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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF  
ETAT-MAJOR MILITAIRE INTERNATIONAL



8 December 2005

IMSM-0912-2005

SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

**RELEASE OF UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)**

1. The Military Committee agreed today to the release of an UNCLASSIFIED version of SACEUR's OPLAN 10302 to facilitate talks with the United Nations, the Afghan authorities and other international bodies. The sanitised OPLAN is enclosed.
2. This document clears IMSWM-0548-2005.

**FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "F. Del Pozo". The signature is written in a cursive style and is enclosed within a simple rectangular box.

F. DEL POZO  
Vice Admiral, SPNA  
Director  
International Military Staff

Enclosure

1. J5PLANS/7340-093/05 - 106409, SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1)  
(Unclassified), Dec 05

Copy To SDL T, IS/OPS

Action Officer Gp Capt J. A. Hill, OPS (5554)

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**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS  
EUROPE**

**BELGIUM**

J5PLANS/7340-093/05 - 106409

DECEMBER 2005



**SACEUR OPLAN 10302  
(REVISE 1)**

**ISAF**

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**OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)**  
**SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE**  
**FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN**

- REFERENCES:
- A. Bonn Agreement, dated 5 Dec 01.
  - B. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386(2001) and subsequent UNSCRs for Afghanistan.
  - C. Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between ISAF and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan, dated 4 Jan 02, and subsequent amendments.

1. **SITUATION.**

a. **Strategic Conditions.** NATO assumed the lead for ISAF on 11 Aug 03, drawing its authority from References A-C. The original operations plan foresaw five phases. Phase 1 was assessment and preparation and ISAF operations in Kabul. In Phase 2, ISAF is expanding its presence from Kabul into the northern, western, eastern and southern regions of the country. Coincident with the final stage of ISAF expansion in Phase 2, command and control structures will be adjusted to ensure greater synergy between ISAF and coalition forces, while respecting the two distinct missions/mandates. Phase 3 is "stabilisation". Phases 4 and 5 are "transition" and "redeployment" respectively. Coalition forces will continue to operate in Afghanistan, adjusting as ISAF expands.

b. **Strategic Environment.** In the fields of security and development, there are a considerable number of international actors assisting the Afghan government. An integrated and strategic approach is crucial to overall success. In the anticipated post-Bonn environment, primary responsibility for this coordination rests with the Afghan government, though in the mid-term it will require assistance from the UN and others. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul is responsible for carrying forward political aspects of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan.

c. **Alliance Political Objective.** Full support for implementation of the Bonn and Kabul (ie post-Bonn) processes, as endorsed by UNSCR 1386 and subsequent UNSCRs for Afghanistan, in co-operation and coordination with key international organisations and the coalition, by assisting the Afghan government to meet its responsibilities to provide security, order, stability and reconstruction.

d. **Alliance Political End-State.** A self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government able to exercise its sovereign authority, independently, throughout Afghanistan.

e. - f. Reserved.

g. **Political Limitations.**

(1) ISAF military elements will engage in mine clearing and explosive ordnance disposal when essential for mission accomplishment.

(2) Counter terrorism operations will not be conducted by ISAF forces, or under ISAF command.

h. **Strategic Planning Assumptions.**

(1) Reserved.

(2) G8 lead nations will retain leadership for the designated pillars of security sector reform, the success of which will be of critical importance to the fulfilment of ISAF's objectives.

(3) Reserved.

(4) To support ISAF operations in Afghanistan, political arrangements will be made to facilitate effective NATO engagement and military liaison with neighbouring states.

2. **MISSION.** When authorized by the NAC, SACEUR will direct the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to conduct military operations across Afghanistan, as appropriate and within the mandate, in cooperation and coordination with Afghan national security forces and in coordination with coalition forces, in order to assist the Afghan government in the maintenance of security; facilitate the development of government structures and extension of its control; and assist reconstruction/humanitarian efforts, through the implementation of the mandate provided by the relevant UNSCRs.

3. **EXECUTION.**

a. **Conduct of Operations.** After completing Phases 1 ("assessment and preparation") and 2 ("geographic expansion") of the five, partially overlapping, phases of Operations Plan 10302, the focus of the third ("stabilisation") phase (and of this revise of the operations plan), will be to assist the Afghan government to extend and exercise its authority and influence. This phase will end, most likely at different intervals for each province (or groups of provinces), as a level of stability is achieved to allow the handover of ISAF military tasks to Afghan authorities. This incremental transition of security responsibilities will take place in Phase 4. Phase 4 ends when SACEUR confirms that the mission from the NAC extant at that time is accomplished. The fifth phase is redeployment.

b. **Strategic Commander's Intent.**

(1) **Main Effort.** Coincident with the expansion of ISAF, as described in the strategic transition plan at Annex A, we will continue to assist the Afghan government in establishing and maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, and creating the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction in its country. At the strategic level, our Main Effort is to achieve our goals in Afghanistan by conducting stability and security operations in order to allow the Afghan government to assume control in the regions and provinces; and by helping the Afghan government to develop its security forces, in cooperation with the G8 lead nations and other international organisations as they intensify their efforts in the south and the east, to the extent that they can be effective without outside assistance.

(2) **Creating Effect – Expanding Afghan Authority.**

(a) **Context.** As directed by the NAC, I will empower COMJFC

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Brunssum, as the JFC, to conduct NATO-led operations across Afghanistan, and provide strategic guidance, derived from political direction from the NAC, and the necessary forces and resources for this task. The JFC will, as the overall operational commander, determine the effects required to achieve the military strategic objectives, provide campaign guidance and continuity and codify and maintain those agreements necessary with US CENTCOM (on behalf of the coalition) to maximise operational synergy. In turn, the JFC will direct COMISAF, as the in-theatre operational commander, to achieve the effects sought and the key military and supporting tasks mandated by the NAC. This will take place in an environment where ISAF has become the principal international military force in Afghanistan. The stability and security components of this ISAF operation are mutually supporting and linked elements that must be driven centrally through coherent and consistent command and control. Moreover, they must be taken forward with the cognisance of the Afghan government. While political direction for this mission comes from the NAC, there must be full consultation with appropriate Afghan political and military authorities over the prosecution of operations by ISAF. Enduring change can only be sustained with clear Afghan support for, and ownership of, initiatives and programmes, leading to the development of self-reliant partners. Although final decisions over ISAF rest with NATO authorities, a collaborative approach will engender indigenous involvement in shaping Afghanistan's destiny and create a shared view of ISAF's execution of its stability and security operations in support of Afghan authorities and forces.

(b) **Stability.** Expanding the government's authority and the rule of law countrywide, and building the indigenous capacity required to sustain them effectively, are critical to success in Afghanistan. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) will be at the leading edge of NATO's effort. Military support to them is one of NATO's major contributions to the success of ISAF in Afghanistan. Stability operations will be used to create an environment that generates the confidence and ambient security required to enable reconstruction and nation-building activities. They will also facilitate the continued physical and moral extension of Afghan government authority. Results will be achieved through presence and engagement. PRTs act as catalysts for change, while remaining sensitive to Afghan sovereignty and political primacy. Teams will have significant influence and a disproportionately positive impact on authorities within a province. Broadening the range of capabilities within a PRT will increase its ability to assist with the expansion of provincial authority and achieve local success. Similarly, while recognizing the different national characters of PRTs, increasing convergence between the activities of all PRTs, with synchronised movement towards a set of common objectives, will have the desired strategic impact. Stimulating economic growth, increasing the level of security, improving governance and public services and enhancing living conditions will satisfy basic human security needs, reduce the need for farmers to acquire income through poppy cultivation and create greater loyalty to legitimate authorities. Lacking a common cause, and without the likelihood of support, extremists will be less able to operate. In this setting, ISAF will work alongside others, supporting the Afghan government (and its forces and agencies) and overall development efforts, sharing information and harmonising its own

activities with those of others to the fullest extent practical to create coherent effects. ISAF elements will operate with subtlety and a light touch, striking a careful balance between the traditionally active approach of military organisations and the requirement for other actors to conduct reconstruction operations.

(c) **Security.** Security operations will be required to allow PRTs to perform their tasks. Such security operations will range from local force protection in a permissive environment to decisive, pro-active military ground and air manoeuvre, thereby creating the environment for PRTs to flourish. ISAF will support the Afghan government by deterring and disrupting those who challenge the extension of government authority or prevent ISAF from operating freely. A robust approach will be necessary to maintain the initiative. In-place forces can be supported by the deployment of out of theatre reserves from those elements of the Strategic Reserve Force earmarked by providing nations for operations in Afghanistan. Operational activity will be closely coordinated with coalition forces, to secure the synergies available and manage the operating space. Increasing involvement of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) will be developed as the mission progresses.

(3) **Building Afghan National Capacity.** Development of effective Afghan national security forces, responsive to central authorities, is a particularly important step in extending government influence. Progress in this area also aids movement towards the NAC desired end state. Manning, training and equipping of the ANA and ANP remains the responsibility of respective G8 lead nations. ISAF's focus will be on the coherent employment of indigenous capability. ISAF will mentor, support and aid the training and operational employment of ANA units in order to increase their capability and reach. This will include the coordination of ANA operations with those of ISAF to achieve synergy, primarily through ISAF operational mentor and liaison teams that can support ANA operations and manage joint operating space and ISAF mission enabling or battle-winning support. It will be critical to establish close coordination, mutual trust, unit-to-unit, and commander-to-commander partnerships at every level, with a clear understanding of respective operating parameters. Accordingly, the operational mentor and liaison teams will operate in support of kandak<sup>1</sup> activities: in barracks; on collective training; and closely mentoring kandak operational deployments where such activities are consistent with the ISAF mandate. Operational effect will be further enhanced through ISAF focusing on practical steps to involve the ANP in the overall security effort, in accordance with Appendix 2 to Annex B. ISAF will assist provincial security committees and help coordinate the various police elements internally and when working in the same operating space with the ANA and/or ISAF. Advice and practical support will also be offered to border police and supporting ANA units to enhance their capacity through the adoption of an integrated border security strategy that reduces illegitimate movement and increases central government revenues. Niche and professional development training will also be conducted for Afghan national security forces on an opportunity basis. In coordination with other forces, ISAF will support Afghan government efforts to disarm illegally armed groups. Given the threats to stability arising from the drugs trade, ISAF

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<sup>1</sup> An operational Afghan National Army unit of battalion size.

will also support Afghan government counter narcotics efforts, within agreed guidelines. Throughout, all ISAF support to security sector reform will be in full coordination with the Afghan government and the G8 lead nations and within means and capabilities.

(4) **Comprehensive Awareness.** While it is clear that ISAF has no responsibility for the delivery of effects by nations and other international organisations supporting the Afghan government, or for the coordination of those effects, ISAF could help. Analysing PRTs' work across the breadth of their engagement provides ISAF with an almost unique ability to observe a range of provincial development activities. Similarly, ISAF, operating countrywide, has a comprehensive view of progress in security sector reform. COMISAF, working in concert with the NATO Senior Civilian Representative and with both supported by appropriately skilled staff, can gauge the breadth and depth of stabilisation, reconstruction and reform, spotting gaps or duplication of effort for the benefit of the wider community. Through politically agreed and accepted coordinating mechanisms, considering civil and military effort, such assessments will assist the Afghan government, who have primacy in this area, in coordinating the wide range of international community activities in the country. It should also prove useful to those nations, organisations and agencies supporting Afghan government development efforts, helping them judge the effects of their programmes.

(5) **External Influences.** Under overall Afghan lead, developing relations with Afghanistan's neighbours<sup>2</sup> will buttress NATO's efforts, thereby enhancing regional and border security. In accordance with NAC guidance, ISAF should promote regular Afghan/NATO military to military contact with key neighbours, supported by a responsive military liaison structure, to provide the primary tool for liaison on the military side and support ISAF's tactical efforts in support of an indigenous border security strategy to reduce illegitimate movement and increase revenue collection.

(6)-(7) Reserved.

(8) **Military Strategic Campaign Objectives.**

- (a) The extension of Afghan government authority across the country.
- (b) Development of the structures necessary to maintain security in Afghanistan, without the assistance of international forces.
- (c) Development and maintenance of a countrywide stable and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in which sustainable reconstruction and developmental efforts have taken hold.

(9) **Desired Strategic Military End-State.** Afghan national security forces provide security and sustain stability in Afghanistan without NATO support.

c. Reserved.

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<sup>2</sup> China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.



d. **Mission Review and Exit.** Progress towards mission accomplishment will be kept under review. Recommendations will be made through the medium of the periodic mission review process. NATO's exit from Afghanistan is dependent on the successful development of credible, professional and legitimate Afghan security structures able to maintain a safe and secure environment in their own country, and on the desires of the Afghan government. Once Afghan national security forces are trained and effective, ISAF should be able to reduce its profile, as decided by the NAC. The first reductions are likely to be in combat forces, leading to PRTs providing the longer-term ISAF military presence. Once these are no longer required, on a province-by-province basis, the capabilities provided by a PRT should be taken on by Afghan structures and the team dissolved.

e. **Key Military and Key Supporting Tasks.** Annex C.

f. - h. Reserved.

i. **Co-ordinating Instructions.**

(1) **Timings.** When the JFC and CENTCOM are satisfied that the necessary conditions are met, transfer of authority for the southern region will take place on SACEUR's orders, following NAC approval. The same arrangements will apply for subsequent expansion. Annex A to this operations plan is ineffective on transfer of authority of coalition assets in the eastern region to ISAF.

(2)-(5) Reserved.

(6) **Markings.** Generally, all ISAF personnel, vehicles and facilities will be identified with the ISAF symbol and/or "ISAF".

(7) **Combined Operations.**

(a) The JFC is authorised to conduct combined operations with Afghan national security forces. In such operations, ISAF will retain primacy for its own operational decision-making and ROE.

(b) The JFC is not authorised to conduct combined operations with coalition forces. However, the JFC is authorised to provide *in extremis* support to coalition operations conducted under separate mandate in support of the Afghan government. This may include operations to prevent the death, wounding or capture of coalition forces or any ANA/ANP supporting them; or to facilitate their extraction from danger. ISAF elements are to use their authorised ROE.

(8)-(10) Reserved.

(11) **Arms Control.** Annex M.

(12)-(14) Reserved.

(15) **Guidance on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.** Annex LL.

#### 4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. **Strategic Logistic Priority.** The priority is to deliver the best possible support to ISAF by rationalising functions, increasing multi-nationality and utilising host nation support as the operation matures in order to reduce manning, equipment and costs. Establishing combined joint logistics and technical reach back capabilities should reduce the size of national support elements. These actions will contribute to reducing the logistic footprint in Afghanistan and increasing logistic efficiency. Readily available in-country resources should be used as much as possible. This practice increases revenue opportunities in the region and may lead to beneficial training for local personnel, thus developing national human capital.

b. **Logistics.** Troop contributing nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support, which may be provided by national logistics assets, through multinational agreements, by using commercial contracts and with host nation support. Nations may take advantage of NATO pre-arranged contracts or basic ordering agreements. The JFC will facilitate bi and multilateral supporting arrangements between nations. Co-ordination of logistic support between NATO and nations should be carried out at the appropriate levels. Similarly, competition between nations should be avoided and, wherever possible, contracting is to be co-ordinated. Accordingly, nations should give NATO commanders visibility of logistic resources and any mutual support arrangements established. Nations should also be prepared to support other nations' forces, subject to mutual support arrangements and/or appropriate bilateral agreements.

c. - d. Reserved.

e. **Engineering.** Nations provide engineer support to their contingents. Force level engineers will support freedom of movement, construction and explosive ordnance disposal, which must be coordinated with the host nation, the United Nations Mine Action Co-ordination Centre and coalition authorities as appropriate. NATO and nations have a collective responsibility for environmental protection.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. **Command, Control and Liaison.** The military chain of command runs from SACEUR to COMJFC Brunssum, as the JFC, to COMISAF. The JFC, as the overall operational commander, provides campaign direction and continuity. COMISAF will be the in-theatre level operational commander, responsible for the synchronisation of NATO's military activities with the Afghan government and with relevant representatives of the international community in Afghanistan. The focus for military to military relations with neighbouring states, under politically approved arrangements, is split. The JFC will lead on longer-term issues. COMISAF may deal with shorter-term practical border security concerns and the modalities of ISAF's operations near borders.

b. Reserved.

c. **Areas.** The ISAF Area of Operations is the territory and airspace of Afghanistan.

ANNEXES:

- A. Concept of Operations for Transitional Operations.
- B. Reserved.
- C. Key Military Tasks and Key Supporting Tasks.
  - App 1. PRT Operations.
  - App 2. Afghan National Security Forces.
  - App 3. Counter Narcotics.
- D. - L. Reserved.
- M. Arms Control.
- O. - KK. Reserved.
- LL. Guidance on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.
- MM. - ZZ. Reserved.

**OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)**  
**SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE**  
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**ANNEX A – SUPPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR TRANSITIONAL**  
**OPERATIONS**

1. **SITUATION.** This annex provides the necessary strategic guidance to allow the conduct of transitional operations for the assimilation into ISAF's area of operations of the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, in accordance with the original SACEUR OPLAN 10302<sup>1</sup>. This annex can be deleted once expansion is complete.
2. Reserved.
3. **EXECUTION.**
  - a. **Strategic Commander's Intent.**
    - (1) Under the strategic guidance in the main body and this annex, the JFC will plan and conduct transitional operations for the assimilation of the southern and eastern regions into ISAF's area of operations. This will involve detailed planning and coordination at the operational and tactical levels, including with providing nations and the coalition, represented by USCENTCOM and its in-theatre HQs.
    - (2) Transitional operations, complex in nature, will see the gradual build-up of forces in the south, before transfer of authority to NATO. Dependent on circumstances, the build up of ISAF forces may continue after transfer of authority. Assimilation of the eastern region will be more a re-flagging of existing coalition forces, though some new contributions may be offered by other nations during the force generation process.
    - (3) Through expansion, NATO aims to build on the success of ISAF operations in the north and west, and coalition operations elsewhere to date, and to further reinforce the dual messages of good governance and stability. Assimilation of the southern provinces marks a commitment for NATO in Afghanistan that is more than just geographic expansion. Given the more challenging security environment into which ISAF is moving, there will be a need to take the necessary and appropriate security measures. There will also be a requirement to establish clear arrangements for operational coordination between an expanding ISAF, Afghan national security forces and any enduring coalition presence.
    - (4) Reserved.
    - (5) The desired end state of transitional operations is for ISAF to be operating nationwide to a coherent mission focused on stability and security

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<sup>1</sup> This will be the completion of Phase 2 of the original plan, which had 4 stages: Stage I, the northern provinces; Stage II, the western provinces; Stage III, the southern provinces; and Stage IV, the eastern provinces. While the original 10302 talked about distinct "central" and "eastern" provinces, subsequent analysis showed the best approach was to wrap the central provinces, less Kabul, into the eastern region.

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through five regional commands (Capital, North, South, East and West). The force will also include appropriate theatre level forces, including an air component, and exercise full operational coordination with the remaining coalition forces and Afghan national security forces. This end state will be reached when NATO-led forces have performed a full relief in place in the southern region (under coalition command until the moment of transfer of authority) and assumed responsibility for the southern provinces; assumed command of re-flagged coalition forces in the eastern region and adjusted theatre-level command and control.

b. **Assimilation of the Southern Region.** The strategic intent of the southern expansion is twofold. First, it is to expand the beneficial ISAF effect in Afghanistan by deploying NATO-led PRTs and units into the southern provinces. Secondly, expansion to the south will establish the conditions for the assimilation of the remaining provinces into the NATO-led mission, and provide for adjustments to existing command and control arrangements. Over winter 2005/spring 2006, under coordination between CENTCOM, the JFC and contributing nations, forces will flow into the southern provinces, carrying out a relief in place of CFC-A forces. When the JFC and CENTCOM are satisfied the necessary conditions are met, transfer of authority for the southern region will take place on SACEUR's orders, following NAC approval. CFC-A retains responsibility for the southern region, and control of forces therein, until transfer of authority has been achieved. Full operating capability will be declared once determined by the operational commander.

c. **Assimilation of the Eastern Region.** Once transfer of authority has been conducted in the southern region, NATO will move towards assuming command of the eastern region. When the JFC and CENTCOM are satisfied that the necessary conditions have been met, transfer of authority of coalition forces in the eastern region to COMISAF under the ISAF mandate will take place on SACEUR's orders, following NAC approval. The coalition retains responsibility for the eastern region until transfer of authority has been achieved.

d. **Capital Region.** The creation of the Capital regional command (Kabul Province) may happen at any stage during the transition process, as recommended by the JFC and providing nations and on SACEUR's orders following NAC approval.

e. Reserved.

f. **Afghan National Security Forces.** As assimilation takes place, so ISAF's role in coordination with Afghan national security forces will increase. The desired endstate is set out at Appendix 2 to Annex C. In broad terms, as ISAF assimilates a region, it will establish clear coordinating arrangements and emplace operational mentor and liaison teams at the Afghan National Army (ANA) corps, brigade and unit (kandak) level in order to provide advice and guidance on the operational employment of the ANA and coordinate ISAF and ANA operations in the same operating space. Simultaneously, ISAF will support the Afghan National Police (ANP), when appropriate, in coordination with the G8 lead nations and in accordance with Appendix 2 to Annex C, in their coordination with ISAF and ANA operations.

g. **Coordinating Instructions.**

(1) **Policies, Guidance and Direction.** Unless specified, all aspects of the main body and other annexes of SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1) apply to the transitional operations set out herein.

(2) **Timings.** Transfer of authority of the forces in the southern and then eastern regions will take place when the operational conditions are met. SACEUR will recommend detailed timings, for MC endorsement and NAC approval.

4. Reserved.

5. **COMMAND AND CONTROL.**

a. **Regional Commanders.** All regions will have regional commanders. The regional coordinators in the northern and western regions should be empowered as regional commanders, with the appropriate staffs and resources to exercise effective military command and control upon execution of this OPLAN.

b. Reserved.

c. **HQ ISAF.** The structure of HQ ISAF has been reviewed to ensure it is organised in the most efficient way to conduct operations in an expanded ISAF. Double-hatting arrangements at the HQ ISAF level, to maximise synergy between ISAF and the coalition, will be in place before full assimilation is complete in the southern region.

d. **Operational Coordination.** Very close coordination of activities and extended liaison with US CENTCOM and CFC-A will be required to support seamless expansion.

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**ANNEX C – KEY MILITARY TASKS AND KEY SUPPORTING TASKS**

**1. Key Military Tasks.** Fulfilling the mandate of ISAF based on Reference B of the OPLAN:

- a. Assist the Afghan government in extending its authority, across the country, including stimulation of the security sector reform process, thus contributing to the maintenance of a secure environment to allow International Organizations (IOs) to carry out their responsibilities and activities. Appendix 1.
- b. In coordination with Afghan national security forces, conduct stability and security<sup>1</sup> operations, to create the operational environment in which government authority may be extended, ISAF may operate unhindered and other international organizations can carry out their responsibilities freely.
- c. Mentor and support the Afghan National Army (ANA) to increase their capability and reach. Coordinate ISAF and ANA operations. Appendix 2.
- d. Support Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.
- e. Coordinate and deconflict ISAF and enduring coalition operations.
- f. Operate, and maintain security for, Kabul International Airport (KAIA), transferring responsibility for specific functions to Afghan authorities<sup>2</sup> when practical.

**2. Key Supporting Tasks.** Within means and capabilities and, where applicable, in line with relevant Afghan government agreed national or provincial project lists:

- a. Provide the NAC, the Afghan government, and those nations, organisations and agencies supporting development efforts, a coherent overview of the progress of development efforts and security sector reform.
- b. Support the Afghan National Police (ANP) to integrate its different components and to help it to coordinate its activities with the ANA and ISAF. Appendix 2.
- c. Advise and support the Afghan government in the development and maintenance of border security through an integrated border security strategy. Appendix 2.
- d. Support Afghan government counter narcotics efforts. Appendix 3.
- e. On request, provide assistance to humanitarian assistance operations conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

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<sup>1</sup> See Strategic Commander's intent in main body for a description of stability and security operations.

<sup>2</sup> Any transition plan must consider the 'human capital' issue to enable the Afghan government to takeover the running of the airport.

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- f. Support UNAMA, United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) and other appropriate agencies for the return of refugees and displaced persons.
- g. Support responsible authorities, and supporting agencies, combating trafficking in human beings. Annex D.
- h. On request, provide assistance to disaster relief operations of the Afghan government, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.
- i. Co-ordinate with nations' non-combatant evacuation operations and, if requested, provide assistance.
- j. On request, provide *in-extremis* support to coalition counter-terrorist operations conducted in support of the Afghan government.
- k. ISAF military elements will only engage in mine clearing and explosive ordnance disposal when essential for mission accomplishment. However, on request, remove/neutralize threats from explosive remnants of war when there is an immediate risk to the community.

APPENDICES:

- 1. PRTs.
- 2. Afghan National Security Forces.
- 3. Counter Narcotics.



**APPENDIX 1 – PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) OPERATIONS**

1. **PRT Concept of Operations.** PRTs are one of the important tools available to COMISAF for stability operations. Their role is to assist the Afghan government extend its authority across the country. This is achieved through promoting the policies and priorities of central government and by stimulating the security sector reform process. While PRTs are not an end in themselves, their military capability provides a security effect and enables the work of other agencies. Military PRT elements, working in close co-operation and concert with a broadly based and multi-disciplined civilian element, will seek to influence local authorities within a province. “Development without security is unachievable and security without development is meaningless<sup>1</sup>”. Where the military element facilitates building security sector capacity, the civilian element facilitates building governance capacity and assisting community development. PRTs, while not surrogate provincial governments, thus act as catalysts for change, sensitive to Afghan sovereignty and political primacy. PRT activities are to be fully integrated into developing Afghan systems in order to encourage and support their own nascent abilities. The desired end state for the PRT network<sup>2</sup> will be achieved when international military forces are no longer required and the Afghan government and provincial government institutions are soundly established and fully functioning, with PRTs in turn becoming unnecessary.

2. **PRT Structures.** Due to the widely differing regional circumstances in Afghanistan, as well as the different capabilities and approaches of PRT lead nations, a “one size fits all” PRT concept is neither appropriate nor possible. The core military elements of a PRT could be complemented by a civil-military co-ordination element and a civilian element. The former facilitates the consultative group mechanism, through bringing together stakeholders to consult and deconflict on pertinent issues within the PRT’s province. Through facilitating wider consultation, the civil-military coordination element is supporting a wider collective strategy. The civilian element can be expected to lead on the political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of a PRT’s work. It can also be expected to support the process of reconstruction in accordance with the Afghan government’s national development priorities and, in particular, to support G8-lead nations in specific aspects of the security sector reform process. Harmonising the military security objectives of the PRTs with the governance and development objectives of the civilian component will deliver a more secure environment that achieves food security and builds human security for the future. The basic premise of any national civilian contribution within the context of a PRT must always be unity of effort with the work of other PRTs, the Afghan government, UNAMA and other organisations and agencies supporting redevelopment.

3. **PRT Effects.** Effects should be achieved through presence and engagement. Progress should have an Afghan face; improvements can only be sustained with local ownership and the development of self-reliant partners. Military PRT elements, working in close co-operation and synchronisation with a broadly based and multi-disciplined civilian PRT element, have significant influence and a disproportionately positive impact on authorities within a province. Increasing convergence between the activities of all PRTs, with coherent and coordinated activity to a set of common objectives, would create

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<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan’s 2020 Vision: Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

<sup>2</sup> PRT Executive Steering Committee’s chosen end state.

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beneficial effects across a number of provinces and achieve strategic impact. ISAF should work alongside others, supporting the Afghan Government (and its forces and agencies) and overall development efforts, sharing information and harmonising activities to the fullest extent practical to create coherent effects. In this context, ISAF elements should operate with subtlety and a light touch, striking a careful balance between the traditionally active approach of military organisations and the requirement for other actors to conduct reconstruction operations.

4. **PRT Tasks.** The following list, whilst not exhaustive, provides strategic guidance on suitable PRT tasks:

- Improve the security environment for the Afghan people through dialogue with provincial leaders and confidence building activities and mitigating likely areas of conflict.
- Monitor, assess, advise on and support security sector reform activities, particularly Afghan National Army and police training, in close co-ordination with UNAMA, security sector reform lead-nations and bilateral programmes.
- Facilitate the development of effective provincial governance, building capacity to plan, prioritise and manage programmes and major events.
- Encourage and facilitate the work of provincial development committees, and other committees that may emerge, for example on security, and provincial bodies, such as joint coordination centres.
- Advise on the coordination of Afghan security forces/agencies in a province.
- Provide a visible presence in assigned areas of operation, monitoring and assessing the military and civil situations within those areas.
- Act as the development reconnaissance force for the reconstruction effort, offering a coherent picture of needs to the ISAF chain of command, provincial authorities and those assisting redevelopment.
- Assist the international community with the process of reform and strengthening of civil administration.
- Help to facilitate information sharing between the Afghan government and civil agencies, on their request.
- Support humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities when requested, within means and capabilities.

**APPENDIX 2 - AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES<sup>1</sup>**

1. **Introduction.** Responsibility for the development of Afghan national security forces rests with the Afghan government, supported by G8 lead nations. GE leads the programme for the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP), with some support from a US-run programme for patrolmen at the regional level. The US is the lead nation for the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA), with some bilateral assistance. It runs an initial individual and collective training programme at a central location, after which units ("kandaks") are deployed to the provinces. NATO's exit from Afghanistan is, *inter alia*, dependent on the successful establishment of an integrated security structure that is owned by the Afghans, capable of maintaining security within its own borders and of deterring foreign adversaries.

2. **Assumptions.** Three assumptions underpin NATO support to Afghan national security forces. First, that the G8 security sector reform lead nations will continue with their efforts to increase the capability of Afghan national security forces. Secondly, that NATO will not be responsible for logistic sustainment of the ANA or ANP or fund their operating and maintenance costs and, thirdly, that any ISAF activity with Afghan national security forces will support the goals of the G8 security sector reform lead nations to deliver enhanced operational capability underpinned by a robust and effective sustaining structure, adding value.

3. **ANP** ISAF will focus on practical steps to harness the ANP into the overall security effort, leaving manning, training, equipping and fielding to the G8 lead nation. As such, ISAF will assist provincial security committees and provincial security coordinating mechanisms and help to coordinate the various police elements, with the ANA and other Afghan national security forces, and with ISAF when operating in the same space. Indirect support can also be offered within means and capabilities, such as information sharing, local technical advice and indirect mentoring/role modelling through local partnership arrangements. Low cost high value training can also be given at the local level in fields such as site security and event management, thus building management capacity. Support to counter narcotics police is encompassed in Appendix 3 to Annex B. Under G8 nation lead, ISAF units may also conduct niche training for the ANP<sup>2</sup>, on an opportunity basis and within means and capabilities.

4. **Border Security.** To enhance border security (and legitimate revenue collection), technical advice and practical mission support should be offered to Afghan border police and supporting ANA units, within the framework of an integrated border security strategy.

5. **Strategic Concept for NATO Support to the ANA.**

a. **Focus.** NATO's involvement with the ANA will focus on employment, leaving manning, initial training, sustainment and fielding to the G8 lead nation.

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<sup>1</sup> Afghan national security forces refers to all security forces under the authority and responsibility of the Afghan government, all of which are in varying stages of development. These comprise the Afghan National Army (ANA), including a small Air Corps; the Afghan National Police (ANP); Highway Police; Border Police; Criminal Investigation Police; and Counter Narcotics Police.

<sup>2</sup> Common skills, such as search procedures, vehicle checkpoints, personal self-protection and weapon handling.

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ISAF will assist the Afghan government and G8 lead nation to bring the ANA to full self sufficiency by operational mentoring, facilitating continuation training and supporting ANA units to increase their capability and reach. This will include the coordination of ANA operations with those of ISAF to achieve synergy, primarily through embedded ISAF operational mentor and liaison teams<sup>3</sup>. Such teams, emplaced in all manoeuvre and combat support and combat service support kandaks, brigade and corps HQs and in the ANA operational HQ, will be able to support ANA operations and manage joint operating space and ANA and ISAF mission and service support. When not deployed, teams will also facilitate continuation training for the kandak or HQ with which they are aligned, against ANA central training objectives. Liaison will be established with the MOD and General Staff. The JFC may direct the conduct of niche and professional development training for the ANA on an opportunity basis, calling on temporary external assistance as required. In addition to the framework of operational mentor and liaison teams, clear arrangements between ISAF units/commanders and local ANA units/commanders will be developed, thereby enhancing integration in the same operating space.

b. **Employment of Teams.** ISAF teams will replace coalition embedded training teams<sup>4</sup> at around the 20-week point in the life of a kandak, providing mentoring and support until self-sufficiency is achieved. It is critical to establish clear arrangements, partnerships at every level and mutual trust, with a clear understanding of respective operating parameters. Thus, operational mentor and liaison teams will operate in support of kandak activities: in barracks; on collective training; and closely mentoring kandak operational deployments.

c. **Mission Support to the ANA.** To facilitate success, ISAF, in addition to assistance provided by the G8 lead nation, will provide practical support for ANA security and stability operations within means and capabilities. ISAF can provide immediate aid to ANA casualties resulting from operations. The provision of military equipment (and its maintenance) ammunition, logistic support, sustainment, pay and routine medical care remains in the hands of the ANA, strongly supported by the G8 lead nation.

d. **Direction.** Clear in-theatre arrangements are necessary to ensure coherent and coordinated direction is provided to the respective G8 lead nation and ISAF components supporting the ANA. The lead nation will discern its way forward for developmental work, funding, equipping, sustainment support and basic training. ISAF will address operational employment. There is distinct complementarity. Training and equipping must match operational needs, while any continuation training conducted by kandaks when not deployed, which will be overseen and facilitated by associated ISAF operational mentor and liaison teams, must fit into an overarching developmental strategy with identified training objectives. While direction for ANA operations and training should come through its own chain of command, suitably supported by advisers at every level, ISAF and G8 lead nation elements must closely coordinate all of their activity in relation to the ANA. During operations, clear command and control arrangements have to be established.

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<sup>3</sup> A different name to that used by the coalition (embedded training teams), reflecting the emphasis on operational employment.

<sup>4</sup> Some elements of the coalition team may remain to handle lead nation issues, such as pay and equipment.

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e. **Command and Control.** ANA operations remain under national command, with close coordination with ISAF. However, effective integration and an increase in operational capability will be achieved through the development of “partnering” arrangements between ISAF units and formations and corresponding ANA structures.

f. **Hand-Off.** As the capability of an ANA unit or HQ grows, the role and the size of its operational mentor and liaison teams will decrease. When full operational capability has been achieved, the team can be withdrawn. Ordinary liaison arrangements can then apply.

**APPENDIX 3 - GUIDANCE ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS**

1. **Background.** The extension of Afghan government authority, the maintenance of long-term stability and the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan are inextricably linked to the successful tackling by the Afghan government of the illicit opium trade.
2. **Situation.** The Afghan government's integrated approach to counter narcotics incorporates interdiction, eradication, law enforcement, the judiciary, alternative livelihood programmes, regional cooperation, improved border controls and domestic demand reduction. Specialised Afghan interdiction and eradication units and the Counter Narcotics Police Force, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, carry out counter narcotics direct action tasks. However, experience shows that success of the overall campaign relies just as much on the creation of good governance at the local level, a secure environment with effective law and order and demonstrable commitment by the international community.
3. **NATO Support.** Supporting Afghan government counter narcotics programmes is an ISAF Key Supporting Task. The Afghan government, supported by the international community, is making a significant effort to tackle the illicit opium trade. NATO, as the primary military force, can contribute. Facilitating Afghan institutions and security forces in a long-term national counter-narcotics strategy is consistent with ISAF's role to support the Afghan government extend its authority across the country.
4. **Parameters.** COMISAF will develop all plans in close co-ordination with the responsible Afghan government authorities and the G8 lead nation and other supporting agencies. Poppy eradication is not a task for ISAF. Any support must be within authorised rules of engagement and the varying roles and capabilities of the forces in any particular area.

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**ANNEX M – ARMS CONTROL**

- REFERENCES:
- A. Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (VD 99), 16 Nov 99.
  - B. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), 18 Sep 97.

1. **Vienna Document 99.** Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are signatories to the Vienna Document 99 (Reference A). It entails an annual exchange of military information, a requirement to give notification of certain military activities above specific thresholds and the requirement to submit to possible area inspections, all specified in the Treaty. This could include military forces from ISAF contributing nations within these states.

2. **Ottawa Convention.** Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are parties to the Ottawa Convention (Reference B). It completely prohibits use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retaining or transfer of anti-personnel mines, as well as the assistance, encouragement or inducement of any activity prohibited under the Convention, under any circumstances. Each signatory also undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines. Mine awareness and related action such as collecting them is permitted, as it supports the spirit of the Convention.

3. **Other Treaties.** Afghanistan is not a signatory to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty or the Vienna Document 99. There is, therefore, no requirement for notification or inspection, under the above agreements, of military forces within Afghanistan.

4. **Additional Remarks.** NATO, as an organisation, is not a signatory to any of these agreements and, therefore, cannot be held accountable under the terms of them. However, the provisions do bind Member States who are parties to the agreements. National forces assigned for collective military activity by member states remain subject to the arms control commitments of their individual governments. NATO and its member states should be sensitive to any arms control activities or obligations that may arise as a result of the deployment of NATO forces to this region.

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**ANNEX LL - COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS IN AFGHANISTAN**

1. **Situation.** NATO policy<sup>1</sup> on combating trafficking in human beings takes into account the universal condemnation of the crime, reiterating that it constitutes a serious abuse of human rights. In the context of the policy, "trafficking" means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat of use of force or other forms of coercion, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation. "Exploitation" shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

2. **Strategic Concept.** The approach has a twin-track: to enforce the basic standards of conduct to which NATO-led forces must adhere; and provide support, within competence and respective mandates, to responsible authorities in the host country in their efforts to combat trafficking in human beings:

a. Forces<sup>2</sup> conducting operations under NATO command and control are prohibited from engaging in trafficking in human beings or facilitating it. The detailed standards of individual behaviour, reflecting the definition of trafficking at Para 1, should be developed in theatre and made clear to contingents through COMISAF's OPLAN. Whenever evidence suggests any involvement in trafficking by ISAF personnel, even in the broadest term, the JFC will take swift action, in full consultation with national authorities, to prevent re-occurrence and ensure that appropriate disciplinary action is taken and records maintained. The JFC will also maintain oversight of any related national investigations and prosecutions concerned with misconduct by members of their forces or civilian elements, including contractors.

b. Set against a background of all ISAF personnel applying the appropriate level of personal conduct, ISAF support to responsible authorities in Afghanistan to combat trafficking in human beings will be provided, within means and capabilities, within the framework of NATO support to security sector reform and the Afghan government. Such measures will include, but not be limited to:

(1) Identification within the area of operation of local and international organisations with the capacity for protecting and housing adult and child victims of trafficking and the establishment of appropriate liaison arrangements with them.

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<sup>1</sup> National training for all personnel taking part in ISAF operations will make them aware of the problem of trafficking; how it affects human rights and stability and security; and to set out their own responsibilities and duties in this area.

<sup>2</sup> The prohibition also applies to any civilian element accompanying such forces, including contractors.



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(2) Sharing of information related to human trafficking gathered during the course of routine operations with government authorities and responsible agencies.

(3) Support to Afghan national security forces' operations<sup>3</sup>.

(4) In a similar vein to the support being provided to other initiatives, production of information products to support anti-human trafficking programmes being run by the Afghan government or responsible agencies.

c. The conformity of contributing forces to the required standards and the implementation of supporting efforts will be evaluated as part of the periodic mission review process, in accordance with agreed policy.

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<sup>3</sup> See Annex C, Appendix 2, Para 3.