POLITICAL 062 PCNP 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON NATO PARTNERSHIPS NATO-EU SECURITY COOPERATION DRAFT REPORT MARCO MINNITI (ITALY) RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 12 April 2005 * Until  this  document  has  been  approved  by  the  Political  Committee,  it  represents  only  the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

062 PCNP 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO-EU RELATIONS................................................................ 1 III. NATO-EU CO-OPERATION .................................................................................................. 2 IV. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE ................................................................................................ 3 V. OUT OF AREA ...................................................................................................................... 4 VI. WMD PROLIFERATION AND TACKLING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS.......... 6 VII. CAPABILITIES ...................................................................................................................... 6 VIII.   CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 8

062 PCNP 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Over  the  past  few  years,  this  Sub-Committee  has  closely  monitored  the  development  of NATO’s  strategic  partnership  with  the  European  Union.    Since  its  start  in  1991,  when  the Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the new European Union, the EU has gradually taken on a more prominent role in European security matters. 2. The  Alliance,  too,  underwent  profound  adjustments  in  the  same  period,  thereby  greatly expanding its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.  As NATO’s transformation process continues, it  puts  an  even  greater  emphasis  on  its  partnerships.    While  the  development  of  its  partnership with the EU has not been without complications, the closer co-operation with the EU has allowed NATO to shift its attention beyond its traditional area.   3. However,  despite  the  present  climate  of  improvement  and  strengthening  of  transatlantic relations  stressed  by  the  recent  visit  of  President  Bush  to  Europe,  the  NATO-EU  dialogue  has reached an impasse.  This is primarily due to the fact that neither Cyprus nor Malta, which joined the EU in May 2004, have a security relationship with the Alliance, and that there is no unanimity within NATO to have meetings with the EU at 25 and to develop in this format a dialogue without discrimination  on  issues  for  which  there  are  no  classified  documents  to  be  exchanged. The agenda  of  joint  NATO-EU  meetings  is  currently  limited  to  the  implementation  of  the  Berlin  Plus arrangements, i.e. the EU-led operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), and capabilities in the NATO-EU Capability Group. There is no further development in other crucial security areas, for  example  on  terrorism  and  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD).    At  the NATO  Istanbul  Summit,  NATO  leaders  announced  they  would  work  together  to  further  develop and deepen their co-operation, but due to the participation issue, nothing has happened yet. 4. This   report   briefly   reviews   the   NATO-EU   partnership   and   will   make   some   general observations on its current state.  As such it will look at some key areas of co-operation.  In the autumn  report,  your  Rapporteur  will  put  forward  specific  proposals to reinvigorate the NATO-EU security partnership.   II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO-EU RELATIONS 5. When  the  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP)  saw  the  light  of  the  day  in  the mid-1990s it was agreed that Europeans should be able to act without US involvement in a future Balkans-style  scenario,  in  a  manner  that  was  ‘separable  but  not  separate’  to  NATO.   However, resolving  the  dilemma  of  institutional  overlap  has  become  the  predominant  issue  of  EU-NATO relations.    Madeline  Albright  expressed  early  concern  in  identifying  the  ‘3  Ds’  where  ESDP  and NATO threatened to overlap.  Decoupling (of NATO and EU actions), duplication (of capabilities) and discrimination (of non-EU NATO members), had to be avoided, she said in a column in the Financial Times.   6. The  right  of  first  refusal  remains  a  controversial  issue.    A  number  of  member  states  see NATO  as  the  platform  through  which  any  potential  operation  should  be  discussed  first.    From there, it could be delegated to the EU if NATO did not wish to be engaged.  The EU, on the other hand,  has  not  recognised  that  right  for  NATO.    Today  there  are  three  agreed  means  by  which Europeans  may  undertake  military  action:    within  NATO;  through  Berlin-plus;  or  an  autonomous operation (with a lead nation or European headquarters).   7. Despite the potential divisions, NATO and EU threat assessments remain similar.  Both the European  Security  Strategy  (ESS),  and  NATO’s  Strategic  Concept,  substituted  by  the  2002 Prague  Summit,  recognised  terrorism,  the  proliferation  of  WMD,  and  failed  states  as  principle

062 PCNP 05 E 2 security  challenges.    Additionally,  both  explained  the  need  for  non-military  policy  dimensions  in relieving  insecurity,  though,  inevitably  for  a  collective security organisation, NATO remains more focused on military means. 8. Agreeing a comprehensive complementarity between the EU and NATO will be important in maintaining  cooperation.    As  the  ESDP  develops  further,  that  need  is  more  pressing.    EU operations  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia¹,  the  Congo  and  most  recently  in Bosnia,  where  EU  replaced  NATO  troops,  demonstrate  an  emerging  role  for  the  EU.    Upon ratification by all EU member states, the EU Constitution could mark yet another significant step for  CFSP.    The  creation  of  an  EU  foreign  minister  could  provide  a  more  centralised  decision- making process, although the national veto would still remain.  Security integration could be further advanced   among   those  EU  member  states  that  want  to  using  the  concept  of  ‘permanent structured co-operation’.  Still, many countries consider NATO the more credible military actor.  On the other hand, in the membership prospect the EU has a powerful incentive to offer the countries of the Balkans.   III. NATO-EU CO-OPERATION 9. The “Berlin Plus” arrangements, in operation since March 2003, form the basis for practical work  in  crisis management between the two organisations.  “Berlin Plus” allows the EU  assured access to NATO operational planning, presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and  common  assets,  NATO  European  command  options  for  EU-led  operations  (including  the European  role  of  Deputy  SACEUR),  and  adaptation  of  the  NATO  defence  planning  system  to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations.   10. Furthermore,  NATO  and  the  EU  have  established  regular  exchanges  at  different  levels.   NATO and EU foreign ministers gather twice a year, while NATO and EU Ambassadors (the North Atlantic Council [NAC] and the EU’s Political and Security Committee - PSC) meet a minimum of three  times  per  semester.    In addition, the NATO and EU Military Committees meet  twice every semester, while regular information exchanges have also been agreed at a committee level as well as at a staff level.  Unfortunately, this pattern is now undermined by the issue of the participation of the EU at 25. 11. The “Framework for an enhanced NATO -EU dialogue and a concerted approach on security and stability in the Western Balkans”, agreed in July 2003, is the only formal agreement between the two organisations.  NATO and the EU agreed to exchange relevant information and keep each other regularly informed at all levels, including possible military options.  In addition to co-operation in  the  area  of  conflict  prevention  and  crisis  management,  the  Framework  document  lists  the following areas where the two organisations plan to co-ordinate their assistance to the countries of the region:  defence and security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, combating terrorism, border security and management, and arms control and removal of small arms.  The Framework also provides for consultation mechanisms between the two institutions, for example between the NAC and the PSC, between the Military Committee and the EU Military Council and between the Policy Co-ordination Group and the Politico-Military Working Group.   12. However,  there  is  still  no  institutional  co-operation  between  the  Alliance and the EU in the Caucasus  region.    Apart  from  Partnership  for  Peace  (PfP),  both  organisations  have  only  lately begun to increase their activities in this region.  Your Rapporteur proposes that NATO and the EU should reach an agreement on a concerted approach for the Southern Caucasus.   1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

062 PCNP 05 E 3 IV. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 13. The  EU’s  first  operation  according  to  “Berlin  Plus”  was  the  takeover  of  the  small  NATO mission in FYR of Macedonia in April 2003.  The smooth transition from NATO's OperationAllied Harmony in FYR of Macedonia to Operation Concordia, which has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities,   has   demonstrated   the   effectiveness   of   the   Berlin   Plus   arrangements   for   the collaboration of the two organisations.  Concordia was not an EU-only mission; it also included 14 non-EU states.   14. In some ways, FYR of Macedonia served as a test case for BiH and possibly for the future transformation of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.  As the security continued to improve, the EU   operation,   “Proxima”,  initially  composed  of  200  police  officers,  was  reduced  to  140  in December   2004.      As   a   result   of   the   increasingly   stable   security   situation   in   Bosnia   and Herzegovina,  NATO  concluded  the  SFOR  mission  and  handed  the  mission  over  to  the  EU (EUFOR mission “Operation Althea”) in December 2004.  With 7,000 troops, “Althea” constitutes the largest EU military mission to date.  A revision of the operation is due for early summer this year and it is likely that “Althea”, which is described as a ‘great success’, will be scaled down to perhaps  5,000  troops.    NATO  retains  a  small  presence  in  the  country,  namely  a  150-strong headquarters  in  Sarajevo,  to  assist  with  defence  reforms,  counter-terrorism  efforts,  and  the apprehension of wanted war crime suspects.   15. Approximately  80  per  cent  of  the  EU  force  has  derived  from  SFOR,  and  EU  commanders aim to provide the same level of security in the country as SFOR.  The main difference is in the chain of command of the new peacekeeping mission and, perhaps, in the duality of the EUFOR and  NATO  missions  which  share  some  operational  tasks,  but  where  EUFOR  has  the  primary stabilisation  role.    A  continued  NATO  and  US  presence  was  considered  crucial  by  Bosnian officials, as ESDP had a relatively untested record and because of Europe’s failure to handle the 1990s  Balkan  crises  on  its  own.    The  first  four  months  of  activities  of  EUFOR  have  proved  the effectiveness and credibility of the mission.   16. The  EU  already  had  experience  in  fielding  police  training  and  advisory  missions  in  Bosnia and Herzegovina and in FYR of Macedonia, both undertaken in the ESDP framework.  In Bosnia, approximately  850  international  police  personnel  have  served  in  the  EU  Police  Mission  (EUPM) since 1 January 2003.   17. Success in handing over the stabilisation mission in BiH from NATO to the EU is important not just for the country’s future, but also for the precedent it may set for future potential handovers from NATO to the EU, for example in Kosovo and perhaps in Afghanistan.  Moreover, “Althea” is an  important  test  for  the  EU’s  ability  to  integrate  its  military,  political  and  economic  instruments.   As such, it may shape the future development of ESDP.    18. In  Kosovo  however,  the  situation  is  much  more  complicated.    The  future  status  of  the remains a pivotal and contested issue.  The Albanian majority largely favours full independence, while  the  Serb  minority  in  the  province  and  the  Serbian  government  in  Belgrade  oppose  this.   NATO and the EU continue to endorse the ‘standards before status principle’, i.e. that the province must first acquire internal stability and respect the criteria set out by UNSCR 1244 before its final status  is  decided.    The  Standards  Review  policy  of  2003  remains  the  international  community’s agreed policy approach, despite the setback of the March 2004 violence in which 19 Serbs were killed  and  more  than  900  people  injured.    To  quell  the  violence,  NATO  had  to  deploy  3,000 additional peacekeepers to back up KFOR (Kosovo Force).   19. Following  the  Alliance’s  78-day  air  campaign,  the  NATO-led  KFOR  was  deployed  in  June 1999 to monitor, verify and where necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict.  Moreover, KFOR’s task is to provide for a secure environment and to assist the UN

062 PCNP 05 E 4 Mission  in  Kosovo  (UNMIK).    As  security  gradually  improved,  KFOR  was  able  be  reduced  from originally 46,000 troops to currently 17,000.   20. The UN-administered province is currently experiencing a time of political tension.  Following the resignation last week of Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, who has been indicted for alleged atrocities committed during the 1998-1999 war, President Ibrahim Rugova escaped unhurt from an assassination  attempt  in  mid-March.    Within  Albanian  Kosovar  public  opinion  there is increasing opposition towards international presence in the province.   21. There are talks of the change of the form of international presence administering the Serbian province (where the EU would possibly take the lead).  The greatest obstacle for the further stage of  the  development  of  NATO’s  role  in  the  region  will,  however,  depend  on  the  ability  of  the peacekeeping mission to secure a sustainable living environment for the non-Albanian minorities (i.e.  the  Serbs)  which  is,  again,  to  an  extent,  related  to  the  unresolved  territorial  status  of  the province  as  well  as  standards  and  institutional  mechanisms  for  the  protection  of  non-Albanian minorities. 22. The handover of operations in the Balkans is generally viewed as successful, although the transition  from  NATO  to  the  EU  was  not  completely  without  problems.    The  handing  over  of operations in FYR of Macedonia was at first hampered by the sharing of information and in the co- ordination   phase.      In   BiH,   the   practical   implementation   of   the   handover   has   been   more cumbersome than anticipated because a clear delineation of NATO and EU responsibilities took more time to achieve.  A possible explanation for this is perhaps that the handover of operations in the Balkans is based on “Berlin Plus”.  However, “Berlin Plus” has never been intended f or the EU to take on an existing NATO operation, but to start a new operation on its own with recourse to NATO  assets.    Much  more  serious  problems  arose  due  to  so-called  ‘national  caveats’,  or restrictions, which have severely hampered NATO’s military ability in a number of operations.  For example, only a third of KFOR troops were eligible to use force against rioting crowds during the March 2004 crisis in Kosovo.   23. Naturally, NATO’s reduced presence coincides with the changing security situation but also because  NATO  and  NATO  member  countries’  troops  are  stretched to the limit in other areas of operation  like  Afghanistan,  Iraq  and  elsewhere.    The  EU’s  higher  visibility  of  the  security  of  the Balkans also reflects an eagerness of the EU Security and Defence Policy to assert its role. V. OUT OF AREA 24. Geographically,  both  NATO  and  the  EU  have  become  increasingly  active  outside  Europe.   Since the end of the Cold War, but particularly after 9-11, NATO has projected security beyond its traditional   area   of   responsibility.      Some   of   the   Alliance’s   most   important   missions   are   in Afghanistan and in Iraq.   25. In Afghanistan, NATO is running the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, which  is  tasked  to  assist  the  Afghan  government  in  maintaining  security.    Initially  restricted  to providing security in and around Kabul, the Alliance is now in the process of expanding the mission to  cover  other  parts  of  the  country.    In  Iraq,  NATO  provides  intelligence,  logistics  expertise, movement  co-ordination,  force  generation  and  secure  communications  support  to Poland, which commands the Multinational Division (MND) Central South as part of the international stabilisation force.  Moreover, NATO has set up a Training Mission in Iraq and will establish a training centre for  senior  security  and  defence  officials.    At  the  February  2005  Summit,  all  26  NATO  member countries agreed to contribute to NATO’s assistance to Iraq.  

062 PCNP 05 E 5 26. Earlier, at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO decided to increase its presence in Central Asia and  the  South  Caucasus.    Azerbaijan,  Armenia  and  Georgia  are  PfP  and  PARP  member countries.   27. Building closer ties between NATO and the Middle East has become a “strategic imperative”. NATO  has  elevated  the  Mediterranean  Dialogue  into  a  genuine  partnership  involving  the  seven Mediterranean  participating  countries:  Algeria,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  Mauritania,  Morocco  and Tunisia. The overall aim is to contribute towards regional security and stability. This aim will be met by  enhancing  the  Dialogue’s  existing  political  dimension,  achieving  interoperability,  assisting  in defence reform, and contributing to the fight against terrorism. 28. The  EU,  too,  has  sought  to  play  a  security  role  beyond  the  Balkans.    Between  June  and September  2003,  responding  to  a  request  by  the  United  Nations,  the  EU  led  an  international 1,400-strong peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo to protect aid workers and stop rebel fighting and atrocities.  In December 2004, the EU announced it would deploy a small police mission to Congo in January 2005 to assist in setting up a Congolese police unit.  In July of last  year,  the  EU  launched  a  small  civilian  rule of law mission in Georgia to assist the country’s judicial  reform  process.  It  is  currently  assisting  an  African  Union  (AU) peace operation in Darfur and could assist an AU operation in Somalia. 29. Moreover,  the  EU  EUJUST  LEX  mission  is  to  launch  an  integrated  rule-of-law  mission  for Iraq. The mission falls under the scope of the ESDP and will consist of integrated training in the fields  of  management  and  criminal  investigation  for  senior  officials  and  executive  staff from  the judiciary, the police and the prison services.   30. The  ESS  recognises  the  borders  of  the  Mediterranean,  the  Middle  East  and  the  Southern Caucasus as key regions for European security.  Accordingly, the EU has a strong interest in the stability  and  development  of  the  Southern  Caucasus,  which  it  clearly  identifies  as  one  of  the regions in which the EU should take a “stronger and moreactive interest”. 31. The  resolution  of  the  Arab/Israeli  conflict  is  a  strategic  priority  for  Europe,  in  order  to  deal with  other  problems  in  the  Middle  East.  The  Mediterranean  area  continues  to  undergo  serious problems  of  economic  stagnation,  social  unrest  and  unresolved  conflicts.  The  EU’s  interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners in the framework of the Barcelona Process.   32. The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) will address the strategic objective of the EU  set  in  the  ESS of “building security in our neighbourhood” after the 2004 enlargement.  The ENP is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours.  The ENP is a complement to the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP),   whose   objective   is   to   strengthen   political,   security,   economic   and   socio-cultural partnerships between EU and the 12 individual Mediterranean countries.  It aims at offering them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater co-operation on political, security and economic issues as well as in cultural and education.  Action Plans were drafted in 2004 in order  to  strengthen  “the  stability,  security  and  well -being  for  all  concerned”.  It  lists  crucial instruments  in  the  process  of  bringing  each  neighbour  closer  to  the  Union.  The  purpose  of  the Action Plans, based on individual country reports, will be to define a joint agenda for relations with the EU for the following three to five years, with the objective of deepening political co-operation and  economic  integration.    Action  Plans  have  already  been  negotiated  with  Israel,  Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine. The Commission has adopted country  reports  on  and  follows  closely  the  developments  in  Egypt,  Lebanon,  Syria  and  the countries of South Caucasus.  

062 PCNP 05 E 6 VI. WMD PROLIFERATION AND TACKLING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS 33. Both  NATO  and  the  EU  have  identified  the  proliferation  of  WMD  and  terrorist  groups  as today’s key security threats.  Both institutions have decided to co-operate to combat internationally active  terrorist  groups  and  the  proliferation  of  WMD.    They  pledged  to  work  toward  concerted planning  of  capabilities  development.    In  this  context,  they  have  exchanged  information  on  the protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks.   34. Further co-operation between the EU and NATO in the area of WMD proliferation could be in the areas of intelligence sharing, consequence management, NBC defence capabilities as well as non-proliferation policies.    35. A  multinational  co-operation  that  brings  together  France,  Spain,  Italy,  Portugal,  Malta, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania has signed a declaration of interest and adopted an Action Plan for 2005 on maritime surveillance, civil protection and air safety to enhance security and fight terrorism in the Mediterranean. This initiative aims at complementing existing multilateral dialogue between these Maghreb countries, the EU in the context of the Barcelona process and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.   36. With regard to combating terrorist groups, military means can only be complementary, hence NATO as well as ESDP play more of a back-up role than that of a crucial part.  However, the EU has a number of instruments outside ESDP that are important in this area, such as the European arrest warrant, agreement on data sharing via Europol’s anti-terrorist cell, and Eurojust, designed to  co-ordinate  investigations  and  prosecutions  between  national  prosecuting  authorities.    At  the March 2005 Madrid anti-terrorism conference, EU President José Manuel Barroso said that the EU Commission  is  preparing  additional  terrorism  initiatives,  such  as  a  centralised  alert  network,  an alert network for the forces of order, a proposal for the information exchange between the forces of order and a network for the surveillance of critical infrastructure.     VII.    CAPABILITIES 37. The question of capabilities has been central to the NATO-EU relationship.  At the Prague Summit of November 2002, NATO approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a more focused  document  than  the  1999  Defence  Capabilities  Initiative  (DCI).    PCC  focuses  on  eight capability goals, targeting the Allies’ principal deficiencies, particularly in the areas of strategic air and sealift, air refuelling, precision-guided munitions, secure communications ground surveillance systems  and  special  forces.    The  Prague  Summit  also  agreed  on  the  establishment  of  a  NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of primarily European high-readiness troops.  The NRF reached initial  operational  capability  in  October  last  year  and  is  now  ready  to  take  on  the  full  range  of missions where and when the Alliance decides to use it.  The NATO force, expected to reach its full operational capability of approximately 21,000 troops by 2006, combines elite land, air and sea units into a single force that can be deployed anywhere in the world in five days and sustain itself for up to a month on a wide range of missions.   38. The EU’s Helsinki summit of December 1999 established the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’, which envisaged the establishment of a force of 60,000 troops by 2003, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to 12 months.  This European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was to be capable of  fulfilling  the  full  spectrum  of  Petersburg  tasks  (humanitarian  and  peacekeeping  operations).   Although  the  force  has  been  declared  operational  at  Laeken  in  late  December  2001,  it  remains clear that it is not yet fully deployable.  Considering the evolution of the strategic context and the adoption of the ESS, a new “Headline Goal 2010” was established in May 2004.   

062 PCNP 05 E 7 39. The EU has announced the creation of a new concept in February 2004, which would lead to the launch of rapid reaction units, composed of joint ‘battle groups’.  In November 2004, the EU decided to set up 13 battle groups of 1,500 troops by 2007, capable of dealing with two separate crises a year and deployable within 15 days.  A EU Defence Agency (EDA) that would focus on the development of defence capabilities, research, acquisition and armaments has been established.   In  effect,  the  ‘Headline  Goal  2010’  aims  to  translate  the  ESS  into  concrete  military objectives in order to fulfil the EU's capability development in the long term.   40. With  very  similar  dimensions  to  the  ERRF  and  drawn  from  the  same,  primarily  European troop pool, clearly the troops would be ‘double-hatted’, usable for NATO or EU missions.  Some pundits have therefore expressed concern that NATO and the EU might ‘compete’ for the use of these forces if there were simultaneous crises.  In fact, the issue which organisation should have the  right  of  first  choice  has  not  been  addressed.    Moreover,  as  SACEUR  General  Jones  told members  during  the  NATO  PA’s  2004  Venice  Plenary  NATO  and  the  EU  train  their  forces  to different standards, with the EU placing more restrictions on the use of its forces than NATO.   41. In  the  context  of  ESDP,  the  EU  also  has  decided  to  create  civilian  capabilities  for  crisis management.    These  include  the  creation  of  a  5,000-strong  civilian  police force (of which 1,000 can  be  deployed  within  30  days),  200  rule  of  law  experts,  including  international  prosecutors, lawyers  and  judges  (including  a  rapid  response  group  capable  of  deployment  within  a  month), civilian administrators, and civil protection consisting of 2 - 3 rapidly deployable assessment teams in   case   of   natural   and   man-made   disasters   with   a   further   2,000   strong   civilian   protection intervention contingent. 42. To overcome existing capability gaps, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) has been initiated  to  devise  strategies  for  remedying  capability  shortfalls.    NATO  experts  provided  military and technical advice starting from the preparations to the implementation of the ECAP.  As both NATO  and  the  EU  strive  to  improve  their  capabilities,  it  is  important  that  efforts  made  by  both organisations  are  neither  duplicative  nor  incompatible.    NATO  and  EU  capabilities  planning  and mutual  reinforcement  between  the  PCC  and  the  ECAP  are  being  addressed  in  the  NATO-EU Capability Group, established in May 2003. 43. The  creation  of  the  European  Gendarmerie  Force  (EGF)  as  agreed  by  France,  Italy, Portugal, Spain, and The Netherlands late September 2004 is a case in point.  The EGF, initially 900  police  officers  strong  and  designed  to  be  ready  for  deployment  on  30  days  notice,  can significantly improve the EU’s peacekeeping capabilities.  The EGF, which has its headquarters in Italy, could be used as a follow-up force to the battle groups and the ERRF, thereby making an important  contribution  to  managing  post-conflict  situations.  The  five  contribution  member  states have  already  announced  that  the  EGF  could  be  available  to  other  international  organisations, including NATO.   45. The April 2003 summit between Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg broached the idea of establishing a distinct European headquarters.  At the height of transatlantic tensions over Iraq,  it  was  seen  as  a  statement  of  intent  to  establish  greater  EU  autonomy.  A  compromise solution  in  November  2003  at  the  Naples  summit  established  a  small  European  planning  cell  in SHAPE  and  a  small  planning  unit  for  the  EU  Military  Staff.    The  planning  cell  for  EU  civil  and military  operations  will  become  operational  in  June  2005.    The  cell  is  designed  to  allow  EU stand-alone operations and will have a staff of 40.   46. As both NATO and the EU are hampered by capability shortfalls in a several key areas, your Rapporteur encourages member nations to increase defence spending to meet the PCC and the ECAP’s  identified  goals.    However,  as  a  significant  increase  in  defence  investments  appears unlikely  in  the  short  run,  Europeans  should  “spend  smarter”  and  try  to  cut  duplication  wherever possible.  The European Defence Agency (EDA) can make an important contribution to that end.

062 PCNP 05 E 8 47. It  is  designed  to  enhance  European  armaments  co-operation  by,  among  other  things, harmonising   military   requirements,   co-ordinating   defence   research   and   development   and encouraging   the   convergence   of   national   procurement   procedures.      However,   because   of established national structures and processes, as well as due to vested interests that will have to be overcome, progress is likely to be only gradual.  The EDA will be successful if governments and parliaments  muster  the  political  will  to  build  more  efficient  and  effective  forces.    While  the NATO-EU Capabilities Group has been successful in information sharing, a formal harmonisation of NATO’s Prague Capabilities’ Commitment and the ECAP could advance co-operation further.   48. Despite their institutional and other differences, NATO and the EU share very similar, if not identical,  goals.  Both are working together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe  and  beyond.    Both  share  common  strategic  interests  and  co-operate  in  a  spirit  of complementarity and partnership.   VIII.   CONCLUSIONS 49. Except   for   the   generally   smooth   running   operations   in   BiH,   the   NATO-EU   security partnership  is  currently  experiencing  serious  difficulties.    To  overcome  the  current  impasse, Cyprus and Malta should engage in a security relationship with NATO and apply for PfP as quickly as possible.  Both countries are already members of the EU and your Rapporteur hopes that all NATO  member  countries  would  endorse  their  PfP  membership  without delay.  In the meantime, NATO should not be hampered to meet, at all levels, with the EU in its full membership. 50. Re-establishing  the  NATO-EU  dialogue  to  its  full  potential,  particularly  on  the  PSC-NAC level, will provide an opportunity to build on past agreements and deepen the existing partnership.   As   NATO   is   increasingly   engaged   in   areas   outside   Europe,   the   EU   could   take   on   more responsibilities from NATO.  Some pundits have already suggested “europeanising” BiH,perhaps also Kosovo.  Improved co-operation between NATO and the EU is feasible in the defence against WMD attacks.  NATO could include the EU in the information exchange on WMD proliferation as organised by its WMD Centre.   51. However,  both  organisations  need  to  develop  co-operation  further.    For  example,  both should work together to secure and stabilise the regions in Europe’s neighbourhood.  Therefore, NATO  and  the  EU  could  agree  on  framework  agreements  on,  for  example,  the  Southern Caucasus,  the  Mediterranean,  Afghanistan  and,  perhaps,  Iraq.    Framework  agreements  could avoid unnecessary duplication and promote complementarity between NATO and the EU.   52. The  Alliance  remains  the  platform  for  collective  defence  as  well  as  for  projecting  credible military power in Europe and beyond.  At the same time, the EU makes an increasingly important contribution to our common security.  In addition, the EU could focus on homeland defence as well as on post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.  NATO should engage the EU in co-ordinating assistance more effectively in the areas of defence reform, rule of law and other capabilities that will enhance security and stability in the areas bordering Europe.  While NATO projects security and  stability  at  its  borders,  the  EU  is  also  transforming  societies  in  its  neighbourhood.    The prospect of EU membership is a powerful incentive for accepting EU norms.   53. The  nature  and  complexity  of  today’s  security  challenges  call  for  a  deeper  co-operation between  NATO  and  the  EU.    What  the  respective  missions  of  both  organisations  will  be  in  the future  and  which  of  the  two will take the lead in which operations will very much depend on the instruments required to deal with upcoming crises.

062 PCNP 05 E 9 54. The  NATO-EU  ‘strategic  dialogue’  on  crisis  management  as  envisaged  by  “Berlin  Plus”  is currently  on  hold.    In  the  current  complex  security  environment,  where  demand  for  security outstrips available resources, it would be counterproductive if NATO and the EU were not able to improve their co-operation and reduce duplication and waste.