1.      Over much of the last fifteen
years, oil and gas issues have largely been taken up on the business pages of
national newspapers while the front pages were dedicated to matters like the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Balkan Wars, and terrorism. In an era of low
energy prices, it was no longer fashionable to consider energy in the same way
one considered other issues directly shaping national power and rivalry. Energy
had effectively become a back pages topic.
2.      This rather benign view of energy
had already begun to change after September 11 when 19 terrorists commandeered
American aircraft and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. Indeed, global oil and gas prices had began to rise in 1998; by 2001
economist were already warning that rising energy costs were likely to impede
soaring global economic growth. Over the last three years, global oil prices
have doubled (Yergin), driven in part by China’s soaring demand and depleting
domestic oil production.
3.      But more than prices were moving.
Military planners and foreign policy specialists had begun to take a renewed
interest in so called oil politics—a common expression in the 1970's
particularly after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent surge in
global oil prices. That term too had suffered a degree of neglect in the era of
cheap gasoline that followed.Â
4.      Suffice it to say that today,
energy politics are very much at the center of the contemporary strategic
debate. In recent months, both the US government and the EU have very strongly
communicated their respective concerns about the very real threats to energy
security and begun to revaluate their strategies for coping with these serious
challenges. NATO itself has formed a working group to look at energy security
matters, although how the Alliance fits this into its broader framework has yet
to be worked out.
5.      There has been a tendency to treat
energy security challenges largely as matters of national and not global
security. But oil in particular is a fungible commodity for which prices are
determined far more by global supply and demand conditions than by strictly
national policies. Any event that obstructs access to supplies such as a
natural disasters, constraints on refining capacity, international conflicts,
or even politically generated risk perceptions can and do affect both current
and future global oil prices. If ever there were a strategic challenge
demanding multilateral and multifaceted approaches, energy would be at the top
of the list.
6.      The last century saw rapid growth
in energy consumption, and a corresponding expansion in exploration and
discovery of new energy resources. Energy consumption is rising in all regions
of the world with the fastest growth rates now registered in the Asia Pacific
region. Asia is undergoing a veritable industrial revolution that has spawned
the rise of mass consumer societies throughout the region. In the 1970s, North
America consumed twice as much oil as Asia; today Asian demand is greater than North America’s (Yergin). That burgeoning demand is driving up global oil and gas prices. Â
7.      Although there is a vigorous debate
among economists and geologists about long-term oil and gas supplies, changing
demand conditions certainly constitute the most dynamic component of rapidly
evolving global energy markets. The profile of global consumption has evolved
substantially over the last twenty years. In developed countries energy
consumption per unit of GDP has declined markedly although overall energy
demand continues to grow. Japanese industry, for example, is seven times more
efficient in energy use than Chinese industry, although the Chinese have begun
now to make advances on this front as its own economy becomes more advanced.Â
Improvements in energy efficiency (energy use per unit of GNP) are directly
correlated to the level of economic development and the structure of the
economy, technological advance, the capacity to respond efficiently to market
signals and overtly political decisions mandating greater efficiency. Over the
last thirty years, America’s GDP increased by 150% while its energy use grew by
only 25%, that is an indication of rising energy efficiency. Sometimes all are
needed to drive genuine change.Â
8.      Oil price volatility has increased
markedly over the last decade and this is having marked implications on
investment in new infrastructure. Although the oil industry is noted for its
capacity to operate in hostile conditions, it also seeks to minimize risk and
is therefore quite sensitive to oil price fluctuations. Price volatility tends
to dampen down capacity enhancing investment, and there are currently concerns
that the lack of investment both in Russia and the Middle East today constitute
one of the largest bottlenecks to oil supply. In global terms, there seems to
be a lack of extractive, refining and delivery capacity, which could hinder the
market's ability to meet future demand if not corrected. The IEA estimates
that $16,000 billion of new investment will be needed over the next three
decades to meet global energy demands.
9.      The problem is rendered all the
more complex because Middle Eastern states, which are the principle owners of
energy assets in the region, have a particular responsibility for capacity
investment and for various reasons have not been willing to expand
infrastructure at rates that some market experts think will be necessary to
meet burgeoning global demand. One model suggests that were Saudi Arabia to cease investment in new production over the next 24 years, the price of oil
could rise by 50% by 2030. Â The political nature of the problem became
clear in the wake of President Bush’s recent State of the Union address in
which he stated that it is in America’s strategic interest to reduce its
dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The region's response in a nutshell was that
its members would hardly be willing to embark upon an ambitious investment
agenda when their clients seem so dedicated to wean themselves off of their
product.  Â
10.    Western governments have also
enacted or are considering levying windfall taxes on the energy industry at the
same time that those same industries are being urged to expand their capacity.Â
The oil market and the political market are thus giving off very mixed signals,
which tends to discourage rather than encourage new investment.
11.    Uncertainties about future oil
prices and concerns about government policies both in producing and consuming
countries are discouraging investment at a moment when experts suggest far more
capacity will be needed to meet future global demand. Another problem involves
the challenges of forecasting future energy requirements in Asia, and this
uncertainty is also a factor in investor hesitation. The practice in some oil
companies has been to assume an oil price of between $20 and $25/barrel when
assessing the viability of possible extraction and refining projects and this
is lending to under-investment in capacity. This is a highly conservative
price given that most long range forecasts conservatively put the price at
between $50 to $55/ barrel (Morrison, Blas, et. al.)
http://moneycontrol.msn.com
12.    The inherent instability in regions
that provide most of the world's oil and gas constitutes another grave
concern. War, terrorism, embargoes, the rise of hostile regimes and political
blackmail could all contribute to sudden supply reductions with severe global
consequences. The Middle East, the origin of 70% of exportable oil and natural
gas available on the global market, is a region seething with political, social
and religious grievance. Attacks on vulnerable and poorly defended energy
infrastructure are now recognized as perhaps the most effective way to strike
at the heart of the region's governments, the elite that benefit most from oil
production and the trading partners that depend on these energy sources. This
is precisely the strategy that militant opponents of the Iraqi government and
the coalition have employed. The fact that Iraqi oil production is currently
30-40% below pre-war levels has made the burden of reconstruction all the more
daunting. (Yergin)Â The effect of this conflict on global supplies has not been
negligible as Iraq is the second most important potential sources of exportable
oil after Saudi Arabia (Doran).
13.    There are genuine concerns among
security planners that the conflicts in Iraq have not been lost on those
militants in the region aspiring to affect political change through
revolutionary violence. From their perspective, attacking oil infrastructure
can be more effective then attacking military or government installations,
particularly when the goal is to precipitate a climate of insecurity and to
internationalise conflict. There is little doubt that the political climate in
the Middle East is rife with tension today, and the potential for militancy is
extraordinarily high. While this has potentially tragic consequences for the
region, it also poses a threat to the flow of energy to international markets.
Persistent risk is also a factor in under investment.
14.    The potential risk of attacks on
infrastructure have grown all the more compelling given the already tight
limits on supplies due to production constraints, inadequate refining capacity,
low infrastructure investment rates and ever rising demand. Added to this set
of concerns is the apparent vulnerability of key energy infrastructure to
natural disasters. Katrina's and Rita’s devastating winds shut down 27% of U.S
oil production and 21% of its refining capacity revealing just how vulnerable America's energy infrastructure is to the elements. (Yergin)Â Â
15.    There are also persistent questions
about remaining global oil and gas reserves. Analysts today have begun to
speculate about when global oil production will peak and what the effects of
falling production will be on global markets and energy security. In 1956, an
American geophysicist, Mr. King Hubbert predicted that the United States would soon reach its own oil production peak. Hubbert’s arguments were
derided but his model ultimately was vindicated. US oil production peaked in
the early 1970s and has declined steadily since then. A similar debate is now
unfolding about global oil production and the stakes are certainly far
greater. When American production began to fall, there was still the option to
import oil and, accordingly, America's import burden increased steadily since
1973. (Doran) Of course, such options will be more difficult for any given
country after the global oil production peak has been reached and available
supplies begin to dwindle.
16.    Supply estimates are often placed
in three categorises: proven, probable, and possible. The most commonly
employed estimates refer to proven reserves. BP defines proven reserves as the
quantity that “geological and engineering information
indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known
reservoirs under existing economic and geological conditions.†The most
recent worldwide estimates place proven world oil reserves at 1.1-1.3 trillion
barrels (EIA). This estimate suggests that an oil crisis is not looming.
17.    In most respects, oil markets
operate under classical supply and demand conditions. Demand fall-offs
precipitated by economic recessions, for example, can trigger significant price
falls. Some economists would even argue that the physical supply is not such a
terrible concern because scarcity will always be reflected in prices; the cost
of the final available increment of globally available oil would effectively
become infinite. Of course, given the lack of readily available alternatives,
global oil demand today is too inelastic to be so sanguine about supply
matters. Western economies and the people that make those economies function
would literarily freeze without oil and gas, and it is hardly comforting to
know that the final drop of oil will have an infinite price. On other hand, we
do know that well before the world nears that point, a range of substitutes
will likely have become economic either due to technological advance or because
real oil price hikes would have made these substitutes price competitive.Â
18.    If there were no alternatives to
oil (and thus if demand for oil were to remain highly inelastic over the
long-term), then prices would indeed rise more precipitously as supplies
dwindled. One should assume, however, that price rises will trigger
development in hard to reach oil and gas fields and alternative energy sources,
making previously expensive energy seem less expensive in relative terms and
making investment in alternative energy technology research potentially more
profitable. As easily recoverable supplies of oil and gas dwindle, the higher
prices provide incentives to exploit oil and gas fields in more challenging
terrain. One would be ill-advised to consider shale oil or tar sands as part
of the energy stock at low energy prices. Oil shale is a potential source of
natural gas although the conversion price today is considered relatively
expensive. (Gold)Â At higher energy prices and assuming a degree of
technological innovation, however, shale and oil derived from Alberta, Canada’s tar sands could become perfectly viable sources of energy.
        Â
Â
19.    Soaring oil prices, persistent
instability in the Middle East, Russia's apparent willingness to wield energy
endowments upon which Europe depends for political ends, a fragmented internal
energy market, dwindling European energy production, Europe’s inability to
project military force beyond the continent, and rising economic nationalism
within Europe, are all raising concerns in Europe about energy security.Â
20.    The apprehension is justified. Over
the next 20-30 years, approximately 70 % of the EU’s energy, compared to 50%
today, will be met by imports. Maintaining a highly diversified energy
portfolio can help achieve a degree of supply security, but Europe is
increasingly dependent upon a narrow band of suppliers. Â Â Roughly half of the
gas EU customers consume, for example, comes from only three countries: Russia, Norway, and Algeria. Europe's vulnerabilities are evident in the statistics. EU members
currently import 45% of their oil from the Middle East and 40% of their natural
gas from Russia. (Dempsey, February 16, 2006)Â Russia is the second largest
exporter of crude oil to Europe. (British Petroleum, June 14, 2005).
21.    The debate about the deficiencies
in European energy policy began last year when then German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder signed a bilateral gas pipeline deal with Russia that failed to heed
the energy and security concerns of its Baltic neighbours. (Ostrovsky and
Benoit) Poland and Lithuania, in particular, were incensed that German
officials had made no attempt to coordinate an overall pipeline strategy within
Europe prior to negotiating with Russia. Both warned their European partners
that Russia seemed increasingly inclined to use energy for political and
diplomatic ends that were not in Europe's greater interests. Polish officials
were also unhappy because the new Baltic pipeline from Vyborg to Freifwalt
would likely reduce its own pipeline revenues. Chancellor Schroeder hammered
home the obvious when he told reporters that the deal was structured to meet Germany's national interests, not Europe's.  (Vodo, et.al)
22.    But the controversy over the German
pipeline deal was only the opening salvo in what has become a full-fledged
debate about energy security in Europe. This past December’s Russian-Ukrainian
stand off over gas pricing effectively opened the flood gates, as it were,
thoroughly galvanizing the debate in Europe about energy security while
exposing glaring deficiencies in Europe’s current approach to building a common
energy market. During a severe cold spell in Europe, the Russian state-owned
gas company, Gazprom, cut gas supplies to Ukraine and Moldova due to a price dispute that appeared to have political overtones. In Ukraine's case, the dispute occurred in the midst of a campaign for critical parliamentary
elections. When the Ukrainian government settled with Russia on what many appeared unfavourable terms, it allowed pro-Russian opposition forces to claim
that had they been in charge, they could have struck a superior deal with their
friends in Moscow. This argument clearly resonated throughout Ukraine and doubtless was a factor in the election results.
23.    This cut had spill over effects in
several European countries including Italy, which imports Russian gas through Ukraine’s pipelines. Authorities in several countries were left scrambling to cope with
unanticipated energy shortages that in the eyes of many Western Europeans
seemed to arise out of Russia's desire to warn Ukraine against leaning too far
westward. This was an unwelcome message in Europe, particularly for those
states importing energy through Ukraine's extensive pipeline network. (Hanson)
For energy and security specialists, the Russian action starkly revealed Europe’s grim energy supply vulnerabilities.Â
24.    The fact that Europe has made
deepening the energy relationship with Russia such a priority made the events
of this past December all the more shocking. But the situation only seemed to
worsen in March when the French government announced that it would block the
purchase of Suez SA by the Italian company ENEL. It justified the decision as
an act of “Economic Patriotismâ€, but for several of France's energy partners
the move was seen as an added blow to ambitions to build a continent wide
European energy market integration. Spanish authorities have also recently
prevented the purchase of an energy champion. The fact that global energy
supplies are extremely tight, Asian oil and gas demand are soaring, and the
Middle East is in turmoil has put energy security and energy policy at the very
centre of discussions in Brussels about Europe’s future. Still reeling from
the defeat of a new constitution last year, the Commission suddenly seemed to
confront a very powerful movement away from common market ideals in one of the
few commercial sectors still operating outside of the purview of the Common
Market. Â
25.    Russia controls the world’s largest
reserves of natural gas and is the word’s largest gas producer. By 2030 the
European members of the OECD will import two thirds of their gas from Russia as compared to one third today. For the 25 EU members, gas import dependence will
rise from 50% to 80%. In North America, by way of comparison, natural gas
imports will rise from negligible levels to 18% over the same period. In 2004
gas from or transported through Russia accounted for 70% of European imports. Russia's state owned company Gazprom accounts for 85% of Russian production and 100% of
Russian exports. It controls the Russian pipeline network and is thus able to
limit competition from other producers. It is also buying upstream assets in
central Asia and downstream European utilities and other energy consumers. But
such investments do little to increase Russia's real gas production capacity,
and this is worrying experts who are concerned both that Gazprom is not
investing sufficiently in its own production capacity and that it is
increasingly acting as a classic monopolist producer. According to the
International Energy Agency, Russia should make a minimum of $11 billion a year
in investments in the gas sector to meet it future domestic and international
supply commitments. Indeed Russia continues to consume its own energy assets in
a highly inefficient manner, partly because energy is subsidized. Here too
policy changes are needed if Russia is to best exploit its natural endowments
and meet its supply commitments both domestically and internationally. (Mandil)
26.    Their
concern is heightened by supply commitments that the company continues to
make. Gazprom, for example, has just agreed to build two major new pipelines
into China that could draw gas away from the European market unless its
capacity is significantly expanded. Moreover, the deal suggests to some that Russia is creating, for itself, an opportunity to play Europe and China off of each other. (Yeh et.
al, March 22, 2006)Â
27.    Europe is thus dependent upon a
monopolistic Russian gas supplier that does not share access to its pipeline
network with competitors and seems inclined to use energy as a diplomatic
tool. Europe's vulnerabilities are increased by the poor structure of its
internal market. Although European commercial markets are generally well
integrated, its energy markets are fragmented along national lines. EU countries
maintain their own oil stocks and negotiate separate delivery deals with
suppliers, a practice which accords large sellers a distinct advantage. At the
same time, only 8% of electricity generated in Europe flows across national
borders, suggesting a high degree of market fragmentation and inefficiency (von
Reppert-Bismarck and Echikson). The persistent exercise of monopoly and
monopsony powers by national energy "champions†undermines overall market
efficiency, increases costs, reduces the incentive to innovate and invest and
adds yet more friction to the integration process. Â
28.    The European's Commission's
recently issued Energy Green Paper formally recognises many of these
challenges. The Paper identifies three key European energy goals: (1)
increasing supply security, (2) ensuring competitiveness across economies, and
(3) promoting environmental sustainability. It also calls for more
coordination between the EU’s foreign and energy policies and the deepening of
international energy partnerships. (A European Strategy for Sustainable,
Competitive and Secure Energy)
29.    The paper takes note of soaring and
increasingly volatile energy prices and the ways in which rapid growth in China and India will help raise world energy demand 60% by 2030. This combined with insufficient
capacity investment will only further tighten global energy markets. According
to the Commission, one trillion euros in additional
European energy infrastructure investment will be needed over the next 20
years.
30.    These problems cannot be fully
distinguished from the climate change challenge. According to the Commission,
carbon emissions have already increased global temperatures by 0.6 degrees.Â
Without further action, these temperatures could rise as much as 5.8 degrees by
the end of the century. The Commission thus recognizes that its energy
strategy will invariably be conditioned by this supreme environmental
challenge. The EU is thus setting out to address both challenges in a synergistic
fashion.
31.    Commission argue that only by
approaching energy matters collectively can Europe’s general interests be
adequately defended. Bilateral energy agreements conducted without European
wide consultation weaken the hand of Europe as a whole and leave smaller
members particularly exposed. Alone, most European countries lack the market
depth and leverage to negotiate fair pricing and delivery terms with large
supplier countries. Collectively member states will have a stronger hand in
such talks. Solidarity thus remains a key theme of the Green Paper. The
Commission is also intent on augmenting Europe’s foreign and domestic energy
sources, broadening the energy mix and augmenting the range of secure transport
routes and basic energy infrastructure upon which Europe relies.Â
32.    The Green Paper points to serious
deficiencies in Europe’s electricity energy market, which optimistically is
slated for full integrated by 2007. Already in 2002, government leaders agreed
to establish an interconnection target of 10% of each Member State’s installed capacity. Member government have been very slow to implement this decision.Â
By 2007, European consumers will theoretically be able to choose their
electricity supplier from anywhere in Europe. However, this will require
significant infrastructure investment and organizational mobilization, and
there is significant scepticism in national capitals that the 2007 target is
realistic.
33.    The Commission has yet to develop
realistic strategies for achieving goals to enhance the role of renewables and
its leverage with national governments is not particularly great at this
moment. In 2001, the EU agreed that the share of electricity from renewable
energy sources in overall EU energy consumption should reach 21% by 2010. In 2003, it agreed that at least 5.75 % of all petrol and diesel should be bio-fuels by 2010.Â
Renewable energy use is expanding rapidly in a number of European countries;
yet there is also a sense that far more can be achieved with coordinated national
and EU strategies in place. European leaders also seem keen on developing a
broader based Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market to diminish the continent’s
current dependence on natural gas piped in from Russia and the Middle East. (See below)
34.    Nuclear energy constitutes a more
controversial component of the discussion. Although nuclear plants generates
roughly one-third of the EU’s total electricity, certain countries like Germany
and Austria have imposed moratoria on plant construction and anticipate phasing
out existing plants. (Beatty, February 9-15, 2006.) Some experts, however,
suggest that nuclear energy is one of the few commercially viable
non-greenhouse gas emitting technologies capable of readily providing a large
portion of the EU’s energy mix. It could be that Europe’s increasingly tenuous
energy security position today might inspire a degree of rethinking among
traditional nuclear sceptics including some in the environmental movement. A
similar rethinking is occurring in the United States, and those
environmentalists who now advocate nuclear energy, point to the prospect of
building smaller and safer plants to mitigate the risk of accident. The problem
of persistent nuclear waste and the potential for nuclear materials to fall
into the hands of terrorists, however, remains a genuine source of concern in
Western societies.
35.    Coal currently fuels one-third of
the EU’s electricity production, but this share is expected to decline as the
climate change targets drive traditional coal burning out of the energy mix.Â
Clean coal technologies and the commercialisation of carbon capture and storage
(sometimes referred to as sequestration) could enable more sustainable coal
electricity generation in the EU and in North America. In order to attract
investment, however, carbon capture and storage will require government
investment, and greater legal certainties. More research and development and
support for large-scale demonstration projects are also essential.
IV.
The US energy security challenge
36.    With less than 5% of the world’s
population the United States currently consumes 25% of its oil. Assuming a
$60/barrel oil price, the United State can expect an oil import bill of $4320
billion in 2006—a very important component of America’s huge trade deficit.
Already in 2005, the American energy bill rose 17% from the year before and
accounted for a 40% increase in the consumer price index. (Lugar)Â During the
Arab oil embargo of the 1970s, 36% of US oil was imported. That figure had
risen to 56% in 2001 and will likely reach 64% over the next fifteen years. The
situation has become so serious that President Bush, to the surprise of many
who have long seen him as closely linked to the Texas oil industry, noted in
this year’s State of the Union Address that “America is addicted to oilâ€,
implying, of course, that it was time for the Americans to begin to kick the
habit.Â
37.    This was a startling admission in
an administration that has argued that there is no realistic alternative to oil
and that in Vice President Cheney’s words, “For years down the road, this will
continue to be true.â€Â Cheney’s has been the voice of so-called oil realism
that has dominated American thinking about energy for years, a set of views
that tended to discourage serious contemplation of alternatives to hydrocarbon
energy use and even to concerted conservation measures. Mr Cheney had also told reporters in Toronto in 2001 that
"conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient
basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy". (Cheney,
April 30, 2001)Â Although conservation alone would by definition fail to
constitute a comprehensive energy strategy, there is a sense that US policy in recent years has treated it as an irrelevancy, and that this has ultimately left the United States more vulnerable that it need be to energy shocks. Nor is this simply an
American problem. Because hydrocarbon energy is a fungible, globally traded and
globally priced commodity, and because of shared environmental exposure, the
Europeans too have a clear stake in encouraging their American allies to move
toward a more sustainable, secure, and environmentally friendly energy
posture.Â
38.    And change may well be afoot. In
this year’s State of the Union Address, President Bush explicitly recognized
U.S energy vulnerabilities, and among other things, vowed to reduce dependence
on Middle Eastern oil through technological solutions. Although the President
laid out a modest program to support alternative energy development, these initiatives
do not yet match the avowed aim of reducing dependence on important fossil
fuels. Nor is the administration yet prepared to admit the strategic rather
than personal virtues of conservation. Others in the Washington establishment--
and perhaps most notably the Republican Senator from Indiana Richard Lugar -
are now doing so. Indeed Senator Lugar’s recent speech at the Brookings
Institute reflects a rather stunning swing in the energy debate in Washington.
39.    The atmosphere in Washington is shifting
precisely because American energy vulnerabilities appear to be multiplying. The
US imports most of its oil from the Middle East, Venezuela, Nigeria, Canada and Mexico. Although maintaining secure access to oil supplies is critical to US economic health, recent supply disruptions and price shocks have raised doubts about the
efficacy, sustainability and, for some, even the wisdom of the US approach. Hurricanes in the oil-rich Gulf of Mexico, tensions in the Middle East,
Presidential politics in Venezuela, instability in Nigeria, tensions with Iran,
insurgent attacks in Iraq, soaring energy prices, refining constraints in the
US, high levels of American hydrocarbon use, a stalled conservation movement,
and growing concerns about global warming, even among groups not traditionally
linked to environmentalism, have all played a role in recasting the debate in
the United States. As in Europe, energy security matters are moving swiftly to
the center of American security and foreign policy concerns. It is not
surprising that President’ Bush’s confession of a long apparent but not much
discussed addiction was seen as the most provocative and potentially
consequential statement in the State of the Union address.
40.    There is a growing sense in
American society that the country’s complete reliance on hydrocarbons for
energy has had adverse security and environmental consequences. Government
policy has biased consumption toward oil and gas in part by implicitly
subsidizing their use. It has done so, in part, by excluding the security and
environmental opportunity costs of using these energy sources and by biasing
publicly funded transport infrastructure toward roadways for gasoline-fuelled
automobiles. Of course, these policies also reflect public preferences.  Indeed
America’s very democratically ordered society has never communicated an
outright desire for energy tax increases, and advocating even slight gasoline
tax hikes can put leaders into political jeopardy. It would be particularly
difficult today, in light of soaring gasoline prices, to suggest that the price
at the pump is still artificially cheap and fails to reflect real opportunity
costs. Realistically speaking, a gasoline tax does not seem likely to emerge
from the current debate. Subsidies of alternative energy technology and
possibly more rigorous fuel and energy efficiency standards, however, seem more
politically feasible and this is the direction in which the current debate
seems to be moving. That said, an open and vigorous public conversation is
needed about the security, economic and environmental risks of policies that
actively promote rather than discourage hydrocarbon use.Â
41.    While the American scope for
increasing oil and gas supplies is limited, it certainly has room to increase
energy efficiency. The automobile sector is illustrative. The United States has lagged behind its European partners in advancing vehicle fuel efficiency
standards. This did not seem to be the case in the wake of the energy shocks of
the 1970s.  The rise of consumer demand for smaller more fuel-efficient
vehicles in the United States in the wake of those shocks was something of a
revolution in a country that had long celebrated automobile size and
performance over fuel efficiency. The sudden shift in demand was driven by
soaring prices, but it also proved short lived. Once world oil prices fell, car
sizes in America soared and fuel efficiency standards stagnated. The now
ubiquitous SUV became popular in the period of cheap gasoline that unfolded as
OPEC’s market powers waned over the 1980’s and 1990s. The absence of a strong
government policy to encourage the use of more fuel-efficient automobiles
combined with the under funded mass transit infrastructure in a geographically
large country has left the country vulnerable to global energy price rises.Â
42.    American security experts are
increasingly questioning whether this single-minded focus on market prices has
been optimal in energy security terms. Over the longer term, the answer may
well be no. Recent price shocks have hit America particularly hard, in part,
because US auto manufacturers, hooked on highly profitable SUV sales, have done
little to prepare for this eventuality and have strongly resisted the
introduction of higher government fuel efficiency standards. Left to its own
devices, the oil market has failed to convey through its price mechanisms the
real opportunity costs of obtaining and using that commodity. Prices, in the
1990s hardly reflected America’s growing vulnerability to supply and demand
shocks nor did it include the costs of deploying forces to defend the sea-lanes
of communication through which oil is shipped.  Those costs are indeed
substantial.
43.    The current Administration is now
looking to advancements in technology as a means to reduce its energy
vulnerabilities.  Batteries for hybrid vehicles, cellulosic ethanol production
and hydrogen powered fuel cells are high on the US government's energy
technology agenda. Ethanol (a form of biofuel) is a domestically produced corn
derived fuel additive that produces significantly less pollution than other
fuels. Pure ethanol can be used in flexible fuel vehicles, which—if widely
adopted in the US—could help reduce US dependence on foreign fuels. Currently
ethanol is blended into 30% of the gasoline sold in the US (Fialka and Ball), and there is a movement in Washington to double ethanol use by 2012. Brazil has weaned itself off foreign oil in part through the widespread use of ethanol and the
adoption of flexible fuel vehicles; it thus provides a potential model for the U.S.
44.    The Bush Administration has also
touted hydrogen as a potential long-term energy carrier that will decrease
foreign oil dependency. There are, however, many problems associated with
hydrogen. First of all the infrastructure costs needed to ensure national
delivery of hydrogen as a vehicle fuel are supremely daunting at this juncture;
given current prices and the state of technology, these costs are economically
prohibitive. Moreover, producing hydrogen is an energy intensive process, and
so it is not in itself a panacea to the energy security problem. Indeed, one
could well imagine fossil fuels being used to produce hydrogen, which would
effectively defeat the purpose. Iceland is looking to generate hydrogen through
its abundant endowment of cheap hydrothermal power; but moving this energy to
markets beyond Iceland is a daunting challenge given current technology and
infrastructure. Finally, fuel cell vehicles will have to overcome several
formidable technology hurdles if they are in any way to rival the current
functionality of fossil fuel powered engines.Â
45.    The United States imports oil from
a range of countries not only beset by domestic and regional insecurities, but
also characterized by rising anti-American and anti-Western sentiment. Polls
suggest that the Middle East has turned harshly anti-American since the war in Iraq. The United States is compelled to deal with certain clear tensions arising out of its
democracy promotion agenda, on the one hand, and its dependence on oil from a
number of highly authoritarian governments on the other. As Senator Lugar
recently noted, state-owned companies control 77% of the world’s oil supplies,
and many of these states are not democratic. Some of these regimes are openly
hostile to the United States. Venezuela's President, Hugo Chavez sees the
United States as his country's principal enemy and has announced his intention
to diversify the client base for Venezuelan oil. Both China and India are more
than ready to indulge him in this and have been invited to participate in oil
exploration in Venezuela. (Eurasia Group, April 28, 2005) Rebels in Nigeria
have attacked oil facilities at moments of tight global supply and recently
even managed to shut down as much as 25% of that country's output. At the same
time, American security experts are convinced that Iran is using its oil
revenues to underwrite a nuclear weapons program in violation of the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty and has obliquely threatened to use oil as a political
weapon if the international community were to impose a sanctions regime upon
it. This is not entirely credible given Iran's utter dependence on oil
revenues, but it nonetheless must be considered a possibility, particularly
given the regime’s tendency to use international crisis to build its own
legitimacy.
46.    America's global military presence
is partly designed to ensure the continued flow of oil and other vital
commodities to itself and to its trading partners. About
two thirds of the world’s oil trade (both crude oils and refined products)
moves by tanker. The US navy has effectively become a
guarantor of open shipping lanes throughout the world. It has a special role
to play in defending the so-called “chokepoints†at which the flow of oil might
most easily be interrupted as a result of hostile military action or even
terrorist or pirate raids. These include the Straits of Hormuz between Oman and
Iran, through which most Gulf oil is exported and the Malacca
Straits between Malaysia and Indonesia through which 80% of Japan's and 60% of China's oil supplies are shipped and through
which two thirds of the world's liquefied natural gas
is transported. In 2004, 17 million barrels of oil per
day were transported through the Strait of Hormuz destined for Europe, the
United States and Asia. (EIA). Other important maritime chokepoints include the Bab el-Mandab passage from
the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea; the Panama Canal and the Panama Pipeline
connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans; the Suez Canal and the Sumed
Pipeline connecting the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea; and the Turkish
Straits/Bosphorous linking the Black Sea (and oil coming from the Caspian Sea
region) to the Mediterranean Sea."
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html)
47.    The United States is the only NATO
country with sufficient naval assets to credibly defend all these chokepoints.
(Cordesman) It is a service to global commerce that is neither underwritten by
America's military allies nor by America's energy consumers. Of course,
America's taxpayers do underwrite the costs, although it would make more
economic sense to put some of the costs directly on the energy consumers who
benefit most from this global security posture--again this would help price
gasoline at its true rather than implicitly subsidized cost. The Institute for
the Analysis of Global Security reports that the cost of defending the sea
lanes of communication and providing military assistance to partners in oil
supplying nations costs the United States $50 billion per year. (http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html)
48.    In any case, rising threats to the
flow of energy are serious and pose a daunting strategic quandary for America
and its allies. In the first place, the Persian Gulf region alone contains two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, and it, like much of
the Middle East, is often ruled by authoritarian
governments that are hard pressed to mediate the demands of their citizens due
to the lack of democratic dialogue. This makes the region politically unstable
and raises the spectre of social unrest and conflict. The relative absence of
democratic dialogue is also a factor in the rise of regional terrorist
movements avowedly dedicated to engaging in asymmetric
warfare. Energy infrastructure represents a tempting
target for those lacking the means to challenge the region's militaries
directly. (Cordesmann) Al-Qaeda's leaders have vowed on countless occasions to
cut the "economic lifelines" of the world's industrialized societies
by attacking vital energy infrastructure. (http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html)Â
Although public discussion tends to focus on the vulnerability of nuclear power
plants, the hydrocarbons sector may prove even more vulnerable.
49.    In October 2002 al-Qaeda deployed a
boat packed with explosives to ram and badly damage a French supertanker off
the Yemeni coast; had the attackers succeeded, the flow of energy to world
markets would have been serious impaired. Another recent attack against Saudi
Arabia’s largest oil processing facility failed to penetrate the protective
perimeter; again, a successful assault would have resulted in very serious
global oil shortages effecting global markets for months. (Lugar) Â Given the increasingly tenuous security order in certain oil
producing states and the regions through which oil is shipped, insurance
preemie for a super tanker bearing two million barrels of oil have increased
from $150,000 per trip to $450,000 per trip just to cover the risk to the ship
(the cargo is covered separately), a rise that in itself has added
approximately 15 cents to the cost of a barrel of oil. A successful attack on a
supertanker would very likely precipitate soaring insurance costs. (http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html)
Thus the private sector is already bearing some of the security costs.
50.    Pipelines, through which about 40%
of world's oil flows and a far higher percentage of the world's natural gas,
are particularly vulnerable as Coalition forces in Iraq have doubtless
discovered. These pipes crisscross over thousands of miles and transverse some
of the world's most volatile regions. Â Although Europe
is more directly dependent on international pipeline systems, particularly for
the shipment of natural gas, the United States boasts 160 thousand miles of oil
pipelines on its territory and depends on oil and gas shipments from both
Canada and Mexico through these lines. (Lugar) China for its part plans on
building key pipeline infrastructure to link its dynamic boom towns to the oil
and gas produced in Central Asia and Russia - a highly strategic bid to make
the country less dependent on energy flowing through the waters essentially
controlled by the US Navy. (Maisais; Austrevicius and Boozman) Pipelines thus
should be understood as potential chokepoints that are particularly exposed to
sabotage.
51.    They are also diplomatic tools
through which exporting countries as well as transhipment countries can
exercise political, diplomatic and economic leverage. Importers in Europe and
North America and exporters like Russia naturally share a common interest in
defending the intricate network of pipelines as well as refineries and port
facilities. Russia is particularly concerned about pipeline security not only
because of problems in sensitive regions like the North Caucuses but also
because its pipeline system is running at or near full capacity, leaving it few
alternatives should certain vital infrastructure be incapacitated.(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html)Â
There are some indications in Brussels that Russian authorities might be
interested in working with NATO to cooperate on common pipeline protection
measures.Â
52.    It is extraordinarily difficult to
predict the role emerging technologies will play in meeting future energy
needs, although breakthroughs will invariably have significant impacts. But
caution is also needed. Fifty years ago many physicists thought fusion
technology was some thirty years away from commercial viability. The American
Association of Arts and Sciences recently reported that fusion is still
35 years away from commercial use; advances once seen as imminent have
therefore yet to materialize, although scientists continue to plug away at the
problem. (Doran)Â Certainly, stumbling upon safe, limitless, low-cost, clean,
and secure sources of energy constitutes the holy grail of energy research.Â
Success would undoubtedly unleash an industrial revolution that would transform
the global economic, social and security order. But this particular golden ring
continues to elude researchers, and there are no indications at present that
they are anywhere near achieving such a fundamental technological breakthrough.
53.    Still,
technology is constantly evolving and recasting energy markets in ways that can
bolster efficiency, lower prices and broaden the energy mix. Supercomputing
and innovative drilling technology, for example, have vastly enhanced the
capacity of oil companies to identify and exploit previously unknown oil
fields. New technologies have reduced the costs of extracting oil from oil
sands, a development that puts Canada on the road toward becoming one of the
world's most important oil producers. Advancements in technology can also help
moderate demand by introducing energy saving technologies in appliances,
buildings, power generation and automobiles.
54.    Because of global warming and the
potential for supply bottlenecks, nuclear power is also garnering a second look
from many who were once sceptical of its merits. Its virtues are that it emits
no carbon during electricity generation and that it reduces dependence on the
Middle East and other highly volatile oil and gas exporting regions. Rising
oil and gas prices, moreover, make it look ever more price competitive. Uranium
fuel is easily stored, abundant and generally sourced from stable regions of
the world such as Canada and Australia. Handling and storing high-level
radioactive waste, costs associated with plant decommissioning, the legacy of
Chernobyl, political battles over where plants will be built and where waste
will be stored, the potential for nuclear proliferation so evident in the
current Iranian proliferation crisis, and ongoing regulatory difficulties are
all factors in why Western publics are not universally embracing a nuclear future.Â
Investment issues also constitute a bottleneck. Nuclear power generation
requires enormous up-front capital investment and is a business characterized
by a long amortisation period, something not favoured by private investors.Â
State-owned utilities thus tend to dominate this market, at least in Europe,
and this, of course, runs counter to the push to liberalize markets in order to
render them more efficient.
Â
55.    The development of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) processing allows natural gas producers to sell in markets
that typically cannot be reached via pipelines for economic or simply
geographic reasons. LNG is obtained by cooling gaseous natural gas to its
liquid form, enabling it to be transported by specialized tanker.  Currently
the trade of natural gas takes place between nodes on pipeline networks, which
obviously limits the market and leaves the business hostage to a range of
constraints--geographical, political, military, and investment related. LNG
promises to turn the gas market into a more global fungible market
similar in many respects to the oil market and less constrained by pipeline
politics. This will also generate critical earnings for certain producer
countries. For years Nigeria has flared off an enormous amount of natural gas
simply because it lacked the means to ship it to market. Africa could
potentially produce 50 million tonnes of LNG a year or 30% of the world’s
total. (Hoyos) The goal now is to liquefy some of this gas so that it can be
sold internationally. This will also help reduce the environmentally
unfriendly flaring. The United States is looking to purchase LNG from Russia
while the Middle East is also expanding its LNG capacity to sell its abundant
gas production in world markets.
Â
56.    Increasing investment in the
development of technologies to generate electricity in a cleaner and more
efficient fashion from traditional energy sources such as coal offers another
means of broadening the energy mix.  The United States, Europe and China all
enjoy abundant coal endowments, but burning this fuel is highly polluting.Â
China is suffering a genuine epidemic of lung ailments due to coal use, and the
government has recognized that Chinese industry needs to move away from
traditional coal burning methods. So far, however, it has done little to stem
the construction of coal fired generation plants. It has nonetheless agreed to
cooperate with both the EU and the United States in the development of cleaner
coal burning technologies. As a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, Europe is
dedicated to lowering carbon emissions and hopes to move away from traditional
coal burning, while developing cleaner technologies to facilitate coal use.Â
For its part, the United States has an endowment of coal that could supply its
electrical energy needs for approximately 200 years. The Bush Administration
has stressed the important role coal can play in increasing US energy security
and has loosened environmental standards to make this possible. Although the
United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, many Americans recognize the
need for cleaner coal burning technologies, and the government has made
research in this area one of its energy priorities.
57.    Three critical advancements are
essential to enable greater coal consumption in the future: (1) cleaner coal
burning technologies, (2) carbon capture and sequestration, and (3) the
development of a synfuel industry. Advancements in technology could
theoretically enable coal-endowed countries to generate power at lower
environmental costs. Carbon capture and sequestration, a technology that
captures CO2 emissions from coal powered generation plants and stores the CO2
in geological formations or other natural sites, could dramatically reduce CO2
emissions from electricity generation. Advances on this front could ensure
that coal remains part of the future energy mix even under a strict climate
change program. Finally, synfuels are coal derived gasoline, diesel, and jet
fuel products that have the virtue of being both cleaner burning than coal
itself and sourced from a broader array of countries and thus more
strategically stable. A significant increase in synfuel production, like that
of biofuels and hydrogen, would accordingly help moderate demand for imported
transportation fuels.
58.    Distributed electricity generation
is localised, small-scale electricity generation often from renewable sources
like wind or solar that does not require the use of transmission and
distribution grids. It precludes electricity losses typically associated with
traditional electrical transmission and distribution.  In conjunction with the
electricity grid, distributed generation adds an additional layer of supply
security, while boosting customer awareness of the need for conservation and
enhancing household energy efficiency. Combined heat and power (CHP) is based
on the idea of capturing heat from small electrical plans and using it to warm
buildings.  In conjunction with distributed electricity generation, CHP could
be used to heat households and bolster overall building thermal efficiency.Â
59.    Renewable energies have the virtue
not only of being clean and potentially abundant, but they also can increase
energy security and lower dependence on imported fossil fuels. There are many
potential sources of renewable energy, but the technology for capturing and
storing intermittently generated power is lagging behind.Â
60.    The most spectacular advances in
recent years have been in wind generation, which although subsidized, is coming
into its own as an important and profitable business. Wind power has become an
important part of the energy mix in several counties like Denmark and Germany
with many other countries expressing an interest in building wind farms to
harvest energy. A number of European countries have made the development of
wind power a priority. Denmark is already generating 19% of its electricity
through wind power and intends to raise this figure to 25% by 2008. (http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4700868.stm).
Last year, in the United States, more than $3 billion in new wind generating
capacity was installed and the rate of investment is expected to be even higher
this year (Harvey). Wave and tidal power represent other new frontiers for
renewable energy generation, although technological advances and strong initial
public support are needed to make these commercially viable over the longer
term. Solar energy collection methods have also markedly improved in recent
years, making this technology ever more viable. There is enormous scope for
developing active and passive solar heating in the housing sector and the costs
savings in doing so can be substantial. There remains ample scope for
government to underwrite solar research and encourage solar energy deployment.
61.    It is important to recognize the
still daunting barriers to making renewable energy an important element in the
energy mix. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently called for greater
investment for the harvest of solar power and energy from ocean tides but noted
as well that increasing the contribution of renewable energy to the world's
electricity supplies by just 1% would cost $1,600 billion in infrastructure.
The IEA suggests that solar thermal collectors could eventually provide up to
10% of heating in its 26 member countries and that research and development
should focus on materials and components, energy storage systems, and
efficiency increases. While wind technology has become a relatively mature
industry, it is intermittent. It raises the question of how one compensates
for power losses when the wind dies down.   Â
62.    Claude Mandil, the Executive
Director of the IEA has urged governments not to leave these developments to
the market alone; state support is clearly needed to underwrite research,
development and the deployment of renewable sources. Government research
budgets devoted to energy technologies increased after the oil price shocks of
the 1970s but had already declined two thirds from their peak by 1987 and have
remained roughly at that level since then. (Harvey).
63.    Economic development, efficiency
improvements, advancements in technology, and public policy changes over the
past 50 years have helped delink economic growth and the intensity of energy
use in the most developed countries.  Acid rain problems in the United States,
for example, inspired a very successful sulphur emissions trading scheme that
provided financial incentives to develop and implement technologies designed to
reduce sulphur emissions (flue-gas desulfurization). That program also helped
define the parameters for the recently introduced EU carbon trading market,
which is now a cornerstone of its strategy to comply with Kyoto’s strictures.Â
Improvements in automobile technologies (catalysts and particulate traps) in
many respects are the result of stricter regulations demanding reductions in
diesel particulates and oxides of nitrogen from diesel vehicle emissions. The
great environmental challenge today is global warming and new regulations,
market innovations, successful conservation strategies and technological
breakthroughs must all be part of the solution. Meeting this challenge should
also lead to advances in energy security.
64.    The challenge is far greater in the
developing world. The UN Conference on Trade and Development estimates that
non-OPEC developing countries spend 3.5% of GDP on imported oil, nearly twice
the rate for OECD countries. This leaves these countries in a particularly
vulnerable position when global prices rise as they have over the last three
years. World Bank studies indicate that a $10 /barrel increase in oil prices
can reduce GDP by 1.47% on average in non-oil exporting developing countries
with a per capita income of less than $300 a year. Oil price increases can
significantly exceed development assistance in certain countries, and this
illustrates how devastating energy price hikes are for these countries.Â
Developing and deploying renewable energy technologies and conservation methods
could therefore have an even greater impact in developing regions. The paradox
is that as countries undergo economic take-off, energy use generally explodes.Â
Increasing the quality of life for the millions of impoverished people will in
the future require new approaches either based on reliance on renewable energy
sources or on much lower energy intensive development. That of course, is far
easier said than done, and it suggests how serious the development-energy
quandary is.
65.    The Chinese case is emblematic. Its
growth is industry driven, highly energy intensive and, in the estimation of
some environmentalists, not sustainable if current trends persist. With its
domestic supply of once plentiful oil rapidly diminishing, it has by default
become a major player on global energy markets.  Its demand has significantly
tightened global oil and gas markets and is a major factor in rising prices.Â
China’s quest for energy and energy security is now a fundamental feature of
its international diplomacy in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and
Russia. As China’s economy expands so will its need for imported energy,
despite the gains the Chinese have made in energy efficiency. Far greater
gains in energy efficiency in production, transmission, distribution and
consumption are essential if the world is going to be able to accommodate the
economic rise of India and China. And still, the West must acknowledge that
energy could prove to be a source of tension with China and India in the future
if progress is not made on these fronts. (Austrevicius and Boozman) The
American environmentalist Lester Brown recently suggested that "The
western economic model - built on fossil fuels, cars and disposable products -
cannot function in such a populous country as China, nor in India, where the
population will surpass China's in 2031 - There is growing recognition in China
that they have to make some changes - although it has not yet publicly taken
the form of saying the western economic model is not going to work for
us". (http://www.theallineed.com/news//0601/06054151.htm.)
But the burden of adjustment will not only be on China; the West too will
invariably face pressures to change as Chinese and Indian demand soars.
66.    Mitigating the risk of any
curtailment of the flow of oil and gas to world markets is, without doubt, one
of the highest immediate and long-term security priorities for both the
Americans and its European allies. Europe and America need to conduct a
dialogue in order to identify common energy security interests and the means to
defend these properly. Improving energy crisis management is also essential;
proactive multilateral measures on many fronts are needed to avoid such crisis,
but when they occur, some degree of coordination should already be in place.
67.    Of course, cooperation also
involves technology sharing, scientific cooperation, and policy dialogues on
best practices etc. But there are military implications as well, and it seems
perfectly reasonable for NATO itself to be part of this dimension of the
dialogue. Moreover, there should be room to engage the EU is this part of the
dialogue even though its Green Paper simply does not deal with military
questions. Military related challenges, however, are fundamental and
consideration of the hard security issues should be factored into EU policy
making. A dialogue with NATO on this front might therefore make sense.Â
Likewise, engaging Russia in an energy security dialogue could also take place
under the umbrella of NATO. Other bodies must also play a role, but on the
hard security matters NATO should be engaged.
68.    At a global level, an enhanced
multilateral energy dialogue with India and China is needed perhaps under the
rubric of the OECD/IEA. Both of these large and rapidly growing developing
countries stand to benefit from energy saving technological developments, and
best practices and policies. Dialogue also has the advantage of making strategic
miscalculations less likely. Along these lines Senator Richard Lugar’s
proposed Energy Diplomacy and Security Act represents a step in the right
direction. It recognises energy security as a central national security, and
calls for enhanced cooperation through international partnerships within NATO
and with key supplier countries like Russia.Â
69.    Greater efforts are needed to
facilitate investment in energy infrastructure. Transparent regulatory
frameworks can be enormously helpful in this regard but so can energy market
liberalisation and international integration designed to generate
efficiencies. Indeed, markets are part of the solution but states also have a
strong role to play. They can ensure that security and environmental costs are
part of the up front costs consumers confront. Subsidies for promising
renewables that reduce security and environmental costs also make economic and
strategic sense. Higher fuel and energy standards are needed for transport,
appliances, industry, and homes and buildings and only states can ensure that
these are broadly accepted and implemented. Political leaders should engage in
an honest dialogue with their constituents about the true cost of energy and
the need to advance energy conservation.
71.    A range of strategies is also
needed to accelerate the development of technologies that will bolster energy
security and broaden the energy mix. International collaboration here is
essential among allies but also among engaging key producer and user countries
like China and India. Far more investment is needed in this research work and
both the private and public sectors must be fully engaged. Along these lines,
the future role of nuclear power in the energy mix poses a genuine challenge to
Western democracies. The dialogue about it should be as informed as possible
and both the advantages, risks, costs and benefits need to be brought out into
the open. Â
Walter Andersen and Daniel Consolatore,
“South Asia Plays the Energy Game,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins
University.
Petras Austrevicius and John Boozman, China’s
Development Challenge, NATO PA Report ESCTER 06 E, 2006Andrew
Beatty, "Energy Policy" European Voice February 9-15, 2006.
Deborah Bleviss, “The Developing World
Wants More Energy Too,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
BBC, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4700868.stm
Kent E. Calder, East Asia and the Middle
East Together Again,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
William Chandler, “Russia Roars Backâ€
SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
Speech by Vice President Dick Cheney to the
Annual Meeting of the Associated Press in Toronto, Canada, April 30, 2001. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/energy/cheney_4-30.html
Commission of the European Communities, A
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, March 3,
2006.
Anthony Cordesman, "The US military
and evolving challenges in the Middle East, Naval War College Review,
June 2002.
Charles F. Doran, "Oil Politics is
World Politics," SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
Marius Deeb, “In the Middle East Oil
Rules,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
"Defining Business Politics,"
Eurasia Group, April 28, 2005.
Judy Dempsey, "Gas crisis a warning
for Europe," International Herald Tribune, February 16, 2006
Joseph M. Dukert, “U.S., Canada and Mexico:
Depending on Interdependence,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins
University.
.
John Fialka, Jeffrey Ball, "Bush pins
energy hopes on new form of ethanolâ€, Wall Street Journal, February 2,
2006.
Russell Gold “Natural-gas hunt heats up in
the U.S.â€Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2005.
Fiona Harvey, IEA Calls for More
investments in renewable energy," Financial Times, February 15,
2006.
Margus Hanson, “Transition in Ukraine,â€
NATO PA Economic and Security Committee, 2006.
Carola Hoyos, “Continent all set to balance
power, Financial Times, March 1, 2006.
http://www.theallineed.com/news//0601/06054151.htm.
Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security, http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html
International Energy Agency, World
Energy Investment Outlook, 2005.
Wilfrid L. Kohl, “Climate Change: Its about
Energy,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
David M. Lampton and Bo Kong, China Comes
In from the Cold,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
Giacomo Luciani, Europeans to Americans:
Welcome to our Energy World,†SAISPHERE, 2005, The Johns Hopkins
University.
Richard Lugar, “Energy Security:: Cause for
Competition or Cooperation?†The Brookings Institution 90 Leadership Forum
Series, March 13, 2006.
David Luhnow, Geraldo Samor “Brazil
cultivates home-grown fuel,†Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2006.
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Energy and War†SAISPHERE,
2005, The Johns Hopkins University.
Vakhtang Maisais, “The Caucasus-Caspain
Regional Security Agenda in the 21st Century: Caspian Oil
Geopolitics and Georgia Global Print, Tbilisi 2002.
Claude Mandil, “Russia must act to avert a
gas supply crisis,†Financial Times, March 22, 2006.
Kevin Morrison, Javier Blas, James Boxell “Oil companies ‘underinvesting by up to
20%â€, Financial Times, May 6, 2005.
Arkay Ostrovsky, Bertrand Benoit,
"Schroeder pipeline salary ‘to reflect his caliber,’†Financial Times,
December 13, 2006.
Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, British Petroleum, June 14, 2005.
"Threat to oil transport,"
Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
http://www.iags.org/oiltransport.html
US Department of Energy, EIA, World Oil
Transit Chokepoints,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html
Andrew Yeh, Richard McGregor, Arkady
Ostovsky, Carola Hoyos, “Russian gas deal with China raises fears of cuts to
Europe,†Financial Times, March 22, 2006.
Daniel Yergin, â€Ensuring Energy Security,†Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2,
March/April 2006.
Juliane von Reppert-Bismarck and William
Echikson, "European leaders appear far apart on Energy policy," The
Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2005.
M. Vodo, M Zygar and N. Grib, “Un pacte
germano-russe qui inquiete Polonais et Baltes," Courrier International,
no. 779October 6-12, 2005.
