CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY 055 CDS 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR (CBRN) DETECTION: A TECHNOLOGICAL OVERVIEW DRAFT SPECIAL REPORT LORD JOPLING (UNITED KINGDOM) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 7 April 2005 * Until this document has been approved by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

055 CDS 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………..1 II. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS:  DETECTIONS MECHANISMS………. 2 A. BIODETECTION…………… …………………………………………………… …… 3 B. CHEMICAL DETECTION…   …………………………………………………………. 6 III.     RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR THREATS: MECHANISMS FOR DETECTION… 8 A. TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR SUBSTANCES………… ………………………. 10 B. DETECTION AT POINT OF ENTRY………………………… ……………………10 IV. CONCLUSIONS…………… ……………………………………………………………… 11 DOCUMENTS OF REFERENCE…… ………………………………………………………… 13

055 CDS 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. In  the  past,  various  terrorist  groups  have  employed  CBRN  agents.  In  Europe,  left-wing extremists  have  threatened  their  use  against  civilian  populations  or  military  targets;  right-wing extremists in North America have conspired to poison city water supplies and have succeeded in acquiring  significant  quantities  of  deadly  agents;  state  sponsors  of  terrorism  have  reportedly developed   CBRN   weapons   suitable   for   terrorist  use;  food  products  have   been  deliberately contaminated,  in  some  cases  causing  human  casualties  and/or  considerable  economic  losses; insurgent  groups  in  various  parts  of  the  world  have  sometimes  used  CBRN  agents  against government forces; and individual assassinations have been carried out by such means. 2. Despite widespread publicity about the threat, however, there have been few actual attempts by  terrorists  to  cause  mass  civilian  casualties  using  CBRN  agents.  Exceptions  have  been  the typhoid poisoning of 750 people (none fatally) by the Rajneesh sect in Oregon, USA in 1984; and the various attempts by the Aum Shinri Kyo in Japan using both chemical and biological agents, the most “successful” of which resulted in 7 dead and 270 injured in Matsumoto, and 12 dead and 5,500 injured in Tokyo. Far more common have been unsubstantiated threats, hoaxes or relatively low-level incidents causing few—if any  —  casualties. 3. There  have  also  been  a  limited  number  of  attacks  on  nuclear  power  facilities  worldwide; numerous unsubstantiated threats to trigger a nuclear explosive device; and at least one reported case of the use of radiological materials—albeit in a very limited manner, where Chechen rebels planted a cesium capsule in a park in Moscow)—by terrorists. 4. However, as information and capabilities spread widely through such means as the Internet, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to distinguish between a mere hoax and the real  thing.  This  raises  a  number  of  difficult  questions  about  the  appropriate  responses  to  such threats,  which  not  only  have  the  potential  to  be  extremely  disruptive  to  normal,  day-to-day activities, but also may afford terrorist individuals and groups a potent instrument against society, even in the absence of a real capability or willingness to carry out an actual attack. 5. Governments and publics alike are viewing with growing concern the potential threat posed by CBRN weapons in the hands of terrorists. The question is, how easy would it really be for an individual terrorist or terrorist group to manufacture or otherwise obtain such weapons? Perhaps even more importantly: How easy would it be for them to deliver such weapons, or disperse such agents, and to what effect? Clearly, the answers vary depending on the type of weapon or agent that one is talking about. 6. Governments at all levels have been prompted to re-consider how ready and able they are to prevent or mitigate the impact of those threats to societies. Many elements can contribute to the minimisation  or  liquidation  of  some  of  these  threats.  Risks  assessment  and  analysis,  fighting proliferation and dissemination of CB agents, and the dismantlement of terrorist networks are all essential  elements  contributing  to  preventing  accidents  and  attacks.  A  prevention  policy  should include  monitoring  and  warning  arrangements  as  well  as  detection  mechanisms  of  toxic  agents. Detection  devices  should  be  able  not  only  to  identify  raw  material  for  potential  bombs,  but  also give the alert as soon as toxic agents are released in the atmosphere, in order to take advantage of the time between exposure of the public and widespread casualties. Governmental authorities, particularly local authorities, are confronted by the need to acquire capabilities to intervene quickly should  radioactive  materials  be  dispersed  in  the  atmosphere.  Here  again,  a  system  for  early, efficient,  and  quick  detection  also  enhances  the  authorities’  capacity  to  respond  not  only  to terrorist attacks, but also to major technological accidents. 7. Following a first report presented in 2003 by Ms Wohlleben (Germany) on “Civil Protection: a general overview” assessing general threats and policy approaches, the Rapporteur Lord Jopling

055 CDS 05 E 2 (UK) decided this year to focus on the available detection mechanism of CNBR potential threats. Additional information regarding latest available devices in this sphere and corresponding fees will be  added  at  a  later  date  to  this report in order to give a more detailed and updated view of the existing detection mechanisms. II. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS:  DETECTIONS MECHANISMS 8. There  have  recently  been  reports  of  new  or  renewed  interest  by  a  number  of  traditional international terrorist groups in obtaining chemical and biological weapons.  These groups include: the  Palestinian  Islamic  Jihad,  Hezbollah,  the  Algerian  Armed  Islamic  Group  (GIA),  Egyptian Islamic  Jihad,  Hamas,  Sikh  and  Chechen  terrorists,  the  Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  (PKK),  the Khmer Rouge, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These reports are usually quite vague, and not all of them have been particularly credible, but the trend is worrisome. Senior US government officials have publicly asserted that the terrorist financier Osama bin Laden has been actively seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons for use against Western targets. The recent apparent resurgence of the Aum Shinri Kyo in Japan is also troubling, given the technical knowledge possessed by some of its remaining followers and the possibility of yet-undiscovered stocks of CB agents or precursors Chemical and Biological Detection Technologies: 9. The   ideal   chemical   or   biological   sensor   would   fulfil   a   host   of   criteria.   It   would   be:   inexpensive; easy to use; rapidly deployable (hand-held); able to detect all dangerous pathogens; able to detect those pathogens in real time; able to detect them from diverse sample types; usable ‘stand-off’ detection; and, most importantly, always correct.   10. The dangers of false positives (detecting a non-existent threat) and false negatives (failing to detect  a  real  threat)  are  obvious.    To  guide  policy-makers  and  to  reassure  a  concerned  public, there must be faith in the equipment used.  Designers must balance the need for sensitivity with the danger of false alarms, with all the consequences they entail.     11. Currently available technologies do not allow for the creation of a perfect sensor.  There are a  number  of  different  technologies  that  have  been  developed  for  the  detection  of  chemical  and biological agents and new innovations are in progress.  They all offer certain advantages and all suffer from flaws.   12. The   US   Counter   proliferation   Program   Review   Committee   concluded   that   ‘technical challenges remain in the areas of biological collection, detection and identification, quantification, sample  processing,  interferent  (i.e.,  false  positive  and  negative  alarms)  and  ambient  biological background rejection, and genetic probe development.  Other challenging areas that still remain today  are  size,  weight,  and  power  reduction  of  detectors;  power  generation  and  consumption; development  of  integrated  biological  and  chemical  detection  systems;  and  the  fusion  of  sensor data with mapping, imagery, and other data for near-real-time display of events. 13. Despite  this,  the  Centre  for  Technology  and  National  Security  Policy  at  the  US  National Defense  University  asserts  that  there  is  no  theoretical  reason  that  the  above  criteria  cannot eventually  be  fulfilled.    This  report  therefore  offers  a  snapshot  of  current  technologies  and  their ability to warn of a chemical or biological weapons attack on a civilian population.

055 CDS 05 E 3 A. BIODETECTION 14. It  is  worth  distinguishing  at  this  point  between  detect-to-warn  and  detect-to-treat  systems.   The former would detect a threat in time to prevent public exposure.  Such real-time detection is currently  unavailable  in  the  field  of  biological  detection  and  the  more  reliable  the  detection instrument  is;  the  longer  it  takes  to  identify  a  defined  threat.    Detect-to-treat  remains  the  more realistic  goal  at  present.    This  would  allow  responders  to  take  advantage  of  the  time  between exposure of the public and widespread casualties. 15. A WHO report concluded that ‘the development of sensitive and rapid methods of detecting and identifying biological agents in the environment will be difficult because of the large number of potential  agents.  Significant  advances  will  have  to  be  made  in  technology  before  such  methods can be made widely accessible, and they may therefore not be available for some time. 16. One of the major concerns of the biological threat is the number of possible toxins that could be maliciously employed.  Experts believe that up to 1,000 toxins could be made from natural or genetic  sources  but  only  13  vaccines  are  currently  available  and  only  in  limited  quantities.  This shortage  of  vaccines  puts  a  greater  emphasis  on  the  need  for  some  kind  of  effective  warning system that can minimise exposure. 17. There are various inequalities in biowarfare between attack and defence, of which the lack of vaccines compared to known toxins is one example.  It is far cheaper and less labour-intensive to create  a  bioweapon  than  to  defend  against  it;  biowarfare  is  a  field  that  favours  the  terrorist. Detection initiatives intend to go some way in redressing this imbalance. 18. The  US  and  Europe  have  both  become  gradually  more  concerned  at  the  bioterror  threat.   Whilst  September  11  was  a  watershed  in  security  assessments,  the  anthrax  attacks  on  the  US postal  system  in  September and October 2001 were an additional wakeup call, leaving 17 dead whilst the perpetrators were never caught. Ultimately, those who survived were the ones who were diagnosed early, underlining the utility of detect-to-treat systems. 19. In response, both sides of the Atlantic have explored means to warn of a biological attack.   This effort has been greatest in the US, where the US BioWatch initiative has increased spending 18-fold since September 11, from $414 million in fiscal year 2001 to $7.6 billion in 2004. 20. Basic information on major bioterrorism agents: Disease Incubation period Type of vaccine Treatment Anthrax not contagious Symptoms can occur within 7 days of infection. Vaccine is protective against invasive disease however, it is primarily given to military personnel and high risk population. Treatment protocols exist for cases of inhalational and cutaneous anthrax Botulism: -Botulism is a muscle- paralyzing disease caused by a toxin made by a bacterium. A single gram of crystalline toxin, evenly dispersed and inhaled, would kill more Ingestion of pre-formed toxin leads to illness few hours to days. With foodborne botulism, symptoms begin within 6 hours to 2 weeks Vaccine availability has been developed by the US Department of Defense If diagnosed early, foodborne and wound botulism can be treated with an antitoxin, which blocks the action of toxin circulating in the blood. This can

055 CDS 05 E 4 than 1 million people, although technical factors would make such dissemination difficult. -not contagious prevent patients from worsening, but recovery still takes many weeks. Plague: -Yersinia pestis used in an aerosol attack could cause cases of the pneumonic form of plague. Contagious: -The bacteria can spread to others who have close contact with them. One to six days after becoming infected with the bacteria, people would develop pneumonic plague. -Currently, no plague vaccine is available -Contamination can be avoided with a treatment to be taken within 7 days of their exposure. Treatment consists of taking antibiotics for at least 7 days. To prevent a high risk of death, antibiotics should be given within 24 hours of the first symptoms. Several types of antibiotics are effective for curing the disease and for preventing it Smallpox: Smallpox is a serious, contagious, and sometimes fatal infectious disease. This incubation period averages about 12 to 14 days but can range from 7 to 17 days.   -Vaccine availability -If given to a person before exposure to smallpox, the vaccine can completely protect them. Vaccination within 3 days after exposure will prevent or greatly lessen the severity of smallpox in most people. Vaccination 4 to 7 days after exposure likely offers some protection from disease or may decrease the severity of disease. There is no specific treatment for smallpox disease, and the only prevention is vaccination. Hemorrhagic fever: -Illness is characterized by abrupt onset of fever, myalgia, and headache. Other signs and symptoms include nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, chest pain, cough, and pharyngitis. -Incubation period of usually 5--10 days -The viruses carried in rodent reservoirs are transmitted when humans have contact -With the exception of yellow fever and Argentine hemorrhagic fever, for which vaccines have been developed, no vaccines exist that can protect against these diseases. Patients receive supportive therapy, but generally speaking, there is no other treatment or established cure for VHFs. Ribavirin, an anti-viral drug, has been effective in treating some individuals with Lassa fever or HFRS. Inhalational tularemia : Tularemia is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known. It requires inoculation or inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to cause disease. Inhalation of F. tularensis causes an abrupt onset of an acute, non-specific febrile illness -Illness beginning 1--14 days after exposure -Release in a densely populated area would be expected to result in an abrupt onset of large numbers of acute, non- specific febrile illness beginning 3–5 days later with pleuropneumonitis developing in a significant proportion of cases during the ensuing days and weeks. In the United States, a live attenuated vaccine derived from a virulent F. tularensis biovar palaearctica (type B) has been used to protect laboratorians routinely working with the bacterium. Until recently, this vaccine was available as an investigational new drug. It is currently under review by the Food and Drug Administration. -Available -In a contained casualty setting, where individual patient management is possible,

055 CDS 05 E 5 Means of Detection: 21. Sensor technology is the most obvious example of biodetection.  The fundamental challenge is that biological agents have different properties and many sensors are pathogen-specific; each test must be tailored to recognise a specific pathogen.  Also, a more deadly pathogen (an agent that causes disease) requires a more sensitive detection system because a smaller dose in the air will be fatal. 22. JASON,  an  independent  scientific  advisory  group  that  provides  consulting  services  to  the U.S.  government  on  matters  of  defence  science  and  technology,  identified  three  broad  types  of biosensors in its 2003 study on biodetection. 23. Environmental Monitoring refers to the continuous automatic monitoring of the environment in  fixed  locations.    They  collect  air  samples  that  are  then  filtered,  concentrated  and  analysed.   Environmental monitors are not equipped for definitive identification of pathogens and in the event of detecting an abnormal presence, further tests are needed.  Although cheap, they are unable to detect a broad range of pathogens.    24. One  such  environmental  monitor  is  the  Autonomous  Pathogen  Detection  System  (APDS) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (within the US Department of Energy).  The APDS  is  stationed  in  one  place  for  continuous  monitoring  and  is  designed  to  work  much  like  a smoke  detector,  but  for  pathogens.  The  system  automatically  samples  the  air  around  the  clock, without human assistance, and sounds an alarm if pathogens are detected.  The current system is configured to test simultaneously for 11 agents and can be expanded to 100 agents. It identifies particles  within  one  hour  and  double-tests  each  sample  to  decrease  the  likelihood  of  false positives and increase the reliability of identification.  A built-in fan pulls in the air, which passes through a glass tube containing water. The water traps any particles in the air, and the resulting fluid is pumped to the next stage for sample preparation and testing, using a technique called the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). PCR is needed to amplify the sample to allow detection of trace amounts of the pathogen, which could nonetheless be deadly. 25. Sample Collection refers to the process of collecting a sample and then analysing it, either on the spot or back at a laboratory.  This is the core process of the BioWatch programme.    Filter paper is often used to collect the data.  The results can be very specific in identifying particularly pathogens  but  this  makes  the  system  inherently  less  able  to  detect  novel  biological  agents.   Sample collection is also a labour-intensive a costly process.   26. Lawrence Livermore’s Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS) is a typical sample collection system.  BASIS collects air samples at defined locations and at specified time intervals  to  help  determine  both  the  time  and  place  of  the  release.    Aerosol  collection  hardware continually  collects,  time-stamps,  and  stores  samples.  A  mobile  field  laboratory  then  analyses DNA from the samples and can identify and characterise a threat organism.  BASIS was deployed in Salt Lake City, Utah, for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games.  BioWatch features elements of the BASIS technology but, instead of a mobile laboratory, uses laboratories that are part of the federal Laboratory Response Network operated by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 27. Rapidly-Deployable Sensors are mobile detectors, often hand-held, which have the obvious benefit  of  being  deployable  to  the  area  of  a  suspected  incident.    However,  they  too  are  often pathogen-specific  and  therefore  unable  to  recognise  a  broad  range  of  agents,  making  them  of diminished utility.  The demands of reduced size and greater mobility obviously impact upon the effectiveness of the machines too. 28. An  example  of  such  a  sensor  is  the  Handheld  Advanced  Nucleic  Acid  Analyzer  (HANAA), developed  at  Lawrence  Livermore.    About  the  size  of  a  brick,  the  system  was  designed  for

055 CDS 05 E 6 emergency response groups, such as fire fighters and police. Each handheld system can test four samples at once, either the same test on four different samples or four different tests on the same sample. HANAA can provide results in less than 30 minutes, compared with the hours to days that regular  laboratory  tests  typically  take,  using  the  PCR  technique,  which  amplifies  agent-specific DNA fragments to a detectable level. 29. Beyond  sensor-based  detection  systems,  which  remain  an  imperfect  science  as  noted above, there are other means of improving a detect-to-treat biodetection architecture.  The Centre for  Technology  and  National  Security  Policy  at  the  US  National  Defense  University  conducted  a ‘Wargame’, simulating a biological attack scenario, and concluded that the most effective means of  rapid  detection  was  through  a  broad,  layered  biodetection  network.    In  other  words,  current technological shortcomings mean that it not sufficient to rely on a single means of detection.  The JASON  study  reached  a  similar  conclusion.    So,  beyond  sensor  technologies,  what  would  that architecture contain? 30. Syndromic  Surveillance  refers to the process of collecting and analysing statistical data on health  trends,  particularly  symptoms  reported  by  people  seeking  care  in  health  care  facilities.  It may also involve sales of particular types of medicine because bioterrorist agents such as anthrax, plague, and smallpox initially present flu-like symptoms and an outbreak could thus be recognised by  increased  sales  in  flu-related  medicines.  By  focusing  on  symptoms  rather  than  confirmed diagnoses, syndromic surveillance aims to detect bioterror events earlier than would be possible with traditional disease surveillance systems.  It is a system in development on both sides of the Atlantic in the US and Britain.  A recent study by RAND’s Center for Domestic and International Health Security assessed the utility of such surveillance.  It recognised the inherent risk of false- positives  and  the  chances  of  environmental  distortions  such  as  flu  season  and  concluded  that, being a relatively untested methodology, health departments should be cautious about investing in costly new syndromic surveillance systems. 31. Beyond syndromic data, a network of data surveillance could also be extended to the areas of  Pharmaceutical   Sales   Data  and  Medical   Claims   Data.  Although  both  face  logistical  and accuracy challenges, they could theoretically be included in this broad architecture of information. 32. Sentinel Organisms, meaning the use of animals and even plants for detection, offer another potential source of information.  A dog, for example, has an olfactory (sense of smell) capacity that is four times larger than that of humans.  In another example, the US Army recently used pigeons in the invasion of Iraq as its first line of detection of chemical and biological agents since they are more sensitive to certain agents than humans.  The potential in this area is broad and studies are currently underway to find a means of incorporating such detection into the overall architecture.  It ranges  from  simple  monitoring  of  veterinary  data  patterns  to  advanced  bioengineering  of  plant cells to indicate the presence of certain agents. B. CHEMICAL DETECTION 33. Chemical  weapons  detection  has  traditionally  been  within  the  military  domain  and  current detection  capabilities  have  largely  arisen  from  that  sector.  Chemical  agents  are  less  difficult  to detect than biological agents.  The ability to detect the presence of even single molecules already exists, but only in sophisticated laboratory environments.  Current detection systems still fall short of the ideal needs for civilian detection purposes, as outlined above.  They are either not sensitive enough, not mobile, or require a trained user.  There are a host of technologies that are used to detect chemical agents.  The following are some of the more widely used examples and none offer a perfect solution. 34. Colorimetric Indicators are at the most basic end of the chemical detection scale.  They are available to first responders and are cheap, fast and simple to use.  They contain an acid–base

055 CDS 05 E 7 indicator that changes colour when exposed to specific agents in liquid form, causing the paper to change  colour.    These  indicators  are  highly  prone  to  false  positives  from  various  everyday substances, even smoke.  They are essentially an early warning system that must be confirmed by further laboratory testing.  The same colorimetric principle is also used in detection tubes, which pump vapour or gas through the tube.  They are agent-specific, requiring a different tube for every agent. 35.     The US military uses M8 and M9 detection paper.  M8 paper is blotted on liquids that arouse suspicion.  It  identifies  agents  by  changing  colour  within  30  seconds of exposure: dark green for vesicants, yellow for nerve agents, and red for blister agents.  M9 paper has adhesive backing that allows  it  to  be  attached  to  clothing  and  equipment.  M9  paper  detects  the  same  agents  as  M8 paper but does not change colour to enable identification. M9 paper tends to react faster than M8 paper  and  can  be  attached  to  vehicles  that  are  entering  areas  filled  with  vapour  to  determine contamination. 36. Ion  Mobility  Spectrometry  is  another  means  of  point  (hand-held)  detection.    It  uses  an electric field to recognise differences in the velocity of ions and has been miniaturised to the point that  it  is  used  in  mobile  detection  without  diminished  resolution.    This  process  is  used  in  many current detection systems, mainly because it is fairly resistant to contamination and false-positives. 37. The US Army’s Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) uses IMS technology and it is now also  available  to  civilian  first  responders.    The  ICAM  detects  vapours  of  chemical  agents  by sensing  molecular  ions  of  specific  mobilities  (time  of  flight)  and  uses  timing  and  microprocessor techniques  to  reject  interferences.  The  monitor  detects  and  discriminates  between  vapours  of nerve  and  mustard  agents.  The  ICAM  is,  however,  vulnerable  to  errors  in  enclosed  spaces  or heavy smoke.  It can also require recalibrating if saturated. 38. Surface  Acoustical  Wave  Detection  is  a  popular  choice  for  first  responders  due  to  the relatively  low  cost.    It  can  also  detect  multiple  agents  simultaneously.    These  SAW  devices use piezoelectric quartz crystals coated in polymers, which absorb certain chemicals.  The limit of this absorption  process  in  turn  limits  the  sensor’s  sensitivity.  Other  molecules  being  inadvertently absorbed can also undermine the process.   39. The MiniCAD mk II is a portable detector that is lightweight, battery operated, and available commercially. It is based on SAW technology, which is deemed to produce fewer false positives than ion mobility spectrometry.  Nonetheless, the Expert Assistance (Equipment Test) Program for the   U.S.   Army   Soldier   and   Biological   Chemical   Command   Program   Director   for   Domestic Preparedness  undertook  an  assessment  of  the  device  and  concluded  that  ‘the  problematic behaviour  observed  throughout  the  evaluation  limits  the  usefulness  of  the  SAW  MiniCAD  as  a viable warning device’. 40. Mass   Spectroscopy,   usually   used   in   conjunction   with   Gas   Chromatography   (GC-MS), represents  the  most  reliable  and  sensitive  means  of  detection  and  is  regarded  as  the  industry standard  method  for  identifying  chemical  agents.    It  involves  breaking  apart  a  molecule  before accelerating  the  charged fragments and bending their paths in a magnetic field. Although highly sensitive  and  able  to  tackle  mixed  samples,  the  technology  is  not  currently  small  enough  to  be incorporated  into  mobile  systems.    It  is  also  expensive  and  requires  sample  preparation  before testing,  which  needs  trained  personnel.    It  is  thus  not  used  in  detection  systems  available  to civilian first responders.  The accuracy of the technology is reflected by the fact that it is the only approved technique for CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) inspection on-site analysis. 41. Infrared Radiation is employed in various chemical agent detectors.  Chemical agents each have  a  unique  infrared  fingerprint  based  on  their  vibrational  wavelength.    Passing  infrared  light through  gases  or  vapours  results  in  specific  wavelengths  of  light  being  absorbed.    Infrared

055 CDS 05 E 8 Spectroscopy  measures  the  quantity  of  light  that  is  absorbed  at  given  wavelengths  in  order  to identify the agent.  Distinguishing these different wavelengths is straightforward in a laboratory but remains difficult to transfer to mobile detectors. 42. The  M21  Remote  Sensing  Chemical  Agent  Alarm  (RSCAAL)  uses  IR  spectroscopy  for stand-off detection.  In other words it can analyse a cloud from a distance (up to 5km), rather than in  close  contact  with  it.      It  continuously  monitors  the  background  spectrum  and  provides comparative analysis if a cloud obscures this background.  The major drawbacks with the M21 unit are cost, size, the needs for trained users and its propensity to be obscured by adverse weather conditions. 43. As well as these oft-used detection techniques, a host of others exist which all have various shortcomings in field or mobile usage. Examples include Flame Photometry, which burns a sample in  a  hydrogen  flame  and  identifies  it  from the resulting emission, or  Photoionisation, which uses ultraviolet light to ionise vapours or gases and then monitors the change in electrical current.   III. RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR THREATS: MECHANISMS FOR DETECTION 44. Terrorist groups armed with radiological weapons are one of the gravest risks our societies face.  Unlike  nuclear  weapons,  radiological  dispersal  devices  (RDD),  or  “dirty  bombs”,  are  not extremely  hard  to  acquire,  transport  or  build.  RDD  are  relatively  easy  to  assemble,  carry  and deliver. Unlike nuclear weapons, a radiological device does not trigger a nuclear reaction. Through a  conventional  explosive,  it  spreads  radioactive  material  contaminating  personnel,  equipment, facilities,  and  terrain.  While  such  weapons  would  bring  about  far  less  damage  than  a  nuclear detonation,  RDDs  have  an  enormous  intimidation  power.  Radiation  emitting  materials  can  be delivered  using  a  variety  of  means:  human  agents,  the  destruction  of  a  nuclear  plant  or  facility containing nuclear material, shipment or remote controlled devices whose explosion disseminates the  radiological  agent,  or  placement  in  facilities  or  water  supplies.  Aircraft,  missiles  and  rockets can also be used as a means of delivery to target military or civilian objectives or to contaminate livestock, fish, and food crops. 45. There  are  only  a  few  radioactive  sources  that  can  be  used  effectively  in  an  RDD.  The greatest  security risk is posed by Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Iridium-192, Strontium-90, Americium- 241, Californium-252, and Plutonium-238. The most typical areas where radiological materials are used  are  hospital  radiation  therapy  (Iodine-125,  Cobalt-60,  Cesium-137),  radiopharmaceuticals (Iodine-131, Iodine-123, Technetium-99, Thalium-201, Xenon-133), nuclear power plants fuel rods (Uranium-235), universities and laboratories. Other common radiological materials are Iridium-192 and Plutonium-239. 46. In the event of a release of radiological material, three types of radiation-induced injury can occur:   external   irradiation,   contamination   with   radioactive   materials,   and   incorporation   of radioactive  material  into  body  cells,  tissues,  or  organs.  More specifically, there are four types of radiation that are emitted: 47. Alpha  Radiation  is  able  to  travel  only  a  short  distance  in  the  air  and  cannot  penetrate  the skin. Materials emitting alpha radiation can harm humans only if inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through  open  wounds.  An  ionization  chamber  such  as  the  CD  V-715  cannot  detect  alpha radiations in the absence of concomitant beta and/or gamma radiation. In addition, instruments are unable  to  detect  alpha  radiation  through  water,  blood,  dust,  or  paper,  as  alpha  radiation  is  not penetrating.  As  a  consequence,  clothing  and  turnout  gear  can  keep  alpha  emitters  off  the  skin. Various instruments are available to detect alpha radiation emitting materials, but special training is  essential  for  making  accurate  measurement.  One  example  is  the  palm  handheld  precision Geiger-mueller meter that detects and measures alpha, beta, gamma and x-ray forms of radiation.

055 CDS 05 E 9 The  unit  is  built  around  a  halogen-quenched  detector  tube.  Such  instruments  are  designed  for emergency  response,  domestic  preparedness,  hazardous  material  safety,  law  enforcement,  and compliance   verification   applications.   This   type   of   instrument   is   critically   important   to   early responders whose task is to determine if a particular area is a nuclear or radiological “hotzone”. Initial responders are thereby enabled to make informed decisions and establish perimeters, and to prepare the ground for the deployment of second tier personnel and more technical equipment for in-depth analysis. 48, Beta Radiation occurs when high-energy electrons are emitted from the nucleus of an atom during  radioactive  decay.  The  skin  or  a  very  thin  sheet  of  metal  can  stop  beta  electrons.  Beta radiation  can  travel  in  air  and  is  moderately  penetrating.  Skin  injury  can  occur  if  beta-emitting materials remain on the skin for a prolonged period of time. It can reach to the germinal layer of the human skin, where new skin cells are produced. If deposited internally, beta contaminants may be harmful. A survey instrument (such as a Geiger counter CD V-700) can detect beta radiation. Some  beta  radiations  (like  carbon-14,  tritium,  and  sulfer-35),  however,  have  poor  penetrating power and can be difficult or impossible to detect. An ionization chamber such as the CD V-715 cannot detect beta radiation. Clothing and turnout gears provide some protection to the skin. 49. Gamma  Radiation  is  high-energy  photons  emitted  from  the  nucleus  of  atoms.  They  easily penetrate  into  body  tissue  and  many  materials,  and  they  are  potentially  lethal.  Thick  layers  of dense materials, such as lead, can protect from gamma ray exposure. Gamma radiation has the ability  to  travel  many  metres  in  the  air  and  to  penetrate  the  human  tissue.  It  quickly  permeates most  materials.  Gamma  rays  represent  the  major  external  hazard,  while  gamma  rays  emitting radioactive materials are both an external and internal hazard for the human body.  Clothing and turnout gear provide little shielding from penetrating radiation. Gamma rays can be detected with survey  instruments,  including  civil  defense  instruments.  A  standard  Geiger  counter  (such  as  the CD  V-700)  can  measure  low  levels  of  radiation,  while  an  ionization chamber is able to measure high levels of gamma rays. Most of the time, gamma radiation is emitted together with alpha and beta  radiation.  Gamma  radiation  will  not  be  detected  by  any  instrument  designed  to  measure exclusively   alpha   radiation   (such   as   an   alpha   scintillation   counter).   The   most   appropriate instruments to measure accumulated exposure to gamma radiation are pocket chamber (pencils) dosimeters, film badges, thermo luminescent, and other types of dosimeters. 50. X-Rays  are  an  invisible  and  highly  penetrating  electromagnetic  radiation  of  much  shorter wavelength (higher frequency) than visible light. As with gamma rays, only thick layers of dense materials can defend from x-rays.   51. The  threat  arising  from  terrorists  trying  to  smuggle  illicit  radioactive  materials  or  a  nuclear fission weapon has forced governments to embark on programmes to detect radiological materials at major points of entry (ports, airports, borders). Detection mechanisms of such substances are still  being  improved  and  much  attention  needs  to  be  concentrated  on  localisation  and  the proliferation of material. The number of orphaned sources (lost, abandoned or stolen radiological sources) has diminished in the past several years, but remains an issue. The physical protection of radiological sources, at medical facilities, food irradiation enterprises, and disposal sites, continues to  raise  concerns  in  some  parts  of  the  world.  Some  countries  are  facing difficulties disposing of these sources: most of the nations' disposal sites will reach full capacity in the next half decade. Without  increased  disposal  capacity,  the  likelihood  that  sources  will  not  be  properly  guarded increases.

055 CDS 05 E 10 A. TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR SUBSTANCES 52. The events of September 11, 2001 have intensified concern that terrorist groups will attempt to steal weapons-useable nuclear material in order to build a nuclear weapon. Although stocks of these  materials—plutonium  and  highly  -enriched  uranium  (HEU)—exist  in  many  countries around the world, the largest inventory in the world is held in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet  Union  (NIS).  Owing  to  economic  and  political  turmoil,  this  material  is  vulnerable  to  theft. Since 1991, there have been numerous reports of the theft of such nuclear material from facilities in the NIS, and a close examination of open source evidence reveals 14 confirmed cases of theft or attempted theft of weapons-useable material from NIS facilities between 1991 and 2001. 53. Multiple instances of profit-motivated nuclear hoaxes have been reported in the media in the past two decades, in which sellers offer weapons-usable or weapons-grade nuclear material and instead deliver some other bogus radioactive, or in some cases, non-radioactive substance. Such scams  increased  when  economic  conditions  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe declined in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The region’s economic decline coupled with weakened security and enforcement mechanisms and a growing interest on the part of both state and non- state  actors  to  illegally  obtain  nuclear  materials  all  created  favorable  conditions  for  nuclear trafficking scams. B. DETECTION AT POINT OF ENTRY 54. Terrorists intending to smuggle radiological materials into target countries aim at exploiting weaknesses of the control mechanisms at ports, terminals, border crossing and airports. Both the UK and the US have embarked on ambitious programmes to install hundreds of detectors at major points of entry. 55. As 90% of all traded goods travels by sea on approximately 72 million sea containers, ports detection mechanisms are of paramount importance. In this respect, national authorities must try to  guarantee  security  without  harming  commerce.  As  100%  inspection  is  not  practical  for  high- volume  ports,  automatic  identification  of  the  container  or  truck  would  reduce  the  impact  of inspections   on   cargos.   There   is   also   the   overall   imperative   to   make   detection   equipment affordable. 56. The main challenge to overcome is to deploy automated equipment able to alert inspectors in  the  presence  of  a  large  volume  of  cargo.  Effective  detection  mechanisms  should  be  able  to identify  radioactive  isotopes  and  the  full  range  of  radiation  types  (alpha,  beta,  gamma,  x-rays). Detectors should identify materials used in a nuclear weapon or RDD, natural sources of radiation, and isotopes commonly used in medicine and industry. 57. The weight of radiological devices can range from 36 to 180 kg. Their high absorption of the fissile material and emission of gamma rays and neutrons would make them detectable. 58. Radiological detection can be active and passive. The verification of explosives and nuclear materials corresponds to active detection, while passive detection utilises radiation portal monitors (RPMs)   to   detect   gamma   rays   and   neutrons   emitted   by   nuclear   weapons   and   radioactive materials.  A  problem  is  posed  by  high-density  shielding  that  might  prevent  passive  detection.  In this  case,  gamma  or  X-ray  radiographic  imaging  would  reinforce  RPMs  in  shielding  detection, particularly of Uranium-235. In containers where gamma ray imaging cannot penetrate, inspection instruments will use high-energy X-rays for secondary detection. To complement RPMs, hand-held isotope  identification  together  with  other  intrusive  inspection  techniques  can  be  utilised  for  more effective  detection.  More  reliable  and  faster  than  manual  inspection  are  non-intrusive  detection methods that allow also for the inspection of a larger number of containers.  In addition, detecting

055 CDS 05 E 11 containers at ports of origin, as demanded by the US’s Container Security Initiative (CSI), would reduce the delays at the ports of destination.   59. One  of  the  most  advanced  detection  mechanisms  is  a  neutron  generator  sensor.  Other sensors can detect long-range alpha-radiation. Some compact detectors are provided with a high- purity germanium crystal to find a radiation source. The identification of the radioactive isotope is made  by  the  interaction  of  photon,  gamma  rays  and  X-rays  with  the  germanium  crystal  that processes the resulting charge. A mechanism similar to that used in mobile phone antennae cools the germanium crystal. 60. Various  gamma  and  neutron  detectors  are  available  commercially.  Their  use  ranges  from crane monitors to cargo monitors and portable search systems for personnel. To reduce the delay of false alarms, provoked for instance by radiation resulting from medical treatment, new gamma spectroscopy detectors are able to identify and distinguish specific radioisotopes. 61. Other  types  of  radiological  detectors  include:  ultrasonic  thickness  gauges  (able  to  detect hollowed-out spaces within cargo containers); infrared systems able to identify hot and cold spots; portable  explosives  detectors,  able  to  identify  plasma’s  signatures  of  nitroglycerin,  ammonium nitrate and other explosives; for personnel with limited technical expertise, user-friendly software is available to guarantee reliable detection and measurement. 62. To reduce delays and costs, cargo containers should be inspected only once, preferably at ports of departure, and then sealed by electronic systems to ensure that they would not be opened en route to their destination. Apart from monitoring ports and other points of entry for the illegal importation of radiation emitting materials, it is also vitally important to monitor the entry of illegal asylum seekers or migrants, some of whom could be potential terrorists. 63. When  the  Science  and  Technology  Committee  visited  the  SAIC  complex  in  San  Diego, California  in  2004,  members  saw  a  demonstration  of  the  SAIC’s  Vehicle  and  Cargo  Inspection Systems (VACIS -$399,000.00 to $724,000.00 and from $1,197,000.00 to $1,197,000.00 for railways and Mercedes systems) that combines gamma ray imaging with radiation scanning and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technology to provide a comprehensive solution to enhance security and productivity at terminal gates, quays, railways and other checkpoint locations. As the container passes through an arch, it is able to detect either the presence of human beings or the existence of suspicious impenetrable structures in which human being have been concealed. Such devices are already in existence in the US and the UK. IV. CONCLUSIONS 64. This paper intends to list the various types of devices, which are already in existence, or in the course of development, to identify CBRN agents at the earliest possible moment. In the event of attempts to import these agents, or in the event of an actual release of CBRN agents, the most urgent  step  is  to  identify  them  so  that  appropriate  measures can be taken to protect the civilian population. 65. In an ideal world, one might wish for a complete range of devices to be held ready for use in heavily  populated  areas.  This  would  be  massively  expensive  as  the  approximate  costing  in  this paper demonstrated. But in the event of an actual CBRN attack, it is almost certain that current capabilities would be deficient, leading to strong criticisms of both national and local government by politicians, media and public opinion. So the more that can be done to prepare an early warning system, before a serious terrorist attack, the less will be the opportunities for criticism afterwards. 66. It  would  clearly  be  foolish  for  us  publicly  to  seek  to  identify  what  measures  have  already been  taken,  thus,  by  implication,  drawing  attention  to  the  gaps.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  this

055 CDS 05 E 12 paper  is  to  highlight  what  could  be  done  in  advance  to  protect  the  civilian  population.  This  will hopefully encourage politicians to enquire what preparation have already been made in their own countries and thereafter to urge their governments at national and local levels to do as much as is financially feasible to fill the gaps. Our civilian population are entitled to expect no less of us.

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