J:\Document\Dominique\2005\Secretariat reports\ 004 PCTR 05 E Secretariat Report Berlin Oct 2004.doc POLITICAL 004 PCTR 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS VISIT TO BERLIN, GERMANY SECRETARIAT REPORT 4-6 OCTOBER 2004 International Secretariat 12 January 2005 * This  Secretariat  Report  is  presented  for  information  only  and  does  not  necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

004 PCTR 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. GERMANY’S SECURITY POLICY......................................................................................... 1 III. TRANSATLANTIC CO-OPERATION..................................................................................... 1 IV. NATO .................................................................................................................................... 2 V. BROADER MIDDLE EAST .................................................................................................... 3 VI. EUROPEAN UNION .............................................................................................................. 3 VII. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE ................................................................................................ 5 VIII.   AFGHANISTAN ..................................................................................................................... 6 IX. TERRORISM ......................................................................................................................... 6 X. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME ........................................................................................ 7 XI. LEGITIMACY OF USING FORCE ......................................................................................... 8

004 PCTR 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Approximately 20 members of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations visited Berlin to discuss transatlantic security issues with German government representatives and members of the Bundestag.    The  meetings  also  included  briefings  by  independent  security  experts.    Among  the topics  addressed  were  the  situation  in  Iraq,  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction (WMD) and the fight against internationally active terrorist organisations.   II. GERMAN SECURITY POLICY 2. Walter  Kolbow,  Parliamentary  State  Secretary  of  the  Defence  Ministry,  explained  that Germany’s  security  policy  was  guided  by  a  “comprehensive  concept  of  security”,  which  also included economic, ecological, environmental and even cultural aspects of security.  This reflected the  changing  nature  of  international  security  in  that  it  was  no  longer  primarily  dominated  by conflicts between nation states; WMD proliferation, terrorism and failed and failing states also now played an important role, the Defence Ministry official explained.  Security could not be achieved through military means alone, he continued.  In this context, Mr Kolbow spoke of a “reticence of using military power” and underlined that armed forces were crucial, but only one of many security elements.    Hence,  German  security  policy  put  emphasis  on  prevention  and  was  committed  to international  action  together  with  Allies.    He  and  other  speakers,  including  Klaus  Scharioth, Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry, stressed the need to strengthen international law,  and  the  UN  in  particular.    “Multinational  a ction  offered  legitimacy”,  German  officials  and independent security experts repeatedly said.   III. TRANSATLANTIC CO-OPERATION 3. Government    representatives    and    independent    speakers    agreed    that    transatlantic co-operation,  and  particularly  the  close  partnership  with  the  US,  remained  essential  for  German and  European  security.    Mr  Scharioth  noted  that  the  transatlantic  security  relationship had been fundamentally   altered   and   that   the   Soviet   threat   had   been   replaced   by   new,   primarily asymmetrical, threats.  The attacks in Madrid on 3-11 demonstrated that terrorism was a threat to all open societies.  There was no “end of atlanticism” as US analyst Robert Kagan had suggested, the German Foreign Ministry official emphasised.  While differences in structural capabilities exist, the   Allies   had   many   more   similarities   and   shared   the   common   interest   of   forming   global developments together.  This view was to a large degree echoed by independent security experts.   The  majority  of  speakers  stressed  that  Europe  and  the  US  generally  agreed  on  the  security threats, but they differed in how to tackle them.  In contrast, Christoph Bertram, Director of the Research  Institute  of  German  Institute  for  International  and  Security  Affairs  (SWP)  stated  that transatlantic  partners  also  differed  in  their  opinions  on  the  nature  of  the  security  challenge.    He pointed out that the US appeared to put a stronger emphasis on military means than the European Allies.  However, the US, too, was using ‘soft’ power, Mr Bertram remarked.  Responding to the comment made by Senator Longin Pastusiak (Poland),  the chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic  Relations,  that  the  US  did  not  sufficiently  use  ‘soft  power’,  Mr  Bertram  noted  that governments   did   not   fully   control   ‘soft   power’.      Gunilla   Carlsson   (Sweden)   spoke   of   a transatlantic “difference in mentality” and raised the question whether US Allies might lack not only its military but also its moral strength.  Moreover, Europeans might have the “right recipe” to solve crises, but might often not “follow through”, whereas the US might not have the right recipe, but would  “follow  through”. Heike  MacKerron  of  the  German  Marshall  Fund  of  the  United  States’ (GMF)  Berlin  Office  provided  background  information  on  public  opinion  on  both  sides  of  the Atlantic as recently released in a GMF study.  She stressed that the acceptance of US leadership had  significantly  dropped  in  many  EU  member  countries  and  that  large  majorities  in  European

004 PCTR 05 E 2 countries wanted Europe to play a more independent role in world affairs.  Briefly touching upon the role of the media for opinion shaping, some members noted the very different reporting in the US and European media on Iraq and the Middle East.  Mr Bertram reminded participants that the transatlantic security relationship had been formed in the Cold War, during which the military was the dominant factor.       4. Several   speakers   and   members   of   the   delegation   repeatedly   emphasised   that   the transatlantic partnership must be based on equality.  Senator Lamberto Dini (Italy) warned that building  ‘coalitions  of  the  willing’  was  acceptable,  if  it  was  based  on  consensus  among  NATO member  states.    Rafael  Estrella  (Spain)  expressed  the  view  of  the  majority  of  speakers  by dismissing the notion of NATO as a ‘toolbox’ as dangerous because it undermined the Alliance in the   medium   to   long   term.      Others   noted   that   Europeans   wanted   to   participate   in   the decision-making process but were sometimes slow in implementing decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).  Pointing to the continuous gap in military capabilities several members of the  Political  Committee,  including  Ruprecht   Polenz  (Germany),  Sub-Committee  Rapporteur, considered the emphasis on ‘equal partnership’ at least at present, as a “minor imposture”.Loic Bouvard (France) predicted that “even if European countries spent much more on defence, they would spend less than the US and the Alliance would therefore remain ‘unbalanced for many years to come’”.   IV. NATO 5. NATO  remains  absolutely  central  for  German  and  Euro-Atlantic  security  was  the  strong consensus  among  all  German  speakers.    The  enlargement  of  the  Alliance  had  significantly strengthened  Euro-Atlantic  and  international  security,  according  to  Mr  Scharioth.    Speakers commended the Alliance for its ability to adapt to new challenges, including combating terrorism and  global  crisis  management.    State  Secretary  Scharioth  commended  the  NATO  PA  for  its important role in providing a forum to discuss NATO decisions.  Moreover, the Assembly was also a yardstick of public opinion from national member states.  While NATO’s activities have changed and  expanded,  it  must  not  overburden  itself,  unless  it  wants  to  risk  undermining  its  credibility, warned  State  Secretary  Kolbow.    He  also  pointed  to  problems  that  the  Allies  need  to  address, particularly existing delays in force generation.   6. The  issue  of  military  contributions  to  NATO-led  missions  and,  more  generally,  of  military capabilities  briefly  came  up  during  the  discussions.    Responding  to  questions  by  Peter  Viggers (United Kingdom) and Paul Keetch (United Kingdom) whether Germany was providing sufficient capabilities,  State  Secretary  Kolbow  said  Germany’s  active  participation  in  security  operations, including  outside  Europe,  demonstrates  the  country’s  commitment  to  NATO.    Moreover,  with currently  7,000  soldiers  deployed  worldwide  Germany  is  one  of  the  largest  troop  provider  for international peacekeeping forces, he stressed.  The State Secretary also reminded the delegation of the German unification, which accomplished the merging of two German states into ‘one stable Germany  in  a  stable  Europe’.    Moreover,  the  transformation  of  military  forces  took  considerable time, as the US example demonstrated.  Mr Kolbow added that Germany reduced its armed forces from  640,000  (the combined size of the Bundeswehr and the GDR’s People’s Army) to 370,000 then to 340,000.  Reflecting the dramatically altered security environment following 9-11, a further cut to 285,000 is envisaged.  Germany could now muster 70,000 stabilisation forces (and 35,000 intervention   forces).      The   remaining   part,   approximately   145,000   was   primarily   for  support operations.    Karl  A.  Lamers  (Germany),  Vice-Chairman  of  the  Political  Committee,  noted  that post-conflict stabilisation required additional forces, but that German and Allied force levels were being reduced.   7. A  critical  assessment  of  NATO’s  current  position  was  offered  by  Walter  Stützle ,  State

004 PCTR 05 E 3 Secretary  at  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  who  considered  NATO  in  the  most  serious  crisis  since  its inception,  due  in  large  part  to  ‘the  Bush  administration’s  de-politicisation  of  the  Alliance’.    He continued by saying that NATO appeared to have at least temporarily lost what he called its ‘C3 capability’, i.e. its ability to agree on a common concept, achieve political consensus and act as a coalition.  Thus, NATO had become a “military alliance without a political strategy”, he said.  The most  important  task  was  to  re-establish  the  Alliance.   To achieve this, Allies needed to redefine NATO’s mission, a mere listing of current challenges was not enough, he suggested.  In his view, the  Istanbul  Summit  was  used  for  addressing  “trivial  questions  but  not  for  grand  ones”  and therefore   merely   papered   over   existing   differences.     Rather,  NATO  member  states  should acknowledge  the  crisis,  define  a  political  goal  and  develop  a  political  strategy  to  achieve  this, Mr Stützle  said.    He  suggested  EU  membership  in  NATO  and  elaborated  by  saying  that  the European Foreign Minister should have a seat at the NAC. 8. While  others  did  not  share  Mr  Stützle’s  critical  v iew  of  NATO’s  current  status,  they,  too, argued  for  strengthening  the  NAC  as  a  forum  for  discussion  among  the  Allies.    In  this  context Mr Bertram  regretted  that  that  the  Allies  had  not  discussed  the  issue  of  war  against  Saddam Hussein in the North Atlantic Council.  He added that he did not see a real effort to revitalise the relationship between governments on both sides of the Atlantic.  Rather, it appeared as if they “let things  slide  rather  than  invest  time  to  rebuild  bridges”.    The  US  were  rightly  the  indispensable nation,  but  its  NATO  allies  remain  its  indispensable  partners,  particularly  with  regard  to  tackling terrorism, WMD proliferation and stabilisation of the ‘Broader Middle East’.  While Germany stood by  the  decisions  of  the  Istanbul  Summit,  the  Berlin  government  remained  ‘reservations’  about  a stronger and more visible NATO engagement in Iraq, State Secretary Scharioth said.  Referring to the possible perception of NATO among Arab peoples he explained that the Allies should not risk possible cooperation with Arab world and added that “if we use NATO unwisely, it will be burnt”. German  speakers,  such  as  Mr  Bertram,  also  said  that  the  ‘coalition  of  the  unwilling’  had  a responsibility in Iraq.   V. BROADER MIDDLE EAST 9. With regard to the ‘Broader Middle East’, Professor Friedmann Büttner , former Professor at Free University Berlin, mapped out recent initiatives to assist the countries of the region.  The task  to  assist  the  region  was  enormous,  he  said,  and  pointed  out  that  the  combined  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 22 Arab states was less than that of Spain and that a minimum of 6 million new jobs needed to be created each year.  He warned that there existed a serious danger of civil wars in the countries of the region if democratisation failed.  According to Ovidiu Petrescu (Romania), many governments in the region did “not really want to embark on democratic reforms” and  had  used  war  against  terrorism  as  a  pretext  to  further  limit  civil  rights.    Professor  Büttner ascribed  lacking  enthusiasm  among  Arab  people  to  embrace  the  US-led  ‘Greater  Middle  East’ initiative to US support for authoritarian regimes in the past.  He continued by saying that after the Iraq  war,  the  American  image  was  at  an  “all  time  low”.    The  challenges  notwithstanding, participants agreed that there was a strong European interest in assisting the region, as, according to Professor Büttner, 58% of all Arab youths wanted to emigrate, most of whom favoured Europe.   The  US  and  Allied  governments  understood  that  partnerships  could  be  imposed  from  outside.   Members  of  the  delegation  agreed  with  Damla  Gürel   (Turkey)  that  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  was part and parcel of tackling the ‘Broader Middle East’.   VI. EUROPEAN UNION 10. Speakers generally welcomed the European Union’s increasingly  important role in the area of  security.    State  Secretary  Scharioth  depicted  the  enlargement  of  the  EU  as  an  example  for

004 PCTR 05 E 4 stability projection and crisis prevention.  EU actions in the Balkans and Africa had demonstrated that  ESDP  was  operational,  he  said,  adding  that  the  ESS  provided  the  necessary  “clarity  of purpose”.  Briefly recurring to the achievements in building ESDP, including the establishment of the European Defence Agency, Mr Scharioth said that there was no alternative to strengthening ESDP and to improving existing capabilities.  Defence State Secretary Kolbow stressed that ESDP allowed independent action where NATO decided to not become active.  Scharioth’s view that a strong  European  defence  pillar  did  not  threaten,  but  would  rather  strengthen  the  transatlantic relationship was consensual among German speakers.   11. Speakers  and  members  of  the  delegation  agreed  that  NATO  and  the  EU  should  develop their  relationship  further.    Markus  Meckel  (Germany),  head  of  the  German  delegation  to  the NATO  PA,  proposed  that  NATO  and  the  EU  establish  institutional  structures.    State  Secretary Scharioth identified four key tasks for NATO-EU co-operation, namely: -    strengthening the co-operation between NATO and the EU; -    ascertaining close consultation with Europe’s North-Atlantic partners concerning the EU’s further development in the security realm; -    creating EU and NATO synergies in improving capabilities; and -    developing a continued ‘strategic dialogue’.   12. Peter  Schmidt  of  the  SWP,  too,  stressed  that  NATO  and  EU  should  develop  a  ‘strategic dialogue’.    This  is  essential  because  of  increased  co-operation  between  the  two  organisations, such  as  the  EU  takeover  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  but  also  the  need  to  harmonise  initiatives such   as   the   Prague   Capability   Commitment   (PCC)   and   European   Capability   Action   Plan.   Moreover,  the  EU  and  NATO  should  jointly  develop  civil  emergency  planning  and  collaborate  in their respective Mediterranean dialogues.   13. Although  speakers  generally  considered  that  the  EU’s  defence  efforts  had  made  great strides,   several   shortcomings   were   also   identified.      Commenting   that   the   EU   ‘Troika’   was “completely ineffective”, State Secretary Scharioth argued for the creation of a European Foreign Minister, supported by a Foreign Office.  In contrast, Mr Schmidt anticipated that the creation of a European  Foreign  Minister  would  merely  symbolise  the  coherence  of  a  Common  European Foreign   and   Security   Policy   (CFSP)   but   that   it   would   continue   to   be   characterised   by contradictions.    The  independent  expert  said  that  the  decision  making  structure  would  remain pluralistic as the intergovernmental aspect would remain, but there will also be leadership by some core countries.  Mr Stützle called Europe's lack in strategic capabilities a “serious issue”.  He said he was ‘surprised’ that there was only very little attention for this important issue in Germany.  In contrast,  Mr  Bertram  considered  the  force  discrepancy  “overrated”,  as  Iraq  demonstrated.    The key problem, in his view, was that institutions were not being used effectively and that Europeans needed to change the “ridiculous way” they spend money on defence.   14. Participants  acknowledged  the  shortcomings  in  European  military  capabilities,  but  while some considered the glass half full, others emphasised that it was half empty and unlikely to be ever filled.  Mr Schmidt maintained that the “single European Army had been put to death” by the creation of the concept of battle groups, while Mr Keetch submitted that in the defence area there “was   no   EU”.      Mr   Scharioth   reminded  the  delegation  that  EU  countries  made  meaningful contributions to international security and often contributed in all other areas 3-4 times as much as US.  In a similar vein, Mr Kolbow noted that European countries were currently assisting military forces  of  12  African  countries.    For  example,  Germany  and  Britain  worked  closely  together  in Accra where they trained African Union troops.   15. The  delegation  also  had  the  opportunity  to  visit  the  Bundeswehr  Operations  Command (BOC), located in Potsdam, where it was briefed on the command’s tasks and capacities.  BOC controls  and  oversees  all  German  military  operations  outside  the  country  currently  running  7

004 PCTR 05 E 5 operations  in  9  countries  on  3  continents,  comprising  some  7,000  soldiers.    BOC  was  part  and parcel of the start of the Bundeswehr’s transformation, a process that would continue over the next four years, according to General Dora, head of the command.  As such BOC had made important strides,  achieving  unity  of  command  and  the  ability  to  deploy  forces  worldwide.    In  addition  to BOC’s   operations   and   German   ‘lessons   learned’   from   previous   and   current   operations, participants  also  discussed  military  conscription  with  General  Dora  who  considered  conscript service an important asset.   VII.    SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 16. The  visit  to  Berlin  also  offered  an  opportunity  to  discuss  the  situation  in  South-Eastern Europe, which remained a priority for German foreign policy, according to Hans-Dieter Lucas of the  Federal  Chancellery.    Germany  provided  a  total  of  €6,48  billion  in  e conomic  assistance  and had more than 5,000 troops - more than any other Allied nation - deployed in the region.  But the region’s   long-term   stabilisation   required   a   multi-lateral   approach   and   in   particular   active American-European  co-operation,  he  underlined.  The  EU’s  primary  task  would  be  to  continue economic  engagement,  Mr  Lucas  said.    In  contrast  to  public perception international efforts had been rather successful, he suggested.   17. Slow pace of reform processes and organised crime remained a problem, as did the issues of war criminals and constitutional questions regarding Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo.  With regard to the latter, the German official commented that the province had been stabilised, but was not  completely  stable.    Having  applied  the  ‘lessons  learned’  from  the  2004  March  riots  KFOR introduced  improvements,  particularly  to  improve  co-ordination  among  national  detachments.   Commenting on the political process of ‘standards before status’, Mr Lucas said that the German government  shared  the  assessment  of  the  special  UN  envoy  Kai  Eide  that  standards  remained important and that there must be no return to the ‘status quo ante’.  According to Mr Lamers, there was an intensive debate in Germany over status and standards.  Senator Pastusiak regretted that neither the international community nor the Allies had a plan for the future of Kosovo.  To this, Mr Lucas    answered    that    there    is    no    “magic   solution”   and   added   that   he   considered   it counterproductive  if  the  international  community  were  to  abandon  the  ‘standards  before  status’ approach and present new concepts now.  Any possible solution for Kosovo must look at the likely impact  on  the  whole  region,  he  said,  backed  by  Assen  Agov  (Bulgaria).    Commenting  on  the upcoming  Kosovo  elections  scheduled  for  23  October  Mr  Lucas  said  it  was  important  that  the province’s Serbian population participate and regretted that Belgrade had not encouraged Kosovo Serbs   to   do   that.      Other   participants,   including   Hans   Raidel   (Germany)   and   Mr Bouvard emphasised the shortcomings of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo.  Criticising the EU for spending “a lot of money ineffectively” Mr Raidel called for a review of EU programmes as well as the roles of UNMIK and KFOR. 18. He briefly commented on the progress in individual countries of the region and stressed the improved regional co-operation.  Mr Lucas stressed that Serbia and Montenegro must comply with its   international   commitments,   particularly   with  regard  to  co-operation  with  the  International Criminal  Court  (ICC).    Commenting  on  the  EU’s  ‘twin-track’  approach,  he  said  that  Serbia  and Montenegro was one state with two different economic parts.  He added that he hoped that Serbia and  Montenegro  continued  the  union.    Commenting  on  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Mr  Lucas depicted  the  transition  of  the  NATO-led  SFOR  to  EUFOR  as  a  “showcase  for  new  strategic partnership  between  NATO  and  EU”.    Germany  would  maintain  its contingent of currently 1,100 soldiers.  Positive developments in the country should not be ignored, but most people continue to “think  along  ethnic  lines”  as  the  last  communal  elections  had  shown,  he  added.    The  former

004 PCTR 05 E 6 Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ was an example for successful international crisis management, but the upcoming referendum against district reform poses a problem.  Albania had the “potential for  further  reform”,  particularly  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  establishing  an  effective police  and  judicial  system.    Croatia  had  developed  positively,  including  its  co-operation  with  the ICC, despite some remaining issues, such as the pending extradition of former General Gotovina.   19. Mr Petrescu highlighted the problem of ‘ethnic hate’, the fragility of the economies and the large  amount  of  weapons  in  the  region.    Mr  Lucas  concluded  by  saying  that  there  was  no alternative  to  the  path  of  bringing  the  region  closer  to  Euro-Atlantic  structures.    Concerning  a possible future enlargement of the Alliance, State Secretary Kolbow said that the three candidate countries,  Albania,  Croatia,  and  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  deserved  a  NATO perspective.   VIII.   AFGHANISTAN 20. Not surprisingly, Afghanistan featured high on the agenda of the meetings.  Afghanistan was a  litmus  test  for  NATO’s  resolve  and  capacity  to  offer  a  future  to  others  to  overcome  security challenges, according to Mr Scharioth.  He stressed the need to undertake nation building and the need to “win the hearts and minds of Afghans”.  Germany was committed to assisting Afghanistan, even though a long-term presence in the country was unpopular among Germans.  For example, German  experts  trained  the  Afghan  police  and  the  courses  were  now  already  envisaged  until 2007. 21. Mr  Scharioth  warned  against  overly  optimistic  hopes  for  an  early  return  from  Afghanistan and said that he believed that the stabilisation of the country would require much more time than currently anticipated.  He dismissed a reduction of troops in Afghanistan as “not possible” as large parts of the country suffered from continuing instability.  Mr Stützle said that Allied troops should be used to destroy poppy fields. 22. To the list of the transatlantic community’s important common interests Mr Stützle added the reform of Russia.  This depended on generous and far-sighted assistance provided by the US and Europe.    Briefly  referring  to  the  tragic  events  in  Beslan,  Mr  Agov  expressed  concern  about Russia’s   development   and   suggested   that   it   should   be   put   higher   on   the   NAC’s   agenda.   Mr Bertram commented that many Western capitals still believed that President Vladimir Putin was stabilising Russia.  This however, might not necessarily be the case and much has been done to increase the power of the presidency.  Mr Bertram also noted a fundamental contradiction on how Russia presented Chechnya as an international problem, but adamantly refused any international involvement. IX. TERRORISM 23. Another key topic of the exchanges was terrorism.  State Secretary Fritz Rudolf Körper  of the German Federal Interior Ministry reminded participants that the threat posed by international terrorists had reached a new dimension and that the traditional distinction between military and law enforcement  instruments  was  blurring.    Moreover,  as  today’s  security  threats,  such  as  those emanating from failed and failing states, were increasingly global in nature, national instruments were no longer sufficient to deal with them.     1 Turkey and the United States recognise the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

004 PCTR 05 E 7 24. In Mr Körper’s view today’s terrorist groups were characterised by: -    a  changed  profile  of  perpetrators  (recruitment  in  different  countries  with  different  social backgrounds); -    a changed profile of attack (focus primarily on soft targets with the goal of killing as many people as possible without differentiation); -    a changed organisational profile (more diffuse, less stringently organised). 25. He underlined the need to focus on prevention and the importance of information gathering by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  Germany’s federal structure made improvements of its security architecture cumbersome (each of the 16 federal states had its own constitutional protection services and police), Mr Körper informe d the group.  Nonetheless, progress had been achieved,  particularly  in  the  areas  of  sharing  information  and  analysis.    On  a  European  level, EUROPOL  played  an  important  role  in  information  gathering  and  assessing  potential  security risks.  Intensive and sustained international co-operation, especially within the EU and with the US, was crucial to tackle the threat posed by terrorists, he said.  Measures that could further advance co-operation  included  a  more  centralised,  EU-wide  compilation  of  information,  including  the pooling of biometric data as well as establishing Visa databank, Mr Körper said.   26. However, police and military tools alone were insufficient to counter terrorist groups, he said.   The West must take on the intellectual challenge and strengthen moderate Muslim forces.  In this context Mr Körper regretted the ‘polemic’ discussion on Turkey’s EU application and commented that  extending  an  invitation  to  Turkey  to  join  the  EU  would  send  a  strong  and  positive  signal  of support   to   modern   Islam.      Members   of   the   delegation,   including   Committee   chairman Peter Viggers,  emphasised  the  need  to  tackle  social,  economic,  religious  and  philosophical circumstances that make terrorism possible.   X. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGR AMME 27. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programme  was also briefly discussed during the exchanges in Berlin.    The  President  of  the  German  Federal  Intelligence  Service  (BND),  August  Hanning, reminded participants that Iran's programme went beyond merely a civil programme.  While Iran was not prepared to publicise its complete programme, it appeared that it continued activities that were  ‘critical’  with  regard  to  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT).    In  this  context  he described  the  activities  at  the  Natanz  and  Arak  facilities  as  especially  problematic.    Mr  Hanning also pointed to Iran’s attempts to build new or increase existing WMD capabilities in other areas, including  in  biological  weapons  research  and  missile  technology.    In  the  latter  area,  Russia,  but also China and North Korea, had made significant contributions.   28. Mr  Polenz  considered  Iran  the  most  important  challenge  for  the  transatlantic  partnership.   Here, too, the Allies agree on the goal to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, but not on how to achieve this,  he  said.    Both  Mr  Polenz  and  Mr  Bertram  dismissed  a  military  option  against  Iran.    State Secretary Scharioth said that the only chance was to build a package that convinced Iran to drop its enrichment plans.  He briefly referred to the diplomatic efforts of the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), but added that agreement could only be reached if the EU, the US, and Russia worked together.   29. Mr  Hanning  offered  a  possible  rationale  for  Iran’s  plans  to  develop  nuclear  weapons  by reminding  participants  that  Teheran  had  been  attacked  by  WMD  during  the  first  Gulf  War.   Moreover, having been diplomatically and otherwise isolated over many years, the Iranian regime might conclude that from the 2003 Iraq war it needed WMD capabilities to defend itself.  Israel’s already  existing  capabilities  probably  also  contributed  to  Iran’s  nuclear  ambitions,  according  to

004 PCTR 05 E 8 Mr Hanning.  He reminded the delegation that a nuclear Iran would have significant consequences for Israel, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and the region as a whole.   30. The  Members  of  the  Sub-Committee  also  had  the  opportunity  to  raise  the  issue  of  the proliferation  of  WMD  with  senior  German  officials.    Pointing  to  changing  proliferation  patterns, BND  president  Mr  Hanning  noted  that  WMD  proliferation  took  no  longer  merely  place  between developed   and   undeveloped   countries,   but   also   between   developing   countries.   Overall, Mr Hanning considered existing non-proliferation regimes, particularly the nuclear NPT, as rather successful, but important problems needed to be addressed.  One of the greatest challenges for the NPT was that key countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba were not members and that  North  Korea  had  announced  plans  to  leave  the  NPT.    With  regard  to  export  controls, Mr Hanning emphasised that they were not effective against terrorist groups, which tried to obtain material illegally.  Corruption of officials and scientists continued to pose problems in a number of countries.  In this context he briefly referred to Russia and Ukraine, but added that there were, at preset, no indications that nuclear material had been stolen.  Moreover, export controls focused on trade, but not on know-how.  Referring to the number of foreign students at German universities, he   was   concerned   about   the   danger   of   fundamentalists   obtaining   knowledge   in   handling WMD-related materials.  The case of the Pakistani scientist Khan showed that ‘the genie was out of  the  bottle’.    A  number  of  ‘prominent’  terrorists  already  had  a  good  knowledge  of  WMD,  he added and recommended to further strengthen co-operation among exporting countries.   31. Mr Hanning also raised concern that ‘stray scientists’ in Iraq might proliferate know-how to terrorist  groups.    However,  he  doubted  that  al-Qaeda  –  or  any  non-state  actor  for  that  matter  - could produce or handle nuclear weapons.  While the intelligence official did, at present, put the risk  of  a  catastrophic  terrorist  attack  very  high,  he  stressed  that  non-conventional  attacks  might occur.  In this context he referred to earlier attempts by the Jordanian-born terrorist al-Zarqawi to produce ricin.  Moreover, the BND had knowledge of plans as well as attempts by groups to obtain radiological weapons, he said.   32. Mr Hanning expressed scepticism that the US and the Allies could reach an agreement over the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).  Moreover, he identified unresolved problems with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), for example, that North Korea, Syria and Egypt had not joined  while  other  countries  had  provided  unreliable  data.    Mr  Hanning  also  expressed  concern that  the  CWC  allowed  trade  with  critical  substances,  some  of  which  cannot  be  exported  from Germany (but by others). 33. Mr Hanning briefly touched upon developments in a number of countries that gave cause for concern.    He  noted  that  Syria  continued  efforts  to  produce  chemical  weapons.    With  regard  to Pakistan, he said that al-Qaeda had contact, albeit without result, with the Khan laboratories about BW,  before  9-11.    Moreover,  the  country  attempted  to  obtain  full  control  of  the  nuclear  circle.   North  Korea  was  heavily  dependent  on  export  of  weapons  technology,  the  German  intelligence official  noted  adding  that  the  possibility  of  the  country  using  WMD  in  a  conflict  as  “very  high”.   North Korea also had advanced BW and CW programmes and was active in developing missile capabilities further.   34. International   co-operation   among   intelligence   services   was   crucial   to   tackle   WMD proliferation, Mr Hanning said.  But both he and State Secretary Körper did not anticipate that the intelligence  services  could  reach  a  level  of  co-operation  similar  to  that  of  the  law  enforcement agencies.   XI. THE USE OF FORCE

004 PCTR 05 E 9 35. During the visit to Berlin, members also had the opportunity to discuss an issue that featured prominently on the agenda of the Political Committee, namely the legality and legitimacy of using force.  Karl-Heinz Kamp of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation stressed the need for a meaningful debate on this issue.    36. In  his  view,  the  combination  of  different  factors  required  a  debate  on  the  possibility  of applying military force pre-emptively as a means of last resort.  These factors were the increased awareness  of  the  dangers  posed  by  the  proliferation  of  WMD  and  their  means  of  delivery,  the technical  progress  in  weapon  accuracy,  plus  the  growing  ability  to  project  power  over  long distances for an increasing number of countries.   37. Stating that more and more countries would consider pre-emption as a possible last resort to avoid  an  attack  that  could  cause  catastrophic  casualties,  the  speaker  turned  to  the  question  of how pre-emption might be reconciled with international law – which is illegal under the UN Charter.   The UN Charter no longer reflected today’s security environment, according to Mr Kamp.  It was therefore  necessary  to  redefine  the  legality  of  the  use  of  force,  he  added  and  pointed  to  the Kosovo   air   campaign   of   1999   when   NATO   intervened   without   prior   UN   Security   Council authorisation.    To  make  pre-emptive  military  action  legitimate,  it  must  comply  with  three criteria, said  the  foreign  policy  expert:    necessity  (i.e.  that  force  would  be  employed  only  when  no  other reasonable option existed to frustrate an attack), proportionality of means (i.e. that military action must  be  limited  to  those  needed  to  defeat  the  attack),  and  immediacy  (i.e.  that  an  attack  was imminent and the threat had been expressed, there was material action to support the perception of  the  threat  and  there  was  no  option  to  tackle  the  threat  at  a  later  stage).    However,  none  of suggested criteria were exactly measurable, Mr Kamp conceded.  Therefore, a debate to create a consensus was urgently necessary, he said.  The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of intelligence and commented that obtaining reliable intelligence in time was always problematic.   In his view there was either too much intelligence available - as on Iraq and before 9-11 - or too little  –  as  was  the  case  with  North  Korea.    The  discussion  that  followed  the  presentation  by Mr Kamp,   referred   to   the   role   of   the   UN   for   international   law   and   UN   Secretary   General Kofi Annan’s  panel  which  was  scheduled  to  present  findings  on  the  UN  reform  in  the  area  of security by the end of this year.  With regard to international security issues, Mr Kamp said that there  was  “no  international  community”,  but  that  it  was  always  a  ‘coalition  of  the  willing’  that provided  the  military  forces  necessary  for  international  action.  All participants agreed that there was no easy answer on the issue of pre-emption and that prospects for finding common ground within  NATO  were  slim.    This  was partly due to the different use  of the terms ‘pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’  in  different  countries.    Concluding  the  discussion,  Mr  Kamp  bemoaned  the  lack  of discussion  on  the  issue,  not  least  because  a  misperception  existed  that  ‘Germany  did  not  have interests’.   38. Concluding  the  programme  in  Berlin,  Mr  Pastusiak  thanked  the  German  delegation  for hosting  the  visit.    The  Sub-Committee  on  Transatlantic  Relations  will  continue  to  work  on  the issues and plans to visit North America and Spain next year, he announced.