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## **NATO Parliamentary Assembly**

### **SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS**

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### **VISIT TO BERLIN, GERMANY**

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### **SECRETARIAT REPORT**

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## ***I. INTRODUCTION***

1. Approximately 20 members of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations visited Berlin to discuss transatlantic security issues with German government representatives and members of the Bundestag. The meetings also included briefings by independent security experts. Among the topics addressed were the situation in Iraq, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the fight against internationally active terrorist organisations.

## ***II. GERMAN SECURITY POLICY***

2. **Walter Kolbow**, Parliamentary State Secretary of the Defence Ministry, explained that Germany's security policy was guided by a "comprehensive concept of security", which also included economic, ecological, environmental and even cultural aspects of security. This reflected the changing nature of international security in that it was no longer primarily dominated by conflicts between nation states; WMD proliferation, terrorism and failed and failing states also now played an important role, the Defence Ministry official explained. Security could not be achieved through military means alone, he continued. In this context, Mr Kolbow spoke of a "reticence of using military power" and underlined that armed forces were crucial, but only one of many security elements. Hence, German security policy put emphasis on prevention and was committed to international action together with Allies. He and other speakers, including **Klaus Scharioth**, Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry, stressed the need to strengthen international law, and the UN in particular. "Multinational action offered legitimacy", German officials and independent security experts repeatedly said.

## ***III. TRANSATLANTIC CO-OPERATION***

3. Government representatives and independent speakers agreed that transatlantic co-operation, and particularly the close partnership with the US, remained essential for German and European security. Mr Scharioth noted that the transatlantic security relationship had been fundamentally altered and that the Soviet threat had been replaced by new, primarily asymmetrical, threats. The attacks in Madrid on 3-11 demonstrated that terrorism was a threat to all open societies. There was no "end of atlanticism" as US analyst Robert Kagan had suggested, the German Foreign Ministry official emphasised. While differences in structural capabilities exist, the Allies had many more similarities and shared the common interest of forming global developments together. This view was to a large degree echoed by independent security experts. The majority of speakers stressed that Europe and the US generally agreed on the security threats, but they differed in how to tackle them. In contrast, **Christoph Bertram**, Director of the Research Institute of German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) stated that transatlantic partners also differed in their opinions on the nature of the security challenge. He pointed out that the US appeared to put a stronger emphasis on military means than the European Allies. However, the US, too, was using 'soft' power, Mr Bertram remarked. Responding to the comment made by **Senator Longin Pastusiak** (Poland), the chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, that the US did not sufficiently use 'soft power', Mr Bertram noted that governments did not fully control 'soft power'. **Gunilla Carlsson** (Sweden) spoke of a transatlantic "difference in mentality" and raised the question whether US Allies might lack not only its military but also its moral strength. Moreover, Europeans might have the "right recipe" to solve crises, but might often not "follow through", whereas the US might not have the right recipe, but would "follow through". **Heike MacKerron** of the German Marshall Fund of the United States' (GMF) Berlin Office provided background information on public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic as recently released in a GMF study. She stressed that the acceptance of US leadership had significantly dropped in many EU member countries and that large majorities in European

countries wanted Europe to play a more independent role in world affairs. Briefly touching upon the role of the media for opinion shaping, some members noted the very different reporting in the US and European media on Iraq and the Middle East. Mr Bertram reminded participants that the transatlantic security relationship had been formed in the Cold War, during which the military was the dominant factor.

4. Several speakers and members of the delegation repeatedly emphasised that the transatlantic partnership must be based on equality. **Senator Lamberto Dini** (Italy) warned that building 'coalitions of the willing' was acceptable, if it was based on consensus among NATO member states. **Rafael Estrella** (Spain) expressed the view of the majority of speakers by dismissing the notion of NATO as a 'toolbox' as dangerous because it undermined the Alliance in the medium to long term. Others noted that Europeans wanted to participate in the decision-making process but were sometimes slow in implementing decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Pointing to the continuous gap in military capabilities several members of the Political Committee, including **Ruprecht Polenz** (Germany), Sub-Committee Rapporteur, considered the emphasis on 'equal partnership' at least at present, as a "minor imposture". **Loic Bouvard** (France) predicted that "even if European countries spent much more on defence, they would spend less than the US and the Alliance would therefore remain 'unbalanced for many years to come'".

#### IV. NATO

5. NATO remains absolutely central for German and Euro-Atlantic security was the strong consensus among all German speakers. The enlargement of the Alliance had significantly strengthened Euro-Atlantic and international security, according to Mr Scharioth. Speakers commended the Alliance for its ability to adapt to new challenges, including combating terrorism and global crisis management. State Secretary Scharioth commended the NATO PA for its important role in providing a forum to discuss NATO decisions. Moreover, the Assembly was also a yardstick of public opinion from national member states. While NATO's activities have changed and expanded, it must not overburden itself, unless it wants to risk undermining its credibility, warned State Secretary Kolbow. He also pointed to problems that the Allies need to address, particularly existing delays in force generation.

6. The issue of military contributions to NATO-led missions and, more generally, of military capabilities briefly came up during the discussions. Responding to questions by **Peter Viggers** (United Kingdom) and **Paul Keetch** (United Kingdom) whether Germany was providing sufficient capabilities, State Secretary Kolbow said Germany's active participation in security operations, including outside Europe, demonstrates the country's commitment to NATO. Moreover, with currently 7,000 soldiers deployed worldwide Germany is one of the largest troop provider for international peacekeeping forces, he stressed. The State Secretary also reminded the delegation of the German unification, which accomplished the merging of two German states into 'one stable Germany in a stable Europe'. Moreover, the transformation of military forces took considerable time, as the US example demonstrated. Mr Kolbow added that Germany reduced its armed forces from 640,000 (the combined size of the *Bundeswehr* and the GDR's People's Army) to 370,000 then to 340,000. Reflecting the dramatically altered security environment following 9-11, a further cut to 285,000 is envisaged. Germany could now muster 70,000 stabilisation forces (and 35,000 intervention forces). The remaining part, approximately 145,000 was primarily for support operations. **Karl A. Lamers** (Germany), Vice-Chairman of the Political Committee, noted that post-conflict stabilisation required additional forces, but that German and Allied force levels were being reduced.

7. A critical assessment of NATO's current position was offered by **Walter Stützle**, State

Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who considered NATO in the most serious crisis since its inception, due in large part to 'the Bush administration's de-politicisation of the Alliance'. He continued by saying that NATO appeared to have at least temporarily lost what he called its 'C3 capability', i.e. its ability to agree on a common concept, achieve political consensus and act as a coalition. Thus, NATO had become a "military alliance without a political strategy", he said. The most important task was to re-establish the Alliance. To achieve this, Allies needed to redefine NATO's mission, a mere listing of current challenges was not enough, he suggested. In his view, the Istanbul Summit was used for addressing "trivial questions but not for grand ones" and therefore merely papered over existing differences. Rather, NATO member states should acknowledge the crisis, define a political goal and develop a political strategy to achieve this, Mr Stützle said. He suggested EU membership in NATO and elaborated by saying that the European Foreign Minister should have a seat at the NAC.

8. While others did not share Mr Stützle's critical view of NATO's current status, they, too, argued for strengthening the NAC as a forum for discussion among the Allies. In this context Mr Bertram regretted that the Allies had not discussed the issue of war against Saddam Hussein in the North Atlantic Council. He added that he did not see a real effort to revitalise the relationship between governments on both sides of the Atlantic. Rather, it appeared as if they "let things slide rather than invest time to rebuild bridges". The US were rightly the indispensable nation, but its NATO allies remain its indispensable partners, particularly with regard to tackling terrorism, WMD proliferation and stabilisation of the 'Broader Middle East'. While Germany stood by the decisions of the Istanbul Summit, the Berlin government remained 'reservations' about a stronger and more visible NATO engagement in Iraq, State Secretary Scharioth said. Referring to the possible perception of NATO among Arab peoples he explained that the Allies should not risk possible cooperation with Arab world and added that "if we use NATO unwisely, it will be burnt". German speakers, such as Mr Bertram, also said that the 'coalition of the unwilling' had a responsibility in Iraq.

## **V. BROADER MIDDLE EAST**

9. With regard to the 'Broader Middle East', **Professor Friedmann Büttner**, former Professor at Free University Berlin, mapped out recent initiatives to assist the countries of the region. The task to assist the region was enormous, he said, and pointed out that the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 22 Arab states was less than that of Spain and that a minimum of 6 million new jobs needed to be created each year. He warned that there existed a serious danger of civil wars in the countries of the region if democratisation failed. According to **Ovidiu Petrescu** (Romania), many governments in the region did "not really want to embark on democratic reforms" and had used war against terrorism as a pretext to further limit civil rights. Professor Büttner ascribed lacking enthusiasm among Arab people to embrace the US-led 'Greater Middle East' initiative to US support for authoritarian regimes in the past. He continued by saying that after the Iraq war, the American image was at an "all time low". The challenges notwithstanding, participants agreed that there was a strong European interest in assisting the region, as, according to Professor Büttner, 58% of all Arab youths wanted to emigrate, most of whom favoured Europe. The US and Allied governments understood that partnerships could be imposed from outside. Members of the delegation agreed with **Damla Gürel** (Turkey) that the Arab-Israeli conflict was part and parcel of tackling the 'Broader Middle East'.

## **VI. EUROPEAN UNION**

10. Speakers generally welcomed the European Union's increasingly important role in the area of security. State Secretary Scharioth depicted the enlargement of the EU as an example for

stability projection and crisis prevention. EU actions in the Balkans and Africa had demonstrated that ESDP was operational, he said, adding that the ESS provided the necessary “clarity of purpose”. Briefly recurring to the achievements in building ESDP, including the establishment of the European Defence Agency, Mr Scharioth said that there was no alternative to strengthening ESDP and to improving existing capabilities. Defence State Secretary Kolbow stressed that ESDP allowed independent action where NATO decided to not become active. Scharioth’s view that a strong European defence pillar did not threaten, but would rather strengthen the transatlantic relationship was consensual among German speakers.

11. Speakers and members of the delegation agreed that NATO and the EU should develop their relationship further. **Markus Meckel** (Germany), head of the German delegation to the NATO PA, proposed that NATO and the EU establish institutional structures. State Secretary Scharioth identified four key tasks for NATO-EU co-operation, namely:

- strengthening the co-operation between NATO and the EU;
- ascertaining close consultation with Europe’s North-Atlantic partners concerning the EU’s further development in the security realm;
- creating EU and NATO synergies in improving capabilities; and
- developing a continued ‘strategic dialogue’.

12. **Peter Schmidt** of the SWP, too, stressed that NATO and EU should develop a ‘strategic dialogue’. This is essential because of increased co-operation between the two organisations, such as the EU takeover in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the need to harmonise initiatives such as the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) and European Capability Action Plan. Moreover, the EU and NATO should jointly develop civil emergency planning and collaborate in their respective Mediterranean dialogues.

13. Although speakers generally considered that the EU’s defence efforts had made great strides, several shortcomings were also identified. Commenting that the EU ‘Troika’ was “completely ineffective”, State Secretary Scharioth argued for the creation of a European Foreign Minister, supported by a Foreign Office. In contrast, Mr Schmidt anticipated that the creation of a European Foreign Minister would merely symbolise the coherence of a Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but that it would continue to be characterised by contradictions. The independent expert said that the decision making structure would remain pluralistic as the intergovernmental aspect would remain, but there will also be leadership by some core countries. Mr Stützle called Europe’s lack in strategic capabilities a “serious issue”. He said he was ‘surprised’ that there was only very little attention for this important issue in Germany. In contrast, Mr Bertram considered the force discrepancy “overrated”, as Iraq demonstrated. The key problem, in his view, was that institutions were not being used effectively and that Europeans needed to change the “ridiculous way” they spend money on defence.

14. Participants acknowledged the shortcomings in European military capabilities, but while some considered the glass half full, others emphasised that it was half empty and unlikely to be ever filled. Mr Schmidt maintained that the “single European Army had been put to death” by the creation of the concept of battle groups, while Mr Keetch submitted that in the defence area there “was no EU”. Mr Scharioth reminded the delegation that EU countries made meaningful contributions to international security and often contributed in all other areas 3-4 times as much as US. In a similar vein, Mr Kolbow noted that European countries were currently assisting military forces of 12 African countries. For example, Germany and Britain worked closely together in Accra where they trained African Union troops.

15. The delegation also had the opportunity to visit the *Bundeswehr* Operations Command (BOC), located in Potsdam, where it was briefed on the command’s tasks and capacities. BOC controls and oversees all German military operations outside the country currently running 7

operations in 9 countries on 3 continents, comprising some 7,000 soldiers. BOC was part and parcel of the start of the *Bundeswehr*'s transformation, a process that would continue over the next four years, according to **General Dora**, head of the command. As such BOC had made important strides, achieving unity of command and the ability to deploy forces worldwide. In addition to BOC's operations and German 'lessons learned' from previous and current operations, participants also discussed military conscription with General Dora who considered conscript service an important asset.

## VII. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

16. The visit to Berlin also offered an opportunity to discuss the situation in South-Eastern Europe, which remained a priority for German foreign policy, according to **Hans-Dieter Lucas** of the Federal Chancellery. Germany provided a total of €6,48 billion in economic assistance and had more than 5,000 troops - more than any other Allied nation - deployed in the region. But the region's long-term stabilisation required a multi-lateral approach and in particular active American-European co-operation, he underlined. The EU's primary task would be to continue economic engagement, Mr Lucas said. In contrast to public perception international efforts had been rather successful, he suggested.

17. Slow pace of reform processes and organised crime remained a problem, as did the issues of war criminals and constitutional questions regarding Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo. With regard to the latter, the German official commented that the province had been stabilised, but was not completely stable. Having applied the 'lessons learned' from the 2004 March riots KFOR introduced improvements, particularly to improve co-ordination among national detachments. Commenting on the political process of 'standards before status', Mr Lucas said that the German government shared the assessment of the special UN envoy Kai Eide that standards remained important and that there must be no return to the 'status quo ante'. According to Mr Lamers, there was an intensive debate in Germany over status and standards. Senator Pastusiak regretted that neither the international community nor the Allies had a plan for the future of Kosovo. To this, Mr Lucas answered that there is no "magic solution" and added that he considered it counterproductive if the international community were to abandon the 'standards before status' approach and present new concepts now. Any possible solution for Kosovo must look at the likely impact on the whole region, he said, backed by **Assen Agov** (Bulgaria). Commenting on the upcoming Kosovo elections scheduled for 23 October Mr Lucas said it was important that the province's Serbian population participate and regretted that Belgrade had not encouraged Kosovo Serbs to do that. Other participants, including **Hans Raidel** (Germany) and Mr Bouvard emphasised the shortcomings of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo. Criticising the EU for spending "a lot of money ineffectively" Mr Raidel called for a review of EU programmes as well as the roles of UNMIK and KFOR.

18. He briefly commented on the progress in individual countries of the region and stressed the improved regional co-operation. Mr Lucas stressed that Serbia and Montenegro must comply with its international commitments, particularly with regard to co-operation with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Commenting on the EU's 'twin-track' approach, he said that Serbia and Montenegro was one state with two different economic parts. He added that he hoped that Serbia and Montenegro continued the union. Commenting on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Lucas depicted the transition of the NATO-led SFOR to EUFOR as a "showcase for new strategic partnership between NATO and EU". Germany would maintain its contingent of currently 1,100 soldiers. Positive developments in the country should not be ignored, but most people continue to "think along ethnic lines" as the last communal elections had shown, he added. The former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup> was an example for successful international crisis management, but the upcoming referendum against district reform poses a problem. Albania had the “potential for further reform”, particularly in the fight against organised crime and establishing an effective police and judicial system. Croatia had developed positively, including its co-operation with the ICC, despite some remaining issues, such as the pending extradition of former General Gotovina.

19. Mr Petrescu highlighted the problem of ‘ethnic hate’, the fragility of the economies and the large amount of weapons in the region. Mr Lucas concluded by saying that there was no alternative to the path of bringing the region closer to Euro-Atlantic structures. Concerning a possible future enlargement of the Alliance, State Secretary Kolbow said that the three candidate countries, Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, deserved a NATO perspective.

### **VIII. AFGHANISTAN**

20. Not surprisingly, Afghanistan featured high on the agenda of the meetings. Afghanistan was a litmus test for NATO’s resolve and capacity to offer a future to others to overcome security challenges, according to Mr Scharioth. He stressed the need to undertake nation building and the need to “win the hearts and minds of Afghans”. Germany was committed to assisting Afghanistan, even though a long-term presence in the country was unpopular among Germans. For example, German experts trained the Afghan police and the courses were now already envisaged until 2007.

21. Mr Scharioth warned against overly optimistic hopes for an early return from Afghanistan and said that he believed that the stabilisation of the country would require much more time than currently anticipated. He dismissed a reduction of troops in Afghanistan as “not possible” as large parts of the country suffered from continuing instability. Mr Stützle said that Allied troops should be used to destroy poppy fields.

22. To the list of the transatlantic community’s important common interests Mr Stützle added the reform of Russia. This depended on generous and far-sighted assistance provided by the US and Europe. Briefly referring to the tragic events in Beslan, Mr Agov expressed concern about Russia’s development and suggested that it should be put higher on the NAC’s agenda. Mr Bertram commented that many Western capitals still believed that President Vladimir Putin was stabilising Russia. This however, might not necessarily be the case and much has been done to increase the power of the presidency. Mr Bertram also noted a fundamental contradiction on how Russia presented Chechnya as an international problem, but adamantly refused any international involvement.

### **IX. TERRORISM**

23. Another key topic of the exchanges was terrorism. State Secretary **Fritz Rudolf Körper** of the German Federal Interior Ministry reminded participants that the threat posed by international terrorists had reached a new dimension and that the traditional distinction between military and law enforcement instruments was blurring. Moreover, as today’s security threats, such as those emanating from failed and failing states, were increasingly global in nature, national instruments were no longer sufficient to deal with them.

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<sup>1</sup> Turkey and the United States recognise the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name



24. In Mr Körper's view today's terrorist groups were characterised by:

- a changed profile of perpetrators (recruitment in different countries with different social backgrounds);
- a changed profile of attack (focus primarily on soft targets with the goal of killing as many people as possible without differentiation);
- a changed organisational profile (more diffuse, less stringently organised).

25. He underlined the need to focus on prevention and the importance of information gathering by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Germany's federal structure made improvements of its security architecture cumbersome (each of the 16 federal states had its own constitutional protection services and police), Mr Körper informed the group. Nonetheless, progress had been achieved, particularly in the areas of sharing information and analysis. On a European level, EUROPOL played an important role in information gathering and assessing potential security risks. Intensive and sustained international co-operation, especially within the EU and with the US, was crucial to tackle the threat posed by terrorists, he said. Measures that could further advance co-operation included a more centralised, EU-wide compilation of information, including the pooling of biometric data as well as establishing Visa databank, Mr Körper said.

26. However, police and military tools alone were insufficient to counter terrorist groups, he said. The West must take on the intellectual challenge and strengthen moderate Muslim forces. In this context Mr Körper regretted the 'polemic' discussion on Turkey's EU application and commented that extending an invitation to Turkey to join the EU would send a strong and positive signal of support to modern Islam. Members of the delegation, including Committee chairman Peter Viggers, emphasised the need to tackle social, economic, religious and philosophical circumstances that make terrorism possible.

## **X. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME**

27. The issue of Iran's nuclear programme was also briefly discussed during the exchanges in Berlin. The President of the German Federal Intelligence Service (*BND*), **August Hanning**, reminded participants that Iran's programme went beyond merely a civil programme. While Iran was not prepared to publicise its complete programme, it appeared that it continued activities that were 'critical' with regard to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In this context he described the activities at the Natanz and Arak facilities as especially problematic. Mr Hanning also pointed to Iran's attempts to build new or increase existing WMD capabilities in other areas, including in biological weapons research and missile technology. In the latter area, Russia, but also China and North Korea, had made significant contributions.

28. Mr Polenz considered Iran the most important challenge for the transatlantic partnership. Here, too, the Allies agree on the goal to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, but not on how to achieve this, he said. Both Mr Polenz and Mr Bertram dismissed a military option against Iran. State Secretary Scharioth said that the only chance was to build a package that convinced Iran to drop its enrichment plans. He briefly referred to the diplomatic efforts of the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), but added that agreement could only be reached if the EU, the US, and Russia worked together.

29. Mr Hanning offered a possible rationale for Iran's plans to develop nuclear weapons by reminding participants that Teheran had been attacked by WMD during the first Gulf War. Moreover, having been diplomatically and otherwise isolated over many years, the Iranian regime might conclude that from the 2003 Iraq war it needed WMD capabilities to defend itself. Israel's already existing capabilities probably also contributed to Iran's nuclear ambitions, according to

Mr Hanning. He reminded the delegation that a nuclear Iran would have significant consequences for Israel, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and the region as a whole.

30. The Members of the Sub-Committee also had the opportunity to raise the issue of the proliferation of WMD with senior German officials. Pointing to changing proliferation patterns, BND president Mr Hanning noted that WMD proliferation took no longer merely place between developed and undeveloped countries, but also between developing countries. Overall, Mr Hanning considered existing non-proliferation regimes, particularly the nuclear NPT, as rather successful, but important problems needed to be addressed. One of the greatest challenges for the NPT was that key countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba were not members and that North Korea had announced plans to leave the NPT. With regard to export controls, Mr Hanning emphasised that they were not effective against terrorist groups, which tried to obtain material illegally. Corruption of officials and scientists continued to pose problems in a number of countries. In this context he briefly referred to Russia and Ukraine, but added that there were, at present, no indications that nuclear material had been stolen. Moreover, export controls focused on trade, but not on know-how. Referring to the number of foreign students at German universities, he was concerned about the danger of fundamentalists obtaining knowledge in handling WMD-related materials. The case of the Pakistani scientist Khan showed that 'the genie was out of the bottle'. A number of 'prominent' terrorists already had a good knowledge of WMD, he added and recommended to further strengthen co-operation among exporting countries.

31. Mr Hanning also raised concern that 'stray scientists' in Iraq might proliferate know-how to terrorist groups. However, he doubted that al-Qaeda – or any non-state actor for that matter - could produce or handle nuclear weapons. While the intelligence official did, at present, put the risk of a catastrophic terrorist attack very high, he stressed that non-conventional attacks might occur. In this context he referred to earlier attempts by the Jordanian-born terrorist al-Zarqawi to produce ricin. Moreover, the BND had knowledge of plans as well as attempts by groups to obtain radiological weapons, he said.

32. Mr Hanning expressed scepticism that the US and the Allies could reach an agreement over the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Moreover, he identified unresolved problems with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), for example, that North Korea, Syria and Egypt had not joined while other countries had provided unreliable data. Mr Hanning also expressed concern that the CWC allowed trade with critical substances, some of which cannot be exported from Germany (but by others).

33. Mr Hanning briefly touched upon developments in a number of countries that gave cause for concern. He noted that Syria continued efforts to produce chemical weapons. With regard to Pakistan, he said that al-Qaeda had contact, albeit without result, with the Khan laboratories about BW, before 9-11. Moreover, the country attempted to obtain full control of the nuclear circle. North Korea was heavily dependent on export of weapons technology, the German intelligence official noted adding that the possibility of the country using WMD in a conflict as "very high". North Korea also had advanced BW and CW programmes and was active in developing missile capabilities further.

34. International co-operation among intelligence services was crucial to tackle WMD proliferation, Mr Hanning said. But both he and State Secretary Körper did not anticipate that the intelligence services could reach a level of co-operation similar to that of the law enforcement agencies.

## ***XI. THE USE OF FORCE***

35. During the visit to Berlin, members also had the opportunity to discuss an issue that featured prominently on the agenda of the Political Committee, namely the legality and legitimacy of using force. **Karl-Heinz Kamp** of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation stressed the need for a meaningful debate on this issue.

36. In his view, the combination of different factors required a debate on the possibility of applying military force pre-emptively as a means of last resort. These factors were the increased awareness of the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, the technical progress in weapon accuracy, plus the growing ability to project power over long distances for an increasing number of countries.

37. Stating that more and more countries would consider pre-emption as a possible last resort to avoid an attack that could cause catastrophic casualties, the speaker turned to the question of how pre-emption might be reconciled with international law – which is illegal under the UN Charter. The UN Charter no longer reflected today's security environment, according to Mr Kamp. It was therefore necessary to redefine the legality of the use of force, he added and pointed to the Kosovo air campaign of 1999 when NATO intervened without prior UN Security Council authorisation. To make pre-emptive military action legitimate, it must comply with three criteria, said the foreign policy expert: necessity (i.e. that force would be employed only when no other reasonable option existed to frustrate an attack), proportionality of means (i.e. that military action must be limited to those needed to defeat the attack), and immediacy (i.e. that an attack was imminent and the threat had been expressed, there was material action to support the perception of the threat and there was no option to tackle the threat at a later stage). However, none of suggested criteria were exactly measurable, Mr Kamp conceded. Therefore, a debate to create a consensus was urgently necessary, he said. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of intelligence and commented that obtaining reliable intelligence in time was always problematic. In his view there was either too much intelligence available - as on Iraq and before 9-11 - or too little – as was the case with North Korea. The discussion that followed the presentation by Mr Kamp, referred to the role of the UN for international law and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's panel which was scheduled to present findings on the UN reform in the area of security by the end of this year. With regard to international security issues, Mr Kamp said that there was "no international community", but that it was always a 'coalition of the willing' that provided the military forces necessary for international action. All participants agreed that there was no easy answer on the issue of pre-emption and that prospects for finding common ground within NATO were slim. This was partly due to the different use of the terms 'pre-emption' and 'prevention' in different countries. Concluding the discussion, Mr Kamp bemoaned the lack of discussion on the issue, not least because a misperception existed that 'Germany did not have interests'.

38. Concluding the programme in Berlin, Mr Pastusiak thanked the German delegation for hosting the visit. The Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations will continue to work on the issues and plans to visit North America and Spain next year, he announced.

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