DEFENCE AND SECURITY 169 DSCFC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES NATO’S ONGOING ROLE IN BALKAN SECURITY DRAFT REPORT VAHIT ERDEM (TURKEY) SUB-COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AND ACTING RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 13 October 2005 * Until   this   document   has   been   approved   by   the   Defence   and   Security   Committee,   it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

169 DSCFC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 II. KOSOVO ...................................................................................................................2 III. THE FYR OF MACEDONIA^* ......................................................................................5 IV. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO ..................................................................................8 V. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA................................................................................10 VI. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................10 * Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

169 DSCFC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Despite the lack of open hostilities in the Balkan region, NATO still has an important role to play in ensuring the stability of the area.  That role will have two main aspects in the coming years.   First, working with other international organizations and the local population to prevent widespread ethnic  violence  in  Kosovo  and  reach  a  final  status  for  the  area.    Second,  to  work  with  the governments  and  militaries  of  the  region  that  want  either  to  join  NATO  or  to  establish  a  closer relationship with the Alliance. 2. In a world dominated by headlines focused on the Middle East and elsewhere, it may seem surprising that the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities decided to focus on  NATO’s  role  in  the  Balkans.    But  in  fact  the  Balkans  are  quite  literally  central  to  the  future security  of  Europe.    Our  visit  to  Bosnia  in  2004,  and  the  Rose-Roth  Seminar  in  the  FYR  of Macedonia   that   same   year,   revealed   a   number   of   unresolved   issues   that   could   seriously undermine  our  mutual  security  in  Europe.    Kosovo  remains  a  potentially  explosive  region.   Organized crime flourishes across the Balkans.  Weak governing structures and law enforcement could  be  exploited  by  terrorist  groups  seeking  bases  close  to  European  population  centres.   Although the region appears relatively tranquil at the moment, its numerous problems need to be addressed or they could pose significant threats to European security in the near future. 3. The  potential  for  the  region  to  become  a  “backdoor”  for  terrorists  into  the  rest  of  Europe should  not  be  overstated,  but  neither  can  it  be  ignored.    At  least  two  NATO  member  national intelligence agencies have identified networks of militant groups in Kosovo and Bosnia with ties to groups operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in Chechnya.  Thus far we have not experienced terrorist activity in the rest of Europe that can be traced to the Balkan region, but the instability  and  weak  governing  structures  in  much  of  the  region  offer  opportunities  for  terrorist groups to establish a foothold.   4. In  addition,  the  Balkan  region  is  in  many  ways  the  testing  ground  for  the  relationship between NATO and the European Union.  This relationship is likely to strongly influence the future of  the  transatlantic  Alliance.    If  that  relationship  flourishes  and  is  based  on  complementarity, transparency  and  pragmatic  co-operation,  the  transatlantic  Alliance  will  likely  remain  a  vital component of our mutual security.  If that relationship flounders, it will likely begin to chip away at some of the founding ideals of the Alliance. 5. The Balkans region is where theory becomes reality in the NATO-EU relationship.  The EU has taken over from NATO in Bosnia, and the vast majority of troops and commanders in KFOR are now from EU member countries.  The EU is also represented by other non-military capabilities such  as  the  police  missions,  the  developmental  assistance  programmes  and  the  aid and advice given in justice and civil affairs.   Most of the countries in the region want to be a part of both the EU and NATO.  It is important that we demonstrate that there is a high degree of complementarity between the two to encourage positive developments in the Balkans. 6. In general there is a high level of co-operation on the ground, as the Sub-Committee found during its visit to Bosnia in 2004.  But as we move forward from straightforward peacekeeping to more complex issues, it will be important to maintain this co-operation.  Whatever the discussion in Brussels is regarding NATO and the EU, the place where the relationship is most put to the test is the Balkans.  A smoothly functioning relationship there will have positive ramifications at the more political level. 7. This report will examine the mission in Kosovo and consider NATO’s role as we move toward a final status for the region.  It will also look at the FYR of Macedonia’s progress in meeting the milestones  for  eventual  membership  in  NATO.    We  also  consider  the  progress  of  Serbia  and Montenegro  in  moving  toward  closer  partnership  with  NATO.    The  Sub-Committee  visited  all  of

169 DSCFC 05 E 2 those  countries  in  2005  and  this  report  is  based  primarily  on  the  findings  of  those  visits.    This report,  however,  was  finalized  before  the  visit  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  so  that  section  of  the report is based on documents issued by the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and government  publications.    In  particular,  your  Rapporteur  acknowledges  the  very  comprehensive report on the Western Balkans by the United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on Foreign Affairs.    A  Secretariat  report  on  the  visit  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro  will  be  made  available  to members at the Annual Session in November. This report does not give as much attention to the ongoing role of NATO in Bosnia, as this was covered in some depth in the Sub-Committee’s 2004 report.    It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  NATO  continues  to  play a smaller, but significant role there in assisting in defence reform and the apprehension of war crimes suspects even after the operation  was  handed  over  to  the  European  Union  in  2004.    This  report  also  does  not  cover developments in Albania or Croatia, in order to focus on the countries that the Sub-Committee was able to visit in 2005. II. KOSOVO 8. The  1999  military  campaign  to  end  the  ethnic  violence  in  Kosovo  left  it  a  ward  of  the international community.  The UN Security Council placed Kosovo under UN administration in the form of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) until the final status of the region could be  resolved.    NATO  is  the  guarantor  of  security  in  Kosovo  through  the  Kosovo  Force  (KFOR).   Other international organizations such as the OSCE and the EU play important roles as well.   9. UNMIK  is  organized  under  a  four  pillar  structure  in  which  Pillar  I  (police  and  justice)  and Pillar  II  (civil  administration)  are  under  direct  UN  control,  and  Pillar  III  (democratisation  and institution building) and Pillar IV (reconstruction and economic development) are led by the OSCE and the EU respectively.   10. NATO has a separate but closely related mission to provide security while the UN and others attempt  to  ready  the  region  for  its  political  future.    KFOR  is  currently  commanded  by  Italian General Giuseppe Valotto and stands at 17,500 troops from across the NATO Alliance and partner countries.    Reserve  forces  can  also  be  brought  in  from  Bosnia  if  necessary,  such  as during the March 2004 ethnic riots. 11. The  March  2004  riots  revealed  substantial  weaknesses  in the system put in place in 1999 and  many  observers  seriously  question  the  effectiveness  of  UNMIK  in  the  current  environment. Economic  development  and  reconstruction  efforts  have  been  generally  unsuccessful,  the  local population is said to be alienated from the UN administration, and UNMIK is dogged by allegations of   corruption.      As   a   result,   the   current   Special   Representative   of   the   Secretary   General, Mr Jessen-Petersen, has undertaken a series of reforms and actions that have greatly helped to reduce this perception and improve the effectiveness of the UN mission in Kosovo. 12. However,  the  continuing  difficulties  have  led  to  an  internal  review  by  the  UN  of  how  to improve  UNMIK’s  functioning.    In  his  report  to  the  Secretary  General,  Ambassador  Kai  Eide suggested  a  two  phase  restructuring  of  UNMIK.    First  the  administrative  structure  should  be streamlined  while  keeping  the  four  pillar  system.    After this there could be a major restructuring with a gradual reduction of the role of the UN and an increase in the role of the OSCE and the EU.   13. No matter what reorganization occurs, the purpose is not to be a permanent administration for Kosovo.  Rather, the goal is to build institutions and the political and economic framework so that a workable final status for Kosovo can be put into place.  The Provisional Institutions of Self- Government  (PISG),  set  up  under  the  terms  of  the  same  UN  Security  Council  resolution  that created  UNMIK,  are  gradually  taking  responsibility  for  some  functions  of  governance  although foreign affairs, security and minority rights remain under UN control.  The plan is that eventually

169 DSCFC 05 E 3 the  local  leaders  will  be  able  to  assume  responsibility  for  maintaining  a  stable  and  multi-ethnic society.   14. In October 2004, elections for the Kosovo Assembly put the ethnic Albanian leader Ramush Haradinaj in the position of Prime Minister.  But the elections were boycotted by the Serb minority, which raises serious questions as to how the Assembly can represent the whole of the population and  if  Serbs  see  any  future  in  Kosovo.    In  addition,  Mr  Haradinaj  is  under  indictment  by  the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes committed when he was  a  leader  of  the  Kosovo  Liberation  Army  in  the  late  1990s.    He  surrendered  himself  to  the Tribunal in The Hague in March 2005 after resigning as Prime Minister.  Regardless, his popularity among ethnic Albanians cannot inspire much confidence among the Serbian minority. 15. Kosovo  has  been  held  in  a  state  of  suspended  animation  for  the  last  five  years.  A  large majority  of  the  ethnic  Albanian  population  favours  an  independent  Kosovo,  but  the  Serbian minority and the government of Serbia and Montenegro is opposed to losing what is considered to be the heart of historic Serbia.  As a result, Kosovo is suspended between being an independent state,  a  part  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  and  a  de  facto  protectorate  of  the  UN.    It  has  some institutions  of  self-government,  but  the  UN  controls  much  of  the  actual  administration.    It  is  still formally a part of Serbia and Montenegro, but Belgrade has no control over Kosovo.  Clearly such a  situation  cannot  last  indefinitely,  and  the  problem  is  arriving  at  a  final  status  that  the  entire population and neighbouring states can accept. 16. For  some  time  the  catchphrase  has  been  “standards  before  status”,  meaning  that  certain standards  for  the  protection  of  minorities,  rule  of  law  and  civil  administration  should  be  in  place before the final status issue can be broached.  Yet many within the UN and academic community believe that the original standards are over-ambitious, and that these should be recalibrated to fit current realities.  The rights of minorities must be protected but it may be time to consider a more realistic set of standards to move the process forward.   17. One  point  should  be  stressed:  time is running out in Kosovo.  The population is frustrated with the current situation and the UN administration is reportedly broadly unpopular.  The economy is in dire condition, unable to create jobs and relying on remittances from Kosovars living abroad.   Final  status  will not solve the regional economic difficulties, but it is a necessary if not sufficient condition for improving the situation.  Negotiations on the final status are expected to start in 2005 and  progress  toward  a  resolution  in  2006.    It  is  critical  that  we  set  Kosovo  on  a  path  toward stability in the coming year. 18. The  March  2004  riots  showed  just  how  precarious  the  situation  in  Kosovo  is.    KFOR  was able to contain the unrest, but not without some difficulty.  The violence revealed that KFOR was not  well  prepared  to  deal  with  this  sort  of  contingency.    Many  troops  lacked  the  training  and equipment for riot control. 19. To  their  credit,  KFOR  commanders  have  learned  from  this  incident  and  KFOR  has  since worked  to  improve  its  capabilities.   The emphasis is on improving riot control and building more flexibility into the force.  KFOR is also working to build better connections with the local population and the UN police presence. 20. The  issue  of  national  caveats   -  restrictions  placed  on  the  use  of  forces  by  national governments -  mostly  appears to have been resolved.  Those caveats placed restrictions on the use of national contingents for crowd control without approval from the national capital, and were a significant  burden  on  KFOR commanders who could ill-afford the hours of waiting that it took to get approval from national capitals.  The removal of most caveats since then has helped to make KFOR a more flexible force capable of immediate response.  KFOR also now features a dedicated tactical   reserve   that   can   be   drawn   on   in   the   event   of   another   crisis.      Previously,   KFOR

169 DSCFC 05 E 4 commanders had to request and wait for additional troops to be supplied, wasting precious hours or even days. 21. Ultimately,  however,  responsibility  for  security  will  progressively  be  handed  over  to  local forces.  Two security forces have been created: the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).  The KPS is composed of 6,500 Kosovar and 3,500 international officers and the ultimate goal is to build a local police force capable of replacing the international police, while maintaining international policing standards.  According to a report by the International Crisis Group, the KPS performed well during the March riots although they were limited by their training and lack of equipment.  Ambassador Eide’s report to the Secretary General also notes that it is necessary  to  train  the  KPS  to  cope  with  civil  disturbances  and  provide  them  with  riot  control equipment.    Some  reports  find  that  the  international  officers  are  often  limited  by  the  language barriers between them and the local officers, and recommend limiting participation in the mission to a few countries to minimize these problems.   22. The KPC is a civil emergency force composed of 3,000 active and 2,000 reserve members.   Essentially  the  KPC  was  created  as  a  way  to  incorporate  former  members  of  the  Kosovo Liberation Army into a legitimate structure under the control of the UN special representative.  As a result,  it  is  a  relatively  incoherent  entity  that  is  not  connected  to the PISG.  It is overwhelmingly composed  of  ethnic  Albanians,  and  minorities  make  up  only  4%  of  the  total  force.    This  clearly poses problems, particularly if Kosovo should become an independent country in the future.  The report  by  the  UK  Parliament  Select  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  notes  these  problems  and recommends  that  the  international  community  do  more  to  develop  the  KPC  into  a  “modern, democratically accountable force with minority representation”. 23. The fundamental difficulty in Kosovo is striking a balance between the demands of the ethnic Albanian community for total independence and the rights of the Serbian minority to live in peace in  Kosovo.    It  is  a  difficult  balance  to  achieve.    If  the  process  toward  a  final  status  moves  too slowly, ethnic Albanians may conclude that the UN is simply stalling.  But the Serbian minority and the  international  community  will  not  tolerate  a  process  that  fails  to  guarantee  standards  that protect minority interests.   24. The Sub-Committee visited Kosovo in March 2005 and met with UN officials, the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo, the Commander of NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR), and numerous representatives   of   citizen’s   groups   and   non-governmental   organizations.      The   delegation concluded that although KFOR together with its partners from non-NATO members have done an impressive  job  in  keeping  the  peace,  Kosovo  has  a  high  potential  for  instability  because  the underlying problems continue to fester. 25. The UN continues to develop the KPS as well as provide an international police presence.   26  police  stations  around  Kosovo  are  under  the  full  control  of  the  KPS  and  UN  officials  are confident that the KPS will take on additional responsibilities in the coming year.  The ultimate goal is  to  construct  a  KPS  of  approximately  7,300  officers  who  reflect  the  ethnic  mix  of  the  country.   Currently   the   participation   of   ethnic   minorities   in   the   KPS   is   roughly   proportional   to   their percentage  in  the  general  population  (14%),  but  UN  authorities  hope  to  push  the  percentage  of minorities  even  higher.    UN  officials  were  very  pleased  with  the  progress  of  the  KPS  both  in quantity  and  quality  and  described  it  as  increasingly  professional  and  capable  of  functioning without  the  heavy  presence  of  international  police officers.  In fact, the international presence is slated to fall significantly over the next year as the KPS increases in size. 26. KFOR  Commander  General  de  Kermabon  and  his  staff  briefed the Sub-Committee on the overall  security  situation  in  Kosovo.    He  described  the  situation  as  calm  but  potentially  volatile.   KFOR is adapting itself to improve its ability to prevent violence such as the March 2004 riots.  As noted  earlier,  many  caveats  have  been  removed  and  General  de  Kermabon  emphasized  the

169 DSCFC 05 E 5 importance  of  eliminating  the  barriers  that  prevented  troops  from  one  sector  in  Kosovo  from responding  to  an  emergency  in  another  sector,  and  of  establishing  rapidly  deployable  reserves that can be called on at very short notice.  General de Kermabon noted that 2005 was a critical year for Kosovo and that NATO will have to maintain a strong presence for the foreseeable future.   27. A significant issue is the perceived lack of freedom of movement.  Many minority residents claim to be afraid to travel within Kosovo, but according to UN officials with whom the delegation met,  many  in  fact  do  so  without  incident.    Nevertheless  this  perception  of  a  lack  of  safety, combined with dire economic conditions and lack of employment opportunities, presents a volatile mixture that could spark additional violence. 28. According to the briefings the delegation received at NATO HQ, however, approximately half of the violent incidents in Kosovo are aimed at the UN.  This may be in part an expression of the frustration  that  many  residents  feel  because  of  the  lack  of  basic  services.    The  Sub-Committee visited several towns and villages in central Kosovo, and heard similar stories in each about the lack  of  potable  water,  sewage  treatment,  paved  roads  and  electricity.    Although  there may be a variety  of  reasons  why  the  basic  infrastructure  remains  in  such  dire  condition  six  years  after Kosovo came under UN administration, a significant portion of the population puts the blame on the UN for the lack of infrastructural repair since 1999.  Regardless of who is responsible, the fact remains  that  economic  development  and  investment  in  Kosovo will be seriously hindered by the lack  of  functioning  basic  infrastructure.    It  will  be  impossible  to  generate  jobs  to  reduce  the unemployment rate currently estimated at more than 50%.  Thus, even if efforts at reconciliation are successful and Serbs and other minorities can live without fear in Kosovo, there will be little reason for many of the refugees to return only to face long-term unemployment and poverty. 29. In sum, there is some cause for optimism about the situation in Kosovo.  The police force is being   built   into   a   professional   and   eventually   self-sufficient   force.      The   institutions   of                  self-governance  are  taking  on  progressively  more  responsibilities.    NATO  is  providing  basic security  and  stability  and  continues  to  enjoy  the  high  confidence  of  the  population  and  the leadership.    Beyond  this,  however,  many  problems  continue  to  plague  Kosovo  and  will  not  be eliminated by settling the final status of the region.  Unless the international community redoubles its efforts to alleviate some of those problems, the stability will remain very fragile and demand the continued presence of NATO troops to guarantee the peace. 30. It  is  often  repeated  that  the  path  to  stability  in  the  region  will  be  greater  integration  into    Euro-Atlantic  institutions.    In  particular,  integration  into  the  EU  is  seen  by  many  to  be  an overarching  solution  to  the  situation  in  Kosovo.    However,  a  note  of  caution  is  appropriate:    EU membership is not a magic wand that can be waved to resolve deep-set ethnic conflicts.  The EU clearly  plays  a  vital  role  and  can  play  a  still  more  significant  role  in  the  region,  particularly  in economic   development   and   assistance   in   building   stronger   governmental   institutions.      The prospect of EU membership and the benefits that entails is also a tremendous incentive to Serbia and Montenegro to make significant compromises regarding the status of Kosovo.  But ultimately the issue can only be resolved by a vastly increased willingness of the population of Kosovo to live in a multi-ethnic society.  The international community in the form of the UN, the EU and NATO can and must help, but lasting stability will depend on the attitudes and actions of the people of the region. III. THE FYR OF MACEDONIA 31. The government of the FYR of Macedonia has expressed its determination to accelerate its reform efforts with the aim of obtaining an invitation to join the Alliance at the next NATO Summit. Both  NATO  and  EU forces have played a stabilizing role there, but now the EU military mission has been replaced by a training and assistance mission.  

169 DSCFC 05 E 6 32. The country maintains a level of stability and security that has been elusive for some of its neighbours. The  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement  signed  by  Macedonian  and  Albanian  leaders spelled out an agreement that addressed many of the grievances of the Albanian minority, such as official  acceptance  of  the  Albanian  language,  an  increase  in  the  proportion  of  Albanians  in government jobs and the police force, and a decentralization of government.  Over the past years, progress  has  been  made  in  the  implementation  of  the  Ohrid Framework Agreement.  Almost all legal   obligations   from   the   Framework   Agreement   have   been   fulfilled,   except   the   Law   on Community   Symbols.      In   terms   of   practical   implementation,   work   is   progressing   regarding decentralization, equitable representation and the use of minority languages. 33. This agreement was in danger of being derailed by a referendum brought by opponents to the Ohrid Framework Agreement.  However, the referendum failed when it was voted on in 2004 because  turnout  did  not  reach  the  necessary  50%  of  registered  voters.    This  may  have  been partially the result of a sustained campaign by the US and European governments, that warned of the consequences to progress of the FYR of Macedonia toward entering the EU and NATO if the referendum should pass and unravel the basis of the political stability of the FYR of Macedonia.   34. The government of The FYR of Macedonia emphasizes its clear commitment to become a NATO  member.    It  joined  the  Partnership  for  Peace  (PfP)  in  1995,  and  has  participated  in  the Membership Action Plan (MAP) since 1991.  In 2005 it will have completed its sixth cycle of the MAP.  The FYR of Macedonia is part of the Adriatic Charter along with Croatia and Albania, the two other aspirants to NATO membership in the region.  2005 is viewed as critical for the FYR of Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  The government of the FYR of Macedonia expects to be invited to join the Alliance in 2006 and hopes to be granted EU candidate status at the EU summit meeting in December 2005. 35. The government of the FYR of Macedonia is undertaking a wide-ranging reform of its military to make itself a viable NATO member.  These reforms are cited by government figures as one of the country’s top priorities.  The broad strategic goal is to build a light, mobile, professional army in accordance  with  NATO  standards  that  is  capable  of  territorial  defence  and  contributing  to international missions.  In December 2004 president Branko Crvenkovski signed the decree on the strategic development and transformation of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM), and 2005  has  been  a  key  year  for  the  transformation  of  the  army.    The  reform  plans  include modernization of equipment and weapons, dismantlement of outdated systems, implementation of a plan for adequate and just representation of ethnic communities, professionalisation of the ARM, and the enactment of an integrated border security strategy. 36. The FYR of Macedonia plans to complete the professionalisation of the army by the end of 2007.    In  accordance  with  the  plan  for  professionalisation,  the  military  has  been  reduced  from 20,000 to 8,500 troops.  With the smaller force, the government hopes to be able to build an army of  well-trained,  highly  professional  soldiers  that  represent  all  ethnic  communities  in  the  country.   Following the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the number of ethnic Albanians in the ARM should be proportional to their overall number in the FYR of Macedonia. The defence ministry has prepared an action plan for an adequate representation of ethnic communities in the ARM, which is to be completed by 2013. 37. The troops from the FYR of Macedonia are participating in international missions and have dedicated 210 soldiers for peacekeeping missions in 2005.  The government plans to increase this number to 410 in 2007.  The ARM is currently contributing 19 ARM soldiers to ISAF in Afghanistan and  approximately  50  troops  to  coalition  operations  in  Iraq,  as  well  as  providing  support  to  the NATO mission in Kosovo. 38. Reform of the armed forces is not the only criteria for obtaining NATO membership.  Other more  political  factors  are  important  as  well.    In  particular,  the  FYR of Macedonia must focus on

169 DSCFC 05 E 7 promoting judicial reform and fully implement the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.  The FYR of Macedonia needs to show that it possesses both stable institutions and a sound legal system. 39. Reform  of  the  judiciary  system  is  important.    Reports  by  international  organizations  have found  corruption  in  the  courts  and  inadequate  judicial  independence  from  the  legislative  and executive authorities.  The FYR of Macedonia is working on a reform package that should bring - at least in theory - the national legal code up to European legal standards by the end of 2005. 40. The  Sub-Committee  met  with  numerous  members  of  the  political  leadership  including  the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of the Interior, and leading members of parliament when it  visited  in  April  2005.    All  emphasized  the  desire  of  the  people  from  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  to move forward and find political solutions to the ethnic troubles that have plagued the Balkans.  The President  of  the  National  Assembly,  Mr.  Jordanovski,  noted  that  it  is  not  correct  to  speak  of “minorities” in the FYR of Macedonia any longer, and that the preferred term is “communities”, a word  signalling  more  integration  and  equality.    He  cited  the  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement,  that gives local communities more control over a variety of issues such as education, as an important step  forward,  and  the  failure  of  its  opponents  to  derail  the  Agreement  as  a  sign  of  its  broad acceptance across society.  He and others suggested that the Ohrid Framework Agreement could be seen at least in part as a model that could be used to resolve ethnic tensions in Kosovo.   41. The  role  of  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  in  regional  integration  also  prominently  featured  in  the discussions.    Political  leaders  from  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  stressed  the  importance  of  close regional  co-operation  for  the  Balkan  region.  They  cited  the  Adriatic  Charter  between  Albania, Croatia  and  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  as  an  example  of  regional  co-operation,  and  expressed  a strong  desire  to  integrate  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  into  NATO  and  the  EU.    All  members  of  the government and the parliament that the delegation met with were united in their desire to see their country  become  part  of  those  institutions,  and  understood  that  doing  so  would  incur  significant costs  and  responsibilities  as  well  as  benefits.    They  were  also  quite  hopeful  that  the  FYR  of Macedonia would receive an invitation to join NATO by 2007. 42. Government officials and members of parliament also raised the issue of the formal name of the Republic of Macedonia and its universal recognition.  They were pleased that some countries such  as  Turkey,  Russia  and  the  United  States  recognize  it  by  its  constitutional  name,  and  were optimistic that a resolution to the current disagreement with Greece could be reached in the near future.    They  feel  that  they  have  given  constitutional  guarantees  to  Greece  to  allay  territorial concerns  and  have  made  compromises  on  symbolic  issues  such  as  the  national  flag.    They believe that those actions should be reciprocated on the outstanding issue of the formal name of their country. 43. Defence reform was of course a major concern of the delegation, as the FYR of Macedonia is a candidate for NATO membership.  In general, the delegation found that the military is being restructured  into  a  smaller,  professional  and  deployable  force  that  can  contribute  to  NATO missions as well as defend the national territory.  In particular, the military is developing a niche capability  in  special  forces  operations  and  a  niche  medical  capability  that  may  be  deployed  to ISAF.  The delegation went to the Illinden military facility where it observed exercises of a special forces unit in a hostage rescue operation.  The unit appears professional and capable and can be seen as part of the efforts of the FYR of Macedonia to make a proportionate contribution to NATO missions. 44. Ongoing reform of the Ministry of the Interior is also a priority.  Most of the border patrol has been  transferred  from  the  military  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  there  is  an  increasing emphasis  on  tackling  the  problem  of  organized  crime.    The  Ministry  of  the  Interior  is  getting considerable support from international organizations in training a specialized police unit to attack the  problem  of  organized  crime  in  the  country,  which  is  particularly  focused  on  smuggling  and

169 DSCFC 05 E 8 human trafficking.  Given the geographic position of the FYR of Macedonia, it is a natural crossing point  for  criminals  seeking  routes  into  the  rest  of  Europe  from  points  further  south  and  east. Mr Mihajlovski, Minister of the Interior, was adamant about the need to stop his country from being used as a transit point for illegal activity and emphasized his commitment to building a professional and non-political Ministry and police force. 45. The  delegation  also  met  with  several  representatives  of  the  EU,  including  Ambassador Michael Sahlin, the EU Special Representative.  He noted that the Ohrid Framework Agreement is now  mostly  implemented and that he expects that the remaining issues will be settled this year.   He  also  noted  that  the  government  is  working  on  answering  the  lengthy  questionnaire  that  will begin the process for EU accession.  The EU expects to make a decision on starting accession talks   sometime   in   late   2005.      Ambassador   Sahlin   and   other   international   observers   were somewhat disappointed by the conduct of the last election, which was marred by irregularities, but were  looking  forward  to  the  upcoming  election  in  2006.    In  many  ways  Ambassador  Sahlin  and other  EU  representatives  felt  that  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  is  a  success  story  in  the  Western Balkans.  Early action on all sides prevented a slide into prolonged violent conflict, and he agreed that  to  some  extent  the  country  can  been  seen  as  a  model  for  other  troubled  regions  such  as Kosovo. 46. The  briefings  the  delegation  received  at  NATO  HQ  showed  the  significant  improvement  in the security situation in the FYR of Macedonia.  General Blease, Commander of the NATO Force in  the  FYR  of  Macedonia,  described  the  situation  as  stable  and  noted  that  his  personal  role  is primarily  as  an  advisor  on  defence  reform.    The  NATO  Mission  in  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  is focused on assisting the Ministry of Defence in its development of professional deployable forces.   From  a  purely  security  perspective,  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  has  made  considerable  progress, especially  compared  to  the  disastrous  direction  that  could  have  been  taken  in  the  midst  of  the violent clashes that flared up between ethnic groups in 2001.   47. That  being  said,  however,  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  faces  considerable  challenges.    The economy  is  in  poor  condition  and  a  large  portion  of  the  population  is  unemployed.    Organized crime and corruption are serious problems that must be confronted as the country moves towards integrating  into  the  EU  and  NATO.    Clearly  these  are  not  problems  unique  to  the  FYR  of Macedonia, but they cannot be overlooked as they can directly affect the stability of the country. IV. SERBIA AND MONTENEGR O 48. Serbia and Montenegro are very much at the centre of any resolution of the current situation in Kosovo and critical to the stability of the region.  Reform of Serbia’s government, military and economy will all be important to ensure a lasting settlement of the ongoing security situation in the Balkans. 49. The main incentive that NATO and the EU can offer to Serbia and Montenegro to continue on its hesitant reform process is the prospect of closer association with both organizations.  The main stumbling block, however, continues to be the issue of co-operation with the ICTY.  Several key individuals have surrendered to the tribunal but full co-operation is needed before Serbia and Montenegro can be considered for closer association with NATO and the EU.   50. The  government’s  strategy  so  far  has  been  to  encourage  suspects  to  surrender  to  the Tribunal rather than pursue them in a more aggressive manner.  This approach has shown some results, although some of the most notorious individuals indicted for war crimes, including General Ratko  Mladic,  have  not  surrendered  to  the  Tribunal.    The  government  has  also  come  under criticism for its policy of offering financial incentives to wanted individuals who surrender.  Despite

169 DSCFC 05 E 9 the  obvious  message  that  such  a  policy  sends,  however,  it  has  resulted  in  several  well-known suspects turning themselves in to the Tribunal.   51. Although there has been improved co-operation with the ICTY, it is far from complete.  What is most troubling, however, is that public opinion in Serbia tends to have a sizeable minority that actively  supports  individuals  indicted  for  war  crimes  and  is  politically  active  through  the  Serbian Radical  Party.    The  Radicals  are  one  of  the  largest  political  parties  in  the  country  and  their popularity is an indicator of public opinion on the issue of full compliance with the ICTY.  Until there is a significant change in public opinion in Serbia, it will likely remain the sticking point in Serbia’s progress toward closer relations with NATO and the European Union. 52. Reforming the Army of Serbia and Montenegro in a manner consistent with NATO standards is a significant part of Serbia’s political development.  Five years after the downfall of Milosevic’s regime and six years after its armed forces were engaged in an armed conflict with NATO, Serbia and   Montenegro   is   an   aspiring   member   of   the   NATO   Partnership   for   Peace   programme.   Milosevic’s  supporters  are  reportedly  still  in  positions  of  authority  in  the  military  and  intelligence services,  so  reform  of  the  security  sector  would  be  an  important  political  signal  that  Serbia  and Montenegro is truly moving forward from its troubled recent past. 53. The Army of Serbia and Montenegro is undergoing a serious process of transformation.  The most important tasks are professionalisation of the army, establishing full civilian control over the army  and  its  security  structures,  introducing  a  career  development  plan,  overcoming  social problems that could arise as a result of employment cuts in the military, defining the role of Serbia and  Montenegro  in  regional  security,  developing  training  programmes,  and  providing  funds  for participation in peacekeeping missions. 54. Serbia and Montenegro also need to cut the armed forces from the current 65,300 to about 20,000.  As part of the move toward a fully professional military, Serbia and Montenegro has cut the  period  of  compulsory  military  service  from  12  to  9  months.    Moreover,  in  light  of  the transformation  of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, several senior officers, including Chief of Staff Branko Krga, retired at the end of 2004.  The new chief of staff of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, Dragan Paškaš, announced that the strategy of the SEM during his term would be to join NATO’s PfP.  Several other important retirements are due to happen by the end of this year. 55. Important  steps  are  being  taken  to  implement  full  civilian  control  of  the  military.    First,  an independent civilian commission was established to investigate the deaths of several recruits.  The conclusions  of  the  civilian  commission  completely  contradicted  the  official  inquiry  of  the  military prosecuting office.  Furthermore, on 14 February 2005 the military judicial system was abolished and  its  authority  transferred  to  the  civilian  judicial  system.    As  of  that  date,  over  1,500  cases pending before the military judicial system were transferred to civilian courts. 56. In December 2004, Serbia and Montenegro enacted a law defining Serbian and Montenegrin participation  in  international  peacekeeping  missions.    Troops  from  Serbia  and  Montenegro  are already part of the UN peacekeeping contingent in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC-6 observers), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI-3 observers), Liberia (UNMIL-6 observers), and the government is  considering  participation  in  missions  in  Haiti  and  Afghanistan.    In  order  to  expand  its  role  in international peacekeeping, the Army of Serbia and Montenegro needs to develop training courses in international peacekeeping, and to establish closer links with NATO, none of which is possible without full co-operation with the ICTY.   57. As  stated  earlier,  the  Sub-Committee  will  visit  Serbia  and  Montenegro  to  explore  some  of those issues.  A Secretariat report with the findings of that visit will be made available for the next meeting of the Defence and Security Committee in November 2005.  Serbian co-operation with the ICTY  is  the  main  issue  at  hand,  but  we  should  not  ignore  other  critical  issues.    Corruption,  the

169 DSCFC 05 E 10 independence  of  the  judiciary,  and  economic  reforms  are  also  significant  issues  that  must  be addressed  before  Serbia  can  move  forward  in  the  process  of  integration  into  Euro-Atlantic institutions.  There are signs of progress on all of those fronts, but continued political pressure and assistance  will  be  needed  to  push  the  process  forward.    In  Montenegro  the  main  issue  remains whether  or  not  it  should  become  an  independent  country  or  maintain  a  federal  relationship  with Serbia.    Although  this  issue  overshadows  all  others,  Montenegro  must  face  similar  problems  as Serbia in its reform efforts.  Corruption in particular has been cited in several reports as a serious issue that compromises the effectiveness of the government and Montenegro’s progress towards joining Euro-Atlantic institutions, regardless of its relationship with Serbia. V. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 58. The  Sub-Committee  did  not  visit  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  in  2005.    Nonetheless  it remains an important area of NATO operations.  NATO transferred most responsibilities in BiH to the European Union at the end of 2003 but remains active in two areas.  First, NATO assists and advises BiH on security sector reform.  Second, NATO conducts operations in co-operation with the   EU   force   related   to   the   apprehension   of   persons   indicted   for   war   crimes   (PIFWICs), intelligence collection and counter-terrorism.   59. NATO and the BiH Ministry of Defence formed the Defence Reform Council (DRC) in 2003.   NATO works with Bosnian officials to shape the military into a force appropriate for a country of BiH’s size and multi-ethnic character.  In July the DRC endorsed two reform bills.  The first sets a 2007 deadline for the creation of a multi-ethnic military, and the second calls for the abolition of sub-national entity defence ministries and compulsory military service. 60. If those bills are passed and implemented, then BiH will have made considerable progress toward satisfying one of the main conditions for becoming a candidate for Partnership for Peace (PfP).  Some recent steps have been encouraging.  The BiH parliament passed legislation placing the  entity  militaries  under  joint  command  and  abolishing  the  sub-national  entities’  ministries  of defence.   The Republika Srpska assembly passed similar legislation. 61. The other important condition, however, is full co-operation with the ICTY.  As in other parts of  the  region,  this  is  a  significant  stumbling  block.    NATO  is  actively  working  to  assist  in  the apprehension  of  PIFWICs,  but  there  is  clearly  some  level  of  local  protection  of  key  wanted individuals  that  prevents them from being brought to justice.  Last year NATO forces arrested a police official who was assisting PIFWICs elude capture.  Other diplomatic sources have accused the military and police officials in Republika Srpska of protecting wanted individuals.  This makes it very  difficult  for  NATO  or  any  other  entity to bring some of the most notorious PIFWICs to trial.   Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are the two key wanted figures and their continuing freedom is very likely a result of protection by Republika Srpska officials.  As long as this continues, BiH will not  be  able  to  satisfy the critical condition of full co-operation with the ICTY for entry in the PfP programme.   VI. CONCLUSION 62. The  path  forward  will  be  uncertain,  but  what  is  certain  is  that  the  region  is  quite  literally central to our common future security.  We have little choice but to help set the Balkan area on the road to stability and relative prosperity or we will continue to feel increasing effects in the rest of Europe.  The Balkans are already a home to organized crime that impacts our societies through drug  smuggling  and  other  debilitating  activities.    But  we  risk  the  danger  of  the  region  also becoming more of a transit point and marshalling station for terrorist organizations seeking a “back

169 DSCFC 05 E 11 door” into the rest of Europe.  How we choose to deal with the region now will affect our security in the coming years. 63. The  challenge  of  building  long-term  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  Western  Balkan  region  is one that will require close transatlantic co-operation in a variety of ways.  Most significantly, it will require co-ordination between the EU and NATO.  The two organizations have played overlapping roles  in  maintaining  the  current  stability  there  and  will  continue  to  do  so  in  the  coming  years.   However,  we  must  increasingly  move  beyond  stabilization  and  assist  in  building  functional  state institutions and economic opportunity.