DEFENCE AND SECURITY 058 DSCTC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLACTIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION PROGESS ON THE PRAGUE CAPABILITY COMMITMENTS DRAFT REPORT JOHN SHIMKUS (UNITED STATES) RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 18 April 2005 * Until   this   document   has   been   approved   by   the   Defence   and   Security   Committee,   it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

058 DSCTC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 II. THE PCC IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT......................................................................2 III. THE PRAGUE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENTS ......................................................3 A. DEPLOYABILITY AND MOBILITY................................................................................ 3 B. SURVIVABILITY........................................................................................................... 5 C.    EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT........................................................................................ 6 D.    CONSULTATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL .......................................................... 8 IV. NICHE CAPABILITIES...............................................................................................9 V. CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................................10

058 DSCTC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, the Allies committed themselves to developing the military capabilities necessary to allow the Alliance to take on a wide range of missions outside of Europe.    The  Prague  Capability  Commitments  (PCC)  are  an  important  step  forward  for  the Alliance  as  it  seeks  to  maintain  its  relevance  in  the  current   security  environment.    Those capabilities in strategic lift, precision strike, command and control, and protection against weapons of mass destruction will enable NATO to act in a wide range of circumstances and be a guarantor of  security  beyond  Europe.    They  are  also  critical  to  the  development  of  the  NATO  Response Force. 2. Failing  to  fulfil  the  PCC,  however,  would  be  a  serious  blow  to  the  Alliance.    First,  it  would send  a  political  signal  that  the  Allies  are  not  serious  about  meeting  their  commitments,  which would weaken the credibility of the Alliance.  Second, it would compromise the ability of NATO to act as a military alliance.  Perhaps capabilities development could be seen as an abstract issue 10 years ago when NATO’s range of operations extended no further than the Balkans.  But it is no longer  a  hypothetical  issue  now  that  NATO  is  involved  in  operations  in  Afghanistan.    At  a  very basic level, either we have the ability to function as an Alliance in out-of-area operations, or NATO begins to lose its position as a major player in international security issues. Thus, progress on the PCC is critical from both a political and a military operational perspective. 3. Although  the  PCC  are  often  broken  down  into  specific  items,  we  should  not  view  each capability  area  as  independent  of  the  others.    To  a  large  extent,  they  are  highly  interdependent and  success  in  one  capability  area  may  be  negated  by  a  lack  of  progress  in  another.    For example,  a  large  inventory  of  Precision  Guided  Munitions  (PGMs)  is  not  very  useful  unless  the Alliance  has  the  intelligence  resources  to  know  what  to  target.    A  rapidly  deployable  chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) protection unit is useless unless the Alliance has the airlift assets to bring that unit when and where it is needed. 4. This report will evaluate progress on the PCC and is a direct follow-on to the 2004 report of the  Subcommittee.    In  doing  so  your  Rapporteur  hopes  that  this  report  will  generate  consistent focus  on  the  development  of  critical  capabilities  as  well  as  provide  the  Defence  and  Security Committee with the means to evaluate the progress that has taken place since the previous report.   The  pursuit of military capabilities is an ongoing process and this survey can only be seen as a progress  report  on  where  we  stand  at  the  moment.  This  report  is  also  not  intended  to  be  a comprehensive survey of all the elements of the PCC of which there are more than 400.  Rather it is a survey that touches on some of the most critical aspects of the PCC.  Some of those aspects are large and obvious programs such as airlift.  Others are subtler such as the many information technology  systems  that  allow  major  improvements  in  what  is  commonly  referred  to  as  C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).   5. It  is  not  a  simple  matter  to  compile  a  complete  picture  of  progress  on  the  PCC  because neither NATO nor most national ministries of defence provide much transparency into either force goals or how national plans have or have not changed to reflect the priorities set forth in Prague.   However,  it  is  encouraging  to  note  that  the  many  PCC  goals  appear  to  have  been  incorporated into national force goals. The reports that do exist on force goals are classified and this report, as all  NATO  Parliamentary  Assembly  reports,  relies  exclusively  on  unclassified  information.  As legislators, it is both our right and responsibility to scrutinize what our governments are doing—or not  doing—to  fulfil  the  PCC.    Your  Rapporteu  r  hopes  that  this  report  will  give  each  of  us  some information that can be used to inform our oversight and encourage greater transparency across the Alliance.  

058 DSCTC 05 E 2 6. This report begins with a brief description of the PCC and its significance.  It then examines the  progress  made  in  some  of  the  more  critical  areas  that  will  allow  NATO  forces  to  be  more deployable   and   sustainable   in   the   field.   We   pay   particular   attention   to   the   multinational programmes  that  could  produce  economies  of  scale  and  reduce  the  overall  cost  of  developing certain capabilities, particularly in strategic lift and air-to-air refuelling.  We also look more closely this year at the contributions of smaller allies in terms of “niche” capabilities.  This draft report does not include a section on sustainability and logistics, but we hope to be able to provide a detailed report on this area in the final version. 7.    This  report  also  lacks  a  section  on  defence  budget  trends,  although  that  information  will  be included in the final version.  The total amount spent on defence and the breakdown of the amount spent  on  personnel,  operations,  research,  investment  and  procurement  are  a  clear  indicator  of where  we  stand  on  developing  the  needed  capabilities.    Recent  deployments  and  the  tempo  of operations are posing budgetary challenges across NATO making it all the more difficult to shift funding to procurement.   We may hope that the operations tempo will decrease at some point, but as  SACEUR  General  James  Jones  has  said  repeatedly,  we  must  hold  the  line  on  defence spending  and  prevent  further  decreases  if  we  hope  to  fulfil  the  capabilities  goals  we  that  have established for the Alliance. II. THE PCC IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 8. Much of the concern over the PCC is driven by the gap in capabilities between the United States and the other members of the Alliance. This capabilities gap has been detailed in several studies, but the basic point is that the US has a much greater ability to project power and remain in the field than its allies. As the US pushes forward on defence transformation, some are concerned that this gap will widen to the point that it will be difficult for NATO to function as a military alliance. 9. In part the gap in capabilities is a function of the different role that militaries have played in the  US  and  in  Europe  over  the  past  60  years.    With  the  exception  of  France  and  the  UK,  most European allies were primarily focused on territorial defence in the half-century after World War II.   The  US,  however,  has  been  focused  on  expeditionary  warfare  since  the  beginning  of  the  last century  and  spent  the  length  of  the  cold  war  developing  its  ability  to  fight  different  types  of operations  on  a  global  basis.    In  the  post-Cold  War  era,  all  NATO  militaries  are  attempting  to adapt to the changed environment and missions, but most European militaries have to make much more fundamental transitions than the US military to become expeditionary and capable of a wide spectrum of operations. 10. This is not a new issue in NATO.  The defence capabilities gap has existed for a long time and the allies have periodically sought to reduce it by encouraging the development of additional capabilities  in  European  militaries.    In  1999  NATO  introduced  the  Defence  Capabilities  Initiative (DCI) that was designed to boost capabilities in the same areas as the PCC.  Before the DCI there was the Conventional Defence Initiative (CDI).  Neither of those initiatives succeeded which is why the PCC came into existence.  A sceptic could be forgiven for asking, what is different now that makes the PCC any more likely to succeed where similar initiatives have failed? 11. Several factors set the PCC apart from those previous attempts.  First, the PCC are much more focused than the DCI or CDI and give a very clear idea of precisely what needs to be done.   Second, there is a considerable amount of political pressure behind the PCC.  It was conceived at a  NATO  summit  and  carries  the  weight  of  a  summit  declaration,  something  that  the  previous attempts lacked.  This indicates a level of “buy -in” at the top political levels and gives the PCC a higher profile.  Third, the PCC is benefiting from a high level of co-operation between groups of individual allies who are organising themselves to share assets and development costs and make

058 DSCTC 05 E 3 obtaining   the   necessary   assets   much   more   affordable   than   previous   attempts   at   defence capabilities improvement. 12. Despite  ongoing  concern  about  the  capabilities  gap,  some  recent  studies  show  that  it actually   may   be   much   less   than   is   commonly   supposed   in   key   areas   related   to   defence transformation.    In  particular,  European  militaries  are  procuring  and  integrating  sophisticated information systems, reconnaissance systems and unmanned aerial vehicles into their inventories. If managed properly and sufficiently funded, this could shrink the gap in many areas 13. There  is  also  another  important  point  to  keep  in  mind:  European  forces  do  not  need  to “compete” with the US or necessarily develop all of the same capabilities.  The US has a global strategic  vision  and  interests,  and  is  committed  to  an  idea  of  completely  networked  operations.   European forces are designed around a more limited vision for the most part.  Their geographic reach is not necessarily global, neither is it necessary to pursue the goal of completely networked operations.  What is important is that forces are interoperable, and that the systems we invest in are modular and can be updated. This is what will enable the Alliance to continue to work together well  into  the  future.    NATO  needs  to  be  able  to  operate  anywhere  in  the  world,  as  the  current mission in Afghanistan demonstrates, and it is clear that such missions will involve both European and US forces. III. THE PRAGUE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENTS 14. The PCC are built around 5 broad areas of capabilities: Deployability and mobility- getting forces into an area of operations and moving them in that area as needed. Sustainability and logistics- supporting forces in the field. Survivability- protecting deployed forces against conventional or non-conventional weapons. Effective  engagement-  improving  the  ability  of  deployed  forces  to  strike  targets  efficiently with minimal collateral damage. Consultation, command and control- improving the ability of forces to communicate with one another and be aware of movements of friendly, hostile, and non-combatant elements. 15. Within   those   general   categories,   the   allies   committed   themselves   to   improving   their capabilities  in:  chemical,  biological,  radiological,  and  nuclear  defence;  intelligence,  surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; PGMs, suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.   All of those areas represent serious holes in the capability of the Alliance, and will affect how the Alliance works together in the future. A. DEPLOYABILITY AND MOBILITY 16. Clearly the first issue to tackle is getting NATO member forces to where they are needed.   The critical elements in the PCC that relate to this area are strategic airlift and sealift.  Although airlift  often  receives  the  most  attention,  sealift  is  also  extremely  important.    In  most  military operations, the bulk of the equipment and supplies is transported by sea.

058 DSCTC 05 E 4 17. Strategic sealift is definitely a point for optimism about the success of the PCC. Norway is the lead country in this effort, convening several meetings to discuss various proposals including arrangements with national shipping companies.  The outlook is good, not the least because of the oversupply  of  commercial  shipping  capacity  in  the  global  market  and  the  willingness  of  the commercial  sector  to  enter  into  contracts  to  supply  sealift  to  the  military.    Eleven  countries (Canada,   the   Czech   Republic,   Denmark,   France,   Greece,   Italy,   the   Netherlands,   Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) are participating in a strategic sealift group, and the goal is to have 12-14 ships (mainly roll-on/roll-off) available for NATO operations on a mix of assured access and full-time charter contracts.  At the moment the sealift group has arranged assured access to three ships, including one Norwegian and two Danish roll-on/roll-off ships, and the residual capacity in four  of  the  UK’s  roll-on/roll-off  ships.  Both  assured  access  and  charter  contracts  involve  using large ships owned by private companies. Assured access allows the military to use those ships for set  periods  of  time.  Full-time  charters  allow  the  military  to  have  continual  use  of  those  ships although the ships are owned and operated by private companies.   18. This  is  closely  tied  to  the  better  co-ordination  of  sealift  through  the  Sealift  Co-ordination Centre  at  Eindhoven,  the  Netherlands,  which  has  already  become  a  cost  effective  operations centre. The Centre costs about 100,000 euros per year to operate, but NATO sources say it saved an aggregate 3.5 million euros last year.  It does so by arranging for ships that would otherwise be travelling  empty  or  only  partially  loaded  on  return  trips  to  carry  the  material  of  other  allies.    For example, an empty UK vessel returning from the Persian Gulf was used to carry Dutch air defence equipment, saving both countries about 500,000 euros each. 19. Those savings of a few million euros per year are only a tiny fraction of the approximately 150 billion euros that the European Allies spend annually on defence, but the sealift co-ordination programme has only just become operational and may show larger savings in the years to come.   More importantly it represents a commitment by the European Allies to do more to rationalise their defence expenditures and avoid unnecessary duplication. 20. Some progress is also being made on the acquisition of strategic airlift.  This has been one of the long-standing shortfalls in European capabilities.  Most hopes are pinned on the success of the  Airbus  A400M.  Germany,  France,  Spain,  United  Kingdom,  Turkey,  Belgium  and  Luxemburg are  committed  to  acquiring  a  total  of 180 of those aircraft. The A400 is unlikely to enter service before 2010; therefore, much of Europe is involved in the effort to find an interim solution until the A400 is ready.   21. Fifteen NATO countries are involved in upgrading the Alliance’s airlift capabilities. Following the  Statement  of  Intent  signed  at  the  Prague  Summit,  Germany  is  leading  the  group  of  Allies (Canada,    the    Czech    Republic,    Denmark,    France,    Germany,    Hungary,    Luxemburg,    the Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain  and  Turkey)  in  a  multilateral effort  to  reduce  the  strategic  lift  shortfall.      After  lengthy  consideration  of  various  options,  the participating nations have decided to move forward with an assured access charter arrangement for six Antonov 124-100 aircraft from Ukraine.  The participating nations expect to have access to the aircraft beginning in 2005.  This should go a long way toward filling the need for strategic airlift in the near-term. This interim solution is slated to cost 70 million Euros per year for the next 8 to 10 years. 22. Another  airlift  project  that  is  achieving  some  initial  success  is  the  European  Airlift  Co- ordination Centre in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.  This centre co-ordinates the airlift and refuelling assets of Germany, Belgium, Italy, the UK, France and the Netherlands.  Although it was only set up in 2002, it has already demonstrated its value.  The centre costs approximately 200,000 euros per  year,  but  has  saved participating nations more than that already by consolidating cargo and preventing many empty return flights.  Because of its initial success, some in NATO are predicting

058 DSCTC 05 E 5 that  it  could  take  on  a  progressively  larger  role  and  possibly  lead  to  a  combined  air  and  sealift operations centre that would maximize the utility of all strategic transportation equipment.   23. Another critical capability is air-to-air refuelling.  There is a serious lack of this capability in European air forces and nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland,  Portugal  and  Spain)  agreed  at  Prague  to  work  together  to  find  a  way  to  this  capability shortfall.  The Spanish-led effort aims to build a jointly owned and operated fleet of approximately 10  multi-role  aircraft  that  can  perform  air-to-air  refuelling  operations.    This  same  shortfall  was recognised by the European Union, and the NATO working group on air-to-air refuelling and the EU  working  group  formed  under  the  European  Capabilities  Action  Plan  are  working  together  to find  cost-effective  ways  to  increase  the  number  of  refuelling  aircraft  available  to  European militaries.  The EU working group is headed by Spain and Italy. 24. Separate from this project, Germany and Canada have cooperated to improve their air-to-air refuelling  capability.    Germany  and  Canada  took  delivery  of  their  first  Airbus  A310  Multi-Role Transport  Tanker  aircraft  in  early  2005.    The  aircraft  are  capable  of  air-to-air  refuelling,  but  can also be used for cargo and passenger transport.  Both the Canadian and German Air Forces have been flying the A310 for a number of years, but the new modifications add an important air-to-air refuelling  capability.    Over  the  next  few  years  Canada  will  take  delivery  of  one  more  A310  and Germany  will  take  delivery  of  three  additional  aircraft.  Essentially  Canada  adopted  an  existing German program for acquiring air-to-air refuelling, but by doing so it cut an estimated three years from the acquisition time and saved approximately $50 million Canadian dollars.   B. SURVIVABILITY 25. The  Alliance  is  also  making  progress  in  its  ability  to  protect  troops  from  attacks.    NATO made  protection  against  CBRN  attacks  a  priority  at  the  Prague  summit,  and  so  far  the  effort  is showing  some  promising  results.   In December 2003, the CBRN battalion was set up under the leadership  of  the  Czech  Republic.    It  reached  full  operational  capability  in  June  2004  and  is composed  of  specialists  from  13  countries  who  will  work  together  in  force  protection  against unconventional  weapons.    The  United  Kingdom  for  example,  is  providing  biological  detection assets and Portugal is providing an explosive ordnance disposal team.  The battalion became part of the third rotation of the NATO Response Force in the summer of 2004.   26. The  remaining  challenges  for  the  CBRN  unit  are  in  communications  and  deployment.   Because  the  battalion’s  components  are  situated  in  different  locations,  strategic  airlift  to  get  the unit  into  the  field  quickly  is  a  priority.    Given  the  lack  of  airlift  in  Europe,  the  CBRN  battalion  is looking to the United States or chartered aircraft for its deployments. Once again, this illustrates the  interconnected  nature  of  the  PCC.    It  is  difficult  to  make  meaningful  progress  in  one  area unless progress is made in all capabilities.   27. Another  aspect  of  protecting  deployed  forces  is  theatre  missile  defence.    One of the main programs in this area is the MEADS program, a joint venture of the Germany, Italy and the United States.    Based  on  the  Patriot  PAC-3  system,  it  is  being  designed  to  provide  protection  for deployed troops from ballistic and cruise missiles as well as manned and unmanned aircraft.  The plan is to reach full operational capability by 2012.  It is a unique system in that it will be compact enough  to  be  transported  by  tactical  aircraft and set up quickly to defend troops on the ground. The US is providing 58 percent of the financing, Germany 25 percent and Italy 17 percent.   28. Although the US and Italy approved moving forward to the design and development phase of the  program  in  September  2004,  MEADS  proved  to  be  more  controversial  in  the  German parliament.      The   main   argument   against   MEADS   is   that   it   is  not  needed  for  foreseeable deployments of German troops and that the funds could be better spent on other projects. After

058 DSCTC 05 E 6 considerable  debate,  the  German  parliament  approved  funding  for  the  design  and  development phase in April 2005. C. EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT 29. Another challenge is to give deployed forces the ability to strike targets with great precision while  at  the  same  time  protecting  those  forces  from  attack.    NATO  is  increasingly  likely  to  face adversaries  that  hide  among  civilians,  and  it  is  morally  and  politically  impossible  to  cause unnecessary civilian casualties when the technology exists to prevent it. 30. Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) is a critical part of effective engagement.  AGS will give Allied commanders a real-time, highly detailed and accurate picture of what is happening on the ground  in  a  given  area.    It  is  a  system  that  will  take  advantage  of  advances  in  distributed information  systems,  Unmanned  Aerial  Vehicles  (UAVs)  and  manned  aerial  systems  to  give commanders  -  both  at  a  headquarters  and  in  the  field  -  the  information  they  need  to  make informed decisions.   31. There   were   two   competing   consortia   of   companies   with   different   platforms   for   the programme:   the   Transatlantic   Industrial   Proposed   Solution   (TIPS)   and   the   Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System (CTAS).  Both consortia were composed of the major aerospace and defence companies on both sides of the Atlantic and both proposed to use the same basic radar system.  The major difference was the type of airborne platform that the two groups of companies proposed to use.  TIPS is looking to a combination of the Airbus A321 and the Global Hawk UAV.   CTAS  planned  to  use  a  combination  of  smaller  Bombardier  business  jets  combined  with  the Predator UAV.  There were various advantages and disadvantages to both proposals, the CTAS version would have had lower acquisition costs for the aircraft than the TIPS proposal, but would have had twice as many ground stations, 49 as opposed to 24 for the TIPS system. 32. The  Conference  of  National  Armaments  Directors  (CNAD)  decided  to  go  forward  with  the TIPS  proposal  and  that  decision  was  endorsed  at  the  Istanbul  Summit  meeting.  This  opens  the door for a 350 million euros two-year design and development phase, and acquisition beginning in 2006 if all goes according to schedule. 33. The  AGS  program  will  be  a  NATO  owned  and  operated  system,  similar  to  the  AWACS programme in that regard.  One advantage to the selected system is its greater ability to process data aboard the manned aircraft.  The TIPS system based on the Airbus A321 will have space for 14 consoles, while the CTAS system would have had only 5 or 6 and relied on the ground stations to  transmit  data  across  the  network.    The  selected  TIPS  system  will  also  use  the  Global  Hawk UAV, which can fly higher and spend longer on target that the Predator UAV that was to be part of CTAS  system.  .  Both  the  manned  and  the  unmanned  platforms  will  carry  the  Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR) which will be able to identify and track individual vehicles on the ground. 34. The  AGS  system  is  a  significant  step  for  the  Alliance  both  in  terms  of  technology  and capabilities,  and  in  terms  of  Transatlantic  defense  cooperation.    The  technology  will  allow commanders to have a complete picture of activity on the ground as it changes in real time.  This will  enable  highly  effective  engagement  against  targets  and  increase  the  accuracy  of  strikes  in complex environments.  It is also a capability that is in high demand and national assets such as the  US  JSTARS  and  UK  ASTOR  systems  that  provide  similar  capabilities  are  often  stretched during operations.  NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999, for example, required the deployment of half of the available JSTARS.   35. The AGS system is also a major collaborative Transatlantic program.  It is jointly funded and it has the potential to improve technology-sharing between the members of the alliance.  Instead

058 DSCTC 05 E 7 of  attempting  to  engineer  connections  between  different  national  systems,  AGS  is  a  jointly developed European-American project that is designed to leverage off technological strengths on both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.    The  consortium  developing  it  features  companies  based  in  France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States. 36. Another  important  factor  in  Effective  engagement  is  Precision  Guided  Munitions  (PGMs).   There  is  substantial  progress  across  the  Alliance  in  procuring  PGMs.      Only  six  years  ago  US forces  conducted  the  vast  majority  of  air  operations  over  Kosovo  and  Serbia  because  most European  air  forces  lacked  the  ability  to  carry  and  use  PGMs.    There  has  been  a  tremendous increase  in  the  precision  strike  capability  of  European  air  forces  since  then,  with  the  United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark in the lead. 37. The United Kingdom selected the Raytheon Paveway IV missile over the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).  This all-weather PGM can use both laser guidance and GPS guidance, giving it the  ability  to  “see”  targets  through  cloud  cover  or  other  obstacles.  It  is  being  fitted  to  the  UK’s Tornado, Harrier and Eurofighter aircraft, and is expected to enter service in 2007.  This will give UK strike aircraft the ability to attack targets from a distance of 150 km. The United Kingdom plans to purchase more than 2,000 of the Paveway IV missiles. 38. The  United  Kingdom  has  already  integrated  PGMs  into  its  combat  forces.    Eighty  four percent  of  the  Royal  Air  Force’s  air-launched  weapons  during  2003  operation  in  Iraq  were precision  guided  including  the  Paveway,  the  US-made  Maverick  and  the  European-produced Storm Shadow.  In fact, as a percentage of air launched weapons used, UK forces used a slightly higher percentage of PGMs than did US forces.   39. Several Allies are looking into joint or modular munitions that can be used across all of the military services.  France and Sweden are discussing a possible pooling of data on multi-service missiles and the UK has recently been involved in those discussions.  This sort of activity could lead to economies of scale on two levels by procuring the same munitions for the naval, ground   and air services, and by pooling national requirements. 40. Technology  transfer  and  encryption  issues,  however,  have  slowed  the  development  of European PGM capabilities.  The most cost effective means of acquiring PGMs is for European militaries to buy part of the production runs of US-made Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits, which  essentially  bolt  a  guidance  package  onto  a  conventional  bomb.    The  problem  is  that although the larger bombs extend past the wing of the aircraft and can link directly to the satellite that  guides  them  to their target, the smaller bombs fit completely under the wing and are linked through the aircraft to the satellite.  This requires upgrading and installing certain technology and encryption  codes  in  European  aircraft,  and  the  US  government  has  not  yet  resolved  how  this should happen.   41. Unfortunately, those technology transfer issues remain thorny and are unlikely to be solved soon.  This has led to considerable frustration on both sides of the Atlantic.  On the US side, many are  reluctant  to  allow  a  relaxation  in  export  controls  that  could  potentially  lead  to  sensitive technology getting into the wrong hands through third parties.  But at the same time, collaborative projects that embody the idea of defence transformation such as the AGS system can be stymied by stringent export controls.  Further complicating the issue is the current direction of the EU on arms sales to the People’s Republic of China.  Although some in Europe can argue that removing the ban on arms exports to China will not have a negative effect on regional security, it has so far failed to be a persuasive argument for many in the US Congress.   This can only strengthen the hand  of  those  who  push  for  more  stringent  export  controls  and  reduced  transatlantic  defence industry cooperation.

058 DSCTC 05 E 8 D. CONSULTATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL 42. It is critical that allied militaries be able to talk to one another securely, know the position of allied forces and have a common picture of the area of operations.  In a rough sense, this is the essence  of  what  is  commonly  referred  to  as  Command,  Control,  Communications,  Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).   43. In the 1991 Gulf War and again in the Balkans, NATO militaries were shown to be lacking in their  ability  to  communicate  securely  and  maintain  a  common  information  picture  of  the  area  of operations.  This problem only increased through the 1990s as the United States embarked on an ever-accelerating process of transformation with an emphasis on network centric warfare.  Some analysts have predicted that the technological gap would continue to grow and would render allied operations increasingly difficult.   44. Those concerns are still very real, but are tempered by developments in C4ISR in Europe.   Those  European  countries  that  make  up  the  vast  majority  of  Europe’s  military  spending  and capability  (France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain  and  the United Kingdom) are making advances  in  important  areas.    All  of  those  countries  are  procuring  and  deploying  command and control  systems  that  cut  across  branches  of  the  military,  integrating  unmanned  or  space  based systems  in  their  ISR  capability  and  deploying  digital  communications  systems.    These  systems often leverage commercial technological advances and can work with existing platforms.  The end result  is  that capabilities and inter-operability can be improved at an affordable cost.  In general there  is  a  widespread  commitment  across  Europe  to  improve  command,  control  and  digital communications systems. 45. There  is  also  notable  interest  across  Europe  in  Unmanned  Aerial  Vehicles  (UAVs).  One indication of the increasing interest in UAVs is the number of cooperative ventures being formed between   European   aerospace   companies   to   produce   UAVs   and   technology   demonstration projects.  EADS, Dassault and Saab are working together to produce a combat UAV expected to be demonstrated in 2009.  Dassault, EADS and Thales are also pooling their expertise to build a strategic UAV for France.  Alenia, the Italian aerospace company, is also building a combat UAV demonstration  project  that  is  slated  to  fly  in  early  2005.    This  aircraft  will  integrate  a  number  of stealth  technologies  to  improve  its  survivability  in  hostile  conditions.      European  aerospace companies are also working on components to make small, sophisticated UAVs that could be used for  tactical  reconnaissance  for  brigades  or  even  smaller  military  units.    EADS,  for  example,  is already producing the world’s smallest synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which will fit on the small (4 meter  long)  German-made  Luna  UAV.    When  finished,  this  project  will  give  its  users  battlefield surveillance over an 80-kilometer area.   46. Finally,  we  should  not  ignore  the  important  role  of  space  systems  as  part  of  the  overall C4ISR  capability.    France  is  the  leader  in  many  ways  in  space-based  capabilities,  but  several European  countries  are  partnering  with  France  to  develop  satellite  reconnaissance  capabilities.   The most significant recent development in this area is the December 2004 launch of the Helios 2 satellite that augments the existing Helios 1 satellite system.  Helios 2, however, has an infrared capability that allows it to detect nighttime movements.  It also can transmit more than 100 images per day- more than twice the capability of the Helios 1 satellite.  Spain and Belgium have access to Helios  2  and  each  bought  into  the  system  by acquiring a 2.5 percent stake in the 2 billion Euro project.  In 2007 a German and an Italian satellite are planned for launch.  Those satellites will be tied into the Helios system and will extend the reconnaissance capabilities to include all-weather surveillance.  

058 DSCTC 05 E 9 IV. NICHE CAPABILITIES 47. Not  all  members  need  to  have  the  same  capabilities.    As  part  of  a  larger  alliance,  it  is possible,  and  in  fact  preferable,  that  smaller  allies  concentrate  on  particular  capabilities  that are often in high demand.  This makes both fiscal and strategic sense.  The smaller Allies cannot be expected  to  develop  large  expeditionary  forces,  but  they  should  be  encouraged  to  develop deployable units in particular high-demand areas. The same amount of money, for example, could be  used  to  purchase  a  few  fighter  aircraft  or  maintain  a  state-of-the-art  brigade  specializing  in chemical  and  biological  protection  or  emergency  medical  care.    But  it  is  clear  that  in  today’s strategic environment a specialized brigade will be far more useful in the Alliance’s missions that a few additional fighters.   48. The Czech CBRN Battalion has been the most high-profile example of niche capabilities in action.    The  battalion  has  been  on  operational  standby  as  part  of  the  NATO  Response  Force (NRF)  since  the  summer  of  2004.    It  arose  directly  in  response  to  the  PCC-identified  need  for improved CBRN capabilities.    49. The Czech Republic sent its Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) unit of 250 troops to Kuwait and maintained a field hospital of 30 doctors with 120 support staff at Bagram air base in Afghanistan. This is a good example of the development of niche capabilities in the Alliance.    The Czech  military  is  using  its  expertise  in  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  (CBRN) protection to contribute a numerically small but highly useful specialized unit in this area.   50. The Czech NBC capability during the Cold War made it an obvious lead nation.  Based on the  knowledge  that  any  East-West  exchange  of  such  weapons  would  likely  have  occurred  over Czechoslovakia, NBC brigades were established to operate alongside each Army Corps.  Although there are eleven other contributing nations, the Czechs have framework nation status and are the largest contributor of equipment and personnel.  The core functions of the battalion are to conduct CBRN reconnaissance, detection, identification, surveillance and decontamination.  On the same theme, the Czechs are also developing an epidemiological centre in Techonin to provide treatment and research on exposure to biological weapons. 51. The  Baltic  countries  are  also  engaging  in  some  specialization.    Lithuania,  Latvia-,  and Estonia have focused on several niche capability areas: Mine-Clearing Measures, (MCM), military medics, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Special Operation Forces (SOF).  By the end of 2005  one  Lithuanian  EOD  platoon  at  30-day  readiness  should  be  operational.    Lithuania  is  also currently  conducting  a  deployment  of  SOF  in  support  of  combat  operations  in  Afghanistan  (in addition  to  its  lead  role  in  one  of  the  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  Western Afghanistan).   Additionally,  Lithuania,  together  with  Latvia  and  Estonia,  is  planning  joint  Baltic  specialisation areas in: diving capabilities, military medicine, and EOD..  Estonia and Latvia have both developed explosive  ordinance  disposal  expertise  and  deployed  those  forces  to  assist  in  Afghanistan  and elsewhere. 52. Poland  has  more  diverse  capabilities  as  one  of  the  larger  new  allies,  but it has developed deployable special forces that have been employed in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Other countries have concentrated  on  medical  services,  decontamination,  combat  engineering,  explosive  ordinance disposal and intelligence.   53. Recently   the   issue   of   common   funding   of   some   NATO   operations   has   come   under discussion.  The issue is particularly significant in the context of the contributions of smaller allies to the broader effort. Your Rapporteur fully endorses this idea that common funding of operations should  be  seriously  considered  by  the  NATO  Parliamentary  Assembly  and  the  North  Atlantic Council.  The  principle  that  only  countries  participating  in  an  operation  pay  for  the  costs  is  not  a viable model for the future. The NATO Response Force (NRF) will feature elements from various

058 DSCTC 05 E 10 allies on a rotating basis, but the decision to use the NRF will be taken by all 26 allies. This would mean that the whole alliance would take decisions to act in the interest of all of the members, yet only  those  currently  supplying  forces  to  the  NRF  would  pay.  A  common  funding  of  operations could eliminate this problem and encourage greater participation in the NRF. V. CONCLUSIONS 54. A number of preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the progress thus far on improving capabilities across the Alliance.  Most importantly, it is clear that the way forward will be through increased cooperation on a variety of levels.  This includes cooperation between European allies, the US and its European partners, and the public and private sector. 55. Cooperation  between  the  public  and  private  sector  is  an  important  aspect  of  improving defence capabilities.  Both in strategic sealift and strategic airlift, cooperative arrangements with the  private  sector  are  tapping  residual  capacity  in  the  commercial  sector.    Those  arrangements have  a  number  of  benefits.    Most  notably,  they  are  available  immediately  and  do  not  require  a lengthy acquisition process. 56. The cooperative programs between the European allies are part of a long-standing effort to achieve  economies  of  scale.  Cooperative  programs  such  as  the  airlift  and  sealift  coordination centres are already showing results. It should be emphasised that it is not critical if such initiatives are taken under a NATO or an EU banner.  The same capabilities will serve either institution and at this point the two organizations are working closely on a variety of levels.  Rather than focus on a  supposed  EU-NATO  rivalry  we  should  focus  on  capabilities  development  and  use  that  as  the benchmark for progress. 57. Cooperation  between  the  US  and  its  allies  is  also  critical  to  capabilities  improvement.   Transatlantic  defence  industrial  collaboration  such  as  the  Joint  Strike  Fighter  are  programs  that can leverage technological innovations on both sides of the Atlantic, reduce unit costs, and provide a  common,  interoperable  product.  But  we  must  be  honest  about  the  problems  to  transatlantic cooperation  in  the  current  environment.    Part  of  the  problem  is  no  doubt  the  US  export  control process that often frustrates close partners.  At the same time, policy decisions taken at the EU level  such  as  the  proposed  end  to  the  arms  embargo  on  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  spark strong reactions in the US and place proponents of reducing export controls in a difficult position.   It  is your Rapporteur’s hope that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly can be a forum to address this issue and reach consensus. One potential solution is a binding transatlantic code of conduct on arms transfers.  Members from both sides of the Atlantic should work together to draft a set of binding  principles  governing  arms  sales.    As  this  issue  will  likely  involve  legislative  action,  the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is a good forum for us to begin this important dialogue. Otherwise the current disagreements over arms sales could have far-reaching consequences for current and future collaborative programs.