CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY 166 CSCDG 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE MINORITIES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: FACTOR OF INSTABILITY? DRAFT REPORT BERT MIDDEL (NETHERLANDS) RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 19 October 2005 * Until this document has been approved by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

166 CSCDG 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. ETHNIC MINORITIES ........................................................................................................... 2 A. The status of ethnic minorities in the three states......................................................... 2 B. Minorities in the separatist regions of the South Caucasus........................................... 6 1. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) ............................................................... 6 2. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) ........................................................................ 10 C. The situation of other ethnic minorities ....................................................................... 12 1. Samtskhe-Javakheti (Georgia) .......................................................................... 12 2. Kvemo Kartli (Georgia) ...................................................................................... 14 3. Meskhetian Turks (Georgia) .............................................................................. 14 4. Lezgins (Azerbaijan).......................................................................................... 15 III. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ................................................................................................... 16 A. Religion in Public Life ................................................................................................. 16 B. Non-traditional Religious Groups ................................................................................ 16 C. Islamist Groups........................................................................................................... 18 IV. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 19 V. BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................. 21

166 CSCDG 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Since they gained their independence from the Soviet Union, powerful movements towards depopulation  and  ethnic  conflict  have  led  to  increasing  mono-ethnicity  in  states  of  the  South Caucasus.    Having  lost  the  overarching  protection  of  the  Soviet  central  government  -  which guaranteed  minority  participation in public life and educational opportunities  - and having largely escaped the attention of the international community, minorities seem to be the net losers in the changes of the independence period. Demographic trends, 1989 –  2005 Population Current growth rate (2004) 1989/1990 Last available census 2004/2005 Armenia 3,448,600 (official) 3,545,000 (UN) 3,213,011 (2001) 3,215,800 (official) 3,016,000 (UN) -0.2% Azerbaijan 7,131,900 (official) 7,212,000 (UN) 7,953,400 (1999) 8,347,300 (official) 8,411,000 (UN) 0.6% Georgia 5,400,841 (official) 5,460,000 (UN) 4,371,534 (2002) 4,543,000 (official; including South  Ossetia:  49,200  and Abkhazia: 178,600) 4,474,000 (UN) -1.0% Sources: UN Population Division, World Bank Development Indicators, National Statistical Service of  the  Republic  of  Armenia,  State  Statistical  Committee  of  the  Republic  of  Azerbaijan,  State Department for Statistics of Georgia 2. This report will examine the condition of minorities in the South Caucasus region, surveying the potential for conflict and instability emanating from their interactions with majority groups and neighbouring  states.  It  will  focus  on  the  status  and  challenges  posed  by  ethnic  and  religious minorities,  paying  special  attention  to  the  so-called  “frozen”  conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 3. Emigration from the three South Caucasus states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - has been  motivated  both  by  war  and  ethnic  hostilities  as  well  as  by  falling  living  standards  and economic  malaise.    Minority  populations  are  most  likely  to  emigrate.    As  mass  emigration  gives rise  to  more  and  more  mono-ethnic  communities  and  regions,  the  status  quo  has  increasingly become  “balkanisation”  rather  than  peaceful  co-existence.    The  political  culture  is  increasingly characterised  by  insularity  and  exclusive  ethnic  nationalism  that  provides  for  little  tolerance  of minorities  by  majority  populations.    In  a  region  that  once  hosted  substantial  ethnic  and  religious diversity,  today  the  often-strained  interaction  between  the  region’s  minority  groups  and  the majorities they live among threatens to destabilise the region’s precarious equilibrium.   4. This report is not meant to provide a comprehensive picture of the situation of minorities in the  South  Caucasus,  but  only  to  highlight  some  of  the  challenges  and  problems  related  to  the integration of certain minority groups in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.  Your Rapporteur would like to thank all the delegations that have provided comments on the report.

166 CSCDG 05 E 2 II. ETHNIC MINORITIES A. THE STATUS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE THREE STATES 5. Shortly after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, a number of ethnic clashes in the South Caucasus region led to damaging civil strife and huge waves of forced migration.  Following this turmoil, the governments of the region have taken pains to smooth inter-ethnic relations.  They have  succeeded  -  both  due  to  their  own  efforts  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that  mass  emigration  has meant   that   substantial   ethnic  and  religious  diversity  has  given  way  to  largely  mono-ethnic communities and regions - insofar as underlying tensions have not led to full-scale war. Armenia Armenians 97.9%, Yezidi Kurds 1.26% note: as of the end of 1993, virtually all Azeris had emigrated from Armenia Sources: official census 2001 Azerbaijan Azeris 90.6%, Lezgins 2.2%, Russians 1.8%, Armenians 1.5%, Talish 1.0%, Avars 0.6% others 2.5% note: Armenians are concentrated separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region Source: official census 1999 Georgia Georgians  83.7%,  Armenians  5.7%,  Russians  1.5%,  Azeris  6.5%,  Ossetians 0.8%, Abkhaz 0.1%, others 1.7% Source: official census 2002 Note:  according  to  international  standards,  the  indication  of  ethnic belonging is voluntary and no documentary evidence is requested. Therefore these numbers should be considered with caution, since they do not necessarily provide an exact picture of the situation. 6. Armenia  is  the  only  state  in  the  Caucasus  which  is  almost  mono-ethnic.    According  to the latest  available  official  census,  an  estimated  98%  of  the  population  is  ethnic  Armenian,  up  from 93%  in  1989.    The  trend  towards  mono-ethnicity  in  Armenia  was  spurred  both  by  the  Karabakh conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan, which led to the expulsion of more than 80,000 Azeris and 2,500 Muslim Kurds, and economic hardship, which prompted the emigration of many Russians.   Azeris,  who  represented  the  largest  minority  in  Armenia  in  1989  (2.6%),  have  virtually  all  left. Today the largest minority group are the Yezidi Kurds, whose population is officially estimated at 40,000.  Assyrians,  Yezidis  and  Kurds  are  predominantly  rural,  while  other  groups  of  national minorities  are  concentrated  in  major  cities.  Armenia  has  engaged  in  an  effort  to  promote  the integration and representation of its minorities, but this is rendered difficult by the very limited size of this population which often does not live compactly in the same areas, and by the assertion of Armenian  ethnic  nationalism  fostered  by  the  country's  strained  relations  with  its  neighbours, particularly in relation to the Karabakh conflict.  Globally, it seems that if the situation of minorities in Armenia is not perfect, it is not the result of a perceived threat, since minority groups in Armenia are numerically too small and too spread out to represent any major security threat to the country’s national integrity. This distinguishes the situation in Armenia from that of certain minority groups in Georgia or Azerbaijan. 7. Armenia  ratified  some  of  the  main  international  instruments  for  the  protection  of  national minorities,  including  the  Council  of  Europe  Framework  Convention  for the Protection of National Minorities  and  the  European  Charter  on  Regional  and  Minority  Languages.    Implementation  of both conventions is reviewed regularly through monitoring mechanisms. As part of the European Charter,  Armenia  granted  Assyrian,  Yezidi,  Greek,  Russian  and  Kurdish  the  status  of  national minority  languages.    However,  since  independence,  the  Armenian  language  has  asserted  its domination in all spheres.  Only Russian is still relatively present and usually benefits from more favourable   conditions   than   other   minority   languages.      For   example,   education   in   minority languages  is  usually  available,  but  a  full  curriculum  exists  only  for  Russian.    Moreover,  in  most

166 CSCDG 05 E 3 cases, shortage of teachers and the difficulty of procuring adequate textbooks have represented considerable obstacles.  The same is true in other areas, such as television and radio broadcasts or printed media. Some TV and radio programmes about, or in a few cases in, minority languages exist and receive some level of state support, but this presence remains very limited. 8. Representation of minorities in government and administrative structures is also limited.  In particular,   Armenia’s   Constitution   does   not   provide   for   any   special   arrangement   for   the representation of minority groups, and a law on the protection of national minorities still needs to be  adopted.    However,  as  a  first  step  towards  a  better  co-ordination  of  policy  with  regards  to minority  issues,  Armenia  created,  in  January  2004,  a  governmental  Department  on  National Minorities and Religious Issues. 9. Despite  these  efforts,  political,  economic  and  social  integration  of  minority  groups  is  still imperfect, particularly in the case of the Yezidi Kurds.  For a long time, this ethnic group has been prevented  from  asserting  a  separate  national  identity,  but  was  assimilated  into  the  Kurdish population.  After independence, Armenia lifted these restrictions, but competition with the Kurdish community has often limited the capacity of Yezidi Kurds to organise a concerted effort towards recognition of their rights and culture. Yezidi Kurds mostly live in rural areas, have not benefited much from the process of land privatisation and have lower levels of education and employment than the rest of the population.  Moreover, they are often excluded from policymaking and are only granted limited opportunities to promote their identity. 10. The situation of minorities in Azerbaijan is also mixed. According to the latest official census in 1999, 91% of the close to 8 million-strong population are ethnic Azeris; main minorities include Lezgins, Russians, Talish and Armenians.  Apart from the Russians who mainly live in Baku, other minorities   are   concentrated   in   remote   areas   in  the  north  and  south  of  the  country.    The Constitution  of  Azerbaijan  provides  for  a  unitary  state  structure,  and  central  authorities  in  Baku have  endeavoured  to  keep  a  relatively  tight  control  over  local  administration  and  organisations representing minority groups.  Former President Aliyev promoted a policy aiming at integrating the representation of minority groups, while firmly suppressing political demands for autonomy.  As an illustration,  ethnic  minorities  are  relatively  well  represented  in  public  positions  and  the  former regime has provided political and financial support for officially sanctioned minority organisations. On  the  other  hand,  the  regime  has  systematically  arrested  and  detained  alleged  separatist movements.  Undoubtedly, the fear that an excessively lax policy regarding minorities might lead to another Karabakh-like situation strongly influences decision-making in this area. 11. Overall, minorities in Azerbaijan are relatively well integrated, but some areas offer a mixed picture.  Minorities  enjoy  better  proficiency  in  the  majority  language  than  other  minorities  in neighbouring  countries,  and  benefit  from  a  more  widespread  presence  of  Russian  in  public  and private life in Azerbaijan.  Minorities have access to education in their language, but only Russians have a complete system of education from primary to high school.  As a result, Russian schools are relatively popular and receive more pupils than the estimated number of Russian children.  In other cases, courses in minority languages are only provided periodically and there is a shortage of trained teachers and adequate textbooks.  As for access to information and media, the Director of Azerbaijan’s new Public Television Channel has recently announced plans to start broadcasting programmes  for  national  minorities,  including  programmes  in  Armenian. Radio, newspapers and magazines in minority languages are usually available.  However, a law adopted in 2002 on usage and  protection  of  Azeri  language  poses  a  certain  number  of  restrictions  on  the  use  of  minority languages in the media, and in particular prohibits the creation of private local television and radio stations broadcasting in minority languages. 12. In  the  political  field,  the  election  of  the  Azerbaijani  parliament  based  on  proportional representation allowed for a fair participation of minorities in the parliament.  The suppression of

166 CSCDG 05 E 4 this  proportional  rule  and  establishment  of  single-seat  constituencies  in  2003  has  raised  some concern among representatives from national minorities. 13. Azerbaijan  has  ratified  the  Council  of  Europe  Framework  Convention  for  the  Protection  of National Minorities in 2000 and submitted itself to the monitoring mechanism it establishes.  In its resolution  on  the  implementation  of  the  Framework  Convention  adopted  on  13  July  2004,  the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe acknowledged the mixed picture of Azerbaijan’s protection of its minorities. It stated: “In Azerbaijan, the importance of the protection and promotion of  cultures  of  national  minorities  is  recognised  and  the  long  history  of  cultural  diversity  of  the country is largely valued.”  However, the Committee of Ministers also pinpointed several areas of concern, such as the issue of education in minority language, access to media, and use of minority languages in relations with administrative authorities. In conclusion, it recommended the adoption of  a  new  law  on  the  protection  of  national  minorities  and  improved  participation  of  national minorities representatives in decision-making. It also noted that other general human rights issues –  including  freedom  of  expression  and  the  registration  of  NGOs  –  “have  an  impact  on  the protection  of  national  minorities  and  need  to  be  addressed  by  the  authorities  as  a  matter  of priority”. 14. Finally   and  maybe  most  importantly,  the  issue  of  minorities  in  Azerbaijan  is  strongly connected to the resolution of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, as stated in the Committee of Ministers’   resolution:   ‘’Despite   the   general   spirit   of   tolerance   in   Azerbaijan,   the   continued occupation of large parts of Azerbaijani territory and the displacement of a high number of people have  caused  tensions  which  have  resulted  in  disconcerting  manifestations  of  intolerance.”  The conflict  over  Nagorno-Karabakh  is  indeed  the  single  most destabilising minority-related issue for Azerbaijan  and  involves  many  different  aspects  that  are  examined  below,  including  the  very difficult situation of ethnic Azeri IDPs (internally displaced persons) from Nagorno-Karabakh. 15. Georgia is the most multi-ethnic country in the South Caucasus and as such has had to face a more complex situation with regards to ethnic minorities on its territory.  In Georgia, according to the  2002  census,  minorities  make  up  16%  of  the  population (as against one third in 1989). The main  ethnic  groups  are:  Azeris  (284,000  today,  compared  with  308,000  in  1989);  Armenians (249,000  today,  compared  with  437,000  in  1989);  Russians  (68,000,  compared  with  341,000  in 1989);  Ukrainians  (7,000,  compared  with  52,000  in  1989);  Greeks  (15,000,  compared  with 100,000 in 1989).  Since 1997, however, ethnic group is no longer recorded on identity cards. 16. Georgia’s  political  culture  and  attitude  towards  its  minorities  is  largely  characterised  by  a relatively  high  and  lingering  level  of  ethnic  nationalism.    Just  as  for  Azerbaijan,  the  unresolved conflicts   in   Akhazia   and  Ossetia  have  contributed  to  reinforcing  Georgian  perceptions  that minorities  represent  a  potential  threat.    President  Saakashvili’s  talk  of  restoration  of  Georgia’s territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty  is  sometimes  also  accompanied  by  nationalistic  rhetoric, supported  in  some  cases  by  a  tacit  alliance  with  the  Georgian  Orthodox  Church,  that  has awakened worries of a nationalistic backlash among minority groups.  Overall, in relations between the majority and minorities, priority has been given to the assertion of the state’s sovereignty over the  protection  of  minorities.  Paralysed  by  the  fear  of  encouraging  other  potential  separatist movements, the government’s policy towards minorities has been hesitating and half-hearted. The situation  is  also  complicated  in  some  cases  by  the  involvement  of  third  party  states  for  the protection of their ethnic populations in Georgia. 17. Senior  government  posts  tend  to  be  occupied  by  ethnic  Georgians,  and  there  is  a  firm perception  of  ethnic  discrimination  in  personnel  appointments,  especially  in  law  enforcement agencies.  Because the government is too weak to pursue a coherent assimilatory or centralising approach, however, some minorities have managed to achieve de facto self-rule.

166 CSCDG 05 E 5 18. Regarding the issue of language and education, the Georgian Constitution only recognises Abkhazian as an official language, along with Georgian, in the Abkhaz region.  No other language has  been  granted  official  status.    However,  the  Constitution  recognises  the  right  of  citizens  “to express themselves in their mother tongue in private and in public”.  In its minority areas, Georgia has  largely  left  intact  the  educational  provisions  inherited  from  the  Soviet  era,  including  primary and secondary education in minority languages.  So-called national schools provide education in minority languages. 19. In reality, the situation is more complex.  Some regions suffer from a shortage of teachers and  the  number  of  admissions  in  national  schools  has  been  in  constant  decline.    Despite constitutional provisions, Georgian still dominates in many areas of society and therefore mastery of   the   official   national   language   is   often   a  pre-condition  for  political,  economic  and  social integration. Access to media and information in minority languages is often difficult.  Minorities also find  it  difficult  to  access  the  Georgian  state,  as  federal  laws  are  published  solely  in Georgian (if official translations are produced, they are done so into English) and exams for civil servants are taken in Georgian.  Because there is no effective state support for Georgian language training, the younger generations tend to speak no language other than their own.  If this situation continues, minorities  risk  soon  being  unable  to  communicate  with  the  rest  of  the  population  and  suffering economic and social marginalization. 20. Simultaneously,  Russian  is  losing  ground  and  does  not  play  the  role  of  a  possible  lingua franca  for  and  among minorities any more.  These problems are even more acute for IDPs and refugees in Georgia or who return to Georgia, as in the case of Ossetians who return from Russia and have been educated in Russian.  Those who have taken up Russian citizenship are also faced with strict Georgian legislation that does not allow dual citizenship. 21. Political representation is also an issue, both on national and local levels. Georgia’s single- chamber   parliament   does   not   provide   any   special   arrangements   for   the   representation   of minorities. Minorities are represented by only eight members in the 235 member-strong Parliament (displaced  persons  from  the  separatist region of Abkhazia have a separate representation of 10 members).    As  not  all  of  these  MPs  understand  Georgian  perfectly,  it  is  unclear  how  they participate in parliamentary legislative work.  Also problematic has been the government’s practice of  appointing  judges  and  administrators  who  speak  only  Georgian  in  minority-populated  areas.   Locals complain that this system leads to unfair treatment and court decisions. 22. There   are,   however,   some   positive   signs   and   developments.   Symbolically,   President Saakashvili   has   appointed   two   representatives   of   regional   minorities   to   his   government. Zinaida Bestaeva,  an  ethnic  Ossetian,  became  State  Minister  for  Civil  Integration  Issues  in December 2004. Lela Avidzba, an ethnic Abkhaz, became the spokesperson for the government in January  2005.    A  draft  Concept  on  Protection  of  National  Minorities  was  introduced  in  the Georgian Parliament in June and entails some far-reaching measures, which find their inspiration in main international conventions on national minorities. A new law on state television has allowed broadcasts in minority languages for the first time.  Some measures are taken for the promotion of members  of  minorities  to  positions  in  the  administration  and  public  institutions.  As  part  of  this programme,  labelled  “affirmative  action”  by  the  government,  representatives  from  minorities  will receive scholarships for training courses that should allow them access to jobs in the public sector. A  School  of  Public  Administration  for  representatives  of  minorities  and  residents  of  Georgia’s mountainous regions was also created and started functioning last September in Kutaisi.  It aims at  training  300  students  to  be  employed  in  the  local  self-governance  administrations.    In  his speech at the UN High-Level Summit in New York last September, President Saakashvili proudly announced  that  major  progress  had  been  made  in  the  promotion  of  “ethnic  inclusiveness  and integration”,   particularly   in   the   implementation   of   affirmative   action   programmes   to   bolster education  and  minority  representation.    Finally,  Georgia’s  Parliament  is  expected  to  ratify  the

166 CSCDG 05 E 6 Framework Convention by the end of October, although this ratification has been postponed many times in the past. B. MINORITIES IN THE SEPARATIST REGIONS OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 23. In none of the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus do the separatist powers (Abkhaz, Ossetian or Karabakh) exhibit any discernible desire to remain in a common state with Georgia or Azerbaijan.    It  is  difficult  to  convince  their  leadership  and  populations  that  anything  might  be gained from this, given the economic and social turmoil as well as poverty in these regions. The common  perception  is  that,  if  incorporated  back  into  their  original  states,  the  separatists  would have much to lose, in particular their security and their dominant political position. 24. These  conflicts  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  “frozen,”  although  this  word  is  misleading, because  in  none  of  these  cases  is  the  situation  stabilised  or  pacified.    It  is  therefore  more appropriate  to  refer  to  these  conflicts  as  unresolved.    While  Georgia  and  Azerbaijan  both  seem unlikely  to  reconcile  themselves  to  the  loss  of  these  territories,  neither  has  proven  able  to  re- incorporate  them.  This  unresolved  situation  poses  several serious challenges to the stabilisation and  development  of  the  region.    First,  ongoing  small-scale  violence  in  the  border  zones  may escalate  into  serious  fighting  at  any  time.  Second,  absence  of  settlement  of  these  conflicts hampers   the   political   transition   and   economic   development   of   the   three   South   Caucasian countries.  In  countries  that  are  still  undergoing  processes  of  political  transition,  unresolved conflicts  can  easily  be  exploited  by  the  politically  ambitious.    Moreover,  the  persistence  of  local conflicts places a heavy burden on national economies and prevents the development of regional co-operation.  Lastly, unresolved conflicts largely hinder the full integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into international structures, and in particular within the partnerships developed with NATO or with the European Union. 25. In the three breakaway regions, minority issues are complicated by the origins of the conflict and  the  current  configuration  of  the  regions.  Several  questions  overlap:  the  status  of  the  region within the state it is legally attached to; the status of populations that have been displaced by the conflicts, whether internally – in the breakaway region or in neighbouring regions of the national state  –  or  to  neighbouring  countries;  and  the  status  of  minorities  within  the  breakaway  regions. Under these circumstances, minority issues can play a true destabilising role for the governments of the region and represent a real challenge to their legitimacy.   1. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) 26. After the peaceful resolution of the situation in Adjaria in May 2004, there was hope for new momentum in negotiations over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  In particular, South Ossetia, whose ethnic composition is still somewhat diverse, allowing for contacts between Georgian and Ossetian populations, was said to be next on the agenda of the Georgian president.  However, subsequent developments  in  the  two  regions    -  and  in  particular  renewed  fighting  in  South  Ossetia  in  the summer of 2004 - have demonstrated the difficulty of replaying the Adjaran success in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia.  An additional obstacle lies in the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have both  experienced  a  long  struggle  for  independence,  in  which  separatist  forces  have  fought  for secession from Georgia, with the support of external players.   27. Georgian authorities have committed themselves in various international fora  - UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, NATO, etc. - to the peaceful resolution of both conflicts and have made several proposals to this effect. To some extent, the situation in Abkhazia provides more ground for  optimism  than  developments  in  South  Ossetia.    However,  in  both  cases,  Georgia  still  has  a long way to go to ensure adequate protection and integration of its minorities.

166 CSCDG 05 E 7 a. Abkhazia 28. At the time of the last Soviet census in 1989, Abkhazia had a population of about 525,000, of which  only  17.8%  were  ethnic  Abkhaz.  At  that  time,  45.7%  of  the  region’s  population  were Georgians  (principally  Mingrelians),  with  the  rest  made  up  of  Armenians  and  Russians,  both representing around 15% of the population. 29. The Abkhaz conflict broke out in 1992 with social unrest and attempts by local authorities to separate  from  Georgia.    It  escalated rapidly and led to a succession of ceasefires and renewed fighting,  during  which  hundreds  of  thousands  of  civilians,  mostly  Georgians,  were  displaced  in what was alleged to be a campaign of ethnic cleansing.  While a ceasefire agreement was signed in   May   1994,   the   conflict   has   not   been   formally   resolved   and   the   breakaway   republic’s independence,  officially  proclaimed  in  1999  following  a  referendum,  is  not  recognised  by  either Tbilisi or the international community.   30. The ceasefire line is patrolled by Russian troops under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent  States  Peacekeeping  Forces  (CISPRF)  as  agreed  in  the  Moscow  Treaty  of  1994. The  United  Nations  (UN)  assumed  a  mediating  role  in  the  conflict  in  Abkhazia,  based  on  the principle of territorial integrity of the Georgian state. A UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was charged with monitoring implementation of the ceasefire, observing the operation of the CIS peacekeeping  forces  and  contributing  to  the  return  of  refugees  and  internally  displaced  persons (IDPs). 31. In  past  years,  Abkhazia  has  achieved  increasing  de  facto  independence  from  Georgia.   Russia’s introduction of a visa regime for Georgian citizens in 2000 - with the exemption of those in  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  -  has  encouraged  the  incorporation  of  these  territories  into Russia’s economic and social space.   32. About  80-85%  of  Abkhazians  are  estimated  to have taken Russian passports.  Abkhaz  de facto  authorities  claim  that  by  the  end  of  the  year,  the  whole  population  of  Abkhazia  will  own  a Russian  passport.    Abkhazians  cited  a  host  of  reasons  for  this  decision,  including  the  desire  to receive a Russian pension – worth around fifty times more than one in Abkhazia – and being able to  travel  abroad  (because  the  republic’s  sovereignty  is  not internationally recognised, Abkhazian “citizens”  are  considered  stateless  by  the  international  community).    Finally,  bitterness  from  war with  Georgia  has  prevented  others  from  taking  Georgian  citizenship.    In  2001,  the  breakaway republic  -  which  had  already  adopted  the  Russian  rouble  as  its  main  currency  and  was  almost totally reliant on Moscow for its economic survival - expressed the desire to apply for ‘Associate Status’ with the Russian Federation.  This offer was subsequently rejected by the Russian Duma. 33. Abkhaz  leaders  have  repeatedly  asserted  that  they  must  never  again  allow  themselves  to become a minority, categorically excluding the return of all Georgian IDPs that is called for by the 1994  Quadripartite  Agreement  on  Voluntary  Return  and  subsequent  UN  resolutions.    As  in Georgia  proper,  access  to  political  power  for  minorities  in  Abkhazia  is  limited.    Abkhaz  are dominant  in  both  the political and business arenas.   However, inter-ethnic relations between the region’s  groups  are  generally  stable,  with  the  notable  exception  of  the  Georgians.  In particular, the few Georgian IDPs who have been able to return to the district of Gali are faced with a series of difficulties, ranging from the impossibility of finding Georgian-language schools for their children to  sporadic  reprisals  and  abductions  by  Abkhaz  criminal  groups.    The  Abkhaz  side’s  refusal  to allow  for  the  opening  of  a  UN  office  in  the  district  to  monitor  human  rights  issues  and  for  the deployment  of  a  small  UN  civilian  police  force  is  certainly  not  helpful  in  restoring  confidence between populations. 34. In elections on 12 January 2005, Abkhazians chose Sergei Bagapsh as their president after months  of  controversy  and  stalemate  following  what  analysts  have  called  a  “barely  concealed

166 CSCDG 05 E 8 attempt by Moscow to block the outcome of an earlier presidential election”.  Under the pressure of an economic blockade imposed by Moscow, Sergei Bagpash agreed to a re-run of the election held on 3 October 2004 and accepted a partnership with his former opponent, the Russian-backed candidate  Raul  Khajimba,  who  was  appointed  vice-president  and  charged  with  co-ordinating  the region’s foreign, defence and security policies. 35. Bagapsh’s  election  has  changed  little  in  relations  between  Georgia  and  its  breakaway republic. There  are  some  encouraging  signs  of  rapprochement,  but  distrust  remains  and  is fostered by uncooperative moves, such as the massive military exercise organised by Abkhaz de facto authorities in August, simulating a sea attack from Georgia.  A positive development came in April  2005,  when  Abkhaz  and  Georgian  representatives  attended  a  high-level  “Friends  of  the Secretary  General”  meeting  in  Geneva  on  the  conflict,  for  the  first  time  in  almost  two  years.    A further  meeting  was  held  on  4  August  in  Tbilisi  as  part  of  the  “Geneva  process”,  after  being postponed twice because of tensions between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. The Georgian side presented  a  new  initiative,  which  aims  at  promoting  confidence  building  through  a  joint  Abkhaz- Georgian  declaration  to  guarantee  the  non-resumption  of  hostilities  and  through  economic  co- operation. It also includes measures regarding the return of IDPs and refugees.  Co-operation on the assessment and rehabilitation of the Abkhaz portion of the Georgia-Russia railway, between Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian experts is also an encouraging development, although the process has experienced many difficulties. b. South Ossetia 36. In   South   Ossetia,   relations   between   the   Ossetian   population   and   Georgia   started   to deteriorate  on  the  eve  of  the  break-up  of  the  Soviet  Union.    South  Ossetians  proclaimed  full sovereignty  in  September  1990,  following  which  Georgia  abolished  South  Ossetia’s  status  of autonomy and conflict erupted in January 1991. A ceasefire was signed in Sochi and entered into force on 28 June 1992.  During those eighteen months, the composition of the population in the region  was  deeply  altered.    According to the 1989 Soviet census, 65,000 Ossetians and 25,500 Georgians  lived  in  the  South  Ossetia  Autonomous  Region,  while  close  to  another  100,000 Ossetians lived in the rest of Georgia, making it the fifth largest ethnic group in the country.  It is estimated  that  60,000  Ossetians  and  10,000  Georgians  -  from  South  Ossetia  -  were  displaced during  the  conflict.    According  to  the  2002  Georgian  census,  only  38,000  Ossetians  were  left  in Georgia.  A vast majority of Ossetians fled to North Ossetia or other regions in Russia, imposing an important financial burden on these regions.   37. In 1999, as part of its admission to the Council of Europe, the Georgian government pledged to   facilitate   the   return   of   refugees   and   IDPs   to   their   homes,   as   well   as   restitution   of   or compensation  for  lost  property.  Little  progress  has  been  made  on  these  issues  since  then.   According  to  the  UNHCR,  only  1,285  of  the  10,000  displaced  Georgians  have  returned  to  their homes,  and  only  3,500  Ossetians  (1,500  from  North  Ossetia,  2,000  from  within  South  Ossetia).   The more time passes, the more difficult it is for displaced families to even consider moving back to Georgia. 38. The  main  framework  for  conflict  resolution  is  the  Joint  Control  Commission  (JCC),  a quadripartite  body  with  Georgian,  Russia,  North  and  South  Ossetian  representatives,  as  well  as OSCE  participation,  created  as  part  of  the  ceasefire  agreements.  The  JCC’s  mandate  is  to implement the ceasefire and assist with settlement and reconstruction issues, including the return of IDPs and refugees.  Several agreements were signed by the parties over the years, but have not led to any significant result or comprehensive solution to the issue of the return of IDPs and refugees.  Georgian authorities have started to challenge the legitimacy and efficiency of the JCC format, and have pleaded for further internationalisation through the involvement of other partners and international organisations in the negotiations.  The Ossetian side, on the contrary, rejects any

166 CSCDG 05 E 9 attempt  at  de-legitimising  and  bypassing  the  JCC,  knowing  it  provides  for  a  framework  where  it can count on the support of North Ossetia and Russia when needed. 39. Progress in talks over political settlement of the conflict has been very limited. In the summer of 2004, both parties were on the brink of war, following parliamentary elections in South Ossetia and  an  attempt  by  the  new  Georgian  government  to  organise  a  large-scale  campaign  against illegal  trade  in  the  area.    A  ceasefire  was  agreed  to  on  November  2004,  but  new  tensions appeared  in  May  and  June  2005  after  a  shootout  between  Georgian  police  and  an  Ossetian detachment,  followed  by  the  kidnapping  of  four  ethnic  Georgians  in the conflict zone, leading to fears  of  renewed  conflict.  Regular  militaristic  talk  or  demonstrations  also  contribute  to  a  general atmosphere   of   distrust.      The   signature   on   18   September   of   a   friendship-and-co-operation agreement   between   the   leaders  of  North  and  South  Ossetia,  explicitly  setting  the  goal  of reunification of both regions within the Russian Federation, was followed by another defiant move when an impressive military parade was organised by South Ossetia’s de facto authorities for the celebration  of  ‘’independence’’  on  20  September  2005.    On  the  same  day,  the  South  Ossetian “capital”  Tskhinvali  was  the  target  of  a  mortar  attack,  which  injured  at  least  ten  civilians;  the circumstances  are  still  unclear.    All  these  incidents  are  evidence  of  lingering  tensions  between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali.  Some observers also start to worry about the growing influence of a group of “hawks’’ in President Saakashvili’s entourage, preaching for a military confrontation to resolve the situation in South Ossetia. 40. Despite these tensions, some attempts at a rapprochement have been initiated, mostly from the  Georgian  side.    In  January  2005,  President  Saakashvili  presented  a  comprehensive  South Ossetia Peace Initiative at the meeting of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). The  initiative  was  based  on  the  recognition  of  South  Ossetia’s  right  to  autonomy  which,  he announced,   should   be   enshrined   in   the   Georgian   constitution,   along   with   guarantees   for representation  of  the  region  in  all  branches  of  government.    It  also  provided  for  economic  and social  reforms  to  promote  prosperity  and  stability  in  South  Ossetia.    Finally,  it  called  on  the international community to support the peace process. 41. A further plan unveiled at an international conference in Batumi on 10 July 2005 completed and   detailed   the   Peace   Initiative,   adopting   a   comprehensive   but   step-by-step   approach   to resolution  of  the  situation  in  South  Ossetia.    Initial  steps  would  include  a  set  of  economic measures  to  help  redress  South  Ossetia’s  economy,  and  several  political  measures  to  promote reconciliation and re-integration of Ossetians in Georgian society.  The economic dimension would include  a  long-awaited  plan  on  restitution  and  rehabilitation  of  victims  of  the  conflict,  as  well  as steps towards greater economic co-operation with South Ossetia (restoring railway, bus, and taxi connections from Georgia proper to Tskhinvali, resuming delivery of humanitarian aid, launching a small  and  medium-size  enterprise  development  support  programme,  etc.).    On  the  political dimension, the plan demonstrates a willingness of the Georgian authorities to take steps towards reconciliation  ahead  of  negotiations  on  the  final  status,  and  to  combine  measures  aimed  at reconciliation  with  measures  to  increase  autonomy  for  the  region.  Propositions include granting official  status  for  the  Ossetian  language,  in  parallel  with  the  Georgian  language;  legalising  dual citizenship for those Ossetians who have taken up Russian citizenship; guaranteed representation of South Ossetians in Georgia’s parliament and in government departments; a quota of 50 places annually  for  Ossetians  in  the  newly-created  School  of Public Administration; air time on national television   and   radio   for   South   Ossetian   authorities   and   for   Ossetian   cultural   programmes; assistance  for  the  creation  of  NGOs;  and  possible  reform  of  school  textbooks  to  include  some elements of Ossetian history. 42. All these propositions certainly represent an important step forward, and although they were immediately  rejected  by  the  South  Ossetian  side,  Georgia  should  keep  up  efforts  towards  the completion  of  its  programme  for  the  protection  and  integration  of  minorities,  as  part  of  a comprehensive approach aimed at building confidence and trust between all parties.  It should be

166 CSCDG 05 E 10 clear that no major progress can be achieved towards the political settlement of the Abkhaz and South  Ossetian  conflicts,  as  long  as  Georgia  does  not  demonstrate  its  willingness  and  ability  to improve the condition of minorities within a multi-ethnic state. 43. On  several  occasions  since  its  election,  Georgian  President  Saakashvili  has  stressed  that reunification with Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a priority of his government.   Little progress has been made, however, in bilateral negotiations on the final political status of the provinces or the return of IDPs, whose numbers are estimated at around 215,000 by the UNHCR for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Restoring Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it seems, would  require  significantly  improved  relations  between  Tbilisi  and  Moscow.    Given  President Saakashvili’s distrust of his larger neighbour’s intentions, however, this seems unlikely.  President Saakashvili,   as   well   as   other   high-level   Georgian   officials,   regularly   condemns   Russian involvement in the breakaway provinces of Georgia. At the meeting of the UN General Assembly last   September,   President   Saakashvili   and   Minister   of  Foreign  Affairs  Salome  Zourabishvili denounced  the  “untold”  and  “ongoing  annexation”  of  Abkhazia  and  the  establishment  of  an “apartheid” regime.  Most recently, on 11 October 2005, the Georgian Parliament also decided to put pressure on Russia by passing a resolution calling for a withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces if no concrete results are achieved in the South Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts by February and July 2006 respectively. 2. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) 44. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which in Soviet times was an autonomous region (oblast) with  a  predominantly  ethnic  Armenian  population,  dates  for  the  most  recent  part  back  to  1988.   Each party supports its own version of the origin and timeline of the conflict.  For Azerbaijan, the war  was  triggered  by  Armenia’s  territorial  ambition.    For  Armenia,  Azerbaijan  suppressed  and crushed  the  right  to  self-determination  of  the  overwhelmingly  Armenian  population  of  Nagorno- Karabakh.    In  December  1991,  a  self-determination  referendum  was  organised  in  Nagorno- Karabakh  and  some  108,615  people  voted  in  favour  of  independence.  On  6  January  1992, independence was officially proclaimed but until now has not been recognised by any state.  For more   information   see   this   Committees’   General   Report   in   2004   on   “Stability   in  the  South Caucasus”. 45. The  conflict  resulted  in  tens  of  thousands  of  dead  and  disabled,  as  well  as  in  major movements of population and ethnic cleansing, which completely changed the ethnic composition of  the  region.  Nagorno-Karabakh  forces  today  occupy  some  13.4%  of  Azerbaijan’s  territory,  i.e. almost the entire territory of the former Soviet Nagorno-Karabkah Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), as well  as  the  entirety  or  part  of  seven  other  districts  (what  is  usually  referred  to  as  the  ‘’occupied territories’’), which together represent close to double the size of the former NKAO and provide the population  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  with  their  only  connection  to  Armenia,  via  the  Lachin  corridor. Although  there  is  no  agreement  on  the  numbers of refugees and IDPs, it is generally estimated that some 413,000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan and neighbouring regions in Armenia, while 724,000 Azerbaijanis  and  Kurds  were  displaced  from  Armenia,  Nagorno-Karabakh  and  the  surrounding districts.  The  last  Soviet census in 1989 estimated the population of the NKAO at 189,085, with 145,550  ethnic  Armenians  (76.9%)  and  40,700  ethnic  Azeris  (21.5%).  Today,  the  de   facto authorities  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  estimate  that  the  Armenian  population  is  still  around  140,000 individuals,  but  virtually  no  Azeris  remain.    It  also  considers  that  one  third  of  its  population  has been displaced. 46. This conflict’s lasting potential for regional destabilisation lies in the fact that while Armenia considers  the  conflict  over,  Azerbaijan  does  not.  A  ceasefire  was  agreed  in  1994  and  peace negotiations  are  conducted  in  the  framework  of  the  OSCE  Minsk  Group,  which  is  co-chaired  by France,  Russia,  and  the  United  States.    Peace  talks  between  Armenian  and  Azeri  presidents gained momentum in early 2001, but the two leaders, while close on many issues, could not make

166 CSCDG 05 E 11 a  final  agreement.    The  major  obstacle  remains  entrenched  public  opinion:  many  on  both  sides suspect  that  their  president  may  betray  the  ‘national  cause’  and  give  up  ‘their’  territory  to  the enemy. Since May 2004, there have been some positive signs again.  A process was initiated in which meetings are regularly organised between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, together with the co-chairs and supplemented by occasional presidential meetings.  As part of this “Prague  process”,  from  May  2004  to  September  2005,  the  foreign  ministers  met 11 times.  The presidents recently met in May and August of 2005.  Reports on the latest presidential meeting in Kazan indicate serious progress on several key issues.  However, a lot will certainly depend on the result of the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan in November 2005. 47. While the official positions of the two presidents seem to be ‘ahead of their populations’ in their  understanding  of  the  need  for  compromise,  both  governments  have  pursued  policies  that complicate the situation.  Moreover, violations of the ceasefire have never really stopped.  On the contrary, it has been reported that between March and May 2005, there have been more violations of the ceasefire than in the same period in 2004.  This continued small arm fire has the potential to seriously derail ongoing negotiations at any time. 48. On  the  Azerbaijani  side,  there  is  a  persistent  attempt  at  proving  by  various  means  that Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be fully part of Azerbaijan, sometimes to the detriment of its own population. For example, the government has until recently insisted that the situation of Azerbaijani IDPs and refugees, displaced as a result of the conflict, was only temporary and has as a result tended to keep them in limbo while promising their return to their former homes. This policy has only  changed  in  the  last  years  of  President  Heydar  Aliyev’s  rule.    Overall,  the  situation  of  IDPs remains difficult in terms of economic and social standards of living, as well as in terms of political representation and participation. 49. Some observers also believe that militancy is on the rise in Azerbaijan, fed by frustration with the lack of progress of the peace process, and evidence thereof can be found in some high-level militaristic comments and moves.  From 2003 to 2005, Azerbaijan has increased its military budget by 122% and has announced plans for another two-fold increase for 2006, bringing Azerbaijan’s budget to the level of 60% of Armenia’s overall budget for 2006. 50. Tensions   have   also   arisen   regarding   allegations   that   the   Armenian   government   is encouraging  the  resettlement  of  ethnic  Armenians  in  the  occupied  territories  around  Karabakh.   After Azerbaijan brought these claims to the United Nations General Assembly in 2004, the OSCE put together a fact-finding mission, which travelled to the region in January and February 2005.  Its conclusions, presented in March, provided a mixed picture of the situation.  The report states that, with  the  exception  of  the  Lachin  district,  the  “FFM  found  no  clear  indications  that  the  NK  or Armenian authorities directly organized resettlement. As well, there was no sign of non-voluntary resettlement in the territories. Likewise, the FFM found no evidence of systematic recruitment of settlers  to  come  to  the  territories’’.    However,  it  also  noted  that  the  authorities  gave  various incentives to settle, from reactive low-level support to more proactive policies, including providing homes,  infrastructure,  tax  exemptions,  and  free  utilities.    In  Lachin,  the  report  concluded  that: “Settlement  incentives  are  readily  apparent  (…)  they  include  socia l  welfare,  medical  care,  a functioning infrastructure and administration, schools, decent roads, tax exemption or tax benefits, reduced rates for utilities, cheap or free electricity, and running water. (…) the FFM has concluded that the authorities pursue a proactive settlement policy.”  The mission also noted clear signs of involvement by the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and support from the Armenian diaspora, but no indication of direct involvement of Armenian authorities. 51. The  fact  that  Nagorno-Karabakh  has  grown  increasingly  dependent  on  Armenia  in  various areas also poses an enormous challenge for any future peace deal. Yerevan provides half of the budget  of  the  province  through  an  “inter-state’’  loan.    The  Armenian  dram  is  the  main currency.   The former Prime Minister and current President of Armenia, Robert Kocharian, was the first de

166 CSCDG 05 E 12 facto president of Nagorno-Karabakh from 1994 to 1997.  The armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh include  many  Armenian  citizens.    No  Azeris  have  returned  to  Nagorno-Karabakh  and  political, economic and social developments in Karabakh have only rendered this hypothetical return more complicated.  Azeris  have  not  been  able  to  participate  in  the  processes  of  privatisation  of  land, home and businesses and the de facto government has put in place mono-ethnic institutions. 52. There   are   many   major   obstacles,   both   internal   and   external,   to   a   peace   settlement.   Moreover,  there  are  still  hesitations  as  to  what  the  best  approach  for  a  settlement  would  be:    a package  deal  including,  from  the  start,  decisions  on  the  final  status,  or  a  progressive  approach starting with confidence-building measures. In any case, building confidence between the parties will certainly prove crucial to the process, especially since the Armenian and Azeri populations are growing  increasingly  apart,  with  only  very  limited  contact,  a  lot  of  resentment,  and  fading memories of the time when both communities actually lived alongside each other.  If they are really serious about reaching an agreement, both governments need to start preparing their populations, in particular if a referendum on the final status of the province is to be held in the next decade. C. THE SITUATION OF OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES 53. The situation of other minorities in the three states of the South Caucasus is less dramatic, in the sense that no other minority group has yet organised into a separatist movement demanding independence from the state.  In some regions, however, the situation of minorities is problematic to  say  the  least  and  could  play  a  destabilising  role  if  not  properly  addressed.  The  situation  in Georgia  is  certainly  the  most  complicated,  because  of  its  less  homogeneous  society  and  a tendency   towards   centralisation   of   the   state   that   has   proved   inadequate   in   promoting   the integration  of  minority  populations.    Nevertheless,  some  issues  also  exist  in  Azerbaijan  and Armenia. 1. Samtskhe-Javakheti (Georgia) 54. Tensions     between     the     Georgian     authorities     and     the     Armenian     population     in Samtskhe-Javakheti  have  increased  in  recent  years,  as  ever  better  organised  minority  political groups  have  become  more  critical  of  Georgian  administration  of  the  province.    Samtskhe- Javakheti  is  divided  into  6  districts,  of  which  two  (Akhalkalaki  and  Ninotsminda,  both  forming Javakhetia)  have  an  overwhelming  Armenian  majority,  representing  more  than  90%  of  the population.   Armenians   represent   the   largest   ethnic   group  in  Georgia,  with  a  population  of approximately 300,000. 55. Historical and cultural factors have combined to create a sense of insularity, exclusive ethnic identity  and  suspicion  of  outsiders  among  the  Armenian  population  in  Javakheti.    All  of  these tendencies are reinforced by this population’s nearly homogeneous ethnic composition, generally lacking  Georgian  language  skills  and  poor  communications  with  the  rest of the country.  Today, the region remains politically, economically and culturally isolated from the capital.   56. In March 2005, the leaders of "United Javakheti", an Armenian public organisation active in the   Javakheti   region,   rallied   thousands   of   people   to   protest   the   socio-economic   hardships experienced  by  the  Armenian  community  there.    Protesters’  demands  included  a  stop  to  the withdrawal  of  the  Russian  military  base  there  (based  on  the  foreseen  damage  to  the  local economy and the need for protection against Turkey); the recognition by the Georgian Parliament of  the  Armenian  Genocide  of  1915-1923;  and  the  ratification  of  a  law  protecting  the  rights  of national minorities in Georgia.  On the latter issue, local political organisations also complain about the impossibility of registering political parties representing minorities, based on a provision of the Georgian Constitution which prohibits any party founded on a regional basis. Already in December 2004, the Council of Armenian NGOs of Samtskhe-Javakheti had condemned an alleged policy of

166 CSCDG 05 E 13 assimilation by the Georgian authorities carried out to the detriment of an economic and political integration policy in the rest of the country. 57. The March incidents were followed by another incident in July, when Armenian residents of Samsar blocked efforts by students and nuns from Tbilisi to help restore a local church.  A brawl ensued,  as  well  as  a  raid  by  local  Armenians  against  a  Georgian  school  nearby.    Finally,  in October, clashes erupted again between the local police and protesters reacting to the closing by the  Georgian  tax  authorities  of  ten  shops  owned,  for  the  most  part,  by  ethnic  Armenians,  for financial irregularities. 58. Georgian authorities have tried to ease tensions in the region through several initiatives, in co-operation  with  Armenia  and  with  the  support  of  international  donors.  Meetings  between  the Presidents  of  Georgia  and  Armenia,  and  between the Prime Ministers took place respectively in April  and  July.    Armenia  provides  funding  for  some  local  projects,  in  particular  for  Armenian schools in the region, and has pledged to increase funding if necessary. 100,000 Javakheti natives also live in Armenia.   59. Georgian initiatives aim mostly at rebuilding connections between Samtskhe-Javakheti and the rest of Georgia and at improving socio-economic conditions for the local population.  On the first  aspect,  construction  of  a  highway  running  from  the  Turkish  border  to  Georgia  and  passing through  Samtskhe-Javakheti  was  due  to  start  in  September.  This  project  is  financed  by  the  US Millennium  Challenge  Account.    The  new  railroad  track  between Kars in Turkey and Azerbaijan, which the three countries had agreed to last April, should also run through Akhalkalaki and break the relative “isolation” of the region.  Turkey has agreed to contribute US$200 million to the cost of the Turkish-Georgian portion of the railroad. 60. Regarding minority rights, President Saakashvili has appeared open to initiatives aiming at the  development  of  self-government  and  at  addressing  the  language  issue.  However,  Georgian authorities  are  also  wary  of  encouraging  any  potential  separatist  forces  and  seem  to  hesitate between  a  “local  solutions  to  local  problems”  line  and  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  the minority rights issue at the national level. 61. Finally,   Georgian   authorities   have   tried   to   address   worries   connected  to  the  planned withdrawal of the Russian military base from Akhalkalaki, which until now has represented a pillar of  local  economic  and  social  life.    Fears  linked  to  the  departure  of  Russian  troops  played  an important role in rallying protesters in March.  As part of a state social programme for the region, the  Georgian  Ministry  of  Defence  has  announced  plans  to  procure  agricultural  products  for Georgia’s armed forces in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. 62. Overall,  the  OSCE  High  Commissioner  on  National  Minorities,  who  implements  a  “Conflict Prevention  and  Integration  Programme  for  Samtskhe-Javakheti”  and  visited  the  region  in  April 2005, favourably judged the new government’s attitude towards future development of the region. However,  in  many  ways,  the  situation  in  Samtskhe-Javakheti  is  typical  of  the  problems  facing Georgia   as   it   strives   to   better   integrate   its   minorities.      Regions   like   Javakhetia   are   very homogeneous ethnically and have developed some sense of insularity from the central authorities. Current  administrative  structures  in  Georgia  do  not  allow  for  the  adequate  representation  of minorities, even at the local level.  If not addressed properly, these situations run the risk of being exploited  by  politically  ambitious  groups  that  can  capitalise  on  fears  of “Georgianisation” and on the  support  provided  by  neighbouring  countries.  Georgia’s  authorities  have  demonstrated  some level of good will in responding to local fears and demands.  However, the response has also too often been hesitant and partial.  Similar elements characterise the situation in Kvemo Kartli.

166 CSCDG 05 E 14 2. Kvemo Kartli (Georgia) 63. According  to  the  Soviet  census  taken  in  1989,  approximately  300,000  Azeris  lived  in Georgia.  While the OSCE estimates that as many as 50,000 Azeris have emigrated since then - due either to economic difficulties or social conditions - birth rates remain high.  Some 18,000 live in  Tbilisi,  but  the  majority  live  in  the  south-western  region  of  Kvemo  Kartli,  on  the  border  with Armenia  and  Azerbaijan.  The  Azeri  population  represents  almost  half  of  the  500,000-strong population. The region also has a small Armenian minority, representing 6.4% of the population. 64. The region is home to some large industrial complexes inherited from the Soviet era. These complexes are in the process of being privatised, but in the meantime, the local economy is still relatively weak.  Estimates of unemployment rates range between 11 and over 20%. 65. In  December  2004  and  January  2005,  tensions  between  Georgia’s  Azeri  minority  and  the state  rose  after  Georgian  security  forces  raided  Azeri  border  villages  and  arrested  a  number  of residents in connection with a crackdown on cross-border smuggling.  Following these incidents, Baku-based newspapers put forth allegations of extortion, arbitrary detentions, and other forms of harassment  against  Azeri  community  leaders  by  the  Georgian  authorities.    Also  in  December 2004, an elderly ethnic Azeri woman was killed and several others injured as a result of clashes between  the  Azeri  villagers  and  a  security  guard  at  a  horse  farm  in  the  Marneuli  district.  The clashes were caused by a dispute over land ownership rights. Following this incident, a group of Azerbaijani NGOs sent an open letter to President Saakashvili to express concern over potential violations of human rights against the Azeri minority in Kvemo Kartli. 66. In  Kvemo  Kartli  as  in  other  parts  of  Georgia,  the  central  authorities’  response  to  the difficulties   facing   its   regions   has   been   to   give   priority   to   the   restoration   of   order   and   to infrastructure   reconstruction  and  development.  Local  authorities  have  launched  a  campaign against   smuggling   along   the   Georgia-Azerbaijan   border   and   have   tried   to   engage   their counterparts in Azerbaijan.  A major road project is also expected to benefit the economy of the region:  the  construction  of  a  super-highway  connecting  the  Black  Sea  port  of  Poti  to  the  Red Bridge border between Georgia and Azerbaijan, in Kvemo Kartli. The construction of the road is planned  for  early  2006.    Financing  for  this  very  expensive  project  should  come  in  part  from international donors and from privatisation revenues. 3. Meskhetian Turks (Georgia) 67. Having been deported to Central Asia from Samtskhe-Javakheti - in what is now Georgia - in 1944, and survived pogroms directed against them, in particular in Uzbekistan 1989, Meskhetians were resettled in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.  According to the last Soviet census of 1989, there were 207,500 living in the USSR.  Current estimates place the Meskhetian population between 270,000 and 320,000. 68. Together with the UNHCR, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) led efforts to move  Meskhetians  back  to  Georgia  during  the  1990s.    As  a  condition  for  joining  the  Council  of Europe (CoE) in 1999, Georgia committed itself to repatriate the Meskhetians over a twelve-year period.    Some  measures  have  been  adopted  towards  that  aim.    A  state  agency  to  handle repatriation was established in 1994; however, its activities have been very limited due to lack of funds.    In  1996,  a  presidential  decree  signed  by  President  Shevardnadze  established  a  state commission,  which  issued  a  blueprint  for  the  repatriation  of  up  to  5000  Meskhetians  by  2000. However, little progress has been made towards implementation of the principles embodied in the presidential decree. The law on repatriation of persons deported from Georgia in the 1940s by the Soviet  regime,  prepared  with  legal  assistance  by  Council  of  Europe  experts,  is  still  outstanding.   As  explained  in  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe (PACE) in January 2005, “the Georgian authorities have made the fulfilment of this commitment

166 CSCDG 05 E 15 conditional   on   the   creation   of   appropriate   conditions   in   the   country   for   the   return   of   this population”, 69. Several   reasons   can   indeed   explain   delays   in   the   implementation   by   Georgia   of   its commitments.  First, the economic burden caused by the repatriation of a large population would be  difficult  to  bear  for  a  country  whose  economy  is  already  undergoing  serious  problems.   Undoubtedly,  there  is  also  a  certain  level  of  fear  as  to  the  challenge  of  integrating  a  Muslim population  in  a  country  which  already  has  serious  issues  with  several  minority groups. Due to a history  of  ethnic  clashes  with  Georgians  and  Armenians  in  the  period  prior  to  their  deportation, Meskhetian repatriation is also met with overwhelming local resentment, including threats to resist the  return  by  force.    The  Georgian  authorities  also  sometimes  argue  that,  for  the  sake  of  inter- ethnic  peace,  it  is  more  feasible  to  resettle  Meskhetians  around  the  country  rather  than  return them to their ethnic homeland. 70. As  a  result,  only  650  Meskhetians  have  succeeded  in  returning  to  Georgia.  Moreover, Meskhetians were unable to obtain Georgian citizenship between 1994-97.  Citizenship began to be granted - on a limited basis - after combined pressure from international organisations. 71. The  number  of  Meskhetians  willing  to  return  is  widely  disputed.    While  the  Georgian authorities fear that as many as 300,000 Meskhetians would seek to move to Georgia, observers argue  that  this  seems  unlikely,  given  that  many  have  already  settled  in  places  where  they  are currently living, such as Azerbaijan.  The Baku Institute of Peace and Democracy estimated that between  90,000  and  110,000  Meskhetian  Turks  lived  in  Azerbaijan  in  2001,  where  they  enjoy generally favourable state policies and attitudes.  Wary of upsetting its relationship with Georgia, Azerbaijan supports the Meskhetians’ right to return, conditional on acceptance by the Georgian side. 4. Lezgins (Azerbaijan) 72. Lezgins  are  the  largest  minority  group  in  Azerbaijan.  Official  statistics  indicate  that  the 178,000 Lezgins account for 2% of Azerbaijan’s total population.  However, independent estimates sometimes put this number at 250,000-260,000.  Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Lezgin population was split between Azerbaijan and the southern part of Russian Daghestan, where the Lezgin  community  is  estimated  at  200,000.  At  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  a  secessionist movement  called  for  the  unification  of  all  Lezgin-inhabited  areas  inside  Russia.  In  1992,  the movement, called Sadval, organised demonstrations on both sides of the borders.  The movement was banned and its members arrested.  Tensions between Lezgins and Azeris appeared again in 1994,   soon   after   the   period  of  heavy  casualties  on  the  Karabakh  front  and  resistance  to conscription  in  the  Azeri  army.    Since  then,  tensions  have  receded  and  claims  from  the  Lezgin community have focused on the protection of the Lezgin language and culture, as well as on their economic and social condition. 73. Because  Lezgins  are  generally  bi-  or  trilingual,  speaking  Lezgin,  Azeri  and  Russian, many live  in  Baku  and  occupy  senior  positions  in  the  civil  service,  army  and  parliament.  The  Lezgin minority was represented by two members in the previous parliament and will have one member in the  newly  elected  parliament,  according  to  the  new  electoral  rules  adopted  in  2003,  which abandoned the system of proportional representation. 74. There  is,  however,  some  concern  among  the  Lezgin  population  as  to  the  progressive disappearance of their language and culture.  As an illustration, Lezgin is taught at local schools, but  is  treated  on  an  equal  footing  with  English  and  Russian.  Usually  courses  in  Lezgin  are  only organised twice a week in primary schools with many Lezgin pupils.  Moreover there is a shortage of  teachers  and  modern  textbooks.  Although,  as  presented  above,  Azerbaijan’s  policy  regarding minorities  is  generally  relatively  favourable,  improvements  could  come  from  the  ratification  and

166 CSCDG 05 E 16 implementation  by  Azerbaijan  of  the  European  Charter  for  Regional  and  Minority  Languages  - which  it  promised  to  do  upon  accession  to  the  Council  of  Europe  in  2000  -  as  well  as  from  the adoption of a new law on the protection of national minorities. III. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 75. The role of religion in the Caucasus has gained prominence in post-Soviet times.  For many, it  provides  not  only  a  pillar  of  national  identity,  but  also  spiritual  guidance  and  psychological comfort at a time which has been rife with turmoil and hardship.  Socially, it serves to assert and distinguish group identity, and it is sometimes used as a political weapon. 76. The majority of Armenians (98%) and Georgians (88%) are Christian, whereas most Azeris (94%)  are  Muslims.    Georgia  has  a  significant  Muslim  population  (about  10%  according  to  the 2002 official census).  There are Zoroastrian believers in Azerbaijan as well as Armenia, and all three states have tiny groups of practicing Jews.   A. RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 77. In all three states, constitutional provisions enshrine a theoretical separation between church and state.  In practice, this separation does not always hold.  In Armenia, although its constitution technically  provides  for  a  separation  between  religion  and  government,  the  1991  Law  “On Freedom  of  Conscience  and  Religious  Organisations”  grants  special  status  to  the  Armenian Apostolic  Church  as the national church of Armenia, and requires all religious bodies to register with the state in order to operate without restrictions. Unregistered religious organisations may not publish  newspapers  or  magazines,  rent  meeting  places,  broadcast  programmes  on  television  or radio, or officially sponsor the visas of visitors.  Azerbaijan, for its part, adopted a Turkish secular model of statehood.  The Constitution provides that persons of all faiths may choose and practice their  religion  without  restriction.  The  Law  on  Religion  expressly  prohibits  the  government  from interfering  in  the  religious  activities  of  any  individual  or  group,  except  when  a  religious  group "threatens public order and stability".  However, in recent years, authorities have increased their monitoring of religion, with the creation of a State Committee on Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA)  and  the  initiation  of  a  process  of  re-registration  of  religious  establishments.    The creation  of  a  Forum  of  Religious  Communities  of  Azerbaijan  “For  the  Sake  of  Peace  and Harmony”,   bringing   together   40   Muslim,   Christian   and   Jewish   communities   with   a   view   to improving  relations  between  religious  communities  and  putting  an  end  to  religious  propagation, has also been criticised by some as state infringement on the freedom of religion.  Georgia is the only  country  from  the  former  Soviet  Union  without  a  law  on  religion  to  define  the  rights  and obligations of religious communities.  The status of the dominant church, the Georgian Orthodox Church, is regulated by a concordat signed in 2002 which provides various privileges, including the right to provide religious education in schools and broad powers to decide on the status of other religious communities.  In recent years, the Orthodox Church has played an important role in the revival of the country’s national identity.   B. NON-TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS 78. In  general,  states  tend  to  respect  the  existence  and  practices  of  minorities  who  belong  to other  traditional  creeds.  In  Azerbaijan,  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church  is  free  to  function,  while Yezidi Kurds in Armenia – whose religion incorporates elements of sun worship, Christianity and Zoroastrianism  – and Muslim groups (such as Azeris and Chechens) in Georgia are also free to practice their religion.  

166 CSCDG 05 E 17 79. Non-traditional religious minorities, however, have been subjected to systematic harassment and even imprisonment in all three countries.  In Shevardnadze’s Georgia, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists  and  Pentecostalists  suffered  hate  speech  from  violent  attacks  by  right-wing  Orthodox Christian  vigilantes.    Such  attacks  occurred  with  the  covert  support  or  even  co-operation  of  the local  authorities  and  the  police,  and  consequently  became  more  frequent  and  pervasive.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses were able to restore their legal status as a non-commercial organisation at the  end  of  2003.    Incidents  of  intimidation  and  violence  against  religious  minorities  were  again reported  in  2004,  for  example  in  the  report  of  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  Freedom  of Religion and Belief for the year 2004, which refers to at least three cases where the Rapporteur had   to   intervene   and   concludes   that   “she   is   concerned   that   alleged   incidents   of   religious intolerance continue to occur throughout the country”.  Nevertheless, upon taking office, President Mikheil Saakashvili clearly stated his determination to eliminate religious persecution. 80. Persecution  of  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  is  also  a  problem  in  Armenia,  where  it  was  linked  to conscription.  However, there has been recent progress in Armenia’s legislation, if not yet in public opinion and attitudes.  After years of international criticism, the Ministry of Justice finally granted official registration to the community of Jehova’s Witnesses on 8 October 2004, despite a strong campaign of protest led by the Armenian Apostolic Church, some government members and the media.  Moreover, the lack of a law on alternative military and civilian service has long resulted in Jehova’s Witnesses being arrested and imprisoned for refusing to serve in Armenia’s army.  This situation changed only in 2004, with the adoption of a law on alternative service (from December 2003,  effective  in  July  2004).    This  law  recognises  the  right  of  Armenian  citizens  to  opt  for alternative service if their religious beliefs or convictions go against mandatory military service in military  units  or  against  bearing,  keeping,  maintaining  and  using  arms.    The  law  organises  an alternative  military  service  (for  a  duration of 36 months) and an alternative civilian service (for a duration  of  42  months),  compared  to  the  24  months  of  the  regular  military  service.  International observers have welcomed the new law, but criticised the excessive duration of the new alternative service, which makes it quasi-punitive.  Shortcomings also include a lack of information about the new  law  and  conditions  for  benefiting  from  the  alternative  service.    As  a  result,  only  twenty applications  for  alternative  civilian  service  were  submitted  during  the  fall  2004  call-up.    All applicants were Jehova’s Witnesses. 81. While  Azerbaijan  also  experienced  problems  with  tolerance  of  non-traditional  religious groups in the past, the situation seems to have improved after a spate of attacks on evangelical Christians  in  1999,  when  President  Aliyev  made  a  statement  committing  the  country  to  greater religious   freedom.      This   prompted   the   authorities’   registration   of   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   in December  1999.    However,  there  is  still  no  legislation  allowing  for  alternative  military  or  civilian service based on atheist or pacifist opinions, and the 1992 regulation “On the Order of Performing Alternative  Service  (Labour  Duty)”  has  not  been  implemented.    Only  members  of  religious communities,  such  as  priests  and  students  of  higher  religious  schools,  can  refuse  to  carry  out military service. 82. In  May  2002,  Pope  John  Paul  II  travelled  to  Azerbaijan  to  plead  for  religious  tolerance around the globe and for an end to violence in the name of God.   Papal spokesman Navarro-Valls said  the  purpose  of  the  Pope’s  visit  to  Baku  was  “to  nurture  a  small  Catholic  community,  to recognise  a  people  who  suffered  under  communism,  to  build  more  ecumenical  bridges  with  an Orthodox community, and to respond to the hospitality of Muslim hosts”. 83. Finally,  although  there  are  no  state-sponsored  policies  to  expel  them,  Russian  Christian minorities such as Dukhobors and Molokans are reported to be under increasing local pressure to emigrate.  Both groups - which fled religious persecution in Tsarist Russia and settled in remote areas  of  the  Caucasus  -  have  lodged  complaints  that  some  local  groups  have  moved  into  their villages, harassing women and children, while the police did not act.

166 CSCDG 05 E 18 C. ISLAMIST GROUPS 84. Azerbaijan   is   the   only   country   of   the   South   Caucasus   with   a   predominantly   Muslim population.  The  majority  of  its  Muslim  population  (65-70%  of  the  Azeri  population)  is  Shi’a,  but there  are substantial Sunni communities in the north and west of the country.  Most of the non- Azeri  minorities  -  such  as  the  Lezgins  -  are  Sunnis.    As  a  result  of  the  Soviet  legacy  and  the adoption  of  a  Turkish  model  of  nationalism  and  secularism,  Islam  has  never  flourished  as  a political force in Azerbaijan. 85. However,  in  recent  years,  Azerbaijan’s  authorities  have  become  increasingly  concerned about  the  rise  of  radical  Islam  and  its  growing  influence  in  Azerbaijani  society.    As  a  result, government  authorities  have  progressively  tightened  their  grip  on  religious  establishments.  The process  of  re-registration  of  religious  establishments  has  led  to  a  significant  reduction  in  the number of registered Muslim communities.  The condition for registration was indeed to pledge to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus (SBMC), which many communities refused.  Some non-registered  Muslim  organisations,  such  as  the  Jumaa  mosque  led  by  the  popular  Imam Ilqar Ibrahimoglu, were submitted to harassment or repression. 86. Signs  of  a  growing  influence  of  Salafi  or  Wahhabi  movements  have  received  the  most attention.  Salafist missionaries have expanded to Azerbaijan from Chechnya and Daghestan, but also from the Persian Gulf. By 2003, 65 new Salafi-controlled mosques had been established in Azerbaijan, the most successful being the Abu Bakr mosque in Baku. Salafist missionaries have been able to attract Sunnis and members of ethnic minorities, disillusioned with the government’s economic and social policies, its pro-Western orientation, and seduced by the movement’s talk of the restoration of moral and universal values. 87. During  a  recent  conference  in  Baku  on  3  August,  Rafik  Aliyev,  Chairman  of  the  SCWRA, reportedly   warned   against   the   increased   activity   of   “Wahhabis”,   meaning   radical   and/or unregistered Islamic groups, and the potential threat they posed to Azerbaijan’s political stability.   He estimated that in December 2004 there were about 15,000 Wahhabis operating in Baku alone. Other  government  officials  have  indicated  that  the  movement  is  becoming  increasingly  better organised, expanding its activities from the mere provision of literature and financial assistance to potential activists, to the active training of activists.  The government’s response has for now been one of firmness, as the multiplication of media reports about government crackdowns on so-called Wahhabi  sympathizers  indicate.  Even  the  SBMC  has  recently  been  criticised  for  its  links  with  a network   importing   radical   Islamic   books   to   Azerbaijan.      It   is   not   certain,   however,   what consequences this policy will have on the development of radical Islam in Azerbaijan.  The danger is  that  by  using  force  against  these  religious  movements,  the  government  may  fuel  opposition, rather than eliminate it. 88. Georgia  has  a  significant  Muslim  population  (officially  about  10%  of  the  population).  It  is mostly  located  in  Adjaria  and  Kvemo  Kartli  (where  it  is  made  up  of  Azeri  Shiites),  and  in  the Pankisi  Valley  (populated  by  Sunni  Kists).    Claims  of  the  development  of  radical  Islam  have focused  on  the  latter  region,  fuelled  by  the  conflict  in  Chechnya  and  the  emigration  of  Chechen refugees to the region.  In particular, Russia has claimed - and, on some occasions, continues to claim - that the Pankisi Valley serves as a sanctuary for Wahhabi fighters and a source of arms and ammunition. The Georgian authorities insist that the situation has changed and that there are no longer any Chechen fighters and no Islamic radicals in the Pankisi Valley. 89. As a result, the situation in the Pankisi Valley therefore continues to contribute to the tense relations  between  Georgia  and  Russia.  The  international  community  has  developed  initiatives  to help  ease  the  tension,  by  addressing  the  situation  of  Chechen  refugees  in  Georgia  or  by dispatching  an  OSCE  mission  to  monitor  the  border.    However,  in  December  2004,  Russia rejected the renewal of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation’s mandate.  

166 CSCDG 05 E 19 IV. CONCLUSION 90. After the fall of the Soviet Union, all three South Caucasus states have been confronted with various  minority-related  claims  and  challenges.    In  some  cases,  these  have  led  to  confrontation and violence. The ethnic composition of all three states has been deeply altered by these conflicts, leading  to  increasing  mono-ethnicity  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  a  nationalistic  revival  aimed  at crushing further claims for autonomy or independence that could threaten national and territorial integrity. 91. The   unresolved   conflicts   in   Abkhazia,   South   Ossetia   and   Nagorno-Karabakh   certainly constitute the most serious challenge to the stability of the region and to the establishment of an atmosphere of trust and tolerance in relations between minority and majority groups. The longer these  conflicts  last,  the  more  difficult  it  will  be  for  the  populations  concerned  to  learn  to  live together again peacefully. The resolution of the so-called “frozen” conflicts should therefore be the first priority for all the governments in the region. There have recently been some positive signs of rapprochement,  but  the  situation  is  so  unstable  that  events  on  the  ground  can  derail  the  peace processes at any time. 92. Nevertheless, progress towards the protection and integration of minority groups should not wait  for  a  final  settlement  of  the  unresolved  conflicts.    A  lot  has  been  achieved  recently  in  this area, in particular as a result of the three countries’ integration into several international structures, but much more needs to be done.  Moreover, it should be clear that the protection of minorities is strongly connected to the overall improvement of the human rights situation and the completion of democratic  transition  in  the  three  countries.  Finally,  regional  co-operation  in  this  area  should  be encouraged.    Some  initiatives  already  exist,  but  in  most  cases,  neighbouring  countries  have played a destabilising role rather than facilitated the dialogue between minorities and the majority. 93. European  and  Euro-Atlantic  institutions  have  an  important  role  towards  these  aims.  The Council of Europe has been a major promoter of the protection and integration of minorities in the South Caucasus.  However, all three countries are still a long way from fulfilling their commitments to  the  Council.    Georgia  still  has  to  ratify  the  European  Charter  for  Regional  and  Minority Languages   and   the   Framework   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   National   Minorities.   Both Azerbaijan  and  Armenia  have  ratified  the  Framework  Convention,  but  Azerbaijan  still  needs  to ratify  the  European  Charter.    Most  importantly,  international  standards  need  not  only  to  be endorsed on paper, but also actively implemented, to ensure effective protection of both national and religious minorities. 94. NATO can and should assist in this process.  Although Alliance officials have indicated that NATO  will  not  get  directly  involved  in  negotiations  over  unresolved  conflicts,  it  can  certainly support other international efforts in promoting confidence-building measures in the region. Since the Istanbul summit in June 2004, the Alliance has clearly indicated its interest in the region and adapted its structures by appointing a Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia,  as  well  as  a  liaison  officer  for  each  of  the  two  regions.  In  addition,  all  three  countries  are engaged  in  the  conclusion  or  implementation  of  NATO  Individual  Partnership  Action  Plans (IPAPs). Georgia was the first country to sign an IPAP in October 2004. The agreement commits the  authorities  to  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  Abkhaz  and  South  Ossetian  conflicts.  The  Plan states  that:  “Frozen  conflict  in  Abkhazia  and  the  Tskhinvali  Region  (South  Ossetia)  hinder  the stable  development  of  the  country.  They  also  pose  a  threat  to  the  internal  and  international security,  as  they  create  fertile  grounds  for  terrorism,  organized  crime,  and  drug  and  arms trafficking. The Georgian Government is committed to solving these problems by peaceful means, in   co-operation   with   relevant   international   organizations   in   accordance   with   appropriate international  standards.”  Azerbaijan  followed  in  May  2005  and  NATO  is  expected  to  approve Armenia’s IPAP by December this year.

166 CSCDG 05 E 20 95. The Alliance, together with other international organisations and with the European Union in particular, needs to ensure that the three countries’ commitments are fulfilled. It should be clear that  support  from  Euro-Atlantic  structures  depends  on  each  country’s  progress  in  achieving domestic reforms and promoting regional stability.

166 CSCDG 05 E 21 BIBLIOGRAPHY Mateeva (A), “Minorities in the South Caucasus”, UNHCR Sub-Regional Seminar, Minority Rights: Cultural Diversity and Development in Central Asia, October 2004. Fédération  Internationale  des  Ligues  des  Droits  de  l’Homme,  “Ethnic  Minorities  in  Georgia”, Report, International Fact-finding Mission, April 2005. European   Commission,   Annex   to   European   Neighbourhood   Policy   Country   Reports   [COM (2005)72 final]: Armenia [SEC (2005) 285/3], Azerbaijan [SEC (2005) 286/3], Georgia [SEC (2005) 288/3]. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution ResCMN(2004)8 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Azerbaijan, 13 July 2004. Second  report  submitted  by  Armenia  Pursuant  to  article  25,  paragraph  1  Of  the  Framework Convention for The Protection of National Minorities, 24 November 2004, ACFC/SR/II(2004)010. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Resolution 1415 (2005), Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Georgia. PACE,  Committee  on  the  Honouring  of  Obligations  and  Commitments  by  Member  States  of  the Council of Europe, Report on the Implementation of Resolution 1358 (2004) on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Azerbaijan, 20 September 2004, Doc. 10285. PACE,  Committee  on  the  Honouring  of  Obligations  and  Commitments  by  Member  States  of  the Council of Europe, Report on the Implementation of Resolution 1361 (2004) and 1374 (2004) on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Armenia, 20 September 2004, Doc. 10286. European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI), “Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia”, ECMI Working Paper N°22, September 2004. ECMI,  “Obstacles  Impeding  the  Regional  Integration  of  the  Kvemo  Kartli  Region  of  Georgia”, ECMI Working Paper N°23, February 2005. ECMI,  “Finding  Durable  Solutions  For  the  Meskhetians”,  A  Presentation  of  Preliminary  Findings and A Roundtable Discussion with Government and Civil Society Actors in Georgia, ECMI Report N°56, August 2005. International  Crisis  Group,  “Nagorno-Karabakh:  Viewing  the  Conflict  from  the  Ground”,  Europe Report N°166, 14 September 2005. International  Crisis  Group,  “Nagorno-Karabakh:  A  Plan  For  Peace”,  Europe  Report  N°167,  11 October 2005.