POLITICAL 040 PC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y NATO’S EVOLVING ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS DRAFT GENERAL REPORT BERT KOENDERS (NETHERLANDS) GENERAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 12 April 2005 * Until  this  document  has  been  approved  by  the  Political  Committee,  it  represents  only  the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

040 PC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION - NATO AFTER THE SUMMITS ................................................................ 1 II. NATO’S EVOLVING ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS ......................................... 2 III. LESSONS FROM PAST AND CURRENT MISSIONS:  BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN............. 3 IV. INCREASING DEMAND VERSUS LIMITED RESOURCES .................................................. 6 V. NEW CHALLENGES:  IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND AFRICA................... 7 VI. CO - OPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ACTORS............................................................ 8 VII. AFTER THE 2005 SUMMIT................................................................................................... 9

040 PC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION - NATO AFTER THE SUMMITS 1. The visit of President Bush to Europe in late February for summits with NATO and European Union (EU) leaders has been heralded as signalling the beginning of a much needed new chapter of transatlantic harmony.  Many believe that his visit laid the foundations for the Allies to put their recent difficulties behind them, and move ahead together to confront the difficult challenges facing the transatlantic partnership.  The veracity of this assumption will be sorely tested in the coming months as the Alliance faces issues such as its possible role in the Middle East, the situation in Iran and the prospective lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. 2. Questions also remain about the role and relevance of NATO itself.  Despite the remarkable military transformation that began at NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002, it is by no means clear  that  parallel  progress  has  been  achieved  in  political  transformation¹.    These  reservations were encapsulated by the remarks of German Chancellor Schröder at the 2005 Munich Security Conference,  where  he  stated  that  NATO  "is  no  longer  the  primary  venue  where  transatlantic partners discuss and co-ordinate strategies."  While his calls for a blue ribbon panel fell on stony ground, most observers agree that member states must decide what sort of a role they wish NATO to fulfil.   3. One  answer  emphasised  by  the  Secretary  General  himself  is  that  NATO  should  become more  political.    The  most  obvious  interpretation  of  this  would  be  that  the  Alliance  once  again becomes a key framework in which member countries consult on a broad range of security issues, not only those with a military dimension.  NATO should not be relegated to being only the provider of capabilities, but incorporate these in a set of political and security policies and concepts. 4. The challenge is not how to win or lose a competition with institutions such as the EU, but rather  how  to  improve  consultation  and  co-operation  between  NATO  and  the  EU  so  that  the special  competencies  of  each  organization  can  be  brought  to  bear  synergistically  to  prevent, manage,  and  deal  with  crises  and  conflicts  wherever  and  whenever  they  arise.    Among  other things, this will involve dealing with the hitherto intractable problem of reconciling how exactly the triangular relationship between NATO, the United States and the EU will work.  We need a more concrete NATO-EU agenda without prior conditions. 5. The  recent  summit  has  paved  the  way  for  serious  discussions  about  how  to  develop  the Alliance’s political role, and there are grounds for optimism that real progress can be made.  In the wake  of  9-11  and  the  demise  of  the  old  ‘out-of-area’  debate,  NATO  is  actively  seeking  in  the NATO  Response  Force  the  wherewithal  to  deploy  military  forces  ‘wherever,  whenever-‘  needed.   However, the setting of political priorities and consensus making on when and where to deploy is still  weak;  the  US  is  not  involved  in  the  NRF  with  troops,  and  divisions  of  labour  are  not  yet clarified.  Even more relevant, deployment will have to be part of a broader political strategy and a key discussion on contentious issues (the nature of the ‘war on terrorism’ and national caveats) is overdue.  A High Level Group on the political transformation of NATO is called for.  It should focus on  the  core  business  of  NATO  as  formulated  in  Istanbul  and  rethink  its  political  consequences.   Nothing can be taken for granted, including a review of the role of the NATO Council and outdated political  mechanisms  of  decision  making.    The  financing  mechanism  of  NATO  operations  is  not acceptable and a critical assessment has to be made of the support for NATO among key decision 1 This   transformation   has   included   substantial   reform   of   the   structure   of   NATO’s   headquarters.   Divisional  responsibilities  have  been  adjusted  and  the  number  of  committees  has  been  greatly reduced.  This reorganisation is continuing, and will no doubt have to be carried further if NATO is to successfully   expand   its   “political   consultation   capabilities”.      While   this   re -organisation   of   the headquarters is important, the Rapporteur prefers to focus attention on the key political issues involved rather than exploring the details of what is after all NATO’s internal “office management”.  However, he will continue to monitor all aspects of NATO’s political transformation.

040 PC 05 E 2 makers, opinion makers on both sides of the Atlantic.  We should avoid a situation in which some organisations are for soft, others for hard security or a situation in which the mission creates the Alliance.    6. At  the  same  time,  pragmatic  co-operation  is  evolving:    NATO  and  EU  co-operation  in  the Balkans  has  worked  well,  and  there  is  a  considerable  incentive  for the two organisations to find effective  ways  of  working  together  to  enhance  stability  and  security  even  well  beyond  their borders.   7. Recognising the potential and realising it are, of course, not the same thing, and the issues which have divided the United States and Europe in recent years have not gone away.  In fact, a cursory look reveals that their number has increased.  With regard to the so-called ‘Greater Middle East’  the  Allies  share  the  view  that  it  poses  a  crucial  security  challenge  and  urgently  needs assistance to reform, but there is no agreement about how to best achieve this.  On Iran, everyone agrees that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a high security challenge, there is very little, if any, consensus on how to instigate Iran to abandon its current plans.  Other disagreements range from whether  or  not  EU  companies  should  be  allowed  to  sell  arms  to  China  to  removing  national restrictions  on  troops  provided  to  NATO  operations.    In  addition,  over  the  past  two  years,  your Rapporteur has outlined a number of additional areas where the Allies need to find a consensus, including the use of force, combating terrorist groups and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.  The political dialogue should be expanded, but not in all directions:  it has to relate to the core business of NATO.   8. The broad range of contentious topics calls for a comprehensive study on the future of the Alliance.    Unless  the  Allies can find a consensus on the issues mentioned above, NATO will be gradually undermined.  In a changing global setting, with different power relations between the US and a ‘post-convention’ EU different views on ways forward and the use of military power, a 2005 Harmel vision on the future of NATO is called for.  Such a study calls for broad transatlantic input and analysis.   9. This spring report will start focusing on only one aspect of this larger question:  NATO’s role in  post-conflict  operations.    NATO  has  an  admirable  track  record  in  this  area.    Quite  simply  its operations  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  in  Afghanistan  are  helping  to  build  nations  from  the wreckage of failed states.  However, one of the main lessons to be learned from these operations can be summarised by the old adage “prevention is better than cure”. II. NATO’S EVOLVING ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS 10. While  its  core  function  remains  the  defence  of  its  member  nations,  NATO's  role  has dramatically  changed  over  the  last  15  years.    Today's  primary  security  threats  are  perceived  to emanate from failed states, from internationally active terrorist groups and from the proliferation of WMD.    As  these  challenges  are  no  longer  geographically  limited,  but  global  in  nature,  NATO's traditional geographic and functional limitations have been superseded by a new set of tasks.    11. The profound transformation of the Alliance is reflected in its way of thinking, its capabilities and its relationships.  For example, almost half of NATO’s member states are former members of the Warsaw Pact or Republics of the Soviet Union.  With regard to its capabilities, the Alliance now tries  to  build  up  forces  that  can  be  quickly  deployed  anywhere  in  the  world  to  tackle  emerging threats rather than just to respond to an attack.   12. Today,  the  Alliance  projects  security  and  stability  well  beyond  the  limits  of  its  historical confinements.    Two  of  NATO's  most  important  missions,  Afghanistan  and  training  Iraqi  security forces, are outside Europe.  Further demands on NATO to take on additional post-conflict jobs are

040 PC 05 E 3 highly  likely:    The  UN  suffers  from  an  ‘overload  of  operations’  and  the  EU’s  fledgling  military capabilities remain very limited for years to come.  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said as much to the Political Committee last spring.  No other organisation can generate, deploy, command and sustain large, multinational military operations such as NATO.   13. Naturally, NATO’s expansion into new fields of security has gradually taken place.  During the 1990s, as a consequence of the Balkans wars, NATO expanded its activities inside Europe.   As  failed  and  failing  states  have  now  been  recognised,  following  9-11,  as  important  security concerns that need to be addressed, NATO has also become active outside Europe. 14. This  report  looks  at  NATO's  experience  from  past  and  present  post -conflict  operations  in South-Eastern Europe and Afghanistan.  As demand on the Alliance for increasing its contribution to ‘out-of-area’ operations of this kind will surely increase, Member States must come to a better understanding about NATO’s possibilities as well as limitations in this field.  In the autumn report, your  Rapporteur  plans  to  put  forward  general  proposals  for  future  Alliance  engagements  in post-conflict operations.   III. LESSONS FROM PAST AND CURRENT MISSIONS:  BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN 15. The  EU’s  political  and  the  UN’s  military  failures  to  end  the  conflicts  in  former  Yugoslavia triggered  NATO’s  involvement  in  South-Eastern  Europe.    The  Alliance  became  increasingly involved  in  supporting  UN  attempts  to  broker  an  end  to  hostilities  and  keep  the  peace  where  a cease-fire had been agreed.  NATO provided support in various air- and sea-based operations - enforcing economic sanctions, an arms embargo, and a no-flight zone - and by providing the UN with  detailed  military  contingency  planning  concerning  safe  areas  and  the  implementation  of  a peace plan.  As a consequence, its capabilities and expertise to manage complex peace support operations have, albeit belatedly, improved significantly.   16. Operations  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  were  a  real  watershed  for  NATO’s  role  in post-conflict  operations.    The  creation  of  the  NATO-led  Implementation  Force  (IFOR)  was  in recognition of the fact that civil war and instability in the Balkans posed the most serious threat to European  security  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.    IFOR  was  NATO’s  first  large-scale  ground operation.  In fact, before IFOR NATO had no experience with planning 'out -of-area' operations.   IFOR  and  the  Stabilisation  Force  (SFOR)  that  succeeded  it  required  NATO’s  engagement  in war-fighting, deterrence and humanitarian capabilities all at the same time.  Following the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, NATO deployed approximately 54,000 troops to enforce the military  aspects  of  the  agreement  and  to  provide  security  for  humanitarian  and other assistance activities.      In   BiH,   NATO-led   forces   enforced   the   cease-fire,   ensured   the   separation   and progressive reduction of the three ethnically based armies from more than 400,000 soldiers and militia  to  20,000  by  2003  and  disbanded  paramilitary  police  units.    More  than  40  countries  have been  participating  in  IFOR  and  SFOR.    On  an  operational  level,  NATO  will  have  to  improve training  to  become  more  rigorous  and  standardised  with  a  focus  on  greater  interoperability, especially in command, control, communication, computers and intelligence.   17. In  Kosovo,  NATO-led  forces  watched  over  the  withdrawal  of  uniformed  Yugoslav  security forces  and  their  stationing  outside  the  province  and  the  monitoring  of  the  de-militarisation  and transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).  The NATO-led KFOR operates under UNSC mandate    and    assists    in    facilitating    the    peaceful    co-existence    between    Serbs    and Kosovo-Albanians.  KFOR's approximately 17,500 troops also provide the political stabilisation of the  province.    However,  KFOR  and  the  UN  Mission  in  Kosovo  were  criticised  for  their  failure  to prevent the March 2004 riots during which 19 Serbs were killed.  NATO has learned its lesson and adjusted its troops accordingly.  NATO will retain a strong presence in the province and provide

040 PC 05 E 4 essential security, as NATO heads of state and government confirmed at the Brussels Summit in February this year.   18. NATO operations in the FYR of Macedonia² were remarkable because the Alliance decided to intervene preventively to defuse a highly volatile situation.  With only a relatively light "footprint" but  with  a  good  co-operation  with  the  EU  and  the  OSCE,  NATO’s  operation  “Essential  Harvest” followed the Ohrid Agreement of August 2001, which put an end to open hostilities.  3,500 NATO troops  disarmed  ethnic  Albanian  groups and destroyed their weapons within 30 days.  This was the  first  time  NATO  became  involved  in  a  region  with  smaller  teams.    However,  NATO's  limited military presence there was backed by superior military might, which stood ready to intervene, if necessary.    “Essential  Harvest”  was  followed  by  NATO  operations  “Amber  Fox”  and  “Allied Harmony”.    While  the  former  consisted  of  300  troops  tasked  to  protect  international  monitors  to oversee   implementation   of   the   Ohrid   peace   plan,   the   latter   also   assisted   the   Macedonian government  in  taking  ownership  of  security  in  the  country.    In  April  2003,  the  EU  took  over  the NATO-led peacekeeping operation “Allied Harmony” 19. In  Afghanistan,  NATO  has  taken  over  the  International  Security  Assistance  Force  forces (ISAF), which operates under UNSC authorisation in August 2003.  The basic role for NATO is to provide  security  for  the  area  of  Kabul  and  to  assist  the  expansion  of  the  central  government’s authority  in  the  country.    The  Alliance  also  provided  support  for  the  presidential  elections  last October  by  sending  additional  forces.    In  addition to ISAF, NATO has also gradually taken over command  over  several  Provincial  Construction  Teams  (PRTs)  in  the  North  and  the  West  of  the country.    In  contrast  to  Kosovo  and  BiH,  NATO  is  not  present  on  a  large  scale,  which  is  one reason  why  security  in  large  parts  of  the  country  remains  problematic,  though  Allied  troops contributed  to  greater  stability  of  Afghanistan.    Remnants  of  the  Taliban  and  al-Qaeda  are  still operating   in   the   southeast   of   the   country,   where   some   NATO   Allies   participate   in   the approximately  18,000-strong  US-led  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  (OEF).    However,  the  most serious security challenge to the country stems from local warlords, many of whom are involved in the narcotics traffic.  The country produces approximately 3,500 tons of opium annually, most of which  is  being  exported  to  Europe.    Unfortunately,  the  Allies  have  been  slow  to  reach  an agreement about the way to deal with the opium production in the country.  Some NATO countries argue to use troops to eradicate poppy cultures, while others have suggested to offer financial and other  incentives  to  farmers  to  convince  them  to  no  longer  grow  poppy  and  switch  to  different products.  However, there now appears to be a general agreement that different tactics need to be simultaneously applied and that any eradication will have to be done by Afghan forces a NATO PA delegation learned during a visit to Afghanistan this March.  President Karzai will have to take the decisions  here,  and  they  will  have  to  be  related  to  a  more  operational  strategy  of  economic development in many areas of Afghanistan.   20. Tackling the problem of the warlords remains a difficult issue, given the limited size of NATO forces there.  The possible alternative, however, co-opting the warlords, would in the medium to long  run  pose  even  bigger  problems  as  some  of  them  have  no  interest  in  the  creation  of  a pluralistic state that the international community is attempting to establish there.  This is already problematic  in  the  context  of  OEF,  which  works  outside  the  NATO  political  framework.    Unless action is taken to bring them in, the parliamentary elections now scheduled for 21 September this year  are  likely  to  be  heavily  influenced  by  the  local  warlords.    Therefore,  the  international community  could  face  the  risk  of  creating  a  narco-state.    On  the  positive  side,  a  NATO  Senior civilian representative in Afghanistan informed the NATO PA delegation this March that a number of warlords have, in fact, disbanded their militias and turned in their heavy weapons.  Ultimately the Afghan National Army (ANA) will be responsible for security in the country, but it is important to note that NATO members will continue to have an important role in training the ANA. 2 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

040 PC 05 E 5 21. Several   key   lessons   can   be  drawn  from  NATO’s  involvement  in  the  Balkans  and  in Afghanistan.    First  is  the  need  to  embed  any  military  deployment  and  involvement  in  a  wider, regional context.  Since the initial stages of its deployment in the Balkans, the Alliance has sought to  develop  a  regional,  long-term  approach  to  peacekeeping  and  reconstruction.    As  NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has argued, one key lesson is not to put oneself under artificial  time  pressure  and  to  be  committed  to  stay  until  peace  is  self-sustaining.    At  the  same time,   any   post-conflict   involvement   must   avoid   the   creation   of   a   ‘culture   of   international dependency’.   Rather, the international community must instil ‘ownership’ by the different political and ethnic groups of the process of reconstruction and reconciliation. 22. Second  is  the  crucial  importance  of  a  credible  military  presence  in  the  field  and  the determination to use it, if necessary.  This is particularly true in the initial stages of the deployment of  NATO  forces.    For  example,  in  BiH,  NATO  deployed  a  credible  force,  approximately  60,000 troops,  in  the  initial  stages,  which  could  be  gradually  reduced  as  the  security  on  the  ground improved.  At a later stage, Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) in Naples, which is responsible for all  NATO-led  operations  in  the  Balkans,  has  enabled  NATO  to  make  effective  use  of  so-called ‘over-the-horizon  reserve  forces’,  which  significantly  contributed  to  providing  security  in  a  highly flexible  and  agile  manner.    This  was  demonstrated  by  the  rapid  deployment  of  four  SFOR companies to bolster KFOR during the March 2004 resurgence of violence in Kosovo.   23. Moreover,   deployed   forces   had   a   sufficiently   robust   mandate   to   oversee   the   military implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  Regrettably, this has not been the norm for all NATO-led  operations.    A  serious  drawback  on  NATO’s  ability  to  accomplish  its  missions  have been   national   restrictions   or   caveats   on   the   rules   of   engagement.      For   example,   only approximately  one  third  of  KFOR’s  18,000  troops  were  eligible  to  use  force  against  Albanian rioters who attacked Serbs in Kosovo in March last year.  Moreover, it also happened that some national  governments  did  not  allow  their  officers  to  participate  in  operations  implemented  by NATO’s  integrated  command  structure,  even  though  the  NAC  had  agreed  to  that  operation.   Although  NATO  member  states  have  recently  begun  to  remove  or  at  least  reduce  caveats,  the issue  remains  a  critical  one  that  has  to  be  addressed,  particularly  by  the  member  states themselves.    Contributing  countries  need  to  recognise  that  any  post-conflict  operation  can, perhaps  will,  also  require  combat  action  to  enforce  peace.    Different  NATO  allies  have  different attitudes to dealing with risks, from risk-averse to willing to tackle risks.  Therefore, it is important to discuss 'putting troops at risk' among the Allies.   24. Another decisive factor has been the development of local capabilities as soon as possible.   For example, in BiH, NATO commanders, backed by a large-enough force, immediately set about working with civilian authorities.  As local multi-ethnic rule-of-law and security institutions grew in competence and gained the trust of minority populations, SFOR was gradually able to reduce its presence and could hand over responsibility to local agencies.   25. Despite  the  unique  case  of  each  operation, post-conflict situations in these countries have certain conditions in common, namely the volatile and highly politicised environment in which they have taken place.  Moreover, post-conflict operations are never purely military operations, but are long-term  efforts  that  require,  respectively  include,  a  broad  range  of  security,  humanitarian, economic,  governance,  and  democracy-building  measures.    In  BiH,  Kosovo,  and  Afghanistan, NATO-led    forces    provide    overall    security,    while    the    international    community    developed country-specific  frameworks  for  rebuilding  the  countries.    In  BiH  and  Kosovo  NATO's  task  is  to enforce the security and military aspects of peace operations under the terms of UNSC resolutions 1031 and 1244.   26. The  lessons  in  South-Eastern  Europe  and  in  Afghanistan  are  that  economic  and  societal reconstruction   and   political   reforms   are   heavily,   if   not   entirely,   dependent   on   a   secure environment.    Moreover,  the  levels  of  security  are  often  directly  proportionate  to  the  level  of

040 PC 05 E 6 resources committed.  It comes as no surprise that the bulk of the reconstruction in Afghanistan has taken place in and around Kabul, which is secured by ISAF.  In the rest of the country, with the  exception  of  the  areas  with  PRTs,  the  flow  of  external  aid  and  humanitarian  assistance  has been   severely   hindered   or   even   receded   as   a   few   international   aid   agencies,   such   as Médecins   sans frontières  decided to stop operations in Afghanistan due to the level of insecurity.   In Afghanistan, the ratio of peacekeeping forces to population is much lower than in South Eastern Europe:    in  BiH  18,6  peacekeepers  are  deployed  per  thousand  population  and  in  Kosovo  20 peacekeepers per thousand.  In Afghanistan, only 0,2 peacekeepers are deployed.  At one point former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson estimated that 700,000 troops were needed for Afghanistan if the Allies wanted to provide a similar level of military forces as in the Balkans.  This might be seen more as occupation forces, however, it is clear that present figures are worrisome in order to reach the long-term political goal. IV. INCREASING DEMAND VERSUS LIMITED RESOURCES 27. NATO operations in Afghanistan have revealed serious gaps between political rhetoric and actual commitments.  Although NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance, they did not commit all the troops, planes and helicopters needed to extend NATO's 8,000 -strong Afghan  peace  keeping  force  from  its  bases  in  Kabul  and  the  north  into  the  west  of  the country.   Similarly, in Iraq, delays in finding the required extra instructors for Iraq had cast doubt on plans to have the expanded mission up and running before the Iraqi elections at the end of January 2005.   28. Trying  to  make  the  best  of these shortcomings, NATO has made a virtue out of necessity and  has  learned  to  do  more  with  fewer  forces.    Afghanistan  has  demonstrated  that  NATO-led operations need not necessarily entail large deployments of troops and material.  The introduction of  the  PRTs  in  Afghanistan  are  a  case  in  point.    PRTs  were  originally  designed  to  address  the dilemma  of  matching  the  urgent  need  to  extend  security  beyond  Kabul  with  the  very  limited resources  available.    PRTs  are  a  mix  of  military  and  civilian  teams,  ranging  from  100  to  300 personnel,  that  provide  security  and  help  with  reconstruction.    Currently,  a  total  of  17  PRTs,  of which five are being run by NATO, operate in Afghanistan.  NATO may take over all PRTs in the future.   29. PRTs are also remarkable because they are not based on one, single concept, but provide for a maximum of flexibility as each country (or group of countries) that is responsible for setting up  a  PRT  has  its  own  national  input.    PRTs  are  in  a  way  an  extension  of  NATO's  role.    As  a consequence,  NATO  now  has  taken  on  responsibility  for  Kabul,  for  the  northern  part  of  the country, for the western part of the country.  Some have criticised that PRTs are too small and too dispersed   to   make   a   real   impact   on   the   security.      Others,   including   representatives   of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have criticised that PRTs mixed military personnel and civilian  relief  efforts  and  make  humanitarian  relief  workers  targets  of  attacks.    However,  PRTs have,   on   the   whole,   significantly   contributed   to   securing   parts   of   northern   and   western Afghanistan.   30. Funding operations is difficult.  Under NATO regulations, a member state is responsible for financing its personnel and equipment on a mission.  Therefore, in comparison to NATO member countries  that  do  not  participate  in  a  mission,  those  NATO  member  countries  that  are  providing personnel and equipment are doubly “punished”.  Countries providing troops and equipment are, under current agreement, also required to finance the operations in the field.  In contrast, those countries  not  participating  in  a  NATO  mission  incur  no  costs.    This  creates  a  disincentive  for countries to provide equipment and personnel as the experience demonstrated in Afghanistan last year.  Your Rapporteur must sadly state that some NATO member countries have not matched the political commitment with providing the goods.  Given the lack of key capabilities in a number of NATO member countries, it appears logical that nations with certain key capabilities will be asked

040 PC 05 E 7 to  assist  in  operations.    However,  it  would  be  unfair  to  expect  these  countries  to  also  pay  for operations.  In addition to being unfair to the contribution nations, it also undermines the very logic of NATO as an alliance in which burdens are shared equitably and fairly, as the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stated.   V. NEW CHALLENGES:  IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND AFRICA 31. Although they have overcome divisions over the war against Iraq and agree that Iraq must be successful, the Allies have only found a least common denominator over NATO's role in Iraq.   While NATO provides assistance to stabilise the country and help train its security forces, its role is rather limited.  By providing logistical, communications, and intelligence support to the Polish-led multinational   division   in   Iraq,   NATO   is   replicating   the   assistance   it   had   given   to   the German-Dutch-led  ISAF  mission  in  Afghanistan  in  2002-2003.    Moreover,  in  accordance  with UNSC  Resolution  1546  and  in  response  to  the  request  by  the  Iraqi  Interim  government,  NATO heads  of  state  and  government  agreed  at  the  Istanbul  Summit  to  establish  a  NATO  Training Implementation Mission.  Since August 2004, approximately 50 officers have been working on the ground  in  Baghdad.    There  are  plans  to  expand  the  mission  to  include  some  300  personnel deployed in Iraq.   32. In  addition  to  training  Iraqi  security  forces  inside,  or  outside,  Iraq,  several  NATO  member states  have  been  providing  funds,  equipment  and  other  resources  to  train  Iraqi  security  forces through  the  NATO  Training  and  Equipment  Co-ordination  Group.    At  the  time  of  this  writing, sixteen NATO member states have troops on the ground and the number of NATO trainers in Iraq is to increase to 159 by mid-2005, according to US Lieutenant General David Petraeus.  By early February   this   year,   US   trainers,   complemented   by   the   small   NATO   mission,   had   trained approximately  136,000  soldiers  and  police  officers.    At  the  2005  Brussels  Summit  of  the  NATO heads of state and government, all NATO member states have pledged support in some form for the  training  of  Iraqi  security  forces.    Eventually,  NATO  will  expand  its  operations  to  more  than 1,000 officers this year and to establish a military training academy east of Baghdad.  NATO also plans  to  establish  an  Iraqi  Training  Education  and  Doctrine  Centre  for  the  leadership  and management training of Iraqi middle and senior level security forces.   33. There is also talk of NATO playing a critical role in bringing greater stability to the so-called Broader Middle East.  One of the possible scenarios under discussion involves the deployment of NATO  troops  to  support  a  peace  agreement  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians  and  to  secure Israel's  withdrawal  from  the  Gaza  strip.    Supporters  of  such  an  idea,  including  former  NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Joseph Ralston, point out that NATO's involvement in BiH and Kosovo can serve as a useful guidance.  Ralston argues that the challenges are rather similar, because populations are of different ethnicities, religions, and histories go back centuries.   NATO's involvement could be developed along the lines of t he early stages in BiH, where NATO established  zones  of  separation,  and  explicit  rules  as  to  who  could  be  where  and  what  type  of arms were allowed, and rigidly enforced these rules.  During a visit to Israel in February this year, NATO  Secretary  General  Jaap  de  Hoop  Scheffer  cited  necessary  preconditions  before  NATO could  envisage  any  contribution  to  addressing  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.    These  included  a lasting  peace  agreement  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  agreement  and  request  for  NATO involvement by both parties and a UN mandate on which NATO operation would be legally based.   34. There are also proposals that NATO should take on peacekeeping operations in Africa, e.g., in Congo and in Darfur.  At the 2005 Munich Conference on Security Policy, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that NATO and the EU ‘must give serious consideration to what, in practical terms,  they  can  do  to  end  the  tragedy’  in  Darfur.  Moreover, US Senator Joseph Biden recently introduced a resolution calling on ‘NATO to assess the potential effectiveness of and requirements for a NATO-enforced no-fly zone’ in the Sudanese province.  However, at this point, any role for

040 PC 05 E 8 NATO in Darfur appears remote, as the African Union (AU) has thus far not indicated interest in obtaining  NATO's  support,  according  to  NATO  Assistant  Secretary  General  Günther  Altenburg who briefed the Committee this February.  Although the AU has not yet requested assistance, your Rapporteur  strongly  supports  Senator  Biden’s  proposal  that  NATO  should  help  enforce  a  no-fly zone over Darfur. VI. CO-OPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 35. Post-conflict  operations  have  become  increasingly  complex,  hence  they  must  be  globally co-ordinated.    In  an  ideal  setting,  ‘interlocking  institutions’  would  work  together  without  frictions, provide    unlimited    supplies,    and    wholeheartedly    support    post-conflict    reconstruction    and confidence-building to the best of their abilities.  The reality falls short of such ‘ideal’ scenarios but the  international  community  has  learned  some  lessons  of  past  failures.    Of  course,  any  NATO involvement  should  be  integrated  into  a  wider  framework  that  includes  political,  financial  and judicial  measures.  Today’s  post-conflict  operations  demand  consistent  long-term  efforts  that include  a  broad  range  of  security,  humanitarian,  economic,  governance  and  democracy-building measures.  This includes primarily international organisations such as the UN, the EU, the OSCE, but  also  increasingly  non-governmental  relief  and  aid  organisations.    Obviously,  any  successful operation requires agreement among international organisations and the respective roles they play in  post-conflict  operations.    Here,  the  picture  has  been  rather  mixed.    For  example,  close co-operation among NATO, the EU, and the OSCE was crucial in making operation in the FYR of Macedonia a success in 2001.  In particular the amnesty agreement, pressured jointly by the three organisations  was  a  crucial  success.    Unfortunately,  the  picture  in  Kosovo,  there  is  a  lack  of co-operation   transparency.      Clearer   agreements   between   NATO   and   other   international organisations, particularly the UN, but also the EU (and the OSCE) would be important.  Moreover, international co-operation has only been partly successful in bringing suspected war criminals to justice in the Western Balkans.   36. The  basic  requirements  for  making  international  co-operation  efficient  and  effective  are  a strong existing political will and political leadership provided by energetic actors.  Former Bulgarian Foreign  Minister  Geoana  played  a  crucial  role  to  solve  the  Macedonia  crisis  when  he  was Chairman-in-Office  (CiO)  of  the  OSCE.    Of  course,  also  necessary  is  a  sensible  distribution  of roles  and  responsibilities  among  the  participating  international  organisations  to assure that each international actor contributes to the best of its capabilities.  This was very good in Macedonia, but less so in Kosovo, where there is a lot of overlap.   37. International organisations must also work with identical, or at least, compatible mandates. In BiH, in contrast to NATO, which was operating on a robust mandate, the civilian presence in the country did not possess similar authority.  This limited its effectiveness in the first two years until the  1997  Peace  Implementation  Council  meeting  in  Bonn  increased  the  authority  of  the  High Representative.   38. Furthermore,  participating  organisations  must  also  share  common  goals  and  strategies.   These  should  be  realistic  and  should  be  adapted  to  the  specific  circumstances.    This  is  not necessarily the case in Afghanistan as there is, for example, no agreement on how to tackle the warlords  and  the  poppy  production.    As  the  fact-finding  mission  of  the  Defence  and  Security Committee  last  year  disclosed,  approaches  to  deal  with  poppy  production  differ  significantly.   Moreover, with regard to the goals in countries like Afghanistan our aim should not be to impose a western-style democracy.  Rather, the international community’s  - and NATO’s - activities should be designed to assist the development of pluralistic structures that allow all (ethnic) groups to fully participate in the political and economic process of the nation.  Transparency and accountability are  key  ingredients  for  this.    As  an  Alliance  of  nations  that  share  democratic  values,  long-term commitments  in  countries  such  as  Afghanistan  require  stable,  long-term  public  support  by  the

040 PC 05 E 9 populations.      Thus,   public   opinion   in   NATO   nations   often   requires   establishing  democratic structures  in  countries  that  do  not  have  a  tradition  of  democratic  participation.    This  can  pose several   dilemmas   for   national   governments:      Propagating   goals   that   fall   short   of   western, democratic  standards  can  gradually  erode  public  support  for  longer-term  presence  in  countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc.  On the other hand, trying to establish democratic structures in countries that are not yet ‘ready’ to embrace them, can easily lead to alienation among recipient countries.   39. In  working  with  the  international  community  at  large,  NATO  has learned a great deal from shortcomings  of  earlier  missions.    For  example,  the  lines  of  command  are  now  drawn  much clearer,  as  ‘dual  key’  agreements  allowed  the  Milosevic  regime  to  play  one  side  off  against  the other.  More generally, as a consequence of the problems during the wars following the dissolution of  the  former  Yugoslavia,  co-ordination  between  NATO  and  the  UN  greatly  improved  at  the Headquarters   level.      NATO   has   meanwhile   established   a   NATO   liaison   officer   to   the   UN Headquarters in New York which offers a daily contact and reports from UN HQ.  Despite progress on the “headquarters level” co -operation on the "theatre level" can vary from "very good" to "poor".   NATO  relations with the OSCE are governed by the Istanbul platform, agreed upon at the 1999 OSCE  Summit  in  Istanbul.    With  the  EU,  co-operation  has  also  greatly  improved.    There  is  a formal agreement on the Western Balkans, and the monthly meetings between the NAC and the PSC  provide  an  opportunity  to  discuss  Balkan  security  issues.    Unfortunately  the  NAC-PSC meetings currently only discuss the operation in BiH.   40. To   be   successful,   post-conflict   operations   must   be   based   on   a   sustained   political commitment  of  all  participating  sides.    Above  all,  the  support  and  full  participation  of  the  host government and society is crucial.  This can pose a huge challenge, particularly if the very nature of  the  state  is  at  issue  and  the  international  community  finds  itself  called  upon  to  reform dysfunctional  institutions,  including  the  state  administration,  the  legal  system  and  even  the  local media.    Moreover,  the  human  and  financial  and  other  resources  supplied  by  the  contributing countries  must  be  adequate  to  carry  out  the  operations.    International  actors  must  co-ordinate assistance  and  try  to  avoid  duplication.    Co-operation  with  non-governmental  organisations (NGOs)   has   become   increasingly   important.      NGOs   can   make   important   contributions   to reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.   VII.    AFTER THE 2005 SUMMIT 41. In addition to its traditional roles some have argued that NATO could in the future have three roles, namely: to run peacekeeping and other post-conflict operations under its own flag; to  act  as  an  'enabler' -  or  toolkit  -  to  help  'coalitions  of  the  willing',  primarily  among NATO member states; or to act as a sub-contractor for peacekeeping or sanctions operations from the UN.   42. Your Rapporteur views that any of NATO's post -conflict operations should be clearly based on  international  law.    At  the  same  time,  only  few  of  the  post-conflict  operations  begun  by  the Alliance have been concluded, operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan are still underway and the latter  remains  severely under-equipped.  In fact, defence budgets of Allies are so stretched that most defence ministers face the alternative between investing in the modernisation of their armed forces or providing troops and equipment for post-conflict operations.  With regard to NATO as a possible  ‘sub-contractor  to  the  UN’:    your  Rapporteur  favours  stronger  relations  between  NATO and the UN.  

040 PC 05 E 10 43. Despite NATO’s military and financial shortcomings, it must be prepared to take on further tasks as the situation requires.  However, NATO's commitment in post conflict operations should, in  practice,  extend  primarily  to  areas  where  the  security  interests  of  member  states  would  be affected  or  threatened.    Other  possible  criteria  that  could  define  NATO's  geographical  area  of operations  are  of  course  where  NATO  has  the  capabilities  that  are  usable;  where  its  presence would be acceptable to NATO member states themselves but also would be welcomed by relevant regional actors. 44. There are more possibilities for international engagement.  For example, if NATO decided to engage  in  the  Middle  East  under  the  pre-conditions  mentioned  before,  it  could  train  Palestinian peacekeepers - even before a peace settlement is agreed.  It might also be feasible to include the Palestine  Authority  in  the  Mediterranean  Dialogue  and  later  in  the  PfP  dialogue  part.    In  Africa, NATO  could  not  only  train  forces  -  like  African  Union  (AU)  peacekeeping  forces  -  but  also  offer transfer of know-how, how the Alliance operates in areas that could be relevant for the AU, e.g., how  does  NATO  operate  in  certain  areas,  such  as  PfP.    NATO  could  also  help  in  strategic planning  for  post-conflict  operations.    In  this  field,  too,  NATO  has  meanwhile  build  up  relevant expertise  and  capabilities.    More  generally,  border  security  could  be  a  role  for  NATO.    In Afghanistan:  crucial - also different kind of border control (military as opposed to civilian one in European countries). 45. Unfortunately,  NATO  has  lost  its  role  as  a  forum  for  forging  a  political  consensus  on important security questions.  While NATO is increasing its military capabilities and develop more flexible,  deployable  and  sustainable  military  forces,  there  is  fewer  and  fewer  agreement  on  the purposes  these  armed  forces  should  be employed.  NATO must become again the transatlantic forum in which all strategic security issues would be discussed.  Such an ‘inclusive’ approach is much preferable to one in which NATO would be seen only as a toolkit capable of use in specific situations.  'Coalitions of the willing' can be useful in certain circumstances, but if they became the norm, NATO would, over time, lose public and political support.   46. Hence, the Alliance faces four fundamental challenges that it must address: The Need to have a strong political dialogue about NATO’s goals:   47. Last  year,  your  Rapporteur  stressed  that  there  is  no  common  ground  on  the  general direction,  nor  on  the  level  of  ambition  of  the  Alliance.    NATO  needs  more  debate  on  strategic issues.  If we agree that our security depends on developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and perhaps the Broader Middle East what could NATO contribute to make these regions safer? 48. Post-conflict operations are, almost by default, long-term commitments.  Therefore, political cohesion of the Allies over a long period of time, if necessary, is required.  To that end it is crucial that  political  leaders  continuously  explain  the  goals  of  NATO  operations  to  the  general  public  in NATO  member  countries.    Moreover,  formulation  of  what  constitutes  operational  success  and failure   may   be   necessary.      The   role   of   public   diplomacy,   both   that   conducted   by   NATO governments  as  well  as  that  conducted  by  NATO  must  be  improved.    As  important  venues  for public debate on security issues national parliaments and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly have a crucial role in building consensus and support for NATO operations.   49. Allies  are  to  agree  on  how  to  deal  with  warlordism  and  implement  any  agreement  with sustained, and if necessary robust, action.  Moreover, discussion is needed on the role of NATO vis-à- vis ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom.   Build further capabilities and modernise the force generation process:  

040 PC 05 E 11 50. The  2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment has clearly identified the gaps in Allied military capabilities.    Progress  has  been  made  in  some  areas,  but  to  address  these  shortcomings  as efficiently as possible remains as important today as it was in Prague.  It should be realised in this context  that  asymmetric  conflict  means  that  the  largest  risks  for  an  operation  might  be  after  an early entry and in the stabilisation period, as Iraq has shown.   51. Your   Rapporteur   also   recommends   considering   adjusting   NATO’s   common   funding approach  to  current  realities.    The  Allies’  present  funding  key  stems  from  the  late  1940s  and  is hopelessly   inadequate   for   today’s   security   environment.      The   current   system   of   financing NATO-led   missions   according   to   the   principle   "costs   lie   where   they   fall"   is   unfair   and counterproductive.  For example, NATO could consider building common NATO assets earmarked for  post-conflict  operations,  similar  to  existing  ones  like  the  Airborne  Early  Warning  System (AWACS).    Or  it  could  build  common  assets  for  logistics  support  -  as  compared  to  the  existing national supply networks.  For example, agreement on common assets in the areas of airlift and medical facilities, to name but two, would be welcome.  Another option would be to pool resources in order to provide the alliance with a transport fleet of helicopters and aircraft.  Moreover, in the context of training Iraqi security forces, the idea has been floated that NATO should create a trust fund to help finance the training.   The need to strengthen co-operation with international actors, especially the EU and the UN: 52. While  NATO  plays  a  crucial  role  in  security  peace  and  stability  in  the  Euro-Atlantic  region and  beyond  it  cannot  do  everything.    Over  time, the Alliance has established co-operations with the OSCE, the UN and the EU, particularly in South-Eastern Europe where the three organisations make significant contributions to the stabilisation and reconstruction of the region.  Co-operation has also been established in other areas, in Afghanistan among others, where NATO activities are based on a UN Security Council resolution.  In addition, there have been NATO-UN talks about a possible  co-ordination  in  Darfur  and  the  Middle  East  and  NATO’s  possible  contributions,  as mentioned before.  But there is no agreement among the Allies on whether or not NATO should have a role in preventing the severe human rights violations in Darfur.  Of course, NATO’s most important  security  relationship  is  with  the  EU  and  the  “Framework  for  an  enhanced  NATO -EU dialogue  and  a  concerted  approach  on  security  and  stability  in  the Western Balkans”, agreed in July  2003  sets  out  the  common  vision  of  both  organisations  on  the  future  of  the  Balkans.   However,  except  for  the  EU-led  operation  in  BiH  there  is  no  political  dialogue  between  the  two organisations.    Therefore,  NATO  should  further  develop  and  deepen  its  co-operation  with  other international actors, particularly the EU and the UN.  National governments should no longer block an operational NATO-EU agenda.    The  need  to  adjust  NATO’s  internal  structure  so  that  its  internal  structure  reflects  the new roles and missions of the Alliance.   53. NATO’s  capability  for  swift  military  action  in  a  crisis  has  been  considerably  improved,  its decision-making processes are however not well suited to fast developing crises.  Deployment of forces  and  possible  pre-emptive  measures  require  consensus  among  all  member  states  of  the Alliance.    A  review  of  the  political  decision  making  process  is  necessary  to  allow  rapid  reaction forces, such as the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) to perform the roles they were designed for.   54. While NATO has significantly developed its post-conflict capabilities, more needs to be done.   A shortage of crises is unlikely as demands for NATO assistance in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus,  and  Africa  indicate.    Discussion  and  agreement  on  NATO’s  priorities  in  the  future  in post-conflict operations should be a major contribution to setting the international security agenda.