DEFENCE AND SECURITY 168 DSC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS DRAFT GENERAL REPORT JULIO MIRANDA-CALHA (PORTUGAL) GENERAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 12 October 2005 * Until   this   document   has   been   approved   by   the   Defence   and   Security   Committee,   it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

168 DSC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT NATO ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN ..............2 III. ISAF UNDER NATO COMMAND ..............................................................................3 IV. PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN.................................................5 A. NARCOTICS PRODUCTION..............................................................................5 B. PROGRESS IN BUILDING THE AFGHAN STATE ............................................8 C. REGIONAL WARLORDS .................................................................................10 D. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE...11 V. NATO IN IRAQ.........................................................................................................12 VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS?........................................................................................14 VII. COMMON FUNDING FOR CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS ............................15

168 DSC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. In 2003 NATO embarked on its first truly out-of-area mission in Afghanistan.  In 2004 NATO took  on  an  additional  out  of  area  mission  training  Iraqi  troops  in  Iraq  and  other  countries  in  the region.    These  missions  raise  important  questions  that  impact  on  the  future  direction  of  the Alliance and its role in providing stability beyond the borders of its members.   2. The mission in Afghanistan in particular presents a test case for the Alliance's capabilities.  If it  can  significantly  add  to  the  stabilization  of  that  remote,  war-torn  country,  then  there  are  few geographic limits on where the Alliance could decide to become involved.  But how effective is the mission?  What is going well and what more needs to be done? This report will attempt to address some of those questions. 3. In  large  part  this  report  builds  on  the  2004  report  of  the  Defence  and  Security  Committee that  examined  the  mission  in  Afghanistan.    We  will  evaluate  the current situation in Afghanistan based  on  the  progress  made  in  addressing  specific  problems  highlighted  in  that  report.    In particular  the  previous  Committee  report  cited  concerns  about  the narcotics traffic, the power of regional warlords relative to the central government, and the development of a "narco-state" where the  drug-producers  and  traffickers  wield  the bulk of political power.  Those issues are intimately connected: regional warlords often make the money they need to control their areas and private armies  from  the  drug  trade.    If  parliamentary  elections  bring  significant  numbers  of  those individuals  to  positions  of  legitimate  power,  then  the  danger  of  Afghanistan  becoming  a  state beholden to narcotics producers will be greatly increased. 4. Although Afghanistan is the major focus of this report, we will also examine the role of NATO in stabilizing Iraq.  It is a far smaller operation, but it too raises important questions: should NATO assume a larger role there as the challenge increasingly turns from providing security to ensuring that Iraqi forces are able to provide security in the context of an emerging democracy?  Even more challenging, should NATO ever consider a role as a guarantor of an eventual Israeli-Arab peace settlement? We will attempt to extract some lessons from current out of area operations that could be generalized to possible future missions.   5. More  broadly,  current  out  of  area  operations  and  the  potential  future  uses  of  the  NATO Response Force (NRF) demonstrate that we need to fundamentally rethink how we organize and fund future operations. The current system of funding is "cost lie where they fall", meaning that the country supplying forces for an operation pays  the costs of getting those forces into the area of operations  and  maintaining  them  for  the  duration  of  the  deployment.    Although  this  formula  has worked in the past, it will be increasingly problematic because of the nature of the NRF.  The NRF is composed of forces from the member countries on a rotating basis, but it will be deployed based on a decision taken by all 26 allies.  Yet, the costs for this decision will fall almost entirely on the allies currently participating in NRF.   This is simply not a fair system, and it will tend to discourage participation in the NRF.  A better system would be to establish some form of expanded common funding for operations so that the costs of operations are spread across the full 26 members of the alliance, not just those supplying forces to the operation in question. 6. In addition, we should also focus on the issue of national caveats (restrictions placed on a national contingent participating in a NATO operation), which are also having a debilitating effect on   the   Alliance's   current   operations.   Declared   caveats   are   often   a   lesser   problem   and commanders on the ground can usually work with known and reasonable restrictions. The problem mainly  lies  in  undeclared  caveats  that  a  commander  does  not  discover  until  he  tasks  a  national contingent  and  finds  that  they  are  unable  to  perform  the  assigned  duty.  Caveats  will  not  be eliminated, but we should consider how they can be minimized and made more transparent so that commanders on the ground understand up front the capabilities and limits on the forces that they have at hand.  

168 DSC 05 E 2 7. Therefore,  your  Rapporteur  urges  you  to  consider  those  broader  issues  as  you  read  the following  report.    The  future  of  the  Alliance  demands  no  less.    While  we  should  be  under  no illusion  that  one  report  can  resolve  such  thorny  issues,  It  is  appropriate  that  we  begin  this discussion at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and take the debate to our national parliaments.   II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT NATO ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN 8. The idea of putting a UN-authorised multinational military force in Afghanistan originated at the  Bonn  Conference  in  December  2001  that  brought  together  all  of  the  political  and  ethnic factions in Afghanistan. This came immediately after the successful US intervention in Afghanistan that  toppled  the  Taliban  regime  as  a  consequence  of  its  support  and  continued  protection  of Osama  bin  Laden,  the  architect  of  the  attacks  of  11  September  2001.    That conference set the groundwork for the partnership between the United Nations, the Afghan Transitional Authority and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 9. The  first  ISAF  was  established  by  a  UN  Security  Council  resolution  and  was  designed  to support the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security around Kabul.  ISAF I was led by the  United  Kingdom  (December  2001-June  2002)  but  included  forces  from  18  countries,  14  of which were NATO members (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Romania,  Spain  and  Turkey).    The  second six-month rotation (ISAF II) was led by Turkey (June 2002-February 2003) and ISAF III was led by Germany  and  the  Netherlands  (February  2003-August 2003). The size of the force continued to grow both in numbers of troops and participating countries.  Canada has played a large role and supplied the largest force for many of the later rotations.   10. ISAF evolved into a three-part structure: ISAF Headquarters, the airport task force, and the Kabul  multinational  brigade.    ISAF  quickly  forged  ties  with  the  US-led  Operation  Enduring Freedom  and  US  Central  Command  (CENTCOM).    This  allowed  the  two  missions,  ISAF  and Enduring  Freedom, to co-ordinate logistics and flights in and out of the region while maintaining their separate identities and missions.   11. NATO took on a progressively larger role in assisting ISAF during the first 18 months of the operation.  Germany and the Netherlands received planning assistance from NATO in 2002, and NATO  provided  valuable  help  in  force  generation,  communications,  and  intelligence.    SHAPE posted  officers  with  the  German  command.    ISAF  headquarters  was  granted  access  to  NATO intelligence and communication systems.  This involvement sparked a close working relationship between NATO and the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell (EACC) at Eindhoven, the Netherlands, to arrange the airlift needs of ISAF. 12. At the same time that NATO was providing this valuable assistance to ISAF, some involved in the mission were concerned that changing the lead nation every six months was hindering its effectiveness and weakening its credibility as a guarantor of a modicum of stability in Afghanistan.   As a result, the North Atlantic Council decided in April 2003 to take on command and planning of ISAF  as  of  11  August  2003.  In  October 2003,  the  UN  approved  an  expansion  of  ISAF  and authorised it to deploy outside of Kabul and the immediate surrounding area.

168 DSC 05 E 3 III. ISAF UNDER NATO COMMAND 13. ISAF falls under the responsibility of Joint Forces Command North (JFC North) in Brunssum, the  Netherlands.    Although  NATO  and  the  commander  of  JFC  North  have  overall  authority, command on the ground in Kabul still rotates between lead nations.   The EUROCORPS took over from  Canada  in  August  2004,  Turkey  took  over  for  the  next  rotation,  and  Italy  most  recently assumed command of the operation. 14. The  NATO  assumption  of  command  opened  the  door  to  discussions  about  expanding  the role of ISAF.  Both the UN and the Government of Afghanistan favour such a move.  In October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan to increase ISAF to 10,000 troops and expand to cover additional cities beyond Kabul, a decision also endorsed by the UN. 15. Assuming control over ISAF is a major step forward for the Alliance, but it also leads to new questions that must be answered if its mission is to be successful.  First and most critically, there is  the  question  of  how  and  if  the  members  of  the  Alliance  can  supply  the  troops  and  military equipment required.  Many pledges of troops and equipment were made, but members have been slow  to  fulfil  those  pledges.    After  much  pressure  from  the  Secretary  General  of  NATO  was applied to national defence ministers in December 2003, NATO received a commitment of three helicopters  from  Turkey  and  three  from  the  Netherlands.    It  took  several  additional  months  of discussion  to  actually  get  the  much-needed  transport  helicopters  to  Afghanistan.    The  Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Jones has also spoken out regarding the need for the Allies to  meet  their  commitments  in  terms  of  personnel  and  materiel  in  Afghanistan.    The  force generation conference held at NATO headquarters in March 2004 appears to have improved the situation.  The conference was to generate forces for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Kunduz and two others in Feyzabad and Maimana.  The helicopter issue was resolved with the Netherlands  providing  six  combat  helicopters  and  Turkey  providing  three  transport  helicopters.   Ongoing  emphasis  on  this  issue  by  the  Secretary  General,  military  commanders  and  the  NATO Parliamentary  Assembly  has  helped  to  alleviate  the  transportation  shortage,  but  there  are  still remaining shortfalls that need to be addressed. 16. Another  question  is  the  relationship  between  the  various  operations  in  Afghanistan.  ISAF and Enduring Freedom are separate operations, although they are gradually merging under NATO command.  Those operations are dynamic, changing somewhat to fit the shifting circumstances, although  both  are  ultimately  directed  at  ensuring  the  increasing  stability  of  the  country  and  the ability of Afghanistan to provide for its own security.   17. ISAF  is  primarily  designed  to  provide  basic  security,  enabling  the  NGOs  to  perform  their work and the central Afghan government to deepen its hold on the country. ISAF is made up of approximately 10,000 troops and was limited by its size and capabilities to an area around Kabul and  some  areas  in  northern  Afghanistan  where  it  runs  the  PRTs.    ISAF  is  now  expanding  the number of PRTs to the western part of the country.  An Italian team took over the PRT in Herat early in 2005. 18. The  expansion  established  a  permanent ISAF presence in the form of four PRTs and one Forward   Support   Base   (FSB).   Two   existing   US-led   PRTs   at   Herat   and   Farah   in   western Afghanistan came under NATO command this year and two new ISAF PRTs were established with Lithuania in the lead at Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and Spain in the lead at Qal'eh-ye Now,  capital  of  Baghdis  province.  Italy  and  Spain  are  providing  the  Forward  Support  Base  (a logistics hub at Herat) with substantial support from other contributors. The extended ISAF mission will provide security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan's territory.   ISAF will continue to expand to the southern provinces of Afghanistan in the first half of 2006.

168 DSC 05 E 4 19. Operation Enduring Freedom is led by the United States. The United States and a group of coalition partners conduct this operation mainly in southern and eastern Afghanistan and along the border  with  Pakistan.    Approximately  20,000  (mostly  US)  troops  are  involved  in  this  operation directed by US Central Command (CENTCOM).  Enduring Freedom is targeted both at eliminating remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida and at building the conditions for stable Afghanistan.  The PRT  concept  was  born  in  the  context  of  Enduring  Freedom  and  most  PRTs  are  under  US command. 20. Some in NATO and in national capitals have argued that it would be a natural progression for NATO to eventually assume control of all operations in Afghanistan.  Centralised control under NATO would help reduce the overlapping authorities and operations in Afghanistan.  According to those involved, there is a high level of co-ordination between all of the military commands, but the overall effort would benefit from a higher level of centralisation.  NATO as the premier international military  organisation  would  be  the  obvious  candidate  as  the  institution  to  centralise  all  military operations in Afghanistan.   21. At  the  Defence  and  Security  Committee  (DSC)  meeting  in  Washington  DC  in  January, several  US  officials  noted  that  it  was  time  to  reconsider  this  option.    Some  allies  have  been reluctant because of the more combat-oriented aspects of Operation Enduring Freedom and were concerned that a merger could further blur the line between combat forces and those involved in reconstruction  and  development.    In  February  2005,  NATO  defence  ministers  agreed  that  the operations should be merged at some point in the near future.  No date was set but the objections of  France  and  Germany  that  had  ended  discussion  of  a  merger  as  recently  as  October  2004 appeared to have been overcome by the improved security situation.  At the September defence ministers'  meeting,  however,  several  national  representatives  insisted  that  the  missions  remain separate with separate chains of command and that NATO forces not engage in counter-terrorist missions.   This casts some doubt on when or if a merger will take place, even if they are moving ever more closely together. 22. The  issue  of  national  caveats  has  affected  relations  between  the  two  operations.    Some members of NATO have restricted their participation in operations to exclude combat roles.  But as we have seen in the past few months, the security situation is fluid in several parts of the country.   Although there are many improvements, violence will continue to flare up periodically and forces on the ground must be prepared to cope with a range of contingencies and perform a number of roles.    Even  those  troops  assigned  to  PRTs  in  a  primarily  humanitarian  capacity  may  need  to return   occasionally   to   a   more   traditional   military   role.      Restricting   a   national   contingent's participation to avoid combat roles may lead to that contingent being assigned to relatively secure parts  of  Afghanistan,  but  it  is  no  guarantee  that  it  will  avoid  combat  situations.    In  fact  such  a caveat may provoke confrontations if extremist elements in Afghanistan learn that certain units are relatively unprepared for combat situations. 23. In September NATO Parliamentarians met with NATO military and civilian officials in Kabul, who  were very frank about the difficulties caused by national caveats.  For example, they noted that  some  troops  stationed  at  Kabul  International  Airport  are  restricted  by  national  caveats  from leaving  the  airport.    Another  national  contingent  that  has  command  of  a  PRT  is  prevented  from staying  outside  their  base  overnight.    In  effect  this  restricts them to an 80-kilometer radius from their  base,  allowing  them  to  be  present  in  only  a  small  part  of  the  province  in  which  they  are based. 24. The officials who met with the delegation were particularly concerned about  the caveats that some  members  have  regarding  the  use  of  their  forces  in  counter-terrorist  operations.    They emphasized that counter-terrorist operations are a critical part of the mission and will become even more significant as NATO takes over the provinces with relatively high amounts of terrorist activity.  

168 DSC 05 E 5 Caveats, such as one member's ban on allowing its forces to patrol at night, will seriously hinder NATO's ability to provide the secure environment needed in those regions with terrorist activity.   25. A  merger  of  the  two  operations  will  also  require  more  of  a  common  understanding  of  the mission  in  Afghanistan  and  the  role  of  the  PRTs.    The  overall  mission  is  complex  and  requires military  forces  to  play  a  variety  of  roles.    It  is  clear  that  not  all  members  of  the  alliance  are comfortable  with  the  implications  of  this  situation.    But  there  are  few  clear  dividing  lines  in Afghanistan  that  allow  us  to  separate  the  humanitarian  aspects  of  the  mission  from  the  military aspects.  They are fundamentally interrelated.  Only by providing security can humanitarian work begin,  and  providing  security  may  involve  the  use  of  force  to  target  those  who  would  spoil  the progress made so far and prevent additional progress. 26. The allies must arrive at a better common understanding of what the operations plan should be in Afghanistan.  This is of the utmost importance as ISAF takes over operations in the southern and  eastern  regions  of  the  country  where  terrorist  activity  is  concentrated.    This  point  was forcefully made by the Secretary General of the United Nations who noted in his 12 August 2005 report to the Security Council that, "As the expansion of ISAF continues, NATO troop-contributing countries  are  strongly  encouraged  to  adopt  common  and  robust  rules  of  engagement  which  will make possible the optimum utilization of resources and enhance ability to respond to situations as they arise.  This capability is vital." 27. It is also important, however, to understand how much improvement there has been over the past year and whether the progress in ensuring Afghanistan's security is sufficient to put it on the road  to  self-sufficiency.    The  goal  of  this  entire exercise is to create a functioning Afghan state, capable of preventing itself from being overwhelmed by internal divisions.  Therefore, the following section  will  evaluate  progress  on  specific  areas  of  concern  underlined  in  the  2004  Defence  and Security   Committee   General   Report   [(158   DSC   04   E)   Operations   in   Afghanistan   and   the Expanding NATO Role, Pierre Lellouche]. IV. PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN 28. The 2004 Defence and Security Committee General Report noted several interrelated issues that  were  of  particular  concern  to  the  committee.    First  was  narcotics  production  and  trafficking and its effects on the political and economic development of Afghanistan.  Second was the power of  the  warlords  and  the  ability  of  the  central  government  to  break  their  power  before  the parliamentary  elections  in  September  2005.    Third  was  the  development  of  the  Afghan  National Army and its capabilities relative to the regional warlords. 29. We will briefly recap the findings of the 2004 report in each of those areas and then evaluate progress   based   on   recent   reports   and   the   findings   of   the   NATO   Parliamentary   Assembly delegations that travelled to Afghanistan in March and September 2005. A. NARCOTICS PRODUCTION 30. The committee noted in 2004 that narcotics production was a major, and growing problem in Afghanistan.  President Hamid Karzai has underlined the need to attack this problem on numerous occasions.  In his inauguration speech in December 2004, he called on his countrymen to engage in a jihad against narcotics production and trafficking.  That same month he pledged to destroy the country's opium-production centres by the end of 2006.   31. The Committee's 2004 report found that the UN and national authorities in co-operation with the government of Afghanistan were working to cut opium poppy production but that their efforts

168 DSC 05 E 6 thus far had failed. Some plans to curtail the production of opium actually had the exact opposite effect. An attempt to prevent the poppy seeds from being turned into heroin by buying the poppy crop  from  farmers  in  2002  only  succeeded  in  encouraging  farmers  to  plant  more  poppies  the following year.  Efforts to destroy opium crops were also unsuccessful.  Only a tiny fraction of the opium  harvest  was  interrupted  and  it  was  difficult  to  find  the  forces  that  might  perform  such operations.   Local   police   and   officials   were   under-funded   and   therefore   easily   bribed,   and international forces were either specifically prohibited from addressing the issue or were reluctant to do so. 32. The  problem  also  appeared  to  be  growing.    In  November  2004  the  UN  Office  for  Drug Control  and  Crime  Prevention  (UNODC)  found  a  17%  increase  in  the  opium  crop  in  2004 compared to 2003.  131,000 hectares of land were used for opium production compared to only 80,000 hectares in 2003. 33. In 2005, however, there are some indications of a marked reduction in opium cultivation.  A March  2005  UN  assessment  found  significant  declines  in  opium  poppy  production.  The  report found that many farmers who grew opium poppies last year have stopped and are instead growing wheat.  In the three provinces that account for half of Afghanistan's opium production (Nangahar, Helmand and Badakhshan), poppy cultivation appears to have declined by as much as 70%.  Five provinces  show  an  increase  in  poppy  production  but  the  increases  in  those  provinces  are outweighed by the decreases in the others.  A subsequent UNODC report released in September confirmed this trend. 34. When  in  Kabul  for  the  September  parliamentary  elections,  the  delegation  from  the  NATO Parliamentary Assembly met with experts from the UK embassy to discuss the counter-narcotics programme (the United Kingdom is the lead nation on this issue in Afghanistan).  In general the trends continue to be moderately positive.  The area of poppy cultivation in the country is down by 20%  compared  to  last  year  although the total reduction in the amount of the opium produced is only 2%.  This is because exceptionally good rains and growing condition produced record yields in all crops in Afghanistan so the yield per hectare of poppy planted was higher than usual.   Some provinces such as Nangahar show very sharp declines in poppy production.  This is mainly due to a sustained effort by the local government to eradicate poppy production.  Other areas, particularly Helmand province, show an increase this year.  The situation is currently being examined to see if any lessons can be learned that would shed more light on what causes the success or failure of the  counter-narcotics  effort  in  different  provinces  and  use  that  analysis  to  refine  the  national programme.   35. A new counter-narcotics plan was agreed to by all of the Afghan ministers in February 2005 and  a  multi-faceted  programme  is  under  way.    The  United  Kingdom  has  taken  the  lead  on institution  building.    After  an  admittedly  bad  start  for  the  Counter-Narcotics  Ministry,  much  has improved  in  the  last  6  months.    President  Karzai  is  personally  involved  and  more  international funding  is  being  directed  to  the  effort.    Several  specialized  teams  of  Afghan  police  have  been trained  in  counter-narcotics  and  are  operating  across  the  country,  targeting  drug  labs,  heroin stockpiles and smugglers.  Most importantly, the current programme is more focused on working with the governors of each province and lending support to their counter-narcotics effort.   36. But there are other factors at work that may have a more long-term effect. President Karzai and other officials have appealed to Afghans' traditional values in the hope that this approach will be  a  more  lasting  deterrent  to  drug  production.    Local  clerics  and  tribal  elders  have  to  a  large extent  answered  Karzai's  call  and  are  preaching  that  opium  production  is  counter  to  Islamic values.    In  a  traditional  and  conservative  society  such  as  Afghanistan's,  these  statements  from local leaders can carry considerable weight.  In fact, Afghan farmers cited this as one of the main reasons  for  their  decision  to  stop  producing  poppy  in  2005  in  interviews  with  UN  personnel conducting the most recent assessment.

168 DSC 05 E 7 37. Another  factor  that  gives  some  cause  for  optimism  is  that  poppy  cultivation  is  not  firmly rooted  in  the  society  and  drug  traffickers  are  still  unorganised.  Opium  production  is  a  relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, starting in the 1980s when neighbouring countries began to aggressively target opium production.  Although the drug trade is immensely profitable, UN reports indicate that drug traffickers do not yet seem to have formed cartels and criminal syndicates.  By most  accounts,  there  is  still  a  window  of  time  in  which  the  opium  production  problem  can  be managed. 38. It  is  likely  that  the  way  forward  will  include  a  range  of  actions.    The  appeal  to  traditional values is important, but it must be backed up with sticks and carrots.  The stick is an aggressive programme  of  arresting  heroin  traffickers  and  destroying  poppy  crops,  although  it  should  be Afghan  police  and  government  officials  in  the  active roles, not their international advisors.  Both the United Kingdom and the US officials responsible for working with the Afghan government on this issue are firmly aware of this important condition and recognize that there must be an Afghan face on the counter-narcotics effort.  The carrot is aid to farmers to improve their ability to grow profitable amounts of legitimate produce and get it to market.   39. Although the trends are positive, both Afghan government officials and international experts emphasize that the key issue is the provision of alternative livelihoods to enable farmers to earn a viable  living  from  legitimate  crops.  This  involves  the  provision  of  seed  and  fertilizer,  agricultural credits  other  financial  measures.  It  also  involves  repairing  Afghanistan's  irrigation  and  road infrastructure. Decades of war destroyed the irrigation system and poppy was the only viable crop because  it  can  thrive  in  dry  environments.  Repairing  the  irrigation system and the roads so that farmers  can  get  their  product  to  markets  is  a  critical  part  of  providing  alternative  livelihoods  to poppy production. Additional attention and financial support of this programme is needed now to ensure that the current reductions in poppy production continue. 40. Despite the long road ahead, we should not ignore the very significant contributions of many NATO members in this area. The United Kingdom, which has the lead role on counter-narcotics assistance, has been very active on all fronts in this struggle.  The United States and others have provided valuable assistance.  In 2005 the United States contributed nearly 1 billion additional to the counter-narcotics effort.  Italy has played a significant role in training judges and prosecutors, and Germany's efforts to build the Afghan National Police are a significant part of the overall fight to reduce the narcotics traffic. 41. In  sum,  the  elements  of  a  comprehensive  policy  appear  to  be  recognized  by  the  Afghan government and its international partners, but how such a policy is implemented is critical.  It must be long-term, and based on developing the Afghan government's ability to manage the situation in a manner that prevents it from becoming another instance of foreign domination in Afghanistan's history.  The test, of course, is the trend line of opium cultivation in the coming years.  As noted, the trend is positive but sustaining it will require prolonged attention and a comprehensive strategy backed by commensurate funding. 42. Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning the demand side of the narcotics problem.  Most of the heroin  consumed  in  Europe  comes  from  Afghanistan's  poppy  fields.    As  President  Karzai  has pointed out, it is demand for heroin in Europe that fuels poppy production and a significant drop in its  consumption  would  make  poppy  a  far  less  attractive  crop  for  Afghan  farmers.  A  serious programme   to   reduce   opium   poppy   production   in   Afghanistan   should   include   a   renewed commitment  to  reduce  heroin  consumption  across  Europe.    Beyond  the  obvious  benefits  to  our societies,  driving  down  the  demand  for  heroin  will  drive  down  the  incentive  to  produce  opium poppies.

168 DSC 05 E 8 B. PROGRESS IN BUILDING THE AFGHAN STATE 43. Afghanistan is struggling to build a functioning state.  There is no system of taxation in place yet  beyond  collecting  customs  duties.    Half  of  the  state  budget  is  financed  through  international contributions.   All   areas   of  public  administration  are  lacking  in  trained  personnel  and  other resources.  Government ministries have been created and ministers have been appointed, but the country lacks the necessary trained individuals to staff those ministries. 44. The  corrosive  effects  of opium production are also felt throughout the governing structure.   Numerous  individuals  from  local  police  to  ministry  officials  are  suspected  of  being  part  of  the problem   rather   than   part   of   the   solution.   In   addition   to   undermining   the   counter-narcotics programme of the central government, they instill a culture of bribery and criminality in the basic structure of the government. 45. There has been some progress in building the basic institutions for governance. The Afghan constitution   drafted   in   2003   sets   forth   the   broad   outlines   of   the   emerging   government   of Afghanistan.  Among its features is a strong presidency with the power to appoint one-third of the upper chamber of the legislature.  There are checks on the power of the president; the parliament can impeach the president and the president is prohibited from disbanding the parliament.   46. The bicameral parliament is divided in a lower chamber (Wolesi Jirga - House of People) and an upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga - House of Elders).  The lower chamber of 249 seats is to be elected  by  the people.  The upper chamber is selected by provincial authorities, district councils and  the  president.    Both  chambers  include  provisions  to  ensure  some  participation  by  women representatives. Half of the president's appointees to the House of Elders are to be women and the  constitution  states  that  at  least  2  representatives  from  each  of  Afghanistan's  34  provinces should be women. 47. The  constitution  also  has  provisions  to  protect  women  and  minorities.    It  recognizes  the equality  of  women  as  citizens  of  Afghanistan.    The Uzbek and Turkmen languages are officially recognized and they may be used as the official language in those regions where those minority groups are concentrated. 48. The  constitution  also  attempts  to  craft  a  balance  between  modern  constitutionalism  and Afghanistan's  traditional  culture.  Political  parties  may  be  established  as  long  as  they  do  not contradict the "principles of Islam" and laws passed by the government are not to contradict the "beliefs and provisions" of Islam.   49. The   most   significant   recent   event   in   Afghanistan   was   the   presidential   election   in October 2004.  Despite  predictions  of  a  wave  of  violence  from  Taliban  and  other  anti-democratic forces, there were remarkably few disruptions. Turnout was high and a considerable percentage of the  female  population  took  part  in  the  voting.  Some  candidates  challenged  the  validity  of  the election process because in some polling stations the election workers used the wrong ink to mark voters' thumbs to prevent fraud. The challenge was short-lived, however, and within a few days all of the candidates agreed that the process was fair if imperfect. 50. As expected, Hamid Karzai won a large percentage of the vote. 55% of the ballots cast were for Karzai putting him over the 50% threshold needed to avoid a run-off election. Karzai's nearest competitor, Yunus Qanooni, received 16% of the vote. 51. In  short,  the  election  process  was  successful.  The large turnout and eager participation of the population demonstrated its legitimacy. The international observers certified its fairness. The lack   of   violence   showed   that   anti-democratic   forces   are   either   cowed   by   the   presence   of international military forces, lack popular support, or both. Most significantly, the election confers

168 DSC 05 E 9 legitimacy on the president who up until now was operating as an appointed chief executive. Now Karzai has greater political freedom to enact changes because he is the popularly elected leader of the country. 52. The  next  challenge  was to extend the democratic legitimacy of the government by holding elections  for  the  lower  house  of  parliament  in  September  2005.    The  months  leading  up  to  the September election featured a resurgence of violence and Taliban activity, mostly along the border with Pakistan and the traditional home of the Taliban in the Kandahar region.  This violence should not  be  dismissed  as  the  "last  gasp"  of  the  Taliban,  but  nor  should  it  be  seen  as  a  sign  of impending  violence  across  the  country  or  broad  dissatisfaction  with  the  political  direction  of  the country.  Rather, we should acknowledge that there is still an active Taliban presence, albeit one that  cannot  muster  enough  personnel  or  support  to  mount  a  threat  to  the  government  of Afghanistan.   53. In  large  part  the  increase  in  activity  is  due  to  a  revised  coalition  strategy  that  is  more distributed  and  proactive.    Coalition  forces  operating  in  the  region  have  turned  increasingly  to smaller, dismounted infantry operations that allow them to investigate the more remote parts of the country.  This has led to more engagements with Taliban remnants who sought shelter in some of the more inaccessible valleys and mountain regions.   54. Five members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly travelled to Afghanistan to participate in the international election observation mission for the September parliamentary election.  In general the delegation found that the election process was well managed.  Afghan election officials were well  prepared  and  knowledgeable  of  the  rules  of  the  election  process.    No  serious  irregularities were  witnessed  by  any  member  of  the  delegation.    Some  problems  that  occurred  in  last  year's Presidential election did not mar this election at the polling sites visited by the delegation.   55. Most  importantly,  the  members  of  the  delegation  were  impressed  by  the  participation  of Afghans of all ethnicities and ages.  Women also participated in force both as voters and election officials, albeit at what appeared to be a lower rate than men.  Turnout also appeared to be lower than  for  the  Presidential  election  held  last  year.    This  may  have  been  caused  in  part  by  the complexity of the ballot, which ran to seven pages in the Kabul area.     56. The  delegation  spoke  informally  with several members of the international community who were critical of the election.  Although the process worked well, they were concerned about what sort of parliament was to be elected and what its role would be in the political system.  Some also voiced concerns about the lack of political parties, which may lead to many members of parliament being  selected  by  the  electorate  on  the  basis  of  ethnicity  rather  than  ideology  or  political programme.  Others would have preferred to see a proportional representation system as opposed to the single non-transferable vote system that was used to elect the parliament. 57. But many other observers were more optimistic and noted that regardless of the flaws, it is better to have a system that pulls former combatants into the political process than to have them outside  it  and  potentially  destabilizing  the  country.  In  addition,  the  parliamentary  elections  had already been postponed once leaving President Karzai as the only elected official in the country for more than one year.  Another postponement might have discouraged the many Afghans who expressed a desire to serve as members of parliament or of the provincial councils. 58. Only time will tell if the elections will provide Afghanistan with a representative government and lasting democratic institutions.  The elections are only a first step and that much must be done to   build   sustainable   democratic   institutions   in   Afghanistan.      This   will   require   a   long   term commitment on the part of NATO, the individual allies and other international organizations.  The delegation was also made aware of the need to build sustainable institutions that can be supported at  least  in  large  part  within  the  Afghan  government's  financial  means.    This  election  cost  the

168 DSC 05 E 10 international  community  $150  million,  approximately  half  of  the  government's  current  annual income.  Cleary a less expensive means of conducting elections must be found if the country is to hold them again without the complete financial support of the international community.   C. REGIONAL WARLORDS 59. During  decades  of  civil  war,  most  power  in  Afghanistan  devolved  to  regional  leaders  who controlled  their  own  militias,  dispensed  with  justice  as  they  saw  fit  and  generally  ruled  over considerable portions of the country.  With the fall of the Taliban government and the creation of an  internationally  recognized  and  now  democratically  elected  government  in  Kabul,  much  of  the focus of the nation-building effort is on reducing the power of the regional warlords and increasing the power of the central government 60. In the 2004 report the committee found that the regional warlords were a significant problem.   The  main  challenge  is  to  build  an  Afghan  state,  but  this  is  not  possible  as  long  as  independent warlords  can  maintain  the  fiefdoms  in  parts  of  the  country,  extracting  resources  and  collecting customs duties as if they were sovereign rulers.  President Karzai called the militias the greatest threat to the country's security and warned that, "without disarmament the Afghan state will have really  serious  difficulties."  Although  the  central  government  is  slowly  extending  its  control,  these regional  warlords  are  often  extremely  powerful  in  their  areas  and  have  little  incentive  to  cede power to the central authority. 61. There  are  some  signs  that  President  Karzai  is  increasingly  able  to  curb  the  power  of  the regional warlords with a combination of co-optation and confrontation. Many of the warlords who commanded  militias  are  now  working  within  the  government  of  Afghanistan.    Ismail  Khan  was removed from his position as governor of Herat but was pulled into the government as Minister of Water and Energy and has allowed his militia to be disarmed.    In the north, Uzbek militia leader Abdul  Rachid  Dostom maintains a strong regional power base, although he has demobilized his forces.    In  return,  President  Karzai  named  Dostom  as  his  chief  military  adviser.    Other  militias belonging to the Northern Alliance began demobilizing in January 2005.  The United States and the  Afghan  government  had  been  reluctant  to  press  too  hard  on  the  Northern  Alliance  militias given  their  role  in  defeating  the  Taliban  and  their  resulting  special  status  in  Afghan  society.   However, a combination of incentives and a general sense that there is more to be gained from being part of the central government than remaining outside of it appears to be working.   62. The  Disarmament,  Demobilization  and  Reintegration  programme  also  appears  to  have succeeded.  The  NATO  Senior  Civilian  Representative  told  the  NATO  Parliamentary  Assembly delegation that visited Kabul in September that all known heavy weapons are now under central government  control  and  that  militia  members  have  been  disarmed.    The  UN  disarmament programme officially ended in June 2005 with the successful demobilization of more than 63,000 militia  members  and  the  cantonment  of  10,880  heavy  weapons.  Most  of  those  former  militia members   are   entering   the   UN-established   Afghanistan's   New   Beginnings   Programme   for retraining and some are opting to be trained for positions in the army or the police force.  Most, however, are choosing to be trained for civilian occupations. It is of interest that the vast majority of  those  demobilized  did  not  chose  to  join  the  military  and  instead  opted  for  retraining  in agriculture, business, or other vocations.  According to the UN only 5% chose to join the army or the police. 63. In  short,  militias  have  disbanded  and  heavy  weapons  are  under  the  control  of  the  central government.      The   trends   are   positive,   but   sustained   support   for   the   current   policies   of disarmament,   demobilization   and   reintegration   is   needed   to   endure   the   future   stability   of Afghanistan.

168 DSC 05 E 11 64. Although  the  larger  militias  have  disbanded,  smaller  units  of  20-200  armed  individuals  are rife across the country. NATO and Afghan government officials estimate that there are many such groups with a total of as many as 20,000 members. These illegally armed groups are a threat to the ongoing progress in Afghanistan because they are often involved in the narcotics traffic. 65. This is a complex task. Some of those groups are simply bandits or criminal gangs and can be addressed as such, but many are composed of individuals who spent much of their adult life fighting against the Soviet occupation. They may be willing to give up their weapons and rejoin civil society, but they need incentives and retraining so that they can become productive members of post-conflict  Afghanistan.  A  successful  policy  will  likely  involve  military  confrontation  with  the particularly dangerous illegally armed groups combined with retraining and incentive programmes to convince others to give up their weapons and reintegrate into society. The issue is now being addressed through the existing 5-part security sector reform project. The current structure features Counter-narcotics  (UK)  Judicial  Reform  (Italy)  Disarmament,  Demobilization  and  Reintegration (Japan), Development of the Afghan National Army (US), and development of the Afghan National Police  (Germany).    It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  simple  fact  that  small  illegally  armed groups have risen to prominence on the security agenda is a sign of progress.  It is only because heavy  weapons  have  been  secured  and  militias  have  been  disbanded  that  the  threat  posed  by small groups of bandits has emerged as a serious security issue. D. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 66. Progress  continues  in  building  the  Afghan  National  Army  (ANA),  which  now  stands  at 25,000.    An  additional  5000  are  currently  in  training.  The  ANA  is  on  track  to  meet  its  target strength  by  September  2007,  three  years  ahead  of  schedule.  Desertion  rates,  which  were  a significant problem a year ago, have declined to manageable levels. The ANA is now the dominant non-NATO military force in the country in terms of training, size, and equipment.  This is a notable difference from two years ago when the ANA was struggling to be a serious military presence in a country dominated by armed militias. Germany has the lead role in building the police force.   67. The  ANA  saw  its  first  military  action  at  the  end  of  2002  when  it  was  deployed  alongside coalition  forces  and  it  is  now  conducting  more  independent  operations  in  southern  Afghanistan against Taliban remnants.  It is also playing an important role in supporting the regional governors by dismantling illegal roadblocks set up by local factions and confiscating weapons caches.  By all accounts the ANA is performing well and is generally welcomed by the local population.  There are now several permanent ANA units based around the country including Mazar e-Sharif in the north, Kandahar in the south, Gardez in the east and Herat in the west.   68. The ANA also appears to be coping with the challenge of integrating different ethnicities into a  national  army.  The  former  Minister  of  Defence,  General  Mohammad  Fahim,  was  originally perceived  as  recruiting  too  many  Tajiks  for  the  army,  which  caused  many  Pashtuns  to  refuse positions in the army or to leave them after short periods of time. Attempts to create an ethnically balanced army were also thwarted by the refusal of regional commanders Abdoul Rachid Dostom and  Ismail  Khan  to  contribute  recruits.  This  situation  has  been  improved  by  the  appointment  of more Pashtuns to positions in the Ministry of Defence and Mr Khan's removal, which was part of Mr  Karzai's  overall  effort  to  rein  in  Afghanistan's  warlords.  The  ANA  is  also  purposely  creating mixed  units of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other groups to ensure that no individual battalion can been seen as solely representative of one ethnic or tribal group. 69. Improved pay for soldiers is helping to build the military. Monthly pay has been increased to $70  from  the  original  $30.  This  has  contributed  to  a  steady  decrease  in  desertion  rates,  from  a high point of 10% in the summer of 2003 to less than 2% in May 2004.  Those working to train the

168 DSC 05 E 12 army also report an emerging esprit de corps.  Soldiers' morale is "very high, with all displaying a positive attitude towards their work and mission," said Office of Military Co-operation - Afghanistan Deputy Director of Defence Operations Sector, British Lt. Col. Andy Fenton. 70. The  long-term  plan  for  the  construction  of  the  ANA  includes  the  rebuilding  of  regional command   centres,   logistics   and   intelligence   units   over   the   next   two   years.      The   military infrastructure - much as the rest of the infrastructure in Afghanistan - is in serious disrepair and will require a considerable investment before the ANA can function without the assistance of ISAF or coalition forces. 71. The national police force is also rapidly expanding according to the Minister of the Interior. Some  38,000  police  are  now  operating  across  Afghanistan  and  the force will number 50,000 by the end of 2005. In addition, the border police will be well on the way to their desired end strength of 12,000 by the end of the year. Corruption in the police force remains a serious concern, but the Ministry  of  the  Interior  recently  increased  pay  in  the  force  to  most  officers  to  $70  per  month,  a considerable  salary  in  a  country  where  the  estimated  per  capita  GDP  is  at  most  a  few  hundred dollars per year. V. NATO IN IRAQ 72. Another  important  mission  for  the  Alliance  is  helping  Iraq  develop  its  security  forces  in  a manner consistent with democratic governance and civilian control of the military. Regardless of the divisions in the Alliance over the intervention in Iraq, all of the Allies recognize that it is now in their collective and individual interests to ensure that Iraq is increasingly stable and able to provide for its own security.   73. This is critical to the reconstruction of Iraq.  An ongoing feature of post-Saddam Iraq is the violence perpetrated mostly by the Sunni Arab minority against the Shia majority.  The attacks are increasing less on coalition troops and more on civilians and the civilian infrastructure.  Until this violence is contained, it will be very difficult to restore the country to any sort of normal economic and  political  life.    Constant  power  interruptions,  dangerous  roads,  and  general  lack  of  security hinder economic development and employment.  The first step in ensuring a democratic and self- sufficient Iraq is building the sort of native security forces that can control the violence, but doing so in a way that does not return to the authoritarian methods of the past. 74. This is a major challenge in a country ruled by a brutal dictatorship that used the military as a primary means of repression.  In the 1980s the army was used in the systematic slaughter of at least 50,000 Kurdish men women and children.  In the early 1990s, the army conducted operations against  the  Arabs  in  the  southern  marshes  of  Iraq,  killing  or  forcibly  moving  more  than  200,000 individuals.  The Iraqi people are unfortunately accustomed to security forces and a military run by the Sunni minority that were often used to violently repress the Kurdish minority, the Shia majority and  any  dissent  across  the  ethnic  or  religious  groups.    Breaking  from  that  past  and  building security forces and a military that have the confidence of the population is a long-term and difficult task. 75. At  the  Istanbul  summit  in  June  2004,  all  NATO  members  agreed  to  support  the  interim government  of  Iraq  in  the  training  of  its  security  forces.    The  North  Atlantic  Council  (NAC)  then considered  how  to  best  implement  this  decision,  and  on  30  July  agreed  to  establish  a  Training Implementation Mission to conduct training both inside Iraq and at other locations in the region or in Europe.  The first troops for this mission were deployed in August under the leadership of Major General Carel Hilderink of the Netherlands who was designated as deputy commander.  Overall command of the mission is under US Army Lt. General David Petraeus who is commander of both the training mission and the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq.

168 DSC 05 E 13 76. In  September  2004  the  NAC  agreed  to  expand  the  mission  in  Iraq  to  include  a  training, education and doctrine center in Iraq.  In December NATO Foreign Ministers met and authorized SACEUR to begin the next stage of the mission expanding the size of the NATO presence from approximately 50 to 300.  The name of the mission also changed to become the NATO Training Mission – Iraq.   In February 2005 Major General Agner Rokos of Denmark took over as deputy commander.    Seven  hundred  officers  will  be  trained  by  the  end  of  2005  and  that  number  is expected to increase to 900 in 2006. 77. On 22 February at a meeting of the heads and state and government of all 26 allies at NATO Headquarters, the allies agreed that all of the allies would contribute to the mission in Iraq. They were  united  in  support  of  the  newly  elected  government,  and  consistent  with  UNSC  Resolution 1546,  all  26  allies  are  now  contributing  to  the  NATO  mission  to  assist  in  training  Iraqi  security forces. 78. The  new  NATO  Training  Education  and  Doctrine  Centre  opened  at  Al  Rustamiyah  in September 2005.  The opening of the centre marks  a significant increase in NATO's commitment to  Iraq,  featuring  both  junior  and  senior  officer  courses.    Other  NATO  training  facilities  and programmes  are  planned  including  the  Baghdad  College  for  National  Defence  Studies  and  the Basic Officer Training Course. 79. Some Iraqi personnel are being trained outside of Iraq.  Selected Iraqi security personnel are being instructed at the NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway and the NATO School on Obergammergau, Germany.  In addition, Germany is training Iraqi personnel in the United Arab Emirates.  France  is  engaged  in  a  bilateral  training  mission  and  is  slated  to  begin  training  Iraqi police  in  Qatar  in  the  near  future.    Spain  announced  that  it  is  willing  to  train  Iraqi  soldiers  in demining operations at a base near Madrid. 80. NATO  is  also  co-ordinating  the  equipment  and  technical  assistance  to  the Iraqi authorities through a NATO Training and Equipment Co-ordination Group established at NATO Headquarters in   October   2004.      The   group   helps   to   ensure   that   bilateral   aid   offered   by   the   allies   is complementary  and  meets  the  needs  of  the  Iraqi  forces.    Several  NATO  allies  have  donated considerable  amounts  of  military  equipment  including  Denmark  and  Romania.    NATO  members have contributed nearly 30,000 weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition.  A delivery of 77 Hungarian  tanks  is  pending.    Greece,  Norway,  and  Luxembourg  have  contributed  financial assistance. 81. The  participation  of  the  allies  varies  widely  and  some  see  this  show  of  unity  as  simply  a token  gesture  to  repair  the  transatlantic  link.    As  of  September,  thirteen  allies  actually  had personnel in Iraq working on the training mission.  The United States is supplying approximately one third of the trainers.  France, Belgium and Germany have all stated that their personnel will not serve with the mission inside of Iraq.  France agreed to allow only one of its officers at NATO headquarters to be involved in planning for the mission. 82. So-called "national caveats" – restrictions placed on forces and personnel assigned to NATO missions  –  are  causing  difficulties  for  the  Iraq  training  mission.  This  is  not  a  new  issue  –  such caveats caused operation difficulties in Kosovo  –  but the problem has resurfaced in a potentially more damaging fashion over NATO's activities in Iraq. Although the Alliance agreed to the training mission  in  Iraq,  certain  nations  are  preventing  their  personnel  assigned  to  NATO  multinational staffs from participating in this mission. When the Committee met in Washington in January, US Defence  Department  officials  pointed  out  that  this  not  only  affects  the  mission  in  Iraq  but,  more important  for  the  long-term,  runs  counter  to  the  spirit  of  multi-nationality  that  underpins  NATO's military structure and to the principle of consensus itself.

168 DSC 05 E 14 83. So far the training mission in Iraq has received relatively minimal tangible support from many of  the  Allies.  This  may  be  a  residual  effect  over  the  disagreement  within  the  Alliance  over  the military  intervention  in  Iraq  in  2003.    It  may  also  reflect  the  stretched  nature  of  many  allied militaries  to  meet  commitments  in  Afghanistan  and  other  deployments.    Either  way,  we  should work  to  overcome  the  obstacles  to  participation  in  the  training  mission  because  its  success  or failure will significantly influence events in Iraq and the region. 84. The January election demonstrated that the insurgency has limited popular support.  More than 8 million Iraqis voted in an act of defiance against the insurgents, who did everything possible to discourage participation in the electoral process.   The insurgents' attacks are now often aimed at civilian targets, particularly Shia mosques and population centres.  As of the time of this report, the  Shia  majority  who  have  been  suffering  the  bulk  of  those  attacks  has  resisted  engaging  in revenge  attacks  on  the  Sunni.    There  is  no  guarantee,  however,  that  this  tolerance  will  last indefinitely.    If  the  insurgents  are  able  to  provoke  the  Shia  majority  into  a  violent  reaction,  the result could be a civil war that would split the country.   85. Obviously,  the  best  way  to  avoid  this  scenario  is  to  end  the  insurgency.    This  is  mainly  a political  process,  but  there  is  a  strong  military  role  to  be  played  by  the  emerging  Iraqi  security forces.    To  be  successful,  those  forces  will  have  to  be  multi-ethnic,  well  disciplined  and trained, and respectful of human and civil rights.  Such forces will not simply spring forth from Iraqi society after the decades of brutality inflicted on the Iraqi population by the previous regime.  They must be  created  and  nurtured  by  professional  Western  militaries  that  embody  the  values  of  the democratic  societies  that  they  serve.    It  is  more  than  a  matter  of  tactical  training  and  ensuring competency with weapons and other systems. Some involved in the NATO training mission note the debilitating effects of three decades of totalitarian rule on the military.  Personal initiative was systematically rooted out as it could only have dangerous consequences for any individual.  The resulting passivity is debilitating to society in general, but it poses particular challenges for those attempting  to  build  a  modern  officer  corps  in  Iraq.  We  will  need  to  ensure  that  the  new  Iraqi security forces maintain close contacts with Western militaries so that they absorb the culture and values of professional militaries subservient to democratically elected leaders.  This is a long-term process, but it is vitally important to building an Iraqi military that can halt the insurgency without triggering a cycle of violence that will divide the country.   VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS? 86. Most allied militaries appear to be stretched to meet current commitments, so it is difficult to consider  additional  operations.    However,  it  is  worthwhile  thinking  in  advance  about  potential scenarios that could lead to the involvement of NATO member forces in the context of the lessons we  have  learned  from  current  operations.    Your  Rapporteur  emphasizes  that  the  following  is merely hypothetical. 87. Some analysts have raised the possibility of NATO becoming involved in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and assisting in the enforcement of a peace agreement if and when one is reached.  Any settlement would involve the creation of new international borders between a new Palestinian  state  and  Israel.    As  an  organization,  NATO  would  likely  win  the  confidence  of  both parties, more so than an EU force or a UN force.  NATO forces could also work closely with the Palestinian security forces, helping them create a military that can contribute to regional stability as well  as  defence  of  the  national  territory.    As  is  the  case  in  Iraq,  such  training  would  have  to  go deeper  than  simply  technical  co-operation,  to  include  long-term  contacts  between  the  emerging Palestinian  military  and  western  militaries  to  help  develop  forces  appropriate  for  an  emerging democracy.

168 DSC 05 E 15 88. NATO might also become involved in other stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future.  At the present time this seems unlikely, but few would have predicted in 2001 that NATO would be heavily involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan by 2003. Even if it is difficult to predict where and how NATO might become involved in such an operation, it is worth reflecting on some of the lessons of the current operation in Afghanistan that can be generalized to other potential situations. - A  commitment  to  stabilization  is  likely  to  be  long-term.      Regardless  of  the  region  or  the circumstances,  the  duration  of  any  such  operations  will  be  measured  in  years,  not  months.   This is a factor of the mission being performed.  There is no single enemy to defeat and then declare an end to the mission.  Instead, stabilization and reconstruction missions are aimed at tasks  that are by definition long-term and somewhat open-ended as they gradually transition from more military tasks to more police-oriented and civil affairs tasks. This can be seen in the mission in Bosnia where NATO maintained a substantial presence for a decade before turning over  the  operation  to the European Union.  Even now, however, the military presence is still needed to ensure stability and the normalization of Bosnia.  Afghanistan is also likely to be a long-term mission.  It is important that we recognize the likely long duration of future missions, as this will affect many aspects of mission planning and force generation.  It is also important that  we  communicate  this  to  the  general  public  –  they  should  not  expect  fast  missions  and deployments that bring the troops home, as is often promised, in time for Christmas. - The  same  forces  may  have  to  cover  the  full  range  of  military  operations.    It  is  likely  to  be increasingly  difficult  to  maintain  the  firm  distinctions  between  combat  and  support  forces.   What we have seen in recent operations in Afghanistan is that the same troops often have to perform a variety of missions nearly simultaneously.  They might support local authorities on a raid against suspected terrorists, perform street patrols, and help dig a well in a short span of time in the same location.  Our forces will have to be better trained to cope with these varied tasks and deployed in combinations that allow for maximal flexibility. - Future operations will likely involve close co-operation with other international actors.  This is nothing new for NATO which has worked closely with the UN and the European Union in other operations.  But it should be emphasised that this is likely to be a hallmark of future operations.   This   may   also   include   working   with   non-governmental   organizations   (NGOs)   such   as humanitarian  relief  groups  or  other  providers  of  aid.    Co-operation  with  the  European  Union may  become  particularly  important.    Future  operations  are  likely  to  involve  many  of  the functions  that  the  European  Union  is  trying  to  build  into  its  crisis  response  capability  in  a concept that combines civil and military response forces.  The planned EU gendarmerie force and the deployment of legal and judicial advisors to Georgia are two examples of this.  They are  capabilities  that  NATO  does  not  have,  but  they  are  likely  to  be  important  parts  of stabilization and reconstruction missions. - Common  funding  of  operations  will  need  to  be  seriously  considered.    The  principle  that  only countries participating in an operation pay for the costs is not a viable model for the future. The NRF will feature elements from various allies on a rotating basis, but the decision to use the NRF  will  be  taken  by  all  26  allies.  This  would  mean  that  the  whole  alliance  would  take decisions to act in the interest of all of the members, yet only those currently supplying forces to  the  NRF  would  pay.  Enhanced  common  funding  of  operations  could  help  eliminate  this problem  and  encourage  greater  participation  in  the  NRF.  The following section of this report offers some thoughts on how this might be pursued. VII.    COMMON FUNDING FOR CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS  

168 DSC 05 E 16 89. NATO relies on the national military capabilities of its members, but some common costs are spread out across the members.  Those include the cost of maintaining the international staff at NATO  HQ,  joint  military  headquarters,  pipelines  and  other  infrastructure,  and  the  commonly owned  and  operated  Airborne  Early  Warning  and  Control  System  (AWACS).    Costs  for  those common  items  are  paid  by  each  member  according  to  a  mutually  agreed  upon  formula.    In general, the larger and more wealthy members pay a larger share of the costs than the smaller and  less  wealthy  members.    The  majority  of  funding  is  provided  by  three  allies.    Germany,  the United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  provide  approximately  60%  of  the  funding  for  common expenses with the United States accounting for the single largest percentage of any member.   90. NATO has long since maintained common funding arrangements for a range of expenses.   The  relevant  question  for  this  committee  is,  should  the  Alliance  consider  adjusting  the  common funding of operations to cover the additional expenses incurred by participants in crisis response operations? 91. Although the basic principle of funding operations throughout the history of the Alliance has been that members participating in an operation pay the costs of transporting and maintaining their forces for the duration of their participation, NATO common funds have been used to pay for some common  expenses  such  as  deployed  headquarters.    But  the  NRF  illustrates  that  it  is  worth considering adjusting the line between what is purely a national expense and what is eligible for common  funding.      A  better  system  would  be  to  establish  some  form  of  increased  eligibility  for common funding so that the costs are spread across the full 26 members of the alliance, not just those supplying forces to the operation in question.  Although the NRF is a good illustration of the problems inherent in current funding mechanisms, the same logic applies to other types of NATO crisis response forces such as the Deployable Joint Task Force or other on-call forces.   92. This  raises  several  obvious  questions:    how  much  should  be  budgeted  for  crisis  response operations,  what  costs  should  be  eligible  for  common  funding,  and  how  could  those  costs  be apportioned across the Alliance?  The current common budgets are relative small compared to the total defence spending of the members.  At less than 1.5 billion dollars combined, they represent a fraction of a percentage point of combined defence spending. But increasing the eligibility for the use  of  common  funds  for  operations  could  add  considerably  to  this  amount.    In  addition,  the current common budgets are for relatively fixed expenditures such as the costs of the international staff at NATO HQ.  Operations costs, however, can vary widely because in some years there may be intense activity and other years could be relatively calm. Deployment costs can be estimated, but different missions could involve different expenditures.  For example, a peacekeeping mission may  involve  very  few  munitions  while  a  peace  enforcement  mission  could  involve  the  use  of  a significant number of precision-guided munitions. 93. Clearly common funding for crisis response operations could vary widely depending on the interpretation of what expenses it should cover.  The following estimate is based on the idea that the common budget should be used to offset the additional expense to members who deploy their troops  as  part  of  the  NATO  mission.    An  obvious  candidate  for  common  funding  would  be  the transportation costs incurred as part of a crisis response operation.   94. One model could be the cost of the US mission in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom).  It is a good model for at least two reasons.  First, the mission involves approximately 20,000 personnel in theatre, roughly the same size that the NRF is expected to be when it reaches its full strength.   Second, it is a difficult and distant location that probably sets an upper limit for cost estimates of the deployment of the NRF.   95. The cost of Enduring Freedom was estimated by the US Congressional Budget Office to be approximately  $4.5  billion  per  year  and  that  figure  is  broken  down  into  several  categories.    The United States spends $0.9 billion on transportation for Enduring Freedom.  Including the costs of

168 DSC 05 E 17 operations  and  maintenance,  fuel,  spare  parts,  ammunition,  and  the  costs  associated  with command,  control  and  communications,  the  United  States  spends  approximately  an  additional $2.6 billion per year.  The remainder of the total cost of Enduring Freedom is personnel expenses. 96. Assuming that common funding would be used to cover the transportation costs of members deploying as part of a crisis response operation, the total amount needed could be in the range of $0.9 billion.   It should be noted, however, that this is a high-end estimate.  It assumes that the entire NRF would be deployed for a year in an operation as distant and difficult as the US mission in  Afghanistan.    But  it  could  likely  be  far  less  costly  depending  on  a  variety  of  factors.      A peacekeeping  mission  in  a  less  difficult  and  distant  location  could  be  far  less  costly,  as  could  a mission that does not require the deployment of the entire NRF. 97. Your Rapporteur encourages the members of the committee to consider how funding could be secured. One option would be to create a new common budget into which members would pay on an annual basis. Unspent funds in any one-year could be reserved for future years.  This would have  the  effect,  however,  of  building  up  a  considerable  account  in  a  few  years  time  if  unused.   Therefore,  a  better  option  might  be  to  increase  the  existing  common  military  budget  by  some percentage  of  the  estimated  transportation  costs  on  the  assumption  that  it  would  not  be  used continuously  every  year.    A  third  option  might  be  to  request  that  each  member  reserve  a  set amount in the national defence budget each year that could be called upon as needed.   98. Assuming  that  the  costs  were  distributed  in  roughly  the  same  percentages  as  the  current common budgets, the costs to each member could be as shown in the table below.  The high-end option indicates the cost to each member assuming that the Allies want to immediately add $0.9 billion  to  the  existing  common  budgets.    The  low-end  option  assumes  that  the  Allies  choose  to build up this amount over a four-year span.   99. Your  Rapporteur  does  not  suggest  that  these  estimates  should  be  viewed  as  more  than simply indicative of the range of costs we might expect to see.  But he hopes that it will serve as a useful point of departure for a serious discussion of the issue and add some substance to what is otherwise an academic exercise. 100.   Despite the benefits of such a funding arrangement, some might argue that this represents an additional and unwarranted cost imposed on each member of the Alliance.  In fact, it is not so much  an  additional  cost  as  it  is  a  spreading  of  the  costs  of  NATO  operations  across  time  and members in a predictable way that facilitates national budgeting.  Most members of the Alliance will participate in the NRF at some point.  There is an equal chance that the NRF will be deployed during any time period.  Under the current funding arrangement, if it is deployed when a member is  in  the  NRF  rotation,  that  member  would  pay  the  full  costs  of  deployment.    This  could  be  a significant  one-time  expenditure  that  would  be  difficult  to  budget  for  in  advance.    But  if  the additional  costs  are  at  least  in  part  commonly  funded,  each  member  insures  itself  against  such budgetary  shocks.    Instead  of  paying  for  an  operation  all  at  once,  the  member  pays  a  much smaller amount each year.  Perhaps the most useful analogy is to view such a funding mechanism as a form of self-insurance that minimizes long-term cost risk.   Table: Potential   cost   of   expanded   common   funding   of   NATO   crisis   response operations to include transportation costs (in millions of US dollars) Country Estimated Average Percentage of Common Budgets High End Option (Build up contingency fund in 1 year) Low End option (Build up contingency fund over 4 years) Belgium 3,5 31,5 7,9 Bulgaria 0,2 1,8 0,5 Canada 4,6 41,4 10,4

168 DSC 05 E 18 Czech Republic 1,0 9,0 2,3 Denmark 2,5 22,5 5,6 Estonia 0,2 1,8 0,5 France 8,0 72,0 18,0 Germany 18,5 166,5 41,6 Greece 0,7 6,3 1,6 Hungary 0,7 6,3 1,6 Iceland 0,0 0,0 0,0 Italy 7,4 66,6 16,7 Latvia 0,2 1,8 0,5 Lithuania 0,2 1,8 0,5 Luxembourg 0,1 0,9 0,2 Netherlands 3,7 33,3 8,3 Norway 2,0 18,0 4,5 Poland 2,7 24,3 6,1 Portugal 0,5 4,5 1,1 Romania 0,2 1,8 0,5 Slovakia 3,7 33,3 8,3 Slovenia 0,2 1,8 0,5 Spain 0,2 1,8 0,5 Turkey 1,4 12,6 3,2 United Kingdom 13,8 124,2 31,1 United States 23,8 214,2 53,6