Whilst developing effective cooperation with the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly in general and within the Science and Technology
Committee (STC) in particular, the parliamentary delegation of the Russian
Federation points out that the topics under discussion affect political
decisions of heads of state and governments, as well as activities of
international organizations. The Russian Delegation is hence presenting a
special report entitled “Improvement of International Law for Space Policyâ€.  Humankind spent most of the past millennium
trying to work out some efficient principles for allocating spheres of interest
on the surface of this planet. Thus, it has not yet learnt to bear
responsibility in the three-dimensional reality.
1.
The world is changing very quickly, and unfortunately,
technological development in all spheres of human activity is outrunning the
development of legal control. This particularly concerns space activities. Last
spring, President Vladimir Putin proclaimed at an international conference in Munich, that Russia is ready to propose a full-scale agreement on the legal regime of
outer space, similar to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies of 1967. This statement made by the Russian leader was no
surprise for the members of the NATO PA Science and Technology Committee, who
had been debating the subject for quite some time. Such an agreement can only
be significant if entered into by a large number of countries. Russia has pioneered this legislative development, since it has been the most active
country in outer-space exploration, and has made the greatest number of space
launches with the largest accident free-score.
2.      We must be aware that the current international
space legislation does not correspond with the realities of the modern world.
Some legal questions of outer space exploration were discussed within the
framework of the UN back in 1958. We have gathered for this session almost on
the same date as when the Space Age began 50 years ago. It was on 4 October 1957,
that the Soviet Union launched the first-ever space satellite. As this session
comes to an end, we will be able to celebrate 40 years of International Space
Law, since it was on 10 October 1967, that the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, came into effect. However,
anniversaries alone cannot bring humankind closer to establishing a new legal
order, in line with the challenges of the 21st century. Drawn up
between 1963 and 1993, this package of five international treaties is no longer
capable of regulating the new relations currently emerging in outer space. This
treaty system comprises:
- Â Â Â Â Â Â The
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under
Water, 1963.
- Â Â Â Â Â Â The
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 1972.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Convention on the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, 1975.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, 1977.
3.      The USSR and the United States, being the two
leading nations in the field of space exploration, reached a number of
bilateral agreements in the past that managed to restrain the militarization of
outer space for a number of years:
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) between the USSR and DEFENCE on the
limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems (1972), with a Protocol
prohibiting space-based ABM systems (1974).
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The
Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles, 1987.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Treaties
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I and
START-II), signed in 1991 and 1993.
4.      As is well known, the US has withdrawn from the
ABM Treaty and presumably intends to continue with the destruction of the
multilateral and bilateral guarantee system that has a direct bearing on the
legal regime of outer space. Today, Moscow and Washington have to get ready to
deal with the problems they will face after the START expires in 2009, and the
SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) expires in 2012.
5.      Fifty years of Space Age have changed the world
significantly. New international law actors have entered into space activities,
such as private companies that lie beyond some legal restrictions. The lack of
proper regulation results in numerous negative consequences, such as
uncontrolled obstruction of outer space, and the sale of land on the Moon by
entrepreneurs.Â
There are several crucial yet unresolved problems concerning the legal regime of outer space, such
as:
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Aerospace delimitation;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Definition
of some significant terms, such as “space object†and “the launching Stateâ€
with respect to extraterritorial launching sites;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Definition
of the terms “outer space activitiesâ€, “military space activitiesâ€, and
“peaceful activitiesâ€, as well as the Participants of such activities;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Procedure
for the use of force in and from outer space in accordance with Articles 42 and
51 of the UN Charter;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Responsibility in case of violation of the
non-proliferation regime;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Limitation
of private commercial activities concerning intentional appropriation of
celestial bodies, the Moon in particular.
6.
The first group of international treaties is merely becoming obsolete.
However, nonobservance of the second group of treaties, limiting the use of
weapons in space, through space and from space, shatters the foundation of
international stability. We are facing a situation where conflicting approaches
to antimissile and anti-satellite defence maintained by certain countries
hamper the creation of an up-to-date international treaty on outer space.Â
Moreover, it became apparent early in this century that the issue of shaping an
adequate legal regime on space depends upon certain Treaties on conventional
arms, such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), 1990, and
the Istanbul Adapted CFE Treaties (ACFE), 1999 - both of which are still
waiting to be ratified by NATO member states. Reaching agreements on the legal
regime on airspace and outer space is most closely linked to the implementation
of the Partnership for Peace programme.
7.      Space activities have become genuinely universal
over the past decades. The number of states with space programmes
of their own has increased. More than 40 countries currently explore outer
space not only for civilian, but also for military purposes. In 2006, nations
worldwide spent roughly US$22.7 billion on military space programmes. The United States (US$21.4 billion), France
(US$591 million), the United Kingdom (US$263 million) and Russia (US$197
million) account for the world’s largest military space budgets, followed by
Spain (US$53 million), Italy and Israel (US$50 million each), Germany (US$39
million), and Belgium (US$32 million). Many countries, such as China, India,
South Korea, Brazil, and Japan, have their military space expenditures
incorporated into civil budgets for dual-purpose programmes.
8.      China
carried out a successful anti-satellite weapons test in January 2007. Soviet
and American designers of anti-satellite systems were under the presumption
that they would have to destroy active satellites emanating radio signals,
which is why beacons were used during the tests. China destroyed a nearly
invisible “silent†or dark satellite. Such military and scientific achievements
arouse respect for a nation that is seeking to ensure its defences. The NATO PA
STC should probably congratulate our colleagues from China and give credit to
their achievements. In a way, your Rapporteur has managed to do so. The Chinese
delegation was among the most active at the recent MAKS 2007 International
Aerospace Show that took place in Moscow in August. At the same time, the
above-mentioned Chinese experiment has had a serious drawback, as it resulted
in a great number of uncontrolled fragments in outer space, which may obstruct
the orbit of the destroyed satellite.
9.      The
US and Japan are naturally worried about China’s growing might, and the lack of
transparency in its space programmes. These two countries requested an explanation
from Beijing about this military test. You might as well ask for an explanation
as to why the Great Wall of China was built.
10.    China
is stepping up its outer space military activities in response to US space
initiatives. The two countries are protecting themselves from the same threats.
China’s successful test does not mean that Beijing will now start shooting down
all satellites indiscriminately. The history of the global arms race shows that
weapon systems can be considered as defensive until they reach a certain level
of development. Countries do not admit their aggressive intentions, and all
military programmes are defensive at the start. It
shouldn’t be difficult to monitor the defence sufficiency limit of outer space programmes through both national and international means. But
a new legal framework is required to ensure transparency and mutual confidence
in outer space. It should include on-ground spacecraft inspection. An orbital
inspection is technically dangerous and may be interpreted as an attempt to
affect the spacecraft’s performance, providing an actual casus belli.
11.    China
has proposed that it be involved with the international community in the
process of elaborating a legal, international outer space regime. Russia has
repeatedly stressed the necessity of inviting China, Japan and India to
co-author a new treaty on outer space. Russia is able to provide mediation and
even guarantee the interests of China, the US and the EU in the new treaty. The
treaty must not only be open for membership, but also for joint elaboration at
its early stages.Â
12.    The
US has been wary of the recent Iranian dual-purpose scientific research. The US
Department of Defense is anxious about Iranian missile technologies which will
allow Iran to create its own satellite in the near future. The US Defense
Department has already seriously overestimated the threat of WMD in Iraq. If
Iran has the possibility to launch a suborbital vehicle of its own, then it is
most likely ready to join the negotiations on the legal regime of outer space.
13.    Â
One cannot rule out the possibility of Washington’s estimates of Iran’s or
North Korea’s missile potential being intentionally exaggerated, serving the
interest of a specific American NGO called the Missile Defense Advocacy
Alliance (MDAA). This organization does not only give voice to fighters against
“international terrorismâ€, but it also represents the interests of certain
industries involved in the emerging hi-tech ABM defence market. It is the task
of the STC to evaluate the capacity of this market, and hence the integrity of
the opposition to ABM limitation. It is the duty of national legislators to
provide their citizens with complete information concerning international
treaties, be they observed or violated.
14.    The
Iranian nuclear threat, imaginary as it is, is nevertheless destabilizing the
entire world. Iran is not giving any guarantees to the US. The US is not giving
any guarantees that it will not attack Iran, claiming that Iran bought 20
medium-range missiles from North Korea in 2005. Washington argues that these
missiles pose a threat to Central Europe, where 56,000 US soldiers are
deployed. It is mainly for their protection that the US is erecting a missile defence system in Europe. An unbiased military analysis
suggests, however, that Iran may have some other, more likely targets outside
Europe. Nobody besides has attempted to analyze the possible military and
political consequences of blasting Iran’s (or any other country’s) missiles in
the airspace over other nations.
Â
15.    The logic of deploying missile and radar
sites in Eastern Europe has little to do with countering the Iranian threat.
Otherwise, the US top brass would have chosen deployment areas in Turkey,
Georgia, or even Romania. The US is completing the tests of a new radar system
on Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands). It is scheduled to be deployed in the
Czech Republic in 2011. But in August, at his meeting with General Yuri
Baluevsky, the Russian Chief of General Staff, First Deputy Minister of Defence
Martin Bartak announced that Prague had postponed its decision on the radar for
one year. And I hope that this wise decision has been due to the influence of
our fellow-parliamentarians from some of the NATO Member States. We realize
that a postponement does not mean cancellation, but it could be the first step.
Regretfully, the US still plans to manufacture such radar systems and deploy
them in other East European countries, right next to the Russian border.
16.    We
hope it is within the Committee’s competence to ask experts to study the
destabilizing influence on the international situation resulting from the
deployment of radars with an operational range of 200-400 km along Russian
borders. It would partially ease the Russian leadership’s concern over foreign
military activities along our borders. The US has not made any statements on
the submission of new missiles and their deployment areas to international
control, as well as on the characteristics of the new radars. In particular, a
radar site in Norway (Varde) is officially announced monitoring outer space,
but instead, it maintains surveillance over Russia’s airspace, which makes it a
functional element of the US National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The US
activity in Europe is closely linked to its operations in the Northwestern
Pacific. The deployment of interceptor missiles in Fort Greely, Alaska, the
floating radar recently deployed to the Aleutian Islands, together with the
developments in Europe, make us question the direction of the US and NATO
military efforts.Â
17.    NATO parliamentarians must realize that an arms race
in space holds real danger for the future. However, an imbalance of armaments
on the ground is already resulting in an arms race. The US NMD systems, Theatre
Missile Defense (TMD) with its elements in outer space and on the territories
of Allies do not contribute to peacekeeping efforts. Only a global MD system
aimed at countering terrorist strikes, created jointly by all nations concerned
in Europe, America, and even Asia, can prove efficient in the long run. Only in
this case will it be possible to develop confidence-building measures and
prevent the actions of some actors aimed at destabilizing the international
situation. This is what prompted President Putin’s proposal to President Bush
at the latest G8 Summit in Heiligendamm. Mr. Putin suggested that Russia
and the US should jointly use the Gabalin radar site in Azerbaijan, which was
designed to monitor outer space and track ballistic missile launches. This initiative
was discussed at the ministerial level during the NATO Council meeting last
June. This Committee reviewed such a possibility at its Spring Session in
Portugal in May.
18.    Russia’s
military and technical achievements in developing its strategic weapons do not
mean that Russia is preparing for an aggression. The Russian
militaro-industrial complex is capable of developing the most sophisticated
weapons systems. No one will artificially decrease the characteristics of
combat systems that cost millions. It would be irrational to re-invent a
zeppelin when there is the possibility of creating a jet. It’s generals who
always prepare for the wars of the past, while scientists prepare for the wars
of the future. We should admit that it takes great effort to hold back progress
in developing means of destruction.
19.     The Russian delegation to the NATO PA Spring
Session proposed a moratorium on deploying new TMD elements in Europe. One year
should be enough to evaluate the military and strategic necessity of TMD and
discard shallow short-term political considerations. Disappointed with its
counterparts’ failure to ratify the CFE Treaty, Russia has been forced to
suspend the Treaty. Luckily, the parties have subsequently managed to
coordinate and partially harmonize their stands, thus, avoiding a
confrontation.
20.    It
is necessary to come to reasonable agreements on the ground before drawing up
rules for outer space. Once we have fulfilled the task of enhancing
confidence-building measures as far as ground-based arms and airspace
monitoring is concerned, we can gradually take on other far‑reaching goals.
21.    The problem of space
orbits being obstructed by debris is very important for all the countries in
the world. Because of the almost uncontrolled activities of launching states,
the amount of space debris is increasing. This may paralyze space operations in
20-30 years. Uncontrolled weapons testing may result in the obstruction of
orbits most often used by commercial satellites. All this drastically increases
the risks of unintentional destruction and insurance costs and decreases
cost-effectiveness of space programmes.
22.    The
term “space debris†comprises artificial objects and their fragments in space
that are out-of-service and will never serve any useful purpose, but which are
nonetheless hazardous for space vehicles, especially manned stations. Space
debris can pose a direct threat to the Earth when it is too large or contains
dangerous (nuclear or toxic) materials; when it exits the orbit without control
or fails to burn in dense atmosphere and when it falls on inhabited areas,
industrial sites, transport communication lines, etc.
23.    The
problem of space debris received official status in 1993 after the UN Secretary
General’s report on “The Impact of Space Activity on the Environmentâ€. In that
report, the Secretary General pointed out that that problem was of
international, global importance. It is not national aerospace that is being
polluted, rather it is the pollution of the Earth’s outer space, which
adversely affects all countries directly or indirectly involved in its
exploration.
24.    The
problem of near-earth space debris pollution appeared as a purely theoretical
one right after the first man-made satellites had been launched in the late
1950s. According to NASA scientists, the amount of space debris transformed
into a new quality. Even if we stop launching vehicles into space today, the
fragmentation of space debris will continue. By 2055, the number of newly formed
fragments will exceed the number of fragments burning in the atmosphere. Some
estimates show that the so-called “cascade effect†will lead to space
exploration becoming eventually impossible. “Self‑reproduction†of space debris
will interfere with the safety of space activities.
25.    At
present only 6% out of the 9,300 artificial orbital objects are active today.
According to different estimates, there are about 5,000 tons of man-made
objects at low-earth orbits (up to 2,000 km). Statistical evaluations show
that the number of such objects (more than 1 cm in diameter) is imprecise and
may total 60,000 – 100,000. Only 10% of them can be detected, monitored (some
8,600 objects) and catalogued by ground radar and optical means. Only 6% of
monitored objects are functional. Nearly 22% of the objects do not function,
17% are spent upper and accelerating stages of boosters, and nearly 55% are
waste products, technological elements used in launches, explosion fragments
and wreckage.
26. Â Â Â A
delicate legal situation emerges when operational objects in space (there are
over 700 of them worth around 100 billion US dollars) have owners. In other
words there are entities with property rights to spacecraft. However, it often
happens that as soon as these spacecraft turn into debris, their owners waive
their property rights and subsequent obligations. There are no provisions for
the use of sanctions against such entities that pollute outer space with
debris.
27.    Most
of these objects lie in the high inclination orbits with intersecting planes,
which is why their average encounter velocity is nearly 10 km/s. A collision of
any of such objects with an operational space vehicle may damage or even
destroy it. There is no effective protection against space debris in particular
with a diameter of more than 1 cm. The most polluted are the orbits used by
space vehicles, consisting of low-earth, geostationary and sun-synchronous
orbits.
28.    In
January 2005, the US space surveillance network registered a collision of the
stage of a US missile launched more than 30 years ago with a fragment of a
Chinese launch vehicle, which exploded in March 2000. At least three new
fragments of the US missile supplemented the garbage dump, created jointly by
all countries, in the near-earth outer space. There is no need for legal
evaluation here because this episode did not lead to a conflict of interest.
However, it is not always the case.
29.    Even existing conventions on space are not strictly
observed today. When a Soviet sputnik with a dangerous power system was falling
down over Canada in the mid 70s, the USSR took responsibility for the damage
caused by its fragments in accordance with the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972). When a Russian spacecraft
“Express AM 11†was damaged in March 2006, none of the signatories accepted
responsibility for the damage inflicted on the Russian space programme. Some
experts reasonably believe that space debris was the reason for the sudden
external influence on the craft. Others link the loss of this Russian sputnik
with the “Joint Operations for Outer Space Control†conducted by the US. Russia
had to put the sputnik into the disposal orbit.
30. Â Â Â The dropping of space debris has become so regular
that it is used as the first hypothesis in explaining the origin of any
mysterious fragments. This was the case in August 2007 in Abkhazia. Fragments
from space falling in the zones of political instability can bring about armed
confrontations.
31.    The technical development of our civilization does
provide us with effective means of destroying debris at orbits higher than 600
km (due to the absence of atmosphere slowdown effect there). At the same time,
the task of providing flight safety in conditions of technologically polluted
near-earth outer space is highly important. The danger of uncontrolled outer
space objects entering a dense atmosphere is increasing very quickly.
32.    International cooperation on the problem of “space
debris†should take the following priority routes:
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Environmental
monitoring of the near-earth outer space, including the geostationary orbit,
“space debris†monitoring and registration of “space debrisâ€;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Mathematical
modeling of “space debris†and the creation of international info systems for
the prognosis of space debris population and its threat to space flights, as
well as for the informational support of dangerous proximity of space objects
and their uncontrolled dense-atmosphere entry.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Developing ways and means of protecting spacecraft against
high-velocity space debris.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Developing
and implementing measures aimed at reducing space debris population resulting
from military tests.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Elaborating
regulations regarding property rights on man-made satellites and their
fragments.
- Â Â Â Â Â Â Establishing
an International Space Inspection Body and its arbitration institutions.
33.    Space
debris problems, like any other complicated and important problem, have several
dimensions, including scientific, technical, legal, ecological and others.
Though this topic attracts the attention of many research centers, space agencies
and international organizations such as the International Astronautical
Federation (IAF), the Committee on Space Research (СOSPAR), the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and others, it seems that the recent “technicalâ€
and “legal†cooperation of two international bodies has brought the
understanding of this problem to a new level. These are the Inter–Agency Space
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) and the Science and Technology Committee
of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (STCS UN COPUOS).
34.    In
IADC, experts from 11 space agencies from the US, Russia, Europe, Japan, China,
India, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Ukraine coordinate the
technological policy of launching states aimed at reducing pollution in space,
and discussing associated problems relating to monitoring, measuring and
preventing new space debris. To a great extent, it was the IADC’s activity that
provided an impetus for this issue to be considered by the STCS UN COPUOS.
35.    Today only two countries, Russia and the US, are
able to monitor the technological population of the near-earth outer space
using their national space monitoring systems. Individual elements of these
systems are located outside their national territories and are subject to bilateral
agreements. Similar systems in Japan and China are only starting to function,
and their specialists are gaining experience.Â
36. Â Â Â Economically
suitable methods of cleaning outer space of debris do not exist, which is why
much attention will be paid to international cooperation and the coordination
of efforts of launching states aimed at the prevention of debris formation,
such as prevention of orbital explosions, moving spent spacecraft into burial
orbits, slowing down in the atmosphere, etc. Most of these measures directly or
indirectly affect the competitiveness of spacecraft and may result in
considerable expenses for modernization. That is why future general norms and
standards on outer space population must be adopted on the basis of international
coordination, in a well-balanced and global way.
37.    It is necessary to grant
full access for participating organizations to the national catalogues of
countries, especially to catalogues concerning orbits populated after weapons
testing. This access will allow every country to optimize its use of outer
space. For example, Russian and US scientists calculated that the number of
International Space Station (ISS) escape manoeuvres, when the Russian System of
Space Control is used, will be 6-8 per year instead of the 24-26 planned by
NASA.
38.    Many experts believe that
the measures aimed at the prevention of space debris population must be
supplemented with sanctions. This is an international activity of a different
order. There is no doubt that an international fund accumulating means for
developing and creating space cleaning systems is necessary. Such systems must
be put into service before 2030 while there is still a hope for preserving
outer space for future generations. It would be helpful to establish incentive
awards for environmental achievements in space - the kind of prize that
inspired the creation of Space Ship One. International aerospace shows should
be used to promote awareness. One should not be afraid of science-fiction as
long as it is scientific. After all the first international spacecraft
exhibition took place in Moscow back in 1929!
39.    A very difficult task is
regulating those types of space activity which are not governed by international
law. This applies to military applied space experiments, such as military tests
of guidance technologies of destruction means in space and from space. Space
deployment of electro-optical and radio-electronic countermeasures equipment is
provoking an arms race beyond the negotiation process. Legislators fighting for
a threshold reduction of armed confrontation fail to notice that the military
men and politicians are misinforming them about new means of warfare.
40.    In the absence of a legal environment, some
countries unilaterally try to determine the rules of the game in space. The
Russian Federation and the NATO European members are waiting for an explanation
of the US National Outer Space Policy. Why does the US “oppose the development
of a new legal regime on the use of space� What is the real meaning of these
words: “Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the
rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and
operations or other activities in space for US national interests�
41.    During discussions in our Committee, we raised the
issue of the dual-purpose space system integration in military systems.
Military systems for space and surface control are being developed
step-by-step. First of all, intelligence or monitoring facilities are created,
then space groupings of communication and navigation are built up, and finally
all these groupings are positioned as commercial or dual-purpose. For example,
in 2005 only 13 out of 76 newly launched satellites were officially declared
military.
42.    When such groupings reach the level of continuous
operation they are integrated with combat systems. Space groupings are
developed relatively slowly and can be monitored. The integration with weapons
can be very fast and nearly unnoticeable, which is why the numerical strength
of the communication, navigation and remote monitoring groupings must have
reasonable limitations.
43.    The number of the
so-called civilian satellites used in recent wars has been gradually increasing.
There were 52 military and 9 civilian satellites used during the Desert Storm
Operation (1990-1991) and 82 military and 16 civilian satellites during the
Desert Fox Operation (1998-1999). NATO used 90 military and 29 civilian
satellites in the operation against Yugoslavia. This tendency remains unchanged
in the 21st century.
On average, dual-purpose satellites accounted for nearly 10% of orbital
groupings in the 2002 conflicts and 25% in 2003-2005.Â
44.    Today, orbital groupings
of dual-purpose craft are growing in number, not for commercial tasks but for
incorporation in the combat control systems. Military experts can easily
determine whether this or that space grouping has reached the necessary
qualitative parameters allowing its incorporation into the weapons control
circuit.
45.    For example, civil space navigation systems
developed primarily as civilian ones also solve military tasks. GPS, GLONASS
and Galileo have a similar organization. Each of them has three main parts –
space and ground control complex and users’ receivers. These receivers can be
placed on weapons, for example on cruise missiles. The satellites are
positioned at medium altitudes – about 20,000 km. This shift from low orbits of
the first systems allows them to avoid the influence of the earth’s atmosphere,
i.e. created conditions for sustained operations without correction of orbit.
The configuration of the orbital structure (several satellites on different
levels) provides a continuous global zone of operation. The difference lies in
the technological realization of space and ground segments.
46.    In July 2006, the space segment of the GPS comprised
28 spacecraft in six orbital levels. Galileo will eventually consist of 30
satellites. This system is optimized to service the countries situated in
latitudes up to 75°. GLONASS provides for creating an orbital grouping of 24
satellites. Now there are 13 spacecraft in orbit and 18 will be sufficient for
reliable navigation in Russia. The Russian navigation system is not ready to
home in on weapons at any point on the globe. The average signal availability
is 97% over the territory of Russian Federation and 81% over the rest of the
world.
47.    The indicator of the space grouping’s military
designation is its multi-echelon formation, which is unnecessary for
civilian-purpose groupings. Today some commercial space groupings have already
exceeded quality and quantity levels necessary to fulfill the declared tasks.
We suggest that the STC should discuss the quality and quantity characteristics
of dual-purpose systems and determine threshold values of space groupings. It
is necessary to identify specific weapons systems, whether they are bombs or
missiles, integrated with space informational systems. This is essential for
reaching an agreement on their limitation.
48.    The use of precision guided systems gives a
considerable economy of ammunition for each target. This leads to the
replacement of powerful nuclear warheads with low-yield ammunition. The
rationale of warheads development is dominated by the perfection of
yield/precision correlation. We are now witnessing a trend towards increasing
precision and a reasonable reduction of weapons yield. A weapon with
conventional ammunition can become strategic and it will not be under limitations
existing today. This is why there is a long-felt need to start negotiations on
the limitation of incorporating dual-purpose systems in the high-precision
weapons control system. This is also why the negotiation process should include
the issue of the limitation of conventional armaments that use target
designation and guidance from space. Weapons integrated with space information
systems and weapons of the same type which do not have this capacity must be
differently classified. Consequently, their export potential should be
different, too.
49.    Thus, to strengthen confidence-building measures in
space and prepare bilateral and international agreements on the improvement of
the international legal regime of outer space, it is proposed that the NATO PA STC
should work out the parameters of these agreements and the methods of their
evaluation:
- Â Â Â Â Â Â Quantity and quality characteristics of orbital
groupings of military designation;
- Â Â Â Â Â Â Quantity
and quality characteristics of dual-purpose orbital groupings that can be
integrated in the combat control system circuit;
- Â Â Â Â Â Â Quantity
and quality characteristics of combat systems integrated with space
informational systems;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Measures
aimed at prevention of uncontrolled debris appearance resulting from weapons
testing in space;
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Measures on limitation of weapon testing and
military activities of private companies in space.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Rights and methods of work of the before-launch
inspections of the spacecraft.
50.    All these issues should be incorporated as a
system into the new International Treaty on Outer Space. The modern world needs
a legal basis and good will in controlling the proliferation of
weapons-production technologies that use integration of space information
systems and strike capacity.
51. Â Â Â The new international legal regime of outer space
must be elaborated faster than means of warfare development. Only in this case
would such a regime prove efficient. Russia is ready to provide a comprehensive
case for overcoming the legal crisis over space-military issues, and propose a
concept for a realistic international agreement that would be acceptable for
all parties involved in the peaceful exploration of outer space.
52.    A full-scale Treaty on Outer Space
will take time to elaborate. There are various ways to achieve this. One could
make use of the United Nations, a legitimate global organization which still
maintains its role in the modern world. Likewise, one could start with
bilateral arrangements — this was done recently as independent experts from
Russia and the US engaged in elaborating a Code of Conduct for a States’
Activity in Outer Space. It would be wise to use this particular document to
ban any measures aimed at reducing the safety of space systems: to make it
illegal to deploy, test or use weapons in outer space, including the means of
destroying or damaging spacecraft.
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