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**NATO'S OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS**

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**DRAFT GENERAL REPORT**

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International Secretariat

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\* Until this document has been approved by the Defence and Security Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In 2003 NATO embarked on its first truly out-of-area mission in Afghanistan. In 2004 NATO took on an additional out-of-area mission training Iraqi troops in Iraq and other countries in the region. Those missions raise important questions that impact on the future direction of the Alliance and its role in providing stability beyond the borders of its members.

2. The mission in Afghanistan in particular presents a test case for the Alliance's capabilities. If it can significantly add to the stabilization of that remote, war-torn country, then there are few geographic limits on where the Alliance could decide to become involved. But how effective is the mission? What is going well and what more needs to be done? This report will attempt to address some of those questions.

3. In large part this report builds on the 2004 report of the Defence and Security Committee that examined the mission in Afghanistan. We will evaluate the current situation in Afghanistan based on the progress made in addressing specific problems highlighted in that report. In particular the previous Committee report cited concerns about the narcotics traffic, the power of regional warlords relative to the central government, and the development of a "narco-state" where the drug-producers and traffickers wield the bulk of political power. Those issues are intimately connected: regional warlords often make the money they need to control their areas and private armies from the drug trade. If parliamentary elections are conducted while those same individuals hold *de facto* power over parts of the country, then they are likely to be elected and become legitimised by the system. Afghanistan at that point would perhaps no longer be a haven for terrorists, but it would be a state beholden to the producers and distributors of heroin.

4. Although Afghanistan is the major focus of this report, we will also examine the role of NATO in stabilizing Iraq. It is a far smaller operation, but it too raises important questions: should NATO assume a larger role there as the challenge increasingly turns from providing security to ensuring that Iraqi forces are able to provide security in the context of an emerging democracy? Even more challenging, should NATO ever consider a role a guarantor of an eventual Israeli-Arab peace settlement? We will attempt to extract some lessons from current out of area operation that could be generalized to possible future missions.

5. More broadly, current out-of-area operations and the potential future uses of the NATO Response Force (NRF) demonstrate that we need to fundamentally rethink how we organize and fund future operations. The current system of funding is "cost lie where they fall", meaning that the country supplying forces for an operation pays the costs of getting those force into the area of operations and maintaining them for the duration of the deployment. Although this formula has worked in the past, it will be increasingly problematic because of the nature of the NRF. The NRF is composed of forces from the member countries on a rotating basis, but it will be deployed based on a decision taken by all 26 allies. Yet, the costs for this decision will fall only on the allies currently participating in NRF. This is simply not a fair system, and it will tend to discourage participation in the NRF. A better system would be to establish some form of common funding for operations so that the costs of operations are spread across the full 26 members of the alliance, not just those supplying forces to the operation in question.

6. In addition, we should also focus on the issue of national caveats (restrictions placed on a national contingent participating in a NATO operation), which are also having a debilitating effect on the Alliance's current operations. Declared caveats are often not a problem and commanders on the ground can usually work with known and reasonable restrictions. The problem lies in undeclared caveats that a commander does not discover until he tasks a national contingent and finds that they are unable to perform the assigned duty. Caveats will not be eliminated, but we should consider how they can be minimized and made more transparent so that commanders on the ground understand up front the capabilities and limits on the forces that they have at hand.

7. Therefore, your Rapporteur urges you to consider those broader issues as you read the following report. The future of the Alliance demands no less. While we should be under no illusion that one report can resolve such thorny issues, It is appropriate that we begin this discussion at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and take the debate to our national parliaments.

## **II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT NATO ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN**

8. The idea of putting a UN-authorized multinational military force in Afghanistan originated at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 that brought together all of the political and ethnic factions in Afghanistan. This came immediately after the successful US intervention in Afghanistan that toppled the Taliban regime as a consequence of its support and continued protection of Osama bin Laden, the architect of the September 11th attacks. That conference set the groundwork for the partnership between the United Nations, the Afghan Transitional Authority and the International Security Assistance Force.

9. The first ISAF was established by a UN Security Council resolution and was designed to support the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security around Kabul. ISAF I was led by the UK (December 2001-June 2002) but included forces from 18 countries, 14 of which were NATO members (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Turkey). The second six-month rotation (ISAF II) was led by Turkey (June 2002-February 2003) and ISAF III was led by Germany and the Netherlands (February 2003-August 2003). The size of the force continued to grow both in numbers of troops and participating countries. Canada has played a large role and supplied the largest force for many of the later rotations.

10. ISAF evolved into a three-part structure: ISAF Headquarters, the airport task force, and the Kabul multinational brigade. ISAF quickly forged ties with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and US Central Command. This allowed the two missions, ISAF and Enduring Freedom, to coordinate logistics and flights in and out of the region while maintaining their separate identities and missions.

11. NATO took on a progressively larger role in assisting ISAF during the first 18 months of the operation. Germany and the Netherlands received planning assistance from NATO in 2002, and NATO provided valuable help in force generation, communications, and intelligence. SHAPE posted officers with the German command. ISAF headquarters was granted access to NATO intelligence and communication systems. This involvement sparked a close working relationship between NATO and the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell at Eindhoven, the Netherlands to arrange the airlift needs of ISAF.

12. At the same time that NATO was providing this valuable assistance to ISAF, some involved in the mission were concerned that changing the lead nation every six months was hindering its effectiveness and weakening its credibility as a guarantor of a modicum of stability in Afghanistan. As a result, the North Atlantic Council decided in April 2003 to take on command and planning of ISAF as of August 11, 2003. In October 2003, the UN approved an expansion of ISAF and authorized it to deploy outside of Kabul and the immediate surrounding area.

## **III. ISAF UNDER NATO COMMAND**

13. ISAF falls under the responsibility of Joint Forces Command North (JFC North) in Brunssum, the Netherlands. Although NATO and the commander of JFC North have overall authority,

command on the ground in Kabul still rotates between lead nations. The EUROCORPS took over from Canada in August 2004 and Turkey recently assumed command of the operation

14. The NATO assumption of command opened the door to discussions about expanding the role of ISAF. Both the UN and the Government of Afghanistan favour such a move. In October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan to increase ISAF to 10,000 troops and expand to cover additional cities beyond Kabul, a decision also endorsed by the UN.

15. Assuming control over ISAF is a major step forward for the Alliance, but it also leads to new questions that must be answered if its mission is to be successful. First and most critically, there is the question of how and if the members of the Alliance can supply the troops and military equipment required. Many pledges of troops and equipment were made, but members have been slow to fulfil those pledges. After much pressure from the Secretary General of NATO was applied to national defence ministers in December 2003, NATO received a commitment of three helicopters from Turkey and three from the Netherlands. It took several additional months of discussion to actually get the much-needed transport helicopters to Afghanistan. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Jones has also spoken out regarding the need for the Allies to meet their commitments in terms of personnel and materiel in Afghanistan. The force generation conference held at NATO headquarters in March 2004 appears to have improved the situation. The conference was to generate forces for the PRT in Kunduz and two others in Feyzabad and Maimana. The helicopter issue was resolved with the Netherlands providing six combat helicopters and Turkey providing three transport helicopters. Ongoing emphasis on this issue by the Secretary General, military commanders and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has helped to alleviate the transportation shortage, but there are still remaining shortfalls that need to be addressed.

16. Another question is the relationship between the various operations in Afghanistan and if NATO should play a role in consolidating them under a single command. ISAF and Enduring Freedom are separate operations. Those operations are dynamic, changing somewhat to fit the shifting circumstances although both are ultimately directed at ensuring the increasing stability of the country and the ability of Afghanistan to provide for its own security.

17. ISAF is primarily designed to provide basic security, enabling the NGOs to perform their work and the central Afghan government to deepen its hold on the country. ISAF is made up of approximately 8,500 troops and is limited by its size and capabilities to an area around Kabul and some areas in northern Afghanistan where it runs the PRTs. ISAF is now expanding the number of PRTs to the western part of the country. An Italian team took over the PRT in Herat early in 2005.

18. The expansion will establish a permanent ISAF presence in the form of four Provincial Reconstruction teams (PRT) and one Forward Support Base (FSB). Two existing US-led PRTs at Herat and Farah in western Afghanistan are coming under NATO command and two new ISAF PRTs will be established with Lithuania in the lead at Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and Spain in the lead at Qal'eh-ye Now, capital of Baghdis province. Italy and Spain will provide the Forward Support Base (a logistics hub at Herat) with substantial support from other contributors. The extended ISAF mission will provide security assistance in 50 percent of Afghanistan's territory.

19. Operation Enduring Freedom is led by the United States. The US and a group of coalition partners conduct this operation mainly in southern and eastern Afghanistan and along the border with Pakistan. Approximately 18,000 (mostly US) troops are involved in this operation directed by US Central Command (CENTCOM). Enduring Freedom is both targeted at eliminating remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida and building the conditions for stable Afghanistan. The PRT concept was born in the context of Enduring Freedom and most PRTs are under US command.

20. Some in NATO and in national capitals argue that it would be a natural progression for NATO to eventually assume control of all operations in Afghanistan. Centralised control under NATO would help reduce the overlapping authorities and operations in Afghanistan. According to those involved, there is a high level of co-ordination between all of the military commands, but the overall effort would benefit from a higher level of centralisation. NATO as the premier international military organisation would be the obvious candidate as the institution to centralise all military operations in Afghanistan.

21. At the Defence and Security Committee meeting in Washington DC in January, several US officials noted that it was time to reconsider this option. Some allies have been reluctant because of the more combat-oriented aspects of Operation Enduring Freedom and were concerned that a merger could further blur the line between combat forces and those involved in reconstruction and development. But by the beginning of 2005 it became increasingly clear that the Taliban is a spent force with little popular support in the Afghanistan. There are increasingly fewer distinctions that can be drawn between the two missions and, therefore, a merger of the two should be reconsidered. In February 2005, NATO defence ministers agreed that the operations should be merged at some point in the near future. No date was set but the objections of France and Germany that had ended discussion of a merger as recently as October 2004 appear to have been overcome by the improved security situation.

22. It is important, however, to understand how much improvement there has been over the past year and if the progress in ensuring Afghanistan's security is sufficient to put it on the road to self-sufficiency. The goal of this entire exercise is to create a functioning Afghan state, capable of preventing itself from being overwhelmed by internal divisions. Therefore, the following section will evaluate progress on specific areas of concern underlined in the 2004 Defence and Security Committee General Report.

#### **IV. PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN**

23. The 2004 Defence and Security Committee General Report noted several interrelated issues that were of particular concern to the committee. First was narcotics production and trafficking and its effects on the political and economic development of Afghanistan. Second, was the power of the warlords and the ability of the central government to break their power before the parliamentary elections in September 2005. Third was the development of the Afghan National Army and its capabilities relative to the regional warlords.

24. We will briefly recap the findings of the 2004 report in each of those areas and then judge progress based on recent reports and the findings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation that travelled to Afghanistan in March 2005.

##### **A. NARCOTICS PRODUCTION**

25. The committee noted in 2004 that narcotics production was a major, and growing problem in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai has underlined the need to attack this problem on numerous occasions. In his inauguration speech in December 2004, he called on his countrymen to engage in a jihad against narcotics production and trafficking. That same month he pledged to destroy the country's opium-production centers by the end of 2006.

26. The Committee's 2004 report found that the UN and national authorities in co-operation with the government of Afghanistan were working to cut opium poppy production but that their efforts thus far had failed. Some plans to curtail the production of opium actually had the exact opposite effect. An attempt to prevent the poppy seeds from being turned into heroin by buying the poppy

crop from farmers in 2002 only succeeded in encouraging farmers to plant more poppies the following year. Efforts to destroy opium crops have also not been successful. Only a tiny fraction of the opium harvest has been interrupted and it is difficult to find the forces that might perform such operations. Local police and officials are under-funded and therefore easily bribed, and international forces are either specifically prohibited from addressing the issue or are reluctant to do so. Troops involved in the PRTs for example, are focused on winning the confidence of the local populations and are not eager to take on a mission likely to alienate large numbers of farmers and the heavily-armed militias controlled by regional warlords.

27. The problem also appears to be growing. In November 2004 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime found a 17% increase in the opium crop in 2004 compared to 2003. 131,000 hectares of land were used for opium production compared to only 80,000 hectares in 2003.

28. In 2005, however, there are some indications of a marked reduction in opium cultivation. A recent report found that many farmers who grew opium poppies last year have stopped and are instead growing wheat. In the three provinces that account for half of Afghanistan's opium production (Nangahar, Helmand and Badakhshan) poppy cultivation appears to have declined by as much as 70 percent.

29. Much of this may be the product of a combination of factors including a drop in the price of opium caused by the record poppy crop in 2004 that flooded the market. Another factor may be that Afghan police burned enough poppy fields last year to have a deterrent effect on potential opium farmers who have concluded that it is better to grow a less profitable product rather than risk losing their entire opium crop.

30. But there are other factors at work that may have a more long-term effect. President Karzai and other officials have appealed to Afghans' traditional values in the hope that this approach will be a more lasting deterrent to drug production. Local clerics and tribal elders have to a large extent answered Karzai's call and are preaching that opium production is counter to Islamic values. In a traditional and conservative society such as Afghanistan's, those statements from local leaders can carry considerable weight.

31. Another factor that gives some cause for optimism is that poppy cultivation is not firmly rooted in the society and drug traffickers are still unorganised. Opium production is a relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, starting in the 1980s when neighbouring countries began to aggressively target opium production. Although the drug trade is immensely profitable, UN reports indicate that drug traffickers do not yet seem to have formed cartels and criminal syndicates. By most accounts, there is still a window of time in which the opium production problem can be managed.

32. It is likely that the way forward will include a range of actions. The appeal to traditional values is important, but it must be backed up with sticks and carrots. The stick is an aggressive program of arresting heroin traffickers and destroying poppy crops, although it should be Afghan police and government officials in the active roles, not their international advisors. Both the UK and the US officials responsible for working with the Afghan government on this issue are firmly aware of this important condition and recognize that there must be an Afghan face on the counter-narcotics effort. The carrot is aid to farmers to improve their ability to grow profitable amounts of legitimate produce and get it to market.

33. Both Afghan government officials and international experts emphasized that the key issue will be the provision of alternative livelihoods to enable farmers to earn a viable living from legitimate crops. This involves the provision of seed and fertilizer, agricultural credits and other financial measures. It also involves repairing Afghanistan's irrigation and road infrastructure. Decades of war destroyed the irrigation system and poppy was the only viable crop because it can

thrive in dry environments. Repairing the irrigation system and the roads so that farmers can get their product to markets is a critical part of providing alternative livelihoods to poppy production. Additional attention and financial support of this program is needed now to ensure that the current reductions in poppy production continue.

34. In sum, the elements of a comprehensive policy appear to be recognized by the Afghan government and its international partners, but how such a policy is implemented is critical. It must be long-term, and based on developing the Afghan government's ability to manage the situation in a manner that prevents it from becoming another instance of foreign domination in Afghanistan's history. The test, of course, is the trend line of opium cultivation in the coming years. As noted, some reports indicate that we should expect a significant reduction in 2005, but turning that into a trend will require a comprehensive strategy and sustained attention.

## **B. PROGRESS IN BUILDING THE AFGHAN STATE**

35. Afghanistan is struggling to build a functioning state. There is no system of taxation in place yet beyond collecting customs duties. Half of the state budget is financed through international contributions. All areas of public administration are lacking in trained personnel and other resources. Government ministries have been created and ministers have been appointed, but the country lacks the necessary trained individuals to staff those ministries.

36. There has been some progress in building the basic institutions for governance. The Afghan constitution drafted in 2003 sets forth the broad outlines of the emerging government of Afghanistan. Among its features is a strong presidency with the power to appoint one-third of the upper chamber of the legislature. There are checks on the power of the president; the parliament can impeach the president and the president is prohibited from disbanding the parliament.

37. The bicameral parliament is divided in a lower chamber (House of People) and an upper chamber (House of Elders). The lower chamber of 249 seats is to be elected by the people. The upper chamber is selected by provincial authorities, district councils and the president. Both chambers include provisions to ensure some participation by women representatives. Half of the president's appointees to the House of Elders are to be women and the constitution states that at least 2 representatives from each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces should be women.

38. The constitution also has provisions to protect women and minorities. It recognizes the equality of women as citizens of Afghanistan. The Uzbek and Turkmen languages are officially recognized and they may be used as the official language in those regions where those minority groups are concentrated.

39. The constitution also attempts to craft a balance between modern constitutionalism and Afghanistan's traditional culture. Political parties may be established as long as they do not contradict the "principles of Islam" and laws passed by the government are not to contradict the "beliefs and provisions" of Islam.

40. The most significant recent event in Afghanistan was the presidential election in October 2004. Despite predictions of a wave of violence from Taliban and other anti-democratic forces, there were remarkably few disruptions. Turnout was high and a considerable percentage of the female population took part in the voting. Some candidates challenged the validity of the election process because in some polling stations the election workers used the wrong ink to mark voters' thumbs to prevent fraud. The challenge was short-lived, however, and within a few days all of the candidates agreed that the process was fair if imperfect.



41. As expected, Hamid Karzai won a large percentage of the vote. 55% of the ballots cast were for Karzai putting him over the 50% threshold needed to avoid a run-off election. Karzai's nearest competitor, Yunus Qanooni, received 16% of the vote.

42. In short, the election process was successful. The large turnout and eager participation of the population demonstrated its legitimacy. The international observers certified its fairness. The lack of violence showed that anti-democratic forces are either cowed by the presence of international military forces, lack popular support, or both. Most significantly, the election confers legitimacy on the president who up until now was operating as an appointed chief executive. Now Karzai has greater political freedom to enact changes because he is the popularly-elected leader of the country.

43. Following on the success of the presidential election in October, Afghanistan is preparing to hold elections for the lower house of the National Assembly on 18 September 2005. This is a massive challenge according to the UN officials working with the Afghan authorities. Some 5,000 to 10,000 candidates are expected to be on the ballot for the 249 seats in the National Assembly, creating a potentially huge and confusing ballot. In addition to the challenge of producing a usable ballot, the logistical and security challenges are also daunting. The potential for fraud and challenges to the elections are high as well; Hundreds of thousands of Afghan citizens have more than one voter registration card and there is no way to prevent them from voting multiple times other than marking their fingers with ink. It will also be difficult to keep many unsavory warlords off of the ballot because they have yet to be successfully prosecuted for any crime and therefore cannot be disqualified for criminal activity.

44. Nonetheless, the election could be a historic moment for Afghanistan and it is vitally important that the election be accepted by the Afghan people and credible to the outside world. But it is important to break the hold of the most notorious drug lords before the election. If they are allowed to stand for office and gain a large number of seats in the parliament, we run the risk of seeing Afghanistan's parliament become a creature of criminal elements who will gain legitimacy through holding elected office.

45. There are two areas where the international community can offer important additional assistance to the election process: funding and observation. First, there is a critical lack of funds for the election. Although several countries have already made generous donations totalling \$39 million, an additional \$110 million will be needed to conduct the election. Second, international observers are needed to monitor the election, report fraud and intimidation, and generally assist in the conduct of a legitimate election. There was no international observation mission for the presidential election, but UN officials are hopeful that other international organizations will step forward to supply observers for the upcoming election (the UN cannot organize the observer mission because it is managing the election process). President Karzai specifically invited NATO parliamentarians to participate in an observation mission.

### **C. REGIONAL WARLORDS**

46. During decades of civil war, most power in Afghanistan devolved to regional leaders who controlled their own militias, dispensed with justice as they saw fit and generally ruled over considerable portions of the country. With the fall of the Taliban government and the creation of an internationally recognized and now democratically elected government in Kabul, much of the focus of the nation-building effort is on reducing the power of the regional warlords and increasing the power of the central government.

47. In the 2004 report the committee found that the regional warlords were a significant problem. The main challenge is to build an Afghan state, but this is not possible as long as independent

warlords can maintain the fiefdoms in parts of the country, extracting resources and collecting customs duties as if they were sovereign rulers. President Karzai called the militias the greatest threat to the country's security and warned that, "without disarmament the Afghan state will have really serious difficulties." Although the central government is slowly extending its control, these regional warlords are often extremely powerful in their areas and have little incentive to cede power to the central authority.

48. There are some signs that President Karzai is increasingly able to curb the power of the regional warlords with a combination of cooptation and confrontation. Many of the warlords who commanded militias are now working within the government of Afghanistan. Ismail Khan was removed from his position as governor of Herat but was pulled into the government as Minister of Water and Energy and has allowed his militia to be disarmed. In the north, Uzbek militia leader Rachid Dostom maintains a strong regional power base, although he has recently agreed to demobilize his forces. In return, President Karzai named Dostom as his chief military adviser. Other militias belonging to the Northern Alliance began demobilizing in January 2005. The US and the Afghan government had been reluctant to press too hard on the Northern Alliance militias given their role in defeating the Taliban and their resulting special status in Afghan society. However, a combination of incentives and general sense that there is more to be gained from being part of the central government than remaining outside of it appears to be working.

49. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program also appears to be working well. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative told the delegation that 96% of all heavy weapons are under central government control and that 45,000-militia members have been disarmed. Most of those former militia members are entering the UN-established Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program for retraining and many are opting to be trained for positions in the army or the police force.

50. In short, there are signs that militias are disbanding and heavy weapons are coming under the control of the central government. It is difficult, however, to estimate how many militia members there are still remaining in the private armies of the warlords, or how many weapons they retain. The trends are positive, but sustained support for the current policies of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is needed to endure the future stability of Afghanistan.

51. Although the larger militias have disbanded, smaller units of 20-200 armed individuals are rife across the country. NATO and Afghan government officials estimate that there are approximately 1800 such groups with a total of 20,000 members. Those illegally armed groups are a threat to the ongoing progress in Afghanistan because they are often involved in the narcotics traffic, and they should be confronted before the National Assembly elections in order to prevent them from influencing the composition of the parliament.

52. This is a complex task. Some of those groups are simply bandits or criminal gangs and can be addressed as such, but many are composed of individuals who spent much of their adult life fighting against the Soviet occupation. They may be willing to give up their weapons and rejoin civil society, but they need incentives and retraining so that they can become productive members of post-conflict Afghanistan. A successful policy will likely involve military confrontation with the particularly dangerous illegally armed groups combined with retraining and incentive programs to convince others to give up their weapons and reintegrate into society. Several representatives from the international community and the Government of Afghanistan underlined the importance of this and the need to incorporate the disarmament of illegally armed groups into the existing 5-part security sector reform project as a sixth pillar. The current structure features Counter-narcotics (UK) Judicial Reform (Italy) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Japan), Development of the Afghan National Army (US), and development of the Afghan National Police (Germany).

## D. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

53. Progress continues in building the Afghan National Army (ANA), which now stands at nearly 23,000. An additional 3,400 are currently in training. The ANA is on track to meet its desired end strength of 70,000 ahead of schedule. Desertion rates, which were a significant problem a year ago, appear to be declining. If the present trend continues, the ANA will soon overtake the other armed groups combined in the country in terms of size, weaponry and training. Germany has the lead role in building the police force.

54. The ANA saw its first military action at the end of 2002 when it was deployed alongside coalition forces and is now conducting more independent operations in southern Afghanistan against Taliban remnants. It is also playing an important role in supporting the regional governors by dismantling illegal roadblocks set up by local factions and confiscating weapons caches. By all accounts the ANA is performing well and is generally welcomed by the local population. There are now several permanent ANA units based around the country including Mazar e-Sharif in the north, Kandahar in the south, Gardez in the east and Herat in the west.

55. The ANA also appears to be coping with the challenge of integrating different ethnicities into a national army. The former Minister of Defence, General Mohammad Fahim, was originally perceived as recruiting too many Tajiks for the army, which caused many Pashtuns to refuse positions in the army or leave them after short periods of time. Attempts to create an ethnically balanced army were also thwarted by the refusal of regional commanders Abdoul Rachid Dostom and Ismail Khan to contribute recruits. This situation has been improved by the appointment of more Pashtuns to positions in the Ministry of Defence and Mr Khan's removal, which was part of Mr Karzai's overall effort to rein in Afghanistan's warlords. The ANA is also purposely creating mixed units of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other groups to ensure that no individual battalion can be seen as solely representative of one ethnic or tribal group.

56. Improved pay for soldiers is helping to build the military. Monthly pay has been increased to \$70 from the original \$30. This has contributed to a steady decrease in desertion rates, from a highpoint of 10% in the summer of 2003 to less than 2% in May 2004. Those working to train the army also report an emerging *esprit de corps*. Soldiers' morale is "very high, with all displaying a positive attitude towards their work and mission," said Office of Military Cooperation - Afghanistan Deputy Director of the Defence Operations Sector British Lt. Col. Andy Fenton.

57. The long-term plan for the construction of the ANA includes the rebuilding of regional command centres, logistics and intelligence units over the next two years. The military infrastructure - much as the rest of the infrastructure in Afghanistan - is in serious disrepair and will require a considerable investment before the ANA can function without the assistance of ISAF or coalition forces.

58. The national police force is also rapidly expanding according to the Minister of the Interior. Some 38,000 police are now operating across Afghanistan and the force will number 50,000 by the end of 2005. In addition, the border police will be well on the way to their desired end strength of 12,000 by the end of the year. Corruption in the police force remains a serious concern, but the ministry of the interior recently increased pay in the force to most officers to \$70 per month, a considerable salary in a country where the estimated per capita GDP is at most a few hundred dollars per year.

## **V. NATO IN IRAQ**

59. Another important mission for the Alliance is helping Iraq develop its security forces in a manner consistent with democratic governance and civilian control of the military. Regardless of the divisions in the Alliance over the intervention in Iraq, all of the Allies recognize that it is now in their collective and individual interests to ensure that Iraq is increasingly stable and able to provide for its own security.

60. This is critical to the reconstruction of Iraq. An ongoing feature of post-Saddam Iraq is the violence perpetrated mostly by the Sunni Arab minority against the Shia majority. The attacks are increasing less on coalition troops and more on civilians and the civilian infrastructure. Until this violence is contained, it will be very difficult to restore the country to any sort of normal economic and political life. Constant power interruptions, dangerous roads, and general lack of security hinder economic development and employment. The first step in ensuring a democratic and self-sufficient Iraq is building the sort of native security forces that can control the violence, but doing so in a way that does not return to the authoritarian methods of the past.

61. This is a major challenge in a country ruled by a brutal dictatorship that used the military as a primary means of repression. In the 1980s the army was used in the systematic slaughter of at least 50,000 Kurdish men women and children. In the early 1990s, the army conducted operations against the Arabs in the southern marshes of Iraq, killing or forcibly moving more than 200,000 individuals. The Iraqi people are unfortunately accustomed to a military and security forces run by the Sunni minority that were often used to violently repress the Kurdish minority, the Shia majority and any dissent across the ethnic or religions groups. Breaking from that past and building a military and security forces that have the confidence of the population is long-term and difficult task.

62. At the Istanbul summit in June 2004, all NATO members agreed to support the interim government of Iraq in the training of its security forces. The North Atlantic Council then considered how to best implement this decision and on 30 July agreed to establish a Training Implementation Mission to conduct training both inside Iraq and at other locations in the region or in Europe. The first troops for this mission were deployed in August under the leadership of Major General Carel Hilderink of the Netherlands who was designated as deputy commander. Overall command of the mission is under US Army Lt. General David Petraeus who is both commander of the training mission and the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq.

63. In September the NAC (North Atlantic Council) agreed to expand the mission in Iraq to include a training, education and doctrine center in Iraq. In December NATO Foreign Ministers met and authorized SACEUR to begin the next stage of the mission expanding the size of the NATO presence from approximately 50 to 300. The name of the mission also changed to become the NATO Training Mission –Iraq. In February 2005 Major General Agner Rokos of Denmark took over as deputy commander.

64. On 22 February at a meeting of the heads and state and government of all 26 allies at NATO Headquarters, the allies agreed that all of the allies would contribute to the mission in Iraq. They were united in support of the newly-elected government, and consistent with UNSC Resolution 1546, all 26 Allies are now contributing to the NATO mission to assist in training Iraqi security forces.

65. Some Iraqi personnel are being trained outside of Iraq. Selected Iraqi security personnel are being instructed at the NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway and the NATO School on Obergarmmergau, Germany. In addition, Germany is training Iraqi personnel in the United Arab Emirates. France is engaged in a bilateral training mission and is slated to begin training Iraqi

police in Qatar in the near future. Spain announced that it is willing to train Iraqi soldiers in demining operations at a base near Madrid.

66. NATO is also coordinating the equipment and technical assistance to the Iraqi authorities through a NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group established at NATO Headquarters in October 2004. The group helps to ensure that bilateral aid offered by the allies is complementary and meeting the needs of the Iraqi forces. Several NATO allies have donated considerable amounts of military equipment including Denmark and Romania. Greece, Norway, and Luxembourg have contributed financial assistance.

67. The participation of the allies varies widely and some see this show of united as simply a token gesture to repair the Transatlantic link. As of February, ten allies actually have personnel in Iraq working on the training mission with three others planning to send forces in the next few months. The US is supplying 60 of the 160 trainers. France, Belgium and Germany have all stated that their personnel will not serve with the mission inside of Iraq. France agreed to allow only one of its officers at NATO headquarters to be involved in planning for the mission.

68. So-called "national caveats" - restrictions placed on forces and personnel assigned to NATO missions are causing difficulties for the Iraq training mission. This is not a new issue—such caveats caused operation difficulties in Kosovo—but the problem has resurfaced in a potentially more damaging fashion over NATO's activities in Iraq. Although the Alliance agreed to the training mission in Iraq, certain nations are preventing their personnel assigned to NATO multinational staffs from participating in this mission. When the Committee met in Washington in January, US Defence Department officials pointed out that this not only affects the mission in Iraq but, more important for the long-term, runs counter to the spirit of multi-nationality that underpins NATO's military structure and to the principle of consensus itself.

69. So far the training mission in Iraq has received relatively minimal tangible support from many of the Allies. This may be a residual effect over the disagreement within the Alliance over the military intervention in Iraq in 2003. It may also reflect the stretched nature of many allied militaries to meet commitments in Afghanistan and other deployments. Either way, we should work to overcome the obstacles to participation in the training mission because its success or failure will significantly influence events in Iraq and the region.

70. The January election demonstrated that the insurgency has limited popular support. More than 8 million Iraqis voted in an act of defiance against the insurgents who did everything possible to discourage participation in the electoral process. The insurgents attacks are now often aimed at civilian targets, particularly Shia mosques and population centres. As of the time of this report, the Shia majority who have been suffering the bulk of those attacks has resisted engaging in revenge attacks on the Sunni. There is no guarantee, however, that this tolerance will last indefinitely. If the insurgents are able to provoke the Shia majority into a violent reaction, the result could be a civil war that would split the country.

71. Obviously, the best way to avoid this scenario is to end the insurgency. This is mainly a political process, but there is a strong military role to be played by the emerging Iraqi security forces. To be successful, those forces will have to be multi-ethnic, well disciplined and trained, and respectful of human and civil rights. Such forces will not simply spring forth from Iraqi society after the decades of brutality inflicted on the Iraqi population by the previous regime. They must be created and nurtured by professional Western militaries that embody the values of the democratic societies that they serve. It is more than a matter of tactical training and ensuring competency with weapons and other systems. Perhaps more important is ensuring that the new Iraqi security forces maintain close contacts with Western militaries so that they absorb the culture and values of professional militaries subservient to democratically elected leaders. This is a long-

term process, but it is vitally important to building an Iraqi military that can halt the insurgency without triggering a cycle of violence that will divide the country.

## **VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS?**

72. Most allied militaries appear to be stretched to meet current commitments, so it is difficult to consider additional operations. However, it is worthwhile thinking in advance about potential scenarios that could lead to the involvement of NATO member forces in the context of the lessons we have learned from current operations. Your Rapporteur emphasizes that the following is merely hypothetical.

73. Some analysts have raised the possibility of NATO becoming involved in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and assisting in the enforcement of a peace agreement if and when one is reached. Any settlement would involve the creation of new international borders between a new Palestinian state and Israel. As an organization, NATO would likely win the confidence of both parties, more so than an EU force or a UN force. NATO forces could also work closely with the Palestinian security forces helping them create a military that can contribute to regional stability as well as defence of the national territory. As is the case in Iraq, such training would have to go deeper than simply technical cooperation to include long-term contacts between the emerging Palestinian military and western militaries to help develop forces appropriate for an emerging democracy.

74. NATO might also become involved in other stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future. At the present time this seems unlikely, but few would have predicted in 2001 that NATO would be heavily involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan by 2003. Even if it difficult to predict where and how NATO might become involved in such an operation, it is worth reflecting on some of the lessons of the current operation in Afghanistan that can be generalized to other potential situations.

- A commitment to stabilization is likely to be long-term. Regardless of the region or the circumstances, the duration of any such operations will be measured in years, not months. This is a factor of the mission being performed. There is no single enemy to defeat and then declare an end to the mission. Instead, stabilization and reconstruction missions are aimed at tasks that are by definition long-term and somewhat open-ended as they gradually transition from more military tasks to more police-oriented and civil affairs tasks. This can be seen in the mission in Bosnia where NATO maintained a substantial presence for a decade before turning over the operation to the European Union. Even now, however, the military presence is still needed to ensure stability and the normalization of Bosnia. Afghanistan is also likely to be a long-term mission. It is important that we recognize the likely long duration of future missions, as this will affect many aspects of mission planning and force generation. It is also important that we communicate this to the general public -they should not expect fast missions and deployments that bring the troops home, as is often promised, in time for Christmas.
- The same forces may have to cover the full range of military operations. It is likely to be increasingly difficult to maintain the firm distinctions between combat and support forces. What we have seen in recent operations in Afghanistan is that the same troops often have to perform a variety of missions nearly simultaneously. They might support local authorities on a raid against suspected terrorists, perform street patrols, and help dig a well in a short span of time in the same location. Our forces will have to be better trained to cope with these varied tasks and deployed in combinations that allow for maximal flexibility.

- Future operations will likely involve close cooperation with other international actors. This is nothing new for NATO which has worked closely with the UN and the EU in other operations. But it should be emphasised that this is likely to be a hallmark of future operations. This may also include working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as humanitarian relief groups or other providers of aid. Cooperation with the EU may become particularly important. Future operations are likely to involve many of the functions that the EU is trying to build into its crisis response capability in a concept that combines civil and military response forces. The planned EU gendarmerie force and the deployment of legal and judicial advisors to Georgia are two examples of this. They are capabilities that NATO does not have, but they are likely to be important parts of stabilization and reconstruction missions.
  - Common funding of operations will need to be seriously considered. The principle that only countries participating in an operation pay for the costs is not a viable model for the future. The NATO Response Force (NRF) will feature elements from various allies on a rotating basis, but the decision to use the NRF will be taken by all 26 allies. This would mean that the whole alliance would take decisions to act in the interest of all of the members, yet only those currently supplying forces to the NRF would pay. A common funding of operations could eliminate this problem and encourage greater participation in the NRF.
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