

## **Parlamentarisk Afdeling**

Sekretariatet for delegationen til NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling

23. februar 2005  
J.nr. 2324/MRH

### **Resumé af**

#### **Joint Committee Møde i Bruxelles 19-21. februar**

Det årlige Joint Committee Møde i Bruxelles, hvor Political Committee, Defence & Security Committee og Economics & Security Committee afholdt et fælles møde, blev vanen tro benyttet til at drøfte aktuelle emner og udfordringer for NATO og NPA.

**Assistant Secretary General, Ambassadør Günther Altenburg** kommenterede på NATO's politiske dagsorden jf. vedlagte talepapir.

**Assistant Secretary General, General Løjtnant Jean Fournet** fremlagde NATO Public Diplomacy Divisions prioriteringer og udfordringer jf. vedlagte notat.

**Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces North Europe, General Gerhard Back** koncentrerede sit indlæg om ISAF og de vanskeligheder NATO er stillet overfor i Afghanistan, jf. vedlagte talepapir.

Endelig fremlagde NPA's nytiltrådte præsident, **Pierre Lellouche**, sine bud på NATO's største udfordringer for de kommende år, og dermed hans oplæg til temaer for NPA's kommende arbejde:

1. Irak (Hvilken strategi kan/bør NATO vælge?)
2. Afghanistan (Hvordan forhindres etableringen af en muslimsk narkostat?)
3. NATO/EU (Hvordan finder man den rette balance mellem det politiske og det militære samarbejde?)
4. Israel/Palæstina (Hvilken rolle kan NATO spille, ifm. konsolidering af en fredsaftale)
5. Iran (Fodslag ml. EU og USA?)
6. Kina (Spørgsmålet om våbenembargo som potentiel splid ml. EU og USA).



**COMJFC Brunssum Speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly**  
**Brussels, 20 February 2005**

**SLIDE 1 – INTRODUCTION**

Honourable Chairpersons of the Political Committee, the Defence and Security, and the Economics and the Security Committees of NATO's Parliamentary Assembly, Ladies and Gentlemen.

NATO's Parliamentary Assembly is of particular importance since you not only represent the parliaments of the member states, but also the collective wisdom and experience of policy and decision-makers at the level of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. As a NATO Operational Commander, I am delighted to have been given the opportunity to address this distinguished audience.

The aim of my address is two fold: first I would like to describe how NATO has changed and the impact this has had on Joint Force Command HQ Brunssum and our preparation for operations. Secondly, I will concentrate on the principal focus of my presentation and give you an overview of NATO's number one operational priority at present, namely the Security Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Once I have completed my address, I will welcome your questions.

As is well known, during the Cold War the strategic situation was almost completely static and the military landscape only altered very slowly. However, since the end of the Cold War NATO's circumstances have undergone dramatic change from defending Europe to acting as a global force for good. The demand for our role in stabilisation and Peace Support Operations seems destined to expand in a world where failed or fragile states and non-state actors combine to generate a complex and far less predictable strategic landscape. To meet this world, the Alliance of today needs to be flexible and dynamic both in planning and conducting operations.

The pace and scale of change within NATO in the last few years has been astonishing. The Transformation process has promoted a radical approach in changing the way the Alliance is structured, organized and run. We now regard Transformation as the normal course of business and are constantly seeking to exploit new ideas and new technology.

Nowhere has change been more dramatic than in the NATO Operational Command Structure where the number of HQs has been reduced from 65 to just 11, while at the same time making these headquarters leaner and more efficient.

**SLIDE 2 – NATO OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE**

Furthermore, and of key significance, we have also developed deployable headquarters with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of anticipated Alliance missions.

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The Joint Force Commands, of which there are 2 (Naples and Brunssum), and Joint Command (Lisbon) now form the backbone of the operational level in the new NATO Command Structure. These commands are designed to support NATO's Level of Ambition by providing the deployable joint command and control capabilities required for operations either by a Combined Joint Task Force or the NATO Response Force. In terms of the ability to react quickly to a crisis the NRF has been embraced as the core of NATO's ability to deliver rapid effect to meet a range of missions.

For my Brunssum headquarters it will therefore come as no surprise to you that our primary focus is firmly established on operations. This is clearly indicated in the first sentence of my Mission Statement, which places operations at the very heart of all that we do....

### **SLIDE 3 – COMJFC MISSION STATEMENT**

Inevitably these changes have placed new demands on the operational level of command. Using JFC HQ Brunssum as the example let me briefly illustrate how. NATO, and specifically my headquarters, has been in command of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan since August 2003. This task is the top priority for the headquarters and one that consumes the main effort of the majority of my staff. However, we are also fully engaged with the developments in deployable forces. This involves frequent participation in exercises - those of other commands as well as our own - at both the tactical and operational levels. Therefore a high priority is also to train our own deployable HQ staff element so that it is able to command the NRF during our next period of responsibility, which begins in mid 2006. We are already planning for this responsibility, which will last for one year and include Final Operational Capability certification. In addition to these two principal tasks there are of course important additional responsibilities, such as progressing military cooperation with partner nations.

The twin tasks of Afghanistan and preparing for deployed operations place significant demands on the headquarters' resources. Furthermore, both tasks are being accomplished at a time of internal structural upheaval due to a new manning structure and the incorporation of officers from the new NATO nations. Although this makes for a demanding balancing trick, life is busy and rewarding and I stress that I am telling you this not in any sense of grievance, but simply to illustrate the radically changed character of NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Finally in these introductory words I would like to point out one other significant change from the old NATO, namely that the Joint Force Commands no longer have permanently designated Areas of Responsibility nor permanently assigned forces. When impending operations demand, SACEUR will designate a Joint Operational Area (JOA) to meet the requirements of the operation and will allocate forces from a Combined Joint Statement of Requirement for the Joint Force Command selected for the job. Physical and intellectual flexibility will be key to meeting SACEUR's requirements.

Having set for you the background to my talk let me now turn to operational matters and Afghanistan. First I would like to recall the origins of our mission and its legal basis. As we all know the international engagement in that country started in the

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aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, where swift action of the US-led Coalition forces succeeded in removing the Taliban from power in October 2001, depriving Osama bin Laden of his main operating base. Thus, the foundation was set for a peacekeeping and stabilization effort given purpose through the Bonn Agreement of December 2001.

This international effort resulted in the ISAF Mission supported by a UN Security Council resolution adopted in late 2001. Although recalling these dates helps us to understand how quickly and effectively the world reacted, we should not forget that the Afghan people, too, showed their determination to end the tyranny of terrorism, lawlessness and oppression. Only two days after the adoption of UNSCR 1386, a Transitional Authority was established, headed by Hamid Karzai. On 9 October 2004 he was chosen by the people of Afghanistan to be their first democratically elected President.

Another important date is 11 August 2003 when NATO took over authority of ISAF. Now, one and a half years later, we have reason to be pleased with the results of our common effort and to congratulate the Afghan people for their determination. However, the restoration of the economy and society of a country ravaged by more than two decades of war, in addition to providing lasting stability and security, makes continued international assistance necessary. A number of important challenges, which I will be addressing during the remainder of my address, still lie ahead of us.

### **SLIDE 4 – ISAF MISSION**

Let me now explain what ISAF has been doing and continues to do in Afghanistan, and how our activities relate to these challenges. First of all it should be recalled that NATO is not an occupying force but is tasked to *assist and support* the Afghan government in establishing a well-functioning statehood. Therefore the final objective is a situation where all Afghan structures are self-sustainable, and in particular a situation in which external military presence is no longer required.

### **SLIDE 5 – NATO AREA OF OPERATIONS**

With Coalition forces in the rest of the country and still engaged in counter insurgency operations, ISAF started its operations in the capital Kabul. As a first step towards its gradual expansion, NATO took over responsibility for the northern provinces and associated Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, from the Coalition in July 2004. As you can see, many different countries under a Lead Nation provide the forces and resources for these PRTs. Although there have been critics of the PRT concept, I am absolutely clear that they provide the most viable and economic way for NATO to make its fullest contribution in the regions. They assist in extending the Government's authority through enhancing stability and security and facilitating provincial government and reconstruction. Importantly, they are also the methodology approved by the Afghan authorities and accepted by the Afghan people for extending our influence into the regions. I believe that it is particularly important that the PRTs are considered by the Afghans to be providing added value; this is achieved by engaging in dialogue with local political leaders and by helping with economic development. Our PRTs must be strong and relevant to provide a clear sign of ISAF's commitment to Afghanistan.

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Let me now turn to the nations contributing to ISAF. I would like to recall that some of them are not NATO member states, and as a military commander I should like to express my special thanks to them for their readiness to contribute and integrate into ISAF.

### **SLIDE 6 – NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISAF**

Today ISAF consists of some 8000 troops from 36 nations. Tactical Command in theatre rotates every six months. NATO member countries with certified rapid deployment corps HQs generally provide the Headquarters, although HQs have also been found from the NATO command Structure. Indeed, exactly one week ago I was in Afghanistan to conduct the Change of Command from the Eurocorps to the National Rapid Deployment Corps Turkey. As the theatre level tactical HQs rotate every 6 months, my Headquarters provides the continuity and stability at the operational level through its responsibility for longer-term planning, training and other activities.

As I just mentioned, the move to the north of the country represented the first step of ISAF's four-stage expansion plan into the areas outside Kabul, with the intention of progressively taking over security responsibility from the Coalition.

### **SLIDE 7 – THE FOUR STAGES OF EXPANSION**

Stage 1 will be followed by Stages 2 to 4, progressively taking us to the west, south and east of the country. Indeed, the long awaited Stage 2 has just been announced at the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers at Nice and I am expecting to have responsibility for this region in the early summer of this year, once forces are in place.

This concept of progressively taking responsibility for the country from the Coalition makes a strong military case for the missions of these 2 groups of forces to be brought together, to ensure unity of effort and efficiency. This is not as easy as it sounds as the 2 missions are operating under different mandates and with differing objectives, with the Coalition still involved in counter insurgency operations. For some months now a debate has been ongoing on how to capitalize now on the benefits of synergy between ISAF and the Coalition missions, as well as how to design a future unified command structure of ISAF and the Coalition in the future. As far as synergy is concerned I want to point out that much has already been achieved. The Coalition and ISAF work very closely together, coordinating activities and ensuring that plans are aligned where possible. However, the need for greater synergy has been recognised, within the basis of these two distinct missions. As stated by the Secretary General at Nice, NATO is going to work on this in an incremental way and plan for some form of unity of command.

A successful implementation of Stage 4 will eventually lead to the next phases of NATO's engagement, namely stabilization, gradually moving the burden of full responsibility for security to the Afghans themselves. An important element in this will be the requirement for the Afghan security forces to be ready for the job, and we should be cognizant of the fact that the more support we provide in this regard the earlier we are likely to be able to end the mission. Although nobody can predict

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when the conditions are going to be right to withdraw our forces, I am optimistic that Afghanistan will be an example of successful international involvement.

Having listened to my positive assessment, you might want to ask me for the reasons for my optimism, and where exactly we stand on our way towards a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan. Let me first refer to the framework of the Bonn Process.

### **SLIDE 8 – BONN PROCESS**

Arguably the most significant event has been the Presidential election that I already mentioned. Within the range of its mandate and in close co-operation with UNAMA, the European Union, the Coalition and other actors, ISAF provided security support from the start of the voter registration process, through campaigning, to the day of the inauguration of the President. Our work was appreciated by the electorate as well as by international observers such as those sent by the OSCE.

Staying with elections, but looking again towards the future, ISAF is ready to deliver security support for the upcoming elections for the National Assembly and the provincial and district bodies. These elections provide a greater organisational and security challenge since there will be a very large number of candidates, and there will be much greater scope for local issues and tensions to play a role. ISAF has already identified the additional capabilities necessary to affect the required support. Once the elections are over and a Parliament established, the Bonn Process, in the strict sense, will be successfully concluded – but the role of the international community in assisting in Afghanistan will be far from over.

### **SLIDE 9 – SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

Our involvement in the electoral process emphasizes the need for co-ordination not only between ISAF, the Government of Afghanistan and the Coalition, but also with other key international players who pledged their help to the country. More specifically, I refer here to the five countries that offered to be the lead nations for Security Sector Reform, the five pillars of the reform areas being shown on this slide.

Leading international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations and the EU are involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Commander ISAF and the Senior Civil Representative of the NATO Secretary General are coordinating their efforts on a continuous basis with these organizations so as to avoid duplications and allow for convergence of efforts wherever possible. This is made even more challenging by the requirement to also coordinate with the efforts of the Coalition. Only together can we all lend meaningful international support to Afghanistan's government and people.

The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme, or DDR, has been an important element of Security Sector Reform, working towards the goal of the National Army and Police being the only forces to bear arms. Nearly two thirds of militias have been disarmed and demobilised, although not always reintegrated, and some 90% of heavy weapons have been cantoned. These results are very promising for the security situation and the strengthening of democracy. ISAF has provided key

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support to this programme, and we continue to do so. However, measures need to be developed against non-compliance by some outstanding militia forces that have so far resisted participation in the DDR process. The next issue that will need to be tackled are the illegal armed groups that are currently outside the DDR process. This is gaining increasing focus from the Afghan Government and in turn we are working on how we can best support this effort.

The most pressing issue with which Afghanistan is confronted today is the fight against drugs. You all know that the country is the largest opium producer in the world. In 2004 the area under cultivation rose from 80000 to 131000 hectares and production rose from 3500 to 4200 tonnes. Drugs contribute to well over half of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product. The Government has taken a very courageous lead in combating this evil and, with international assistance, has set up specialist police forces that are tasked with interdiction and eradication. In the two months since his inauguration, President Karzai has raised public awareness and shown his own determination by holding two conferences on counter-narcotics; he has also declared a *jihad* or Holy War against drugs, a declaration that was accompanied by a *fatwa* issued by the religious leaders. I need not tell you how important it is in an Islamic republic that both political and religious leaders send the same message to the people. There have been some encouraging early indications that this is having an effect, but we need to be realistic; tackling the drugs issue is going to require a coordinated, focussed and long term effort from all quarters, both at the national and international level.

When combating drugs, the state must firmly impose law and order; otherwise it will lose the respect of its citizens and cede control to the drug traffickers, some of whom are very powerful. I am also convinced that the economic side of the problem is of equal importance and it is critical that we develop alternative livelihoods that will enable the mostly very poor farmers to end their economic reliance on the opium poppy. The UK and the US have taken the lead in this area, but there is a long way to go, and there are polarised views on how this can best be achieved.

NATO's mandate does not provide for an active role for ISAF in interdiction or eradication of drugs, but does provide for support to the Government of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics strategy. It also facilitates Afghan institutions and security forces in their long-term efforts to combat this evil. We must acknowledge the necessity for an overall, internationally recognised counter-narcotics strategy, which is complementary and sustainable. The fact that this has yet to be achieved was recognised by the Secretary General at the NAC Seminar on Afghanistan last month.

There is no doubt that there continue to be significant co-ordination challenges in security sector reform; meeting these challenges will require the cooperation of all stakeholders. For example, to conduct an effective Counter Narcotics campaign you need to have in place DDR, the ANA, police, courts, prosecutors and judges and of course jails. It would definitely send the wrong signal if drug traffickers were arrested only for them to be released within a few hours. As an example of the distance that needs to be travelled with the criminal justice system, in 2003 123 traffickers were arrested. Only one has subsequently been convicted. Therefore, there is a great



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deal of interdependence between these pillars, with counter narcotics being the key interdependency between all the others.

### SLIDE 10 – NEXT STEPS

I hope I have given you a good appreciation of some of our successes, and also of some of the considerable challenges that we face. There is no doubt that we have made, and will continue to make, an important contribution in Afghanistan. As the Secretary General re-affirmed at Nice, NATO is committed to Afghanistan for the long term, and he acknowledged that an international framework would be required to continue the mission once the Parliamentary elections are complete and the Bonn Process formally comes to an end. We will need to have a sustainable and structurally sound concept for achieving the final end state, and for addressing all of the challenges I have described to you today.

Before concluding my presentation I would like to address the last two challenges that for me as the Commander constitute determining factors both for planning and conducting operations. Here I refer to the issues of force generation and related national caveats, topics that I also raised at the seminar on Afghanistan held in Brussels on 20 January 2005, and which allowed for reflection and exchange of experiences based on our common endeavour.


What I wish to stress is that staged expansion is what our Nations agreed upon and remains NATO's first priority, and there is no greater demonstration of this commitment than that of providing the required forces and capabilities to accomplish the mission.

On a related issue, national caveats on the use of forces assigned to a commander are burdensome, and there is no greater example of this than that currently experienced by COM ISAF. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements reflects the minimum military requirement -- without caveats -- to carry out tasks assigned. The imposition of caveats results either in the requirement of additional forces to create the desired effect or in a reduction of operational effectiveness. The ISAF mission requires clear purpose and unity in the chain of command, but this can be most challenging for COM ISAF where, for example, national approval is required 12 hours before employment of its nation's forces, such as a Quick Reaction Force, in another nation's helicopters. Noting that COM ISAF's operational flexibility and authority are undermined by such caveats, I would ask that Nations offering forces consider carefully the requirement for each and every caveat imposed.

With that important request I will end. I would like to reiterate my warmest thanks to you for having invited me to address you today. I sincerely hope that my comments have helped you get a deeper insight into the results at the operational level of command of NATO's transformation and that I have broaden your understanding of our operations in Afghanistan.

Thank you for your attention, and I shall be happy to answer your questions.



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18 January 2005

**DOCUMENT**

C-M(2005)0005

**Silence Procedure ends:****31 Jan 2005 18:00****PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR 2005****Note by the Secretary General**

1. I attach the Public Diplomacy Action Plan for 2005 which has been approved by the Committee on Public Diplomacy.
2. Given the interest that Permanent Representatives have in the development of NATO's public diplomacy, I also intend to discuss this Action Plan at one of our Tuesday lunches early in the New Year. I believe that an informal exchange among Ambassadors will provide the Committee on Public Diplomacy and the Public Diplomacy Division with useful political guidance. My suggested date for this discussion will be communicated later.
3. Unless I hear to the contrary **by close of business on Monday, 31 January 2005**, I will assume that Council has approved this Action Plan which will then serve as the basis for the Public Diplomacy Division's 2005 strategic priorities and key flagship activities.

(Signed) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer


3 Annexes

Action Officer: Jamie P. Shea

Original: English

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**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR 2005****Introduction**

During 2004 the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) implemented a large part of the new strategy that was noted by Council in the autumn of 2003. More focus and resources were applied to the NATO member states. A series of flagship events were organized bringing several activities together to achieve a larger impact and visibility for the Alliance. Robust public diplomacy strategies were developed to support NATO's operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the enhancement of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the launching of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. PDD also developed information plans for high profile events, such as the formal accession to NATO of seven new Allies and the handover of SFOR in Bosnia to the EU. A major effort was also made to revitalize the Atlantic Treaty Association, to interact more with NGOs and think tanks, to reach out to new target groups and to put more emphasis on youth. Above all, PDD designed and implemented an ambitious and successful strategy to amplify the results of NATO's key 2004 event: the Istanbul Summit.

**The Public Opinion Environment**

This continues to present NATO with many challenges.

- a) **Transforming the perception of NATO in its own member states so that it is more in line with the reality of the new NATO.**

Because NATO is an established organization which has been in existence for over half a century, the public still tends largely to view it as the old Alliance and does not appreciate just how much NATO has changed and is taking on new roles and missions. When these new roles and missions are discussed in the press, for instance in Afghanistan or Iraq, the reporting dwells too much on NATO's decision making process or on capability shortfalls. It does not highlight NATO's achievements or its readiness to take on new security challenges beyond Europe. High-level visits to NATO Headquarters by political leaders from NATO member countries could be a useful opportunity to advertise NATO's new roles and missions to Allied public opinion.

- b) **NATO's public diplomacy strategy has become largely focused on what NATO does and not what it is.**

This is the inevitable consequence of NATO launching operations for the first time after the Cold War. Action in the field is also a good news story, and a good way of demonstrating relevance, as in the Balkans in the 1990s, particularly to the wider, non-specialist public. It also means, however, that small setbacks, such as helicopters for Afghanistan, are exaggerated into major credibility failures. NATO's public diplomacy must therefore put these operational details into a broader context so that the public understands that they are part of the process and not "make or break" questions for an Alliance which remains essential for fundamental reasons: transatlantic security cooperation, stability through partnership, projecting stability and collective defence against new threats.

- c) **NATO's public diplomacy has to enhance public support for NATO's operations.**

This is particularly important within national parliaments, and especially those parliaments which have the authority to vote on the renewal of the mandates of national forces participating in NATO's missions. As NATO moves beyond its traditional area of responsibility, public opinion no longer automatically perceives the necessity of NATO engagement. This was different in the Balkans in the 1990s, when press and public opinion were calling on NATO constantly to intervene and criticising the Alliance for perceived hesitation. The slogan "If we don't go to Afghanistan, Afghanistan will come to us" is conceptually correct, but a greater effort has to be made to explain why it is correct to the public, particularly when success requires the mobilisation of scarce resources and the deployment of NATO forces into potential danger zones.

An additional challenge is to link NATO in a more visible way to the operations it actually conducts. All too often the media in NATO countries talk about the activities of their national contingents in the Balkans or Afghanistan without mentioning that they are there as part of a NATO-led mission.

- d) **The centrality of NATO in maintaining the transatlantic security relationship has to be better stressed.**

Opinion polls on both sides of the Atlantic, and in particular the most recent German Marshall Fund survey, show that public opinion still believes in the necessity of a strong transatlantic relationship. Yet it is more pessimistic that such a relationship is possible today given recent transatlantic differences over Iraq and other issues. Logically this phenomenon should be a reason for greater support for NATO as the institution which keeps both sides of the Atlantic working together, despite the inevitable ups and downs. Too frequently, however, it is perceived in the opposite way, as proof that NATO's best days are behind it and that the Alliance is only of interest to the United States as an extension of its foreign policy agenda. The pessimism is greatly exaggerated and somewhat one-sided but all PDD staff that engage regularly with think tanks and the academic community know that it is a much stronger perception on both sides of the Atlantic than just a few years ago. Consequently a major challenge for NATO's public diplomacy in 2005 will be to combat the prevalent mood of pessimism and replace it with a more balanced picture showing not only why transatlantic cooperation remains indispensable but also how NATO is delivering transatlantic cooperation in solving concrete security challenges.

- e) **Engaging public opinion in Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries**

The seminars with academics and officials from the Mediterranean Dialogue countries that PDD held in 2004, especially the meeting with NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue Ambassadors at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the RAND conference in Qatar, underscored the extent to which NATO suffers from a public diplomacy deficit in the Arab world. It is therefore clear that

the Public Diplomacy Division will have to implement a focused strategy in the near future to change the image of NATO among the élites of these regions if NATO's practical cooperation initiatives are to be successful. We could make use of the large number of Arab language media outlets in NATO capitals to reach out to public opinion in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries.

**f) Communicating the significance of the Istanbul Summit.**

Istanbul was a success and adopted many new initiatives. Given the debate on Iraq, however, and the fact that Istanbul did not launch NATO's transformation, unlike the previous Summit in Prague, its new initiatives have not received the attention that they deserve. Here again NATO's public diplomacy will have to be fully mobilised to correct the picture.

**Aims**

Post-Istanbul we need to:

- set out a clear vision of where NATO needs to go in the future;
- re-convince our publics on both sides of the Atlantic of the necessity of transatlantic security co-operation through NATO;
- establish a new public perception of a transformed, future-oriented NATO dealing concretely with the new spectrum of security threats;
- stress the importance of NATO's operations;
- emphasize NATO's central role in maintaining a network of security partnerships across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond; and its complementarity with the EU and other international organizations in enhancing stability;
- remind our publics of the important results of the Istanbul Summit.

**Master Messages**

There are several broad themes that should be mainstreamed in all our public diplomacy activities.

- The new NATO is projecting stability to areas around the Alliance as well as to crisis areas further afield. Security in the wider world is essential also to preserve the security of the NATO countries. By engaging beyond its traditional area of responsibility, NATO is helping to keep all of us safe;
- NATO is transforming to deal with the new security challenges; it is helping to reduce instability, and to fight terrorism;
- It is transforming its military structures and making its forces more capable and more useable in order to respond to crises and to carry out effective peace operations in Europe and beyond;
- Europe and North America share values and security interests. They have the most effective armed forces and can operate militarily together easily. Transatlantic security co-operation is essential to have a safe world and it is NATO that is the backbone of that co-operation;

- To stay effective, the Alliance needs not only new 21<sup>st</sup> century capabilities, but new ways of doing business: we need to ensure our political commitments are matched by the forces required to carry out the missions; we need to make full use of NATO as the forum for transatlantic political dialogue; we need to strengthen our existing partnerships and build new ones beyond the Euro-Atlantic area;
- NATO is offering its Partners many new forms of co-operation to help them build secure democratic defence institutions and to address their most pressing security concerns. It is raising its partnerships with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia to a new level. It is also reinforcing its partnership with the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and has launched an Istanbul Co-operation Initiative to engage countries in the broader Middle East in partnership and co-operation;
- NATO and the EU are developing a strategic partnership which will be a further element in strengthening the transatlantic relationship.

More targeted messages will be needed for more targeted audiences, for instance in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative regions.

#### **Priority areas for NATO's Public Diplomacy activities**

The Public Diplomacy Strategy noted by Council in 2003 remains valid. In order to implement it fully, PDD will focus its efforts in 2005 on the following priorities, so that key players, target audiences and messages are brought together in a coherent plan.

#### **1. Key Players**

##### **a) The Secretary General**

The Secretary General is the chief NATO spokesman who commands broad public and media attention. It is therefore essential that PDD supports him to communicate his messages, and assists the Private Office in arranging the best public platforms for his speeches. PDD will discuss on a monthly basis its matrix of flagship events with the Private Office in order to identify the best opportunities.

##### **b) Other senior NATO officials**

The Communications Strategy Task Force (ComStrat) will continue to meet once a month to review the media environment and to discuss the best ways of using other senior NATO officials (DSG, ASGs, CMC, etc.) in PDD's flagship events. The ComStrat will also identify activities organized by the Divisions which have a distinct public diplomacy value, such as PfP exercises, trust fund activities and high-level conferences and seminars of interest to the press.

##### **c) Nations**

The challenges facing NATO's public diplomacy in an Alliance of 26 nations, with several partners and more far-reaching ambitions, are such that NATO Headquarters must receive more help from nations to run a successful public diplomacy strategy. Therefore a key objective in 2005 will be for PDD to work



more closely with the Committee on Public Diplomacy to achieve closer synergy with national efforts. This could be having more Permanent Representatives taking on outside speaking tours and engagements. It could also be nations organizing their own NATO activities with PDD support and participation or giving greater support to national Atlantic Committees or trying to secure more NATO visibility in national activities such as Foreign Office and MOD open days and military parades.

Nations can also be encouraged to exploit NATO-related anniversaries. For instance, 2005 will mark 50 years of Germany's NATO membership and this is an excellent opportunity for PDD and the German Government to work together to devise a series of activities which will have a popular as well as expert level impact.

➤ **Key Events:**

- *May 2005, Flagship event involving the Secretary General in Berlin organized in conjunction with the German Council on Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*
- *Spring 2005, NATO Essay Prize for junior academics and researchers in Germany on the occasion of Germany's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary as a NATO member (sponsored by NATO PDD).*
- *Early 2005, Spokesmen's meeting in Lisbon.*

**d) Role of the Contact Point Embassies**

CPEs are a valuable distribution channel for NATO information. Working optimally the CPEs can also be valuable sources of information, political guidance and feedback which can help PDD to better target its activities in Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries as well as Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This closer working relationship will be especially important in the Caucasus and Central Asia as NATO increases its engagement with these regions.

CPEs can also assist PDD in maintaining NATO's visibility in those European Partner countries that are non-aligned but which have also contributed significantly to PfP and NATO's operations.

PDD will coordinate its Partner information programmes with the CPEs. PDD will also organize regional meetings with CPEs to discuss the development of NATO's public diplomacy programmes in areas of strategic importance, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia.

**2. Target Groups**

While continuing to cultivate close ties with its traditional interlocutors, such as Atlantic Committees, universities, and particularly the press and media accredited to NATO, PDD will intensify its efforts to reach out to the following critical target groups:

**a) Think Tanks**

The pamphlets and policy papers that think tanks produce can have a strong resonance including in the media. Consequently PDD will intensify its efforts to encourage think tanks to launch projects on NATO. It will also offer NATO inputs and perspectives to think tank publications that focus on the European Union ESDP where NATO has also a role. This strategy requires PDD to be visible on the Brussels scene and to make full use of the platforms offered by local think tanks such as the New Defence Agenda, the Centre for European Policy Studies, the European Policy Centre, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund. PDD will endeavour to send the best speakers from the IS, IMS and delegations to think tank discussions to make the NATO case. It will also improve contacts with less mainstream think tanks which have not always been friendly to NATO in the past but which are now more receptive. In this respect, PDD will draw up a list of those think tanks that it can most usefully engage with and which are proven platforms for putting the NATO message across to expert audiences.

**b) NGOs**

As NATO embarks on more operations, it is facing criticism from NGOs. For instance recently in Afghanistan, NGOs have taken NATO to task for the slowness in expanding ISAF or on account of the PRTs' role in humanitarian aid. PDD will engage NGOs more to counter misperceptions and clarify our mandate. The PDD conference with NGOs at NATO on November 29-30 will be a good opportunity to re-engage this dialogue which began when NATO intervened in the Balkans in the 1990s. In anticipation that this conference will be successful, it plans to organize another conference with NGOs at the Centre for Security Studies in Geneva early in 2005.

PDD will also engage more with critical audiences, for example peace movement activists, religious and community leaders and women's organisations. Business leaders who are influential in defence debates can also be a useful audience.

➤ *Key Event: Spring 2005, Conference with NGOs organized with the Geneva Center for Security Studies in Geneva*

**c) Youth Audiences**

Although it may not produce an immediate PR benefit, PDD needs to keep up its efforts towards the successor generation of young political leaders and organized youth. These groups are frequently more open minded than the think tank community and can be persuaded to form a permanent link to the Alliance via Atlantic Councils and membership of NGOs and political parties. PDD has already helped to constitute a functioning Youth ATA (YATA). The Secretary General intends to speak more at the prestigious universities and business schools where tomorrow's elites are being trained; for instance commencement

addresses and established formal annual lectures. PDD will also encourage Atlantic Councils and universities to organise model NATO exercises and competitions for high school and university students with our support.

PDD will also continue its work with the ATA to develop education programmes and engage secondary schools further. The NATO Website is becoming a better education tool, especially through the launching of the "e-generation" web module in June 2004. This will be bolstered in 2005.

➤ *Key Events:*

- *Spring 2005, Model NATO Conference in Ottawa, Canada.*
- *Spring 2005, Twentieth Anniversary Model NATO Conference at Howard University, USA, in combination with speaking tour by senior IS representative.*
- *Summer 2005, YATA Conference on the future of transatlantic relations, Brussels.*

d) **Parliamentarians and Parliamentary Staffers**

As NATO looks increasingly to national parliaments for support for its peace operations and for its military transformation efforts, including stabilised defence budgets, PDD will increase its interaction with parliamentarians. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) is a valuable interlocutor which NATO is now engaging more fully through the participation of Permanent Representatives as well as senior NATO officials in its annual assemblies. PDD is cooperating more closely with the NPA staff to ensure NATO representation at NPA seminars and activities, and is also organising visits to NATO by NPA committees and new parliamentarians. PDD will also cooperate more closely with the new European Parliament and will send speakers to debate NATO issues with parliamentarians in capitals. Another key audience in this respect are the parliamentary staffers who advise MPs. These individuals will feature prominently in visits to NATO Headquarters and PDD will maintain a regular flow of information to them.

➤ *Key Events:*

- *Spring 2005, High-level seminar for parliamentary staffers from Allied countries, Brussels.*
- *Spring 2005, seminar for members of the European Parliament, Brussels.*
- *Summer 2005, workshop for young parliamentarians from Allied countries in co-operation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Berlin or London.*
- *Spring and Autumn 2005, Visit of US Congressional staffers to NATO HQ.*

### 3. Events

#### a) Ministerials

NATO Ministerials are key events around which to organize public diplomacy activities. Although it will not be feasible for PDD to organize for Foreign and Defence Ministerial meetings the same ambitious programme that it arranged for the Istanbul Summit, PDD will work with host nations to see if some outreach events can be introduced into NATO Ministerials, for instance, youth conferences, displays, exhibitions and publications stands.

➤ *Key Events:*

- *Proposed Youth Conference to be held in the margins of the Informal Defence Ministerial next February with the participation of the Secretary General and possibly Defence Ministers. Co-sponsored with Nice University.*
- *High-level conference to be organized in Sweden next May to coincide with the EAPC Ministerial.*

#### b) Flagship events and major conferences

Flagship events have proved their worth in 2004 in creating more visibility for NATO. However, there is a need to limit their number so that they really live up to their billing. Flagship events should involve not just one well-organized activity but clusters of events targeted at different audiences (think tanks, opinion formers, youth, etc.) organized around the central pillar event.

PDD will work closely with the Private Office to have the Secretary General speak as often as possible at key security conferences where opinion maker attention and abundant media coverage are more or less guaranteed. In close co-ordination with the Private Office, PDD will propose a selected number of flagship events in Allied and Partner countries which the Secretary General could address.

➤ *Key Events:*

- *The 2005 Secretary General's conference, to be held in Brussels on 14 April, will be PDD's most important flagship event. It will be devoted to the theme of transformation and attract high-level speakers and participation, including that of many journalists.*
- *15-17 April 2005, US-EU-NATO Dialogue for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, high-level conference organized by the CSIS at the Wye Plantation, Virginia, USA.*
- *Spring 2005, high-level conference on transatlantic relations organised by WIIS, Brussels.*

- *Spring 2005, high-level conference "Assessing Multilateralism" organised by Athens University, Delphi, Greece.*
- *Summer 2005, high-level conference assessing NATO's operations, in co-ordination with RUSI, London.*

**c) NATO Days (or Weeks)**

Last year a successful "NATO Week" was held in Azerbaijan, and Romania has recently declared an annual "NATO Day". In this vein, PDD will encourage nations to organize each year a public NATO event, or at least feature NATO prominently in a national event, for instance, military parades and exercises, armed forces Open Days, Foreign and Defence Ministry Open Days, school programmes, etc. Ministries will be encouraged to work with Atlantic Councils and PDD to determine what works best in each nation and then organize activities on a co-sponsorship basis. PDD will also encourage nations to fly the NATO flag in Ministries and public buildings and at airports in the same way as the EU flag is flown.

It could be particularly useful to organize these NATO days in the seven new member countries to stress the benefits from their membership of the Alliance.

**d) Press Tours and Activities**

Press tours are a good way of showing NATO in action to the broader public and as NATO's operations expand beyond Europe, there are many positive stories to exploit. In 2005 PDD will increase the number of press tours to cover operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, as well as partnership activities, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. There may also be opportunities arising from the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative.

Although NATO engages most regularly with the accredited journalists in Brussels, it is important to address also media in Allied member states through visits by the Spokesman and Press Officers, video conferences, regular telephone links and organized visits to NATO by individual journalists and groups.

➤ **Key Events:**

- *Press tour in 2005 to Iraq to see NATO's Training Mission.*
- *Production of video and photo packages for journalists on topical issues, including operations.*
- *Video briefings on the web, including Spokesman's monthly update.*

**e) Visiting Groups and Speakers' Tours**

Speakers' tours by Ambassadors and senior IS and IMS officials can be a cost-effective way of getting NATO's messages across to a variety of audiences, particularly in those countries such as the US and Canada which are distant from NATO Headquarters but which offer many good communication platforms (World Affairs Councils, universities, local radio, editorial boards, etc.). Although speakers' tours require a great deal of organization, they can achieve a significant impact and PDD will therefore try to make more use of this concept in 2005. The visits programme at NATO Headquarters is a long-standing and proven tool and efforts will continue to attract PDD's key target audiences to NATO Headquarters for briefing programmes. The recent practice of inviting key individuals, such as parliamentary spokesmen on defence and security issues, for intensive programmes has proven a good investment and will be continued in 2005.

**4. Publications****a) Articles**

NATO's senior leadership give many speeches but do not publish enough articles and essays, which circulate more widely and are read by far more people. Accordingly, PDD will endeavour to place more material by the Secretary General and other senior officials in the foreign affairs journals that feed the intellectual and academic community (and the press) but which rarely discuss NATO. PDD will endeavour to place Op Eds on a regular basis in major newspapers and also local newspapers using the syndicated arrangements that exist in many Allied member states, but particularly the US and Canada.

**b) NATO Publications and Website**

Specific attention will be given to policy-specific publications featuring tangible results of NATO's work. Furthermore special emphasis will be placed on publications for young audiences as well as forms of publishing engaging critical or previously unaware audiences. These general publishing trends should also post-Summit be combined with the systematic collection of reader feedback and the targeted marketing of publications, ie. measures aimed to constantly enhance the impact and effectiveness of all publishing work. Overall, PDD will maintain a balance between portraying what NATO is and what it does.

The NATO website remains NATO's key public diplomacy tool with an average of 300,000 unique visitors per month in the first half of 2004. It is thus crucial to ensure that it remains a cutting edge tool, constantly updated and up-to-date with technological evolutions. In 2004 significant progress was made in implementing the new web database-driven system for the website with a working prototype now being tested. In the months ahead, this prototype will be used for concept validation and further fine-tuning of the new platform, which will make the NATO website much more user-friendly and easier to maintain. In

parallel the process of migrating the current website content to the new platform will continue.

A particular challenge will be to provide more NATO publications and/or other documents in Arabic as part of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative public diplomacy strategies. This will depend on the availability of additional resources.

➤ **Key Activities:**

- Continue and further enhance the online publishing of NATO Review, NATO's flagship magazine on current policy issues, in a total of 24 languages on NATO's internet web site including its future migration to the new database-driven web site.
- Issue further publications illustrating and explaining NATO's evolving agenda: e.g. on NATO's operations, NATO's role in the Balkans, NATO - EU relations, Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI, on new threats and challenges, on NATO's transformation and evolving capabilities etc.
- Develop and implement further publications for Russian and Ukrainian audiences as well as audiences in NATO's partner countries, taking into account NATO's evolving partnerships.
- Further enhance the range of educational publications and tools addressing young audiences, comprising in particular the creation of a short 'Guide to NATO' specifically tailored for youth audiences and the further bolstering of the online 'e-generation' web module on NATO's internet web site.
- Ensure the further steady growth of the NATO website's content and user services, comprising in particular the weekly publishing of the online 'NATO Update' newsletter, the regular publishing of new and /or updated so-called 'issue pages' on a growing range of NATO-related topics and the launch of a series of interactive maps and other multimedia products.
- Develop and implement an innovative 'teaser' or alternative publishing tool engaging disinterested and/or critical audiences.
- Ensure the professional and effective promotion of NATO via its publishing programme on the occasion of key political events: publication stands to be implemented and managed e.g. on the occasion of the Nice Ministerials, the EAPC Forum and other key flagship events throughout 2005.

## 5. Key Areas

### a) Getting more out of operations

NATO is often criticised for what it is not doing but does not get sufficient coverage (or credit) for what it actually does. There is not only a need to stress NATO's day-to-day operations in theatre, but also to link NATO more to the work of national contingents in these operations. PDD will launch a special effort in 2005 to persuade the press (and particularly TV) to cover "day in the life of ISAF" stories, such as the work of PRTs in Afghanistan, so that news audiences can see NATO making a difference in the lives of ordinary people. The same applies to "telegenic" PfP activities and exercises, such as fire-fighting in Croatia or NBC protection in Russia. CIMIC activities could also be a useful source of positive media coverage.

### b) Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

A key priority for PDD after Istanbul will be to implement a more ambitious and systematic strategy vis-à-vis the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and to begin public diplomacy activities vis-à-vis the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries.

Any available data that Allies are able to make available to PDD on attitudes to NATO in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries would be a useful input into NATO's PD strategy for these regions.

Comprehensive strategy documents have been approved by the Committee on Public Diplomacy, the MCG and the ICIG and submitted for Council consideration<sup>1</sup>. These strategies put the emphasis on the need for more NATO public diplomacy activities to be carried out in Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries. However, developing these programmes will be a long-term commitment and given the difficult political environment it will require patience and realistic expectations.

#### ➤ *Key Events for Mediterranean Dialogue countries:*

- *a tailored Visits Programme for each of the MD countries. This programme will be aimed at bringing to the NATO HQ at least one group of 12 opinion leaders from each of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.*
- *one high level regional international conference with participation of opinion leaders from Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO countries, in Amman co-sponsored with the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies.*
- *briefing missions to Mediterranean Dialogue countries.*

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<sup>1</sup> AC/52-WP(2004)0011-REV3 and AC/52-WP(2004)0012-REV3 (to be sent to Council under C-M references)



- co-sponsor in 2005 the organisation of a number of international conferences and seminars, together with think tanks and research organisations in NATO countries, with participation of NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue opinion leaders and senior scholars of world-wide reputation.
- Key Events for Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries:
  - a tailored Visits Programme for each of the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries. This programme will be aimed at bringing to the NATO HQ at least one group of 12 opinion leaders from each of the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries.
  - one high level regional international conference with participation with participation of opinion leaders from Istanbul Co-operation Initiative and NATO countries in Dubai, to be co-sponsored with the Gulf Research Center.
  - an Ambassadorial Conference at the NATO Defense College bringing together the NAC, Istanbul Co-operation Initiative Ambassadors, Istanbul Co-operation Initiative Secretaries of State with academics and senior international scholars from NATO and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries. the participation of opinion leaders from Istanbul Co-operation Initiative in the international conferences and seminars to be co-sponsored in 2005 by PDD with think tanks and research organisations in NATO countries, with participation of opinion leaders and senior scholars of world-wide reputation from NATO, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative countries.

c) Caucasus and Central Asia

To support NATO's reinforced partnership activities in these two regions, PDD will also intensify its information programmes. PDD has already established close contact with the Secretary General's Special Representative for the regions to co-ordinate activities. PDD will also make full use of the Contact Point Embassies in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

- Key Events:
  - Armenia:
    - Annual Symposium of the Armenian Atlantic Association.

- International Conference on Regional Security and the role of International Organizations.
- Workshop on Regional Co-operation and NATO.
- Azerbaijan:
  - NATO Summer School.
- Georgia:
  - Conference on "The South Caucasus in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century".
  - Conference on "Integration in NATO: from Illusions to Reality".
  - Workshop on "Democratic Institutions and Stabilisation in the Caucasus".
- Kazakhstan:
  - International media event: "Fourth Eurasian Media Forum"
- Tajikistan:
  - Conference on "Security in Central Asia"
- Afghanistan:
  - Organisation of a high-level seminar at NATO HQ, including the NAC and a group of international experts.

In both the Mediterranean and Caucasus and Central Asia areas, the Science Programme is a useful public diplomacy tool as it is seen as offering concrete assistance in areas affecting the quality of people's daily lives. PDD will exploit its activities to the full in public diplomacy as well.

d) Partners, including Russia and Ukraine

As NATO's co-operation with its Partners intensifies, PDD will support the NATO Divisions that are responsible for implementing the activities in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Workplan to ensure that they receive the public visibility that they deserve both in Partner countries and the wider EAPC community. This can also involve the activities of trust funds, a good recent example being the disposal of ammunition in Albania. PDD will also continue to use to the maximum the facilities of the NATO Information Office in Moscow and the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, particularly with a view to establishing documentation centres in universities and institutes in the regions.

➤ Key Events:

- Russia:
  - NATO Days planned for the third week of February and including a conference at St

Petersburg State University, the Winter Academy in Moscow and seminars in the regions.

- Seminar in Pskov.
- Seminar in Novgorod.
- Summer Academy in Gelendzhik.
- Activities to coincide with the Science Committee meeting in St Petersburg in June.

○ Ukraine:

- Winter Academy in Lviv.
- Summer Academy in Simferopol.
- Autumn Academy in Dnipropetrovsk.
- Scientific NATO-STCU Workshop in Kyiv.

○ Albania

- April 2005, Educational conference for teachers, "NATO for our future", organized by the Albanian Atlantic Association, launch of a wide educational project.

○ Croatia

- November 2005, "What does it mean to be a member of NATO in the new security environment?", a conference for history teachers in secondary schools. Organized by the Croatian Atlantic Council (TBC)

○ the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>2</sup>:

- October 2005, conference on "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, NATO and the new security environment" for teachers, combined with the opening of an exhibition organised by the "Euro-Atlantic Club of Macedonia".

e) TV and Radio

It is still the case even in this Internet age that most people obtain their information about the world from TV. NATO is frequently mentioned in newspapers but is rarely seen on TV. PDD will make a special effort to gain more TV coverage for NATO by taking TV crews to film operations and, where possible, co-sponsoring the production of TV programmes as was done recently for a series on defence reform aimed at the Former Yugoslavia.

Radio is also a useful medium for reaching a mass audience.

<sup>2</sup> Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

An initial breakdown of the financial implications of implementing this Action Plan is attached at Annex 3.

## NATO'S CURRENT POLITICAL AGENDA

Address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Defence and Security, Political, and Economics and Security Committees, at the Palais d'Egmont,  
Sunday 20<sup>th</sup> February 2005

by Günther Altenburg, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy

## INTRODUCTION

- Thank you for the invitation to talk to you this morning. It is very good to see so many parliamentarians here. I take it as a very positive sign for NATO that you are prepared to give up your Sunday in order to participate today.
- I have received the request to talk to you about "NATO's current political agenda", of course I could talk to you for hours on this subject. But I am aware that we have a tight and busy agenda. So I shall keep my remarks short.
- In two days time, Heads of State and Government will meet in Brussels for a NATO Summit. As you will be aware, this is not a formal summit with a comprehensive review of the Alliance issues, but it does provide a valuable opportunity for Heads of State and Government to meet following the re-election of President Bush. And of course, the summit comes hard on the heels of the other informal meetings that were held earlier this month. Our Foreign Ministers met in Brussels and our Defence Ministers met in Nice. And I should not miss this opportunity to stress the significance of that meeting in France – the first NATO ministerial meeting on French soil for over 20 years.
- Despite their informal nature, all of these meetings are key for NATO. They come at a time when there is considerable focus on transatlantic relations. They provide a platform for emphasising that, despite the strains of the past, the transatlantic partnership within NATO remains vital for the security and stability of both North America and Europe. And they reinforce the role of NATO as the principal forum for

transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on security issues.

- Although there were major differences between United States' and European views over Iraq, there is now transatlantic unity on the key subjects for NATO. There is unanimity that US and Europe have to work together to address the challenges of today's security environment. There is also unanimous agreement on what these security challenges are - terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. And there is unanimity that to achieve security at home in the face of these challenges, we have to project stability abroad. We either tackle these problems where and when they arise, or they will end up on our doorstep.
- NATO therefore has had to move away from being a Euro-centric organisation, to one with a more global view. To deliver this new approach, there are 3 principal strands to NATO's current agenda: first, operations; second, new capabilities; and thirdly, partnerships and relationships.

#### NATO OPERATIONS

- Afghanistan remains NATO's number one priority. We started our international security assistance operation in Kabul in 2003. We expanded to the North last year and we shall expand to the West shortly. In addition, having provided successful support to the presidential elections, we shall provide similar support to this year's parliamentary elections. Finally, on the subject of Afghanistan, we are looking to see how we can get greater synergy between NATO's ISAF operation and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom.
- In the Balkans, although we terminated SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina last December, NATO remains committed to the country and has established an office in Sarejevo. The priority area of work is defence reform, but we also carry out a number of other operational supporting tasks in coordination with the EU operation ALTHEA.
- We retain a strong military presence in Kosovo and continue our political engagement through active participation in the Extended Contact Group. The discussions and

possible decision this year on the province's future status will undoubtedly have an impact on the security situation there, so we monitor the situation very closely.

- At sea, on Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, our naval assets are conducting the Alliance's only Article 5 operation. In addition to monitoring and surveillance, responsibilities include compliant boarding. For a period, NATO military assets had also escorted high-valued allied commercial shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar. These escort tasks are currently suspended, but they could be re-established if required. In the very near future, we shall see Russian and Ukrainian participation in Operation Active Endeavour. And Algeria, too, has expressed a desire to participate.
- Before reviewing our mission in Iraq, it would be remiss of me not to mention that NATO has also provided military support to some High Visibility Events, such as NATO and EU Summits, royal weddings, the Euro 2004 soccer competition and the Olympic Games in Greece. And NATO allies continue to carry out air policing for 3 Baltic states and Slovenia.
- Let me conclude this overview of our operations with an update on our mission in Iraq. There are four elements to this mission. Firstly, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. Training of Iraqi security forces is already underway. We are also helping to identify Iraqi personnel for training outside Iraq. This external training is being offered by Allies – some of it in their own countries - some of it in third countries such as the United Arab Emirates - and some of it at NATO establishments such as Oberammergau in Germany and Stavanger in Norway. We have established the NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group at HQ NATO to coordinate individual nations' offers of training and equipment with the Iraqi requirements. And we will assist the Iraqi authorities with the establishment of an Iraqi Training, Education and Doctrine Centre in Iraq.

## NEW CAPABILITIES

- These new operations and missions that I have described require new capabilities. We need to be able to respond more rapidly to crises; we need to be able to move over strategic distances; and we need to sustain our forces throughout long-term peace support operations.
- The need for more rapid response is reflected in the establishment of NATO's Response Force, the NRF. This force was created in order that NATO could deploy rapidly a balanced package of forces – with all the requisite capabilities – to wherever it is required. The NRF reached initial operating capability last October, on schedule. And we are working closely with the EU to ensure that the NRF and the EU's "Headline Goal" of creating a EU rapid reaction capability will be mutually reinforcing. The NRF is also being used as a vehicle for transformation of European capabilities so that North American and European Allies can engage together in highly demanding combat operations.
- At their summit in Prague in 2002, Allies committed themselves to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. They agreed a package, known as the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which sets out specific capability improvements relevant to all of NATO's missions, including the struggle against terrorism, and contains firm national commitments to acquire them. The improvements focus on CBRN defence; target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness including precision weapons and suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. We are making good progress in all these fields.
- At Istanbul, last June, NATO leaders followed up their Prague decisions, by approving a series of measures for the further enhancement of capabilities to defend specifically against terrorist attacks. These measures address among other things, the protection of civilian airliners from shoulder launched missiles, the protection of harbours and vessels, and defence against improvised explosive devices.



- NATO has found itself on operations in places where government was ineffective, and infrastructure either destroyed or non-existent when NATO first deployed. This required NATO to do far more than provide security. But we were initially badly equipped and trained to carry out these other tasks, which are frequently referred to as "post-conflict reconstruction". We are now assessing how best to meet the requirements for carrying out these tasks.
- I have to acknowledge that we have sometimes had difficulties in generating sufficient forces for our operations and missions. In order to address this, we are currently looking at the procedures within NATO. We wish to ensure that our political decisions and military commitments are linked more coherently, and we want to achieve greater predictability in our operational planning. And because we wish to ensure that the burden of deploying and sustaining capabilities in theatre is shared equitably, we are developing deployability and usability targets for our forces and examining funding arrangements.
- Finally under the heading of capabilities, I would like to mention Intelligence. NATO has no intelligence assets of its own – all intelligence is provided by nations. However, last year at Istanbul, Allied leaders agreed to improve intelligence sharing. Consequently, the current intelligence structure at NATO HQ and with Allies is under review, and a new Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit has been created.

## PARTNERSHIPS AND RELATIONSHIPS

- I mentioned earlier that the third area of work was partnerships and relationships. The threats that I described are global, and they need an integrated and coordinated global response. That is why we pay so much attention to our network of partnerships and relationships.
- NATO enjoys a formal Partnership with 20 other states in the EAPC. These Partners spread from Northern Europe's Scandinavian states, down to the Balkans, through the

Caucasus and across to Central Asia. A "one hat fits all" approach is no longer viable, so we are working to tailor the programme more specifically to the requirements of individual Partners.

- Our EAPC Partners are fully committed to NATO's fight against terrorism and are busy implementing the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. They are also working with us to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also offer the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, where NATO advice and assistance is proving invaluable.
- And it must not be forgotten that many Partners make significant contributions to NATO operations. Any additional military commitment that NATO undertakes in the future is also likely to require Partner involvement, so we are encouraging greater Partner participation in NATO-led operations. Naturally, participating partners are involved in the political consultations relating to those operations.
- We are now placing a much greater focus on Caucasus and Central Asia. A Special Representative has been appointed, and a liaison officer is being sent to each region. Allies are clear that it is essential to engage these 2 areas and bring greater stability to the regions.
- NATO has a distinctive partnership with Russia & Ukraine through the NRC and NUC respectively. Building confidence is the key, and we do this through a pragmatic approach to dealing with common security challenges. With Russia, terrorism, non-proliferation, defence reform and crisis management are key areas of co-operation. With Ukraine, we are awaiting to see how the new government wishes to take forward its relationship with us – indeed, the Ukrainian president will visit Brussels on Tuesday and meet with NATO Heads of State and Government.
- But the area that will probably influence our longer term security more than any other, is the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East. This is a vast and complex region that demands our engagement. At Istanbul, we made 2 key decisions in this respect.

- First, we decided to develop our Mediterranean Dialogue with seven countries of North Africa and the Middle East into a true partnership. We are seeking to reinforce the existing mechanisms and structures; enhance military interoperability; and increase cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
- Second, we launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This is an offer of practical cooperation to interested countries in the broader region. Six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have already expressed interest in working with us and we are now fleshing out the details.
- In both these relationships, joint ownership is key - as is complementarity with other international efforts. These steps may seem modest, but against the background of the past 2 years, recent progress must be seen as real success.
- In addition to these formal partnerships, we have established links with contact countries, such as Japan and China, Australia and New Zealand, India and Pakistan, and South Korea, as well as several countries in South America.
- However, enhanced Partnerships with individual countries is not enough. A comprehensive approach to security today also requires strong relationships with other institutions. This includes the United Nations and the OSCE. Above all, however, it includes the European Union. I believe the priority at the moment is to dispel the perceived competitive aspect of the relationship, and seek opportunities for greater pragmatism and complementarity. In Afghanistan, NATO plays a key role as a military stabiliser, and EU is the biggest financial donor. This suggests that more coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU would be beneficial. And the same logic of NATO-EU synergy also applies to the Broader Middle East.

## CONCLUSION

- At the Istanbul Summit, NATO's Heads of State and Government took a number of

key decisions in critical areas. Those decisions indicated clear signs of common agreement on transatlantic security cooperation in face of the challenge posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states. This month's high level meetings are reinforcing that transatlantic agreement, and re-emphasising NATO's role in promoting that transatlantic cooperation.

- That was a bit of a race to cover all of the agenda, and I am aware that I have not gone into depth on any of the issues. So, if there is anything in particular that you would wish me to cover in detail, than I would be happy to take your questions.