NPA, Alm.del - 2009-10 - Bilag 31: Optegnelser fra komitéerne fra forårssessionen i Riga i 2010

II. Presentation by Zaneta Ozolina, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Latvia on Human Security -Addressing New Dimensions2. Zaneta Ozolina explained that the rapid emergence of the concept of human security in the early 1990s reflects atransformation in the security environment, a shift from a state-centric approach to security to what can be referred to as societalsecurity. Human security is now universally defined as “the state of being free from fear and free from want”. However, theconcept includes a number of less-known additional elements: the universal character of human security; the interdependencebetween its different components; early prevention as the best way to guarantee human security; and a recognition that thesecurity concerns of individual men and women are not always best served by the security priorities of their governments.3. The majority of studies and policies relating to human security is targeted at developing countries, yet, according to MsOzolina, human security should be integrated into the security policies of all countries. Additionally, it should not be consideredonly as a part of foreign and security policy, but of domestic policy as well. It was important to note also that human securityincludes both an objective element – economic and social benefits, democratic institutions and values, etc. – and a subjectiveelement – a feeling of security.4. Ms Ozolina argued that new approaches and solutions are needed to address the new dimensions of human security. Theserequired “investments” in a number of areas:- better addressing human security-relevant areas of development cooperation;- developing civilian capabilities for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstructions missions;- including human security in public policies;- increasing the citizens’ feeling of security;- focusing more on policies applicable at the micro level;- developing human security components of military capabilities, and bridging the gap between military and other dimensions ofsecurity;- building local knowledge and a cross-sectoral understanding of security;- and addressing human security issues in the transatlantic area.5. Questions raised in the discussion highlighted the relevance of the human security concept with regard to conflict and post-conflict situations such as Afghanistan, Somalia or Georgia, as well as with regard to many global challenges, e.g. pandemics,climate change, cyber-security, organised crime. Violence against women, as well as the contribution of women toreconstruction in war-torn societies, are also important dimensions of the human security concept.6. Ms Ozolina also stressed that cooperation needs to be established and strengthened between the national and internationallevels, as well as among international bodies, in addressing human security concerns. In particular, NATO and the EuropeanUnion need to share rather than divide responsibility. Latvia, she argued, has often suffered from ideological fights about NATO-EU relations. In her view, while NATO already addresses several aspects of human security, this will never be the Alliance’sprimary responsibility. NATO, however, needs to cooperate better with those international bodies, particularly the UnitedNations, which have already developed notions and policies emphasizing the importance of human security.

8. Another key challenge, according to Mr Délétroz, is religious fundamentalism, and in particular the destabilising influence ofthe Pakistani Taliban. Mr Délétroz cited indications that a growing number of Central Asian militants are trained in Pakistan andsent to fight in Afghanistan, before “vanishing into thin air”. There are also signs that the Pakistani Taliban control a growingshare of drug trafficking originating in Afghanistan.9. The nature of the political regimes in these countries poses another challenge. In Mr Délétroz’s assessment, Turkmenistanand Uzbekistan have the most autocratic regimes. In addition, in Uzbekistan, the lack of prospects for a youth representingsome 70% of the population provides a fertile ground for recruitment by fundamentalists. The Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik regimeshave also become more repressive. However, the recent overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan was a significant eventfor all leaders in the region, Mr Délétroz noted.10. The suppression of secular opposition movements throughout the region creates a situation in which the Islamic oppositionis the only structured and capable alternative to the regime, Mr Délétroz warned. He therefore called on Western governmentsto continue to support dissident voices in those countries where they remain, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.Economic assistance should focus on the two most fragile states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In Mr Délétroz’s view, a seriousrisk of destabilisation exists in Tajikistan this winter if authorities again fail to address the energy crisis.11. Mr Délétroz also pointed to the absence of cooperation between the five states and lack of implementation of regionalagreements. For instance, despite regional agreements on the free movement of goods across borders, Uzbek authoritiesimpose a permanent blockade of their border with Tajikistan allegedly for security reasons. Russia’s pressure on Uzbekistanhas so far been unsuccessful, and Mr Délétroz called on other partners to help solve this issue as well.12. Mr Délétroz described the “great game” currently unfolding among major powers – Russia, China, and Western allies – overtheir respective influence in the region. Links with China were growing rapidly, surpassing Russia in many areas. Russia retainsa strong influence in the region, particularly through its links with the political and security establishments. However, accordingto Mr Délétroz, its diplomatic prestige was tarnished in particular by its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Mr Délétrozargued that Russia also needs to become a soft power in the region, building on the continuing appeal of Russian culture in theregion. Most importantly, dialogue and cooperation between all major regional powers are essential, Mr Délétroz emphasized,as Russia, China and Western allies would all be affected by a destabilisation of Central Asia.13. Answering questions on Iran’s role in the region, Mr Délétroz agreed that Tehran is a stabilising force with regard to thedrug issue, especially since Iran is directly affected by a sharp increase in drug consumption among its youth, and its territoryprovides the main route for exporting Afghan drugs. Nevertheless, developing cooperation with Iran in the current circumstancesis very difficult. Mr Délétroz also insisted that there are no indications of Iran playing a destabilising role by supporting Islamicextremism. Overall, Iran’s influence in the region remains limited, except in Tajikistan, with which it shares cultural and linguisticlinks.

IV. Consideration of the draft General Report Maritime Security: NATO and EU Roles and Coordination by Lord Jopling(United Kingdom) [043 CDS 10 E]14. The General Rapporteur stressed the timeliness and relevance of a report on maritime security, pointing out that 90% ofglobal trade and about half of the world’s oil are transported by sea, and that the global financial and economic crisis makes thefreedom and security of the sea even more important. In an evolving security environment, states face a broad array of maritimethreats, ranging from traditional security concerns to non-traditional threats, and natural and industrial disasters at sea. TheGeneral Rapporteur argued that addressing these threats requires a new strategic approach that should be inter-agency, co-operative and comprehensive, allowing navies to assume new roles and tasks while maintaining their capability in traditionalmaritime warfare.15. Lord Jopling emphasised that NATO is not a new player at sea. Collective defence at sea has been a traditional task of theAlliance. NATO is also responding to non-traditional threats through maritime operations such as Active Endeavour, NATO’scounterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean, and Ocean Shield, NATO’s contribution to counter-piracy efforts off the coastof Somalia. In addition, the Alliance has developed security cooperation at sea with a broad range of partners.16. Lord Jopling referred to current reflections on NATO’s contribution to maritime security, including discussions on a newAlliance Maritime Strategy, a Maritime Security Operations Concept, and NATO’s new Strategic Concept. In his view, it isdifficult to imagine NATO doing much more than it already does in such areas as counter-piracy or other law enforcement tasksat sea. However, in other areas, such as maritime surveillance, maritime capacity-building and crisis response, NATO shouldconsider ways in which it can act more effectively, by better utilizing member states’ capabilities, as well as enhancing NATO’sown procedures and capabilities.17. The European Union is gradually moving towards an Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in an effort to rationalise and connectexisting EU policies with a maritime dimension. Lord Jopling noted however that the security dimensions of the IMP are stillrelatively limited, with the exception of initiatives on maritime surveillance. The General Rapporteur also acknowledged the EU’sdeveloping ability to generate naval assets and capabilities, as demonstrated by its counter-piracy operation off the coast ofSomalia (EUNAVFOR). As NATO, the EU is also currently debating its future contribution to maritime security, and Lord Joplinginformed members that the revised report would include details on recent developments.18. Lord Jopling concluded his presentation by emphasizing that international co-ordination and co-operation provide added

value through enhanced maritime domain awareness and greater response capacity. He called on NATO and the EU to avoidduplication at all cost, to enhance coordination and cooperation with other international organizations and regional initiatives, toreach out to new partners in tackling maritime security, and to develop links with the private sector.19. Comments from members of the Committee stressed the ongoing challenge posed by the prosecution of pirates. LordJopling agreed that a regional solution was best, but noted that the resources and capacities of regional states were limited andthe Kenyan judicial system in particular was already reaching its limits. He agreed that reference should be made in the updatedreport of United Nations Security Council resolution 1918 of 27 April 2010, which requests the UN Secretary General, within 3months, to present options for the prosecution of pirates.20. Asked whether the report suggested a global role for NATO, the General Rapporteur argued that, unless a situation fallswithin the scope of article 5 or a specific decision is taken to intervene, NATO cannot be responsible for all types of maritimeincidents worldwide. It would be preferable to be able to rely on other regional organisations to respond to events in theirgeographic area of responsibility. As far as NATO-EU coordination is concerned, the General Rapporteur acknowledged thatcurrent problems are connected with the Cyprus issue and took note of comments from the Turkish delegation that cooperationunder the agreed framework can only improve if both NATO and the EU adopt a forthcoming approach.21. Members of the Committee also raised several additional points:- the close cooperation already existing on maritime security in the Baltic Sea, and the need to include the Russian Federation;- the need for a closer examination of the situation in the High North / the Artic region in the report;- the need to address the proliferation of torpedoes;- the threat of terror mining and the importance of mine countermeasures capabilities;- the problem of ageing naval capabilities and the importance of new technologies;- the importance of maintaining naval capabilities for shallow water environments;- unresolved issues regarding the delimitation of the EU’s external maritime borders.The General Rapporteur agreed to include these points in the revised report.

V. Consideration of the draft Special Report Governance Challenges in Afghanistan [045 CDSDG 10 E] by VitalinoCanas (Portugal), Special Rapporteur22. The Special Rapporteur stressed that 2010 would be a decisive year for Afghanistan, yet many challenges remain beforeAfghanistan can become a prosperous, stable and democratic state. While the report focuses on governance challenges, MrCanas emphasised that governance, security and development are pieces of the same puzzle and therefore need to beaddressed together as part of a comprehensive strategy.23. At the central level of government, the report points to three main challenges:- the balance of powers between a powerful President and an increasingly assertive but still weak National Assembly;- the need to address the shortcomings revealed during last year’s presidential and provincial elections in time for theSeptember parliamentary elections; and- national reconciliation with those elements of the insurgency that respect the Constitution, lay down their arms, and decide toparticipate in the political process.24. A lot remains to be done also in terms of local governance, Mr Canas emphasized. For years, empowering the centralgovernment was the primary focus of state building. Local governance and local capacity building have only recently beenincluded in strategies for achieving sustainable security. Nonetheless, Mr Canas pointed to positive experiences, particularly inHelmand.25. In the area of the rule of law, Mr Canas mentioned three main challenges:- widespread corruption, which undermines governance both directly and indirectly, as only a small share of internationalassistance is channelled through Afghan institutions;- justice reform, which also needs to include a strategy for integrating the formal and informal justice systems; and- the illicit drug economy, which continues to pose a serious challenge to the establishment of the rule of law despite recentprogress.26. Mr Canas argued that international efforts have initially been hampered by narrow mandates, limited resources, theunstable security situation, and the absence of a shared long-term strategy and clear division of labour. In his view, thecombination of a more coherent and Afghan-led effort and NATO’s new counterinsurgency strategy provide a genuineopportunity for decisive progress on the governance front. However, he warned that transition to full Afghan ownership willrequire resources, patience and resolve; it cannot mean a rush to the exit door.27. In the discussion, members of the Committee stressed that good governance is still a long way ahead in Afghanistan andcan only be achieved if competent people are put in place; yet, the Afghan government has not delivered on its promises to

bring change, and the international community continues to work with officials whose competence is questionable. Morebroadly, members emphasized that educating and training a new cadre of Afghan officials and civil servants is a hugechallenge, and will require the development of capacity-building programmes at all levels of society.28. The Turkish delegation put forward a number of specific amendments:- include a reference to the need for a regional approach in the description of NATO’s new counterinsurgency strategy inparagraph 99;- remove the word “model” in paragraph 100 when referring to Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and- delete the reference to the Kandahar campaign as a key test for NATO in paragraph 102.Mr Canas took note of these suggested amendments.29. Mati Raidma (E) presented the main findings of the visit of a NATO PA delegation to Afghanistan on 24-28 April 2010. Thedelegation met with Afghan and NATO officials in Kabul, and travelled to Regional Commands South and East, including a firstvisit of a NATO PA delegation to the new Detention Facility in Parwan. Mr Raidma concurred with Mr Canas that challengesremain enormous, but noted that the visit provided cause for cautious optimism. Operations in the South will test NATO’scounterinsurgency strategy, a strategy widely praised by Afghan officials.30. The delegation learned that preparations for a transition of the lead responsibility for security to the Afghan national securityforces were ongoing. However, this process faced serious challenges, both on the side of the ANSF – resource and capabilityshortfalls as well as widespread illiteracy and drug use, high attrition rates and a dearth of leadership –, and on the side of theinternational community – shortfalls in NATO and EU trainers in particular. Additionally, Afghan and NATO officials stressed thattransition should not be a euphemism for a premature exit strategy.31. Discussions with Afghan leaders on reconciliation and reintegration highlighted that this process can only succeed if anumber of conditions are met, including:- a clear military advantage on the ground for the coalition;- an attractive reintegration package for those Taliban supporters who are not ideological hardliners;- and an end to Pakistan’s support for the insurgency.32. Although they were worried about the risk of renewed fraud, Afghan parliamentarians insisted that parliamentary electionsshould take place as scheduled in September 2010; these, in their view, would provide a fresh source of legitimacy following thecontroversy over the presidential election last year.

VI. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance The Western Balkans, 15 yearsafter Dayton: Achievements and Prospects [044 CDSDG 10 E] by Marc Angel (Luxembourg), Rapporteur33. The Rapporteur argued that at a time when NATO looks to the future and discusses its new Strategic Concept, it isimportant to remember that there is still unfinished business on Europe’s borders. He explained that the report attempts toprovide a realistic assessment of the situation in the Western Balkans, one which acknowledges achievements, while alsorecognising that areas of fragility remain on the way to a full normalisation of the region.34. Among the main achievements of the past 15 years, Mr. Angel cited:- the establishment of a zone of security and prosperity, in which armed conflict has become unacceptable;- the consolidation of independent states in the region, despite persistent problems particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina;- the prosecution of war criminals in international and local courts;- the development of a dense network of regional cooperation structures.Mr Angel stressed that much of this progress was made possible through the strong impetus and pressure coming from theinternational community.35. Nevertheless, the international community’s record in the Balkans is mixed, Mr Angel argued. Key achievements includethe stabilisation of the security situation, NATO and EU integration processes and defence reform. Mr Angel also emphasizedhow interventions in the Balkans have deeply transformed the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. International institutions havebeen less successful in preventing conflict, however, with the exception of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.36. Mr Angel cited two key remaining challenges for the region: the consolidation of truly multiethnic institutions andreconciliation. Additionally, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are particularly problematic cases, Mr Angel stated. Delays inthe implementation of key reforms and the worsened political climate in Sarajevo are cause for concern. However, the Octobergeneral elections provide an opportunity to demonstrate that Bosnia is ready to move beyond the current deadlock andresolutely towards EU and NATO integration, Mr Angel argued. Kosovo also continues to face many challenges, including thelack of universal recognition on the international arena, and internal challenges relating to governance, rule of law, economicdevelopment, and, most importantly, the integration of the Serb population. Mr Angel concluded that maintaining as much as

possible the unity and clarity of international action is essential, and that KFOR and EULEX need to continue to be seen asneutral and legitimate partners by Pristina, Belgrade and the local Albanian and Serb populations.37. Members of the Committee raised the following points in the discussion:- the impact of the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia on Croatia’s EU integration process, versus its lack of impacton Croatia joining NATO last year;- concerns regarding indications of an active programme of construction of mosques in Albanian-speaking regions of the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia financed from abroad;- the limited opportunities for the Croat community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to influence decision-making;- constitutional reform – and a reaffirmation of the equality of the three constituent people – as the key to moving beyond thecurrent crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina;- the need for the report to include a greater focus on prospects for the region.38. A number of specific amendments were put forward by different delegations:- include data on Kosovo’s ethnic composition and official languages in table 2 (LT);- add a sentence welcoming NATO’s decision to grant a Membership Action Plan to Bosnia and Herzegovina (TR);- refer to Kosovo in a differentiated manner in appendixes 2 and 3 (RS);- include a reference to the number of internally displaced Serbs during the Kosovo conflict (RS);- recognise Serbia’s active participation in Partnership for Peace despite its parliamentary declared status of neutrality (RS).The Rapporteur agreed to include these amendments in the revised report.39. Konstantin Samofalov (RS) also stated Serbia’s position regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. He affirmed thatSerbia, as one of the guarantors of the Dayton peace accords, would not question Bosnia and Herzegovina’s borders orterritorial integrity, and would accept any decision taken in accordance with the Constitution. On Kosovo, he stated that Serbiawould never recognize Kosovo’s independence, and was fully committed to a new round of status negotiations following theadoption by the International Court of Justice of its advisory opinion. Serbia had “agreed to disagree” with those of its partnersthat have recognised Kosovo, and, in the meantime, it was determined to pursue cooperation with them and speed up EUintegration.VII. Activities in 201040. Hendrik Jan Ormel (NL), Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance, briefly informed members about theSub-Committee’s visit to Georgia at the beginning of April 2010. He mentioned that the delegation was able to witness first-handthe impact of the conflict and the deep personal tragedies it created by visiting Gori, the administrative border line with SouthOssetia, and a camp for internally displaced persons. He called on the Assembly to keep Georgia high on its agenda.41. The Acting Chairperson informed members of upcoming visits in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (open only toCommittee and Sub-Committee officers), in the United States, and in Serbia, as well as of the Committee’s planned participationin NATO’s disaster response exercise in Armenia.VIII. Any other business42. The Acting Chairperson informed members that Bruce George (UK), Dennis Moore (US) and Michael Clapham (UK) wouldbe leaving the Assembly, and thanked them for their exceptional contribution throughout the years.43. She thanked the Latvian Delegation and their staff for organising a successful session in Riga and closed the meeting.