NATO, after the proposed contributions to suchoperations have been assessed. The Contact Country remains responsible for the deployment ofits contingents and for providing the support needed to enable them to function effectively. It isoften the case that an individual NATO country will offer its support to assist in the deployment.11. The participation of Partners in NATO-led operations is guided by the Political-MilitaryFramework (PMF), which has been developed for NATO-led PfP operations. The PMF allowscontributing Partners to participate in the decision-making process as well as in planning and forcegeneration processes which are taking place through the International Coordination Centre atSupreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and, when appropriate, throughthe temporary liaison arrangements with the strategic commands.
III.
BILATERALCOUNTRIES
RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN
NATO
AND
ITS
CONTACT
12. NATO Contact Countries feature a range of countries across the globe, including, forexample, Argentina and Chile which have worked alongside NATO Allies in ensuring security inthe Balkans. The report looks more closely at the four nations among the Contact Countries,
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which are making significant contributions to NATO operations and policies: Australia, Japan, NewZealand, and the Republic of Korea. Each country has a different set of motivations regarding theestablishing and developing of its relationship with the Alliance. Those countries contributing toNATO-led operations may also want to improve their operational experience for their troopsserving alongside Allied forces. Others, like Japan and the ROK, are interested in using NATO asan additional venue to raise international, particularly European, awareness of the Asian securitysituation. Contact Countries are also interested in benefiting from NATO’s expertise in areas suchas interoperability, standardisation, joint procurement, research and development, multilateralplanning and defence planning. This is especially the case for countries in the Asia-Pacific region,where multilateral security co-operation is largely undeveloped if not totally absent. Practicalco-operation with NATO through, for example, participation in NATO exercise and seminars,allows Contact Countries to familiarise themselves with multilateral ways of planning andoperations.13. However, countries seeking co-operation with NATO also share a number of similarities.Generally speaking, Contact Countries seek the same goals as NATO, such as stability in theBalkans or in Afghanistan, the fight against internationally active terrorist groups, the prevention ofthe proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. ContactCountries consider collaboration with NATO as the best means to contribute to the achievement ofthose goals. From the outside world NATO is seen as an influential security actor and ContactCountries like Japan see NATO as an important new political partner.
A.
THE AUSTRALIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP
14. Largely through bilateral engagement activities with member states, especially the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia has had contact with NATO for many years.The Australian Defence Forces have thus been exposed to NATO doctrine and operatingprocedures, publications and standardisation agreements, and various NATO working groups andtechnical bodies. Over the past decade, NATO and Australia have developed meaningful practicalco-operation, complemented by political dialogue in a large number of areas. This co-operationhas significantly increased following September 11, 2001. The strengthened co-operation withNATO has been reflected by numerous official visits and consultations, including also the first visitof a NATO Secretary General to Australia in 2005.15. Increased co-operation was also followed by concrete institutional steps. NATO andAustralia reached an agreement for the sharing of classified information in April 2005, and anAustralian Defence Adviser to NATO and the EU was posted in Brussels in September of thatyear. At the same time, NATO and Australia established a terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit tofacilitate the exchange of information and assessments on counter-terrorism. Australia has beenthe most vocal Contact Country demanding more information-sharing and more involvement inpolicy-shaping and eventually decision-making. Initial difficulties concerning information-sharingare meanwhile overcome, after Australia and NATO agreed on a deal on the exchange of secretmilitary information in March 2008.16. The relationship between NATO and Australia has deepened significantly in the last severalyears, primarily as a result of co-operation in Afghanistan. Australia is the biggest non-NATOthcontributor to ISAF and the 9 largest military contributor overall – including Allies. The initialcontribution of 240 troops had steadily increased to close around 1,550 Australian Defence Forcepersonnel, including an Australian Federal Police training team (which is deployed in the country).Ministerial (mainly Defence Ministers’) meetings in the ISAF format have become a regular eventand working-level meetings among troop contributors, for example within the PCG (PolicyCoordination Group) framework, serve as the venues for more substantial consultation.
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17. The focus of the Australian commitment is in the Oruzgan province, providing assistance in amultinational effort to train an Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade and serving in a volatile areawithout caveats. Australia also has deployed Chinook helicopters, a Special Forces Task Group, aRadar Control and Reporting Unit in theatre as well as a number of staff officers attached to theHeadquarters in Kabul and Kandahar. In June 2010, however, Australia announced that it wouldcomplete its core mission in Afghanistan and begin to pull out troops within the next two to fouryears. Nevertheless, with its contribution of €150 million Australia is the largest contributor to theANA Trust Fund and has also made a contribution to the UK-France Helicopter Trust Fund, whichendeavours to provide means to upgrade otherwise unsuitable helicopters for deployment toAfghanistan. What is more, since 2001, Australia’s Foreign Assistance Programme has providedmore than 580 million Australian dollars to Afghanistan.18. In addition to hosting US military bases and deploying forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,Australia has joined the American worldwide interceptor missile system and it has significantlycontributed to NATO-led stabilisation operations in the former Yugoslavia.19. When the Defence and Security Committee visited Australia in September 2009, seniorofficials from the Ministries of Defence and of Foreign Affairs and Trade emphasised that Australiaand NATO share many common concerns, including Afghanistan, international terrorism, theproliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and piracy. In October 2010, Australian PrimeMinister Julia Eileen Gillard visited NATO Headquarters and discussed Afghanistan as well as thefuture relationship between Australia and the Alliance. The Prime Minister said that “Australiawould be looking towards having the ability to engage with NATO in a flexible way over time, andthis is being debated through and discussed in the NATO Strategic Concept.”
B.
THE JAPAN-NATO RELATIONSHIP
20. Unlike NATO’s relationships with Australia and New Zealand, where operational co-operationhas been the main pillar of relations, those between NATO and Japan are primarily driven throughpolitical dialogue. The NATO-Japan relationship has developed progressively since the early 90sand has further strengthened in the aftermath of NATO-Japan Security Conferences. NATOmember countries and Japan regularly hold ministerial and sub-ministerial talks on a wide range ofissues of mutual concern. These increasing political dialogues are also followed by practicalco-operation, which focuses on various areas of common interest, including civil emergencyplanning, terrorism, non-proliferation and crisis management, as well as military-to-militaryexchanges. At the same time, security-related collaboration between individual NATO countriesand Japan has become more concrete since 9/11, particularly in the fight against terrorist groups.21. Japan’s ability to contribute militarily to NATO operations is limited largely due to theJapanese Constitution, which only allows for the defence of its own territory. Despite theconstitutional restrictions, Japanese troops have worked with NATO member countries in variouspeace-support operations. For example, during the 90s, Japan made a meaningful contribution tostabilising the Balkans. Between December 2001 and January 2010, Japanese naval vesselsoperated in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, providing fuel and water to ships fightingagainst terrorists. Moreover, as part of the international coalition effort, Japanese ground troopswere stationed in Southern Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction missions betweenJanuary 2004 and September 2006. The Japanese Armed Forces have sent observers tonumerous Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) exercises organised by NATO member countries.Moreover, Japan participates in a range of NATO PfP Trust Fund projects, namely in Afghanistan,Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan. As Australia, Japan has also contributed to UK-FranceHelicopter Trust Fund.
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22. Japanese involvement in security-oriented operations in Afghanistan has included work in:the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former Afghan military combatants; indisbanding illegally armed groups; and in supporting a Law and Order Trust Fund. In addition, theJapanese government has committed two billion yen (approximately 22 million US$) towardshumanitarian and reconstruction projects through the NATO system of PRTs. Moreover, Japan’searlier participation in the refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean has also greatly facilitatedNATO’s role in assisting in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan.23. The contributions of Japanese troops and increasing political dialogue reflect thestrengthening of relations with NATO over the last few years. During the visit to Japan by theEconomics and Security’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations in June 2007,Japanese officials expressed their interest in forming a deeper security co-operation with NATOand its member governments and a willingness to contribute actively to international peacekeepingoperations. Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited NATO HQ in January 2007 and expressedJapan's interest in building a stronger partnership with NATO, both politically and in practicalterms. The Prime Minister announced that Japan would further strengthen its support inAfghanistan by directly supporting NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for example in theareas of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the changing security environment in Northeast Asiais likely to put improvements of Japan’s interoperability with international peacekeeping forceshigher on the agenda of the evolving dialogue between Japan and NATO. Recent domesticpolitical upheaval, which began in mid-2009 and continued through 2010, may result in areassessment of Japan's security policyvis-à-visthe United States as well asvis-à-visNATO. InJanuary 2010 Japan officially ended its naval refuelling mission that supported coalition shipsmobilised in the war in Afghanistan since 2001. Tokyo pledged instead to step up reconstructionaid to the country to five billion dollars over the next five years. In addition, Japan pledged11.5 million US dollars to the ANA Trust fund. However, mutual interests, such as counteringNorth Korean threats and blocking nuclear proliferation, will ensure continued dialogue. As theSub-Committee on NATO Partnerships learned during a visit in mid-October 2010, Japan plans toassist in the training of Afghan National Police. Moreover, senior Japanese officials informed thedelegation that Tokyo is interested in exploring additional areas of co-operation between Japanand the Alliance in the future.
C.
THE NEW ZEALAND-NATO RELATIONSHIP
24. NATO and New Zealand (NZ) have had regular interactions since 2001, following the 9/11attacks in the US. However, the main driver for the developing partnership has been NewZealand’s contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan. As for Australia, New Zealand’s troop deployment toAfghanistan was initially conducted within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) inclose bilateral co-operation with the US. As a result of the geographical expansion of ISAF in late2006, the NZ troops stationed in Bamiyan province moved from OEF command to ISAF.25. The country’s commitment is the 71 elite Special Air Service (SAS) troops and about140 defence force personnel who are currently running a PRT in Bamiyan province. Overall, NewZealand has currently deployed 220 personnel in Afghanistan, though its contribution is expectedto gradually wind down, as Prime Minister John Key informed NATO Secretary General inSeptember 2009 that New Zealand troops will be out of Afghanistan in three to five years. Thecountry contributed to NATO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the successor EU-led force,EUFOR, until 2007.26. On the political-diplomatic level, dialogue and high-level visits have significantly increasedbetween New Zealand and NATO over the past few years. Former Prime Minister Helen Clarkstarted visiting NATO Headquarters on a regular basis, and the Foreign Minister Phil Goff met thethen-Secretary General Lord Robertson in September 2001, and again in November 2003. The
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first official visit by a NATO Secretary General to New Zealand took place in March 2005 andreaffirmed NATO’s willingness to develop closer co-operation given the shared common values ofdemocracy, freedom and basic human rights.27. In line with the increasing co-operation, on 3 February 2006, New Zealand and NATO signedan agreement on the protection of classified information. This agreement permits the exchange ofclassified operational information on a regular basis and not only on an ad hoc basis. In addition,other practical co-operation is being pursued through the annual Individual Tailored Co-operationPackage (TCP). New Zealand also participates in a number of technical activities, primarilyfocused on areas related to peace-support operations, as well as through targeted aid assistanceand diplomatic support for international negotiations.
D.
THE SOUTH KOREA-NATO RELATIONSHIP
28. The relationship being forged between the Republic of Korea (ROK – South Korea) andNATO is a rather recent development. Contacts were initially exchanged in 2005, when thenSouth Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon addressed the NAC, and have since evolved throughregular high-level talks. As with other Contact Countries, NATO established a TCP annualprogramme with South Korea. This provides the basis for practical co-operation, with a primaryfocus on areas related to peace-support operations.29. The Republic of Korea participates in NATO’s operations, and is currently contributing tostabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. The country led the PRT in Parwan province, where medicaland engineering units were dispatched in 2002 but were pulled out completely in 2007, after theTaliban killed two Korean church workers from a group they had taken hostage. However, thoughthe military forces have been withdrawn, a presence of medical personnel and engineers has beenmaintained. In July 2010, a contingent of approximately 320 has again deployed in the Parwanprovince as part of a ROK PRT. The group is scheduled to comprise 50-70 civilians, 30-50 policeofficers, and 200-400 infantry troops. The primary task of the soldiers will be to protect civilian aidworkers in the Parwan province. The police officers will help train Afghan police. This deploymentrepresents a welcome change in the ROK’s policy and a strong signal of its willingness to co-operate with NATO. Moreover, the ROK is working together with NATO, the Coalition MaritimeForce, EU and other individual nations to patrol the pirate-infested waters of the Gulf of Aden.30. The Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships visited South Korea in October 2008 to discussissues of common concern. Senior officials, including Deputy Defence Minister Kim Jeong-cheon,told the delegation that the ROK is very interested in co-operating with NATO in a number ofareas. Kim Jeong-cheon agreed that international co-operation was increasingly necessary todeal with issues like WMD proliferation, terrorism, piracy. The ROK is particularly interested incombating piracy off the coast of Somalia. This is of particular concern to the country, as SouthththndKorea is the 10 largest consumer of energy, the 4 largest oil importer and the 2 largest naturalgas and coal importer in the world. Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said that the ROK was fullyprepared to work with NATO on WMD proliferation. Though the ROK has, in terms of numbers,ththe 6 largest military in the world, its contribution to international operations (under UNCommand) has been limited. However, the country is slowly developing an increasingly globalstrategic perspective which, over time, will lead to a greater and more active international role.
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IV.
CONCLUSIONS
31. As NATO is increasingly engaged outside its original area, co-operation with ContactCountries is becoming ever more important. NATO’s partnership with Contact Countries enlargesthe capacities of members and partners to address new security challenges.ContactCountries’ contributions are increasingly valuable and critical to the success of ongoing NATOoperations. They have an important input into planning, and issues like interoperability andinformation-sharing.32. NATO should further develop its relations with Contact Countries. With regard to ISAF,consultation and co-operation have considerably improved and ISAF meetings now regularly bringtogether Allies with Contact Countries that contribute to the operations in Afghanistan as well aswith the other Non-NATO Troop Contribution Nations (NNTCNs). On the operational level,maritime anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa appear to offer a good potential for closerco-operation between NATO and Contact Countries. Moreover, it would be desirable if NATO andContact Countries would develop their political dialogue, particularly regarding WMD proliferationand terrorism.33. Co-operation with the Alliance differs among Contact Countries with regard to both themanners and the depth of their engagement. Some want to co-operate militarily, while othersfinancially or perhaps diplomatically. Moreover, there is no agreement among the Allies to developthe informal relations with Contact Countries into a more formal concept of a “Global Partnership”.In addition, despite occasional concerns regarding their input in planning operations andinformation-sharing, Contact Countries appear generally satisfied with their current status, in whichthey enjoy a flexible, pragmatic relationship with the Alliance based on mutual interests, and do notseek for now a more formal relationship. A flexible and close co-operation based on a bilateralbasis of regular consultations, joint transformation programmes and exercises appear to be thebest option to enhance co-operation in the short-term. The update of the Strategic Concept canprovide an impetus for the further deepening of relations between the Alliance and ContactCountries. Highlighting the importance of partnerships, the report of the Group of Expertsrecommended “enhancing the scope and management of partnerships” to NATO’s core pillars.The report also proposed deepening partnerships with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic regionby expanding the list of shared activities while preserving the ability of individual partners to formtailored co-operative relationships with the Alliance.34. By deepening inter-parliamentary dialogue with Contact Countries’ Parliaments, the NATOParliamentary Assembly can make a significant contribution to the further development ofNATO’s relations with Contact Countries. The Assembly, and particularly the Sub-Committee onNATO Partnerships, visited a number of Contact Countries in the past. By engaging withParliaments on a regular basis, the Assembly can help intensify the relationship between thesecountries and NATO. The opportunity for parliamentary exchanges during visits as well as duringNATO PA annual sessions provide a general framework for a continued dialogue on sharedsecurity issues. Moreover, the activities of the Assembly add to the transparency of the Allianceand strengthen NATO’s public policy efforts.