NPA, Alm.del - 2010-11 (1. samling) - Bilag 21: Rapport fra det 76. Rose-Roth Seminar i Tblisi

II. OPENING SESSION2. The Opening Session was moderated by Giorgi Kandelaki, Head of the Georgian delegation to the NATO PA.3. Welcoming participants, Giorgi Kandelaki, noted that in spite of the war of 2008, Georgia has demonstrated its commitment toreforms and to Euro-Atlantic Integration. Georgia values its constructive relationship with the NATO Parliamentary Assemblyand it is grateful for the Assembly’s continuous support in the process towards NATO membership. Georgia is delighted to hostthe 76th Rose-Roth seminar, the third such seminar in Tbilisi, which will provide a great opportunity to discuss important issuesof the region.4. Dr. Karl Lamers, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, welcomed all participants and thanked the Parliament ofGeorgia for hosting this event. The NATO PA has supported Georgia throughout its transformation and backed Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic membership aspirations. Georgia today is a young, vibrant and dynamic nation that has a clear sense of purpose anddirection. At the same time, there are some concerns. Undoubtedly, the greatest concern is the legacy of the conflict overAbkhazia and South Ossetia that culminated in the tragic events of August 2008. Dr. Lamers reminded participants that theAssembly had condemned Russia’s disproportionate use of force and the violation of Georgia’s territorial sovereignty and calledfor a return to the status quo ante. The Assembly had also denounced Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Atthe same time, the NATO PA had stressed the need to resolve the conflict peacefully through dialogue.5. The Assembly had strengthened its institutional relationship with Georgia by creating the Georgia-NATO InterparliamentaryCouncil, which was designed as a parliamentary counterpart to the NATO-Georgia Commission and is a clear demonstration ofthe Assembly’s solidarity with Georgia.6. Dr. Lamers said that he did not see any contradiction in supporting Georgia and promoting dialogue with Russia and heregretted that the Russian delegation to the NATO PA had decided not to attend the seminar. Their participation would havesent a truly positive signal and would have been mutually beneficial.7. The President pointed out that it is crucial for NATO parliamentarians to show sustained attention and support towardsGeorgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in their transition process towards democracy, security and prosperity. Georgia could becomea role model for other nations yearning to change and democratize their political systems. Therefore, it is crucial that Georgiacontinues to make progress in terms of free and fair elections, freedom of expression and forging less antagonistic and moreconstructive relations with the political opposition.8. In conclusion, Dr. Lamers expressed his hope that this seminar would be a constructive contribution to progress in the region.9. H.E. Mr Guenther Baechler, Ambassador of the Swiss Confederation in Georgia, in his welcoming remarks, reconfirmedSwitzerland’s long-term commitment to the region, as shown by its continued support to NATO’s Partnership for Peace and tothe NATO PA’s Rose-Roth Seminar programme.10. Ambassador Baechler noted that today’s security is very complex because it is composed of a whole variety of levels,dimensions and factors. The levels reach from internal security to border security, to security with immediate neighbours as wellas with regional powers and global players. The dimensions may encompass military and state security, but increasingly alsoeconomic, environmental and human security. Many factors have an impact on the security system such as old conflict patterns,perceptions and misperceptions and changing economic, social and political challenges.11. It is understandable that in many Arab and non-Arab countries, social and political movements have a major impact on

security. Today, the world is experiencing a second or even third wave of democratization in the aftermath of 1989. Around theworld, people are asking for democracy and freedom. It is a genuine cry for freedom. This cry will not only be heard in the Arabworld; it is already being heard in Iran, China, in Russia and elsewhere. Insecurity is very much related to repressive regimessuch as in Sudan. Security on the other hand is related to democracy. Without democracy there is no comprehensive security.Security and freedom cannot and shall not be separated and divided. In the future there is no security against, “there is onlysecurity with”. Mr Ambassador concluded that it is a high time to think about a functioning collective security system.12. Mr David Bakradze, Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, noted that co-operation with the NATO PA is a high priority forGeorgia and Georgia is very grateful to the NATO PA for its continuing support.13. If one looks at Georgia’s development during the past 10 years, then one would see that Georgia has achieved a lot in spiteof the Soviet legacy. The most important achievement is visible in the fight against corruption. More than 2000 officials havebeen arrested during the past 7 years, and some were members of parliament from the majority party. Public trust in institutionsrose to a very high level, especially public trust in police. Around 3 % of the population trusted the police before the reforms andnow 73% of the population say that they trust the police. Public opinion polls also show that during the last year, 97 % of peoplepolled said that they did not pay any bribes in 2010.14. Another achievement is modernization, which changed the way the bureaucracy works. If someone wanted to receive abusiness licence 10 years ago, it would require a large bribe and it would be a very long process. Today, one can receive alicence in three days. Everyone can see the results of the educational, political, institutional, constitutional and election reforms.It is important to note that all reforms are carried out in the difficult context of Russian aggression. But in spite of this situation,Georgia has chosen to be democratic and to continue its reforms on the way to Euro-Atlantic integration.15. As for Russia’s occupation of Georgia, Georgia wants dialogue, said Mr Bakradze, but Russia refuses dialogue. Georgiahas been negotiating with Russia for 15 years now and Russia has never given Georgia an answer to the question“ what doesRussia expect from Georgia?”16. Mr Bakradze concluded that the aspiration to NATO membership is very important for Georgia, and public supportdemonstrates this. Small democracies need allies with whom they feel safe. NATO is the only future place for Georgia.17. In his keynote address, Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow of the Jamestown Foundation, noted that Georgia has a record forpublic support for joining NATO among former and present aspirant countries. Romania was leading before with 70% of publicsupport. This demonstrates that joining NATO is a social and public desire in Georgia. In 2008, Georgia received its AnnualNational Plan and since then has considerably improved in military, defence and civil areas. Mr Socor stressed that the NATOPA should remind NATO to acknowledge political progress in Georgia. NATO’s policy towards Georgia is not sufficient, there isa lack of seriousness in the open door policy and NATO has “set the bar higher for Georgia”. Georgia’s geography should notdisqualify the country from NATO membership.18. Previous candidate countries never found themselves in a vulnerable situation as Georgia. There is a regional deficit ofsecurity in this region and this is why Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. The Russian monopoly on peacekeeping was toleratedfor a long time during the 1990s, and as a result, the sphere of Russian influence “hardened” in the Georgian occupiedterritories.19. In the late 1990s Georgia advanced to become a net provider of security in the region, dealing successfully, for example,with Chechen terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge. Today, Georgia continues to demonstrate that it could be a strong securityprovider. It is contributing to most NATO operations, including Afghanistan where it operates without any national caveats and inthe most dangerous area.20. Regarding the NATO Summit in Bucharest and the decision that Georgia will become a member of NATO, Mr Socor notedthat this was interpreted differently by Georgia and Russia. Russia’s interpretation was: NATO did not offer MAP to Georgiabecause its members were divided and did not want to challenge Russia. This gave Russia a green light to move into Georgia in2008 and SFE was effectively suspended so there was no monitoring of forces massed on Georgia’s northern border. There isalso an undeclared arms embargo on Georgia such that Georgia is not even being provided with defence equipment. This signof deference to Russia effectively supports Russia’s policy of seeking to ensure that its neighbours are in a defenceless militaryvacuum.21. The Geneva process is not addressing ethnic cleansing. It is stabilizing the situation but there is no fundamentalimprovement on the ground. Russia wants Georgia to sign an agreement on non-use of weapons with Abkhazia and SouthOssetia, which would mean that Georgia recognizes the secession and would create an impression that it is a local conflict andnot a conflict with Russia. This will also give Russia a guarantee that it could maximize its influence on the process as anintermediary. Georgia should sign an agreement with Russia and not with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, concluded Mr Socor.22. Georgia’s bid to join NATO rests on government performance. After the revolution of 2003, a new group of state builderscame to power. They are all young, most of them received western education and they are all committed to the transformationof society. Thanks to this leadership, Georgia became the most de-sovietised country in the post-soviet area (except the Balticstates which never had the same Soviet influence as other republics of the former Soviet Union). Today, Georgia ranks veryhigh when it comes to reforms and its success could be inspirational to other post-soviet countries, including Russia. Russia’spolitical commentators have already talked about Georgia’s success in police reform and the fight against corruption as a

III. THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN CONFLICTThe session of the Georgian-Russian Conflict was moderated by Lucio Malan, Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on DemocraticGovernance of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security23. Eka Tkeshelashvili, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration, emphasised that the Georgian government is very eager tofind a solution to the conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The resolution of this conflict will help to provide security in thewhole region. Georgia developed an action plan where it identified activities for reconciliation such as a possibility of healthcare, education, people to people relations, development of business relations and connectivity of IDPs (Internally DisplacedPersons). There is considerable progress, especially when it comes to health care. Georgia finances the medical treatment ofAbkhazians and this has a positive impact. “Reconnecting people” and “people-to-people relations” are very important factors inthe process of solving the conflict. The problem is that young people living in Georgia do not remember living together in oneunified country. This problem should be addressed and young people from Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be reconnectedwith young people in the rest of Georgia. Development of business relations is also very important. Prices are very high in theoccupied territories because they rose to the same levels as the Russian neighbouring territories but locals cannot afford suchhigh prices. They should have the same prices as in Georgia.24. Concluding her presentation, the Minister said that it was not easy to work with the occupied territories. If Russia were tosee Georgia’s efforts for reconciliation as a threat, it would obstruct the process. Co-ordination with international organisations isvery important. It is a learning process for all parties but there is a firm commitment to achieving results.25. Batu Kutelia, Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, noted that there were three questions forconsideration: Why is there a conflict? What should we do to solve it? And what are the wider implications of this conflict? Theanswer to the first question lies in Russia’s conflict with democratic values. Assessing motives is a challenge, as is finding pro-active solutions to the problem. The main goal for Russia is not to occupy Georgia’s territory but to halt Georgia’s progresstowards irreversible democratic development and prevent Georgia’s membership of NATO. To counter this Russian policy,Georgia is firmly proceeding with reforms in all spheres of democratic development - it has been improving interoperability withNATO and it has been developing close relations with the EU.26. The answer to the second question (“What should we do?”) lies in an international format, primarily with the UN and theOSCE. Unfortunately, Russia has a right of veto in these organisations and also has an indirect influence on NATO and the EU.The EU mission in Georgia is very important but should be transformed into a fully pledged peacekeeping force. Georgia needssolid security guarantees to continue with reforms, stressed Mr Kutelia. NATO should give clear signals and internationalorganisations should clearly refer to “occupation” as “occupation” and “ethnic cleansing” as “ethnic cleansing”.27. The answer to the third question is very simple. The implications of this conflict will influence other conflicts in the region andwill have a negative effect on the democratic development of the region.28. H.E. Mr Hansjörg Haber, Head of the EU Monitoring Mission, emphasized that the conflict was not progressing towards aresolution and that the conflict was broader than just a conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.29. Russia used the two de facto entities to gain leverage over Georgia but in fact Russia has lost great part of its influence overGeorgia. The Ambassador noted that in October, 2008 when the EU Monitoring Mission was deployed in Georgia, officials inTbilisi told him that Russia had three goals: to topple President Saakashvili; to undermine Georgia’s role as an energy transitroute and to forever bar Georgia from becoming a NATO member. The Ambassador left it to the participants to judge thecredibility of the last argument but he said that the first two have been on the agenda constantly over the past two and a halfyears.30. Regarding the Geneva talks, the Ambassador noted that Russia is trying to move from its role as a party in the conflict to therole of peace-manager, claiming that it was not a party in the conflict. Russia also started again to insist on a non-use of forceagreement to be signed between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but at the same time refusing to make itself part ofsuch agreement. The Ambassador noted that at this point, the Russians do not really know how to regain influence overGeorgia, so they are trying to get the guarantor’s role.31. Georgia’s policy towards Russia is quite one-sided. Basically it consists of using international leverage to demonstrate thecontinued character of the principle of territorial integrity. The Ambassador underlined that Georgia was not engaging directlywith Russia and instead was doing so through its American and European partners.32. The Ambassador warned that some of Georgia’s demands would hardly promote Tbilisi’s objective of the reintegration ofAbkhazia and South Ossetia. He cited the example of Georgia’s position on Russia’s WTO bid, wherein Tbilisi in exchange forconsent to Russia’s WTO entry wants to have some sort of control over the trade at the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sections ofthe Georgian-Russian border.33. In his presentation, David Smith, Director of the Georgian Security Analysis Center, warned the participants about a biggeopolitical game being played in the region, including the militarisation of the occupied territories. He noted that the conflict did

not begin in 2008 and Russia’s invasion was long and well planned. There were clear messages during the Russian invasion.Russia hit the port of Poti, the town of Gori and a railway bridge, and “bracketed” a pipeline with deliberate near misses to showwho was in control.34. Russia continues to militarise Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Latest additions include: BM-30 Smerch MLRS, SS-21 Tochkaand S-300 air defence system. Russia could move to the Gali region, which would allow it to control an entry to Georgia. Militarybases have been built to create a barrier between the North and the South. Russia occupied Akhalgori because it is located onthe high ground, 30 km closer to Tbilisi than Tskhinvali and beyond a river, which would have been a military obstacle. Mr Smithreiterated that the conflict did not end in 2008. There are three Russian military bases circling Georgia, which could be used inthe future. There is also the modernisation of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, including potentially a “Mistral” class ship to bepurchased from France.35. Mr Smith emphasized that all western countries have an interest in the region and it is not only energy, there is also a NATONorthern Distribution Network Corridor to be taken into an account. Concluding, Mr Smith stressed that if NATO has said thatGeorgia “will” become a member of NATO then Georgia should become a member of NATO.36. Dr. Sergey Markedonov, Russian political researcher and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, Washington, USA, gave his presentation via a video conference from Washington.37. He began by saying that against the background of the events in the Middle East, the situation in the Greater Caucasus haslost its acuteness. The new escalation of violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with possible complete annexation of Georgiaby Russia, which was expected by many in the West, has not occurred. The “revanche” by NATO, anticipated in Moscow, hasnot happened. The implementation of the idea of the North Atlantic Alliance to enlarge at the expense of the South Caucasianstates has been set aside for a long time. The Armenian-Turkish reconciliation has also failed.38. A detailed analysis of the geopolitical trends in the Caucasian region demonstrates that a new status quo has been shapingup in the region. The old status quo was established in early 1990’s as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and a seriesof armed and latent conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. There were several unsuccessfulattempts to solve the “frozen” conflicts in Chechnya by Russia, in 1999-2000, by Georgia in Abkhazia in 1998 and 2001, and inSouth Ossetia in 2004. Unlike Moscow and Tbilisi, Azerbaijan targetted its efforts to change the diplomatic format of the peacesettlement and achieved quite good results, making the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh bilateral between Yerevan and Bakuwithout Stepanakert.39. August 2008 became the point of the qualitative break of the old status quo. The principle of the inviolability of the bordersbetween the entities of the former Soviet Union, which had remained intact for no less than 17 years, was questioned. Aprecedent of recognition of the new states on the Eurasian territory among former Soviet autonomies was created. Seriousredistribution of internal and external policies has taken place. The Russian economic and military-political presence becamepriority for Abkhazia while for the South Ossetia the priority is in organizing the control over the financial aid, provided byRussia, for rehabilitation of the Republic. Russia lost leverage on Georgia, pushing Tbilisi closer to the United States at thesame time pushing Abkhazia and South Ossetia further from Georgia. This consolidated a new status quo.40. This new status quo influenced Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is why there is such growth of interest in the Armenian-Turkishrelations, which has not been seen since 1991-1993. The Armenian-Turkish dialogue has become a serious factor of influenceon the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. Turkey signed two Protocols on the normalization of relations with Armenia inOctober 2009, which professional optimists called “historical” and “breakthrough” but have not yet been ratified by theparliaments. Turkey is playing a parallel game in the Middle East. Ankara’s swift reorientation towards this region actualizesIsrael’s interference in Caucasian affairs. Jewish lobbying circles of the United States are already discussing the thesis of thepossible recognition of Armenian Genocide (or at least a serious promotion of this theme) in Israel and in the United States bymeans of establishing co-operation with the Armenian lobby.41. Iran has also been playing a role in the formation of a new status quo in the Caucasus because it does not like theemergence of various external actors in its neighbourhood. In April 2010 the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottakiannounced that Tehran worked out some proposals that might be considered as alternatives for the “renewed Madridprinciples,” signed by the US, Russian and French Presidents. Iran is not interested in a conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh with the engagement of international peace-keeping forces. It has already insisted on the presence of only regionalforces.42. Regarding the role of Russia, Dr Markedonov noted that while Russia has been claiming a role in the Caucasian hegemony,it faces some problems in its own North Caucasian field. Having crashed Chechen national separatism, Moscow now faces theproblem of radical Islamism in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya. Agreeing to unilateral support to the Chechen PresidentRamzan Kadyrov, Russia has got a new challenge in the form of republican particularism. And finally, having recognizedAbkhazian independence, Moscow faces growing Cherkessian nationalism in Adygea, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria.43. Concluding, Dr. Markedonov stated that there is a serious regrouping of forces in the Greater Caucasus. Old rules of thegame, formats of talks and the UN and the OSCE missions in Georgia are not effective enough. Iran and Turkey are activelygetting back into the big geopolitical game while Moscow’s relations with Armenia and non-recognized republics are changing,probably for the worse. New concerned players such as Israel might appear in the region, while the US and EU might also

IV. THE EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION OF GEORGIAThe session of the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia was moderated by Assen AGOV, Special Co-ordinator of the Georgia-NATO Inter Parliamentary Council, NATO PA44. Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister of Georgia and a State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic integrationemphasised that Georgia is moving towards Euro and Euro-Atlantic integration in spite of the occupation of its territory, in spiteof the ethnic cleansing and in spite of the conflict with Russia. Why is integration so important to Georgia? Because the countryneeds security in order to continue its democratic development and to continue with its reforms. Georgia is now the number onereformer in the world, according to the World Bank and is ranked the third highest in fighting corruption, according to the EBRD,but of course, there is still a lot left to be done.45. Russia still thinks there is a chance to re-take Georgia. When the Russian people see the results of successful reforms inGeorgia, they will ask their government why they cannot have the same. This is what the Russian government is trying to avoid.Georgia is ready to co-operate with Russia but in an atmosphere of respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity. Georgia and Russiashare a common interest in co-operation in the fight against terrorism, and in co-operating in the spheres of economics,education, science and culture amongst others.46. Georgia is preparing itself for membership at NATO through the Annual National Programme (ANP), which highlights thereforms that need to be addressed. The NATO-Georgia Commission is another instrument, helping Georgia’s integration.Georgia needs 2-3 years to be eligible for NATO membership and then NATO should follow its Bucharest commitment.47. European integration is also moving forward successfully with the neighbourhood action plan. It is now the 5th cycle ofimplementing reforms under this plan. The EU and Georgia are now negotiating the associate status.48. “All reforms that Georgia does, it does for itself, and not for the EU and NATO. Reforms help Georgia to be united anddemocratic”, concluded Mr Baramidze.49. Andro Barnovi, Head of the Military Academy of Georgia, noted that we have a new era of partnership and sharedresponsibility but of course, this new era is facing a lot of challenges such as terrorism, extremism, isolationist philosophy offormer empires, nuclear proliferations, ecology and many others. Georgia is facing the same challenges. The entire SouthCaucasus region is split by mistrust and irrational fears. There a need to solve these challenges. Georgia could be a good agentfor peace and security in this region, acting together with the western partners. The political and strategic orientation of Georgiarequires a strong co-operation with NATO. This would be a very important component for the identity of Georgian citizenship inyears to come.50. Education is the cornerstone for Georgia. Reforms are now underway in the National Defence Academy. The GeorgianArmy today is much more competent and disciplined than before. Georgia is building a “sandwich model” for its Armed Forces,which means interchangeable periods of service and education throughout an officer’s entire career. There are significantreforms in administration, which will help to manage three schools: Army Officers’ Basic Training School; Captains CareerSchool and the Command and General Staff College. Officers and civilians from the entire Armed Forces and Ministry ofDefence will undergo language training in the NDA Language School.51. Mr Barnovi concluded that every endeavour is aimed at regional and Euro-Atlantic co operation with a very clear focus onNATO membership. The National Defence Academy wants to contribute to peace, democracy, trust building and co-operation inthe region and to best contribute to NATO goals of wider partnership.

54. H.E. Mr Linas Linkevicius, Ambassador of Lithuania to NATO, reminded the participants that at the Lisbon Summit, Heads ofState agreed to further enhance existing partnerships. NATO’s partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over thepast 20 years. Today, NATO is in partnership with 70 countries. The Council has been developing a more efficient and flexiblepartnership policy, which would be ready for the April 2011 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Berlin.55. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO Heads of State agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and thisdecision was reaffirmed in Lisbon. Practical co-operation with Georgia continues successfully through the NATO-GeorgiaCommission and the Annual National Programme, which is the same as the Membership Action Plan.56. Georgia is in a better position today than Lithuania was before joining NATO. Lithuania did not have any programmes anddid not have any feedback. There are some opponents of Georgia’s membership but this only means that Georgia shouldconvince the sceptics with its successful reforms, particularly democratic, electoral and judicial reforms, as well as security anddefence sector reforms. It is important not to get frustrated and continue moving forward, concluded Ambassador Linkevicius.57. H.E. Philip Dimitrov, Head of the EU delegation to Georgia, confirmed that Georgia is moving ahead in its co-operation withthe EU. Georgia and the EU have started negotiations on the Association Agreement and on the Comprehensive TradeAgreement. A lot has been achieved during the past 7 years but a lot remains to be achieved.58. Some Georgians say that Europe has not been interested in Georgia since the war. It is not a fair statement because theEuropean Union is engaged in hundreds of programmes with Georgia. Georgia is not abandoned.59. Ambassador concluded by encouraging Georgia “You should be able to appreciate being that close. Being a part of family isnot a gift but a fact of life, it means sharing the same values and common efforts”.VI. GEORGIA’S DEMOCRATISATION AGENDA: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTSThe session was moderated by Eden COLE, Deputy Head, Operations NIS & Head, Asia Task Force, the Geneva Centre forthe Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)A. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, ROLE OF OPPOSITION60. Ghia Nodia, Chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, stated in his presentation that allparties have two points of consensus: 1) democracy is the only way of development for Georgia and 2) Georgia is not fullydemocratic. International experts say that Georgia has a mixed system – it is not democratic and it is not authoritarian. Whydoes Georgia have a democratic deficit?61. Some say that Saakashvili is too authoritarian and that the government is too arrogant. But when you ask the Georgianpeople if they should be replaced, the people have doubts. Another aspect is the Constitution, which is not democratic enough;it gives too many powers to the President. But the problem is partially solved with new Constitutional changes of October 2010.These changes provide for a mixed system with more emphasis on the parliament. They will come into force in 2013. Thespeaker thought that Georgia would not have a consolidated democracy in 2013 but it is moving in the right direction. Thepriority is to disperse power and to develop democratic processes.62. Giorgi Targamadze, the Parliamentary Minority Leader, noted that today, Georgia is at a crossroads. If political partiessucceed in changing the election environment fundamentally and restoring trust towards the election process, the winningpolitical force in a fair competition will continue to govern the country. It is highly likely that this governing force will be mixture ofdifferent political forces as all previously conducted surveys indicate, and the present ruling party might also be a part of thiscoalition.63. Improvement of the election environment means a number of reforms in the following fields: administration resources,media, finances, transparency, system for electoral disputes, etc. In this regard, the government needs to consider all theinternal and external factors and start relevant reforms immediately. Otherwise, Georgia will continue to be governed either bya usurper of power with a soft authoritarian model or by radical forces which will come to power by toppling the currentgovernment as a result of revolution.64. The two most radical political parties in Georgia are talking intensely about inevitable revolutionary changes, therefore, areal threat emerges that demonstrators may escalate the situation in Tbilisi streets by burning cars and breaking shop-windows.In this case, the law enforcement bodies will unquestionably attempt to stabilise the situation which might easily causecasualties, detention of opposition leaders, and the closure of pro-opposition TV stations. Finally, it will result in a full de-legitimization of the Georgian government, and this is where the threat lies of Russia’s military engagement in the process.65. Russia will take “responsibility” for stabilising the escalated political situation in Georgia, and will try to justify its actionssaying that they are helping Georgians to get rid of their illegitimate government. It is quite possible for the situation to escalatein Georgia in the immediate future, which could be followed by a second wave of Russian aggression.66. The Christian Democratic Movement of Georgia, which Mr Targamadze represents, fully supports Georgia’s Euro-Atlanticaspirations and openly champions Georgia’s participation in the joint efforts for strengthening global security, including the ISAF

operation.B. MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GEORGIA67. Louis Navarro, Head of the National Democratic Institute in Georgia, said that NDI has worked in Georgia since 1994, andhas conducted programs in political party development, parliamentary strengthening, safeguarding elections, civil societydevelopment, women’s political participation, local governance and conducted public opinion research examining citizens’attitudes toward reforms.68. In July 2010, NDI conducted an opinion poll on public attitudes towards elections in Georgia, which showed that that themost important national issues of concern for population are: unemployment, territorial integrity, poverty and pensions. The pollalso showed that the economic development was not related to the democratic development. 46% of people polled said thatGeorgia was not a democracy yet, while 33% believed that it was. For most people polled democracy meant “freedom ofspeech”, “equality before law/protection of justice, and “liberty”. 38 % of people polled identified “independence of judiciary” asthe most important reform for Georgia to be carried out and 20 % identified “electoral reform” as the most important on theagenda.69. Mr Navarro also commented on the development of the NGOs in Georgia. He noted that there is a considerableimprovement in transparency and accountability. Today it is much easier to start an NGO. There is a new NGO liaison office,which can develop legislation. However, there is also a disproportional reliance on international funding and a lack of culture.The Government sees NGOs as the opposition force and it made it difficult for private sector to support NGOs (taxes are toohigh).70. Robert Parson, Director of PIK TV channel, noted that the Georgian media are “partly free”, according to Freedom House’sannual index of global media freedom in April 2010, a view pretty much adhered to by Reporters Without Borders, which rankedGeorgia 99th out of 178 countries in its annual survey last October.71. The government does not have a monopoly over the news. Kavkasia TV and Maestro make no secret of their anti-Saakashvili position, although their reach is limited to the Tbilisi area and a few other key cities like Rustavi and Batumi but thatmakes up at least 30 per cent of the population.72. The same can be said of radio and the print media. If you’re a Georgian, it’s not difficult to find a wide spectrum of politicalviews in the national and regional media. The problem with the Georgian media is that they so accurately reflect the nationalpolitical culture. This is a polarised society in which the media behave like rival cheer-leaders at a football game. Georgiantelevision not only reflects the polarisation of society but also plays a critical part in sharpening and hardening its divisions.There may be pluralism of views but it is not contributing to freedom of speech.73. There has been some attempt to correct this. The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) now has a board of governors thatmakes some attempt to reflect the spectrum of political views. The GPB has launched its very own C-SPAN, Channel 2, whichgives every political party or group the airtime to state its views but the format in which it operates is so indigestible that no onewants to watch it. This is also true of the GPB in general. Despite efforts to improve its output, viewing figures remaindepressingly low - 3 per cent of the national audience, according to President Saakashvili himself.74. Beyond the GPB the picture is bleaker: the two biggest commercial stations are Rustavi Ori and Imedi, which bothbroadcast nationwide. These are slick, professional organisations that devote considerable attention to presentation of theirproduct - although the accent is more on entertainment than news. Professional standards in the news area are no better thananywhere else in the Georgian media - and the content is very pro-government. There are no strong media unions to defend therights of journalists and faith in the independence of the judiciary is weak. Other problems include: the pressure to conform, thetemptation to self-censorship, the lack of professional pride, the absence of a middle-ground and the absence of an institutionalsupport base for high quality objective journalism.75. Kanal PIK - Pervyi Informatsionnyi Kavkazskii (First Caucasian News), which Mr Parsons represents, is a part of the nationalmedia environment but its prime audience is not in Georgia but beyond Georgia’s borders - and it broadcasts in Russian notGeorgian. Part of the purpose of this channel is diplomatic. The only way the channel can gain the trust of its audience is bybeing honest, open, fair and balanced.76. And there is a need in the Caucasus for a channel like this - one that is open, independent and impartial in a region that isdominated by the Russian media. The Kremlin has enjoyed a virtual monopoly over information in the North Caucasus and,albeit to a lesser degree, through the penetration of Russian television to Armenia and Azerbaijan. To a very large extent, thepeoples of this region - outside of Georgia - receive their information about this country through the distorting prism of theRussian media. One of the aims of Kanal PIK is to present a fuller, more nuanced, more honest and less aggressive picture ofGeorgia.

The session was moderated by Dennis SAMMUT, Executive Director, LINKSA. SOUTH CAUCASUS77. Richard Giragosian, Director of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies, warned the participants of thedanger of escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh because there was a high level of provocation. He noted that it wasnot a zero-sum game. There is the question of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. There is a high level of frustration due to alack of progress and the status quo is unacceptable for both sides.78. Armenia has demonstrated that it could be a contributor to security but it has never claimed NATO membership. The threatto Armenia is related to its isolation and the possibility it could become a Russian garrison. Mr Giragosian stressed that theArmenian-Turkish relations should be improved and all sides should focus on the present and future and not be locked on thepast. Georgia should play a more significant role in the process of finding a solution to the problem.79. Russia benefits from tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh because it wants to deploy its peacekeepers. Mr Giragosian warnedthat if tensions continue, there could be another war.80. Erkin Gadirli, legal researcher and civic activist from Azerbaijan, noted in his presentation, that Armenia, Azerbaijan andGeorgia have in the past been in the Persian, Turkish, Russian and Soviet Empires. All these Empires influenced thesecountries differently. Today, Russia has a bad relationship with Georgia but a good one with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkeyhas good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia but not with Armenia. Iran has bad relations with Azerbaijan but good relationswith Armenia and Georgia. Azerbaijan and Georgia have strategic interdependence when it comes to energy security. WithoutGeorgia, Azerbaijan does not have entry to the world market. Azerbaijan-Armenia relations are very complicated; there is no co-operation in any area. Azerbaijan is ready for co-operation as soon as Armenia frees the occupied territories.81. Role of Russia is very significant in the region with a Russian military base in Armenia and it’s investments in Armenia’seconomic sphere. Russia owns Armenia both economically and politically. If Azerbaijan wants to talk to Armenia, it has tonegotiate with Russia. When Russia asked the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to come to Moscow for negotiations,people started to believe that something might change after these talks but the Presidents came back and nothing happened.Then there was the Turkish initiative, which was welcomed by the Azeri people. If Turkey could improve its relations withArmenia, then it would be the only country to have good relations with all three countries of the South Caucasus. Turkey couldhave used soft power to influence the process. However, the Turkish initiative failed and the only country that gained from it isRussia because it guards the border between Armenia and Turkey.82. The EU should play a more important role in the region. The EU lost an opportunity by abolishing the position of the EUrepresentative. The EU should not endorse the political elite in both countries.83. Mitati Celikpala, Associate professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University (Istanbul, Turkey), emphasized thatTurkey has concerns about this region and it has changed its position recently to be involved more in the region as a soft power.However, it is not an easy task because Turkey is a member of NATO and it is negotiating membership with the EU. Turkeyfinds itself more in the West, although Black Sea security is very important. Turkey acts in the region as a representative fromthe West.84. Turkey is trying to change to multi-dimensional diplomacy and it is a learning process. Turkey supports Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and its territorial integrity. Georgia is one of Turkey’s most important trade partners after Azerbaijan.85. Frozen conflicts have a direct effect on Turkey’s domestic situation. After the war in 2008, Turkey’s economic infrastructurewas damaged considerably (pipelines stopped, roads were closed and trade ships could not get through).86. Mr Celikpala regretted that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was not a success. He said that more positive publicopinion should be created in both countries and that talks should be reconvened.B. NORTH CAUCASUS87. Andrei Piontkovsky, Leading Researcher at the Institute for Systems Analysis at the Russian Academy of Science, notedthat the violence in the North Caucasus was becoming less a serious regional conflict and more an existential threat to theentire Russian Federation. The war against separatism in the North Caucasus has now evolved into the war against Islamicfundamentalism. Ignited by the violence of the Chechen wars, Islamic-sponsored terrorism spread widely in the region, asRussian policies, similar to those during the Chechen war, are increasing the number of Islamists. President Medvedev, forexample, is regularly calling for the extremists to be “burned to ashes” and for everybody to be punished, including those“washing linen and preparing soup for terrorists.” Such appeals could only result in a significant increase in brutality.88. Russia has lost the war against Chechen separatists. The winner is Ramzan Kadyrom, although he is a Putin appointee butin reality he is virtually independent from the Kremlin. The tribute that the Kremlin pays Kadyrom and the corrupted elites of theother Caucasian republics has purchased palaces and gold pistols for men who are driving the region’s young, unemployed anddisadvantaged down the path of Islamic revolution. Across the Caucasus, young people have grown up absolutely lost to Russiaand increasingly susceptible to recruitment in the ranks of Allah’s warriors. There is a big mental gap today that separates

Russian and the youth of the Caucasus. Young Muscovites hate the Caucasians, who behave increasingly provocative on thestreets of Russian cities.89. But neither the Kremlin nor its North Caucasian allies are ready for formal separation. The former remains wedded to itsphantom imperial illusions about a “zone of privileged interests”, while the latter are happy to take handouts from the Russianstate budget.90. Alex Rondeli, Chairman of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, said that the North Caucasusremains not only the most insecure area of Russia but also on Europe’s borderland. Continuing instability and violence in theregion poses serious security problems to the neighbouring South Caucasus states.91. Since the collapse of the USSR, the North Caucasus has never been calm and Chechnya remained the primary trouble spotof the region. The first and second Chechen wars made the region known to the whole world. Former President Putinsucceeded in convincing the world that Chechnya had been calmed. However, in reality, a low-level insurgency continued andviolence and terrorist attacks escalated in 2009 and 2010.92. Several issues contributed to further deterioration of the situation in the region: “chechenization” policy, confrontationbetween Inrushes and Ossetians, territorial mergers, and the Russification of the region. The most important change in thepolitical and security situation in the North Caucasus is the growing Islamization of the anti-Russian resistance. The fact that thenew generation that grew up in Chechnya had very few ties with Russia has contributed to the spread of radical Islamism in thewhole region. Radical Islamization resulted in its institutionalization with the creation of the so called “Caucasian Emirate”, whichwas announced by Doku Umarov in 2007. It marked the transition from a nationalist-separatist Chechen resistance to a diffuseregional Jihad. The military capabilities of the Emirate so far do not allow for serious military actions but are sufficient for attackson security forces as well as suicide attacks.93. Russia’s strategy in the region has been mainly the use of force and suppression. Only recently, Russia changed its strategyinto a more sophisticated approach: improving the general atmosphere and developing business in the region. Economic andsocial conditions in the region are one of the worst in Russia. Even during the Soviet times, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestanwere the most heavily subsidized (up to 70%) regions of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the USSR, the region’s socio-economic situation was further aggravated. Without improving the economic and social conditions, not much can be achievedpolitically and in the security sphere.94. The situation in the region will deteriorate more if Russia: 1) fails to improve governance and socio-economic conditions andgive jobs and hope to the region’s population; 2) if security fails to neutralize radical and terrorist networks with moresophisticated methods and not simply brutally reacting to events; 3) if radical Islamism strengthens its positions in Afghanistanand other countries.95. For Georgia, peace and stability in the North Caucasus is of primary importance. Any negative development in the NorthCaucasus may have dramatic consequences for Georgia. Georgia is trying to re-establish good relations with the NorthCaucasus by improving Georgia’s image and abolishing the visa regime for the inhabitants of North Caucasus.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS96. Giorgi Kandelaki concluded that the seminar was a success and that it was informative and useful. He agreed that Georgiashould play a more active role in developing independent media, civil society and NGOs as well as continuing reforms in otherimportant areas.97. He reminded participants that there was a threat of further escalation of the conflict due to the militarization of the occupiedterritories.98. Mr Kandelaki reiterates the words of Ambassador Linas Linkevicius that Georgia successfully fulfills the Annual NationalPlan, which is basically Membership Action Plan. And he concluded by saying: “Georgia does not have a plan “B”, it has onlyplan “A” – membership in the Alliance. Georgia’s success will help the region and its failure will damage the region”.99. Assen Agov noted his regret that the Russian delegation was not present to participate in the discussion. He reiterated thatthis seminar was a demonstration of the Assembly’s sustained commitment and support for the region and Georgia in particular.The progress Georgia had made in reforms is remarkable but challenges remain, particularly in relations with Russia. Georgiahas to find the way, with the help of the international community, to normalize relations with its neighbour. The resolution of thisissue would certainly remove the major roadblock on the path towards implementing the vision of a secure, free and prosperousGeorgia.100. In terms of domestic politics, Mr Agov noted that the greatest challenge was reducing polarization. The normalization of thepolitical dialogue is not only important as a value in itself, but also because of the possible implications for the regional securitysituation.101. However, despite problems and setbacks, the principal message that the participants will bring back is that Georgia is