DEFENCE AND SECURITY 056 DSC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y NATO’S OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS DRAFT GENERAL REPORT JULIO MIRANDA-CALHA (PORTUGAL) GENERAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 30 March 2005 * Until   this   document   has   been   approved   by   the   Defence   and   Security   Committee,   it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

i056 DSC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT NATO ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN...............2 III. ISAF UNDER NATO COMMAND ..............................................................................2 IV. PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN.................................................4 A. Narcotics Production..................................................................................................... 4 B. Progress in Building the Afghan State .......................................................................... 6 C. Regional Warlords........................................................................................................ 7 D. The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police .......................................... 9 V. NATO IN IRAQ.........................................................................................................10 VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS? ........................................................................................12

056 DSC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. In 2003 NATO embarked on its first truly out-of-area mission in Afghanistan.  In 2004 NATO took  on  an  additional  out-of-area  mission  training  Iraqi  troops  in  Iraq  and  other  countries  in  the region.    Those  missions  raise  important  questions  that  impact  on  the  future  direction  of  the Alliance and its role in providing stability beyond the borders of its members.   2. The mission in Afghanistan in particular presents a test case for the Alliance’s capabilities.  If it  can  significantly  add  to  the  stabilization  of  that  remote,  war-torn  country,  then  there  are  few geographic limits on where the Alliance could decide to become involved.  But how effective is the mission?  What is going well and what more needs to be done? This report will attempt to address some of those questions. 3. In  large  part  this  report  builds  on  the  2004  report  of  the  Defence  and  Security  Committee that  examined  the  mission  in  Afghanistan.    We  will  evaluate  the current situation in Afghanistan based  on  the  progress  made  in  addressing  specific  problems  highlighted  in  that  report.    In particular  the  previous  Committee  report  cited  concerns  about  the narcotics traffic, the power of regional warlords relative to the central government, and the development of a “narco -state” where the  drug-producers  and  traffickers  wield  the bulk of political power.  Those issues are intimately connected: regional warlords often make the money they need to control their areas and private armies from the drug trade.  If parliamentary elections are conducted while those same individuals hold  de  facto  power  over  parts  of  the  country,  then  they  are  likely  to  be  elected  and  become legitimised  by  the  system.    Afghanistan  at  that  point  would  perhaps  no  longer  be  a  haven  for terrorists, but it would be a state beholden to the producers and distributors of heroin.   4. Although Afghanistan is the major focus of this report, we will also examine the role of NATO in stabilizing Iraq.  It is a far smaller operation, but it too raises important questions: should NATO assume a larger role there as the challenge increasingly turns from providing security to ensuring that Iraqi forces are able to provide security in the context of an emerging democracy?  Even more challenging,  should  NATO  ever  consider  a  role  a  guarantor  of  an  eventual  Israeli-Arab  peace settlement? We will attempt to extract some lessons from current out of area operation that could be generalized to possible future missions.   5. More  broadly,  current  out-of-area  operations  and  the  potential  future  uses  of  the  NATO Response Force (NRF) demonstrate that we need to fundamentally rethink how we organize and fund future operations. The current system of funding is “cost lie where they fall”, meaning that the country  supplying  forces  for  an  operation  pays  the  costs  of  getting  those  force  into  the  area  of operations  and  maintaining  them  for  the  duration  of  the  deployment.    Although  this  formula  has worked in the past, it will be increasingly problematic because of the nature of the NRF.  The NRF is composed of forces from the member countries on a rotating basis, but it will be deployed based on  a  decision  taken  by  all  26  allies.    Yet,  the  costs  for  this  decision  will  fall  only  on  the  allies currently  participating  in  NRF.      This  is  simply  not  a  fair  system,  and  it  will  tend  to  discourage participation in the NRF.  A better system would be to establish some form of common funding for operations so that the costs of operations are spread across the full 26 members of the alliance, not just those supplying forces to the operation in question. 6. In addition, we should also focus on the issue of national caveats (restrictions placed on a national contingent participating in a NATO operation), which are also having a debilitating effect on the Alliance’s current operations. Declared caveats are often not a problem and commanders on  the  ground  can  usually  work  with  known  and  reasonable  restrictions.  The  problem  lies  in undeclared caveats that a commander does not discover until he tasks a national contingent and finds  that  they  are  unable  to  perform  the  assigned  duty.  Caveats  will  not  be  eliminated,  but  we should consider how they can be minimized and made more transparent so that commanders on the ground understand up front the capabilities and limits on the forces that they have at hand.  

056 DSC 05 E 2 7. Therefore,  your  Rapporteur  urges  you  to  consider  those  broader  issues  as  you  read  the following  report.    The  future  of  the  Alliance  demands  no  less.    While  we  should  be  under  no illusion  that  one  report  can  resolve  such  thorny  issues,  It  is  appropriate  that  we  begin  this discussion at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and take the debate to our national parliaments.   II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT NATO ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN 8. The idea of putting a UN-authorised multinational military force in Afghanistan originated at the  Bonn  Conference  in  December  2001  that  brought  together  all  of  the  political  and  ethnic factions in Afghanistan. This came immediately after the successful US intervention in Afghanistan that  toppled  the  Taliban  regime  as  a  consequence  of  its  support  and  continued  protection  of Osama  bin  Laden,  the  architect  of  the  September  11th  attacks.     That  conference  set  the groundwork for the partnership between the United Nations, the Afghan Transitional Authority and the International Security Assistance Force. 9. The  first  ISAF  was  established  by  a  UN  Security  Council  resolution  and  was  designed  to support the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security around Kabul.  ISAF I was led by the  UK  (December  2001-June  2002)  but  included  forces  from  18  countries,  14  of  which  were NATO  members  (Belgium,  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Greece, Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Romania,  Spain  and  Turkey).    The  second  six-month rotation (ISAF II) was led by Turkey (June 2002-February 2003) and ISAF III was led by Germany and the Netherlands (February 2003-August 2003). The size of the force continued to grow both in numbers of troops and participating countries.  Canada has played a large role and supplied the largest force for many of the later rotations.   10. ISAF evolved into a three-part structure: ISAF Headquarters, the airport task force, and the Kabul  multinational  brigade.    ISAF  quickly  forged  ties  with  the  US-led  Operation  Enduring Freedom and US Central Command.  This allowed the two missions, ISAF and Enduring Freedom, to coordinate logistics and flights in and out of the region while maintaining their separate identities and missions.   11. NATO took on a progressively larger role in assisting ISAF during the first 18 months of the operation.  Germany and the Netherlands received planning assistance from NATO in 2002, and NATO  provided  valuable  help  in  force  generation,  communications,  and  intelligence.    SHAPE posted  officers  with  the  German  command.    ISAF  headquarters  was  granted  access  to  NATO intelligence and communication systems.  This involvement sparked a close working relationship between  NATO  and  the  European  Airlift  Co-ordination  Cell  at  Eindhoven,  the  Netherlands  to arrange the airlift needs of ISAF. 12. At the same time that NATO was providing this valuable assistance to ISAF, some involved in the mission were concerned that changing the lead nation every six months was hindering its effectiveness and weakening its credibility as a guarantor of a modicum of stability in Afghanistan.   As a result, the North Atlantic Council decided in April 2003 to take on command and planning of ISAF  as  of  August  11,  2003.  In  October 2003,  the  UN  approved  an  expansion  of  ISAF  and authorised it to deploy outside of Kabul and the immediate surrounding area. III. ISAF UNDER NATO COMMAND 13. ISAF falls under the responsibility of Join Forces Command North (JFC North) in Brunssum, the  Netherlands.    Although  NATO  and  the  commander  of  JFC  North  have  overall  authority,

056 DSC 05 E 3 command on the ground in Kabul still rotates between lead nations.   The EUROCORPS took over from Canada in August 2004 and Turkey recently assumed command of the operation 14. The  NATO  assumption  of  command  opened  the  door  to  discussions  about  expanding  the role of ISAF.  Both the UN and the Government of Afghanistan favour such a move.  In    October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan to increase ISAF to 10,000 troops and expand to cover additional cities beyond Kabul, a decision also endorsed by the UN. 15. Assuming control over ISAF is a major step forward for the Alliance, but it also leads to new questions that must be answered if its mission is to be successful.  First and most critically, there is  the  question  of  how  and  if  the  members  of  the  Alliance  can  supply  the  troops  and  military equipment required.  Many pledges of troops and equipment were made, but members have been slow  to  fulfil  those  pledges.    After  much  pressure  from  the  Secretary  General  of  NATO  was applied to national defence ministers in December 2003, NATO received a commitment of three helicopters  from  Turkey  and  three  from  the  Netherlands.    It  took  several  additional  months  of discussion  to  actually  get  the  much-needed  transport  helicopters  to  Afghanistan.    The  Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Jones has also spoken out regarding the need for the Allies to  meet  their  commitments  in  terms  of  personnel  and  materiel  in  Afghanistan.    The  force generation conference held at NATO headquarters in March 2004 appears to have improved the situation.    The  conference  was  to  generate  forces  for  the  PRT  in  Kunduz  and  two  others  in Feyzabad  and  Maimana.    The  helicopter  issue  was  resolved  with  the  Netherlands  providing  six combat helicopters and Turkey providing three transport helicopters.  Ongoing emphasis on this issue by the Secretary General, military commanders and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has helped to alleviate the transportation shortage, but there are still remaining shortfalls that need to be addressed. 16. Another  question  is  the  relationship  between  the  various  operations  in  Afghanistan  and  if NATO  should  play  a  role  in  consolidating  them  under  a  single  command.    ISAF  and  Enduring Freedom are separate operations.  Those operations are dynamic, changing somewhat to fit the shifting circumstances although both are ultimately directed at ensuring the increasing stability of the country and the ability of Afghanistan to provide for its own security.   17. ISAF  is  primarily  designed  to  provide  basic  security,  enabling  the  NGOs  to  perform  their work and the central Afghan government to deepen its hold on the country. ISAF is made up of approximately 8,500 troops and is limited by its size and capabilities to an area around Kabul and some areas in northern Afghanistan where it runs the PRTs.  ISAF is now expanding the number of PRTs to the western part of the country.  An Italian team took over the PRT in Herat early in 2005. 18. The  expansion  will  establish  a  permanent  ISAF  presence  in  the  form  of  four  Provincial Reconstruction teams (PRT) and one Forward Support Base (FSB). Two existing US-led PRTs at Herat  and  Farah  in  western  Afghanistan  are  coming  under  NATO  command  and  two  new  ISAF PRTs will be established with Lithuania in the lead at Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and Spain  in  the lead at Qal’eh-ye Now, capital of Baghdis province. Italy and Spain will provide the Forward Support Base (a logistics hub at Herat) with substantial support from other contributors. The extended ISAF mission will provide security assistance in 50 percent of Afghanistan’s territory. 19. Operation Enduring Freedom is led by the United States. The US and a group of coalition partners conduct this operation mainly in southern and eastern Afghanistan and along the border with Pakistan.  Approximately 18,000 (mostly US) troops are involved in this operation directed by US Central Command (CENTCOM).  Enduring Freedom is both targeted at eliminating remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida and building the conditions for stable Afghanistan.  The PRT concept was born in the context of Enduring Freedom and most PRTs are under US command.

056 DSC 05 E 4 20. Some  in  NATO  and  in  national  capitals  argue  that  it  would  be  a  natural  progression  for NATO  to  eventually  assume  control  of  all  operations  in  Afghanistan.    Centralised  control  under NATO would help reduce the overlapping authorities and operations in Afghanistan.  According to those involved, there is a high level of co-ordination between all of the military commands, but the overall effort would benefit from a higher level of centralisation.  NATO as the premier international military  organisation  would  be  the  obvious  candidate  as  the  institution  to  centralise  all  military operations in Afghanistan.   21. At the Defence and Security Committee meeting in Washington DC in January, several US officials noted that it was time to reconsider this option.  Some allies have been reluctant because of the more combat-oriented aspects of Operation Enduring Freedom and were concerned that a merger could further blur the line between combat forces and those involved in reconstruction and development.    But  by  the  beginning  of  2005  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  the  Taliban  is  a spent force with little popular support in the Afghanistan.  There are increasingly fewer distinctions that  can  be  drawn  between  the  two  missions  and,  therefore,  a  merger  of  the  two  should  be reconsidered.In  February  2005,  NATO  defence  ministers  agreed  that  the  operations  should  be merged  at  some  point  in  the  near  future.    No  date  was  set  but  the  objections  of  France  and Germany  that  had  ended  discussion  of  a  merger  as  recently  as  October  2004  appear  to  have been overcome by the improved security situation. 22. It is important, however, to understand how much improvement there has been over the past year and if the progress in ensuring Afghanistan’s security is sufficient to put it on the road to self- sufficiency.    The  goal  of  this  entire  exercise  is  to  create  a  functioning  Afghan  state,  capable  of preventing itself from being overwhelmed by internal divisions.  Therefore, the following section will evaluate  progress  on  specific  areas  of  concern  underlined  in  the  2004  Defence  and  Security Committee General Report. IV. PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN 23. The 2004 Defence and Security Committee General Report noted several interrelated issues that  were  of  particular  concern  to  the  committee.    First  was  narcotics  production  and  trafficking and its effects on the political and economic development of Afghanistan.  Second, was the power of  the  warlords  and  the  ability  of  the  central  government  to  break  their  power  before  the parliamentary  elections  in  September  2005.    Third  was  the  development  of  the  Afghan  National Army and its capabilities relative to the regional warlords. 24. We will briefly recap the findings of the 2004 report in each of those areas and then judge progress   based   on   recent   reports   and   the   findings   of   the   NATO   Parliamentary   Assembly delegation that travelled to Afghanistan in March 2005. A. NARCOTICS PRODUCTION 25. The committee noted in 2004 that narcotics production was a major, and growing problem in Afghanistan.  President Hamid Karzai has underlined the need to attack this problem on numerous occasions.  In his inauguration speech in December 2004, he called on his countrymen to engage in a jihad against narcotics production and trafficking.  That same month he pledged to destroy the country’s opium-production centers by the end of 2006.   26. The Committee’s 2004 report found that the UN and national authorities in co-operation with the government of Afghanistan were working to cut opium poppy production but that their efforts thus far had failed. Some plans to curtail the production of opium actually had the exact opposite effect. An attempt to prevent the poppy seeds from being turned into heroin by buying the poppy

056 DSC 05 E 5 crop  from  farmers  in  2002  only  succeeded  in  encouraging  farmers  to  plant  more  poppies  the following year.  Efforts to destroy opium crops have also not been successful.  Only a tiny fraction of the opium harvest has been interrupted and it is difficult to find the forces that might perform such  operations.    Local  police  and  officials  are  under-funded  and  therefore  easily  bribed,  and international forces are either specifically prohibited from addressing the issue or are reluctant to do  so.  Troops involved in the PRTs for example, are focused on winning the confidence of the local  populations  and  are  not  eager  to  take  on  a  mission  likely  to  alienate  large  numbers  of farmers and the heavily-armed militias controlled by regional warlords. 27. The problem also appears to be growing.  In November 2004 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime found a 17% increase in the opium crop in 2004 compared to 2003.  131,000 hectares of land were used for opium production compared to only 80,000 hectares in 2003. 28. In 2005, however, there are some indications of a marked reduction in opium cultivation.  A recent report found that many farmers who grew opium poppies last year have stopped and are instead  growing  wheat.    In  the  three  provinces  that  account  for  half  of  Afghanistan’s  opium production (Nangahar, Helmand and Badakhshan) poppy cultivation appears to have declined by as much as 70 percent.   29. Much of this may be the product of a combination of factors including a drop in the price of opium caused by the record poppy crop in 2004 that flooded the market.  Another factor may that Afghan police burned enough poppy fields last year to have a deterrent effect on potential opium farmers  who  have  concluded  that  it  is  better  to  grow  a  less  profitable  product  rather  than  risk losing their entire opium crop. 30. But there are other factors at work that may have a more long-term effect. President Karzai and other officials have appealed to Afghans’ traditional values in the hope that this approach will be  a  more  lasting  deterrent  to  drug  production.    Local  clerics  and  tribal  elders  have  to  a  large extent  answered  Karzai’s  call  and  are  preaching  that  opium  production  is  counter  to  Islamic values.    In  a  traditional  and  conservative  society  such  as  Afghanistan’s,  those  statements  from local leaders can carry considerable weight. 31. Another  factor  that  gives  some  cause  for  optimism  is  that  poppy  cultivation  is  not  firmly rooted  in  the  society  and  drug  traffickers  are  still  unorganised.  Opium  production  is  a  relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, starting in the 1980s when neighbouring countries began to aggressively target opium production.  Although the drug trade is immensely profitable, UN reports indicate that drug traffickers do not yet seem to have formed cartels and criminal syndicates.  By most  accounts,  there  is  still  a  window  of  time  in  which  the  opium  production  problem  can  be managed. 32. It  is  likely  that  the  way  forward  will  include  a  range  of  actions.    The  appeal  to  traditional values is important, but it must be backed up with sticks and carrots.  The stick is an aggressive program of arresting heroin traffickers and destroying poppy crops, although it should be Afghan police  and  government  officials  in  the  active  roles,  not  their international advisors.  Both the UK and the US officials responsible for working with the Afghan government on this issue are firmly aware of this important condition and recognize that there must be an Afghan face on the counter- narcotics effort.  The carrot is aid to farmers to improve their ability to grow profitable amounts of legitimate produce and get it to market.   33. Both  Afghan  government  officials  and  international  experts  emphasized  that  the  key  issue will  be  the  provision  of  alternative  livelihoods  to  enable  farmers  to  earn  a  viable  living  from legitimate  crops.  This  involves  the  provision  of  seed  and  fertilizer,  agricultural  credits  other financial  measures.  It  also  involves  repairing  Afghanistan’s  irrigation  and  road  infrastructure. Decades of war destroyed the irrigation system and poppy was the only viable crop because it can

056 DSC 05 E 6 thrive in dry environments. Repairing the irrigation system and the roads so that farmers can get their  product  to  markets  is a critical part of providing alternative livelihoods to poppy production. Additional attention and financial support of this program is needed now to ensure that the current reductions in poppy production continue. 34. In  sum,  the  elements  of  a  comprehensive  policy  appear  to  be  recognized  by  the  Afghan government and its international partners, but how such a policy is implemented is critical.  It must be long-term, and based on developing the Afghan government’s ability to manage the situation in a manner that prevents it from becoming another instance of foreign domination in Afghanistan’s history.  The test, of course, is the trend line of opium cultivation in the coming years.  As noted, some reports indicate that we should expect a significant reduction in 2005, but turning that into a trend will require a comprehensive strategy and sustained attention. B. PROGRESS IN BUILDING THE AFGHAN STATE 35. Afghanistan is struggling to build a functioning state.  There is no system of taxation in place yet  beyond  collecting  customs  duties.    Half  of  the  state  budget  is  financed  through  international contributions.   All   areas   of  public  administration  are  lacking  in  trained  personnel  and  other resources.  Government ministries have been created and ministers have been appointed, but the country lacks the necessary trained individuals to staff those ministries. 36. There has been some progress in building the basic institutions for governance. The Afghan constitution   drafted   in   2003   sets   forth   the   broad   outlines   of   the   emerging   government   of Afghanistan.  Among its features is a strong presidency with the power to appoint one-third of the upper chamber of the legislature.  There are checks on the power of the president; the parliament can impeach the president and the president is prohibited from disbanding the parliament.   37. The  bicameral  parliament  is  divided  in  a  lower  chamber  (House  of  People)  and  an  upper chamber (House of Elders).  The lower chamber of 249 seats is to be elected by the people.  The upper  chamber  is  selected  by  provincial  authorities,  district  councils  and  the  president.    Both chambers include provisions to ensure some participation by women representatives. Half of the president’s appointees to the House of Elders are to be women and the constitution states that at least 2 representatives from each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces should be women. 38. The  constitution  also  has  provisions  to  protect  women  and  minorities.    It  recognizes  the equality  of  women  as  citizens  of  Afghanistan.    The Uzbek and Turkmen languages are officially recognized and they may be used as the official language in those regions where those minority groups are concentrated. 39. The  constitution  also  attempts  to  craft  a  balance  between  modern  constitutionalism  and Afghanistan’s  traditional  culture.  Political  parties  may  be  established  as  long  as  they  do  not contradict the “principles of Islam” and laws passed by the government are not to contradict the “beliefs and provisions” of Islam.   40. The  most  significant  recent  event  in  Afghanistan  was  the  presidential  election  in  October 2004.  Despite  predictions  of  a  wave  of  violence  from  Taliban  and  other  anti-democratic  forces, there  were  remarkably  few  disruptions.  Turnout  was  high  and  a  considerable  percentage  of  the female population took part in the voting. Some candidates challenged the validity of the election process because in some polling stations the election workers used the wrong ink to mark voters’ thumbs to prevent fraud. The challenge was short-lived, however, and within a few days all of the candidates agreed that the process was fair if imperfect.

056 DSC 05 E 7 41. As expected, Hamid Karzai won a large percentage of the vote. 55% of the ballots cast were for Karzai putting him over the 50% threshold needed to avoid a run-off election. Karzai’s nearest competitor, Yunus Qanooni, received 16% of the vote. 42. In  short,  the  election  process  was  successful.  The large turnout and eager participation of the population demonstrated its legitimacy. The international observers certified its fairness. The lack   of   violence   showed   that   anti-democratic   forces   are   either   cowed   by   the   presence   of international military forces, lack popular support, or both. Most significantly, the election confers legitimacy on the president who up until now was operating as an appointed chief executive. Now Karzai has greater political freedom to enact changes because he is the popularly-elected leader of the country. 43. Following on the success of the presidential election in October, Afghanistan is preparing to hold  elections  for  the  lower  house  of  the  National  Assembly  on  18  September  2005.  This  is  a massive challenge according to the UN officials working with the Afghan authorities. Some 5,000 to 10,000 candidates are expected to be on the ballot for the 249 seats in the National Assembly, creating a potentially huge and confusing ballot. In addition to the challenge of producing a usable ballot,  the  logistical  and  security  challenges  are  also  daunting.  The  potential  for  fraud  and challenges to the elections are high as well; Hundreds of thousands of Afghan citizens have more than  one  voter  registration  card  and  there  is  no  way  to  prevent  them  from  voting  multiple  times other than marking their fingers with ink. It will also be difficult to keep many unsavory warlords off of  the  ballot  because  they  have  yet  to  be  successfully  prosecuted  for  any  crime  and  therefore cannot be disqualified for criminal activity. 44. Nonetheless,  the  election  could  be  a  historic  moment  for  Afghanistan  and  it  is  vitally important  that  the  election  be  accepted  by  the  Afghan people and credible to the outside world. But it is important to break the hold of the most notorious drug lords before the election. If they are allowed to stand for office and gain a large number of seats in the parliament, we run the risk of seeing Afghanistan’s parliament become a creature of criminal elements who will gain legitimacy through holding elected office. 45. There  are  two  areas  where  the  international  community  can  offer  important  additional assistance to the election process: funding and observation. First, there is a critical lack of funds for the election. Although several countries have already made generous donations totalling $39 million,  an  additional  $110  million  will  be  needed  to  conduct  the  election.  Second,  international observers are needed to monitor the election, report fraud and intimidation, and generally assist in the  conduct  of  a  legitimate  election.  There  was  no  international  observation  mission  for  the presidential  election,  but  UN  officials  are  hopeful  that  other  international  organizations  will  step forward  to  supply  observers  for  the  upcoming  election  (the  UN  cannot  organize  the  observer mission because it is managing the election process). President Karzai specifically invited NATO parliamentarians to participate in an observation mission. C. REGIONAL WARLORDS 46. During  decades  of  civil  war,  most  power  in  Afghanistan  devolved  to  regional  leaders  who controlled  their  own  militias,  dispensed  with  justice  as  they  saw  fit  and  generally  ruled  over considerable portions of the country.  With the fall of the Taliban government and the creation of an  internationally  recognized  and  now  democratically  elected  government  in  Kabul,  much  of  the focus of the nation-building effort is on reducing the power of the regional warlords and increasing the power of the central government 47. In the 2004 report the committee found that the regional warlords were a significant problem.   The  main  challenge  is  to  build  an  Afghan  state,  but  this  is  not  possible  as  long  as  independent

056 DSC 05 E 8 warlords  can  maintain  the  fiefdoms  in  parts  of  the  country,  extracting  resources  and  collecting customs duties as if they were sovereign rulers.  President Karzai called the militias the greatest threat to the country’s security and warned that, “without disarmament the Afghan state will have really  serious  difficulties.”  Although  the  central  government  is  slowly  extending  its  control,  these regional  warlords  are  often  extremely  powerful  in  their  areas  and  have  little  incentive  to  cede power to the central authority. 48. There  are  some  signs  that  President  Karzai  is  increasingly  able  to  curb  the  power  of  the regional  warlords  with  a  combination  of  cooptation  and  confrontation.  Many  of  the  warlords who commanded  militias  are  now  working  within  the  government  of  Afghanistan.    Ismail  Khan  was removed from his position as governor of Herat but was pulled into the government as Minister of Water and Energy and has allowed his militia to be disarmed.    In the north, Uzbek militia leader Rachid  Dostom  maintains  a  strong  regional  power  base,  although  he  has  recently  agreed  to demobilize  his  forces.    In  return,  President  Karzai  named  Dostom  as  his  chief  military  adviser.   Other militias belonging to the Northern Alliance began demobilizing in January 2005.  The US and the  Afghan  government  had  been  reluctant  to  press  too  hard  on  the  Northern  Alliance  militias given  their  role  in  defeating  the  Taliban  and  their  resulting  special  status  in  Afghan  society.   However,  a  combination  of  incentives  and  general  sense  that  there  is  more  to  be  gained  from being part of the central government than remaining outside of it appears to be working.   49. The  Disarmament,  Demobilization  and  Reintegration  program  also  appears  to  be  working well. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative told the delegation that 96% of all heavy weapons are under central government control and that 45,000-militia members have been disarmed.  Most of  those  former  militia  members  are  entering  the  UN-established  Afghanistan’s  New  Beginnings Program  for  retraining  and  many  are  opting  to  be  trained  for  positions  in  the army or the police force. 50. In short, there are signs that militias are disbanding and heavy weapons are coming under the  control  of  the  central  government.    It  is  difficult,  however,  to  estimate  how  many  militia members  there  are  still  remaining  in  the  private  armies  of  the  warlords,  or  how  many  weapons they retain.  The trends are positive, but sustained support for the current policies of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is needed to endure the future stability of Afghanistan. 51. Although  the  larger  militias  have  disbanded,  smaller  units  of  20-200  armed  individuals  are rife   across   the   country.   NATO   and   Afghan   government   officials   estimate   that   there   are approximately 1800 such groups with a total of 20,000 members. Those illegally armed groups are a threat to the ongoing progress in Afghanistan because they are often involved in the narcotics traffic, and they should be confronted before the National Assembly elections in order to prevent them from influencing the composition of the parliament. 52. This is a complex task. Some of those groups are simply bandits or criminal gangs and can be addressed as such, but many are composed of individuals who spent much of their adult life fighting against the Soviet occupation. They may be willing to give up their weapons and rejoin civil society, but they need incentives and retraining so that they can become productive members of post-conflict  Afghanistan.  A  successful  policy  will  likely  involve  military  confrontation  with  the particularly dangerous illegally armed groups combined with retraining and incentive programs to convince  others  to  give  up  their  weapons  and  reintegrate  into  society.  Several  representatives from the international community and the Government of Afghanistan underlined the importance of this and the need to incorporate the disarmament of illegally armed groups into the existing 5-part security  sector  reform  project  as  a  sixth  pillar.  The  current  structure  features  Counter-narcotics (UK) Judicial Reform (Italy) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Japan), Development of the Afghan National Army (US), and development of the Afghan National Police (Germany).

056 DSC 05 E 9 D. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 53. Progress continues in building the Afghan National Army (ANA), which now stands at nearly 23,000.  An additional 3,400 are currently in training. The ANA is on track to meet its desired end strength  of  70,000  ahead  of  schedule.  Desertion  rates,  which  were  a  significant  problem  a  year ago, appear to be declining. If the present trend continues, the ANA will soon overtake the other armed groups combined in the country in terms of size, weaponry and training. Germany has the lead role in building the police force.   54. The  ANA  saw  its  first  military  action  at  the  end  of  2002  when  it  was  deployed  alongside coalition  forces  and  is  now  conducting  more  independent  operations  in  southern  Afghanistan against Taliban remnants.  It is also playing an important role in supporting the regional governors by dismantling illegal roadblocks set up by local factions and confiscating weapons caches.  By all accounts the ANA is performing well and is generally welcomed by the local population.  There are now several permanent ANA units based around the country including Mazar e-Sharif in the north, Kandahar in the south, Gardez in the east and Herat in the west.   55. The ANA also appears to be coping with the challenge of integrating different ethnicities into a  national  army.  The  former  Minister  of  Defence,  General  Mohammad  Fahim,  was  originally perceived  as  recruiting  too  many  Tajiks  for  the  army,  which  caused  many  Pashtuns  to  refuse positions  in  the  army  or  leave  them  after  short  periods  of  time.  Attempts  to  create  an  ethnically balanced army were also thwarted by the refusal of regional commanders Abdoul Rachid Dostom and  Ismail  Khan  to  contribute  recruits.  This  situation  has  been  improved  by  the  appointment  of more Pashtuns to positions in the Ministry of Defence and Mr Khan's removal, which was part of Mr  Karzai's  overall  effort  to  rein  in  Afghanistan's  warlords. The  ANA  is  also  purposely  creating mixed  units of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other groups to ensure that no individual battalion can been seen as solely representative of one ethnic or tribal group. 56. Improved pay for soldiers is helping to build the military. Monthly pay has been increased to $70  from  the  original  $30.  This  has  contributed  to  a  steady  decrease  in  desertion  rates,  from  a highpoint of 10% in the summer  of 2003 to less than 2% in May 2004.  Those working to train the army also report an emerging esprit de corps.  Soldiers’ morale is “very high, with all displaying a positive attitude towards their work and mission,” said Office of Military Cooperation - Afghanistan Deputy Director of the Defence Operations Sector British Lt. Col. Andy Fenton. 57. The  long-term  plan  for  the  construction  of  the  ANA  includes  the  rebuilding  of  regional command   centres,   logistics   and   intelligence   units   over   the   next   two   years.      The   military infrastructure - much as the rest of the infrastructure in Afghanistan - is in serious disrepair and will require a considerable investment before the ANA can function without the assistance of ISAF or coalition forces. 58. The national police force is also rapidly expanding according to the Minister of the Interior. Some  38,000  police  are  now  operating  across  Afghanistan  and  the force will number 50,000 by the end of 2005. In addition, the border police will be well on the way to their desired end strength of 12,000 by the end of the year. Corruption in the police force remains a serious concern, but the ministry  of  the  interior  recently  increased  pay  in  the  force  to  most  officers  to  $70  per  month,  a considerable  salary  in  a  country  where  the  estimated  per  capita  GDP  is  at  most  a  few  hundred dollars per year.

056 DSC 05 E 10 V. NATO IN IRAQ 59. Another  important  mission  for  the  Alliance  is  helping  Iraq  develop  its  security  forces  in  a manner consistent with democratic governance and civilian control of the military. Regardless of the divisions in the Alliance over the intervention in Iraq, all of the Allies recognize that it is now in their collective and individual interests to ensure that Iraq is increasingly stable and able to provide for its own security.   60. This is critical to the reconstruction of Iraq.  An ongoing feature of post-Saddam Iraq is the violence perpetrated mostly by the Sunni Arab minority against the Shia majority.  The attacks are increasing less on coalition troops and more on civilians and the civilian infrastructure.  Until this violence is contained, it will be very difficult to restore the country to any sort of normal economic and  political  life.    Constant  power  interruptions,  dangerous  roads,  and  general  lack  of  security hinder economic development and employment.  The first step in ensuring a democratic and self- sufficient Iraq is building the sort of native security forces that can control the violence, but doing so in a way that does not return to the authoritarian methods of the past. 61. This is a major challenge in a country ruled by a brutal dictatorship that used the military as a primary means of repression.  In the 1980s the army was used in the systematic slaughter of at least 50,000 Kurdish men women and children.  In the early 1990s, the army conducted operations against  the  Arabs  in  the  southern  marshes  of  Iraq,  killing  or  forcibly  moving  more  than  200,000 individuals.  The Iraqi people are unfortunately accustomed to a military and security forces run by the Sunni minority that were often used to violently repress the Kurdish minority, the Shia majority and  any  dissent  across  the  ethnic  or  religions  groups.    Breaking  from  that  past  and  building  a military  and  security  forces  that  have  the  confidence  of  the  population  is  long-term  and  difficult task. 62. At  the  Istanbul  summit  in  June  2004,  all  NATO  members  agreed  to  support  the  interim government  of  Iraq  in  the  training  of  its  security  forces.    The  North  Atlantic  Council  then considered  how  to  best  implement  this  decision  and  on  30  July  agreed  to  establish  a  Training Implementation Mission to conduct training both inside Iraq and at other locations in the region or in Europe.  The first troops for this mission were deployed in August under the leadership of Major General Carel Hilderink of the Netherlands who was designated as deputy commander.  Overall command of the mission is under US Army Lt. General David Petraeus who is both commander of the training mission and the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq. 63. In  September  the  NAC  (North  Atlantic  Council)  agreed  to  expand  the  mission  in  Iraq  to include  a  training,  education  and  doctrine  center  in  Iraq.    In  December  NATO  Foreign  Ministers met  and  authorized  SACEUR  to  begin  the  next  stage  of  the  mission  expanding  the  size  of  the NATO presence from approximately 50 to 300.  The name of the mission also changed to become the  NATO  Training  Mission  –Iraq.      In  February  2005  Major  General  Agner  Rokos  of  Denmark took over as deputy commander. 64. On 22 February at a meeting of the heads and state and government of all 26 allies at NATO Headquarters, the allies agreed that all of the allies would contribute to the mission in Iraq. They were  united  in  support  of  the  newly-elected  government,  and  consistent  with  UNSC  Resolution 1546,  all  26  Allies  are  now  contributing  to  the  NATO  mission  to  assist  in  training  Iraqi  security forces. 65. Some Iraqi personnel are being trained outside of Iraq.  Selected Iraqi security personnel are being instructed at the NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway and the NATO School on Obergammergau, Germany.  In addition, Germany is training Iraqi personnel in the United Arab Emirates.  France  is  engaged  in  a  bilateral  training  mission  and  is  slated  to  begin  training  Iraqi

056 DSC 05 E 11 police  in  Qatar  in  the  near  future.    Spain  announced  that  it  is  willing  to  train  Iraqi  soldiers  in demining operations at a base near Madrid. 66. NATO  is  also  coordinating  the  equipment  and  technical  assistance  to  the  Iraqi  authorities through a NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group established at NATO Headquarters in   October   2004.      The   group   helps   to   ensure   that   bilateral   aid   offered   by   the   allies   is complementary  and  meeting  the  needs  of  the  Iraqi  forces.    Several  NATO  allies  have  donated considerable  amounts  of  military  equipment including Denmark and Romania.  Greece, Norway, and Luxembourg have contributed financial assistance. 67. The  participation  of  the  allies  varies  widely  and  some  see  this  show  of  united  as  simply  a token gesture to repair the Transatlantic link.  As of February, ten allies actually have personnel in Iraq  working  on  the  training  mission  with  three  others  planning  to  send  forces  in  the  next  few months.    The  US  is  supplying  60  of  the  160  trainers.    France,  Belgium  and  Germany  have  all stated that their personnel will not serve with the mission inside of Iraq.  France agreed to allow only one of its officers at NATO headquarters to be involved in planning for the mission. 68. So-called “national caveats” - restrictions placed on forces and personnel assigned to NATO missions  are  causing  difficulties  for  the  Iraq  training  mission.  This  is  not  a  new  issue—such caveats  caused  operation  difficulties  in  Kosovo—but  the  problem  has  resurfaced  in a potentia  lly more damaging fashion over NATO’s activities in Iraq. Although the Alliance agreed to the training mission  in  Iraq,  certain  nations  are  preventing  their  personnel  assigned  to  NATO  multinational staffs from participating in this mission. When the Committee met in Washington in January, US Defence  Department  officials  pointed  out  that  this  not  only  affects  the  mission  in  Iraq  but,  more important  for  the  long-term,  runs  counter  to  the  spirit  of  multi-nationality  that  underpins  NATO's military structure and to the principle of consensus itself. 69. So far the training mission in Iraq has received relatively minimal tangible support from many of  the  Allies.  This  may  be  a  residual  effect  over  the  disagreement  within  the  Alliance  over  the military  intervention  in  Iraq  in  2003.    It  may  also  reflect  the  stretched  nature  of  many  allied militaries  to  meet  commitments  in  Afghanistan  and  other  deployments.    Either  way,  we  should work  to  overcome  the  obstacles  to  participation  in  the  training  mission  because  its  success  or failure will significantly influence events in Iraq and the region. 70. The January election demonstrated that the insurgency has limited popular support.  More than 8 million Iraqis voted in an act of defiance against the insurgents who did everything possible to discourage participation in the electoral process.   The insurgents attacks are now often aimed at civilian targets, particularly Shia mosques and population centres.  As of the time of this report, the  Shia  majority  who  have  been  suffering  the  bulk  of  those  attacks  has  resisted  engaging  in revenge  attacks  on  the  Sunni.    There  is  no  guarantee,  however,  that  this  tolerance  will  last indefinitely.    If  the  insurgents  are  able  to  provoke  the  Shia  majority  into  a  violent  reaction,  the result could be a civil war that would split the country.   71. Obviously,  the  best  way  to  avoid  this  scenario  is  to  end  the  insurgency.    This  is  mainly  a political  process,  but  there  is  a  strong  military  role  to  be  played  by  the  emerging  Iraqi  security forces.    To  be  successful,  those  forces  will  have  to  be  multi-ethnic,  well  disciplined  and trained, and respectful of human and civil rights.  Such forces will not simply spring forth from Iraqi society after the decades of brutality inflicted on the Iraqi population by the previous regime.  They must be  created  and  nurtured  by  professional  Western  militaries  that  embody  the  values  of  the democratic  societies  that  they  serve.    It  is  more  than  a  matter  of  tactical  training  and  ensuring competency with weapons and other systems.  Perhaps more important is ensuring that the new Iraqi security forces maintain close contacts with Western militaries so that they absorb the culture and values of professional militaries subservient to democratically elected leaders.  This is a long-

056 DSC 05 E 12 term  process,  but  it  is  vitally  important  to  building  an  Iraqi  military  that  can  halt  the  insurgency without triggering a cycle of violence that will divide the country.   VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS? 72. Most allied militaries appear to be stretched to meet current commitments, so it is difficult to consider  additional  operations.    However,  it  is  worthwhile  thinking  in  advance  about  potential scenarios that could lead to the involvement of NATO member forces in the context of the lessons we  have  learned  from  current  operations.    Your  Rapporteur  emphasizes  that  the  following  is merely hypothetical. 73. Some analysts have raised the possibility of NATO becoming involved in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and assisting in the enforcement of a peace agreement if and when one is reached.  Any settlement would involve the creation of new international borders between a new Palestinian  state  and  Israel.    As  an  organization,  NATO  would  likely  win  the  confidence  of  both parties, more so than an EU force or a UN force.  NATO forces could also work closely with the Palestinian security forces helping them create a military that can contribute to regional stability as well  as  defence  of  the  national  territory.    As  is  the  case  in  Iraq,  such  training  would  have  to  go deeper  than  simply  technical  cooperation  to  include  long-term  contacts  between  the  emerging Palestinian  military  and  western  militaries  to  help  develop  forces  appropriate  for  an  emerging democracy. 74. NATO might also become involved in other stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future.  At the present time this seems unlikely, but few would have predicted in 2001 that NATO would be heavily involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan by 2003. Even if it difficult to predict where and how NATO might become involved in such an operation, it is worth reflecting on some of the lessons of the current operation in Afghanistan that can be generalized to other potential situations. - A  commitment  to  stabilization  is  likely  to  be  long-term.      Regardless  of  the  region  or  the circumstances,  the  duration  of  any  such  operations  will  be  measured  in  years,  not  months.   This is a factor of the mission being performed.  There is no single enemy to defeat and then declare an end to the mission.  Instead, stabilization and reconstruction missions are aimed at tasks  that are by definition long-term and somewhat open-ended as they gradually transition from more military tasks to more police-oriented and civil affairs tasks. This can be seen in the mission in Bosnia where NATO maintained a substantial presence for a decade before turning over  the  operation  to the European Union.  Even now, however, the military presence is still needed to ensure stability and the normalization of Bosnia.  Afghanistan is also likely to be a long-term mission.  It is important that we recognize the likely long duration of future missions, as this will affect many aspects of mission planning and force generation.  It is also important that  we  communicate  this  to  the  general  public  -they  should  not  expect  fast  missions  and deployments that bring the troops home, as is often promised, in time for Christmas. - The  same  forces  may  have  to  cover  the  full  range  of  military  operations.    It  is  likely  to  be increasingly  difficult  to  maintain  the  firm  distinctions  between  combat  and  support  forces.   What we have seen in recent operations in Afghanistan is that the same troops often have to perform a variety of missions nearly simultaneously.  They might support local authorities on a raid against suspected terrorists, perform street patrols, and help dig a well in a short span of time in the same location.  Our forces will have to be better trained to cope with these varied tasks and deployed in combinations that allow for maximal flexibility.

056 DSC 05 E 13 - Future  operations  will  likely  involve  close  cooperation  with  other  international actors.  This is nothing new for NATO which has worked closely with the UN and the EU in other operations.   But it should be emphasised that this is likely to be a hallmark of future operations.  This may also include working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as humanitarian relief groups or other providers of aid.  Cooperation with the EU may become particularly important.   Future operations are likely to involve many of the functions that the EU is trying to build into its crisis response capability in a concept that combines civil and military response forces.  The planned  EU  gendarmerie  force  and  the  deployment  of  legal  and  judicial  advisors  to  Georgia are two examples of this.  They are capabilities that NATO does not have, but they are likely to be important parts of stabilization and reconstruction missions. - Common  funding  of  operations  will  need  to  be  seriously  considered.    The  principle  that  only countries participating in an operation pay for the costs is not a viable model for the future. The NATO Response Force (NRF) will feature elements from various allies on a rotating basis, but the  decision  to  use  the  NRF  will  be  taken  by  all  26  allies.  This  would  mean  that  the  whole alliance  would  take  decisions  to  act  in  the  interest  of  all  of  the  members,  yet  only  those currently  supplying  forces  to  the  NRF  would  pay.  A  common  funding  of  operations  could eliminate this problem and encourage greater participation in the NRF.