SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 066 STC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y CLIMATE CHANGES IN THE ARTIC: CHALLENGES FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY DRAFT SPECIAL REPORT PIERRE CLAUDE NOLIN (CANADA) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 26 April 2005 * Until  this  document  has  been  approved  by  the  Science  and  Technology  Committee,  it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

066 STC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 II. SOME RISK FACTORS FOR THE WORLD GEOPOLITICAL STABILITY ............. 2 III. CLIMATE CHANGE: A LONG-TERM THREAT?..................................................... 3 IV. CLIMATE CHANGES AND ARCTIC WARMING..................................................... 4 V. THE INTENSIFICATION OF WARMING IN THE ARCTIC DURING THE 21^ST CENTURY............................................................................................................... 8 VI. ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGES: THE WEAKENING OF OCEAN CIRCULATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC REGION........................................................................ 11 VII. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CHALLENGES TO NATO SECURITY INITIATED BY ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGES ............................................................................................................ 15

066 STC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Today,  when  we  speak  of  security  we  do  so  with  a  vocabulary  considerably  different  from that used during the Cold War.  We no longer speak of containment, mutual assured destruction, super power rivalry, or bloc interests.  These were the organizing concepts and descriptors of an era appreciably different from the one in which we now find ourselves. 2. While  the  previous  period  was  more  stable  it  was  also  more  dangerous;  dangerous  in  the sense  that  a  nuclear  exchange  between  the  superpowers  would  have  meant  devastation  on  a global, if not permanent, basis.  More stable in the sense that the strategic environment was more ordered; everyone knew to which side they belonged and client states were kept in check by their patrons.   3. Now  we  are  confronted  by  a  strategic  environment  less  dangerous  but  far  more  unstable.   We are confounded by failed states, international terrorism, tribal conflict, child warriors, trafficking in  human  beings  and  transnational  criminal  organisations.    The  challenges  to  our  security  and well-being are multi-faceted. They are reflective of Nietzsche’s aphorism that “ […] madness is rare in individuals but in groups, parties, nations and ages it is the rule.” 4. In coming to cope with these challenges we have adopted a discourse informed by a broader and  subtler  set  of  concepts  than  previously  possible.    We  speak  of  human  security,  capacity building, the sanctity of the individual, multilateralism, and the need to hold the authority of states themselves accountable.   5. We  no  longer  accept  the  notion  that  the  pursuit  of  genuine  security  for  human  beings,  as individuals, is necessarily subversive of the foundations of international society.  Intervention in the behaviour  of  states  to  protect  individuals  is  now  deemed  an  accepted  principle  of  international relations.  Indeed, the Rwanda genocide that happened 10 years ago has taught us that it can, at times, be an obligation.  These views entail far more than the musings of disaffected intellectuals or naïve nirvanists.  They are attempts to come to terms with a reality we do not fully comprehend nor feel entirely comfortable with.  What we are certain of is that today “security” means coming to terms  with  forms  of  domination  and  insecurities  that  had  long  been  ignored  or  sacrificed  on  the altar of realpolitik.   6. The  primacy  of  the  state  in  strategic  thinking  permitted  a  gap  to  develop  between  the meanings of the term security as applied to individuals and its meaning for the state.  For security to  make  sense  at  the  international  level  it  must  make  sense  at  the  basic  level  of  the  individual human being.  Thus, when attempting to understand the complexities of security threats we need to look for our raw data not only in the perceptions and histories of statesmen and diplomats; we also need to take into account the experiences of those rendered insecure by the present world order.  While we continue to speak of the importance of foreign aid we now also accept the fact that the principle of state sovereignty can be breached in order to save those being victimized by the  “state”  and  its  agents.    Human  security,  first  and  foremost,  entails  “physical  security” –  the basic security of the individual.  Without such security, foreign aid remains little more than a cheap meal on the road to continuing despair.   7. The  language  of  realpolitik  is  slowly  giving  way  to  the  more  nuanced  and  humanitarian principles  of  soft  power  and  human  security.    This  new  lexicon  has  enabled  us  to  widen  our horizons  and  to  put  on  the  table  security  concerns  formerly  relegated  to  subsidiary,  if  any, relevance.  It is, in part, because of this rethinking that we can seriously ponder the implications of environmental degradation for our long-term “common security” interests. 8. Although our intellectual horizons may be widening, it is important to remember that what we now refer to as non-traditional security threats have always been with us.  Disease, crime, poverty,

066 STC 05 E 2 malnutrition, terrorism, environmental degradation and so on, are not newly found realities.  They have long been part of the human condition.  The fact that we have not adequately dealt with them before is largely due to the paucity of previous theory and its inability to deal with the realities of world   politics.      While   discomfiting   to   some,   the   post-cold   war   environment,   along   with   its unanswered questions and myriad problems, also offers the hope of new vistas.  What we require to take advantage are the appropriate intellectual constructs to help us find our way through the new labyrinth and the political will to confront and deal with issues when presented. 9. Population   growth,   migration,   resource   scarcity   and   environmental   degradation   are perceived to have two kinds of security implications.  They may either affect security directly, as in the case of a nuclear accident, or they may cause negative social changes, which in turn decrease security.  A recent example would be the decision of the United States government to define AIDS as  a  security  problem.    What  is  particularly  important  is  that  the  foregoing  concerns  are  trans- national  and  global  in  nature.    In  many  instances  they  cannot  be  addressed  effectively  by individual states acting on their own; their management requires international cooperation.  Some of the concerns, like AIDS, are immediate risks while others are risks in the longer term.   II. SOME RISK FACTORS FOR THE WORLD GEOPOLITICAL STABILITY 10. The World Watch Institute, in its State of the World 2005:  Trends and Facts, identifies the following as increasingly important risk factors: Natural  Resources:    These  are  at  the  core  of  a  number  of  conflicts.    Non-renewable resources  such  as  oil  and  minerals  fuel  geopolitical  rivalries,  clashes  with  indigenous peoples,  and  sometimes  finance  civil  wars.    Disputes  also  arise  over  renewable  natural resources   such   as   water,   arable   land,   and   forests.      The   effects   of   environmental breakdown  often  reinforce  social  and  economic  inequities  or  deepen  ethnic  and  political fault lines. Food  Scarcity:    Food  scarcity  is  at  the  intersection  of  poverty,  water  availability,  land distribution, and environmental degradation.  About 1.4 billion people, almost all of them in developing countries, confront environmental fragility in the form of arid or marginal land, poor soil quality, and land scarcity. Disease:    Disease  burdens  can,  in  some  cases,  be  sufficiently  severe  to  undermine economies  and  threaten  social  stability.    Infectious  diseases  and  other  pathologies  are crossing borders with increasing ease.  And AIDS cripples affected societies at all levels, undermining  a  state’s  overall  resilience  and  its  ability  to  govern  and  provide  for  basic human needs. Lack of Employment, Uncertain Economic Prospects, and Rapid Population Growth: These make for a potentially volatile mix.  Youth unemployment is skyrocketing to record levels.  And when large numbers of young men feel frustrated in their search for status and livelihood,  they  can  be  a  destabilizing  force  if  their  discontent  pushes  them  into  crime  or into joining militias or extremist groups. 11. The last risk factor identified by the World Watch Institute is the ecosystem destruction that will be the main topic of this paper.  This and other human actions are setting the stage for more frequent and more devastating natural disasters.  According to many observers, the pace is likely to  accelerate  as  climate  change  translates  into  more  intense  storms,  flooding,  heat  waves,  and droughts.  The result may be a growing number of environmental refugees.

066 STC 05 E 3 III. CLIMATE CHANGE: A LONG-TERM THREAT? 12. In  recent  years,  a  number  of  scientific  studies  have  detailed  the  harmful  consequences  of climate  change,  not  only  for  the  various  terrestrial  ecosystems,  but  also  for  the  economies, agriculture  and  social  policies  of  many  countries.  The  media  often  report,  with  pictures  and sensationalistic accounts as props, weather catastrophes that are automatically attributed to global warming. 13. Although the scientific basis of the theory of climate change is extremely complex, scientists views are clouded by uncertainty given the many models of weather forecasts, and many interest groups  with  opposing  points  of  view  put  serious  pressure  on  political  decision-makers  to  reflect their  views  in  the  government  policies  of  numerous  countries,  one  fact  remains:  since  the beginning of the industrial revolution, in the 19^th century, the Earth’s climate has been warming up and this phenomenon is particularly attributable to humans’ industrial activities.    14. Already, in 1998, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee had  studied  this  question  in  a  special  report  and  looked  at  the  options  available  to  political decision-makers,  in  particular  the  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on Climate Change, to reduce greenhouse gases (the Kyoto Protocol) in order to reduce the effects of temperature increases.¹ 15.     New data on climate change published in recent years provoked a crisis of conscience and indeed a great uncertainty among scientists and many governments. Until very recently, most of the  climatology  studies  presented  their  long-term  effects  in  a  linear,  gradual  fashion  extending over  several  decades  under  the  influence  of  natural  and  human  events.  Today,  they  no  longer dismiss   the   possibility   that,   beyond   a   certain   threshold   that   is   difficult   to   determine,   the temperature increases would lead to sudden and irreversible climate changes produced by a drop in temperatures in the Northern hemisphere. 16. In   2002,   the   National   Academy   for   Science   produced   the   following   definition   of   this phenomenon  that  could  produce  enormous  environmental,  economic,  political  and  geostrategic consequences for all the countries of the North Atlantic community: “Abrupt  climate  change  generally  refers  to  a  large  shift  in  climate  that  persists  for years  or  longer—such  as  marked  changes  in  average  temperature,  or  altered patterns of storms, floods, or droughts—over a widespread area such as an entire country  or  continent,  that  takes  place  so  rapidly  and  unexpectedly  that  human  or natural  systems  have  difficulty  adapting  to it. In the context of past abrupt climate change, “rapidly” typically means on the order of a decade.”² 17. In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—created jointly in 1988 by the   World   Meteorological   Organization   and   the   United   Nations   Environment   Programme— published its Third Assessment Report on climate change.³ The group’s mandate is to provide an assessment of the state of knowledge on all aspects of climate change, and in particular the ways in which human activities can both cause such changes and be affected by them.⁴ 1 See Ibrügger, Lothar.  From  Kyoto  to  Buenos  Aires:  The  Agreement  on  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions. Brussels. Committee on Science and Technology – NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 1998. 2 Collaboration.  Abrupt  Climate  Change:  Inevitable  Surprises  –  Report  in  Brief.  Washington.  National Academy Press. 2002. p. 1. 3 Collaboration,  Climate  Change  2001:  IPCC  Third  Assessment  Report.  Cambridge  University  Press, Cambridge, 2001, 398 p. 4 The IPCC consists of three working groups. At present, the groups have the following responsibilities: Group I must study the scientific aspects of the climate system and its evolution; Group II looks at the effects  of  climate  changes  and  ways  to  adapt  to  these  changes;  and  Group III  examines  various

066 STC 05 E 4 18. After presenting various global warming scenarios, the IPCC mentioned that many countries would have to expect increased climatic instability and an increase in violent weather events such as  El Nino  in  the  South  Pacific.  They  would  also  have  to  expect  abrupt  changes  in  certain ecosystems, many of them irreversible.⁵ One of these changes could be a marked weakening in ocean circulation in the North Atlantic. 19. In  2002,  another  major  study  produced  by  an  expert  panel,  this  time  for  the  prestigious National Academy for Science, evoked a similar scenario.⁶ Based on major paleoclimatic research conducted  in  recent  years,  the  experts  agreed  that  the  climate  has  sometimes  evolved  quite quickly, and abruptly, over the past 100 000 years and that such a phenomenon could soon recur in the Northern hemisphere.⁷ Once again, the report affirmed that the weakening, indeed complete cessation,  of  ocean  circulation  in  the  North  Atlantic  could  have  been  responsible  for  these changes. 20. Such a possibility seems to have disturbed American government officials deeply. Indeed, at a time when international terrorism was perceived to be the greatest threat to the United States’ national  security,  the  American  Department  of  Defence,  in  2004,  published  a  secret  report prepared in 2003 on the effects of an abrupt climate change produced by cooling temperatures in the Northern hemisphere, the regional and international political and economic consequences of such a situation and, finally, its implications for the United States’ national security.⁸ 21. Having  said  that,  before  going  into  greater  detail  about  abrupt  climate  changes  and  their consequences for the North Atlantic community, it is important to briefly explain the mechanisms that  could  produce  them.  The  scientific  research  in  this  area  tends  to  show  that  the  warming currently under way in the Artic could be one of the triggers of this phenomenon. IV. CLIMATE CHANGES AND ARCTIC WARMING 22. In 2001, the IPCC’s third report showed that the decade of the 1990s had been the hottest on  record  since  1861  and  that  1998  had  been  the  hottest  year  during  that  same  period.  These changes did not occur uniformly, however, and varied by region and in different parts of the lower atmosphere. For example, between 1910 and 1945, the warming was concentrated mainly in the North Atlantic region. Then, from 1945 to 1975, the temperatures in that same region, like those in the  rest  of  the  Northern  hemisphere,  cooled  slightly,  while  they  were  increasing  in  the  Southern hemisphere.  The  most  recent  period  of  warming  (1976-1999)  affected  almost  the  entire  planet, while  the  greatest  increases  were  recorded  in  the  mid-  and  high  latitudes  of  the  Northern hemisphere. ⁹ possible ways to mitigate climate changes. The IPCC produced its first assessment report in 1990 and its second in 1996. 5 Collaboration. Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report – Summary for Policymakers. 2001. pp. 14-15. 6 Collaboration.  Abrupt  Climate  Change:  Inevitable  Surprises.  Washington.  National  Academy  Press. 2002, 244 p. 7 Paleoclimatology analyses historical data such as that from ice core samples taken in polar regions, primarily in order to better understand the effects of human activities on climatic processes. The best examples   of   climate   variations   are   illustrated   by   the   periods   of   glaciation   and   warming.   The mechanisms  underlying  such  changes  include  sea  currents  and  continental  drift  related  to  plate tectonics,  but  also  include  the  cyclical  variations  in  the  Earth’s  annual  orbit  around  the  Sun  and  the inclination of its axis in relation to the plane of that elliptical orbit. 8 Randal, Doug and Shwartz. An Abrupt Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security. Washington. United States Department of Defence, 2003. 22 p. 9 Collaboration.  Climate  Change  2001:  The  Scientific  Basis  –  Report  of  Working  Group  1  (IPCC). Cambridge.  Cambridge University Press. 2001. p. 25.  

066 STC 05 E 5 23. To sum up, the IPCC set the worldwide increase in temperature at +0.6 degrees Celsius (°C) throughout the 20^th century.¹⁰ The report points out that this increase results from rapid growth in greenhouse   gases   in   the   atmosphere,   particularly   carbon   dioxide   (CO²).   Indeed,   recent paleoclimatic  research  measured  the  concentrations  of  CO²  in  the  atmosphere  at  280  parts  per million (ppm) for the period between the years 1000 and 1850. In 2000, the rate was 368 ppm, an increase  of  31 percent  since  the  middle  of  the  19^th  century!  The  IPCC  says,  “Today’s  CO² concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years and likely not during the past 20 million years. The rate of increase over the past century is unprecedented, at least during the past 20,000 years.”¹¹ Last February, over 200 scientists participated in an international symposium on  the  stabilization  of  greenhouse  gases  and  abrupt  climate  changes  in  Exeter  in  the UK. They agreed that such a phenomenon could occur when concentrations of CO² reached the 500-ppm threshold by the middle of the 21^st century, propelling the average worldwide temperature increase to +2^oC.¹² 24. The  IPCC  report  also  states  that  the  majority  of  the  climatic  warming  caused  by  CO² emissions since 1950 was caused by anthropogenic factors, that is, by human activities. And still according  to  the UN panel, almost 75 percent of these emissions were caused by burning fossil fuels. The rest is attributable essentially to changes in land use, and particularly deforestation in developing countries.¹³ This warming has had a number of effects on ecosystems, including: A rise in sea levels of 1 to 2 millimetres annually during the 20^th century, in other words, of one to two metres during this period;¹⁴ an  increase  in  the  number  of  events  such  as  El  Nino  in  the  South  Pacific  over  the  past 30 years, events that last longer and are more intense than in the past;¹⁵ an increase, between 1950 and 1993, of around 0.2°C every decade in the minimum daily surface air temperature measured at night. This is roughly double the rate of increase in maximum daytime temperatures, that is, 0.1°C every decade for the same period; a  decrease  of  more  than  two  weeks  in  the  freezing  season  for  lakes  and  rivers  in  the Northern hemisphere;¹⁶ a  lengthening  of  the  biological  growing  season  of  one  to  four  days  every  decade  for  the past 40 years in that same region;¹⁷ an increase in precipitation of 0.5 to 1 percent every decade throughout most of the mid- and high latitudes of the Northern hemisphere, compared with only 0.2 to 0.3 percent in the tropical zones;¹⁸ a  significant  reduction  in  the  number  of  glaciers  in  mountains  outside  the  polar  regions, particularly in the Alps, in Europe;¹⁹ and a roughly 10-percent reduction in snow coverage, according to satellite data, since the late 1960s.²⁰ 10 Ibid, p. 25 (Supra, Note 9) 11 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra, Note 9)   12 Collaboration.  International   symposium   on   the   stabilization   of   greenhouse   gases:   Report   of   the Steering Committee – Draft. Exeter. Hadley Center for Climate Protection and Research - Met Office. 2005. 7 p. 13 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra, Note 9) 14 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra, Note 9) 15 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra, Note 5) 16 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra, Note 5) 17 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra, Note 5) 18 Ibid, p. 28 (Supra, Note 9) 19 Ibid, p. 29 (Supra, Note 9) 20 Ibid, p. 29 (Supra, Note 9)

066 STC 05 E 6 25. As  we  can  see,  a  number  of  the  above  impacts  occurred  in  the  Northern  hemisphere, particularly in the Arctic region, widely recognized as the habitat of the Inuit and polar bears. The IPCC states: “The Arctic is extremely vulnerable to climate change, and major physical, ecological and  economical  impacts  are  expected  to  appear  rapidly.  A  variety  of  feedback  mechanisms  will cause an amplified response, with consequent impacts on other systems and peoples.”²¹  In 2001, the  intergovernmental  panel  put  more  emphasis  on  the  consequences  of  global  warming  in  the Arctic  than  the  Antarctic  since,  apart  from  a  temperature  rise  in  the  Antarctic  Peninsula,  the scientific data available combined with the climatic forecasts for the 21^st century seem to indicate that  such  a  phenomenon  would  occur  over  a  longer  period  at  the  South  Pole.  Many  scientists explain this difference by the fact that the majority of the Antarctic ice cap is located on a continent where temperatures rarely rise above freezing and not on the ocean, as at the North Pole, where the temperatures are more mild during the summer period, and thus have a greater effect on snow and ice coverage and climate changes.²² 26. In November 2004, the Arctic Council—an intergovernmental forum of countries that border the  polar  region—published  a  major    study  conducted  over  the  past  four  years  by  over  300 scientists from 15 countries on climate changes’ effects on this important and fragile ecosystem.²³ 27. This study’s findings are troubling and confirm some of the IPCC’s observations.²⁴ The Arctic is warming up more rapidly than other regions of the world and the effects of that warming will be felt  throughout  the  world  in  the  21^st  century.  Three  reasons  explain  the  Arctic’s  influence on the world  climate.  First,  because  of  the  significant  snow  and  ice  coverage  found  there,  most  of  the solar energy is reflected back into space, the reverse of what happens in the tropical regions. This phenomenon  is  called  albedo.  For  example,  sea  ice  reflects  almost  90 percent  of  solar  energy. What  is  more,  this  ecosystem  also  plays  an  important  role  in  ocean  circulation  in  the  North Atlantic.  Finally,  any  increase  in  the  temperature  of  the  permafrost  which  contains  methane— another greenhouse gas—and any change in the Arctic vegetation combined with a reduction in the  snow  and  ice  coverage  could  reduce  the  Arctic  region’s  albedo,  contribute  further  to  global warming and increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.    28. The Arctic Council’s study also revealed that the average temperature in that region, despite certain local variations, had increased two times more rapidly than the global average in the past ten years. For example, it increased from 3 to 4°C in Alaska and in Western Canada during the past 50 years!²⁵ An important fact to note is that this warming is more marked during the winter season.  The  scientists  explain  this  unusual,  and  unprecedented,  increase  by  the  increase  in greenhouse gases caused mainly by anthropogenic factors. 29. The  effect  of  this  marked  increase  in  temperatures  combined  with  other  factors  such  as waves  and  sea  currents  was  (as  can  be  seen  in  figures  1  and  2)  to  reduce  the  extent  of  the permanent  sea  ice  by  almost  8 percent,  or  over  one  million  square  kilometres,  over the past 30 years, an area greater than the combined territories of Norway, Sweden and Finland.²⁶ Not only is 21 Collaboration. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability – Report of Working Group II (IPCC). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2001. p. 65.   22 New,  Mark.  “Arctic  Climate  Change  with  a  2^oC  Global  Warming.”  p.  8.  In  L.  Rosentrater.  2^o  is  too much:   Evidences   and   Implications   of   Dangerous   Climate   Changes   in   the   Artic.   Norway.   LDR Consulting for World Wildlife Fund. 2005. 70 p. 23 The  member  countries  of  the  Arctic  Council  are  Canada,  the  United  States  (Alaska),  Denmark (Greenland  and  Faeroe  Islands),  Iceland,  Norway,  Sweden,  Finland  and  Russia,  as  well  as  the Aboriginal communities living in these countries. 24 Collaboration.   Impacts   of   a   Warming   Arctic:   Arctic   Climate   Impact   Assessment.   Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2004. 144 p. 25 Collaboration, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment – Supporting Evidence for the Key Findings. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2004. p. 23. 26 Ibid, p. 25 (Supra, Note 24)

066 STC 05 E 7 the area of the ice cap covering the Arctic Ocean shrinking rapidly, but its thickness is also being affected  by  the  climate  changes.  Since  1960,  its  average  thickness  has  lessened  by  10  to  15 percent; some regions show a 40-percent reduction.²⁷ As for the snow coverage of the continental Arctic, that has diminished by 10 percent over the past 30 years.²⁸ A study recently published by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) apparently demonstrates an increase in the thaw season for sea ice  and  snow  on  the  order  of  13 days  for  the  ice  cap  on  the  Arctic  Ocean,  four  days  for  the Greenland ice cap and five days for northern Canada and Alaska.²⁹          Figure 1: Extent of sea ice, 1979            Figure 2: Extent of sea ice, 2003 Source: NASA (2003)                                                                                     Source: NASA (2003) 30. The  authors  of  Arctic  Council  study,  like  those  of  the  WWF  study,  point  out  that  these changes  are  irreversible  and  that  they  are  already  threatening  the  survival  of  numerous  animal species such as polar bears, sea elephants, seals and certain species of birds that depend on the sea  ice  or  snow  for  their  sustenance,  reproduction  or  habitat.  In  the  case  of  polar  bears,  the reduction  in  the  extent  of  the  sea  ice  combined  with  its  delayed  formation  in  the  fall  and  the premature  melting  in  the  spring  in  Hudson  Bay  in  Canada  has  already  had  significant  effects. Between 1981 and 1998, there was a 15-percent reduction in the polar bears’ weight and birthrate. The  thinner  the  females  are,  the  more  likely  their  newborns  are  to  be  in  poor  health  or  to  die prematurely.³⁰ 31. Although there is still a certain amount of scientific uncertainty about the ways to effectively measure  precipitation  in  an  environment  as  cold  as  the  Arctic,  precipitation  also  increased  by eight percent during the 20^th century. A disturbing fact is that most of this increase was in the form of rain, primarily during the winter and, to a lesser extent, the fall and spring. In some regions such as western Russia, liquid precipitation events increased by 50 percent in the past fifty years.³¹ 32. The increase in temperatures in the Arctic also had effects on the region’s various vegetation areas, which include, from north to south, the polar desert, the tundra and the boreal forest. Let us not forget that the wooded and forested stretches of the Arctic make up almost 30 percent of the planet’s forests and that the boreal forest alone covers 17 percent of the land surface. As we will see  further  on,  the  most  damaging  and  irreversible  effects  in this area will occur during the 21^st century. 27 Ibid, p. 25 (Supra, Note 24) 28 Ibid., p. 31 (Supra, Note 24) 29 Comiso, Josefino O. “Impact Studies of a 2^oC Global Warming on the Arctic Sea Ice Cover.” p. 50. In L. Rosentrater. 2^o is too much: Evidences and Implications of Dangerous Climate Changes in the Artic. Norway. LDR Consulting for World Wildlife Fund. 2005. 70 p. 30 Ibid, p. 58 (Supra, Note 24) 31 Ibid, p. 22 (Supra, Note 24)

066 STC 05 E 8 33. All these changes are quite obvious to the Aboriginal communities who live in the Arctic. In northern Canada, for example, the Inuit who have lived in that region for centuries maintain that the rise in temperatures threatens the environment that is the basis of their traditional way of life. Over  the  years  they  have  noted  a  decrease  in  the  number  of  polar  bears,  an  increase  in  the number of summer storms, a significant thawing of the permafrost, which leads to erosion of the shores and significant damages to the road and economic infrastructures vital to the development of the Great North, the arrival of new animal and marine species from the south and, finally, the growing ineffectiveness, because of climatic instability, of traditional weather forecasting methods used  when  organizing  hunting  and  fishing  excursions.  These  observations  are  confirmed  by  the Aboriginal  people  living  in  Alaska,  a  region  where  the  shores  formed  by  the  permafrost  of  the Barents Sea (southwest of the Arctic Ocean) suffered serious erosion because of the increase in the number of violent storms.³² V. THE    INTENSIFICATION    OF    WARMING    IN    THE    ARCTIC    DURING    THE 21^ST CENTURY 34. Unfortunately, climatic forecasts for the 21^st century are not optimistic, either for the planet as  a  whole  or  the  Arctic.  In  2001,  the  aforementioned  IPCC  report  predicted,  using  six  climatic forecast  models,  an  average  increase  in  world  temperatures  of  1.4  to  5.8°C  by  2100.  These increases are based on an increase of C0² concentrations in the atmosphere, for the same period, of  540  to  970  ppm.³³  As  well,  the  aforementioned  increase  in  average  temperatures  would  be, according to the various scenarios, two to ten times greater than those recorded during the 20^th century  and,  based  on  the  paleoclimatic  data,  without  precedent  in  the  last  10 000  years.³⁴  The IPCC states that, despite a stabilization in C0² emissions during the 21^st century, temperatures will continue to rise, because it will take many years for the atmospheric concentrations of this gas to diminish. 35. Still  based  on  the  six  climatic  forecast  scenarios,  the  IPCC  report  predicts,  with  some regional  variations,  an  increase  in  annual  precipitation  on  the  order  of  5  to  20 percent.  In  the northern hemisphere, most of the increase will be in the summer and winter periods. Still based on the same models, sea levels—under the combined effect of melting ice and snow and   the rise in both precipitation and water temperature—would increase by 9 to 88 centimetres, threatening the coastal populations in many countries such as Bangladesh and Senegal and U.S. states such as Florida and Louisiana.³⁵ 36. As with all the climate changes observed in the Arctic in the 20^th century, those that will occur there by 2100 will be more severe than those observed on a planetary scale. 37. As  well,  using  five  forecast  models  that  take  into  account  different  variables  that  could influence the region’s climate, the authors of the study published by the Arctic Council predict that the  average  annual  temperature  will  increase,  between  now  and  2100,  by  3  to  5°C  close  to  the surface of the land and 4 to 7°C over the ocean. This increase will be more pronounced during the winter period, with respective increases of 4 to 7°C and 7 to 10°C. Regionally, temperatures will increase significantly in northern Russia and northern Canada.³⁶ 32 Ibid, pp. 78-81 (Supra Note 24); Crowler, Paul, T. Fenge and S. Watt-Cloutier. “Responding to Global Climate  Change:  The  Perspective  of  the  Inuit  Circumpolar  Conference  on  the  Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.” pp. 58-60. In L. Rosentrater. 2^o is too much: Evidences and Implications of Dangerous Climate Changes in the Artic. Norway. LDR Consulting for World Wildlife Fund. 2005. 70 p. 33 Ibid, p. 8 (Supra Note 5) 34 Ibid, p.8 (Supra Note 5) 35 Ibid, p. 9 (Supra Note 5) 36 Ibid, pp. 26-27 (Supra Note 24)

066 STC 05 E 9 38. This  significant  increase  in  temperatures  will  have  numerous  effects.  First,  precipitation, primarily in the form of rain, will increase by more than 20 percent by the end of the 21^st century as a  result  of  the  increased  evaporation  of  water  from  the  melting  of  ice  and  snow.  It  will  be concentrated in the coastal zones during the fall and winter. The increase in precipitation during these two seasons alone could reach almost 30 percent.³⁷ 39. As  for  the  sea  ice,  the  five  models  used  by  the  Arctic  Council  predict,  still  by  2100,  an additional reduction in its extent on the order of 10 to 50 percent. This disturbing phenomenon will be  accentuated  during  the  summer,  since  the  researchers’  data  predict  a  reduction  of  over 50 percent in the extent of the summer sea ice for the same period. Some models even predict the almost  complete  disappearance  of  the  ice cap on the Arctic Ocean during the summer!³⁸ As for Greenland, the data indicate that local temperatures will increase by 3°C during the 21^st century, which  will  lead  to  the  long-term  and  irreversible  melting  of  the  thick  layer  of  ice  covering  the majority  of  this  Danish  territory.  Since  1979,  the  area  affected  by  melting  ice  has  increased  by 16 percent,  an  area  roughly  the  size  of  Sweden.  The  study’s  authors  state  that,  even  if  climatic conditions stabilize in the next century, the increase will have been enough to lead to the complete disappearance of Greenland’s continental ice cap, which will in turn increase sea levels by more than seven metres.³⁹ Figure 3: Projected area of the sea ice in September during the 21^e Century according to the average of the five models 40. The same phenomenon will affect the snow cover of the continental Arctic, which could see its area reduced by 10 to 20 percent by 2100. As well, with the warmer temperatures, the snow will melt prematurely in the spring, thus increasing the flow of fresh water from rivers that empty into the Artic and North Atlantic oceans.⁴⁰ 41. The composition of the Arctic vegetation could also be seriously changed, as we mentioned earlier.  A  study  published  by  the  WWF  last  January  states  that  a  2°C  increase  in  global temperature, which could happen between 2026 and 2060, would, by the end of the 21^st century, lead to a 42-percent reduction in the tundra, an increase of more than 55 percent in the area of the 37 Ibid, p. 29 (Supra Note 24) 38 Ibid, p. 30 (Supra Note 24) 39 Ibid, p. 33 (Supra Note 24) 40 Ibid, p. 31 (Supra Note 24)

066 STC 05 E 10 boreal forest and the complete disappearance of the areas in which lichen currently grows.⁴¹ The limits of the boreal forest would then be pushed farther north. Although the study conducted for the Arctic Council states that a rapid increase in temperatures could compromise this scenario, since the   transition   period   would   be   too   quick,   killing   the   trees   and   producing  new  ecosystems heretofore non-existent in the Arctic.⁴² For example, the boreal forest in Siberia could disappear in certain  areas  rather  than  migrating  north.  This  would  mean  that  the  savannah  would  border directly on the tundra.    42. What  is  more,  the  extent  of  the  permafrost  could  be  greatly  reduced  and  compromise  the northward movement of the boreal forest. This type of soil, which covers most of the continental Arctic, is composed primarily of earth, rocks or sediments whose temperature remains below 0°C for  more  than  two  consecutive  years.  There  are  two  categories  of  permafrost.  The  first  is continuous  permafrost,  that  is,  permafrost  that  occupies  all  of  a  given  area  and  that  can  be 1500 metres  deep.  It  is  found  primarily  in  Alaska,  northern  Canada—particularly  the  Northwest Territories  and  Nunavut—and  Siberia.  The  second  category  is  called  sporadic  or  discontinuous permafrost. It occupies only 10 to 90 percent of a land surface in the Arctic and is no more than a few metres deep.   43. Normally,  the  upper,  or  active,  part  of  the  permafrost  thaws  during  the  summer.  In  recent decades, however, scientists and Aboriginal communities have noticed that the temperature of this type  of  soil  in  the  sub-arctic  zones  has  increased  by  several  degrees  Celsius,  to  +2^oC,  thus increasing the depth of the thaw. In some regions, the active portion no longer freezes during the winter,  which  causes  considerable  damage  to  the  Arctic’s  road  and  economic  infrastructures.⁴³ Over  the  course  of  the  past  30 years,  Alaska’s  Department  of  Natural  resources  has  had  to reduce,  from  200  to  100  days,  the  period  in  which  heavy  equipment  can  be  used  for  oil prospecting and development, because of the significant thawing of the permafrost. 44. In  this  regard,  the  warming  temperatures  will  have  two  consequences  during  the  21^st century.  First,  the  permafrost  degradation  area  will  reach  10  to  20 percent  of  the  total  area  in which this type of soil is found. Second, the southern boundary of the permafrost will recede by several hundred kilometres, particularly in Alaska, Canada and Russia.⁴⁴ 45. Some argue that such a change will be beneficial in the long term because it will allow the boreal  forest  to  move  northward,  for  one  thing,  and  will  open  up  new  farmland,  for  another.  In order  for  these  optimistic  scenarios  to  become  a  reality,  climate  changes  must  occur  in  a  linear and predictable fashion. 46. As with the vegetation, the authors of the Arctic Council study state that a rapid thawing of the  permafrost  could  kill  the  trees  and  other  forms  of  vegetation  found  there,  as  they  would  be literally  drowned  by  the  large  quantities  of  water  produced by the thawing soil. Once completely thawed, the water in the permafrost could simply drain off into the underground water networks, thus drying up the lakes and rivers on which the people, animals, fish and birds depend for their survival.  Ultimately,  this  would  lead  to  the  partial  desertification  of  some  areas.⁴⁵  As  we  said earlier,  the  thawing  of  the  permafrost  will  also  increase  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases  since  it contains methane from the decomposition of trees and tundra when it is thawed. Although present 41 Kaplan,  Jed  O.  “Climate  Change  and  Arctic  Vegetation.”  p.  25.  In  L.  Rosentrater.2^o  is  too  much: Evidences  and  Implications  of  Dangerous  Climate  Changes  in  the Artic. Norway. LDR Consulting for World Wildlife Fund. 2005. 70 p. 42 Ibid, p. 52 (Supra Note 24) 43 Ibid, p. 87 (Supra Note 24) 44 Ibid, p. 87 (Supra Note 24) 45 Ibid, pp. 91-92 (Supra Note 24)

066 STC 05 E 11 in  lesser  quantities,  this  greenhouse  gas  captures  23  times  more  heat  in  the  atmosphere  than CO². 47. Thus,  if  these  scenarios  about  the  rising  temperatures,  melting  of  sea  ice  and  snow, changes in vegetation and significant thawing of the permafrost materialize, the climatic warming will increase in the Arctic, which would create a sort of vicious circle whose dynamic will be difficult to break.    48. In truth, all these factors explain why the Arctic is warming up faster than anywhere else on the planet. First, as the sea ice and snow melt, the soil and the ocean absorb more solar energy, since the process of albedo is greatly reduced; this combined with the effects of the thawing of the permafrost further increases temperatures in the Arctic. Second, the reduction in the area of the ocean covered by sea ice means that the solar energy absorbed by the ocean during the summer period is more easily transferable to the atmosphere, which explains in part why the temperatures is  increasing  more  quickly  in  winter  than  in  summer  in  this  region  of  the  planet.  Finally,  the changes in both the ocean and atmospheric currents observed in recent years also have an effect on the warming of this polar region.⁴⁶ VI. ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGES: THE WEAKENING OF OCEAN CIRCULATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC REGION 49. At first glance, the warming of the Arctic, in addition to certain advantages we have already mentioned  in  terms  of  vegetation,  could,  provided  the  changes  occur  gradually,  encourage  the development of northern communities, particularly in northern Russia, Alaska and Canada, and in the areas of mineral and oil prospecting. The melting of sea ice could also open up new and highly lucrative sea-lanes. If this happens, some of the countries of the North Atlantic community such as Canada,  the  United  States,  Norway  and  Finland  risk  being  confronted  with  new  economic  and geostrategic challenges. They will also be exposed to possible environmental catastrophes in an ecosystem already greatly weakened by climate changes. 50. That being said, at the beginning of this study we mentioned a more disturbing problem likely to affect most of the countries of the Northern hemisphere. We mentioned that, beyond a certain, not easily identifiable threshold, global warming would produce abrupt climate changes such as a marked cooling of temperatures in certain regions of the globe. How could this happen and what role would the Arctic play in this phenomenon? 51. The  Northern  hemisphere,  particularly  the  eastern  portion  of  North  America,  Iceland  and Europe,  has  a  temperate  climate  and  mild  winters.  Europe  is  particularly  blessed  in  this  regard. While the cites of London, Paris and even Moscow benefit from winters in which the temperatures are relatively mild and there are few snowstorms, cities situated at comparable latitudes in Canada must deal with winters in which daytime temperatures do not rise above – 15^oC for days at a time and freezing rain and snowstorms follow one after the other, leaving tens of centimetres of snow and ice on the ground between November and March. 52. This situation results from the planetary ocean circulation that crosses the Atlantic, Antarctic, Indian and then Pacific oceans. What is sometimes called the conveyor belt of the oceans carries heat  from  the  equatorial  zones  to  the  northern  latitudes.  Without  this  circulation,  temperatures would be higher around the Equator and colder in the Northern hemisphere. 46 Collaboration. Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment–Summary. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2004. p. 20.

066 STC 05 E 12 53. The  surface  water  of  the  oceans  benefits  from  a  significant  heat  influx  in  the  tropics  that allows it to attain temperatures between 25 and 30^oC, while in the polar regions, it scarcely rises above the freezing temperature of seawater, - 2^oC. It thus forms a layer of warm water that can be tens  of  metres  deep  that  is  carried  northward  by  the  North  Atlantic  current  better  known  as  the Gulf   Stream.   Once   it   arrives  on  the  coasts  of  Europe,  Greenland  and  Iceland,  the  water temperatures cools again as the heat evaporates into the atmosphere. The heat is then taken up by  winds  coming  from  the  west  and  carried  over  Europe.  Once  the  heat  escapes,  the  surface water possesses a high salinity rate, so as it cools, it sinks deep into the ocean mingling with the denser, colder water coming from the Arctic on the currents from Labrador, Denmark (Greenland) and the Faeroe Islands, west of Iceland. It then flows south, thus guaranteeing the constant influx of warm water into the northern latitudes. 54. This  marine  mechanism,  illustrated  by  Figure 4,  is  in  perpetual  motion  and  thus  plays  a critical  role  in  the  regulation  of  the  world’s  climate.  Its  functioning  depends  on  a  fragile  balance between  fresh  and  salt  water.  It  is  known  as  “thermohaline  circulation,”  “thermo”  for  “heat”  and “haline”  for  “water  salinity,”  and  it  reduces  the  temperature  differences  between  the  equatorial regions  and  the  polar  zones.⁴⁷  The  Arctic  plays  an  important  role  in  this  process,  since  the formation  of  sea  ice  maintains  the  salinity  of  the  seawater  and  thus  ensures  the  formation  of denser water to feed the thermohaline circulation.⁴⁸ 55. According  to  the  Ocean  and  Climate  Change  Institute  (OCCI)  affiliated  with  Woods  Hole Oceanographic  Institute  in  Maryland,  U.S.A.,  the  decisive  influence  of  the  North  Atlantic  current must not be overlooked because it carries twice as much heat as sea currents produced by winds would. The reviews of paleoclimatic data produced by that same institute indicate that the North Atlantic current is also the most unstable of the world’s thermohaline circulation pathways.⁴⁹ Figure 4: Thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic Source: United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 47 Ibid, pp. 35-36 (Supra Note 24); Joyce, Terrance and Lloyd Keigen, Abrupt Climate Change: Are we on the  Brink  of  a  New  Little  Ice  Age?  Woods Hole. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (Ocean and Climate Change Institute), 7 p. 48 Ibid, p. 36 (Supra Note 24) 49 Ibid, p. 4. (Supra Note 46)

066 STC 05 E 13 56. This  historic  instability  is  explained  primarily  by  the  influence  of  climatic  warming  in  the Arctic,  although  more  thorough  research  will  be  necessary  in  the  coming  years  to  confirm  this theory.  As  we  mentioned,  the  rising  temperatures  make  the  sea  ice  and  snow  melt  much  more quickly,  thus  producing  an  ever-increasing  inflow  of  fresh  water  into  the  Arctic  Ocean  that  then flows into the North Atlantic. Combined with the increase in precipitation predicted by the IPCC in 2001, the increase in the fresh water rate not only raises the sea level slightly, it also disrupts the fragile  balance  between  the  masses  of  fresh  water  and  saltier  water.  In  other  words,  the  more fresh water there is in the North Atlantic, the higher the salinity level of the water at low latitudes will be, such that, once we cross a certain critical threshold that scientists are not currently able to determine,  the  surface  waters  will  no  longer  be  dense  enough  to  sink  to  the  ocean  depths  and perpetuate the thermohaline circulation. As a result of the increase in the level of fresh water, the thermohaline  circulation  could  weaken  or  even  stop  completely  for  a  period  lasting  several decades, indeed, over a century.⁵⁰ 57. The models used by the OCCI make clear that a marked weakening or total interruption of the North Atlantic current would cause a drop in temperature in the Northern hemisphere of 3 to 5^oC, which is a least a third of the climatic cooling during the major ice ages that the Earth has experienced over the millennia. 58. These climate changes are far from insignificant. According to the OCCI, they are twice as great as those observed during the worst winters in eastern North America. It is important to point out,  however,  that  a  drop  in  temperatures  in  the  Northern  hemisphere  will  not  affect  the  entire planet.  In  fact,  climatologists  say  that  changes  that  occur  at  high  latitudes  are  less  likely  to influence the global climate than those that occur at lower latitudes, such as those caused by El Nino.⁵¹ 59. The paleoclimatic data used not only by the OCCI, but also by the scientists at the United States  Oceanographic  and  Atmospheric  Administration  (NOAA)  and  by  those  who  produced  the aforementioned  study  for  the  National  Academy  for  Science  on  abrupt  climate  changes,  tend  to show that, 12 700 years ago, a major weakening of the North Atlantic current apparently caused an  abrupt  and  marked  drop  in  temperatures  in  the  Northern  hemisphere,  for  a  period  of  1300 years.  This  phenomenon  apparently  occurred  following  a  significant  rise  in  temperatures  at  the end of the last great ice age, 14 500 years ago. After a rapid climatic warming of more than 10^oC, temperatures dropped abruptly, over the space of a few decades, by more than 5^oC in Greenland. This  colder  period  accompanied  by  a  dry  climate  is  known  as  the  Younger Dryas event, named after a flower that grew in Europe at the time. This cooling event occurred during a period when the  influx  of  fresh  water  into  the  North  Atlantic  Ocean  was  very  high.  At  the  time,  it  was  not uncommon  to  find  glaciers  close  to  the  coasts  of  Portugal.  This  period  ended  abruptly,  11 400 years ago, with a temperature increase, still in Greenland, of 10^oC in a single decade!⁵² 60. A  less  severe  cooling  event  occurred  in  the  Northern  hemisphere  8200  years  ago,  after  a period of climatic warming similar to the one we are currently experiencing. This episode, in which the temperature of Greenland fell by 5^oC, was also apparently caused by a significant weakening of the North Atlantic current.⁵³ More recently the paleoclimatic data suggest that the Little Ice Age that  hit  Europe  hard  from  1300  to  1850  was  apparently  caused  by  a  weakening  of  the  North Atlantic current, volcanic eruptions and a temporary drop in solar energy. During this period, the temperature in the western portion of the Northern hemisphere dropped by 1^oC, producing a drop in precipitation that seriously affected Europe’s agriculture and economy. The scarcity of food and 50 Ibid, p.4 (Supra Note 46), Ibid, p. 2 (Supra Note 2), Ibid, pp. 8-10 (Supra Note 9) 51 Ibid, p. 4 (Supra Note 46) 52 Collaboration.   Mechanisms   that   Can   Cause   Abrupt   Climate   Change.  National  Atmospheric  and Oceanographic Administration. United States Government, 3 p. 53 Ibid, p. 6 (Supra Note 9), Ibid, (Supra Note 2)

066 STC 05 E 14 other  resources  also  caused  numerous  political-military  problems,  great  famines—particularly  in the  Viking  countries  between  1315  and  1319  and  in  Ireland,  where  a  million  people  died—and devastating plagues. 61. In its 2001 report, the IPCC states that, despite the records of warmer temperatures during the  Middle  Ages,  the  paleoclimatic  data  show  that,  from  the  11^th  century  to  the  middle  of  the 19^th century, at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, there was a strong downward trend in temperatures in the Northern hemisphere, a trend that changed direction abruptly as the data we have cited demonstrates.⁵⁴ 62. That being said, could the North Atlantic current again weaken over the coming decades to the point where an event such as the Little Ice Age or, worse, the Younger Dryas recur and thus threaten the economic, political and geostrategic stability of the Northern hemisphere, and Europe in particular? During recent years, the magazine Nature has published a series of scientific studies based  on  recent  observations  and  paleoclimatic  data  that  confirm  a  certain  weakening  of  the current  over  the  past  40 years,  particularly  since  the  early  1990s.⁵⁵  These  studies  state  that  the salinity rate of the water in the North Atlantic, and particularly the water from the deep currents of Labrador, Denmark and the Faeroe Islands, has diminished slightly while further south, near the Equator,  it  has  increased  slightly,  thus  threatening  the  balance  on  which  the  thermohaline circulation in this region depends. Moreover, a number of these studies, like the one done for the Arctic  Council,  note  that  the  western  part  of  the  North  Atlantic  has  cooled  down  in  recent  years while the Artic has warmed up greatly. While the authors of these studies do not have sufficient data  to  determine  whether  this  is  a  temporary  phenomenon  or  a  general  trend  heralding  major long-term  climate  changes  for  Europe  and  North  America  similar  to  those  that  occurred  in  the past, they do agree that it may be one of the consequences of global warming and the melting of sea ice and snow in the Arctic. 63. In 2001, the IPCC mentioned in its report that the climatic warming simulation models for the 21^st century suggest a weakening of the North Atlantic current. Beyond the year 2100, however, these same models predict that this current could be interrupted completely, and irreversibly, if the warming  continues  at  an  accelerated  rate  throughout  the  21^st  century.⁵⁶  Experts  attending  an international  symposium  on  abrupt climate changes last February also discussed this possibility. Despite a number of scientific uncertainties, one of them predicted the complete interruption of the current by 2050, while two other experts estimated the possibility of such a scenario’s occurring to be 30 percent by 2100 and 75 percent by the 23^rd century.⁵⁷ 64. The  authors  of  the  study  conducted  for  the  American  Department  of  Defence  on  the consequences  of  an  interruption  in  the  thermohaline  circulation  in  the  North  Atlantic  based  their scenario on a cooling event that occurred 8200 years ago. They simulated a marked weakening of the current between 2010 and 2020. According to their scenario, such an event would produce a temperature drop in the Northern hemisphere of almost 5^oC, a 30-percent reduction in precipitation and a 15-percent increase in wind strength during that decade. 54 Ibid, (Supra Note 20) 55 See Hansen, Bogl, S. Osterhus and W.H. Turrell. “Decreasing overflow from the Nordic seas into the Atlantic Ocean through the Faroe channel since 1950.”  Nature. Vol. 411. 21 June 2001. pp. 927-930; Dickson Bob, Stephen D., J. Holfort, J. Meincke, W.R. Turrell and I. Yashayaev. “Rapid Freshening of the deep North Atlantic Ocean over the past four decades.”  Nature. Vol. 416. 25 April 2002. pp. 832- 837; Curry, Ruth, B. Dickson and I. Yashayaev. “A change in freshwater balance of the Atlantic Ocean over the past four decades.” Nature. Vol. 426. 18-25 December 2003. pp. 826-829; Häkkinen and P.B. Rhines. “Decline of Subpolar North Atlantic Circulation During the 1990s.”Science Magazine. Vol. 304. 23 April 2004. pp. 555-559. 56 Ibid, p. 15  (Supra Note 6) 57 Ibid, p. 8 (Supra Note 12)

066 STC 05 E 15 65. Although the authors state at the outset that such a situation could occur over many decades or  centuries,  their  study  at  least  has  the  merit  of  simulating  the  human,  economic,  political  and geostrategic effects such a cooling, and more specifically the reduced precipitation, would have for the North Atlantic community. 66. Some will say that this event will never happen. The data presented in this study show that there is a chance it might happen again and that the repercussions could be more severe than in the  past  given  the  level  of  economic  and  technological  advancement  of  societies  living  in  the Northern hemisphere. VII.    CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CHALLENGES    TO    NATO    SECURITY    INITIATED    BY    ABRUPT    CLIMATE CHANGES 67. Needless to say, “securitizing” an issue can provide it with a status otherwise not granted.   The  term  security  can  well  become  a  political  tool  in  the  competition  for  government  attention.   Thus, what gets onto the agenda may well reflect the interests of some over those of others.  If global warming and abrupt climate changes are truly “common security” interests then weneed to be careful that we not ignore them because their effects are largely asymmetric; that is because they are more of a problem for the developing world than for the rest.  Getting the issue on the agenda needs to be viewed as a priority matter. 68. To a certain extent, your Rapporteur believes NATO has already taken the initial step.  Its Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was created in 1969 with the aim of addressing problems  affecting  the  environment  of  member  nations  and  the  quality  of  life  of  their  people.   Today, the Committee also meets with partner countries.  The key objectives guiding the work of the Committee include: Reducing the environmental impact of military activities; Conducting regional studies including cross-border activities; Preventing conflict in relation to the scarcity of resources; Addressing  emerging  risks  to  the  environment  and  society  that  could  cause  economic, cultural and political instability; and Addressing non-traditional threats to security. 69. The Committee itself does not engage in research activities.  Rather, work is carried out on a decentralized  basis,  mainly  through  pilot  studies  of  three  to  five  years  and  short-term  ad  hoc projects from 12 to 18 months, which are nationally funded.  Activities also include the organization of topical workshops and the co-sponsoring of international conferences and seminars.  Although the work of the Committee is limited, it is at least evidence of the fact that environmental factors such as abrupt climates changes in strategic analysis are regarded as increasingly important. 70. Your Rapporteur think that, as an assembly, we are well suited to take stock of these new security  concerns—for  they  have  political,  military,  economic,  scientific  and  social  implications. Our various committees may well wish to devote some effort to examining these implications from their particular perspective, thereby enabling us collectively to make a useful contribution. 71. The   urgency   of   such   proposed   studies,   according   to   your   Rapporteur,   was   recently highlighted  by  the  report  earlier  quoted  and  commissioned  by  the  United  States  Department  of Defence. While the scenario presented is extreme, it is nevertheless plausible and challenges our

066 STC 05 E 16 “ […] security in ways that should be considered immediately.”⁵⁸  It concludes that global warming “[…] should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to a U.S. national security concern.”⁵⁹  If such an  eventuality  should  ever  become  a  security  concern  for  the  United  States,  it  would,  most certainly,  also  become  one  for  many  of  the  rest  of  us.  Unless  properly  prepared  we  could  be confronted by a significant drop in the human carrying capacity of the Earth’s environment.   72. The report goes on to explore how such abrupt climate change could de-stabilize the geo- political  environment  leading  to  various  types  and  levels  of  conflict  due  to  resource  constraints.   The latter would include, inter  alia, food shortages, the decreased availability of fresh water and disruptions  in  energy  supplies.    As  global  and  local  carrying  capacities  decrease,  those  with adequate resources, such as the United States, Canada and most of European countries, could well turn themselves into fortresses while the less fortunate could engage in offensive forays into neighbouring countries or regimes. 73. For example, the paper says that Russia could join the European Union in 2018, providing energy   resources.   But   because   of   infighting   around   millions   of   refugees   coming   from Scandinavian countries, access to rivers, water and other resources, the authors also predict that the European Union could collapse in 2025. In North America, the need for better security could mean,  by  2020,  that  the  United  States  forms  an  integrated  security  alliance  with  Canada  and Mexico in order to stop the flow of refugees coming from Caribbean Islands that were flooded and Europe.   Finally,   shortage   of   oil   combined   with   decreasing   temperatures   in   the   Northern Hemisphere could trigger a military conflict in the Persian Gulf between China, India, Europe, and the United States.     74. It  is  the  strong  belief  of  your  Rapporteur  that  the  likelihood  of  internecine  conflict  would increase;  now  being  fuelled  not  only  by  old  enmities  but  also  resource  scarcities.    Differing alliances  could  be  formed  as  priorities  shift  and  the  goal  is  resources  for  survival  rather  than ideology, religion, or more traditional forms of nationalism.  New challenges will then require new approaches  and  mechanisms.  They  will  need  to  be  defined  over  the  following  years  by  this Assembly. 58 Ibid, p. 1 (Supra Note 9) 59 Ibid, p. 3 (Supra Note 9)