1.      The 9/11 attacks highlighted Pakistan’s strategic importance for international security. Islamabad’s co-operation is
crucial for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, for the fight against
internationally active terrorist groups, but also for tackling the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.
Despite broad agreement about Pakistan’s pivotal role in these areas, views
differ on whether Pakistan is more a part of the problem than a part of the
solution. This brief report tries to shed light on Islamabad’s security
policies, particularly those that relate to NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. The paper argues that Pakistan’s contributions to Afghanistan’s stability have
not received the recognition they deserve. But Islamabad can do more to help
stabilise its north-western neighbour. To that end, the NATO Allies and NATO as
an organisation should engage more fully with Pakistan and provide technical
assistance, training and develop a political dialogue.
II.
Pakistan and the
stability of Afghanistan
2.      Since 9/11, Pakistan has become a front-line state in defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban and has a key role in
stabilising Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan have very strong historical and cultural links and the security of both countries is closely intertwined.
Developments in Afghanistan will have a profound impact on Pakistan. Likewise, events in Pakistan will impact the security of Afghanistan. In the 1980s, Pakistan played a crucial part in helping to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation. At one point, an estimated 30 to 35% of the Afghan
population was living in Pakistan as refugees.Â
3.      Pakistani troops are making a
meaningful contribution in fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Islamabad has shared intelligence and its security forces have arrested a number of key
al-Qaeda operatives. Moreover, last year alone, Pakistan apprehended several
hundred suspected Taliban and handed over most of them to the Afghan
Government. Despite Pakistan’s limited resources, it is contributing to
reconstruction and development programmes in Afghanistan and has pledged US$300
million, of which approximately US$110 million have already been disbursed.
However, Pakistan has not yet succeeded in tackling the problem of insurgency
in Afghanistan and in dealing with the rise of “Talibanisation†in its tribal
areas.Â
4.      In addition, Pakistan is giving shelter to between 2.8 and 3.2 million Afghan refugees. During the visit
of the Sub-Committee to Pakistan in March this year, Prime Minister Aziz and
other senior Pakistani government officials underlined Pakistan’s total
commitment to a stable Afghanistan which would be in the “strategic, economic,
political and security interest of Pakistanâ€. They pointed out that Islamabad has stationed 80,000 troops and set up
1,000 checkpoints along the porous border in contrast to only 100
checkpoints on the Afghan side. What is more, several
hundred Pakistani soldiers have been killed over the last years, considerably
more than ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) has lost thus far
during operations in Afghanistan. Taliban influence in
the frontier provinces, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) as well in Afghan refugee camps in Baluchistan, weakens Islamabad’s
authority.Â
5.      But Pakistan has also been
criticised for not doing enough to support the government in Kabul. There are
reports that Pashtun tribes in Pakistan's border areas have been sheltering
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. There is mounting pressure on Islamabad from
coalition partners and the Afghan government to intensify its efforts to check
cross-border movement of suspected Taliban militants. An
estimated 30,000 people cross the Afghan-Pakistani border every day, the
Sub-Committee was informed during its visit. Pakistani
proposals to build a fence and lay land mines on the 2,250 km-long border with
Afghanistan would not stop the infiltration of foreigners. Because of the
rugged terrain, implementation would be difficult. What is more, such a move would alienate the Pashtun, who live on both sides of
the border, and further limit their willingness to co-operate with Islamabad
and ISAF. Pashtuns make up 40% of Afghanistan, but
there are more Pashtuns in Pakistan, where they constitute 15% percent of the
population. Similarly, Pakistan’s
announced plan to relocate those refugee camps that are close to the border
with Afghanistan to the Afghan side would probably only aggravate the plight of
refugees rather than solve existing problems. Illegal
border crossings can only be prevented if Pakistan and Afghanistan improve
co-operation.Â
6.      The growing insurgency in the
provinces bordering the Pakistan-Afghan frontier have led to a deterioration of
bilateral relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Moreover, Afghan officials,
including President Karzai, have repeatedly maintained that Islamabad continues
to actively interfere in Afghanistan and tries to destabilise it, a claim that
Pakistani officials persistently deny. They stress that Pakistan has nothing to gain from a “Talibanisation†of Afghanistan.
President Pervez Musharraf and other Pakistani leaders
have repeatedly criticised Afghanistan for trying to place the blame for its
own failure on Pakistan. They have stressed that the lack of a comprehensive
reconstruction effort, shortcomings in national reconciliation, delays in
building up the country’s physical and institutional infrastructure, and the
nexus between drugs and militancy compound the security situation in
Afghanistan. Pakistani officials also point out that Kabul has not enough
border posts along the frontier to monitor cross-border movements. Moreover,
Kabul still refuses to recognise the Durand line as the international border
between the two countries and once claimed Pashtun
tribal areas in Pakistan as part of Afghanistan.Â
7.      Critics say that elements of the
Pakistani security forces remain sympathetic to the Taliban and that they may
not necessarily see Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy as being in Pakistan’s
interest. These critics have argued that Pakistan wanted to maintain the
Taliban as a strategic option in case Afghanistan dissolved into civil war and
chaos once again. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri dismissed such allegations in meetings with the Sub‑Committee.
However, the Foreign Minister and other senior
officials in Islamabad acknowledged
that there is “some sympathy for the Taliban in
Pakistan’s border regionsâ€. Pakistani interlocutors attributed this to the
fact that some of the groups that are today called
“Taliban†were previously called mujahideen and were considered allies in the
fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The US and their allies
supported them with weapons and money. Many of the “foreign†Islamist fighters
have been living in the country for years and have meanwhile intermarried with
local Pashtuns.
8.      Pakistan’s policy towards
Afghanistan is shaped by its geographical location. A sense of “encirclementâ€
is prevalent among the military and political leaderships. In addition to a
fragile Afghanistan, whose instability threatens to “spill over†to its own
soil, Pakistan’s relations with India have been marked by tensions or outright
hostility. Relations with Iran have also been unstable, alternating between
co-operation and conflict.Â
9.      Pakistan’s relations with the
West, particularly with the United States, Islamabad’s most
important partner, have been bumpy. Unlike India, which has been a leading
member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan was part of a system created to
contain the former Soviet Union. Islamabad’s bilateral relationship with the
United States has shifted back and forth from close co-operation to alienation.
When relations were good, Pakistan received financial assistance, sophisticated
weaponry and training. When relations deteriorated, military and training
assistance was cut, which undermined Pakistani trust in the United States.
Pakistan’s strategic role diminished after the end of the Cold War and the
absence of the US and the international community from Afghanistan led to a
feeling of abandonment among Pakistanis. After the unprecedented closeness of
the immediate post-9/11 alliance, a subsequent series of events have lessened
confidence on both sides. These include the failure to catch Osama bin Laden,
the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan, and the revelations in early 2004 of
A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear network. Pakistan feels that it has not been
recognised for its contributions to the fight against terrorist groups. Official Pakistani interlocutors repeatedly pointed out to the
Sub-Committee that their contribution has been greater than any other country,
including the United States or any NATO country. Thus,
Pakistan’s only constant stable foreign policy relationship has been with
China.Â
10.    Pakistan – India: Pakistan’s relations with India are
complex and there is a strong perception of the Indian threat that has left a
legacy of bitterness and mistrust. Pakistan views the growing presence of
India and its aid to Afghanistan with suspicion, as it fears becoming
“encircled†by a rival India and Afghanistan. At
the end of 2002 India re-opened four consulates in Afghanistan and promised
US$750 million in aid, significantly more than Islamabad.
13.    Indian officials have accused
Pakistan’s intelligence services of trying to destabilise India by supporting
militant groups that use Pakistan as a base to cross the Line of Control (LoC)
to launch attacks on Indian-controlled Kashmir and on India itself. Pakistan
denies this and says that it is only providing diplomatic support to these
groups. While Pakistan has reduced its support for these groups in recent
years, India remains concerned about this. There are also quarrels over the
still undetermined maritime and land borders in the Sir Creek region (which is
supposed to be rich in oil and gas) and the Siachen glacier.Â
14.    President Musharraf has displayed a
pragmatic approach since coming to power in 1999 and the bilateral relationship
with India has improved, following the initiative launched in 2004 by then‑Indian
Prime Minister Vajpayee. The ensuing peace process, although low-key, has
delivered tangible improvements, including the cease-fire along Kashmir’s LoC,
the opening of new cross‑border train and bus lines as well as a sharp increase
in Pakistani-Indian trade. However, despite frequent manifestations of
goodwill on both sides, a quick settlement of core disputes between India and
Pakistan seems to be difficult to achieve, as underlying tensions remain close
to the surface. It will take time to overcome the deep mutual distrust.Â
15.    The conflict over Kashmir and the
related defence expenditures weigh heavily on the Pakistani economy. In
comparison to India, which has 7 times its population, Pakistan’s 620,000‑strong
military is about half that of India. Moreover, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is
a major factor in its high defence outlays. The country, which has not signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), has an estimated 24-48 HEU-based
nuclear warheads. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons-grade
plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons. According
to a recent report by the Institute of Science for International Security
(ISIS), Pakistan is building a new nuclear reactor that can produce weapons‑grade
plutonium thereby â€increasing significantly its production of plutonium for
nuclear weaponsâ€.  Pakistan's primary motive for pursuing a nuclear
weapons programme is to counter the perceived threat posed by its principal
rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as President Pervez
Musharraf's statements in May 2002 indicate. Defence expenditures claim the
largest part of the government’s budget. Estimates range from between 35% to 70%
(if pensions to retired military personnel are included). Seven to eight
percent of the country's GDP is spent on defence. In contrast, only 3-4% of
government spending is earmarked for education. Â Â
16.    In part to counter its imbalance
with India, Pakistan has had longstanding military co‑operation with China.
These countries have had a fruitful partnership in the development of nuclear
and missile technologies. China played a major role in the development of
Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent
export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire
materials and technology elsewhere. In 2005, Pakistan and China signed a
Co-operation and Friendship Treaty.
17.    Although Pakistan has had a traditionally
close relationship with Iran, Pakistan’s current relations with its
neighbouring Muslim state are uneasy. Iran supported Pakistan in earlier
conflicts with India by providing logistical support. Pakistan assisted in
Tehran’s nuclear programme even before the technology transfers from the A.Q.
Khan network. Pakistan reportedly signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with
Iran in 1986 (although the terms of that agreement are unknown) and Iranian
scientists received training in Pakistan in 1988. However, bilateral relations
deteriorated during the 1990s when the two countries pursued divergent
interests in Afghanistan and towards the Taliban regime as well as over
competing economic opportunities in Central Asia. The bilateral relationship
improved after the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and the
beginning of the low-key Pakistani-Indian peace process. Both Islamabad and
Tehran have congruent energy interests, as they favour building new transport
routes through Pakistan towards Central Asia and particularly China and India.
However, Tehran’s assertive policies, especially its nuclear programme and the
conflict with the international community, and particularly the United States,
have put Pakistan in a difficult position. Islamabad wants to co-operate both
with Tehran and with the United States, and is anxious about a possible
military conflict between the two which it fears would have a significant
impact on its own security.Â
18.    If there is any doubt about
Islamabad's position in tackling the insurgency and the stabilisation of
Afghanistan it is probably related more to its capacity than to its
commitment. Pakistan’s security situation is highly complex and its security
situation has deteriorated over the last year. In addition to the difficult
relations with its neighbours, it is facing numerous domestic threats. There
is a high threat from terrorism and sectarian violence throughout Pakistan.
Weak political institutions, corruption, the inability
to define its religious and ethnic identity and the continued failure to meet
the needs of the people limit the government’s ability to overcome these
challenges.  Â
19.    Because of the complexity of the
situation in Pakistan, President Musharraf and the Pakistani government walk a
fine line in tackling the insurgency in the areas bordering Afghanistan.Â
Pakistan’s support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the Soviet
occupation, as well as to jihadist movements in Kashmir, has weakened the sovereignty
of the state itself. Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was one of three countries that
officially recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and had relatively
good relations with them, namely through the intelligence services. The
Pakistani government made a U-turn after 9/11, however, and supported the
US-led coalition in the war against terrorist groups and
in tackling terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Since
then, Pakistan has received approximately
US$10 billion from the United States alone and the
lifting of sanctions in return. But President Pervez Musharraf's decision to
join the “war on terror†has placed him in direct opposition to the country’s
tribal leaders who control the provinces and who are traditionally fiercely
averse to any kind of government interference in their territory.Â
20.    To stop cross-border infiltration
and in response to US pressure, Islamabad deployed the army in the border
regions in 2004. While initially successful – a number of training camps and
local headquarters training Uzbek insurgents and other foreign militants were
destroyed - the Pakistani army suffered serious casualties. Moreover, the
longer the Pakistani armed forces stayed in the tribal regions, the more they
were seen as an occupying force, alienating the local population and making it
more difficult for Islamabad to control the area. In reality, large parts of
the region that border Afghanistan, particularly in the FATA and the Northwest
Frontier Province, are mostly outside government control. As it lacks the
equipment and the training to take on insurgents, the effectiveness of the
Pakistani army in the northwest is limited. As a result, the Pakistani armed
forces have lost an estimated 700-800 soldiers in the FATA with little or no
gain. A major problem in the FATA remains the lack of development and it is estimated that more than 90% of the approximately six million people
in the tribal areas live below the poverty line.
21.    Recognising that its approach
towards the FATA did not work, the Musharraf government adapted its policy and
signed an agreement with the tribal leaders in the region bordering Afghanistan
last year. This agreement gives the leaders more sovereignty in the region. The
deal has been criticised by the United States and other NATO member countries,
who have expressed concern that the terrorist infrastructure is being rebuilt.Â
22.    Islamabad’s new emphasis, namely
setting up so-called Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in the FATA to
generate more economic activity for job creation and poverty reduction, is, if
implemented, certainly the right approach. But it remains to be seen if the
federal government in Islamabad will deliver on its promises to improve the
living conditions in the border regions. Moreover, critics of the agreement
with tribal leaders say that the latter have lost their past influence and that
the FATA is now an almost leaderless region. The termination of the cease-fire
in North Waziristan in mid-July by Pakistani militants who call themselves the
“Pakistani Taliban†indicates that the agreements have not, or at least not
yet, solved the problems in the border regions.
23.    But even if President Musharraf’s
approach is vindicated, there is a significant problem with timing. Improving
security in Afghanistan demands immediate defeat of the insurgency and the
exclusion of insurgents from safe havens in Pakistan’s border areas. In
contrast, Musharraf’s strategy is a longer-term solution that requires time to
work and would be based on weak local authorities with relatively poor security
mechanisms at their disposal.Â
24.    President Musharraf started a wide-ranging and ambitious national reform programme in 2000 that
has produced a significant increase in GDP (more than 8% between 2004 and 2005,
according to the World Bank) and in currency reserves, as well as a reduction
of public debt to 55.4% of GDP. But serious disparities remain within the different regions as faster
economic growth and unfairly shared gas dividends have dramatically extended
the gap between the provinces. The poorest provinces like Waziristan and
Baluchistan, which are where the insurgency is primarily rooted, have not kept
pace with the rest of the country and are clearly lagging behind Punjab, the
most prosperous of Pakistan’s provinces.
25.    In fact, the weakness of Pakistan’s
political institutions remains a core problem that limits the country’s ability
to tackle fundamentalism and terrorism. Despite the Pakistani army being seen
as a reliable provider of stability, there is an increasing danger of a
disconnect between the army and the population. President Pervez Musharraf’s attempt to dismiss the head of Pakistan's judiciary, Iftikhar
Chaudhry, on charges of misconduct and misuse of authority, has prompted the
most damaging challenge to his authority since he seized power in 1999. Mr
Chaudhry’s suspension has further eroded Pakistan’s institutions. Moreover, the week-long siege and eventual storming of the Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad by the Pakistani Army epitomises the very
difficult political position of the Pakistani government under President
Musharraf. Musharraf has had to tread the fine line between his position as an
ally to the West in the â€war on terror†and as the president of a country which
has allowed extremist activity. This â€double-edged sword†has taken a toll on
Musharraf’s popularity in the West as well as in Pakistan itself. Therefore,
it has been in Musharraf’s interest to remain somewhat neutral when dealing
with the radical parties in Pakistan – not to mention that Musharraf does
depend on some fringe religious parties as political allies for his military
rule, given their deep grass-roots support. At the time of writing, the
consequences of the storming of the Red Mosque, during which 108 people were
killed and many more wounded – according to official figures – are still
unclear. Some, including the exiled opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, backed
Musharraf’s action because, as she said, it ended an “ambiguous†approach
towards terrorism and a “policy of appeasement†towards terrorists â€which has
encouraged militantsâ€. But many believe that his action against the radicals
inside the mosque will further decrease his popularity among the religious
parties who have helped keep him in power. Pro-Taliban militants opposed to
President Musharraf have been carrying out a string of attacks that are also
said to be linked with the siege.
26. There is a direct link between
security and democracy and the weakness of Pakistan’s institutions can be
ascribed, to a large degree, to shortcomings in the country’s democratic
culture. Much of this is due to the nation’s education system, which
has been plagued by corruption and inefficiency. According to the Heritage
Foundation, the average adult literacy rate is a mere 43.5%, with female
literacy considerably lower. Moreover, there are large provincial disparities
between Punjab, which has the highest literacy rate, and Baluchistan and the
northwestern border areas which have the lowest. This is crucial because a strong
education system is an integral part of a moderate and tolerant society, which
is challenged by extremist political parties in Pakistan. It
is estimated that one of every third child is receiving education in madrassas,
which offer religious education, provide food and accommodation. The
importance of the madrassas reflects a continuing under-investment in the
nation’s human capital as well as in infrastructure. Moreover, the government
has turned a blind eye to activities of fundamentalist clerics, thereby
allowing some madrassas to promote radical beliefs. In
addition to political participation, democracy provides a degree of
transparency and, over time, the possibility of checking and, if necessary
correcting, the political, economic, social and other choices of a society,
thereby preventing the marginalisation of parts of the society. Although the
continued pre-eminence of the military in virtually all layers of public life
has provided the country with a certain kind of stability, there are also
significant political, economic and social costs involved and an increasing
number of critics argue that the costs outweigh the benefits.Â
27.    The conflict with India has not
only serious economic consequences, but has also hurt the democratisation process
in Pakistan. One of the key challenges that Pakistan needs to address is
whether it will be able to maintain its defence spending in the long term
without causing considerable problems for the development of the Pakistani
economy and society. One main reason for the demise of the Soviet Union was
its huge defense spending, which ranged between 15 and 17% of GDP. Pakistan
needs to balance its available resources with the right mix of spending and
investing. Pakistan’s internal and external security also depends on
non-military spending and the lack of development and infrastructure in parts
of the country, especially in northwestern tribal areas, has undermined
Islamabad’s authority and served the forces that support the Taliban.Â
28.    NATO – Pakistan relations have
developed only recently and are dominated by the situation in Afghanistan and
NATO’s ongoing operations there. In response to a request from Pakistan, NATO
provided relief operations to cope with the October 2005 earthquake that left
more than 73,000 people dead, 70,000 injured and some four million homeless.
NATO provided an air‑bridge, which was established through the Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Relief Co-operation Council (EADRCC) and deployed by elements drawn
from the NATO Response Force, which included a deployed headquarters command
and control structure as well as engineering units, helicopters and military
field hospitals. In close co-operation with the government of Pakistan and the
United Nations, NATO's contribution to the relief operation was to maintain the
air-bridge, support intra‑theatre lifts, restore critical road infrastructure
and provide makeshift shelter and medical support. Between 11 October 2005 and
1 February 2006 NATO forces flew 168 relief missions delivering 3,500 tons of
urgently needed supplies. The Alliance also deployed engineers and medical
units.Â
29.    Pakistan also co-operates with NATO
under the Tripartite Military Commission where ISAF has received full member status.
To facilitate communication and co-operation, Pakistani liaison officers are stationed in Kabul and other cities in Afghanistan. Pakistani
and ISAF soldiers hold regular border security meetings with coalition forces
and a joint intelligence operations cell has recently been established. Moreover, just recently, NATO and Islamabad have finalised a transit
agreement that enables the Alliance to move personnel and equipment through the
country to Afghanistan.Â
30.    WMD proliferation remains a concern
in NATO’s relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal country in
tackling the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. However, the
country’s past proliferation behaviour has been very problematic and has
undermined its credibility with the international community and the West in
particular. Pakistan's most prominent nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, sold
sensitive nuclear and missile technology around the world. The Khan Research
Laboratories (KRL) assisted Iran in acquiring centrifuge uranium-enrichment
capability between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. Between the early 1990s
and approximately 2002, Libya received blueprints, components, full assemblies
of centrifuges, and low-enriched uranium, as well as a nuclear weapons design.
Moreover, the KRL developed missiles in collaboration with Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.  Â
31.    Some have argued that because of
Pakistan’s co-operation with Iran, DPRK and Iraq, the Pakistani government
might have known about Khan’s transfers. Serious questions about the Pakistani
government's role in the network remain and also whether it has fully addressed
Khan’s proliferation behaviour. Pakistani officials placed Khan under house
arrest but have denied access by foreign investigators to him.  Â
32.    Because of Pakistan’s continuing
struggle with fundamentalism the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass
destruction is possibly greater in Pakistan than in other countries, including
Iraq, Libya, DPRK, or Iran.Â
33.    Pakistan is strategically important
in combating global extremism as well as in the stabilisation of Afghanistan.Â
It is a potential ally for NATO and we have a strong interest in improving the
capacity of Pakistani forces to tackle the insurgency. We need to
recognise Islamabad’s role and contribution to the security of Afghanistan and enhance the Pakistani capacity to do more.Â
34.    In the past, Pakistan has been both
part of the problem and part of the solution in the stabilisation of
Afghanistan. Pakistan can do more to tackle the Taliban. However, Western
policy towards Pakistan has been characterised by a lack of continuity and
consistency. We must overcome the lack of trust and we should help Islamabad to
avoid being isolated. Tackling the insurgency requires
increased assistance from the international community, particularly the
Allies. Moreover, aid given to Pakistan also needs to be better
co-ordinated and the assistance provided to Islamabad needs to be linked with
greater accountability.Â
35.    We need to build a long-term
partnership with Pakistan if we want to effectively address the stabilisation
of Afghanistan and to defeat the Taliban and international terrorist groups.Â
Your Rapporteur suggests that NATO should therefore engage in a political dialogue
with Islamabad. Following the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
to NATO Headquarters in January and the first-ever visit of a NATO Secretary
General to Pakistan in early May, NATO as an organization has now begun a
process of confidence building with Pakistan. Moreover, we should provide
technical assistance to enable Pakistan to monitor better the border
crossings. Moreover, the Alliance should consider
opening more PfP training activities (on an ad hoc basis) to Pakistani
participation and increase available funding for this. To date, Pakistan has
been offered participation in five activities, but has not participated in
these because of limited funding. Your Rapporteur hopes that funding for
Pakistani participation in training activities can be increased. Moreover, NATO has developed considerable expertise in defence
sector reform, including border security. The latter is also an area where the
EU has taken on an increasingly important role and your Rapporteur endorses
NATO and EU co-operation to strengthen Islamabad’s capacity to secure its
borders. In addition, if we want to engage Islamabad,
we must reach out to a broader public in Pakistan. The majority of Pakistanis
are critical of NATO and we must do more to inform the population about the
Alliance and what it does. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly can also play a
pivotal role in developing a deeper relationship with Pakistan and your
Rapporteur strongly welcomes the political dialogue that the Assembly has begun
with the Pakistani parliament after the visit of this Sub-Committee to
Islamabad earlier this year.Â
36.    What is more, we need to address
Pakistan’s proliferation behaviour. There are no contacts between NATO and
Pakistan concerning the proliferation of WMD. It would be useful if NATO could
establish a dialogue with Pakistani authorities in this area. For example,
Pakistan could be invited to regularly participate in seminars organised by
NATO and NATO’s WMD Centre.
Although NATO has no proactive role in non-proliferation,
it could consider helping to persuade Pakistan to join the NPT, as well as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). To that end, Pakistan
would have to adopt domestic control over missile and nuclear technology.  Â
37.    However, increased NATO-Pakistan
engagement must not be seen as directed against India. Rather, NATO as an
organisation as well as NATO member countries should support and endorse the
India-Pakistan peace process. For example, it could consider opening the
Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI) to Pakistan and India.Â
38.    The international community could
and should help to strike a settlement on an agreed border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The Tripartite Military Commission, which comprises the United
States, NATO, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and provides a forum for policy
co-ordination on Afghan refugees, could be used in this direction.
39.    Eventually, the most effective
policy towards Pakistan would be if the NATO Allies deliver on their promises
in Afghanistan. The Allies must continue their engagement and must do more to
stabilise the country, particularly the southern parts. Pakistan certainly has
a responsibility and a strong self-interest to help its northern neighbour, but
the international community that is collectively responsible for defeating the
scourge of terrorism and curbing militant activities inside Afghanistan.
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