J:\Document\Dominique\2005\Secretariat reports POLITICAL 127 PCTR 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS VISIT TO NEW YORK AND BOSTON SECRETARIAT REPORT 25-29 APRIL 2005 International Secretariat 15 June 2005 * This Secretariat Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

127 PCTR 05 E 1 1. Approximately 35 members of the Political Committee chaired by Egemen Bagis (Turkey), the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, visited New York and Boston from 25  to  29  April  2005.    The  main  areas  covered  in  the  meetings  were  the  reform  of  the  United Nations  (UN)  and  the  state  of  the  transatlantic  relationship.    Participants  had  the  opportunity  to exchange views with senior officials of the UN as well as numerous independent experts on the issues of the UN and transatlantic relations.   I. MEETING WITH UN OFFICIALS AND NATO-UN RELATIONS: 2. The overall message conveyed by senior UN officials to the delegation was that the growing UN-NATO  relationship  is  highly  appreciated  and  that  a  further  deepening  of  the  partnership  is strongly   desirable.      UN   Under-Secretary-General   for   Peacekeeping   Jean-Marie   Guehenno identified areas where NATO and NATO member nations could make concrete contributions to the UN.  First and foremost, he urged that NATO capabilities, particularly the NATO Reaction Force (NRF),  were  made  available  to  UN  operations.    Moreover,  the  UN  would  also  be  interested  in obtaining support from NATO in the areas of military planning and logistics.  NATO’s experience with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan has generated great interest at the  UN,  according  to  the  UN  official.    Increased  participation  of  NATO  member  countries  in  UN peacekeeping  operations  through  troop  contributions,  equipment  and  logistical  assistance  would also send an important political signal, Mr Guehenno emphasised.   3. The fact that the UN has, over time, improved its record in post-conflict reconstruction was stressed by Simon Chesterman, Executive Director of the New York University School of Law’s Institute for International Law and Justice.  In the past, there have been ‘numerous ill-co-operated programmes of the UN’, on the level of decision making, on the ‘operational level’, and the level of co-operation with local authorities.  According to Mr Guehenno, the currently 18 UN peacekeeping operations  require  about  300,000  peacekeeping  troops,  and  if  rotation  schedule  was  included, approximately 1 million soldiers.  Actual figures of peacekeepers were, however, much lower and the UN commandeered approximately 120,000 peacekeepers last year.  Because of the smooth transition from peace enforcing to peacekeeping the operations in East Timor were a role model for  future  operations  of  this  kind,  Mr  Guehenno  said.    He  anticipated  that  most  peacekeeping operations   will   be   ‘hybrid   operations’,   namely   operations   in   which   different   international organisations  will  work  together.    Which  organisation  would  take  the  lead  will  depend  on  which could   add   value.      The   discussion   revealed   different   opinions   about   the   right   to   authorise peacekeeping missions.  Senator Lamberto Dini (Italy) expressed scepticism that NATO had the mandate to co-operate in UN operations.   4. NATO-UN relations on the ground have increased considerably, particularly in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, according to Mr Guehenno.  In Kosovo KFOR and UNMIK are closely co-operating.   Briefly touching upon the violent protests that erupted in the UN-administered province in March 2004, he commented that while violent backlashes could not be completely discarded, both NATO and  the  UN  had  learned  their  lesson.    In  this  context,  he  specifically  stressed  that  the  KFOR presence  was  now  ‘robust’.    Mr  Guehenno  continued  by  reminding  participants  of  this  year’s examination  of  the  development  in  Kosovo,  which  could  lead  to  the  beginning  of  talks  over Kosovo’s final status if the province had achieved sufficient progress in the areas identified by the UN.    However,  while  Karl Kamers  (Germany)  suggested  that  it  was  necessary  to  agree  on  the final  status  of  Kosovo  this  year,  Mr  Guehenno  cautioned  that  the  UN  would  lose  a  lot  of  its leverage to advance important reforms in the province.   5. In a separate meeting, Theodore Tanoue, US State Department Fellow at Tufts University, informed about the lessons learned from the peacekeeping in South Eastern Europe.  He stressed that  military  and  civilian  aspects  of  peacekeeping  operations  needed  to  be  better  integrated.  

127 PCTR 05 E 2 Earlier  problems  of  operations  in  the  Balkans  included  an  insufficient  mandate  for  the  civilian aspects  of  peacekeeping  that  had  not  been  as  robust  as  the  military  ones.    Moreover,  the international  community’s  operations  have  too  often  been  ‘driven  by  deadlines  rather  than  by benchmarks’, he said.  One of the continuing and actually increasing problems was the growing gap   in   the   timelines   of   war   fighters   and   peace   implementers.      Available   resources   for reconstruction and build-up also remained a challenge.  Those countries torn by civil war needed positive    perspectives    and    continuing    relationship    with    the    international    community    and organisations.      In   this   context,   Mr   Tanoue   praised   NATO’s   Partnership   for   Peace   (PfP) programme.   6. Asked about a possible UN role in Iraq, Mr Guehenno commented that a UN role cannot be imposed.  In his view, such operations can be only successful if there is ‘trust and demand’.  In Iraq,  Mr  Guehenno  anticipated  that  the  UN  could  play  a  political  role  as  ‘facilitator’  if  the  Iraqis would  request  this.    In  contrast  to  Afghanistan,  a  ‘UN  blue  helmet  phase’  in  Iraq  is  unlikely,  he said, as Iraqis probably preferred to establish their own security troops.     7. UN   reform   naturally   featured   also   high   among   the   topics   discussed   during   the   visit.   According  to  UN  Under-Secretary-General  for  Political  Affairs  Kieran  Prendergast,  the  UN  has been in a state of ‘permanent revolution’ or ‘permanent reform’ since the ColdWar.  Noting that there was a ‘widespread sense that the UN is in crisis’ he observed he reminded the delegation of the three key topics that have shaped discussions on the UN, namely: humanitarian  intervention  (instigated  by  a  number  of  civil  wars  and  NATO’s  1999 Kosovo air campaign); new  security  threats  (following  the  attacks  of  9-11  that  dramatically  changed  the security threat perceptions and shifted the focus of the UN debate towards the nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism); and the authorisation and use of military force (in the context of the 2003 Iraq war). 8. Dealing  with  today's  threats  requires  broad,  deep,  and  sustained  global  co-operation,  he stressed.    Thus  the  states  of  the  world  must  create  a  collective  security  system  to  prevent terrorism,  strengthen  non-proliferation  and  bring  peace  to  war-torn  areas,  while  also  promoting human rights, democracy and development.  Therefore, the UN must go through its most radical overhaul yet, Mr Prendergast said.  He considered the next UN General Assembly meeting to be a ‘watershed’ and added that ‘if we fail to take advantage of this opportunity, we will not have one for quite some time’.  One of the key issues to debate will be the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, according to Prendergast.   The UN official argued that ‘a world without law would be a very dangerous world and failure to agree on rules would set a bad example for others, emerging powers like China and India.   9. The  possible  enlargement  of  the  UN  Security  Council  was  also  addressed.    Different opinions were expressed as to whether the question of new permanent member countries should be addressed first or last among the issues concerning UN reform.  Stressing that it will be up to UN   member   countries,   not   the   UN   secretariat,   to   decide   upon   the   UN   Security   Council, Prendergast submitted that UNSC enlargement should be the first priority because its necessary to address the 'globalisation and privatisation of terror'.  In contrast, Simon Chesterman argued that expanding membership of the Security Council, which is seen as the most important part of UN,  may  not  necessarily  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  UN.    Rather,  he  maintained  that including the issue of expanding the UNSC in the project of UN reform would make agreement on reform more difficult.   10. The  academic  emphasised  the  importance  of  UN  member  states’  political  will  for  any successful UN reform.  He submitted that, historically, reform has been led by political will and that

127 PCTR 05 E 3 the underlying issues remained the issue of ‘what is the purpose of the UN’?  Was it a forum for joint decision and action or merely a venue for discussion?  Other key questions were:  ‘on what should reform be judged?’ And ‘who should decide on reform processes?’  Referring to criticism that the UN was merely a ‘talking shop’, he reminded the delegation that outside Europe and North America  human  rights  were  much  more  precarious.    Therefore,  getting  countries  talking  about human rights is ‘not nothing’, he argued.   11. UN   Under-Secretary-General   for   Disarmament   Affairs   Nobuyasu   Abe   informed   the Committee about UN disarmament efforts.  The department, with 55 staff a rather small part of the UN administration, is increasingly working on the issue of small arms.  For many countries, e.g. in Latin   America,   small   arms   are   a   much   higher   security   concern   than   WMD,   he   reminded participants.  The senior UN disarmament official briefly sketched out developments in the area of WMD  proliferation,  emphasising  the  current  concerns  that  terrorist  groups  might  obtain  WMD.   Similar to Mr Prendergast, Mr Abe considered the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as, thus far, enormously successful because far fewer countries than originally anticipated have developed nuclear weapons.  But the NPT must be strengthened by improving existing safeguards, among other  things,  he  emphasised.    He  added  that  other  initiatives,  such  as  the  Proliferation  Security Initiative (PSI), make important contributions to prevent the proliferation of WMD.  The discussion with Mr Abe focused on the NPT review conference, which participants unanimously considered a crucial  meeting.    Different  opinions  were  expressed  as  to  the  past  effectiveness  of  the  NPT.   Donald  Anderson  (United  Kingdom)  raised  the  question  whether  the  NPT  is  now  outdated?   NATO PA Vice President Jozef Banas (Slovakia) stressed the importance of reliable intelligence for the prevention of WMD proliferation.  Unfortunately the UN did not dispose of an intelligence capability of its own, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs admitted.  Attempts to develop a UN intelligence unit had been prevented by member states.  Member states provide intelligence  sporadically  and  they  would  sometimes  do  this  to  influence  decisions  by  the  UN Secretary General, Mr Abe said.   12. Discussions  also  touched  upon  the  possible  impact  of  Iran  becoming  a  nuclear  power.   Mr Abe noted that the UN is currently not involved in negotiations with Iran, but is closely following the EU’s efforts in this regard.  He anticipated that the impact of Iran becoming a nuclear power as “serious”  and  stressed  that  this  might  incite  neighbouring  countries  to  also  attempt  to  obtain nuclear  weapons.    Moreover,  he  said,  the  NPTs  would  be  damaged  as  its  credibility  would  be undermined. 13. Commenting  that  NATO  has  transformed  from  a  “collective  defence  body  to  collective security organisation” Mr Abe said that the UN Secretariat is quite interested in working with NATO in  the  area  of  disarmament.    The  UN  disarmament  official  underlined  the  need  to  ‘devalue  the importance   of   having   nuclear   weapons’   and   to   strengthen   legal   obligations   to   nuclear disarmament.  In this context, he said that ‘NATO could lower the value of nuclear weapons’.   14. The   danger   of   ‘WMD   terrorism’   was   also   discussed   during   meetings   in   Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Nuclear terrorism is considered the key security challenge to the US, according to Professor Steven Miller, Director of the Belfer Center’s International Security Program at Harvard University.  The interest of terrorist groups in WMD has strongly increased over last 10-15 years, he said.  In this context he cited that al-Qaeda had declared the goal to kill 4 million Americans  and  that  Afghanistan  showed  al-Qaeda’s  serious  interest.    Mr  Miller  considered  the possibility of terrorists building a bomb as increasing, among others because ‘nuclear expertise is not a scarce commodity on this planet’:  the technology to build nuclear bombs is 60 years old and basic information about nuclear weapons is widely available.  Moreover, building primitive nuclear weapons  is  relatively  simple;  certainly,  no  terrorist  could  build  complex missile delivery systems, but this is not necessary.   

127 PCTR 05 E 4 15. The fact that terrorist groups might obtain nuclear materials was ‘quite plausible’ according to Professor Miller.  He identified three key risks, namely the difficulties to achieve sustainable security of fissile material in Russia; increasing proliferation by networks such as Khan; fissile material in civil research reactors; 16. Mr  Miller  argued  that  there  is  a  role  for  NATO  in  preventing  WMD  proliferation  and concluded  by  saying  that  it  was  of  utmost  importance  to  deny  terrorist  groups  access  to  fissile material.  In the discussion that followed, Valery Prozorovskiy (Russian Federation) maintained that there had been ‘no single case of theft of nuclear materials in Russia’.  Mr Miller disagreed and said that there had been hundreds of instances when nuclear materials had been stolen from facilities.  As to the probable reason why no major amount of nuclear materials has not been found as of yet he said that there is no WMD black market because there is no ‘market infrastructure’ and explained that most black markets were set up parallel to existing, legal markets.   17. Tommy   Paulsen,   NATO   Liaison   officer   at   the   UN   headquarters,   depicted   NATO-UN relations as ‘good’.  To further strengthen the relationship, he suggested that NATO and the UN might sign a declaration on a ‘distinguished partnership’.  Moreover, a possible Memorandum of Understanding  (MoU)  on  modalities  of  sharing  information  could  greatly  enhance  information sharing.      Mr   Paulsen   also   suggested   that   expanding   the   NATO   liaison   office   at   the   UN headquarters (which was established during the Balkan crises) by including a civilian officer would greatly enhance co-operation between the two organisations.  Mr Paulsen and his counterparts on the UN welcomed NATO PA visits to the UN headquarters with the former noting that they further deepen NATO-UN relations.   II. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 18. While a majority of speakers stressed the change in tone of the second Bush administration, this was interpreted differently.  A rather positive outlook was given by Bill Drozdiak, President of the   American   Council   on   Germany,   who   argued   that   several   developments,   above   all   the difficulties  in  Iraq  but  also  ‘increasing  economic  pressure’,  prompted  the  US  administration  to recognise  that  it  needed  assistance  from  its  democratic  allies.    Moreover,  Europeans  had  a leading  role  in  a  number  of  areas,  such  as  the  ‘Broader  Middle  East’,  the  Israeli-Palestinian dialogue  and  in  negotiations  with  Iran.    However,  in  Mr  Drozdiak’s  view  Iran  will  really be a test case  that  could  be  the  most  difficult  challenge  to  the  Western  Alliance  since  the  Cuban  missile crisis.  The US administration was debating possible options, but a military option to the problem was ‘widely seen as improbable’ he said.  Perhaps a "grand bargain" which reassured Iran about its own security and included Israel was possible.   19. Other speakers held a more sceptical view of the current state of the transatlantic relations.   Glenda Rosenthal, Director of the EU Program of the Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Europe, argued that the US administration had ‘not shown many signals in developing common goals with Europe’.   20. As to possible explanations for the current state of the transatlantic relationship, Mr Drozdiak commented that it appeared that Europeans fear that they might be presented with new risks by the US.  The US, on the other hand, considered the ‘European problem’ finally solved.  Therefore, now that US feels threatened in other regions, it no longer needs to focus that much on Europe.   Thus, in the eyes of the US administration, Europe is no longer the problem’, but not yet part of the  solution.    Further  development  of  the  EU  will  strongly  influence  the  transatlantic  relationship was  Ms  Rosenthal’s  the  key  message.    For  example,  US-EU  co-operation  in  the  European

127 PCTR 05 E 5 neighbourhood’ could help to revitalise the US-European partnership, she said.  The question is what impact new a EU will have, i.e. will it be content as a ‘junior partner of US, or will it challenge US dominance?  In her view, EU enlargement has extended external borders of the EU to ‘some of the most troublesome countries on the planet’.  She suggested that the EU needed to find new ways to export stability and provide a new vision for its partners.  Merely offering a prospect for EU membership  application  was  insufficient,  she  added.    The  question  raised  by  Juozas  Olekas (Lithuania) on what could be done to help Belarus move towards democratic development was left unanswered,  however.    In  slight  contrast  to  Ms  Rosenthal,  Senator  Dini  considered  ENP  as ‘eminently successful’ because it is helping nation building by providing set of rules as well as aid.   The EU had, in his view, the ‘most effective nation building policy of the world’- in stark contrast to US  policy  on  nation  building  which  is  ‘wanting’.    Ms  Rosenthal  acknowledged  that  a  successful ENP  policy  that  went  beyond  what  the  EU  is  offering  is  a  challenging  task  because  of  the heterogenity of southern neighbours and because the EU needed to respect its own values and interests and those of its member states.  Balancing these competing forces will not be an easy task particularly during times of tight national budgets, she added.   21. The importance of organisational structures for the transatlantic relationship was one of the framing discussions of a roundtable with academic experts at the Tufts University in Cambridge, Massachusetts.    Professor  Alan  Henrikson,  Associate  Professor  of  Diplomatic  History  at  The Fletcher  School,  who  proposed  a  reconsideration  of  the  transatlantic  partnership’s  underlying purposes, stressed that “structures matter”.  In this context Mr Henriksen suggested creating an "Atlantic  Steering  Group"  a  "contact  group"  which  could  provide  guidance  for  an  organisational overhaul of the US-European relationship.  Markus Meckel (Germany) submitted that institutional relations between the US and the EU should be established.   22. Other  speakers,  for  example,  Professor  Robert  Art  of  Brandeis  University,  Professor Robert Pfaltzgraff of the IFPA and Professor Michael Glennon Professor if International Law at The  Fletcher  School,  were  sceptical  that  organisational  fixes  could  solve  political  problems.   Rather, as Professort Art argued, organisational solutions would fail if the political will lacked.  In contrast  to  earlier  differences  between  the  US  and  its  Allies,  the  relationship  is  no  longer determined by a Soviet threat.  Professor Glennon remarked that the first decade of this century is no longer the decade of Europe, but rather more that of Asia.  Recent enlargements of NATO and the  EU  may  have  added  countries  that  staunchly  support  the  US,  but  European  economic  ties would   slowly   dilute   stronger   US   sentiments,   Professor   Art   cautioned.      Professor   Glennon suggested that US foreign policy was unlikely to change under a new president.  He offered three reasons why US-European differences are likely to continue: legitimacy:  In contrast to Americans, Europeans see legitimacy derive primarily from international organisations;   power disparity:  manifest power disparities provided different incentives and disincentives to meet security challenges;  a large state can rely on its military to protect itself, a small state cannot different threat assessments:  the US assesses threats deriving from terrorist groups differently than Europeans.   23. As  several  American  interlocutors  stressed,  the  transatlantic  relationship  had  also  been strained by considerations of EU member countries to sell weapons to China.  A great majority of US speakers agreed that the removal of the ‘EU arms embargo’ would be a serious issue for the US.  Both in New York and in Boston, the delegation raised issues relating to the legal standards in  treating  and  detaining  suspected  terrorists.    Juliette  Kayyem,  Acting  Executive  Director  for Research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs maintained that the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) is over, because the ‘military option is largely spent’.  Referring to the strains on  the  US  national  reserve,  she  also  said  that  the  lesson  of  the  Iraq  war  is  that  military  is

127 PCTR 05 E 6 ‘over-utilised’.  Commenting on the “plethora” of activities concerning homeland security she said that  their  co-ordination  needed  to  be  improved.    Moreover,  areas  such  as  port  security  should receive  higher  priority,  particularly  as  approximately  65  percent  of  imports  to  the  US  passed through  ports.    In  this  context,  the  delegation  also  had  an  opportunity  to  visit  the  company American   Science   and   Engineering   (AS&E),   which   produces   devices   for   the   detection   of explosives and nuclear materials.   24. In the discussions Europeans, including Colette Flesch (Luxembourg) suggested that even a  super  power  like  the  US  needed  Allies  in  an  increasingly  global  world.    For  example,  having Allies  adds  diplomatic  and  political  weight  to  a  superpower,  Professor  Glennon  acknowledged.   Professor  Art  added  that  the  US  would  like  to  have  military  support  in  Iraq,  even  it  this  was perhaps more for political than military reasons.  In contrast, Harvey Sapolski, Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, maintained that NATO was no longer necessary.  “Allied contributions to US security are mainly symbolic”, he said, and that the US was no longer relevant for European security as there are not many security threats to Europe.  Therefore, the remaining US troops in Europe  was  “absurd”.    To  act  globally,  ‘US  forces  only  needed  airports  and  gas  stations’  that facilitated operations, Mr Sapolski maintained.  He continued by saying that the US did “too much policing”  and  the  US  Allies  and  neighbours  were  not  supportive  of  the  US.    The  US  should  no longer  behave  like  a  “gentle  giant”  and  accept  that  the  Allies  were  ‘appeasing  and  free-riding’.   Therefore,  US  military  withdrawal  from  Europe  was  overdue.    To  this  Mr  Donald  Anderson suggested that the US had an interest in meeting security challenges outside the US.   25. Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) provided a short outline of ‘US Grand Strategy’.  In his view, the Iraq war and the increasing number of US losses have not significantly affected US politics, primarily because the  domestic  ‘political  costs’  for  the  US  administration  have  been  ‘relatively  low’.    Thus,  the fundamentals  that  are  driving  the  ‘US  Grand  Strategy’  have  not  changed.    In  DrPosen’s  view, America is strongly interested in sustaining its pre-eminent power advantage.  While this was this was an ‘elite project’ before 9-11 the terror attacks have now ‘added a mixture of fear and rage’.   ‘Post 9-11 Americans’ had become furiously interest in safety’ he suggested, which explained the focus on terrorism, also on WMD.  In addition, there is a surge of the ‘ideology of idealism’ which is  shared  both  by  Republicans  and  Democrats  who,  while  they  may  have  slightly  different definitions of it, believe that liberalism has to be taken abroad.    26. The meeting with military fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) touched upon a broad  number  of  political  and  military  issues  relevant  for  the  transatlantic  relationship.    Colonel Dan  Gerstein  of  the  US  Army  offered  a  brief  sketch  of  the  impact  of  globalisation  on  the application  of  national  strategy.    He  stressed  the  need  to  develop  a  more  holistic  approach  to developing a US national security strategy which no longer needed to ‘merely’ develop ways and means but also needed to weigh factors like the environment in its planning.  In the information age security is defined much more broadly and now needed to refer not only to hard power, but also  to  the  economic,  social  and  even  culture  cultural  factors.    To  meet  tomorrow’s  security threats, the entire US government needed to be reorganised and to rethink how the nation applies available resources.     27. Colonel  Ron  Bailey,  US  Marine  Corps,  briefed  about  the  2003  war  and  US  operations  in Iraq.    He  also  touched  upon  counter  insurgency  operations  and  stressed  the  importance  of ‘winning  the  hearts  and  minds’  of  the  Iraqi  people.    In  Iraq,  US  armed  forces  were  now  also involved in rebuilding efforts, as the infrastructure was devastated, not only from the war but also from neglect.   28. Commenting  positively  on  the  elections  in  Iraq,  Colonel  Gerstein  stressed  that  providing training  for  the  fledgling  Iraqi  security  forces  is  crucial.    Responding  to  a  question  by  Helmut

127 PCTR 05 E 7 Rauber  (Germany)  on  the  insurgency  in  Iraq,  Colonel  Bailey  said  he  believed  ‘that  the  US-led coalition  is  making  gains  and  that  some  Iraqis  are  now  co-operating  with  coalition  forces’.   Whether  the  insurgency  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  are  comparable  was  raised  by  Mr  Bagis.    This was not the case, according to Colonel Gerstein.  The situation was also different in Bosnia and Herzegovina  in  the  mid-1990s  as  the  warring  parties  were  war-weary  by  the  time  the  Dayton accords were concluded. 29. US  military  preponderance  and  the  huge  difference  in  defence  spending  between  the  US and  the  Allies  also  received  some  attention  during  the  visit.    The  US  military  officers  did  not anticipate a surge in European defence.  However, co-operation has improved in recent years, US military officers noted.  Allies had significantly improved co-operation among themselves after the initial experiences with IFOR and SFOR, Colonel Bailey noted.  Here, too, improved training was a main contributor to the improvements.  What is more, NATO’s Allied Centre Transition (ACT) has significantly helped improving standardisation Colonel Chris Haave of the US Air Force stressed. But the US military officers acknowledged that the US ‘needed to learn how to share information better’.  As military and post-conflict operations have become increasingly complex, the need for co-operation between government agencies as well as with NGOs has significantly increased, he noted.      Colonel  Haave  pleaded  with  the  delegation  to  not  allow  the  US  to  be  misperceived  by public opinion as the ‘hard-power ally’ and the Europeans as the ‘soft-power allies’.  US speakers generally  shared  the  view  that  a  division  of  labour  where  the  US  would  focus  on  military operations, while Europeans would do soft operations would be ‘very corrosive in the long term’.   NATO has always been about shared risks, the majority of participants agreed.  Speakers at Tufts University  also  stressed  that  NATO’s  role  and  value  would  be  significantly  diminished  if  the  US would play its off partners against each other or if European member countries would operate as a block within the Alliance.   III. AFGHANISTAN 30. The  latest  developments  in  Afghanistan  and  ways  to  assist  the  country  towards  a  more stable political and economic future were discussed on several occasions.  Mr Guehenno stressed the need to ‘consolidate improvements’ in the country and specifically referredto the problem of drug  cultivation.    The  UN  Under-Secretary-General  also  identified  the  upcoming  parliamentary elections  and  further  steps  in  the  democratisation  of  the  country  as  challenging.    Having  just returned  from  Afghanistan,  Barney  Rubin,  Director  of  Studies  and  Senior  Fellow  at  New  York University, provided an overall picture of the recent developments in the country.  He stressed that current  operations  in  Afghanistan  were  going  relatively  well.    In  this  context,  he  said  that  ‘main benchmarks’  as  stipulated  in  the  Bonn  agreement,  such  as  the  meeting  of  the  Loya  Jirga,  the adoption of the constitution, the election of an interim government presided by Hamid Karzai, had been met.  Existing shortcomings were due to shortcomings in security.  Here, too, progress was being made as armed groups have been largely disarmed and the insurgency was reduced.  What is  more,  the  powers  of  the  warlords  was  ‘crumbling’,  although  there  were  many  demobilised soldiers.    The  build-up  of  the  Afghan  National  Army  (ANA)  was  well  under  way,  Rubin  said.   However, continuation of ANA build-up was unsustainable, he warned, because continuation of the build-up would require the Afghan annual GDP, which amounts to less than $5 billion, to increase by 500 percent in the short to medium term.  He warned of the danger that a well-trained, relatively large army that could not be paid might turn into an ‘insecurity force’ rather than a security force.   31. Rubin  anticipated  the  upcoming  Afghan  parliamentary  elections  as  more  challenging  than the presidential ones last year.  For example, the absence of a reliable census made it impossible to establish single member districts, hence the provinces will be multi-member districts.  Political parties  were  ‘virtually  non-existing’  and  the  only  working  structures  have  been  armed  factions  - which  have  no  internal  democratic  structures.    Moreover,  an  Afghan  parliament  lacked  any

127 PCTR 05 E 8 ‘logistical support’ as there is no parliament building and no parliamentary staff. 32. The issue of drug production in Afghanistan was also discussed.  Afghanistan itself cannot solve  the  drug  problems  of  industrialised  countries,  Mr  Rubin  stressed.    He  estimated  that  drug production is worth approximately 2.6 billion US-$ or 60 percent of the legal economy, respectively 40 percent of the total.  The dilemma was that stabilisation of the country required eradication of the  drug  production,  but  that  would  destroy  40  percent  of  the  economy.    The  country’s  main problem is the amount of illegal income which goes into the pockets of warlords.  The good news was  that  because  of  the  counter  narcotics  programme,  drug  production  has  decreased.    Asked about   viable   counter-narcotics   policy   Rubin   recommended   focusing   on   interdiction   and   on economic development.  Rural development (water management, electricity) and a comprehensive reform of civil service were needed, he said. 33. Rubin commented positively on the NATO-led International Security Force (ISAF).  ISAF was particularly successful in ‘shielding’ the Afghan government from the militias and in ‘mitigating the domestic  political  pressure  on  the  government.’    But  ISAF  has  not  provided  the  kind  of  security that it was originally planned for and the militias could consolidate power in their areas, Mr Rubin added.    In  addition  to  substantial,  long-term  assistance  by  the  Allies  and  the  international community, Afghanistan will need regional co-operation to develop, Mr Rubin stressed.   34. Cindy   Williams,   Senior   Fellow   of   the   Security   Studies   Program   at   MIT,   briefed   the Committee on the US experience in the transition from conscript forces to professional ones and the current trends in European forces.  While transformation towards professional forces is often motivated  by  domestic  reasons,  all-volunteer  forces  are  often  considered  more  appropriate  to tackle  today’s  security  challenges  as,  it  is  argued,  professional  forces  are  more  deployable  and allowed   closing   the   capabilities   gap   (with   US   forces)   more   easily.      Another   argument   for abandoning  military  conscription  is  that  all  volunteer  forces  are  smaller  and  therefore  less expensive.  Ms Williams noted that these anticipations have been corroborated in the case of the US.  Transformation of US forces has produced a much more hi-tech force than before.  However, she cautioned that one should not ignore problems involved and the duration of the transformation process.    While  switching  to  an  all-volunteer  force  has  taken  approximately  a  decade in the US this was likely to be even longer in Europe because of demographic, social, and economic factors. 35. In addition, European countries are likely to face similar difficulties as the US did during the transformation  period.    Among  the  problems,  Ms  Williams  cited  recruiting  (as  it  becomes  more difficult to recruit sufficient numbers and quality of recruits) and ‘attrition’ (as a high percentage of recruits leaves prematurely as the US has experienced).  What is more, projected cost reductions are not achieved or savings are not used for military purposes, Ms Williams added.  Unlike in the US,  the  shift  to  all-volunteer  forces  in  Europe  appears  simultaneously  with  a  downsizing  of defence  budgets;  which  is  likely  to  make  force  transformation  more  difficult.    Ms  Williams concluded  by  saying  the  decision  to  adopt  all-volunteer  forces  depends  on  the  specific  national circumstances:    While  there  are  good  arguments  for  abandoning  military  conscription,  some European  countries  have  found  ways  to  adapt  their  conscript  systems  in  a  manner  that  makes their armed forces more flexible and effective.  The discussion with the delegation touched upon the economic, societal and political effects of transforming conscript armies to all-volunteer forces.   Noting  that  200,000  of  Germany's  320,000  soldiers  are  volunteers,  Mr Rauber stressed that the pool of conscripts provided the ‘best soldiers’ and that they are needed for out of area operations.