POLITICAL 175 PC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SECURING NATO'S ROLE AND RELEVANCE DRAFT GENERAL REPORT BERT KOENDERS (NETHERLANDS) GENERAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 31 October 2005 * Until  this  document  has  been  approved  by  the  Political  Commitee,  it  represents  only  the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

175 PC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE NEXT SUMMITS.......................................................... 1 II. A MORE POLITICAL NATO................................................................................................. 2 III. TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES...................................................................................... 3 IV. RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS................................................................... 4 V. ESDP: PARTNER OR COMPETITOR? ............................................................................... 5 VI. ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT: WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? ................. 6 A. IRAQ ............................................................................................................................ 6 B. THE “BROADER MIDDLE EAST” ................................................................................. 7 C.    AFRICA - AND BEYOND.............................................................................................. 7 VII. OPERATIONAL LESSONS.................................................................................................. 8 VIII. AN ENLARGED ALLIANCE ................................................................................................. 9 IX. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................... 9

175 PC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE NEXT SUMMITS 1. NATO   is   developing   more   and   more   as   a   pragmatic   organisation   which   answers   to unexpected and new challenges. In the midst of a complicated and risky extension of its mission to the  south  of  Afghanistan,  NATO  has  answered  to  natural  disasters  in  the  US  and  Pakistan (providing  logistical  assistance  after  hurricane  Katrina  and  after  the  earthquake  in  Kashmir).  In Darfur, NATO has assisted the African Union (AU) with strategic airlift. This pragmatic evolution of NATO  is  to  be  welcomed.  Codification  of  all  new  developments  and  challenges  might  lead  to endless diplomatic discussion with no end. However, pragmatism can only deliver success if key questions regarding the future of NATO are tackled. For example, the Spanish NATO Response Force (NRF) contribution to the Pakistan relief effort shows the need for a solution to the problem of common funding. But also more fundamental problems regarding the future of NATO will have to be solved in order for pragmatism to succeed, not least the issue of an improved transatlantic political dialogue on priorities and the role of NATO. 2. It was hoped that the visit of President Bush to NATO and the European Union in February would  breathe  a  new  sense  of  harmony  into  transatlantic  relations  and  a new sense of purpose into  the  Atlantic  Alliance.  Unfortunately  the  jury  is  still  out  as  to  whether  either  expectation  has been realised. Alliance atmospherics appear better than a year ago although many issues remain for  Alliance  friction  to  thrive  on.  Iraq  continues  to  cast  a  deep  shadow  in  both  political  and operational  terms.  However,  while  substantial  differences  over  the  rationale  for  the  war  remain, they  have  gradually  been  put  to  one  side  in  the  recognition  that  it  is  in  everyone's  interest  to prevent Iraq descending even further into the abyss. 3. Iraq  apart,  NATO  faces  challenges  on  a  number  of  fronts.  The  single  most  important challenge  is  the  prevailing  perception  that  the  Alliance  is  no  longer  the  primary  forum  for consultation  among  allies.  Chancellor  Schröder  elaborated  publicly  what  many  had  been  saying privately  when  he  commented  last  February  that  NATO  "is  no  longer  the  primary  venue  where transatlantic  partners  discuss  and  coordinate  strategies".  The  question  provoked  two  immediate reactions: if this is true what can be done to reverse the situation, and if nothing can be done, was there an alternative? 4. The  NATO  Secretary  General's  response  was  immediate  –  make  NATO  more  relevant  by making it more political. Accordingly, he set in train internal studies to see where further changes could be made to achieve this objective. Making NATO more political and therefore a more central forum for consultation is a worthy goal in itself. But it is not enough. The relevance of the Alliance is inextricably linked to its performance. Goals must be matched by means. 5. The  military  and  operational  dimension  is  easier  to  define.  If  the  Alliance  is  to  handle situations  such  as  Afghanistan,  then,  it  must  deliver  the  forces  and  the  capabilities  in  sufficient numbers, unfettered by national reservations and restrictions on their operational use. While it is true  that  transformation  has  brought  improvements  and  while  Alliance  forces  in  Kosovo  and Afghanistan  are  doing  a  commendable  job,  the  overall  picture  remains  discouraging.  Alliance resources are stretched to the hilt, making a response to sudden emergencies problematic.  This shortfall  has  been  seen  in  the  response  to  the  Pakistan  emergency,  where  scarce  assets  have had to be deployed from Afghanistan. There are no magic solutions to improving our capabilities and  no  additional  resources  for  defence  forthcoming  from  our  national  coffers.  Spending  better and  wiser,  learning  lessons  from  existing  deployments  and  insisting  that  the  collective  "good" provided  by  the  Alliance  take  precedence  over  national  interests  would  appear  to  offer  the  best way of ensuring better capabilities. 6. With NATO Summits looming in 2006 and again in 2008, a clear road map is needed that will confirm and underpin the centrality of the Alliance to contemporary challenges. This road map must  address  several  elements,  including  agreements  on:  what  "making  NATO  more  political"

175 PC 05 E 2 means   for   the   internal   consultation   and   decision-making   structures;   how   we   can   improve transatlantic dialogue and resolve transatlantic differences; how we shape the future membership of   the   Alliance   and   how   we   develop   partnerships;   how   we   develop   relations   with   other organisations,  especially  with  the  EU  on  the  basis  of  genuine  partnership  and  cooperation  -  not competition and duplication. The road map’s elements also must address the breadth and scope of  NATO's  operations  and  the  circumstances  under  which  NATO  capabilities  can  be  used, particularly in operations that include other organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the African  Union  (AU).  Last,  but  not  least  we  must  apply  the  lessons  of  current  deployments  and ensure that the military means available match political aspirations. Successfully addressing these elements  will  ensure  that  NATO  is  sufficiently  equipped  to  continue  to  play  a  pivotal  role  in ensuring our collective security. 7. In brief, it is up to the 26 member nations to define the future role of the NATO Alliance and decide what measures should be taken that will reassert the centrality of the Alliance. The reality is that NATO will be seen to be relevant to the degree that it is used; and it will be used to the degree that it is seen to be relevant – responsibility for this lies, as always, with its member nations. 8. This report will provide an assessment of these different elements; greater details of certain aspects are provided by the Sub-Committee reports this year. II. A MORE POLITICAL NATO 9. At the Prague and Istanbul Summits, NATO Heads of State and Governments have agreed to  make  the  Allied  militaries  more  responsive  to  the  threats  and  challenges  of  the  21^st  century. Your Rapporteur notes that military transformation remains crucial, but is not sufficient in itself. If the  Alliance  wants  to  maintain  its  role  as  key  forum  for  transatlantic  co-ordination  and  common action,  it  needs  to  complement  its  ongoing  military  transformation  by  a  profound political one. A political    transformation    is    urgently    needed    to    adapt    NATO’s    consensus    building    and decision-making  processes  to  today’s  and  tomorrow’s  security  environment,  which  is  radically different  from  the  time  the  Alliance  was  founded.  New,  asymmetric  threats,  the  resulting  mix  of military  and  non-military  operations  to  respond  these  threats  and  new  security  actors  demand  a review of NATO’s way to do business. 10. Political  transformation  will  require  the  adaptation  of  existing  structures  and  procedures  at NATO  Headquarters.  To  this  end,  the  NATO  Secretary  General  has  launched  the  Secretary General’s  Reform  Group  led  by  former  Danish  Ambassador  Jesper Vahr. The group consists of personnel from the international and military staff and former senior experts and it reviews how the efficiency  of  NATO  Headquarters  can  be  improved.  More  specifically,  the  group  examines  NAC consultations   and   decision-making,   NATO’s   committee   structure,   the   coherence   of   existing budgetary and resource processes, and the organisation of the staff. Your Rapporteur welcomes the  political  transformation  at  NATO  Headquarters  initiated  by  the  NATO  Secretary  General. However, he would caution that the results are likely to be limited and may not address all the key issues. First, we need the broadest agreement possible for NATO's agenda for consultation. And second, we need to examine whether and how NATO action is possible if not all allies agree. In other  words:  how  does  NATO  act  –  or  react  - if there is no consensus among Allies? Delays in decision-making  are  fundamentally  related  to  political  differences  among  Allies  on  the  issues  at hand  rather  than  to  the  mechanisms  and  procedures  of  decision-making.  We  must  therefore address the question of how can we avoid paralysis when there is no unanimity among member countries. 11. Some  suggestions  to  strengthen  NATO’s  role  as  the  prime  forum  for  transatlantic  security dialogue - or as Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said, to make it “more political” - have  been  put  on  the  table.  Among  the  suggestions  under  discussions  are  a  new  Strategic

175 PC 05 E 3 Concept which would substitute the one from 1999 or a report produced by a team of independent senior experts for eventual NAC review (similar to the “Harmel” report of 1967), or as Chancellor Schröder  has  suggeste d,  a  high-ranking  panel  of  independent  figures  from  both  sides  of  the Atlantic to help us find a solution. 12. However, each of these solutions would risk long exacerbating transatlantic debates which would hinder, rather than promote, Allied consensus building. This is even more likely as time and personnel  resources  required  for  agreeing  on  a  new  “Harmel”  Report  or  negotiating  a  new Strategic Concept would be difficult and time-consuming, at a time when NATO is occupied with its numerous operations in the Balkans and “out-of-area” as well as with its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the EU, to name a few. In fact, the Alliance is revising its Strategic Concept through actions on the ground, through practice rather than theory. 13. Any consideration of changing NATO's practices will have to start from the assumption that consensus  will  remain  the  guiding  principle  of  Alliance  decision-making  (the  'catch  22'  situation, there will be no consensus to move away from consensus!). Nevertheless, we need try to reform the  decision-making  process  so  as  to  improve  NATO’s  ability  to  take  decisions  quickly  and  to deploy capable forces rapidly. 14. Therefore,  NATO’s  political  dialogue  must  be  expanded  so  that  the  Allies  will  be  able  to discuss  any  issue  that  may  impact  the  security  of  the  Alliance.  A  new  strategic  vision  could  be perhaps submitted at a later stage, after continuing discussions at NAC. 15. There are more crises in the world than NATO Allies have the will or resources to manage and it is therefore essential to start discussion on first priorities. No agreement exists on the best way to tackle terrorism and countries with WMD. Some nations believe that the way in which the current  fight  against  terrorism  is  framed  might  actually  lead  to  more  terrorism.  No  agreement exists   on   the   relevance   of   the   concepts   of   containment   and   deterrence   in   case   of   new proliferators.  Except  for  Afghanistan,  “failing  states”  have  received  little,  if  any,  attention  from NATO.  Human  rights,  detention  policy  and  respect  for  the  Geneva  Conventions  are  dividing  the transatlantic Allies and require discussion especially when a further link between ISAF and OEF is planned in Afghanistan. 16. The Allies may also discuss whether, and if so how, to “manage change” i.e. how we may deal with the rise of new emerging powers like China and India and their growing importance for security. NATO could provide a forum for finding concerted diplomatic and multi-lateral approach to make them net contributors to effective multilateralism. III. TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES 17. Despite   the   charm   offensive   of   US   President   Bush   earlier   this   year,   the   number   of unresolved  issues  among  the  Allies  has  not  diminished.    What  is  more,  some  consider  NATO merely  as  a  toolkit  or  promote  “coalitions  of  the  willing”  which  can  be  assembled  on  an  ad-hoc basis  to  deal  with  upcoming  crises.  Disagreement  among  Allies  also  exists  on  more  specific questions  such  as  if  combating  terrorist  groups  is  primarily  done  by  military  means  or  by  law enforcement measures. 18. In  Afghanistan,  security  is  still  critical  in  many  areas,  as  your  Rapporteur  has  witnessed during a recent visit. NATO operations there have revealed serious gaps between political rhetoric and actual commitment. It is a shame that we have not been able to remove national restrictions on  troops  provided  to  NATO  operations.  Moreover,  we  cannot  agree  on  a  joint  command  in Afghanistan   for   the   US-led   counter-terrorism   Operation   Enduring   Freedom   (OEF)   and   the NATO-led International Security Force (ISAF). Also, detention policy is still under debate.

175 PC 05 E 4 19. Capabilities, particularly the gap between the military strength of US and its Allies, remain a contentious  issue.  The  NRF,  designed  as  a  catalyst  to  advance  military  capabilities  of  NATO forces, has made good progress. However, the setting of political priorities and consensus making on when and where to deploy is still weak. Furthermore, the US is not involved in the NRF with troops, and divisions of labour are not yet clarified. 20. These  pending  security  issues  are  embedded  in  the  overall  political  context  in  which  the Alliance is operating. Other disputes are unlikely to facilitate reconciliation among NATO partners. While the Allies share the view that the so-called “Broader Middle East” poses a crucial security challenge  and  urgently  needs  assistance  to  reform,  there  is  no  agreement  about  how  to  best achieve this. On Iran, everyone agrees that nuclear-armed Republican Guards would pose a high security challenge, but there is insufficient consensus on how to instigate Teheran to abandon its current  plans.  The  IAEA  has  a  vital  role  to  play and the EU and US positions should be closely coordinated.  Simultaneously  human  rights  policy  should  receive  more  attention  especially  since the  election  of  the  new  fundamentalist  Iranian  president  who  has  shocked  the  world  by  strong anti-semitism. 21. European   and   Canadian   allies   are   also   concerned   over   a   perceived   US-American “à-la-carte”  multilateralism,  which  they  consider  particularly  damaging  for  existing  arms  control instruments  like  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT)  or  the  Comprehensive  Test  Ban Treaty (CTBT). On the other hand, Americans criticise that the EU considers allowing European firms to sell arms to China. 22. But  the  reasons  for  lack  of  trust  are  more  complex.  Perhaps  the  US  feels  the  risks  more immediate than its partners and is willing to employ military force for its defence and places less emphasis  on  international  institutions.  Perhaps  Europeans  fear  being  dragged  into  new  risks  by the US which in turn considers its allies “appeasing and free-riding” as Harvey Sapolski, Director of the   MIT   Security   Studies   Program,   maintained   in   a   meeting   with   the   Sub-Committee   on Transatlantic Relations. 23. The relevance of the Alliance will depend on how effective it will be in meeting the security challenges it is facing. As spillover of crises from the regions of Europe’s periphery appears likely, NATO will be involved in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. Missions will increasingly be “out-of-area”   and   will   include   longer-term   deployments   with   both   military   and   non-military components.  In  addition  to  applying  the  lessons  learned  in  previous  missions  for  future  ones, NATO needs to find its role in meeting the new security challenges, particularly those stemming from international terrorist groups and WMD proliferation. IV. RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 24. Iraq and Afghanistan are resounding reminders no single nation or group of nations can win the  peace,  nor  tackle  root  causes  for  future  conflicts  alone.  Most  of  today’s  conflicts  are  within states rather than between them. Dealing with today's threats requires broad, deep and sustained global cooperation. Therefore, NATO needs to also broaden its political and strategic debate with other international organisations. For example, the nature and complexity of today’s post-conflict operations  call  for  broadest  possible  international  collaboration.   While  NATO  is  capable  of deploying  powerful  forces  in  large  numbers,  it  has  no  capacity  for  civil  implementation  and depends  upon  other  organisations,  particularly  the  UN  or  the  EU,  to  perform  the  non-military functions  essential  to  the  success  of  any  nation-building  operation.  The  challenge  is  also  to achieve   seamless   transition   from   possible   combat   operations   to   peace   enforcing.   Close co-operation with partners, particularly the EU, but also the UN and the OSCE, is required. This demands   a   clear   delineation   of   tasks   among   participating   actors   and   that   the   efforts   of

175 PC 05 E 5 participating  organisations  complement  and  do  not  compete  against  each  other.  Moreover,  their mandates must be compatible to each other and mutually reinforcing. The United Nations (UN) 25. In the broadest terms, the UN provides a platform not ‘only’ for aid development, promoting human  rights,  democracy  and  arms  control,  but  also  for  common  action  to  fight  international terrorists,    strengthen    non-proliferation,    and    bring    peace    to    war-torn    areas.    Despite    its shortcomings, the UN has a key role in conflict prevention. The UN is also key as a legitimator of international military action. 26. Your Rapporteur regrets the failure of the recent UN reform summit. The final document was much  weaker  than  first  envisage  and  did  not  produce  agreement  on  a  strategy  to  prevent  the spread  of  nuclear  weapons  nor  on  a  common  definition  of  terrorism.  As  the  UN’s  ability  for broadest  international  action  in  the  security  realm  remains  underdeveloped,  NATO  member countries should discuss how they and the Alliance, as an organisation, can help building effective multilateralism.  One  possibility  may  be  to  create  caucuses  of  NATO-member  countries  in  the respective UN structures to advance issues on terrorism and non-proliferation. In addition, a closer institutional  relationship  between  the  Alliance  and  the  UN  should  be  welcome.  Your  Rapporteur therefore  welcomes  the  announcement  between  Jaap  de  Hoop  Scheffer  and  Kofi  Annan  to “pursue  a  deeper  and  more  structured  relationship  between  the  two  organisations”.  A  practical step for NATO would be to expand its liaison office at the UN Headquarters in New York, which is currently  staffed  by  one  person  only.  The  NRF  should  play  an  increasingly  important  role  in strengthening  UN  Peacekeeping  and  training  and  cooperation  with  the  AU  should  also  be developed seriously. V. ESDP: PARTNER OR COMPETITOR? 27. The  nature  and  complexity  of  current  security  challenges  also  calls  for  deeper  NATO-EU co-operation.  Overall,  the  NATO-EU  relationship  has  made  great  strides  towards  an  effective partnership. The generally smooth transfer of the stabilisation mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO to the EU sets a precedent for potential subsequent handovers. NATO’s new role is to facilitate  Bosnian  defence  reform  and  conduct  operational  tasks  in  co-operation  with  the  EU related  to  apprehension  of  persons  indicted  for  war  crimes  (PIFWCs),  counter-terrorism,  and intelligence    sharing.    Although    political    differences    over    the    mandate    initially    delayed implementation of the transfer, the ongoing collaboration in Bosnia and Herzegovina signals that it is possible for NATO and the EU to work together. 28. 19 NATO Allies are also members of the EU.  As each country commands only one set of forces,  the  EU  and  NATO  coordinate  the  generation  of  forces.  It  is  therefore  crucially  important that  NATO  and  the  EU  co-ordinate  their  force  planning  in  a  way  that  avoids  discrepancies  or duplication. An improved co-ordination is necessary on the NRF and the EU battle groups as well as a broad discussion between the Secretary General of NATO and the Secretary-General of the European Council. 29. One can argue that NATO has agreed to function as a toolbox for EU operations when the Alliance as a whole is not involved. When we contemplate how to further strengthen the NATO-EU co-operation,  we  should  consider  the  (non-military)  capabilities  that  the  EU  can  bring  to  bear  in crisis prevention and in post-conflict operations. 30. Improved co-operation is also essential in the areas of WMD and Terrorism where NATO is only  a  part  of  the  wider  solution.  Fighting  terrorist  groups  requires  the  full  range  of  policy

175 PC 05 E 6 instruments,  some  of  which  NATO  does  not  have.  NATO  is  not  the  right  venue  to  discuss coordination of actions to track terrorist finances or how to best support elections in Afghanistan or Iraq. 31. Similarly, NATO’s contribution to tackle WMD proliferation is rather limited. However, it could become   a   platform   to   find   convergent,   primarily   diplomatic,   approaches   to   prevent   WMD proliferation. This is particularly important in the case of Iran, which could become the most difficult challenge  to  the  Western  Alliance  since  the  Cuban  missile  crisis,  particularly  as  negotiations between the EU-3 and Teheran are at an impasse. 32. NATO’s primary role should be that of a facilitator to make existing non-proliferation regimes more effective. Bi-lateral agreements between governments can be helpful to supplement existing international agreements, but should not be undermining them if there is no agreed replacement. In this context, your Rapporteur is sceptical that the agreement between the US administration and India may undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the long-term without providing a viable alternative to this multilateral agreement. 33. More NATO may also be possible, if not necessary, in homeland defence and disaster relief. The  military  is  increasingly  becoming  involved  in  disaster  relief  efforts  as  in  the  Indian  ocean tsunami last December, Hurricane “Katrina” or the earth quake in northern Pakistan this year have proven.  The  Alliance  already  has  limited  responsibility  in  disaster  relief  and  is  co-operating  with countries like Ukraine in this area. NATO does not hold any responsibility in homeland defence, but your Rapporteur believes that we should explore possible synergies that can be generated by first   responses   and   disaster   relief.   However,   the   Alliance   should   discuss   whether   NATO Headquarters can take on a role as policy co-ordinator. VI. ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT: WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? A. IRAQ 34. Following the low point in transatlantic relations over the Iraq war all NATO member states have  now  pledged  support  in  some  form  for  the  training  of  Iraqi  security  forces.  By  providing communications, logistical and intelligence support to the Polish-led multinational division in Iraq, NATO  is  replicating  the  assistance  it  had  given  to  the  German/Dutch-led  ISAF  mission  in Afghanistan  in  2002-2003.  In  addition,  NATO  has  engaged  in  the  Training  Implementation Mission,  now  called  the  NATO  Training  Mission–Iraq.  Since  August  2004,  approximately  50 officers have been working on the ground in Baghdad. There are plans to expand the mission to include some 300 personnel deployed in Iraq. 35. Thus far, NATO’s role in Iraq remains rather limited, because agreement on NATO’s role is only the least common denominator among Allies who previously disagreed over the Iraq war. But we must recognise that all NATO partners have a stake in securing and stabilising Iraq. Whether we will succeed or fail will significantly influence the stability in the region and beyond. However, given the fragile security situation on the ground and the unclarity over the duration and character of the US-led coalition’s presence in the country, we must not make Iraq a “make or break” issue for  NATO  as  an  organisation.  What  is  needed  is  increased  assistance  to  the  Iraqi  government, especially  in  the  sectors  that  are  relevant  for  reconstruction  and  development.  We  also  need  a constructive  debate  on  what  the  Alliance  as  an  organisation  can  do  more  to  support  the  Iraqi people. This also applies to the EU whose involvement has thus far only been rather minimal. A positive example is its EUJUST LEX mission, operational since 1 July 2005, which trains up to 770 senior officials of the Iraqi police, justice and penitentiary in four-week courses outside the country.

175 PC 05 E 7 Of course, we must not impose ourselves, and any NATO or other action should be based on Iraqi demands. B. THE “BROADER MIDDLE  EAST” 36. The Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf have become much more relevant for our security, particularly as the most likely challenges, those stemming from terrorism and WMD proliferation, originate from there. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) are a recognition of this. But NATO’s role in the Mediterranean and the Gulf is still developing, and achievements thus far have been rather limited. With regard to the so-called “Broader Middle East” (BME), there are different views about whether NATO as an organisation could take on a role and, if  so,  what  that  role  could  be  and  how  that  may  relate  to  activities  of  other  international organisations. 37. There  is  also  talk  of  NATO  playing  a  critical  role  in  bringing  greater  stability  to  the  BME, perhaps  also  in  the  Middle  East  conflict.  Necessary  preconditions  before  NATO  could  envisage any  contribution  to  addressing  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  should  certainly  include  a  lasting peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, any involvement should be based on agreement and request for a NATO involvement by both parties, as well as a UN mandate on which NATO operation would be legally based. Your Rapporteur would consider a NATO role in the  Middle-East  peace  process  positively.  As  a  preliminary  step  NATO  could  train  Palestinian security forces to help them establish a military that can contribute to regional stability as well as defence of the national territory. C. AFRICA - AND BEYOND 38. NATO’s involvement in Africa is also a demonstration of the changing transatlantic security agenda.   There   is   growing   interest   in   NATO   supporting   stabilisation   operations   in   Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. Following a formal request by the AU on 26 April 2005 to assist its mission in Darfur, NATO has airlifted peacekeepers from contributing countries to support the AU’s mission in Sudan. Moreover NATO as well as the EU are supporting the  combined  air  movement  co-ordination  cell  which  operates  under  the  AU’s  leadership  in Addis Abeba. NATO is also training AU troops in how to run a multinational military headquarters and  how  to  ‘manage  intelligence’.  Because  of  the  training  programme’s  success,  the  AU  has asked NATO to broaden it. 39. The current operation in Darfur is both an example for good NATO-EU co-operation and a reminder  that  we  need  to  avoid  competition  between  the  two organisations. In the run-up to the agreement   on   NATO   assistance,   several   EU   member   countries   tried   to   block   any   NATO involvement in the operations. With a growing interest in security in Africa, NATO will look for ways to  strengthen  regional  military  capabilities  to  develop  an  African  response  to  conflicts  on  the continent. Lack of available resources are likely to limit NATO’s direct involvement in Africa, but it may   be   in   a   position   to   help   and   facilitate   deployment   of   forces   by   other   international organisations. NATO should increase its existing “enabler capabilities” and further its capacity to train  security  forces  of  partner  countries  and  regional  organisations  (such  as  the  AU)  to  tackle crises  in  their  own  backyard.  There  is  a  need  to  have  a  strong  political  dialogue  about  NATO’s tasks   and   priorities   in   Africa   and   the   possible   co-operation  with  other  international  actors, particularly the EU, the UN, and the AU.

175 PC 05 E 8 VII.    OPERATIONAL LESSONS 40. NATO  Allies  recognise that geographically remote areas can have a direct impact on their security,   as   Afghanistan   has   demonstrated.   Failing   states   can   be   breeding   grounds   for internationally  active  terrorist  groups.  NATO’s  post  Cold-War  operations  have  not  only  been “instigators”  for  reforms,  they  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  debate  on  the  transformation  of  the Alliance.  Getting  the  operations  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Afghanistan  “right”  is  not  only  important because  NATO’s  success  –  or  possible  failure  –  would  heavily  impact  on  its  credibility  and  its military as well as political cohesion. Moreover, the operations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq are central for the security of the Alliance. 41. NATO-led operations cannot be successful without prior agreement on clear political goals and  precisely  defined  military  missions.  Deployed  forces  must  operate  under  a  robust  mandate that allows quick adaptation to changing circumstances if required. Rules of engagement should provide  a  maximum  of  flexibility  allowing  commanders  to  deal  with  the  broadest  spectrum  of operations, from peacekeeping to counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations. At the same time, it is essential that peacekeeping, stabilisation and counter-terrorism should not be confused. It  is  also  important  that  NATO  defends  its  values,  and  respects  the  Geneva  Conventions  at  all times. 42. National  caveats:  Achieving  the  highest  degree  possible  of  interoperability  among  NATO forces is not only desirable but the sine qua non for the successful implementation of operations. We  must  therefore  eliminate,  or  at  least  considerably  reduce,  so-called  national  caveats  i.e. restrictions that member nations put on the use of national contingents in joint NATO operations. The majority of caveats relates to rules of engagement (i.e. peacekeeping rather than war fighting) and  geographical  mobility.  In  addition,  there  are  also  caveats  that  limit  participation  in  NATO’s integrated command structure, even though there is NAC agreement on that operation. 43. Although  NATO  member  states  appear  to  have  tackled  the  problem  of national caveats in the  Balkans,  the  issue  remains  critical  in  Afghanistan.  This  is  particularly  important  as  ISAF  is expanding to the West and South of the country until the first half of 2006. This will bring it into direct contact with OEF, the US-led counter-terrorism operation. Some NATO member countries contributing  to  ISAF  have  restricted  their  participation  to  exclude  combat operations. Expressing reservations  about  using  ISAF  forces  to  help  fight  the  Taliban-led  insurgency  in  the  south  of Afghanistan, German Defence Minister Peter Struck said at the September Defence Ministerial in Berlin that he would not like to expose our soldiers to more danger by linking these two mandates together. 44. Funding  of  operations:  Success  or  failure  of  operations  heavily  depends  on  the  sufficient allocation  of  resources.  Your  Rapporteur  must  sadly  state  that  some  NATO  member  countries have   not   matched   political   commitments   with   necessary   resources.   Although   NATO   Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance in Afghanistan, the allocation of troops and equipment was considerably delayed, as was the case in Iraq. 45. Under current NATO regulations, a member state is responsible for financing its personnel and equipment on a mission. In contrast, those countries not participating in a NATO mission incur no costs, even though they have agreed to the operation in the NAC. Placing the financial burden only on participating members is unfair and creates a disincentive for countries to contribute. What is  more,  it  undermines  the  very  logic  of  NATO  as  an  alliance  in  which  burdens  are  shared equitably and fairly. 46. NATO must urgently review the issue of common funding for joint operations with the aim to avoid   “punishing”   contributing   countries,   especially   those   which   provide   key   enablers.   One

175 PC 05 E 9 possible solution to deal with existing shortcomings, in the medium-term may be to further expand the NATO’s commonly funded projects. VIII.   AN ENLARGED ALLIANCE 47. The  Alliance  has  a  taken  on  a  crucial  and  increasingly  important  role  for  the  protection  of security and stability beyond its borders. NATO’s geographical and topical enlargements also pose the  question  where  NATO  ends.  With  the  application  of  Albania,  Croatia  and  the  FYR  of Macedonia,  the  enlargement  of  the  Alliance  continues.  Moreover,  as  NATO  relations  with  Kyiv have entered a qualitatively new phase after the Orange Revolution with the “Intensified Dialogue”, Ukraine’s future membership is not excluded. There is also interest in countries of the Southern Caucasus  to  join  the  Alliance.  We  need  to  agree  on  future  enlargements  of  the  Alliance.  But enlargement must avoid raising new barriers within Europe. 48. Partnerships,   including   NATO’s   special   relationships   with   the   Russian   Federation   and Ukraine,  must  evolve  further.  Over  the  years,  the  Alliance  developed  specific  programmes  of co-operation  on  defence  reform,  including  in  areas  like  combating  transborder  crime,  tightening border security, promoting civil-military relations, and the democratic control of the armed forces. However, NATO might consider expanding its activities geared towards strengthening democratic standards.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  regard  to  the  Central  Asian  republics,  which  benefit from  NATO’s  assistance  in  the  framework  of  Partnership  for  Peace  (PfP).  To  that  end,  NATO might,  in  the  long  run,  explore  possible  co-ordination  with  other  international  organisations, especially  the  OSCE  and  the  EU.  This  would  not  only  avoid  possible  duplication  of  efforts undertaken by these organisations, but could also contribute to slowly developing more democratic structures and the rule of law. There is ample room for closer collaboration as NATO commands the  necessary  military  and  security  expertise,  and  the  EU  already  provides  critical  economic, financial and other assistance. IX. CONCLUSIONS 49. If  NATO  wants  to  re-gain  its  rightful  role  as  the  prime  transatlantic  security  forum  it  must further transform. Transformation is about adapting existing structures and processes, but it is first and  foremost  about  transformation  of  our  minds,  i.e.  how  we  think  about  security.  Political consensus among the Allies remains crucial, but it can only be a result of continued, meaningful dialogue among member states. Whether or not we will succeed in rebuilding trust will depend on “affirmative  action”,  i.e.  the  increase  in  military  capabilities,  and  on  our  ability  for  a  true  debate among equals. 50. In  the  military  field,  building  additional  capabilities  as  agreed  upon  in  the  Istanbul  Summit must  be  an  absolute  priority  and  is  a  sine  qua  non  for  NATO’s  effectiveness  as  well  as  for  its credibility. The goal must be to modernise our forces to make them more mobile and interoperable so they will be able to perform a broader spectrum of tasks that ranges from war fighting to peace keeping,   but   also   disaster   relief   operations.   Modernising   the   force   generation   process   by improving   co-ordination   and   planning   national   contributions   to   joint   missions   is   necessary. Moreover, the funding mechanism must urgently be improved, including particularly the financing of joint infrastructure and joint operations. 51. NATO must adapt its political process and should strengthen the role of the NAC as a forum for debate at different levels. Reform at NATO Headquarters can facilitate Allied decision-making but it cannot substitute consensus. The Alliance can only be as effective as its member countries allow.  Governments  and  Parliaments  are  responsible  for  making  NATO  a  success.  Intensified discourse on NATO’s priorities and missions within NATO must be at the same time supplemented

175 PC 05 E 10 by improved public diplomacy efforts. This is crucial to garner lasting support for NATO’s activities and commitments among our own population, but also to explain NATO to our partner countries. Parliaments should play an active role in the debates on the future of NATO and should discuss in depth the new missions of the NRF. 52. As  the  Alliance  will  increasingly  operate  in  a  global  strategic  environment  and  because available  resources  will  be  limited,  we  need  to  put  a  premium  on  conflict  prevention.  NATO should expand its set of instruments in this area. At NATO headquarters some divisions could be strengthened,  such  as  the  WMD  Centre  or  the  divisions  that  are  responsible  for  assisting  in defence   reform.   More   generally,   NATO   and   member   countries   need   to   better   co-ordinate assistance to its partner countries and organisations to avoid redundancy. On the diplomatic level, identifying   special   regional   representatives,   e.g.,   for   Africa,   may   be   helpful.   In   addition   to strengthening its own role in areas outlined above, NATO should advance the institutional dialogue with the UN and the AU. 53. But our guiding principle must be practicality, which is we must avoid duplicating what other organisations can do and can do better. Further strengthening of co-operation and co-ordination with  other  actors,  particularly  with  the  EU,  is  therefore  necessary.  Intensifying  the  institutional dialogue between NATO and the EU is an important responsibility for the 19 member states that are member of both organisations. It is crucial that no NATO or EU Member further blocks broad discussions  between  NATO  and  the  EU.  NATO  must  also  further  develop  co-operation  with partner countries and develop existing programmes like the ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue. 54. As outlined above, more, not less, NATO is needed. To achieve this, the political dialogue must be strengthened with the aim to (re-) build consensus on what NATO is for - and what it is not for. In this context we must agree on priorities and the necessary means to employ. Time is an essential factor and the process must be led to successful conclusions by the two NATO summits that will address military transformation in 2006 and political transformation in 2008. The overdue debate   will   have   to   take   place   within   NATO   structures   and   particularly   among   member governments.  But  parliaments,  too,  have  important  contributions  to  make.  The  task  we  have before us is huge, but we must not shy away from it or we risk the slow decline of the Alliance. ________________