TABLE OF CONTENTSI.II.NATO-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP: QUO VADIS? ................................................................... 1CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR SECURITY ............................................... 3A. TOWARDS GLOBAL ZERO ......................................................................................... 3B. THE DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES.............................................................................. 41.The New START ................................................................................................. 42.Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-Off ....Treaty (FMCT)..................................................................................................... 5C. THE NON-PROLIFERATION AGENDA........................................................................ 61.Strengthening the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ......... 62.Other Initiatives to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism ..................................................... 83.Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions................................................................ 10INTERNATIONAL BAN ON BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS........................... 12EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ...................... 13A. THE KEY FEATURES OF THE MISSILE DEFENCE PROPOSAL ............................. 14B. MISSILE DEFENCE AND NATO COHESION ............................................................ 16C. ENGAGING RUSSIA .................................................................................................. 17D. ADDRESSING MISSILE PROLIFERATION ............................................................... 18

1.Genuine partnership between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia remains vital toglobal security. Although the global political landscape no longer revolves around twosuperpowers, Russia still owns roughly half of the world’s nuclear weapons, it has a permanentseat at the UN Security Council, it is a major supplier of hydrocarbons and it remains a criticalactor in several regions of the Eurasian continent. However, the durable framework for strategicdialogue with Russia has yet to be found: the relationships with Russia remains a roller-coasterride which veers from occasional rapprochements to periods of tension. The current thaw inrelations presents a unique window of opportunity to forge a robust long-term partnership betweenRussia and the Western countries.2.Without ignoring the difficulties involved, this report offers an approach which is bothpragmatic and based on a long-term vision. Non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemicalweapons is the area in which the US/NATO and USSR/Russia have a long history of productiveco-operation. Russia and the Western countries are engaged in several WMD (Weapons of MassDestruction) disarmament initiatives; they are also both concerned about the potential threat posedby ambiguous nuclear programmes in countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Rapporteur believes that the notion of“Global Zero” provides a sound basis for a strategic partnership with Russia; it provides a meansof making collective non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Additionally, the role of missiledefences is crucial to our efforts to establish a world free of nuclear weapons, and Russia’scontribution in this area is instrumental. The Rapporteur fully supports the proposal of the NATOSecretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to move missile defence to the centre of theAlliance’s agenda.3.In particular, The Rapporteur wishes to suggest the following:The US/NATO-Russian partnership must be based on concrete and provenco-operation patterns. Rather than discussing elusive grand projects such as the “newEuropean security architecture”, the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia shouldco-operate on a very practical level and collectively aim to reduce global nuclear/WMDthreats. At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO leaders identified the spread of WMD and thepossible acquisition of WMD by terrorists as the principal threats facing the Allianceover the next 10-15 years.The long-term vision of a nuclear-weapon free (or, even more ambitiously, WMD-free)world could become the underlying premise of this co-operation framework. Howeverunfeasible it might be in the coming decades, the notion of Global Zero would give asense of direction for joint disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives.Moving closer to Global Zero would require adequate progress in two other areas:1) strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime (to prevent the emergenceof new nuclear weapon states); and 2) the development of missile defence systems asa last line of defence against breaches of the non-proliferation regime.In terms of non-proliferation, co-operation with the Russian Federation is criticallyimportant in order to: 1) strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (byuniversalizing the Additional Protocol; making it more difficult to withdraw from theTreaty; adopting clear rules to deal with violators and addressing the issue of dual-usetechnology); 2) deal with the Iranian nuclear challenge (first through dialogue andjointly presented alternative options and incentive packages, and then by agreeing oneffective sanctions if the incentives are rejected); and 3) to reinforce othernon-proliferation mechanisms (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and missilecontrol regimes, including the universalisation of the INF (Intermediate-Range nuclearForces) Treaty).

In terms of missile defence (MD), the US and NATO plans to install a MD system inEurope should not be regarded by Russia as a zero-sum game. The proposed systemdoes not pose any threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability. Instead, it couldprovide a basis for mutually beneficial co-operation between the Western countriesand Russia. A formula needs to be found to ensure that Russia has a voice, but not aveto, in a new MD architecture. As renowned security expert Mark Fitzpatrick put it: “Inthe long term, the availability of missile defences to defend against roguenuclear-armed states may become an important element in the strategy for realisingthe dream of a secure, nuclear weapons-free world, which Obama and Russian1President Dmitry Medvedev, among many other leaders, have set as national goals.”If nuclear and missile non-proliferation measures are sufficiently robust and effective,these MD systems could remain limited.This co-operation framework, if successfully implemented, could provide the basis forfurther rapprochement between the Euro-Atlantic Community and Russia, thusaugmenting mutual trust and enhancing dialogue in other more sensitive areas.

4.It is evident that the existing co-operation framework needs to be revisited. The Rapporteursees this report as a means of encouraging comprehensive discussion on the relations betweenthe Euro-Atlantic community and Russia. While this report focuses on nuclear, chemical andbiological non-proliferation and missile defence as possible cornerstones of the new framework,the Committee should also analyse the potential for co-operation with Russia on issues such asenergy security, the High North, climate change and other environmental challenges.5.It is essential that while discussing relations with Russia, NATO Allies take a pro-active andcreative approach. The fundamental roadblocks that hinder their co-operation need to be identifiedand we must think outside the box while addressing the following questions:What is the role of Russia in the contemporary world, and is Russia’s engagementcrucial to achieving NATO’s own objectives?How far can the Allies go in their relations with Russia?How would NATO react if Russia officially applied for membership of the Alliance? (AsSecretary Hillary Clinton said when asked about Russian membership of NATO, “I canimagine it. I’m not sure the Russians can imagine it.”)Should NATO circumvent sensitive issues or confront them?Is the existing format for NATO-Russia co-operation (the NATO-Russia Council)adequate?Is the bilateral format most suitable, or should more actors be involved?Can the Allies agree with Russia on common threat assessments and on the exactagenda of their partnership?6.An honest discussion of these issues is particularly relevant as the Alliance prepares its newStrategic Concept.7.The following chapters of this report are intended as a background to the discussion outlinedabove.8.The Rapporteur also wishes to praise the efforts of his predecessor and the currentChairman of the NATO PA Science and Technology Committee, Michael Mates, for his work in thearea of WMD proliferation and missile defence. In particular, Mr. Mates’ reports on these subjectshave provided an outstanding overview of the situation and offer precise and valuable policyrecommendations for current policy-makers.1

9.In January 2007, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunnpublished their vision of a world without nuclear weapons. They also offered concrete steps onhow to realize that vision. In his famous Prague speech in 2009, President Obama embraced the2vision of Global Zero and pledged to: 1) negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START), 2) strengthen the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 3) deemphasize the role of nuclearweapons in pending the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 4) push for ratification of theComprehensive Nuclear test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the US Senate, and 5) aim to negotiate aFissile Material Cut-Off Threat Treaty (FMCT).10. The progress the Global Zero concept is making and the attention it is getting is due, in part,to the constructive atmosphere that currently exists between Washington and Moscow. A jointstatement by President Obama and President Medvedev in April 2009 highlights this positivedevelopment. Both Heads of State made a common commitment to a world free of nuclearweapons and announced a framework agreement for new reductions in their nuclear arsenals.President Medvedev also unambiguously stated his country’s commitment to nuclear disarmamentand non-proliferation when he declared: “Today our common task consists in undertaking [every3effort] . . . to make deadly weapons of mass destruction . . . a thing of the past.” The Americanand Russian reciprocal commitments indicate that, although the ultimate goal is not attainable inthe foreseeable future, both nations are committed to the basic principle of step by step totaldenuclearisation.11. Critics point out that while verbally embracing the Global Zero option, both nations continueto invest in nuclear weapons and delivery systems. President Medvedev declared in early 2010that Russian forces would receive upwards of 30 ballistic land- and sea-based missiles, and threenuclear submarines. This decision mirrors Medvedev’s conviction that maintaining the country’s4nuclear arsenal is crucial to its independence and sovereignty . At the same time, although the USdoes not intend to acquire new nuclear devices, it is extending the service lives of existingwarheads through the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Rapporteur wishes to underline,however, that there is no inconsistency between support for the long-term vision and support fornear-term steps to maintain and sustain smaller nuclear arsenals.12. The military doctrine of Russia does not yet reflect the spirit of Global Zero, although thereare some positive signs that point in this direction. The new 2010 Doctrine puts more emphasisthan the 2000 Doctrine on conventional forces as opposed to nuclear arms. It further raises thethreshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Instead of “situations critical for national security”, the2010 version authorises resorting to nuclear weapons only when “the very existence of [Russia] isunder threat”. However, the view of NATO as Russia’s main threat remains unchanged in the newRussian Military doctrine, as does the belief that a US first strike still represents Russia’s mostserious external security threat.13. The new US Nuclear Posture Review, completed in April 2010, supports Global Zero goalsand reduces the relevance of nuclear weapons in the US’ national security strategy. For the firsttime, the United States clearly stated that it would not use its nuclear arms against non-nuclear234

countries that comply with NPT commitments. Even in the case of a chemical or biological attack,the United States would only respond with conventional weapons. The US also committed itself torefraining from developing new nuclear weapons and from future nuclear testing. In the mediumterm, however, these commitments will not change the US’ interim reliance on “a safe, secure, and5effective nuclear deterrent” .14. The backing of Global Zero by other nuclear weapon states is of crucial importance. AsPresident Medvedev put it recently: “Global zero is a beautiful idea but [...] this idea can only bereached as a result of concerted work by all nuclear states". In this respect, British Prime MinisterGordon Brown strongly supported the Global Zero vision by stating that “a world free of nuclearweapons is not only achievable, but one of the most important policy objectives of our times. [...] Itwill be difficult, but I am pledged to do what it takes to enable all countries to give up their nuclear6weapons, verifiably and irreversibly.” One must recognize the profound unilateral arms reductionsthe United Kingdom (UK) has made in the past years. The recent Strategic Defence Reviewannounced further cuts in both operational warhead number and the size of the overall stockpile.15. With regards to China, the country committed itself, in a joint declaration with the US, to: 1)“the eventual realization” of a world free of nuclear weapons, 2) uphold the NPT, 3) aim to ratifythe CTBT as soon as possible, and 4) work more closely in the area of nuclear safety and security.However, China is also believed to have enlarged its nuclear arsenal.16. Of all NATO countries, France took the most sceptical stance on the Global Zero initiative,portraying it as a distant dream that does not appropriately account for the threats posed by moreand more states engaging in nuclear development programmes. Although France is committed tonuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the country does not see Global Zero as an initiativeon which nations can collaborate in the present and the medium-term without compromising theirsecurity. In this vein, President Sarkozy said France would not abandon the French deterrentwithout being sure that the same thing was happening everywhere. [...] “As I said to PresidentObama: 'We'll reduce our level of nuclear weapons when the United States and Russia have comedown to the same level as us'." This viewpoint might explain France’s plan to modernize, in themeantime, its sea-based ballistic missile submarine force and the airborne missiles carried bynuclear-capable combat aircraft.17. In sum, the possibility of accepting the Global Zero concept as a commonly held philosophyby the official nuclear weapon states is a difficult but feasible task. It must be clearly understoodthat Global Zero is a long-term vision that might not be achieved in our lifetime, as PresidentObama noted. The vision should not be implemented at the expense of our nations’ security. Thatsaid, accepting this vision would create a basis for durable partnership between the Westernpowers and Russia. It would offset feelings of insecurity resulting from disarmament by the parallelprogress being made in the non-proliferation and missile defence areas.

their disarmament commitments under the NPT seriously. The old START Treaty, which wassigned in 1991, entered into force in 1994 and expired in December 2009, not only sought to limitthe permitted number of offensive strategic nuclear warheads, and their long-range deliveryvehicles, in the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, but also to restrain thelocations and movements of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers via a complexverification scheme. START’s mandate additionally allowed the parties to deploy 6,000 “attributed”warheads on no more than 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles, which represented a significant cut7from the past . The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) Moscow Treaty envisaged evendeeper cuts of deployed warheads, but it lacked START’s verification mechanisms. The newtreaty, once ratified, will replace both the ‘old’ START and SORT.19. Although the American and Russian negotiators missed their December 2009 deadline, thenew agreement is hailed as a milestone in nuclear disarmament. First, the 10-year treaty requiresRussia and the US to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,550 deployed warheads. Thisrepresents a roughly 75% reduction when compared to the old treaty and a 30% cut whencompared to SORT. The number of launchers and other delivery systems is also subject to drasticcuts, and covers both deployed and non-deployed launchers. Each nation will have a mere800 platforms (700 deployed and 100 in reserve), which compares to 1,600 in the original STARTTreaty (SORT did not address delivery platforms at all). Second, the treaty entails use of adequateverification mechanisms. Third, it shows that Russia and the US are serious about theirdisarmament commitments. The new START, in short, represents a significant progress towardsthe goal of Global Zero.20. However, the new treaty has yet to be ratified. Putin’s and Medvedev’s United Russia party,which has far more seats than necessary for the Treaty’s ratification, has signalled its support forthe new START. However, Russian deputies are reluctant to vote on ratification only to see theagreement fail in the US Senate.21. The US Senate will give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty by approvingthe resolution of ratification by a vote of 2/3 of the Senators. On 16 Sept, the Senate ForeignRelations Committee voted 14-4 to approve the New START Treaty, sending it to the full Senatefor consideration. It is not likely, however, to be considered until after the November elections.Sceptical members of the Senate will need to be convinced that the Treaty does not hamper USmissile defense plans, and that the verification measures, while less extensive than old START,are still adequate. If the sceptics’ concerns are sufficiently addressed, the prospects that theSenate will approve the New START are good.

2. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

(FMCT)

23. American and Chinese ratification would encourage other remaining seven states to followsuit – India for instance is sending signals that its possible accession to the CTBT depends uponon the US and Chinese CTBT ratifications. The US Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999, but Mr.Obama’s dedication to get it approved as soon as possible (although no specific timeframe is set)is encouraging. However, the Obama Administration faces the difficult task of securing significantRepublican support in the Senate. Although less concrete than the latest American actions, recentcomments by the Chinese government with regard to ratifying the CTBT are positive. Russia isconstantly urging the US and China to ratify the treaty. In its previous reports, the NATOParliamentary Assembly also expressed its strong support for the ratification of the treaty. Mostexperts believe that the CTBT’s entry into force would not weaken America’s security, particularlysince the US has voluntarily refrained from nuclear testing since 1992. On the contrary, theuniversal ban on nuclear weapons testing with a comprehensive verification system wouldsignificantly hinder progress of nuclear weapon programmes in countries that are hostile to theUnited States.24. FMCT is further from realization than the CTBT, as its terms have not yet been fixed at theUN-backed Conference on Disarmament (CD). The aim of the negotiations is to ban theproduction of fissile material (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium), and thus to reduce the totalmaterial available to build nuclear bombs and lower the probability that it will fall into terroristshands. Unfortunately, the CD failed to launch negotiations in 2010 since Pakistan rejected the planof work, citing disadvantages compared to its nuclear-armed rival India. However, ongoing small-group talks in parallel to the CD sessions might help to overcome the deadlock. The successfulnegotiation and ratification of a FMCT would constitute a breakthrough in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as it would require all key fuel-cycle facilities across the world to beplaced under international safeguards. Since uranium enrichment and plutonium separationprocesses are likely to become increasingly widespread (with more and more states relying on the“inalienable right” to nuclear energy, as stipulated in Article IV of the NPT), accounting for andcontrolling the fissile materials that are produced or otherwise available is the only secure methodof ensuring that new nuclear bombs will not be developed. Given that the Nuclear Weapons Statesare believed to have ended their production of fissile material for weapons in the 1990s, theproposed FMCT would primarily constrain three non-NPT states -India, Israel, and Pakistan.

26. The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularlybecause almost every state in the world, except Israel, India, and Pakistan, and the DPRK (whichopted out unilaterally in 2003), is a treaty member. It was concluded in 1968, entered into force in1970, and was extended indefinitely in 1995. It is designed to: 1) prevent the spread of nuclearweapons and nuclear technology, 2) further nuclear disarmament to its ultimate conclusion, and3) promote co-operation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As stated previously, it contains atantalizing quid pro quo: countries that possess nuclear weapons shall move towards nucleardisarmament (Art. VI), while countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and inexchange will acquire access to peaceful nuclear energy (Art. IV). In order to further the goal ofnon-proliferation, the Treaty additionally provides an inspection-based safeguards system underthe auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

27. Although the NPT has been instrumental in halting the spread of nuclear weapon capabilitiesworldwide, it is also evident that it contains some flaws. In particular, it does not address theproblem of dual-use nuclear technology, such as uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.Therefore, it does not effectively prevent the pursuit of military nuclear programmes disguised aspurely civilian ventures. The IAEA’s stringent verification measures can only be applied incountries that voluntarily chose to sign and ratify the so-called Additional Protocol. Furthermore,the Treaty does not contain clear provisions to discourage a member’s withdrawal from the NPT,which the DPRK has exploited. Finally, there are no clear and country-neutral rules on how to dealwith Treaty violators. To counter challenges such as these, NPT review conferences are heldevery five years to overview the implementation of the Treaty and to discuss measures tostrengthen the regime. Unfortunately, attempts to rectify these shortcomings failed badly at theNPT Review Conference in 2005.28. It was frequently suggested that two failed Review Conferences in a row would irreparablydamage the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime. It is therefore encouraging that therecent Review Conference in May 2010 has been at least partially successful, although partlybecause failure of the 2005 Conference set the bar of success very low. The Conference reacheda consensus on a 64-point action plan which asks NPT member states to take specific actionsreinforcing all three pillars of the treaty. The US Special Representative of the President forNuclear Nonproliferation Susan Burk referred to the outcomes of the Review Conference as a“glass half full”.29. On a political level, the most daunting non-proliferation task is to find a balance between theinterests of the nuclear weapon states and those of the non-nuclear-weapon states. Being abargain between these two groups, the NPT suffers from fundamental disagreements betweenthose who focus on disarmament commitments (many developing nations) and those who seek tostrengthen non-proliferation measures (the US and its allies). Both sides maintain that one facet ofthe Treaty is receiving less attention than it should. This pulling and hauling became again obviousat this latest Review Conference. Egypt, holding the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)effectively vetoed tougher non-proliferation steps tying it with the nuclear weapon states refusal toaccept a time-bound process for negotiating nuclear disarmament.30. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ignore significant progress made in the field of disarmament:the importance of the START Treaty and the new US Nuclear Posture Review has already beennoted. Moreover, the US and UK publicly announced the number of nuclear warheads theypossessed. That said, more progress on disarmament at the Review Conference could have beenachieved if not for the reported China’s opposition to fissile material production ban and Russia’sreluctance to include references to tactical nuclear weapons. Progress in the disarmament field isa decisive precondition to reinforce the basic deal between nuclear and non-nuclear states and touniversalise the NPT. The nonofficial nuclear weapons states (Israel, Pakistan, India, and theDPRK) need, sooner or later, to become integral to the non-proliferation-for-disarmament deal.Formally accepting Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea as official nuclear weapons stateswould send a crucial signal to compliant states or nuclear aspirants. Thus, the NPT memberstates, headed by Russia, unequivocally call for those outside the Treaty to join it immediately. Asdesirable as their access to the Treaty is, however, there are also difficulties as regards theirpotential involvement. Should they, for example, be pressured to join as non-nuclear-weaponstates and consequently destroy any warheads they might have built? This option is rather unlikelyat present or in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the four countries must be engaged, both withinand outside of the NPT’s framework. One such possibility includes inducing them to ratify theCTBT and the FMCT. Verification of implementation of disarmament initiatives as well as workingon confidence-building measures is also of critical importance. The 2007 cooperation agreementbetween the United Kingdom and Norway (a non-nuclear weapon state) designed to elaboratebetter verification and confidence-building methods serves as an excellent example that could bereplicated by other states. The project breaks new ground in this area, technically as well as

politically. There is much work to be done in strengthening disarmament verification, includingsolving access issues for foreign inspectors visiting highly sensitive facilities, such as warheaddisassembly sites.31. In terms of non-proliferation, the Western powers wanted the 2010 NPT Review Conferenceto agree on a plan that would make it harder for countries like Iran and the DPRK to violate NPTobligations, thereby hindering their abilities to acquire sensitive technology and to build nuclearweapons. Therefore, stronger collective measures against NPT violators, as well as an obligatory,universal ‘entering-into-force’ of the IAEA Additional Protocol, are essential. As Russia sees noalternative to the NPT and underscores its viability, it also supports modifications towards strictercontrols. Its representatives have said that the Protocol “considerably increases the Agency'scapability to detect undeclared activities and nuclear materials and provides credible assurance oftheir absence. We strongly believe that in the future, Safeguards Agreements and the AdditionalProtocols to them should become a universally accepted standard to verify the compliance of8states parties to the NPT with their non-proliferation obligations” . The Action 32 of the ReviewConference’s action plan called on those member states that have not signed or ratified theAdditional Protocol to do so as soon as possible. However, the Review Conference failed tointroduce stricter non-proliferation measures. Due to consensus rules, the US was unable to nameIran in the compliance section of the final document. That said, Iran found itself in a more difficultposition than during at the earlier conferences, as its traditional NAM allies also criticised thecountry for breaching its safeguard agreements and enriching uranium up to 20%. The mostconcrete result at this year’s conference was the call for convening a special meeting in 2012 tonegotiate the establishment of a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Middle East. This meeting willbe attended by all states of the region (including Israel and Iran). Israel was also specifically calledby name to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. North Korea was requested to fullymeet its denuclearization obligations and to continue the Six-Party Talks (including with the UnitedStates and Russia).32. As far as the “third pillar” is concerned (the access to peaceful nuclear energy), theConference unambiguously endorsed further development of nuclear energy. The spread ofnuclear technology, however, should go hand in hand with functioning safeguards and exportcontrols. Although the dilemma of dual-use technology was not resolved, the Conferenceexpressed support to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and reaffirmed the key rolethe IAEA plays in preventing misuse of nuclear technology.

2. Other Initiatives to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

33 President Obama has identified the threat of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons as“the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”. The menace of terrorism remainsstacute in the 21 century: major incidents take place periodically, including the Christmas Dayterrorist attack on a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the most recent Times Square bombingattempt in New York. While thus far no acts of nuclear terrorism were recorded, such possibilityshould nevertheless be taken seriously, particularly given the potential catastrophic consequencesof such an attack. Acts of radiological terrorism (using conventional explosives to disperseradioactive substances) would cause little physical destruction but could cause considerable panicas well as economic losses.34. Al Qaeda has been reportedly seeking nuclear materials and technology. Stockpiles of low-or highly-enriched uranium, plutonium, spent nuclear fuel and other dangerous substances areabundant and scattered all over our planet (it has to be noted, however, that handling thesesubstances, particularly plutonium, is a serious technological challenge and terrorist organization8

would be unlikely to build a plutonium bomb without an assistance from a state-supported nuclearweapons program). Security of these stockpiles is an utmost priority for nations possessing them.It is mostly a national responsibility, but international co-operation mechanisms do exist to assistsome nations, including Russia, to ensure that these substances do not fall into the wrong hands.35. As one Northern Irish terrorist put it after a failed bombing attempt, “today we were unlucky,but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always”. In order toprevent nuclear terrorism, a multilayered system is needed which includes efficient intelligence,physical security of storages and other related sites, and trafficking interdiction.36. In terms of physical security, the US and Russia has a long and successful co-operationexperience in the framework of the Nunn-Lugar initiative, launched in the early 1990s anddesigned to assist Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union ensuring that the nuclearlegacy of the USSR remains secure. The programme was remarkably successful and was laterexpanded to include other donor countries (in 2002, the G-8 Global Partnership Against theSpread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was launched and it includes multinationalprogrammes in biological and chemical weapon sectors as well). It succeeded in securing almostall nuclear weapon storages and material sites in Russia, as well as in eliminating surplus of HighlyEnriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium stockpiles and dismantling decommissioned nuclearsubmarines. A number of issues remain though, most notably the uncertainty over sustainability ofAmerican investments in security upgrades, i.e, if Russia will be able to ensure adequate fundingin the future. Also, further improvements in security culture and personnel training are necessary.That said, the Nunn-Lugar programme is an excellent example of productive Russo-American co-operation in nuclear security, and this experience should be extended to other regions andcountries.37. In terms of practical results, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is another successfulmultinational non-proliferation effort. The US launched this informal arrangement in 2003, in anattempt to block the transfer of WMD to terrorists or rogue states. In addition to the US, France,the UK and Russia, there are more than 90 countries co-operating in this venture. In contrast tointernational treaties, the PSI focuses specifically on the practical prevention of the spread ofWMD by means of shared intelligence, sea patrols, and military co-operation in specific situations.It does not create any new legal authorities, but it is successful, and acts in compliance withinternational law and UN resolutions. So far, this promising model has only been applied to theopen seas, but could be buttressed by expanding its charter further, both in terms of members andscope. It is even praised by some as a pillar of a Global Security Architecture.38. A number of other multinational non-proliferation mechanisms were set up in recent years,including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (largely a product of US-Russianpartnership; it is designed share best counter-terrorist practices among the parties), Conventionfor the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (which focuses on police and law enforcementco-operation), Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (which provides guidelinesfor security or nuclear sites), UNSC Resolution 1540 (which requires nations to adopt relevantnational legislation), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (which gives guidelines to its 45 membersregarding export policies of nuclear materials and technologies) as well asad hocevents such asthe Nuclear Security summit. This summit was held in Washington DC in April 2010 and resultedin a non-binding communiqué and brought some practical results such as Ukraine’s decision togive up its stockpile of HEU and an additional Russo-American agreement on disposal of 34 tonsof weapons-grade plutonium. However, the multitude of these international initiatives andmechanisms is confusing and making the global nuclear security architecture rather cumbersome.The US, other NATO countries and Russia should enhance their efforts to streamline thisarchitecture and to strengthen it in order to establish clear, universal and stringent standards andsecurity requirements for nuclear/radiological material sites that would mandatory to all nationspossessing these materials.

39. Diplomatic engagement, the imposition of non-military sanctions, and the use of militaryforce remain the tools available to more or less effectively prevent more states from developingnuclear weapon capabilities. In the case of Iran, apparently, neither the Obama Administration’sengagement approach nor previous sanctions have yet been able to exert leverage on Tehran’snuclear stance. Since the military option is extremely undesirable, a strong and unified position bythe international community is the only possible way to ensure that non-military measures areeffective in dealing with proliferation-prone countries. The upcoming section briefly addressesIran’s current capabilities, the new round of sanctions, and Russia’s role in dealing with Tehran’snuclear program.40. To achieve a break-out capability, the main challenge for Iran probably remains theproduction of a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Experts believe that about 700-1000 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) would give the country the capability to produce enoughHEU for a nuclear warhead, provided that it is able to enrich LEU up to 90%. Iran’s LEU productioncame to 2776 kg by September 2010 – if further enriched, this amount would be sufficient toproduce 1-2 nuclear bombs. The Islamic Republic also started to enrich uranium up to 20% in itsPilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz in February 2010 (allegedly for the production of medicalradioisotopes). About 25 kg of such material are believed to be produced so far. Iran has alsoindicated that it would start working on a third uranium enrichment facility. Iran’s current nuclearactivities do not pose an immediate threat, but they do represent a clear breach of UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions and other international obligations, since the country started furtherenrichment in the absence of IAEA inspectors. Whatever the intention of Tehran’s nuclearprogram might be, the mere fact that the country is getting closer to the capability to build TheBomb is highly alarming.41. Ahead of these recent advances in Iran’s nuclear program, the major powers of theUnited Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany (the P5+1) agreed on a dual track strategyof engagement and pressure. Unfortunately, the latest UN-backed proposal, submitted jointly by9the US, Russia and France in October 2009 , was not responded positively by Iran. One positive“side-effect” of the very public effort by the P5 +1 to exhaust all diplomatic means has been tobring the US, Europe, Russia, and China closer together in their position towards Iran.42. UNSC adopted a fourth round of sanctions in June 2010, despite the announced agreementbetween Brazil, Turkey and Iran on a fuel swap mirroring the one proposed in October 2009. Thesanctions broaden the international weapons embargo imposed on Tehran and bar states fromproviding licenses to Iranian banks linked to the nation’s nuclear or missile efforts. Moreover, theyalso prohibit any Iranian “activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear10weapons” . Although it was very important to reach consensus among the permanent members ofthe UNSC, these measures are far less than the “crippling” sanctions the US and its key allies hadsought. Therefore, the US and the EU decided unilaterally to go beyond UNSC Resolution 1929and penalize firms selling gasoline to Iran. It’s too early to assess if the new sanctions broughtsome sort of success, but they seem to slow down the nuclear program and stir up tensionsbetween the different fractions of the political establishment in Iran. While the country insists itsuranium work is non-negotiable, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran would be willing9

to resume talks on disputed elements of its nuclear program in September, if some sanctions weredropped.43. During the past years, Russia’s position towards the Iranian nuclear program seems to haveoscillated between strategic temptations and proliferation concerns. On the one hand, it is in theKremlin’s interest to uphold good political and economic relations (especially in the field of nucleartechnology and weapons sales) with an important player in the adjacent Middle East. Russiaunequivocally pursues economic interests in Iran; it is a key market for Russia in terms of militarysales and nuclear technologies (one of the main commodities Russia can export). Furthermore, anumber of large Russian enterprises are fulfilling contracts with Iran and therefore seek to preventa worsening of Iranian-Russian relations due to further sanctions. Kremlin supported the last roundof sanctions against Iran, but together with China, it always made clear that it rejects unilateralpunitive measures that restrict Iran’s oil and gas sector by targeting companies in third-partynations. Russia is the only state to have openly co-operated with Iran in the nuclear field in thefourteen-year period (1995 - 2009) during which Tehran has developed a light-water reactor inBushehr. After years of delay, the plant was announced to be operational this summer. Theannouncement has caused some concern of the international community, despite the clause in theRusso-Iranian agreement whereby Russia would be the only supplier of uranium fuel to the plantand would take away all spent nuclear fuel (which contains plutonium). The critics point out thatthe agreement is signed for the period of ten years only, while the reactor’s lifespan is roughly50 years. Also, the Iranian engineers will acquire invaluable experience from their Russiancolleagues in terms of operating nuclear facilities and dealing with nuclear substances, thusincreasing Iran’s “nuclear break-out” potential. Therefore, the role of Russia (as well the IAEAsince the plant is under the Agency’s safeguards) will remain critical to ensure that the Bushehrreactor continues to operate as a purely civilian enterprise.44. On the other hand, a nuclear armed Iran would run against Russia’s policy of upholdingnuclear non-proliferation and preventing a potential nuclear arms race in the already fragileneighboring region. In 2002, the Kremlin was shocked, perhaps even more than the Westerncountries, when Tehran admitted that it had been conducting clandestine nuclear researchactivities. Currently, it appears that nuclear concerns outweigh Russian economic and geopoliticalinterests. In addition, as terrorism remains one of the key threats to Russia’s security, the reportedlinks between Tehran and certain hostile non-state entities cannot but raise concern in Moscow.The delivery of Russia’s advanced S-300 antiaircraft missile system to Iran is now officiallycancelled, a decision in line with the spirit of the latest UN resolution on sanctions against Iran.45. Russia, perceiving itself as a dialogue enabler between Iran and the Euro-Atlanticcommunity, has made several proposals to enrich uranium for Iran’s nuclear program on Russianterritory. In 2005, Moscow offered to build a Russian-Iranian enrichment joint-venture in Russia,and, one year later, an international joint venture. However, the initiatives failed, since Iran finallyinsisted on the uranium enrichment taking place on its own soil. Russia’s offer to do this for Iran inthe international fuel cycle center in Angarsk, Siberia, still stands.46. In recent years, Moscow’s special interest in co-operating with Iran on the one hand, andWashington’s refusal to talk directly with Tehran on the other hand, rendered a constructive andcommon US, European and Russian stance towards Iran impossible. Now the preconditions havechanged. The US is willing to talk to Tehran directly, and Iran’s continued non-compliance withIAEA norms constitutes a turning point for Russia. As US-Russian relations improve, the possibilityof their adopting a strong united approach towards Iran is increasing considerably. Russia, theUnited States and Europe should continue to make a concerted effort to engage andsimultaneously pressure Iran, in order to take advantage of this window of opportunity.

47. In addition to the nuclear security area, Russia and the Western powers are also key actorswhen it comes to addressing threats posed by the two other categories of weapons of massdestruction – chemical (CW) and biological (BW) weapons. These weapons can also be highlylethal: for instance, the death rate from BW varies hugely, from several dozen to 88 billion deaths11per kg of anthrax agent . CW or BW could be an option for countries or non-state actors that lackthe expertise or capability to develop nuclear weapons.48. While, according to the NPT, the permanent members of the UNSC are temporarily entitledto possess nuclear weapons, international law – namely, the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – entirely bans the development,production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical and biological weapons. Engagement with Russiain strengthening these Conventions is particularly important in the context of approaching BWCReview Conference in December 2011 and CWC Review Conference in 2013.49.

CWC

is nearly universal. Only a handful of small countries are not members of theConvention, but most of them are in the vulnerable Middle East region: Egypt, Israel, and Syria.North Korea also remains outside of the Convention. CWC has a strict verification system: itsagency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), monitors thechemical weapons stockpile destruction and conducts on-site inspections of chemical plants.50. Collectively, the US and Russia possess 95% of chemical weapons worldwide, whichcorresponds to 70,000 tons of this category of weapons. Both countries are in the process ofdestroying them, but will probably not technically be able to do so before the final deadline expireson April 29, 2012.51. In addition to ensuring adequate funding of CW destruction programmes, Russia and the USand its Allies need to address the existing loopholes in the CWC system, which provide stateparties with the leeway to cheat, without much risk of their being detected. Some next-generationprecursors and agents are excluded, e.g. ”calmative” agents, which both the US and Russia havedeveloped for “law enforcement, including domestic riot control” under the CWC’s exceptionalclause. Also, the majority of inspectors are busy monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons,which leaves them with far less time to inspect registered and “other” production facilities. Greateruse of remotely operated equipment as well as the use of sampling analysis during routineinspections should be enhanced, while additional steps to prevent the revealing of trade secrets12and national security intelligence need to be taken .52. The

BWC

was signed and ratified by 163 states. Thirty-two countries remain outside of theConvention, mostly in Africa and the Middle East (again including Egypt, Israel and Syria). Sincethe regime does not stipulate verification instruments, its effectiveness is gravely curtailed.Furthermore, noncompliance can only be addressed by bilateral or multilateral consultation (Art. 5)or by a UNSC request to investigate under Article 6 of the Convention.53. Several efforts have been made to strengthen the BWC in terms of verification andenforcement, but parties eventually failed to agree on a compliance protocol. The major technicalhurdle to be overcome in order to bolster the BWC is that only small quantities of biological agentsare required for a devastating attack. Even worse, these agents can be produced on a small scale,mainly using dual-use equipment that is available worldwide. In addition, life science research1112

(particularly genomics, synthetic biology and neuroscience) usually pursues civilian goals butcould, potentially, be misused for malign purposes. In this context, the United States authoritiesargue that BWC is essentially unverifiable. When Russia and the EU nations, among othercountries, called for resumption of the verification negotiations in 2007, the US found that the13costs of reviving them would outweigh the benefits . The US opposition to the BWC VerificationProtocol is consistent and dates back to 2001. The Obama Administration also rejected theprotocol.54. As a result, the focus shifted back to national strategies to address bio-threats. That said,discussions on possible ways to strengthen the international biological non-proliferation system stillcontinue. Proposals include increasing the number of national data submissions; merging BWCand CWC (particularly since some new substances can be qualified as both CW and BW); orintroducing “consultative visits” to biological facilities of concern, initiated at the request of a BWCmember state. Partnership with Russia (which had an extensive BW programme during the Sovietperiod) is essential to creating an international mechanism that would: 1) deter any country fromdeveloping BW programmes; and 2) prevent leakage of BW to terrorist groups or hostileindividuals.

55. One of the principal objectives of this report is to highlight the potential of missile defences14(MD) both as as the “new glue” for the Alliance and a game-changer in relationship with theRussian Federation. It is increasingly being regarded as a “silver bullet” to rectify relations withRussia and a even as a principle foundation for durable strategic partnership. While two-threeyears ago MD was considered the biggest bone of contention between the US/NATO and Russia,now the completely opposite view is beginning to prevail. A renowned Russian internationalstrelations expert Dmitri Trenin even suggests that MD “could actually be a 21 century equivalent of15Russia’s membership in NATO or a bilateral security alliance with the United States”.56. This view is advocated not only by independent experts, but also by political figures of thehighest calibre. An outstanding American politician Sam Nunn, former Russian foreign MinisterIgor Ivanov and the Chairman of the Munich Conference Wolfgang Ischingerco-wrote an articlewhich urging North America, Europe and Russia “to make defense of the entire Euro-Atlanticregion against potential ballistic missile attack a joint priority”. That, they argue, would “in asingle stroke undermine much of the threat analysis that sets Russia against NATO, and provethat trilateral cooperation on a key security issue is possible.” The three authors also believethat this cooperation would play critical role bolstering global nuclear non-proliferation effort.16NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is also a vocal supporter theUS-European-Russian MD co-operation idea.57. Missile defence is an integral part of the WMD disarmament and non-proliferation debate. InJuly 2009, the presidents of the US and Russia signed a joint statement that included a referenceto “interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”. However, there is afundamental disagreement between the US and Russia on the nature of this linkage:13

59. The new MD proposal – both as proposed by President Bush and as revised by theObama Administration – does not entail developing a comprehensive anti-missile shield. It isdeliberately designed as a limited one, capable of intercepting a small number of missileslaunched from unpredictable countries, such as North Korea and Iran. The proposed system, withseveral dozens of interceptor missiles, would be ineffective against thousands of Russian ICBMs.60. Furthermore, MD bases in Europe will be located in geographic areas that would make themincapable – even theoretically – of intercepting US-bound Russian missiles. The nature of ballisticmissiles is to travel to their destination via the shortest possible global route (the so-called ‘grandcircle’). The shortest way from Russia to the US is over the Arctic Ocean. Therefore, interceptormissiles based in the Balkans – or even in Poland as per the original plan, and on ships deployedin the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, cannot possibly be used against the Russian ICBMs.61. Thus, Russian strategic nuclear deterrence is in no way affected by US and NATO MDplans. This fact must be clearly understood by the decision-makers and the public, both inWestern countries and in Russia. MD ought to be considered, not as a scarecrow, but rather as anintegral component of the US/NATO-Russia co-operation framework, aimed at reducing globalnuclear, chemical and biological threats.62. The original Bush Administration proposal to station elements of its MD system in Polandand the Czech Republic was considered – rather unjustly – to be controversial. It deeplyantagonised Moscow. Despite the fact that Poland is, hypothetically, on the direct missile pathfrom Iran to the Eastern coast of the US, elements of the general public perceived Poland to betoo distant from the Middle East and too close to Russia for the base not to be perceived as ameans of defence against Russia. To some, the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to be deployedin Poland were wrongly perceived as similar to silo-based offensive ICBMs (which are, in fact,fundamentally different as they do not carry warheads at all and only intercept incoming missilesby way of kinetic impact). The original proposal (officially referred to as the Ground-basedMidcourse Defence – GMD) was also criticised in the US for being ineffective and technologicallyunsound. The test record of GBI stationed in Alaska and California is rather poor – tests were17

characterised by many experts as unrealistic and pre-scripted. The most recent test mimicking thehypothetical Iranian missile attack failed, although, reportedly, the interceptor missile performednormally and the failure was caused by a malfunction in a Raytheon-built radar. The Bushproposal was also criticised for being based on bilateral as opposed to Alliance-widearrangements.63. The new plan, announced by the Obama Administration in September 2009, addressedsome of the flaws (whether real or perceived) of the original proposal. The US President stressedthat the US did not abandon the idea of anti-missile protection, but instead was replacing the oldproposal with one that “will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces andAmerica’s allies”. The plan to deploy GBI in Poland was dropped and the focus shifted to StandardMissile-3 (SM-3) interceptors that are mounted onAegisships of the US Navy. SM-3 missiles havea sound performance record and their credibility was explicitly demonstrated in 2009 when oneSM-3 missile successfully destroyed an inoperative satellite. A small number of Aegis ships, eachcarrying approximately 100 SM-3 missiles, will be deployed closer to Iran, in the waters of theSouth-Eastern Europe, thus negating any allegations that it is directed against Russia.Development of land-based SM-3 missiles is also planned with possible deployment in Romaniawithin the 2015 timeframe.64. The MD system championed by the Obama Administration is less controversial and moreflexible than that proposed by the previous Administration. However, some questions have yet tobe addressed. For instance, the question of cost: while the US government claims that the newsystem will be more cost-effective, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the deploymentof the advanced sea-based version of SM-3 projected to enter service by 2018 would beconsiderably more expensive than GBI. The land-based version of SM-3 would be less costly but18potentially just as controversial as GBI .65. Unlike GBI, SM-3 is currently incapable of intercepting long-range missiles . Therefore, inthe short-term, the Aegis ships deployed in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea would onlyprovide protection against short- and medium-range missiles. The US experts believe that SM-3missiles can be gradually upgraded to meet long-range missile threats as well. Advanced sea- aswell as land-based versions of SM-3, currently under development, will provide coverage forincreasingly larger territories in Europe. By 2020, the US plans to deploy SM-3 Block IIB missiles,which are potentially capable to intercepting ICBMs launched against the United States. The silo-based GBI will continue to be perfected and the possibility of their deployment in Europe has notbeen ruled out.66. Thus, the Obama Administration is replacing the ‘capabilities-based’ approach with the20‘threat-based’ approach to MD. Accordingly, the new MD plan is tailored to meet missile threatsas the Iranian missile capability develops.67. Iran is developing a formidable medium-range ballistic missile capability. Its Shahab missileprogramme, originally based on technology transfers from Russia, China and North Korea, isdeveloping rapidly as Iranian rocket engineers are mastering the ballistic technology. Its upgradedSejil 2 missile, test fired in May 2009, has a range of 2,000 km and is thus capable of reachingtargets in Israel, Turkey or South-Eastern Europe. It also uses solid rather than liquid fuel, makingit less vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes (liquid-fuel rockets need to be filled up before a launch; anactivity that could be detected by adversaries).1819

68. In 2009 and in January 2010, Iran also successfully test-fired multi-stage satellite rockets,designed to deliver objects to space. Iran claims that it is an entirely civilian capability but, from atechnological standpoint, satellite carrier rockets intrinsically resemble inter-continental offensivemissiles. However, according to the latest US intelligence assessment, Iran is unlikely to develop along-range ballistic missile capability before the end of this decade when the advanced SM-3Block IIB missiles are expected to enter service.69. Among other advantages of the new MD plan, the US will develop a much more flexible andversatile system of ground-, sea-, air- and space-based sensors to detect launches of hostilemissiles and to track them. This will reduce the need for a large ground-based X-band radar, suchas the one originally due to be installed in the Czech Republic. This radar caused considerableirritation in Moscow, which claimed it would be able to see deep into Russian territory.70. Some experts also point out that the proposed MD system could enhance security in theMiddle East. The Aegis ships would provide some degree of additional anti-missile protection forIsrael, which, according to Israel’s strategic calculations, would reduce the relevance of a pre-21emptive strike option against Iran .71. One also has to bear in mind that MD is relatively young and rapidly developing sector.Technological progress is difficult to predict, and one cannot rule out that new emergingcapabilities will require revisiting current plans and assessing potential implications for internationalrelations. For instance, the US defence companies are rapidly mastering MD systems capable ofintercepting hostile missiles in the boost phase of their flight. The Airborne Laser (ABL)programme as well as projects to develop high-speed interceptor rockets mounted on patrollingaircraft or UAVs (such as Predators) when completed might require new deployment andengagement patterns. Boost-phase interception is preferable because ascending missiles areslower, more visible and more vulnerable; besides debris from interception would fall onto theterritory of an attacker. On the other hand, boost-phase interception requires extremely swiftdecision-making and data exchange mechanism among the Allies and partners as response timeis 2-4 minutes. It also entails constant patrolling in the vicinity of a potential source of threat. It isimperative therefore that relevant national and international bodies, including this Assembly and itsScience and Technology Committee, closely follow these developments and analyse their politicaland national security implications.

72. The revised plan is much more Alliance-centric than the previous one. In fact, in the initialstages, the proposed MD architecture would not have provided any protection for the US andwould only have covered the territory of the United States’ European Allies. The US authoritiesannounced they “will work with our Allies to integrate this architecture with NATO members’ missiledefense capabilities, as well as with the emerging NATO command and control network that isunder development”. Also, the US “will be consulting closely at NATO with Allies on the specific22deployment options” . NATO Secretary General has strongly endorsed the new plan. It remains tobe seen if the growing support for MD as one of future cornerstones of the Alliance will bereflected in the new NATO Strategic Concept.73. The increasing number of analysts argue that development of the Alliance-wide missiledefence system could ensure NATO’s cohesion in a context when the future of the US nuclearweapons in Europe is being questioned. Many of these weapons, as well as their delivery systems,21

approach the end of their lifetime. The modernisation proposals for these weapons and systemswould likely meet considerable opposition in some European countries; they would also send amessage which directly contradicts the spirit of President Obama’s ‘nuclear zero’ vision. If,however, the US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe, there is a risk of weakening thetransatlantic link and reducing the relevance of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. In that case,the Allies’ involvement in force planning in the framework of missile defence could provide an23opportunity to sustain the cohesion of the Alliance .74. The implementation of the revised MD plan must be accompanied with specific measures,designed to reassure Central and Eastern European Allies, particularly Poland and the CzechRepublic. It goes without saying that these nations considered the original MD proposal a meansof directly increasing US presence in the region. The announcement by the US government thatthe original plan has been shelved caused some resentment in Central and Eastern Europe. Aheadline in the leading Czech newspaperMlada Fronta Dnesread: "There Will Not Be Radar.Russia Won". In their famous statement, a group of distinguished former Central and EasternEuropean statesmen, including Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, Valdas Adamkus, AlexanderKwasniewski, Mart Laar, and Vaira Vike-Freiberga, while welcoming the ‘reset’ with Russia,regretted the shelving of the original European missile defense plan which was "a symbol ofAmerica's credibility and commitment to the region”. The influential American Republicans,including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and the House Minority Leader John Boehner,24also criticised this decision by the US President as capitulation to Russia .75. In this context, the announced deployment of the US Patriot anti-missile unit in Poland is awelcome step. The deployment poses no threat to Russia as Patriot MD capability is designed toprotect deployed troops against short-range missiles. The US-Polish agreement is a symbolicgesture of strategic partnership of the two nations. The Czech Republic expects similar gestures ofsolidarity.

76. The Rapporteur is convinced that Russia could and should become a part of the joint missiledefence effort. Moscow has been sending contradictory signals on this issue. On the one hand,Moscow vehemently opposed the proposal of the Bush Administration to install an MD system inPoland and the Czech Republic. President Medvedev threatened to postpone the dismantling ofthe Kozelsk ICBM unit from the Kaliningrad enclave and to deploy modern short-range Iskanderballistic missiles there, which would be capable of hitting targets in Poland and other Central andEastern European countries. This idea was called off in response to the US decision to shelve theoriginal MD plan. However, although the US now plans to deploy MD capabilities closer to Iran, astep that Russian officials have been arguing would be a logical one, Moscow still refuses toendorse the revised MD proposal. In particular, Russian officials expressed their concern aboutthe announced deployment of Patriot anti-missile systems to Poland. Also, Russian officials,25including the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov , have started to raise new concerns that SM-3systems might threaten the Russian nuclear deterrent. This claim is unsubstantiated as even whenSM-3 missiles receive upgrades which enable them to intercept ICBMs, the numbers andgeographical deployment of Aegis ships or ground-based SM-3 would prevent them from posing athreat to the Russian nuclear forces. That said, the US and NATO might consider the possibility ofoffering additional guarantees to Russia as the most advanced versions of SM-3 becomeavailable.

77. On the other hand, Russia is not fundamentally opposed to MDper se.After all, Russiamaintains an MD system near Moscow, which dates back to the Cold War era. Reportedly, theRussian capital is protected by interceptor missiles that are nuclear-tipped. Also, when the BushAdministration announced its MD plans for Europe, Moscow suggested that it could also join thisproject and offered the Russian-leased early warning radar based in Gabala, Azerbaijan as well asa brand new detection radar in Armavir, Southern Russia, as a potential contribution to theproposed system. Activation of the US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Centre in Moscow, set up inthe late 1990s, but never previously invoked, is yet another possibility to develop co-operation,although it is uncertain if Moscow still has much interest in moving this project forward.78. All these proposals have to be considered seriously by the US and NATO. The White Housewelcomed “Russian co-operation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense ofour common strategic interests”. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has explicitly urged Russiato take part in a MD project: "Just as Russia is an important partner in efforts to prevent nuclearproliferation, so should it be in missile defense”. While establishing joint command system wouldnot be realistic, the ultimate arrangement should include effective sharing of MD-related databetween the US/NATO and Russian radar systems. However, safeguards must be in place toprevent either side from abusing or leaking sensitive information and from being able to stall ordisrupt the swift decision-making process in MD. NATO-Russia Council is also exploring ways toincorporate territorial MD into its agenda.79. Another important aspect of the MD co-operation with Russia is joint missile threatassessment. Experts note that as the new US Administration shifted its focus from Iranianintercontinental- to medium-range missile capability, the American and Russian assessments of26the Iranian missile programme “are now in sync” . The arrangements were made during the visitof President Obama to Moscow in July 2009 to establish a bilateral threat assessment group.

80. Last but not least, the Euro-Atlantic community, together with Russia, must redouble theirefforts to curb proliferation of missiles and missile technology. This is a challenge of paramountimportance. If the issue is addressed effectively, such efforts will not merely serve to pre-empt orrespond to potential threats, but will also help prevent the growth of missile capabilities in certainhostile countries, thus enabling the US and NATO to avoid further developing their missiledefences to a point that might undermine the strategic global nuclear balance.81. There is no universal treaty or convention that prohibits proliferation of missile technology.The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) establishes export policy guidelines in order tocurtail proliferation of missiles (and related technologies) that could carry weapons of massdestruction. MTCR unites only 34 nations, excluding some of the suspected missile proliferators.Nevertheless, it has been remarkably successful in reducing the pace of missile programmes insome countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Yet, the regime needs to be revisited inorder to close certain gaps, particularly when it comes to cruise missiles.82. Experts note that non-proliferation measures are particularly important in cases when acountry decides to pursue ICBM capability. The move from medium- to long-range capabilityrepresents a considerable technological leap which is extremely difficult to accomplish without27foreign assistance . Preventing countries like Iran from developing multi-stage ICBMs could be asuccessful endeavour which would benefit the US, NATO and Russia (since the Western system2627