1.      The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 dramatically changed the global security landscape and
had a profound impact on the transatlantic relationship and NATO as an
alliance.Â
2.      This report takes a brief look at
where the transatlantic partners stand six years after US President George W. Bush declared the “war on terrorâ€. The paper argues that progress has been
made, but that the Allies need to expand and refine their instruments and that NATO’s political-diplomatic clout has not been used to its full
potential. NATO’s role in combating terrorism is important, but limited. Many
of the essential activities of the fight against terrorism occur outside NATO,
through bilateral co-operation, or are done by international actors such as the
UN.  Â
3.      Terrorism is not a new phenomenon,
but it has evolved over the past years. Today’s threat of terrorism, brutally
exposed by 9/11, does not come from an organised enemy with a clear identity
and a coherent set of objectives. The threat emanates from a relatively small
number of loose, shifting and disparate groups that want to force their
individual and narrow values on others through violence. Religious extremism, while not the sole motivation for
terrorism, is likely to be the most immediate source of terrorist threats in
the short to medium term. In 2006, 706 individuals were arrested in 15
EU member states on suspicion of terrorism offences, and half of these arrests were related to Islamist terrorism. Among the
range of terrorist threats, that of “home-grownâ€
terrorism is a particular concern, because it is more difficult to anticipate
the motives or actions of potential terrorists who are citizens of Western
countries. “Home-grown†Islamist terrorism is considered a bigger
problem in Europe than in the United States or in Canada. The Muslim
communities in Western European countries account for a larger percentage of
the population and Muslims in North America are generally better integrated
than their counterparts in Europe.Â
4.      The threat of terrorism is global
and the widespread availability of information technology has enabled terrorist
organisations to communicate in new and more effective ways. Terrorists can
increasingly operate “virtually†and without formal structures. They can share
tactics and strategies through the internet and there is evidence of
collaboration between terrorist organisations and international criminal
organisations. Â
5.      Terrorist groups like al Qaeda
have planned attacks across the world, from Afghanistan to Indonesia to the United Kingdom and the United States. Terrorist groups work across borders and in
stateless cyberspace. No single nation can defeat terrorism on its own, as it
is a global threat. International co-operation between national authorities,
and firm and decisive resistance of the societies is essential to ensuring the
safety of innocent civilians around the world.
6.      All international organisations
have some role to play in combating terrorism, as it is a multi-faceted threat
requiring a multi-pronged response. However, as a long-established political‑military
organisation, NATO has particular comparative advantages in this struggle. The
capabilities of NATO member countries and their co-operation with
geographically, ethnically, and culturally diverse partner countries, allow
NATO as an organisation to create counter‑terrorism strategies that are useful
to a wide range of situations and threats. NATO can also help countries with
weaker defences against terrorism by disseminating expertise from countries
that have had more experience in this area. Through the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) and its consensus-driven decision-making, NATO has the ability to
generate political will among the Allies to address terrorism. NATO also has
proven intelligence-sharing channels, used predominantly in the military
domain. NATO has the military assets needed for operations to disrupt
terrorist activities, including force generation and command and control
procedures. Finally, through science and technology co-operation, NATO can
perform the research and development necessary to find new methods to
counteract terrorism. Together, these areas are essential to tackle terrorist
groups, and should be fully exploited by Allies.
7.      The attacks of 9/11 were a turning
point for NATO, propelling the fight against internationally active terrorist
groups to the top of NATO’s priorities. Almost all of
NATO’s activities today are shaped by the struggle against terrorism. While terrorism was listed as a threat when NATO revised its
Strategic Concept in 1999, there was little talk within the Alliance, at that
time, either at the strategic or at the operational level, about how NATO
should combat this threat. However, within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks on
America the Alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first
time in its history. This interpretation of collective defence, which the
founders of NATO could not have envisioned, made abundantly clear that the Alliance faced a new threat, and that the Alliance needed to find a way to respond.
8.      Operationally, the Alliance agreed to eight measures to aid the United States immediately after 9/11,
including its first official counter-terrorism operations. NATO deployed its
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) to the Eastern Mediterranean
(Operation “Active Endeavour†- OAE) and sent Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) aircraft to help defend the United States from further
attack. Additionally, NATO members agreed upon increased intelligence sharing,
assistance to states subject to increased terrorist threat, blanket overflight
rights for counter-terrorism operations, free access to ports, and finally to
“backfill†selected Allied assets that were being used to fight terrorism.
9.      Politically, however, these eight
measures were seen as small compared to the operation that the United States launched to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. NATO Allies had offered the United States much more support for its initial campaign in Afghanistan, but the US administration preferred to run the campaign through its own Central Command,
rather than through NATO command. This decision was largely based on the US administration’s perception that the Kosovo campaign was made more difficult through
problems with “targeting by committeeâ€. It was also due to the fact that NATO
lacked, at that point, the range of capabilities needed for such a large
operation far from NATO territory, particularly one that relied heavily on
Special Forces. In the end, however, 15 of the then 19 Allies contributed to
the initial Afghanistan campaign on a national basis, including large troop
contributions and air and naval resources.
10.    Following intense discussion among
member states as to the appropriate role for the Alliance in the fight against
terrorism, the Allies agreed in early 2002 that NATO’s role should be “to help
deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of
attacks, directed from abroad against our populations, territory,
infrastructure and forces of any member state, including by acting against
these terrorists and those that harbour them,†as the political guidance
provided by the NAC stated. This overall goal has directed all further efforts
by the Alliance to combat terrorism.
11.    Recent NATO Summits have adopted
incremental measures to enhance Allied capabilities to fight terrorism. At the
Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed on a new
Military Concept for the Defence against Terrorism that recognised four key
areas where NATO can play a role: antiterrorism, i.e. defensive measures
against terrorism, management of the consequences of a terrorist attack,
offensive counter-terrorism operations, and military co‑operation, particularly
intelligence sharing. These four areas are clearly military competencies, and
on these military dimensions NATO has made much progress. The Alliance also
initiated a new Missile Defence Feasibility Study.
12.    NATO’s Comprehensive Political
Guidance (CPG), endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government in November 2006
at the Riga Summit, states that NATO must have the “ability to deter, disrupt,
defend and protect against terrorism, and more particularly to contribute to
the protection of the Alliance’s populations, territory, critical
infrastructure and forces, and to support consequence managementâ€. The CPG also
refers to the importance of protecting information systems of critical
importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks.Â
13.    The transformation in NATO
capabilities since autumn 2001 is perhaps the most striking change in the Alliance. At the Prague Summit, the Allies adopted a three-pronged approach to improving
their defence capabilities - launching of the Prague Capabilities Commitment
(PCC), the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the streamlining of
the military command structure. The PCC set specific targets for each Ally, and
the Alliance collectively, to increase capabilities in over 400 specific areas.
While these capabilities span many different military fields, all are relevant
to counter-terrorist operations. Progress on implementation of the PCC,
however, has been mixed, thereby delaying and diminishing NATO’s usefulness in
the struggle against terrorism.
14.    More successful has been the
creation of the NRF, a Rapid Reaction Force that is self‑sustainable and able
to deploy for any crisis anywhere in the world. The NRF was declared fully
operational at the Riga Summit in November 2006 and can be a key asset in any
future counter‑terrorism operation. Combining land, air, sea, and Special
Forces into one package, the NRF is deployable within five days of a North
Atlantic Council decision to do so. However, force generation for the NRF still
poses problems. Shortfall in terms of troops and equipment remain and need to
be tackled.
15.    NATO has also developed key
capabilities in the management of a possible terrorist attack. In Prague the Allies agreed on five initiatives to develop capabilities in dealing with
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. The largest of
these initiatives was the creation of a Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion,
which can be deployed with NATO forces or on its own to provide a full range of
CBRN defences, including reconnaissance, detection, and light and heavy
decontamination units. The Battalion has already been deployed to aid civilian
authorities during the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece. In addition, NATO
has compiled an inventory of Allies’ response capabilities under a terrorist
attack that can be called upon if an incident occurs.Â
16.    The Alliance has also improved
intelligence sharing since 9/11. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004, the Allies
agreed to create a joint Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, which uses both
civilian and military intelligence resources to provide advice to the NAC and
the NATO staff. However, as intelligence is by its nature confidential and
paramount to each nation’s security, most intelligence sharing still happens on
a bilateral basis, making it difficult for NATO to add value in this area.
Still, a thorough review of NATO intelligence is underway to identify means of
ensuring that NATO staff has timely access to accurate intelligence.
17.    NATO’s operations are also aiding
the struggle against terrorism. OAE, NATO’s only Article 5 operation, continues
to help detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. Broadly
defined, its mandate has been expanded since it was created in 2001 to cover
the entire Mediterranean and to counter terrorism in the region,. OAE now
involves intelligence sharing in targeting of specific vessels of interest that
can be tracked, or even boarded. NATO ships also patrol and survey choke
points in the region, such as important passages and harbours. In addition,
while their primary goal is to create and maintain a secure environment, NATO
operations in Afghanistan and in the Western Balkans also include significant
counter‑terrorism components. These operations rely on NATO’s main comparative
advantages in fighting terrorism - its integrated military structure, highly
developed military planning mechanisms, and less tangibly, its moral authority
as an alliance of democracies.
18.    The NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan continues to assist the Government of
Afghanistan, as part of the international community's broader efforts in
creating and maintaining a secure environment across all Afghanistan. In this context ISAF can be considered to be by far the most important
contribution of the Alliance in the fight against international terrorism. It is the most challenging mission
NATO has ever taken on and its primary task there is to assist the
Afghan authorities in providing security and stability. In addition, the Alliance has also become involved in reconstruction efforts. Significant progress has been achieved, but the
security situation in Afghanistan markedly worsened during 2006, particularly
in the south of the country. Suicide bombings, previously unknown in Afghanistan, have increased fourfold from 2005 and the Taliban were able to perform major
military operations against Afghan and ISAF units at the end of last year.
Security has also deteriorated in other parts of Afghanistan, including in Kabul. The decreased level of security has already hampered reconstruction efforts and
limited NGO assistance activities mainly to urban areas. This year’s General
Report of the Political Committee offers a closer look at the operations in Afghanistan.
19.    Partnerships, too, are part and
parcel of the fight against terrorism. NATO and Partner countries agreed to the
Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism in November 2002, which provides a
framework for co-operation against terrorism. This mechanism is important for
generating political will to fight terrorism across a broad range of states and
for exchanging information on preparedness as well as on ways to impede support
to terrorist groups. Co-operation on terrorism is also a key aspect in the
founding charter of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), signed in 2002. The NRC
draws up an annual action plan on terrorism and conducts training exercises to
manage the consequences of a terrorist attack. In 2006 Russia joined OAE. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue also contributes to the fight against
terrorism which, through individual co-operation programmes (ICP), offers the
opportunity to focus more on terrorism. NATO and partner countries also
established the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), a
mechanism through which NATO can coordinate responses to a terrorist attack or
other disasters by all NATO Allies and Partners. The EADRCC helps to avoid
duplication in an emergency, and also facilitates training to improve
capabilities.Â
20.    The US administration has defined
the Iraq war as the “front line in the ‘war on terror’â€. The involvement and
the presence of the Alliance in Iraq have been limited, however. NATO has provided
communications, logistical and intelligence support to the Polish-led
multinational division in Iraq and it has set up the NATO Training Mission-Iraq
(NTM-I). Through NTM-I, NATO has trained over 4,000 mid- and senior-level
military officers in the country, and over 900 officers in NATO and national
facilities. NTM-I also co-ordinated donations of
equipment to Iraq from a number of NATO countries worth more than €110 million
in the last two years.
21.    There is no effective central
government in Iraq and the overall security picture has been steadily
deteriorating. Since 2003, an estimated 64,000 Iraqi civilians died as a result
of insurgents’ attacks and sectarian violence. Iraq has become one of the most
dangerous places in the world. Sectarian clashes have continued to increase,
as has the insurgents’ capacity to organise high-impact attacks mainly through
car-bombings. As reconciliation efforts have made little headway, the UN
Security Council has, at the request of the Iraqi government, unanimously
approved a resolution expanding the UN's role to help promote political talks among
the country's ethnic and religious groups. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 2 million Iraqis have fled to
neighbouring countries, primarily Jordan and Syria, and 1.9 million Iraqis are
internally displaced in Iraq. Nearly 50,000 Iraqis leave the country every
month. The deployment of 17,500 additional US troops as part of a major
US-Iraqi “surge†operation to secure Baghdad appears to have reduced sectarian
violence somewhat. According to an ABC News/USA Today/BBC News/ARD TV poll of
late February/early March 2007, only 26% Iraqis feel safe in their
neighbourhoods and 80% have experienced some forms of attack. Furthermore,
living and economic conditions are significantly deteriorating given not only
the worsening security situation but also the lack of rule of law, as well as
rising levels of corruption. Iraq has become a training ground for terrorists
and the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that approximately 10%
of the Iraqi insurgency consists of foreign fighters, the majority of whom are
allegedly suicide bombers.Â
22.    The decision to go to war in Iraq had badly strained the transatlantic partnership, NATO, and also the EU. The Allies
differed on whether Iraq represented an immediate threat and whether it was
justified to use force against the regime of Saddam Hussein. While these
tensions have now settled, there is still no transatlantic consensus on the
best way to promote stability in the country.
23.    The US focus on the Iraq war has jeopardised the early military victory in Afghanistan of 2001. Moreover, the 2006 US
National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the Iraq war has fuelled the
growth of Islamist extremism. The war has also created a climate of growing
mistrust between Islamic countries and the West. Linking democracy promotion
and regime change sparked a debate not only among allies but also outside the Alliance. Unfortunately, the Iraq war has discredited democracy in the eyes of many
Iraqis. Many Muslims throughout the world regard the war in Iraq as unjust and there is a deep suspicion of US motives among the Muslims in the region.
The pictures of the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo prisons and
related events have increased anti-American sentiment among Muslims
around the world. Democracy promotion's place in foreign policy has become
controversial with the debate over the war in Iraq.
24.    Islamic fundamentalists argue that
terrorist action is a result of policy, primarily the perceived injustice in Palestine and the presence of a non-Muslim military on sacred Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia. The Middle East conflict is one of the most important, if not the most important, stumbling blocks on
the path towards reducing terrorism. Many Muslims are critical of the United States and the West because they perceive that we have backed repressive regimes in the Middle East and that we appear to be tacitly supporting repression and imprisonment of
dissenters. Moreover, many Muslims perceive that the United States and the
European countries support Israel and its occupation of Arab and Muslim
territories. They feel that the United States and the West are applying double
standards and they also cannot understand the opposition to Iran's nuclear programme while Israel's was ignored. However, the primary enemy for Islamic
fundamentalists is not the United States and the West but their own
governments and ruling elites, which have failed to prevent the corruption of
their religion and to protect Muslim society from the unholy influence of the
secular world. The United States and the Allies are being targeted because
they are perceived to be in support of these oppressive governments and
policies.Â
25.    There is a link between political
repression and the rise of terrorist movements. However, we need to be careful
with advocating regime change. We cannot and we must not impose our political
system on others. Rather, our priority should be to help these countries allow
political participation of all their citizens, rule of law and economic
opportunity.
26.    Secular governments across the
Broader Middle East face a surge in conservative religiosity that supports an
extreme form of political Islam. Many countries in this region have suffered
terrorist attacks from local groups that have emerged from the repressed
extremists. Their governments have outlawed extreme Islamist parties that
would be likely to win large parliamentary blocs - if not majorities - were
they allowed to participate in free and fair national elections. But the
circumscribed democracy that exists throughout the region also prevents more
liberal elements of civil society from participating in politics as well.
Islamist movements appear to be gaining ground and they can easily exploit the
disenchantment with repressive, corrupt regimes, particularly among the young
generation that forms a high percentage of the population in many Arab
countries and many of whom are unemployed. Economic development alone, however,
does not suffice to address the problem. In fact, a recent study by the Gallup
Centre for Muslim Studies in ten Muslim countries showed that wealthier and
better-educated Muslims are more likely to be radicalised. Islamist movements
easily exploit the Internet and Arabic satellite TV stations to spread their
militant political messages.   Â
27.    The fight against terrorism is
being waged on many fronts: military, intelligence, diplomatic and financial.
NATO’s role in this fight is important, but limited. The fight against
terrorist groups is principally a “war of ideas†and the principal weapons that
the Allies should be applying are our freedom, our
liberty, and our rule of law, as Colonel (ret.) Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, stressed during the visit of the Sub-Committee to the United States in July this year. To succeed in tackling terrorist groups the Allies need to have
consistent policy approaches and need to act transparently, Colonel Wilkerson
told the Sub‑Committee. Moreover, international co-ordination and co‑operation
are and remain crucial to counter the threat, both at the international level,
as well as on the bi-lateral level.
28.    The UN has much to contribute to
the development and implementation of an effective strategy to combat
internationally active terrorist groups. The UN’s most
important contribution is that it establishes a legal
framework for counter-terrorism and that it provides
legitimacy in combating terrorist groups. The UN
Security Council (UNSC) has passed numerous binding counter-terrorism related
resolutions. To monitor member states’ implementation of these obligations and
to strengthen their counter-terrorism infrastructures it also established a
number of subsidiary bodies. Moreover, the UN General Assembly has adopted a
Global Counter‑Terrorism Strategy thus marking an important consensus in the UN
on terrorism.Â
29.    Shortly after 9/11 the UNSC adopted
Resolution 1373, which required all 191 UN member countries to freeze the
financial assets of terrorists and their supporters, deny them travel or safe
haven, prevent terrorist recruitment and weapons supply, and cooperate with
other countries in information sharing and criminal prosecution. To monitor
state compliance with these obligations and to strengthen their
counter-terrorism capacities, Resolution 1373 created the Counter‑Terrorism
Committee (CTC).
30.    UN activities have raised awareness
among member states of the importance of international co-operation on
counter-terrorism, but political and institutional limitations, including the
consensus decision-making process that makes it difficult to take action in a
timely fashion, as well as a lack of financial and human resources, impede the
UN’s efforts. Moreover, the UNSC’s counter-terrorism activity has been mostly
reactive, with the majority of Council resolutions dealing with terrorism
having come in the aftermath of an attack or another major event. As a result,
the Security Council’s efforts against terrorism are both incoherent and
uncoordinated. The CTC relies exclusively on reports from member states and
has no possibility of verifying if countries are actually implementing
counter-terrorism mandates.Â
31.    The
9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as the later attacks in Madrid and London, were also calls to action for the European Union. While the EU gives primary
responsibility for the protection of citizens to the member states, the Union feels it can add value to the fight against terrorism by confronting networks of
terror with networks against terror. Therefore, in the months following 9/11,
European leaders agreed to a series of broad political measures intended to
improve co‑operation in the fight against terrorism. The EU's initial
« Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism », agreed within the context of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in late September 2001, aimed to
enhance police and judicial co-operation, while fighting terrorist financing
and improving air security. This was followed by an agreement to create a
European Arrest Warrant, thus speeding extradition of terrorist suspects and
other criminals within the EU, and a common definition of terrorism. In March 2004, in the wake of the Madrid bombings, the EU member states agreed to a new “Declaration on
Combating Terrorism†which, among other things, created an agreement on
solidarity among the member states in the event of another terrorist attack.
The EU also created the position of Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, who would
report directly to the High Representative for CFSP. The EU has a number of
instruments outside European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that are
important in this area, such as an agreement on data sharing via Europol's
antiterrorist cell, and Eurojust, designed to co-ordinate investigations and
prosecutions between national prosecuting authorities. Â
32.    In the
wake of the attacks in London in July 2005 the British Council Presidency sped
the creation of a unified “EU Counter-terrorism Strategy.â€Â Along with its
accompanying action plan, with its 160 specific measures, this Strategy is a
comprehensive document combining steps to fight terrorism across all three EU
pillars. The Strategy’s headline commitment is “to combat terrorism globally
while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to
live in an area of freedom, security and justice.â€Â It is important to note
that security and the preservation of fundamental rights are given equal weight
in this statement. The Strategy is divided into four work streams – prevent,
protect, pursue, and respond – each of which has its own key priorities. The
work streams aim to improve upon national efforts by strengthening national
capabilities, facilitating European co-operation, developing collective
capability, and promoting international partnership. The Council meets to
review the progress on implementing the Strategy every six months, and prior to
this meeting a High Level Political Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism takes place,
with representatives from the Council, the Commission, and the European
Parliament. The EU has also assisted the United States in the areas of police
and judicial co‑operation, in particular regarding regulation on extradition
and police surveillance.Â
33.    While the EU has now created a unified counter-terrorism strategy,
implementation of this strategy is left to the member states. In practice this
means that member states differ radically in their counter-terrorism
legislation. In general, smaller and less affluent states have had difficulties
advancing their legislation as speedily as the larger member states, many of
whom had counter‑terrorism legislation even prior to 9/11. More co-operation
among member states in implementation of counter-terrorism policies would
certainly add to the security of the Union as a whole. Other areas for
improvement within the EU framework are better sharing of information and best
practice, and better co-ordination of counter-terrorism related external
development assistance.
34.    Although 9/11
and other attacks such as those in Turkey in 2003, in Spain in 2004 and in the United Kingdom in 2005 created a general consensus that the
transatlantic partners face a similar threat, there are significant
differences, across the Atlantic, on the means to employ to counter the threat.
In the United States, the terrorist
attacks led to the largest expansion and restructuring of the security agencies
in US history. This has not been the case in European member countries, as a
number of them have been exposed to terrorism long before and had already
adapted their law enforcement structures and legal means. However, the EU has introduced a
broad array of structures and initiatives to allow for a more integrated and
co-ordinated management of its policies to address the problem.
35.    Many
governments have introduced new anti-terrorism legislation and the issue
remains high on the agendas in member countries. Surveillance of private
individuals and the collection of data about them has been greatly expanded.
But there has also been concern that the character of our open societies may
change for the worse. One of the challenges the Allies face is that they have
differing answers on how to balance civil liberties against the need to
increase security. The issue is primarily related to domestic legislation and
it is up to every individual country to define the proper balance between civil
liberties and increased state control. However, there are also important
foreign and security aspects to it.Â
36.    NATO allies
share the same values, including the emphasis on the “rule of law†and a strong
case can be made that protecting human rights and strengthening democracy are
essential over the long term to the fight against terrorism. Holding on to our
values and obtaining the strongest international legitimacy will make it easier
to combat terrorists. Allegations
of war crimes and torture undermine our values and make it more difficult to
reach out to Muslim communities as well as hurt our reputation and legitimacy
abroad.Â
37.    Tackling
terrorist groups also requires co-operation with countries that do not
necessarily share our values. Terrorist movements often arise in societies
where civil and human rights are denied and opportunities for political
expression are lacking. The difficulty is that we also need to co-operate with
repressive governments, some of which may use this co-operation for their own
domestic purposes. While we also
need to co-operate with repressive regimes, we need to consider short-term
gains against long-term costs. We
need to recognise that democracy can be a tool against terrorism and we must resist any temptation to weaken democratic values in our
own societies. While we cannot and should not impose our values on others, we
must be strong examples of how countries benefit from democracy and we must
encourage other states to adhere to democratic values as well. We must
consider that the potential costs of avoiding democratisation are far greater
in terms of forsaking our values and weakening our long-term security.Â
38.    There is no
trade-off to be made between human rights and terrorism and upholding human
rights is not at odds with battling terrorism. On the contrary, the moral
vision of human rights - the respect for the dignity of each person - is among
our most powerful weapons against it. We must not torture, arrest without justification, and detain
individuals without recourse to basic legal protections. These are means
employed by terrorist groups like al Qaeda. To compromise on the protection of human rights would hand
terrorists a victory they cannot achieve on their own. Therefore, the promotion
and protection of human rights should be key part of our strategy to combat
terrorism.
39.    We need to use
the ''soft power'' of values and ideas as well as military strength to defeat
extremism. We must avoid “politics of fear†– which is the primary weapon that
terrorists employ – and we must also reject the vision of Islam as the Evil
Power. Most Muslims consider terrorist acts to be egregious violations of
Islam's laws.Â
40.    Another problem
that our open societies face is how we deal with terrorists and insurgents, as
the distinction between military and civilian combatants has become
increasingly blurred. In addition to ignoring or violating many fundamental
individual rights and liberties, the Bush Administration has been accused of
acting in violation of international law, human rights, and the US Constitution
in its execution of the campaign, particularly with regard to the
internment of so‑called “unlawful combatants†in its military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Critics emphasise that it has detained many hundreds of prisoners,
some of them American citizens, indefinitely, in secret, and without charge or
access to a lawyer. Concerns have also been raised about the creation of
special military tribunals where traditional safeguards to protect the innocent
from conviction will not be available. Designated by the US authorities as
“unlawful enemy combatantsâ€, who are thus denied the privileges of prisoner of
war (POW) designation in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, many have been
held for more than five years without knowing if or when they will be released
or brought to any form of judicial process. But other
countries, too, have difficulties in finding a “right†balance between
upholding civil liberties and protecting against terrorist attacks and some of
their anti-terror programmes have been criticized domestically and
internationally.
41.    The Bush
Administration has also been criticised over the rendition-flights programme of
kidnapped suspects. At least 1,245 such flights in EU states have occurred
since 2001 with the tacit approval and co-operation of some
European governments, according to a report by the European Parliament.Â
42.    The existence
of the CIA's secret prison system and allegations by some former prisoners that
they were tortured in these secret facilities have made European public opinion
more critical of the United States. In addition, critical media reports have
prompted a closer look in Europe at the co-operation with United States intelligence agencies. Europeans are increasingly concerned about the US's use of airline and banking data of European citizens in terrorist profiling. A German
court has ordered the arrest of 13 Americans, presumed to be CIA agents, in the
"extraordinary rendition" of a German citizen who was later found not
to have any connections to terrorism. Critics have chided the United States and some European governments for "outsourcing torture."Â
43.    Six years after President Bush
declared the “war on terror†it is difficult to assess where we stand. There
are no clear benchmarks against which we could measure success or possible
failure. Moreover, the inherent secrecy of terrorist and government actions
makes it almost impossible to provide a clear picture. Failure or success in
combating terrorist groups becomes public only after an attack or after a
foiled attempt. Calling the fight against international terrorist groups a “war
on terror†has been a mistake. The term is vague and simplistic and suggests
that we could win this struggle by applying primarily military means. Groups
like al Qaeda are not governments that can be subdued by war but a diverse
network of non-state actors spread across more than sixty countries.Â
44.    It appears that the general picture
is mixed. One main success is certainly that the Taliban no longer rule Afghanistan. What is more, international awareness of and co-operation against terrorism
has greatly increased. As to the bi-lateral and multi-lateral co-operation, a
number of new initiatives have been developed, such as the Container Security
Initiative (CSI). With regard to NATO, it has engaged in a major transformation
which is directed to make it much more responsive to fight terrorism. NATO has
developed and expanded its capabilities that are important in tackling the
threat posed by internationally active terrorist groups.
45.    According to reports, a number of
major terrorist attacks have been thwarted and numerous high-profile terrorists
have been arrested or killed. Foiled plots like the trolley bomb case near
Cologne in Germany in July 2006 and the London airplane in August, which had a
large impact on civilian air travel and led to a substantial increase in
airport security measures, demonstrate that the threat has not subsided, but
that national and international authorities are making progress in tracking
these threats.Â
46.    But “despite being forced to
decentralise its network, al Qaeda retains the ability to organise complex,
mass-casualty attacks and inspire othersâ€, as the director of the US Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), General Michael Maples, submitted in a written
statement to the US Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year.
Moreover, according to the 2006 US National Intelligence Estimate, al Qaeda may
have been weakened since the 11 September 2001 attacks, but new
radical Islamic groups and cells, which are inspired by Osama Bin Laden but not
under his direct control, have been formed. The terror threat to EU member states is “more
serious than everâ€, according to the annual report of Europol, the EU’s police
office. Al Qaeda
propaganda is now of "greater sophistication and quality" and
more "professional" than ever before and the radicalisation of young,
disenchanted Muslims has become more rapid.
47.    As to Iraq, the security is highly
fragile and the country is close to a civil war which could spill over to neighbouring countries. The presence of the US-led
coalition is proving a recruiting tool for young radical Muslims worldwide, but
a precipitous withdrawal of the troops would probably make the situation worse,
thereby aggravating the terrorism problem.Â
48.    By concentrating on Iraq, we diverted already scarce resources from improving the situation in Afghanistan. As a result, we have made less progress there than was possible, and there is
still unrest and instability in Afghanistan while the Taliban are resurging.
Moreover, the focus on Iraq distracted us from addressing other important
issues, in particular Iran, which has been accused of assisting terrorist
organisations. American intelligence officials allege that Iranian paramilitary
groups are providing weapons and sophisticated bombs to Iraqi Shiite groups
thereby helping the insurgency there. Tehran was also able to continue pursuing
its controversial nuclear programme. If Iran decided to develop nuclear
weapons, it could lead to the further proliferation
of WMD and would further destabilise the Gulf’s already volatile security.
The Iranian problem contains the basis for another transatlantic clash. The
clash could emerge over whether the idea of Iran having nuclear weapons is
something that is inevitable and worth the risk of war.Â
49.    The
greatest threat to our security is a “nexus between terrorist networks,
terrorist states and WMD" as former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld described. Here, too, the picture is mixed as international
co-operation has increased and new partnerships developed. Programmes like the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
and the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) have generated additional capabilities
among participating
countries to combat the global threat of nuclear
terrorism. However, there
has been no progress with regard to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime
(NPT) which is worrisome, as the danger of WMD proliferation appears to
increase and the possible nexus of terrorism, "states of concern" and
WMD proliferation has become a major security concern.
50.    Despite the achievements in
combating terrorism, the threat posed by international terrorist groups has not
abated. Although assessments like the 2007 US
National Intelligence Estimate do not allow for much optimism that the fight
against globally active Islamist terrorist groups can be won in the short term,
the long term prognosis may be rather good. These groups suffer from
significant strategic weaknesses as Peter Bergen, Adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at
Johns Hopkins University, informed the Sub-Committee:Â Their lack of a positive
vision and their willingness to accept the killing of innocent Muslims through
their actions are depriving them of mass support and their expanding list of
enemies will eventually led to their defeat.Â
51. Â Â Â Although its role in this field is limited, NATO provides the essential
transatlantic dimension in combating terrorism. Defeating radical Islamist
terrorist groups requires vigorous law
enforcement, intelligence, and military action.Â
However, the operations in Afghanistan have shown that the “rules of the
road†in this fight are not clearly agreed upon in the Alliance. Therefore, NATO should use its
political-diplomatic clout more effectively to work towards greater policy
coherence between the Allies. The Alliance needs to re-invigorate its ability
to achieve political consensus, agree on common
concept and act as a coalition. To that end, NATO needs to expand and refine
some of the policies it has developed.Â
52.    One of
the areas where NATO could take on additional responsibility is homeland
defence, and its role in this area could be to
co-ordinate national policies across the Atlantic. Certainly the main
responsibility for protecting citizens from terrorist attacks belongs with
national authorities and homeland security will always remain an essential
competence of every nation’s government. However, NATO has already had a role
in homeland defence and homeland security since the Cold War. What is more,
military forces have always co-operated with civilian authorities in responding
to natural disasters, sealing borders or protecting critical infrastructures.
NATO’s role in homeland defence must not detract from national and EU
capabilities and institutions in this field but rather complement these. Thus
NATO could develop a co-ordination and planning role to warrant that Allies’
capabilities and activities are adapted and integrated to deal with these new
threats.
53.    NATO’s political clout should also
be used more effectively with regard to partner countries. As the Broader Middle East is of critical
strategic importance, the Allies should expand the engagement with neighbouring
states by developing existing programmes like the Mediterranean Dialogue and
the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI) using the experience and assets of
NATO's Partnership for Peace.Â
54.    A just and lasting solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would go a long way in tackling the problem of
Islamist terrorism. Although NATO is not involved in settling this conflict,
NATO should consider adding its political and diplomatic weight to finding a
solution. For example, the NAC could be used to devise joint transatlantic
initiatives that could help to co-ordinate the policies and initiatives of
member countries as well as those of the United States and the EU. Moreover,
NATO could provide additional training assistance to Mediterranean Dialogue or ICI partner
countries. A greater emphasis should be placed on co-operation with
countries that develop democratic structures and respect human rights. Here
too, it would be important to co‑ordinate with the EU as the latter could offer
non-military assistance and training that are relevant in tackling terrorism.
55.    Finally, the developments in the
last six years have underlined the importance of public diplomacy, both in
terms of maintaining support at home and co-operation abroad. Although the role
of the Alliance is limited in this area, NATO can and should do more to build
public support for the operations in Afghanistan and to explain the Alliance as a values-based organisation. The fight against Islamist terrorist groups is a
struggle of ideas and we need to do better in dealing with the radicalisation
of Islam. Allies need to support moderate Islamic forces who can show how
al Qaeda and similar groups are distorting the Koran. NATO allies should
better orchestrate their activities among themselves. To that end NATO’s
capacities should be strengthened and more funding as well as expertise made
available.Â
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