CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY 054 CDSDG 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE MINORITIES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: FACTOR OF INSTABILITY? DRAFT REPORT BERT MIDDEL (NETHERLANDS) RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 19 April 2005 * Until  this  document  has  been  approved  by  the  Committee  on  the  Civil  Dimension  of Security, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

054 CDSDG 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. TRANS-NATIONAL MINORITIES.......................................................................................... 1 II. POTENTIAL SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS............................................................................ 2 A. Javakheti (Georgia) ...................................................................................................... 2 B. Kvemo-Kartli (Georgia) ................................................................................................. 2 III. ONGOING SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS .............................................................................. 3 A. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia)......................................................................... 3 B. Nagorno Karabakh(Azerbaijan) .................................................................................... 5 IV. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ..................................................................................................... 6 A. Religion in Public Life ................................................................................................... 6 B. Non-traditional Religious Groups .................................................................................. 7 C. Islamist Groups............................................................................................................. 8 V. ETHNIC MINORITIES ........................................................................................................... 8 A. Meskhetian Turks (Georgia) ......................................................................................... 9 B. Lezgins (Azerbaijan) ................................................................................................... 10 DOCUMENTS OF REFERENCE…………………………………………………………………………11

054 CDSDG 05 E 1 1. Since they gained their independence from the Soviet Union, powerful movements towards depopulation  and  ethnic  conflict  have  led  to  increasing  mono-ethnicity  in  states  of  the  South Caucasus.    Having  lost  the  overarching  protection  of  the  Soviet  central  government—which guaranteed minority participation in public life and educational opportunities—and largely   escaped the attention of the international community, minorities seem to be the net losers in the changes of the independence period. Demographic trends, 1989 – 2004 Population 1989 2004 Current growth rate Armenia 3.304,353 2,991,360 -0.32% Azerbaijan 7,021,200 7,868,385 0.52% Georgia 5.5 million 4,693,892,   including   South   Ossetia (est. pop. 160,000) and Abkhazia (est. pop. 70,000) -0.36% Source: 2004 CIA Factbook, Eurasianet.org, all are official datas, see doc of reference in appendix 2. This  report  will  examine  the  condition  of  minorities  in  the  Caucasus  region,  surveying  the potential  for  conflict  and  instability  emanating  from  their  interactions  with  majority  groups  and neighboring states.  This analysis will be based on the assumption that minorities in the Caucasus can  be  loosely  categorized  as  religious,  ethnic,  or  transnational  in  character  based  on  bases  of their  shared  identity  or  condition.    Where  these  groups  overlap,  as  they  often  do,  they  are classified  according  to  the  attribute  most  relevant  to  the  instability—past,  present  or  potential  — arising as a result of their interactions with the majority group.  Thus, while diaspora populations often share both a common religion and ethnicity, they are identified in this report as transnational minorities by virtue of the fact that they identify with and/or have the sympathy and support of the neighbouring state, engendering the possibility of inter-state conflict.   3. Emigration from the three South Caucasus states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - has been  motivated  both  by  war  and  ethnic  hostilities  as  well  as  by  falling  living  standards  and economic malaise.  Minority populations are most likely to emigrate. As mass emigration gives rise to more and more mono-ethnic communities and regions, the status quo has increasingly become “balkanization” rather than peaceful co -existence, with political culture is increasingly characterized by  insularity  and  exclusive  ethnic  nationalism  that  provides  for  little  of  tolerance  by  majority populations of minorities.  In a region that once hosted substantial ethnic and religious diversity, today  the  often-strained  interactions  between  the  region’s  religious,  ethnic,  and  trans-national minority groups and the majorities they live among threatens to imbalance the region’s precarious stability.   I. TRANS-NATIONAL MINORITIES 4. As mentioned in the introduction, this report classifies diaspora populations that identify with and/or have the sympathy and support of the neighbouring state as Trans-National Minorities.  As such, it analyses the interaction between diaspora populations - and, when appropriate, the states that support them - and the majority population of the state in which the territory they occupy from the standpoint of the degree to which these relations could produce an inter-state conflict.   5. The   separatist   movements   that   encourage   the   insularity,   regional   concentration,   and eventual  claim  to  independence  of  these  diasporas  can be divided into two categories: potential and ongoing.

054 CDSDG 05 E 2 II. POTENTIAL SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS A. JAVAKHETI (GEORGIA) 6. Tension  between  Georgia  proper  and  the  Armenian  diaspora  in  Javakheti—where  the latter makes up 95 percent of the population—have increased in recent years, a  s diaspora groups increasingly raise the issue of autonomy an anti-Armenian sentiment and xenophobic attitudes in Georgia continues to rise. 7. Historical and cultural factors have combined to create a sense of insularity, exclusive ethnic identity  and  suspicion  of  outsiders  among  the  Armenian  minority  in  Georgia.    All  of  these tendencies are reinforced by this population’s nearly homogeneous ethnic composition, generally lacking Georgian language skills and poor communications with the rest of the country (see doc of reference in appendix).  Today, the region remains politically, economically and culturally isolated from the capital.  There are strong feelings of mistrust for the central government, which does not exercise effective influence in Javakheti. 8. The  Georgian  authorities  have  also  cited  opposition  from  the  Armenian  population  as  a complicating factor in the repatriation of the Meskhetians to the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, where they lived before being deported in 1944.  While such perceptions among Armenians are indeed widespread, only 12 of the 220 villages that Meskhetians were originally deported from are located in Armenian-populated territory, while 86 villages are deserted (see doc of reference in appendix). 9. As  a  result,  some  observers  have  speculated  that  the  Javakheti  region  may  be  the  “most crucial  single  region  in  the  South  Caucasus  today.”    This  assessment  is  based  on  the  relatively high tensions in the area, its isolation from the rest of Georgia, and the devastating implications that a conflict there could have both for Georgia’s statehood and for regional peace and stability. In the worst-case scenario, observers say, potential armed conflict between Georgian and ethnic Armenian groups in Javakheti could be the starting point for a general South Caucasian war (see doc of reference in appendix). 10. Very recently, the leaders of United Javakheti, an Armenian public organization active in the Javakheti region, rallied thousands of people to protest the socio-economic hardships experienced by the Armenian community there. Thousands of Armenians—estimates range widely, from 3, 000 –  9,000—joined  the  demonstration,  which  went  ahead  as  planned  in  spite  of  attempts  by  the Georgian  police  to  prevent  it.    Protesters’  demands  included  a  stop  to  the  withdrawal  of  the Russian military base there (based on the damage foreseen to the local economy and the need for protection against a Turkish invasion like the one that occurred after WWI); the recognition by the Georgian  Parliament  of  the  Armenian  Genocide  of  1915-1923;  and  the  ratification  of  a  law protecting the rights of national minorities in Georgia (see doc of reference in appendix). B. KVEMO-KARTLI (GEORGIA) 11. According  to  the  Soviet  census  taken  in  1989,  approximately  300,000  Azeris  lived  in Georgia.  While the OSCE estimates that as many as 50,000 Azeris have emigrated since then— due  either  to  economic  difficulties  or  social  conditions—birth  rates  remain  high.    Estimates  of Georgia’s current Azeri population range between 250,000 and 500,000, the majority of which live in  the  south-western  Kvemo  Kartli  region,  where  they  account  for  nearly  half  of  the  population. Some 18,000 also live in Tbilisi.  (See doc of reference in appendix ) . 12. In 2004, tensions between Georgia’s Azeri minority and the state began rising after Georgian security forces raided Azeri border villages in Kvemo Kartli and arrested a number of residents in

054 CDSDG 05 E 3 connection  with  a  crackdown  cross-border  smuggling.  Following  these  incidents,  Baku-based newspapers put forth allegations of extortion, arbitrary detentions, and other forms of harassment against Azeri community leaders by their Georgian authorities. On May 25, 2004, over 400 ethnic Azeris gathered to protest what they claim is an ongoing campaign of repression by Kvemo-Kartli’s governor, Soso Mazmishvili, a member of Saakashvili’s ruling National Movement bloc (see doc of reference in appendix). 13. Governor Mazmishvili has denied any wrongdoing, and told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that such accusations are unfounded.  "All these reports about alleged violations of ethnic Azeris' rights  are  out of place. What [these people in Baku] say or write is sheer provocation,” he said. “Neither I nor any other Georgian has had any conflict [with ethnic Azeris]. There can be no talk of rights violations against [Georgia's] Azeris.”(see doc of reference in appendix) III. ONGOING SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS 14. In none of the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus do the separatist powers (Abkhaz, Ossetian or Karabakh) exhibit a discernible desire to remain in a common state with Georgia or Azerbaijan. It is difficult to convince their leadership and populations that anything might be gained by this, given the economic and social turmoil as well as poverty in these regions. The common perception is that, if incorporated back into their original states, the separatists would have much to lose in particular their security and their dominant political position. 15. In this way, the conflicts have become “frozen,” but not solved: while Georgia and Azerbaijan both seem unlikely to reconcile themselves to the loss of these territories, neither has proven able to  re-incorporate  them.  It  is  likely  the  status  quo  will  continue,  but  this  carries  its  own  dangers. First, ongoing small-scale violence in the border zones may escalate into serious fighting. Second, ongoing processes of political transition in both countries may bring unresolved conflicts back into focus  to  be  exploited  by  the  politically  ambitious.  Third,  the  persistence  of  local  conflicts  largely hampers the development of regional co-operations. A. ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA (GEORGIA) 16. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian-oriented separatists have fought for secession from Georgia.    While  observers  indicate  that  the  issue  of  South  Ossetia  rests  largely  on  economic concerns,  however  (The   Economist  has  suggested  that  enclave  might  be  described  as  “a smuggling racket with a patch of land attached”  -see doc of reference in appendix) it is generally agreed that the situation in Abkhazia is more complex. 17. At the time of the last Soviet census in 1989, Abkhazia had a population of about 500,000, of which only 17% were ethnic Abkhaz. At that time, 48% of the region’s population were Georgians (principally  Mingrelians),    with  the  rest  made  up  by  Armenians  and  Russians,  both  representing around 15% of the population (OSCE background information, 2004). 18. In  1993,  a  major  war  led  the  province  to  declare  its  independance  from  Georgia,  during which virtually the entire Georgian population—about 250,000 people, or 46% of Abkhazia’s total population—were  displaced  in  what  was alleged to be a campaign of ethnic cleansing.  While a ceacefire  agreement  was  signed  in  1994  and  a  new  constitution  adopted  the  same  year,  the conflict has not been formally resolved and the breakaway republic’s sovereignty is not recognized either by Tbilisi or by the international community.   19. The ceasefire line is patrolled by Russian troops under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent  States  Peacekeeping  Forces  (CISPRF)  as  agreed  at  the  Moscow  Treaty  of  1994. The United Nations (UN) assumed the mediating in the conflict in Abkhazia and a UN Observer

054 CDSDG 05 E 4 Mission   in   Georgia   (UNOMIG)   monitors   the   border   area.      Both   UN   staff   and   Russian peacekeepers have been killed in attacks and ambushes by Guerrilla troops. 20. Open hostilities broke out twice in the border region of Gali, in May 1998 and October 2001, when  Chechen  fighters  and  Georgian  paramilitaries  launched  an  offensive.  Abkhazia  quickly mobilised and fought back, forcing the attackers to flee (see doc of ref in appendix). In autumn of 2002, both sides were on the brink of confrontation following military activity in Kodori valley, partly controlled  by  Georgian  and  partly  by  the  Abkhaz  side.  Since  then, de-escalation took place, but tensions run high. 21. In  past  years,  Abkhazia  has  achieved  increasing  de-facto  independence  from  Georgia.   Abkhaz  leadership  proclaimed  formal  independence  in  November  1999,  following  a  referendum.   Russia’s introduction of a visa regime for Georgian citizens in 2000—with the exemption of those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—has further encouraged the incorporation of these territories into Russia’s  economic  and  social  space.    In  2001,  the  breakaway  republic—which  had    already adopted the Russian Rouble as its main currency and was almost totally reliant on Moscow for its economic   survival—expressed   the   desire   to   apply   for   ‘Associate   Status’   with   the   Russian Federation. 22. By   2002,   70%   of   Abkhazians   were   estimated   to   have   taken   on   Russian   citizenship.   Abkhazians  cited  a  host  of  reasons  for  this  decision,  including  the  desire  to  receive  a  Russian pension  –  worth  around  fifty  times  more  than  one  in  Abkhazia  –  to  being  able  to  travel  abroad (because  the  republic’s  sovereignty  is  not  internationally  recognised,  Abkhazian  “citizens”  are considered   stateless   by   the   international   community).      As   Abkhazian   “Prime   Minister”  Anri Djergenia  summarized,  Russian  citizenship  means  protection:  “the  more  Russian  citizens  live  in Abkhazia,” he said, “the greater the guarantee that Georgia will not begin a new war.”   23. Finally,  bitterness  from  war  with  Georgia  has  prevented  others  from  assuming  Georgian citizenship.    "I  would  rather  die  of  hunger  than  take  a  Georgian  passport,”  said  one  man  who fought in the Georgia-Abkhazia war. “That would be a betrayal of the memory of my brother, who died in the war." (See doc of ref in appendix). 24. In  concert  with  such  statements,  Abkhaz  leaders  have  repeatedly  asserted  that  they  must never  again  allow  themselves  to  become  a  minority,  categorically  excluding  the  return  of  all Georgian  IDPs.    As  in  Georgia  proper,  access  to  political  power  for  minorities  in  Abkhazia  is limited.  Abkhaz  are  dominant  in  both  the  political  and  business  arenas.  While  he  situation  of minorities  in  Abkhazia  is  far  from  ideal,  inter-ethnic  relations  between  the  region’s  groups  are generally stable, with the notable exception of the Georgians. 25. In an address on May 2004, Georgian President Saakashvili stressed that reunification with Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be a priority of his government. Little progress has been made, however,  in  bilateral  negotiations  on  the  future  political  status  of  Abkhazia  or  the  return  of Georgian  IDPs,  whose  numbers  are  estimated  at  around  250,000  by  the  UNHRC.    Restoring Georgian  sovereignty  over  South  Ossetia  and  Abkhazia,  it  seems,  would  require  significantly improved  relations  between  Tbilisi  and  Moscow.    Given  President  Saakashvili’s  distrust  of  his larger  neighbour’s  intentions,  however,  this  seems  unlikely.    He  has  quipped  that  Russia’s surported efforts at peacekeeping in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would more accurately be called “piece -keeping.”  For  some  Russians,  he  says,  these  breakaway  republics  represent  “the  last bastion  of  the  fight  for  the  empire.”  (See  articles  from  “the  economist”  and  other  docs  of  ref  in appendix).  In a comment not explicity—  but almost certainly—referring to Russia during his   annual state of the nation speech to parliament on February 10 of this year, Saakashvili said that Georgia is "a country that has to reclaim the most attractive part of its territory and which faces… perhaps not the strongest but certainly the most aggressive… forces in the world."

054 CDSDG 05 E 5 26. In line with such suspicions, many speculated about Russian involvement in the recent death of  Georgian  Prime  Minister  Zurab  Zhvania.    After  investigations,  however,  the  Associated  Press detected "no sign of foul play" and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation ruled out murder as the cause of death.   27. In  elections  on  January  12,  Abkhazians  chose  Bagapsh  as  their  president  after  months  of controversy  and  stalemate  following  what  analysts  have  called  a  “barely  concealed  attempt  by Moscow  to  block  the  outcome  of  an  earlier  presidential  election.”    The  previous  election,  which took  place  on  October  3,  2004,  had  also  declared  Sergei  Bagapsh  the  winner.    The  January elections provided for a system of power sharing whereby Khajimba—Bagapsh’s main contender in  October  elections,  generally  considered  to  have  been  favoured  by  Russia—is  charged  with coordinating the region’s foreign, defence and security policies. 28. Bagapsh’s  election  has  changed  little  in  relations  between  Georgia  and  its  breakaway republics: Saakashvili’s offers of broader autonomy in exchange for central control of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to be rejected. B. NAGORNO KARABAKH (AZERBAIJAN) 29. The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh—which, in Soviet times, was an autonomous province with predominantly  ethnic  Armenian  composition—  dates   –for  the  most  recent  part-  back  from  1988. Conflict   erupted   over   Armenian   perceptions   of   ethnic   discrimination   and   the   Azerbaijani government’s denial of cultural rights. For more information see this Committees’ general report in 2004 on “Stability in the South Caucasus”. 30. As  Minority  Rights  International  reports,  “the  desire  for  the  region  to  be  transferred  from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction within broader USSR federal arrangements led to escalation of tensions,  ethnic  conflict  and,  subsequently,  a  war  between  the  two  states  when  they  acquired independence  in  1991…  The  escalation  of  inter   -ethnic  tensions  led  to  the  expulsion  of  185,000 Azeris and 11,000 Muslim Kurds from Armenia in 1988. A similar sequence of events in 1990 led to  over  300,000  Armenians  fleeing  Azerbaijan.  Fighting  initially  erupted  in  Karabakh  and  47,000 Karabakh Azeris were forced to flee in 1991. In 1991 Karabakh proclaimed independence rather than unification with Armenia.” 31. This “frozen” conflict’s lasting potential for regional destabilization lies in the fact that, while Armenia   considers   the   conflict   over,   Azerbaijan   does   not.   Karabakh   peace   talks   between Armenian  and  Azeri  presidents  gained  momentum  in  early  2001,  but  have  globally  stalled  since then. The two leaders, while close on many issues, could not make a final agreement. The major obstacle remains entrenched public opinion: many on both sides suspect that their president may betray the ‘national cause’ and give up ‘their’ territory to the enemy. 32. While the official positions of the two presidents seem to be ‘ahead of their populations’ in their  understanding  of  the  need  for  compromise,  both  governments  have  pursued  policies  that complicate the situation.  Azerbaijan hosts over 760,000 IDPs and refugees displaced as a result of  the  conflict.  The  government  tends  to  keep  them  in  limbo  promising  return.  Some  younger people migrated to Russia for work, but many continue to live in tented accommodation. 33. Rather  counterproductive  have  been  the  allegations  on  the  Armenian  government’s  policy encouraging  Armenian  resettlement  in  areas  held  by  the  Armenian  forces  around  Karabakh (‘occupied  territories’  or  ‘security  zone’),  which  enjoy  relative  security.  Settlers  receive  state support in renovation of houses, do not pay taxes and much-reduced rates for utilities, while the authorities  try  to  build  physical  and  social  infrastructure.  As  Anna  Mateeva  warns  in  a  report submitted  to  the  UN  Working  Group  on  Minorities,  while  the  settler  population  is  currently  small (between 20,000 to 28,000, according to local authorities) “an Israel -type scenario can be easily

054 CDSDG 05 E 6 envisaged if this process continues, making it even more difficult to reach a ‘peace for territories’ settlement.” 34. Whether this “frozen” conflict will be revived by enthusiasm for war is difficult to determine.   While Azerbaijan does not exhibit a militant culture, but some observers believe that militancy may be on the rise, fed by frustration with the lack of progress in the peace process. 35. After  meeting  with  Azeri  and  Armenian  officials  in  April  2005,  OSCE  Chairman-in-Office Dimitrij  Rupel  urged  both  sides  to  continue  attempts  to  reach  a  lasting  solution  to  the  conflict.   Speaking in April of this year, he called for the stabilization of the situation along the frontlines and said  that,  "to  defuse  the  present  tension  and  start  developing  confidence  between  the  sides, ceasefire violations must stop."  He did not comment on Armenia’s settlement policy. IV. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 36. The role of religion in the Caucasus has increased in prominence in post-Soviet times.  For many, it provided not only a pillar of national identity, but also spiritual guidance and psychological comfort at a time which for many been rife with turmoil and hardship. Socially, it serves to assert and distinguish group identity, and it sometimes used as a political weapon. Armenia Armenian Apostolic 94%, other Christian 4%, Yezidi (Zoroastrian/animist) 2% Azerbaijan Shia  Muslim  93.4%,  Russian  Orthodox  2.5%,  Armenian  Orthodox  2.3%,  other 1.8% (1995 est.) Georgia Georgian Orthodox 65%, Sunni Muslim 11%, Russian Orthodox 10%, Armenian Apostolic 8%, unknown 6% Source: 2004 CIA Factbook 37. The majority of Armenians (98%) and Georgians (83%) are Christian, whereas most Azeris (94%) are Shi’a Muslims. There are Zoroastrian believers in Azerbaijan as well as Armenia, and all three states have tiny groups of practicing Jews.   A. RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 38. In  all  three  states,  constitutional  provisions  enshrine  a  theoretical  separation  between church and state. In practice, this separation does not always hold.  In Armenia, the government grants  special  status  to  the  Armenian  Apostolic  Church  as  the  national  church  of  Armenia,  and requires all religious bodies to register with the state, although its constitution technically provides for  a  separation  between  religion  and  government.  Azerbaijan—which  has  adopted  a  Turkish secular model of statehood since independence—has increased its monitoring of religion after the creation of a State Committee on Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA).   39. The  most  striking  illustration  of  the  state  exercising  control  over  religion  in  Azerbaijan  has been  the  case  Imam  Ilgar  Ibrahimoglu,  the  head  of  the  Center for the Protection of Conscience and Religious Freedom, and a government critic.  Having been tried for alleged participation in the post-election  violence,  he  was  found  him  guilty  and  sentenced  to  five  years  in  prison  despite serious  allegations  that  the  charges  were  falsified.  While  Ibrahimoglu  was  in  custody,  a  court ordered  that  the  Juma  Mosque  community—which  Ibrahimoglu  had  led  —to  be  evicted  from  the mosque  it  had  used  since  1992.  Worshippers  were  forcefully  evicted  from  the  mosque  in  June 2004.  In  the  following  month,  authorities  prevented  the  community  from  meeting  at  a  private house,  raiding  the  premises  and  temporarily  detaining  all  twenty-six  members  present  (source Human Right Watch).

054 CDSDG 05 E 7 40. Authorities based their actions on allegations of Ibrahimoglu’s and the community's political activities,  whereby  Azeri  law  prohibits  a  religious  organization  from  directly  involving  itself  in political activities. The Juma Mosque congregation, which registered with the Ministry of Justice in 1993,  has  refused  to re-register with SCWRA, citing concerns that the new process might allow the Government to interfere with its practices. B. NON-TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS 41. In  general,  however,  states  tend  to  respect  the  existence  and  practices  of  minorities  who practice other traditional creeds—  in Azerbaijan, the Russian Orthodox Church is free to function, while Yezidi Kurds in Armenia – whose religion incorporates elements of sun worship, Christianity and Zoroastrianism – and Muslim groups (such as Azeris and Chechens) in Georgia are also free to practice their religion.   42. Non-traditional  religious  minorities,  however,  have  been  subject  to  systematic  harassment and even imprisonment in all three countries.  In Shevadnadze’s Georgia, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists  and  Pentecostalists  suffered  hate  speech  from  violent  attacks  by  right-wing  Orthodox Christian  vigilantes.    Such  attacks  occurred  with  the  covert  support  or  even  cooperation  of  the local authorities and the police, consequently became more frequent and pervasive. As Amnesty International reports, minorities in Georgia “continued to face harassment, intimidation and violent attacks by supporters of the Georgian Orthodox Church” throughout 2003, while “police failed to provide  adequate  protection  for  those  targeted.”    While  incidents  of  intimidation  and  violence against   religious   minorities   were   reported   by   Human   Rights   Watch   in   2004,   after   Mikheil Saakashvili  took  over  as  president,  the  numbers  were  significantly  lower  than  previous  years, marking an improvement in the country’s environment for freedom of religion. 43. Persecution  of  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  is  also  a  problem  in  Armenia,  where  it  is  linked  to conscription  and  the  lack  of  a  law  on  alternative  military  service.  By  December  2003,  prison sentences  for  conscientious  objection  had  been  imposed  on  at  least  27  men—all  Jehovah’s Witnesses—while  five  more  had  been  arrested  and  were  awaiting  trial,  Amnesty  International reported. 44. There  was  limited  improvement  for  religious  freedom  in  2004:  despite  the  authorities’ promises  to  release  all  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  imprisoned  for  refusing  to  perform  military  service, the  courts  continue  to  impose  fresh  prison  terms.  As  of  September  of  that  year,  the  Armenian Helsinki Association reported that eight Jehovah’s Witnesses were serving prison terms for their refusal to perform military service, and a further eight, five of whom were in custody, were awaiting trial  for  the  same  offences.  In  many  instances,  such  groups  have  enjoyed  protection  only  as  a result of pressure from the international community.   45. While  Azerbaijan  also  experienced  problems  with  tolerance  of  non-traditional  religious groups in the past, the situation seems to have improved after a spate of attacks on evangelical Christians  in  1999,  when  President  Aliev  made  a  statement  committing  the  country  to  greater religious  freedom.  This  prompted  the  authorities’  registration  of  the  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  in December 1999. 46. In  May  2002,  Pope  John  Paul  II  travelled  to  Azerbaijan  to  plead  for  religious  tolerance around the globe and an end to violence in the name of God.   Papal spokesman Navarro-Valls said  the  purpose  of  the  Pope’s  visit  to  Baku  was  “to  nurture  a  small  Catholic  community,  to recognise  a  people  who  suffered  under  communism,  to  build  more  ecumenical  bridges  with  an Orthodox community, and to respond to the hospitality of Muslim hosts.” 47. Finally,  although  there  are  no  state-sponsored  policies  to  expel  them,  Russian  Christian minorities such as Dukhobors and Molokans, are reported to be under increasing local pressure to

054 CDSDG 05 E 8 emigrate.  Both  groups—which  fled  religious  persecution  in  Tsarist  Russia  and  settled  in  remote areas  of  the  Caucasus—have  lodged  complaints  are  that  some  local  groups  move  into  their villages, harassing women and children, while the police do not act. C.  ISLAMIST GROUPS 48. In  Azerbaijan,  both  authorities  and  citizens—most  of  whom  are  Muslims  —have  become increasingly  concerned  about  the  rise  of  radical  Islam  among  the  North  Caucasian  groups,  as Islamic movements from Chechnya and Dagestan have begun to spill over into Azerbaijan. As of 2002, about 20,000 Chechens who escaped the fighting in Chechnya were estimated to be living in  Azerbaijan.  The  authorities  do  not  recognize  their  presence,  either  by  registering  them  as refugees or by treating them as illegal migrants.  Some observers believe the Chechens’ presence might encourages the spread of a militant mood. 49. Similar problems have been previously observed in the Pankissi Valley in Georgia.  Radical Islam,  or  Wahhabism,  started  to  penetrate  Pankissi  during  the  first  war  in  Chechnya  when  Kist volunteers came into contact with Islamic fighters and took root as the second war in Chechnya progressed. The valley, which is populated by Kists (8,000 people or 65 %), Georgians (24 %) and Ossetians (11%) is prone to not only to interethnic tensions but also Interconfessional friction, as Kists  are  traditionally  Sunni  Muslims,  while  their  neighbours  in  the  surrounding  area  tend  to  be Christian. 50. As Anna Matveeva summarizes, the security situation in Pankissi is one of the worst in the Caucasus.   The second Russian war in Chechnya led to refugee flows into Pankissi, many hosted by the Kists, with whom they share close ethnic ties. Russia, for its part, has claimed that Chechen and  international  terrorists  penetrated  the  Pankissi  valley  disguised  as  refugees,  and  that  the valley serves as a sanctuary for fighters and a source of arms and ammunition. Georgia denied these  allegations  until  the  US  State  Department  articulated  similar  concerns.  In  August  2002 Russian warplanes bombed the valley, trying to hit bases of Chechen and Islamist fighters. V. ETHNIC MINORITIES 51. Shortly after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, a number of ethnic clashes in the South Caucasus region led to damaging civil strife and huge waves of forced migration.  Following this turmoil, the governments of the region have taken pains to smooth inter-ethnic relations.  They have  succeeded—both  due  to  their  own  efforts  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that  mass  emigration  has meant   that   substantial   ethnic  and  religious  diversity  has  given  way  to  largely  mono-ethnic communities and regions—insofar as underlying tensions   have not led to full-scale war. Armenia Armenian 98%, Yezidi Kurd 1.8% note: as of the end of 1993, virtually all Azeris had emigrated from Armenia Sources: Minority Rights Group International, Kurdish Human Rights Project Azerbaijan Azeri 91%, Lezgins (2.2%), Avars (0.6%) other North Caucasians and Russians (1.8%) note: Armenians are concentrated separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region Source: Minority Rights Group International Georgia Georgian  70.1%,  Armenian  8.1%,  Russian  6.3%,  Azeri  5.7%,  Ossetian  3%, Abkhaz 1.8%, other 5% Source: 2004 CIA Factbook

054 CDSDG 05 E 9 52. Armenia is the only state in the Caucasus, which is almost mono-ethnic: according to CIA Fact  Book  an  estimated  98%  of  the  population  is  ethnic  Armenian,  up  from  93%  in  1989.  The trend   towards   mono-ethnicity   in   Armenia   was   spurred   both   by   the   Karabakh   conflict   with neighbouring  Azerbaijan,  which  led  to  expulsion  of  Azeris  and  Muslim  Kurds,  and  economic hardship, which prompted the emigration of many Russians. The largest minority group, the Yezidi Kurds, is often excluded from policymaking and opportunities to promote their identity. 53. Of Georgia’s behaviour vis-à- vis ethnic minorities, the Minority Rights Group reports that the country’s  political  culture  is  “characterized  by  an  exclusive  ethnic  nationalism  so  profound  that minorities  are  not  accepted  as  fully-fledged  citizens  of  the  country.  Nationalism  continues  to project a climate of ‘Georgia for Georgians’ where minorities are expected to feel privileged that they are allowed to reside on the territory of the Georgian state.   Considerable passion surrounds the issue of whether or not minorities can constitute a legitimate part of the nation, or a group of people  defined  as  Georgians  by  culture  and  language  should  have  a  pride  of  place.  As  the  UN Office  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  noticed  in  a  report,  this  dilemma  remains unresolved, projecting tension and potential conflict.” 54. As a result, although Georgia remains the most multiethnic country of the South Caucasus, it has so experienced significant difficulties in creating policies to successfully support its diversity.   Senior government posts tend to be occupied by ethnic Georgians, and there is a firm perception of  ethnic  discrimination  in  personnel  appointments,  especially  in  law  enforcement  agencies. Because the government is too weak to pursue a coherent assimilatory or centralizing approach, however, some minorities managed to achieve de facto self-rule. 55. In its minority areas, Georgia has largely left intact the educational provisions inherited from the Soviet era, including primary and secondary education in the minority languages.  There has, however,  been  no  coordinated  effort  by  the  state  to  organize  Georgian  language  courses  for minorities.  Because  new  needs  of  civil  integration  though  language  have  not  been  adequately addressed, minorities’ isolation from public and political life is increasing.  In particular, they find it difficult to access the Georgian state, as federal laws are published solely in Georgian (if officialy translations are produced, they are done so into English) and exams for civil servants are taken in Georgian.  Because  there  is  no  state  support  for  Georgian  or  language  training,  the  younger generations  tend  to  speak  no  language  other  than  their  own.  If  this  situation  continues,  the minorities risk being soon unable to communicate with the rest of the population.   56. Political representation is also an issue, both on national and local levels. Armenians (who constitute   approximately   5.7%   of   Georgia’s   population)   have   only   six   MPs,   while   Azeris (representing  8.1%  of  the  total  Georgian  population)  have  only  four  MPs  in  the  235  members Georgian Parliament. As not all of these MPs perfectly understand Georgian, it is unclear how they participate  in  the  parliamentary  legislative  work.    Also  problematic  has  been  the  government’s practice  of  appointing  judges  and  administrators  who  speak  only Georgian in minority-populated areas.  Locals complain that this system leads to unfair treatment and court decisions. A. MESKHETIAN TURKS (GEORGIA) 57. Having been deported to Central Asia from Samtskhe-Javakheti in what is now Georgia in 1944,  and  survived  pogroms  directed  against  them  in  Uzbekistan  1989,  Meskhetians  were resettled in Azerbaijan, the Ukraine, and in Russia. According to the last Soviet census of 1989, there  were  207,500  living  in  the  USSR.    Current  estimates  place  the  Meskhetian  population between 270,000 and 320,000. 58. Together with the UNHCR, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) led efforts to move  Meskhetians  back  to  Georgia  during  the  1990s.  As  a  condition  for  joining  the  Council  of Europe (CoE) in 1999, Georgia committed itself to repatriate the Meskhetians over a twelve-year

054 CDSDG 05 E 10 period. Due to a history of ethnic clashes with Georgians and Armenians in the period prior to their deportation, Meskhetian repatriation is met with overwhelming local resentment, including threats to resist the return by force.  Both regional governments and the national media sympathize with citizens  in  on  the  issue,  and  news  coverage  similarly  echoes  such  sentiments,  claiming  that repatriation should never be allowed even if the withdrawal from the CoE is the price for this. Tbilisi argues that, for the sake of inter-ethnic peace, it is more feasible to resettle Meskhetians around the country rather than return them to their ethnic homeland. (See doc of ref in appendix) 59. As  a  result,  only  650  Meskhetians  have  succeeded  in  returning  to  Georgia.  Moreover, Meskhetians were unable to obtain Georgian citizenship between 1994-97.  Citizenship began to be granted—on a limited basis  —after combined pressure from international organ  isations. 60. Numbers of Meskhetian willing to return are widely disputed, While Georgian authorities fear that as much as 300,000 Meskhetians would seek to move to Georgia, observers argue that this seems   unlikely,   given   that   many   have   already   settled   in   places   where   they   are,   such   as Azerbaijan.    The  Baku  Institute  of  Peace  and  Democracy  estimated  that  between  90,000  and 110,000 Meskhetian Turks lived in Azerbaijan in 2001, where they enjoy generally favourable state policies  and  attitudes.  Wary  of  upsetting  its  relationship  with  Georgia,  Azerbaijan  supports  the Meskhetian right to return, conditional on its acceptance by the Georgian side. B. LEZGINS (AZERBAIJAN) 61. Having flared up shortly after independence, tensions between Lezgins and Azeris peaked in 1994,   soon   after   the   period  of  heavy  casualties  on  the  Karabakh  front  and  resistance  to conscription to the Azeri army. While tensions have receded, Lezgins still fear the assimilation of their culture. 62. Because  Lezgins  are  generally  bi-  or  trilingual,  speaking  Lezgin,  Azeri  and  Russian, many live in Baku and occupy senior positions in the civil service, army and parliament. For the sake of stability, the Aliev regime has ensured that ethnic minorities (as well as women) are proportionally represented in public positions. The state also provides financial and political support to officially sanctioned minority organizations.

054 CDSDG 05 E 11 DOCUMENTS OF REFERENCE Minority issues: http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/SouthCaucasusreport.pdf Central Asia- Caucasus Analyst Wednesday / April 06, 2005 “Demonstration in Javakheti marks increased tensions in Armenian populated regions of Georgia”. IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service Zaza Baazov, “Georgia: Unwanted Meskhetians”, no. 106, 20 November 2001 Arif Yunusov.,  Meskhetinskie Turki, RFE/RL Caucasus report: “Meskhetians face yet another deportation”,4 April 2002, Volume  5, Number  12. http://www.rferl.org/features/features_article_old.aspx?id=ab31de8c-2d6f-49e4-a978- 8431b9cd7884&y=2004&m=07 Demographic data http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/azerbaijan/hypermail/200103/0062.html http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062304a.shtml, “Georgian treatment of Azeri Minority raises concerns”. FarizIsmailzade 6/23/04 http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/georgia/hypermail/200211/0003.shtml http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/4ef3cd6090fd58cac1256d1f0057f d7b http://www.agbu.org/spotlight/display.asp?S_ID=77 Armenian     Demography,     the Homeland,  and  the  Diaspora:  Trends  and  Consequences  by  Stephan  H. Astourian, “Clearly at this point the population of Armenia is unlikely to exceed 2.300,000 even if we  assume  that  about  one-third  of  the  Armenian  refugees  from  Azerbaijan  have settled   permanently   in   Armenia,   that   is,   about   100,000   of   them.   The   recent announcement  by  the  National  Statistics  Service  of  Armenia  that  that  there  were 3.020,768  inhabitants  in Armenia according to the preliminary results of the census carried out from October 10-19, 2001 is viewed with scepticism by many.” OSCE  Background  Information:  Visit  to  Georgia  5-9  September  2004  (Data  on Georgian Minorities) CIA Factbook:  Estimate from CIA Factbook: Armenian 93%, Azeri 1%, Russian 2%, other   (mostly   Yezidi   Kurds)   4%   (2002).    Estimate  from   Minority  Rights  Group International:    Armenian    98%.    Estimate    from    The    Kurdish    Human    Rights Project:Yezidi Kurd 1.8% http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/docs/WP3.doc Minority Rights: Cultural   Diversity   and   Development   in   Central   Asia,   UN   Office   of   the   High Commissioner for Human Rights. Pankissi Valley -Alexandr   Iskandarian,   Alan   Parastaev,   Gagik   Avakian,   ‘Sobytia   v   Kodorskom Ushelie.  Oktiabr’  2001  goda’  (Events  in  Kodori  valley.  October  2001),  Fact-finding mission   of   the   Caucasus   NGO   Forum,   UNHCR   Working   Group   of   the   CIS Conference and The William R. Nelson Institute for public Affairs, Dzaujikau, 2001. OSCE Background Information, Visit to Georgia 5-9 September 2004 Abkhazia http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/ac88e00bb9643479c1256be5004 bc68a   Tbilisi's   relations   with   Moscow   worsen   as   hundreds   of   thousands   of

054 CDSDG 05 E 12 Abkhazians take up Russian citizenship, By Inal Khashig in Sukhu, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfm?story_id=36446 04 Trouble across the border, and for Georgia's boisterous president http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021105a.shtml http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012005.shtml  on  elections in Abkhazia. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/4/B4574284-B064-41D7-AE2B- Abkhaz Leader Says No Talk With Tbilisi Over Status, 12 April 2005,  C1A49AB34126.html Nagorno Karabakh: http://www.osce.org/item/13662.html    OSCE    Press    Release    02-04-2005,   OSCE Chairman calls on all sides to focus on ways to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Human Rights Issues http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200204_124_2_eng.txt Azerbaijan: State Hounds Muslim Leaders IPWR, 04-2002. http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/azerba9891.htm    World    Report    2005, Human Rights Watch http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/geo-summary-eng  Amnesty  International  Georgia Country report 2004 http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/georgi9903.htm  Georgia,  Human  Rights Watch World Report 2005. http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/arm-summary-eng Amnesty International Armenia Country Report 2004. http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/armeni9889.htm   Human   Rights   Watch Overview World Report 2005. Other  issues: http://www.cornellcaspian.com/sida/sida_sum-rec.html http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfm?story_id=29461 81 “Putting out more flags, Mikhail Saakashvili is using his international connections, as well as traditional tokens of authority, to put Georgia back on the map” Jul 22nd 2004