SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 100 STCMT 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE PROLIFERATION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY VISIT TO MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION SECRETARIAT REPORT 25-27 APRIL 2005 International Secretariat 13 May 2005 * This Secretariat Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

100 STCMT 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Members of the Sub-Committee on Proliferation of Military Technology travelled to Moscow, Federation of Russia, to discuss the issues related to the dismantlement and security of Russia's arsenals   of   weapons   of   mass   destruction   (WMD).   The   NATO-PA   delegation   was   led   by               Mr.   Lothar   Ibr gger   (Germany),  the  Treasurer  of  the  Assembly  and  the  Sub-Committee's Rapporteur.  The  delegation  met  their  colleagues  from  the  State  Duma,  as  well  as  Russian government officials, independent analysts and representatives of the scientific community. II. STATE DUMA 2. On  April  25,  the  NATO  legislators  had  a  number  of  meetings  at  the  State  Duma  of  the Russian Federation. Mrs.  Lubov  Sliska, First Deputy Chair of the State Duma and Head of the Duma  delegation  to  the  NATO-PA,  opened  the  first  meeting.  In  her  welcoming  remarks,  she stressed that the prospect of NATO-Russian co-operation in the field of military-technological was very promising. The idea of developing joint NATO-Russian military-technological projects was named  as  one  of  top  priorities  in  the  presentation  by  Mr.  Nikolay  Bezborodov,  member  of  the Duma's Defence Committee. Mr. Bezborodov maintained that such a co-operation would enhance the general spirit of NATO-Russian relationships. The development of Russia's military-industrial complex,  Mr.  Bezborodov  believed,  could  contribute  to  a  stabilisation  in  vulnerable  regions,  as Russian   supplies   of   military  technology  might  help  sustain  a  military  balance  between  the adversaries.    NATO    and    Russian    military-scientific    communities    should    co-operate    more extensively  as  well.  According  to  Mr.  Bezborodov,  Russia  is  being  abused  by  some  new  NATO countries from Central and Eastern Europe in terms of intellectual property, as these countries are using former Soviet military-technological know-how without proper agreements with Russia. 3. Mr. Rafael Gimalov, member of the State Duma delegation to NATO-PA, presented a basic overview of the Russian position towards guarding WMD arsenals. Russia is determined to join and actively participate in international initiatives and frameworks designed to regulate the world's WMD sector. This sector in the Soviet Union/Russia was always under rigid governmental control. Mr.  Gimalov  maintained  that  private  companies  should  be  kept  away  from  the  military  complex, since only governmental institutions could manage this sector with full responsibility. The security of Russia's WMD complex meets the highest standards, as was demonstrated by the Avaria'2004 exercise  last  year.  Any  fears  that  the  WMD  arsenals  are  not  guarded  properly  are  absolutely unfounded. Certain problems, of course, remain – for instance, the slow pace of the destruction of chemical weapons – but these are rather technical issues. 4. A large part of Mr. Gimalov's presentation dealt with the issue of weapons in space. This is a  particularly  relevant  problem  in  terms  of  ecology.  Private  companies  that  operate  in  cosmos sometimes  lack  a  responsible  attitude,  thereby  causing  cosmic  contamination,  which  is  virtually permanent.   Russia   strongly   supports   policies   directed   against   weapons   in   space.   A   more comprehensive international regime in this area needs to be elaborated, and the NATO-PA could contribute  to  this.  Mr.  Ibr gger  suggested  that  Mr.  Gimalov  take  the  initiative  and  prepare  a presentation on this issue for the NATO-PA Annual session in Copenhagen, which could be later transformed into a Committee' Special report. 5. The   highly   important   issue   of   the   utilisation   of   decommissioned   Russian   nuclear submarines   was  addressed  in  the  presentations  by   Mr.   Sergey  Antipov,  Deputy  Head  of Russian  Federal  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (Rosatom),  and  Mr.  Viktor  Akhunov,  Head  of  the Department  for  Environment  and  Decommisioned  Nuclear  Facilities  of  Rosatom.  The  issue  was named as one of four priorities by the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials  of  Mass  Destruction,  launched  in  2002  in  Kananaskis,  Canada,  and  one  of  the  two

100 STCMT 05 E 2 priorities   in   cooperative   threat   reduction   efforts   for   the   Russian   Federation   (together   with destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles). 6. Mr.  Antipov  stressed  that  the  issue  of  decommissioned  nuclear  submarines  is  particularly acute   in   Russia,   primarily   due   to   the   vast   amount   of   such   submarines.   To   this   day,   the USSR/Russia  has  built  as  many  as  250  nuclear  submarines,  and  195  of  them  have  been decommissioned.  112  submarines  have  been  dismantled  (31  of  them  –  with  the  assistance  of foreign  donors),  and  the  remaining  83  are  either  in  the  process  of  dismantlement  or  awaiting  it. Russia expects to finish the utilisation process by 2010, provided the foreign donors honour their commitments. 7. A number of problems are related to the issue: - Most  of  the  submarines  were  decommissioned  in  the  period  of  1988-1998,  when  the USSR/Russia was suffering particular economic hardships. A number of decommissioned submarines  were  abandoned  and  left  in  shabby  condition,  often  with  the  spent  fuel  and radioactive waste onboard, thus seriously threatening the environment. - A number of coastal storage facilities are in extremely poor shape, with the Andreyeva Bay being the most illustrious example. - The  efforts  to  secure  the  submarines  remain  dangerously  underfunded.  Although  the Global   Partnership   countries   pledged   to   dedicate   approximately   10%   of   the   total Partnership's commitment of $20 billions to the utilisation of Russian nuclear submarines, only a tiny amount actually reached Russia. According to the Rosatom figures, so far only $542 million were provided to the utilisation of submarines in the framework of the Global Partnership, and almost half of this amount ($266 million) coming from Russia itself. - As many as 41 service boats containing dangerous waste also need to be secured. At this point, the utilisation of these large boats seems hardly feasible. 8. With  respect  to  the  sensitive  issue  of  access  to  dismantlement  facilities  and  storages,  the Rosatom officials believed that the problem was virtually solved. The foreign delegations may visit the sites provided they warned the Russian side at least 30 days in advance. The issue is often being raised only as an excuse for refusing to meet financial commitments. 9. The question of liability for accidents while implementing threat reduction projects is one of the  most  significant  stumbling  blocks  that  hinders  broader  US  involvement  in  the  utilisation  of submarines.  According  to  the  representatives  of  Rosatom,  the  US  does  not  even  wish  to  be responsible  for  the  harm  that  was  caused  by  deliberate  actions  of  American  contractors  and employees.  The  Russian  government  under  President  Yeltsin  accepted  such  a  pre-condition  in early 1990s, however, the current Russian administration has taken a much more rigorous stance in this respect. Nevertheless, the problem might be easily solved if both sides had a political will. 10. The  problem  of  co-ordinating  efforts  was  also  raised  during  the  discussions.  In  addition  to the Global Partnership, the issues related to utilisation are also being dealt with by initiatives such as   Northern   Dimension   Environmental   Partnership   (NDEP),   the   Artic   Military   Environmental         Co-operation  (AMEC),  IAEA's  Contact  Expert  Group,  and  the  Multilateral  Nuclear  Environment Program  in  the  Russian  Federation  (MNEPR).  While  the  Russian  experts  believe  that  better coordination is vitally important, as some contributions are minor and need to be grouped, they do not support the idea of establishing one coordination forum. All of the initiatives deal with different aspects of the issue, the Rosatom representatives maintained. 11. Mr.  Vyacheslav  Kulebyakin,  Deputy  Director  of  Federal  Agency  on  Industry,  briefed  the NATO  parliamentarians  on  the  chemical  weapons  (CW)  destruction  programme  in  Russia. Russia's legacy of the Soviet of CW arsenal is the largest in the world – approximately 40 000 tons of  chemical  agents,  located  in  7  sites.  The  country  ratified  the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention

100 STCMT 05 E 3 (CWC) in 1997, and agreed to destroy its SW arsenal by 2012. The task is extremely challenging, and the costs of the programme are enormous. Russia desperately needs foreign assistance. The first  destruction  facility  was  finished  in  Gornyi  in  2002  with  considerable  aid  from  Germany, Finland,  Sweden  and the EU. The other two facilities in Shchuchye and Kambarka are currently under  construction.  The  Americans  are  mostly  focusing  on  the  Shchuchye  facility,  designed  to destroy  a  vast  part  of  nerve  gas  agents  (the  most  significant  part  of  all  Russian  CW).  The  UK, Canada, Italy, France and other countries are also becoming extensively involved. 12. However,   a   number   of   problems   remain,   and   most   importantly   –   the   slow   pace   of destruction.  By  now,  only  approximately  2%  of  all  agents  have  been  destroyed.  Serious  doubts remain  whether  Russia  will  actually  manage  to  finish  the  process  by  2012.  The  international assistance is far less significant than Russia initially expected. Only a little more than $200 million were actually received out of the total Global Partnership pledge of $1.7 billion for CW destruction. Russia carries the largest share of the burden, having contributed more than $500 million. Russian contribution increased dramatically in 2005 – more than double compared to 2004. 13. Mr. Kulebyakin criticised the American proposals to destroy all nerve gases at Shchuchye. The  transportation  of  chemical  agents  is  extremely  costly  and  dangerous.  Russian  officials strongly   believe   that  destruction  facilities  should  be  built  in  proximity  to  the  storage  sites.             Mr. Ibr gger agreed with this rationale and suggested that both Russian and American politicians, including parliamentarians, exert their influence to eliminate this disagreement. 14. Mr. Peter Litavrin, Deputy Director of the Security and Disarmament Department of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking on Russian views towards strengthening the Biological and Toxin  Weapons  Convention  (BTWC),  emphasised  the  growing  threat  of  bioterrorism.  Russia fully supports the initiatives to introduce verification tools to the BTWC, comparable to those of the CWC.  Russia  regrets  that  the  United  States  decided  to  abandon  this  initiative.  The  Russian officials reiterated assurances that the country did not possess offensive biological weapons (BW). However,  they  also  referred  to  the  sensitivity  of  biological  sector  in  terms  of  "national  security", thereby  explaining  the  reluctance  to  provide  access  to  certain  biological  R&D  facilities.  When asked  about  possible  contradiction  between  these  two  statements,  the  host  side  pointed  to  the lack of reciprocity on part of the US. The Russian participants assured the NATO-PA delegation, that signing the Verification Protocol to the BTWC would solve the 'access problem'. 15. Mr.  Ibr gger  stated  that  the  magnitude  of  the  threat  of  biological  terrorism  cannot  be overemphasised. The anthrax agents used against the US Congress were of American origin. The head of the NATO-PA delegation posed a rhetorical question: "what if one day the Russian Duma was  attacked  by  bioagents  originating  from  Russia's  facilities?  Or  the  German  Bundestag?"         Mr. Ibr gger urged all sides to move forward with effective cooperative security arrangements. He also  highlightened  the  importance  of  the  scientific  redirection  programmes,  ensuring  the  non- proliferation in biological weapons expertise. 16. In  his  presentation,  Mr.  Evgeny  Utkin  of  Russian  Foreign  Affairs  Ministry  presented  the Russian  perspective  on  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  Russia's  recent  decision  to  ratify  the  Protocol  was based on the conclusion that the Protocol was beneficial not only for the environment, but also in terms   of   long-term   economic   development,   as   new   and   more   efficient   technologies   are encouraged by the Protocol. Russia regrets that the US and Australia decided to stay out of this agreement.  Russian  authorities  prepared  a  comprehensive  programme  for  the  coordination  of efforts in implementing the Protocol, and look forward to cooperating with other countries. 17. In  general,  the  participants  from  both  NATO-PA  and  Russia  agreed  that  the  only  way  of solving the problems related to security of the WMD complex in Russia was abandoning Cold-war era prejudices and engaging in truly genuine co-operation.

100 STCMT 05 E 4 III. INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) AND THE CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTRE 18. On April 26, the Sub-Committee met with outstanding representatives of Russia's scientific and  expert  community,  listened  to  comprehensive  analytical  presentations  and  participated  in intense roundtable discussions on various aspects of WMD related issues. 19. With  respect  to  nuclear  security,  the  experts  were  rather  positive  that  Russia's  nuclear weapons   and   relative   materials   had   been   properly   guarded,   and   significant   quantities   of dangerous materials of Russian origin had never been lost. As Dr. Viktor Mizin of IMEMO put it, the truth is somewhere in the middle of two radical approaches – 'apocalyptic' approach (terrorists are about to acquire nuclear weapons) and 'everything is perfect' approach, often reflected in the position of Russian government. While the security of military assets was demonstrated in series of  exercises,  only  half  of  the  non-military  nuclear  material  storages  received  adequate  security upgrades.  The  sensitivity  of  the  'access  issue'  is  closely  related  to  the  fact  that  the  nuclear deterrence strategy remains  to be the backbone of post-Cold War military strategies. 20. Experts were seriously concerned about the prospects of finishing the destruction of CW in Russia by 2012, as provided by the CWC. According to Dr. Alexander Savelyev, the Russian CW expert,  the  most  probable  scenario  was  that  both  Russia  and  the  US,  by  far  two  of  the  largest possessors   of   CW,   would   eventually   request   the   extension   of   the   Convention's   deadlines. Nevertheless, he believed that most of the co-operation problems were merely bureaucratic and could be easily overcome. 21. The  scholars  reiterated  regrets  that  the  US  had  decided  not  to  support  the  Verification Protocol   to   BTWC.   Mr.    Grigoryi    Shcherbakov   of   Biopreparat,   a   vast   pharmaceutical conglomerate, allegedly involved in production of Soviet BW, stated that he had never seen BW during  his  20  years  with  Biopreparat.  All  biological  research  laboratories  are  engaged  in  purely civilian  activities.  In  fact,  production  of  offensive  BW  agents  is  considered  a  criminal  offense  in Russia's  criminal  code.  Nevertheless,  Mr.  Shcherbakov  acknowledged  the  seriousness  of  a bioterror  threat,  as  any  person  with  standard  biological  background  could  produce  dangerous pathogens  in  his/her  kitchen,  while  modern  transportation  means  could  facilitate  the  spread  of these  agents.  A  serious  problem,  widely  mentioned  in  the  discussions,  was  the  fate  of  former weapons  scientists.  According  to  Mr.  Shcherbakov's  figures,  Biopreparat  currently  employed approximately  5  000  scientists,  down  from  28  000  in  Soviet  times.  At  least  some of those other     23 000 might pose expertise proliferation threats. 22. During  the  roundtable  discussions,  the  participants  also  discussed  the  issues  related  to export  controls,  the  security  of  nuclear  power  plants,  NATO-Russian  co-operation  in  fighting terrorism and other relevant topics. IV. NANOTECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE 23. On April 29, the NATO legislators met with Mr. Boris Pastukhov, Senior Vice-President of the  Russia's  Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  a  number  of  experts  from  Russian  Nanotechnology Institute, led by Professor Mikhail Ananyan, to discuss the prospects of nanotechnology (NT – manipulation  of  material  on  an  atomic  and  molecular  level),  the  topic  that  is  addressed  in  this year's Sub-Committee report.

100 STCMT 05 E 5 24. Mr.  Pastukhov  assured  the  guests  that  Russian  business  and  even  the  authorities  had become increasingly aware of the potential of NT, and that Russia was the third leading nation of the world in NT R&D, after the United States and Japan. 25. In his extensive presentation, Prof. Ananyan described the extraordinary nature on NT. NT enables  revolutionary  breakthroughs  in  medicine,  ecology,  biology,  manufacturing,  computing, optics  and  virtually  all  areas  of  life  by  exposing  unique  characteristics  of  materials.  Russian scientists have already invented a number of nanodevices that would be widely used in medicine, decontamination, energy saving and other practical areas. NT has a potential of ultimately solving the world's energy problems, diminishing the significance of traditional resources, such as oil, gas or  coal,  thereby  radically  changing  the  geopolitical  situation.  The  changes  might  by  so  dramatic that the question arises whether the society is ready to accept them. 26. However, just like any technological revolution, NT might be potentially used for malevolent purposes.  Nanoweapons  could  be  virtually  undetectable,  facilitating  proliferation.  Autonomously killing  nanorobots  and  other  nanoweapons  could  radically  change  military  strategies  and  tactics. The  participants  agreed  that,  while  technological  progress  was  impossible  to  stop,  the  world's politicians  should  consider  the  issue  seriously  and  come  up  with  preventive  measures,  and possibly launching a new international convention, in order to ensure peaceful development of NT.