

NATOs Parlamentariske Forsamling
NPA alm. del - Bilag 34
Offentligt

NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire de l'OTAN

KORRESPONDENT
FR. SIRENETTA SPARSØ

I BOKS HER

i. LUDV. SEKRETARIAT

IA

12428/04

25 November 2004

Dear Sir/Madam,

Please find attached a copy of the Policy Recommendations of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted at its Fiftieth Annual Session in Venice, Italy, in November 2004. I ask you to distribute these documents to all members of your delegation (including Committee members included).

I would be grateful if you could also distribute these Policy Recommendations to the appropriate government and parliamentary authorities in your country (Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers, Leaders or Speakers of Parliaments and Heads of parliamentary Delegations and Foreign Affairs Committees).

As you know, the Policy Recommendations are also available on the Assembly website, www.nato-pa.int.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

David Hobbs
Deputy Secretary General

To Secretaries of Member and Associate Delegations



NATO Parliamentary Assembly

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

**FIFTIETH ANNUAL SESSION
VENICE, ITALY
NOVEMBER 2004**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Resolutions

| | | |
|------------|--|----|
| 328 | on Trafficking in Children | 1 |
| 329 | on NATO Operations in Afghanistan | 5 |
| 330 | on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development: The Challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan | 7 |
| 331 | on Reinvigorating the Transatlantic Security Dialogue | 10 |
| 332 | on Confronting Nuclear Proliferation | 13 |

RESOLUTION 328

on

TRAFFICKING IN CHILDREN*

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** that trafficking in human beings constitutes an intolerable affront to human dignity as well as a threat to stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area;
2. **Reaffirming** its resolution 323 on Trafficking in Human Beings adopted at the Assembly's Annual Session in Orlando in November 2003;
3. **Acknowledging** that trafficking in children poses specific problems within the general issues of trafficking in human beings and the fight against organized crime and therefore requires member governments and parliaments to adapt their policies and legal frameworks;
4. **Alarmed** by the new trends in the trafficking of children in Europe, including new routes and new forms of exploitation, and **convinced** of the necessity to adapt policy to take into account these changing patterns;
5. **Persuaded** that the struggle against trafficking in children should include adequate policies aimed at prevention, law enforcement and prosecution, victim identification, assistance and reintegration, as well as eradication of the root causes of this phenomenon;
6. **Convinced** of the need to deal with internal as well as trans-border trafficking in children, with the supply side as well as the demand and to combine prosecution of traffickers and protection of the victims;
7. **Insisting** also that cooperation between countries of origin, of transit and of destination is crucial, and **welcoming**, in this regard, recent initiatives taken by European and international organisations to advance the fight against trafficking in children in Europe;
8. **Stressing** however that governments and international organisations should avoid creating overlapping or competing initiatives and that coordination and cooperation should always be a priority;
9. **Applauding** the adoption by the North Atlantic Council at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit of a NATO Policy on combating trafficking in human beings and **encouraging** all member and partner governments and parliaments to fully cooperate in the implementation of this policy;
10. **Praising** the adoption in the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe of an enhanced legal framework for the protection of children and the fight against trafficking in the European Union and **welcoming** the adoption of the new expanded Daphne programme;
11. **Commending** the appointment by the OSCE of a Special Representative in Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, as well as the appointment by the OSCE-Parliamentary Assembly of

* presented by the Committee on Civil Dimension of Security

a Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues, and **hoping** that they will both play a leading role in the coordination of OSCE policies against trafficking, particularly in children;

12. **Encouraging** the rapid adoption and implementation by member countries of the Stability Pact Task Force on trafficking in human beings and national action plans against trafficking in children;

13. **Strongly supporting** the preparation of a Council of Europe Convention on action against trafficking in human beings as a means of furthering and enhancing the UN Palermo Protocol and **calling upon** member states to provide the highest possible level of cooperation to this process, ensuring in particular the inclusion of effective implementation mechanisms and measures taking into account the specific features of trafficking in children and the specific needs of child victims of trafficking;

14. **Calling upon** member and partner parliaments to give careful consideration to the UNICEF Handbook for Parliamentarians on child protection, especially the parts on sexual exploitation of children and trafficking and sale of children;

15. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. Legal measures

- i. to ratify and implement the existing international laws and principles concerning child trafficking, including the UN Palermo Protocol, the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Form of Child Labour and the UNICEF Guidelines on the Protection of the Rights of Children Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe;
- ii. to review, evaluate and, if necessary, reform existing legal frameworks to ensure that they take into account the particularities of child trafficking and that they adequately cover all phases and all forms of trafficking;
- iii. to grant children victims of trafficking the legal status of victims, in accordance with human rights requirements as spelled out in the UN Convention on the Rights of Children;
- iv. to outlaw the dissemination of child pornography in any way, shape or form, especially on the internet;
- v. to prohibit military personnel from patronising child prostitutes, particularly when military personnel are deployed;

b. Victim identification, assistance and re-integration

- i. to adopt measures to facilitate the identification of migrant children, including passport and visa regulations, the limited use of biometrics data and systems of data registration to record unaccompanied minors;
- ii. to ensure that all victims, regardless of their legal status, have access to shelters and to all necessary assistance;

- iii. to ensure that all identification and assistance programmes aim primarily to protect the child's rights and dignity;
 - iv. to create, in cooperation with non-governmental institutions, reintegration programmes and activities granting child victims non-discriminatory access to structures specifically designed for children;
 - v. to monitor and evaluate the existing reintegration programmes for effectiveness, focusing in particular on the need to ensure lasting re-integration away from trafficking networks;
- c. National and international coordination
- i. to ensure proper coordination between national authorities in charge of counter-trafficking and assistance to victims of trafficking, including all relevant public and private stakeholders;
 - ii. to provide the highest level possible of cooperation within regional and international structures and encourage bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information and of best practices among countries of origin, of transit and of destination;
 - iii. to harmonize, whenever possible, national legislation and penalties to avoid jurisdiction gaps and to provide appropriate levels of investigative and judicial cooperation;
- d. Training
- i. to include information about trafficking and victims' rights in the curricula of schools, police academies, law schools, and social worker training centres;
 - ii. to provide general training for international military, police peacekeepers and related civilian contractors on the subject of child trafficking;
 - iii. to pay special attention to training in the area of trafficking in children, child rights, and special protection measures for child victims of trafficking;
16. **CALLS UPON** governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations:
- a. to conduct research and provide more comprehensive statistical data on the extent, nature and changing patterns of child trafficking and child labour in Europe;
 - b. to organise and promote both large-scale and small-scale awareness-raising campaigns, differentiating between target groups and also addressing the ethical dimension of trafficking;
 - c. to support projects aimed at combating the root causes of child trafficking in countries of origin, as well as in countries of destination;
17. **REITERATES** its determination:
- a. to ensure that it provides a forum to discuss and promote the fight against trafficking in children and the coordination of efforts among its members;
 - b. to use its structures, such as the Mediterranean Special Group and other working groups to develop a dialogue with Mediterranean partners and observers to the NATO-PA on the global issue of trafficking in human beings.

RESOLUTION 329

on

NATO OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the stabilisation of Afghanistan is in the strategic interest of the Allies and the countries in the region;
2. **Noting** the NATO Istanbul Summit Communiqué wherein it was declared, *inter alia*, that contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority;
3. **Commending** the actions of the Alliance so far to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan;
4. **Recognising** the contributions of all 26 allies and 11 partner countries to both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom;
5. **Commending** the government of Afghanistan and the international community for conducting the first nation-wide presidential election in the history of the country;
6. **Noting** the successful contribution of many international governmental and non-governmental organisations to the presidential elections, achieved through co-operation with the NATO ISAF mission;
7. But **recognising** that the task is far from complete and will require a long-term commitment and additional resources;
8. **Understanding** that the mission in Afghanistan represents NATO's first truly out-of-area mission;
9. **Further understanding** that the Alliance made specific commitments at the Istanbul summit to provide additional forces and support assets to the mission in Afghanistan;
10. **Noting** that although additional forces have been committed, they are not of the nature requested by the commanders on the ground who specifically underlined the need for a mobile brigade;
11. **Further noting** that stability will be difficult if not impossible to achieve unless much more is done to control the narcotics traffic, the independent power of certain key regional warlords and the Taliban regime remnants;
12. **Recognising** that the Afghan government cannot do this without large-scale international assistance over a period of years;
13. **Further recognising** that the Alliance has to a large extent staked its credibility on the success of this mission and that the credibility of the UN is also at stake;
14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance to make a long-term commitment to the stabilisation of Afghanistan by:
 - a. committing a larger, more mobile and combat-ready force to Afghanistan for at least one year;

* presented by the Defence and Security Committee

- b. supporting the national parliamentary elections in Spring 2005 by providing adequate assistance and security across the country, at least at the same level as during the presidential elections;
- c. working with the Afghan government to identify and bring under control the regional warlords and the Taliban regime remnants who threaten the viability of the nation;
- d. actively supporting efforts to reduce heroin production and trafficking in Afghanistan and defining a long-term strategy for combating the drug problem.

RESOLUTION 330

on

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN*

The Assembly,

1. **Noting** United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1483, 1511 and 1546 on Iraq, as well as UNSCR 1401, 1419, 1471, 1510 and 1563 regarding the situation in Afghanistan;
2. **Aware** that violent conflict in developing societies inflicts appalling visible and invisible damage, and the longer conflict rages, the more destructive are its consequences;
3. **Noting** that the post-Cold War era has been marked by a proliferation of wars in the developing world, compelling Western governments, international development and lending institutions, the United Nations and NGOs to allocate resources to helping war-torn countries;
4. **Recognising** that in the wake of the attacks of September 11, the international community has become increasingly aware of the close relationship between development and security;
5. **Lamenting** the fact that Western governments confront serious barriers to inter-ministerial and international co-operation and are therefore poorly structured to offer emergency post-conflict support;
6. **Acknowledging** that it is only after active hostilities have ceased that attention can shift from humanitarian relief operations to longer-term reconstruction efforts and the revival of basic services;
7. **Convinced** therefore that a reasonable degree of peace and security is the *sine qua non* for initiating economic, political and cultural revival;
8. **Concerned** that the international community generally spends far more capital and energy coping with the aftermath of war and internal conflict than it would have had it taken earlier measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict;
9. **Noting** that the most successful efforts to spark development in post-conflict societies have involved wide and deep consultation with recipient societies;
10. **Applauding** the positive impact of Community-driven Reconstruction Strategies (CDRs), which accord local and broadly representative councils significant powers to decide how development funds will be spent;
11. **Acknowledging** that the need for foreign assistance and the recipient country's capacity to put it to good use generally increases significantly three years after a conflict;

12. But **concerned** that aid is almost never disbursed along such intrinsically rational criteria, as the largest aid inflows often occur in the immediate wake of a conflict and decline from that point onward;

13. **Recognising** the potential problems that can arise from highly restrictive contract bidding procedures and the failure to engage fully local people and governments in their own reconstruction efforts;

14. **Applauding** the interest of Western countries as well as the contributions of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and a range of NGOs in seeking to reduce violence and fostering genuine reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq;

15. **Yet noting** the lack of progress that has been made within Iraq as a result of widespread insurgency, planning shortfalls, and the occupying authorities' unrealistic emphasis on market driven solutions rather than meeting immediate security and human needs in a period of grave economic, political and social crisis errors that likely inflamed some of the violence currently besetting that country and further retarding the reconstruction process;

16. **Recognising** the need for western governments and NATO to work with Afghan authorities as well as other governments from Central Asia to combat the burgeoning opium trade, which threatens to overwhelm Afghanistan's highly fragile political and economic reconstruction;

17. **Acknowledging** the challenge to all Western countries to generate sufficient and sustained funding to underwrite humanitarian relief, reconstruction and longer-term development in Afghanistan;

18. **Emphasizing** that the greatest hope for the citizens of Afghanistan and of Iraq for peace, prosperity and security rests in the election and preservation of legitimate representative governments;

19. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to accord a far higher priority than in the past to conflict prevention in order to avoid having to deal with far more daunting post-conflict problems;
- b. to shape post-conflict reconstruction policy in accordance with several core principles including the ideas that:
 - i. security is *sine qua non* for beginning the reconstruction process;
 - ii. UN Security Council endorsement of a post-conflict operation or an intervention itself lends far greater legitimacy to the operation;
 - iii. properly coordinated with the democratically-elected President of Afghanistan and with the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, reconstruction aid can most effectively nurture development of stable, democratic governments by helping to empower them to meet the needs of the Afghan and Iraqi peoples;
 - iv. a sense of local ownership over development processes and a degree of decentralisation in decision making and resource allocation increase the likelihood of ultimate success;
 - v. international lending organisations and NGOs have a key role to play in ensuring adequate dispatch of aid, accountability and transparency in its delivery;

- vi. rapid job creation and swift restoration of basic utility, health and social services help inculcate civil societies with the sense that they have a stake in the reconstruction process;
- vii. the sequencing of aid policies should be driven by local conditions rather than artificially established deadlines dictated by the Western political calendar;
- c. to begin international peace operations with a political basis for peace;
- d. to strive for UN mandates for critical missions and to allocate sufficient resources to underwrite those missions;
- e. to cultivate a sense of local ownership of the reconstruction and development process through close consultation and in-depth consideration of the local concerns during shared decision making;
- f. to engage local firms in the reconstruction process and to strive to employ local rather than foreign workers when possible;
- g. to ensure that more weight is given to achieving social stability over radical liberalisation schemes in the immediate wake of conflict;
- h. to work towards rebuilding social trust and a more vibrant civil society by:
 - i. encouraging rather than suppressing labour unions and other civil society institutions that are needed to build the habit of dialogue and the practice of pluralism;
 - ii. encouraging a free and independent media both as a foundation of democratic practice and to ensure greater transparency in the use of development funds and the organization of reconstruction efforts;
- i. to empower central governments by providing support through multi-donor trusts which gives recipient governments a greater say in establishing development spending priorities without having to navigate through a tangle of international bureaucracy and to urge recipient governments that good governance standards are met;
- j. to ensure that the structures of donor aid packages are coherent with post-conflict development goals and are coordinated with other donors and recipients;
- k. to continue to work to find a basis for a common approach to Iraq which remains in the midst of a very serious security and political crisis;
- l. to take steps not to allow the significant resources allocated to Afghanistan and Iraq to crowd out resources needed to assist other developing countries including those that are making progress in implementing difficult economic and social reforms;
- m. to administer oil contracts in Iraq in a transparent fashion, and to ensure that these revenues are used to underwrite fundamental needs like a social safety net;
- n. to bolster Afghanistan's central governmental capacity to assert its authority throughout the country by increasing the presence of international security forces;
- o. to work with the Afghan government and its neighbours to develop innovative strategies and alternative crop programmes in order to curtail poppy production in Afghanistan;

- p. to continue efforts under way in both Iraq and Afghanistan to advance the protection of basic human rights, paying special attention to the needs of women who can provide a vital catalyst to development;
- q. to work with the Afghan authorities and local groups in order to enhance the process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration.

RESOLUTION 331

on

REINVIGORATING THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY DIALOGUE*

The Assembly,

1. **Welcoming** the renewed unity demonstrated by NATO Allies at the Istanbul Summit as a sign of their willingness and determination to rebuild trust and confidence in the Alliance and work further on the urgent adaptation of the Alliance in order to meet the political and security challenges of the 21st century;
2. **Recognising** that terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organised crime, but also failed and failing states as well as internal conflict, present the most serious challenges to international security, and that NATO has an important role in tackling these threats;
3. **Praising** the NATO Istanbul summit decision to expand NATO's operations in Afghanistan by creating new Provincial Reconstruction Teams and enhancing support for the electoral process;
4. **Affirming** that a stable Iraq is in the common interest of the member states as well as in the interest of the international community and **welcoming** the Allies' agreement, in response to the Iraqi Interim Government request and in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1546, to offer NATO's assistance to the government of Iraq in the training of security forces, as an essential step towards the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country;
5. **Noting** and **commending** the progress towards the full implementation of the Prague initiatives on the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, as well as on the strengthening of NATO's capabilities and the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF);
6. **Affirming** the importance of continuing to develop the established NATO Partnerships and **welcoming** the decision to further enhance partnerships, particularly the Mediterranean Dialogue, the creation of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the increased focus on relations with the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia;
7. **Stressing** the increasing importance of NATO's cooperation with the EU, particularly in South-East Europe, in accordance with the Berlin Plus agreement and the Framework for an enhanced NATO-EU dialogue and **emphasizing** the need for a concerted approach to promote security and stabilisation in the Western Balkans;
8. **Concerned**, however, that differences of opinion about the authorisation and use of military force that have been raised over the war in Iraq have not yet been resolved into an international agreement or an operational consensus on the use of force;
9. **Determined** that continuing differences as to whether the use of military force in Iraq was justified shall not stand in the way of future cooperation in stabilising that country;

10. **Strongly persuaded** that confirmation of the Alliance's political priorities and of basic principles for action is essential to facilitate future consensus building and allow for success of the Alliance's initiatives;

11. **Recognising** that as NATO cannot meet all challenges to international security NATO must set priorities and needs to come to agreements with international organisations like the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and the African Union;

12. **Stressing** the need to find a consensus on the level of ambition of the Alliance, particularly with regard to available capabilities and its role in projecting stability and conflict prevention;

13. **Encouraging** NATO Allies to avoid the disconnect between political decisions and the implementation of commitments, particularly in key areas like Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, among others;

14. **Further encouraging** the Allies to strengthen efforts and to increase investments in the transformation of their armed forces as agreed at the Prague 2002 Summit;

15. **Convinced** that a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be achieved with strong US and European engagement, and that a peace agreement will also help stabilise other parts of the greater Middle East;

16. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to re-invigorate the role of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as the Allies' primary forum for consultations addressing crucial security issues and engage in a genuine strategic dialogue in the NAC on the current and future role of the Alliance in tackling the new threats to international security, including military and political priorities, the role of prevention strategies and NATO's role in conflict prevention;
- b. to consider devising a more operational agreement on the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation;
- c. to consider declassifying Prague's NATO Military Concept for defence against terrorism, as a means to increase public awareness of the threat posed by terrorism and NATO's determination to contribute to deterring, defending and protecting our societies against this threat;
- d. to reinvigorate policy co-ordination concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including within the Quartet (EU, UN, USA and Russia), in order to help the parties resume direct peace negotiations;
- e. to improve military capabilities as agreed in the 2002 Prague summit in order to match means with NATO ambitions;
- f. to improve the co-ordination efforts among Allies and with the EU as well as other international organisations, in particular the United Nations, especially in the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, in accordance with the basic principles of international law;
- g. to examine the adequacy of the role of NATO in arms control and to strengthen multilateral arms control regimes and legally binding export controls;

- h. to ensure enforcement of non-proliferation regimes and a successful NPT Review Conference;
- i. to engage in a dialogue on NATO's role in promoting effective conflict prevention, including through training and capacity building, especially in the case of failing states, in close partnership with the United Nations, the OSCE, the EU, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other regional organisations, in particular the African Union;
- j. to improve the planning and co-ordination of national contributions to the NRF, EU Headline Goals and Battle Groups among others in order to avoid duplications and lack of clarity.

RESOLUTION 332
on
CONFRONTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION*

The Assembly,

1. **Convinced** that nuclear weapons are a risk to mankind, and all countries should take steps to promote a safer world by pursuing their eventual elimination;
2. **Recognising** that for more than 50 years, the international community has struggled to make the acquisition and development of such weapons more difficult and less desirable;
3. **Persuaded** that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and has led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons programmes;
4. **Aware** that changes in the international security environment require the strengthening of the NPT regime and its adaptation to the threats of the 21st century aiming at its universalisation;
5. **Extremely concerned** that North Korea has declared its withdrawal from the NPT and is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons;
6. **Remaining concerned** by the risks of proliferation presented by Iran's nuclear programme and activities, nonetheless **welcomes** Iran's recent announcement to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and **calls on** the Iranian Government to comply permanently with the relevant IAEA provisions;
7. **Profoundly disturbed** by the disclosure of a worldwide black market covering weapons technologies and nuclear materials from various arsenals, as was the case with that instigated by Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan;
8. **Particularly concerned** that some of the technologies and materials necessary to build nuclear devices, because of their dual-use, have become relatively easy to acquire by terrorist or criminal groups;
9. **Praising** Libya's recent decision to halt and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programmes;
10. **Strongly persuaded** that to maximise effectiveness in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons and other WMD, any international response firstly requires a coordinated transatlantic approach;
11. **Welcoming** the G-8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation adopted by the G-8 Summit at Sea Island and the initiatives adopted by NATO at its 2004 Istanbul Summit to deter, prevent, counter and respond to the threat and potential use of WMD;

* presented by the Science and Technology Committee

12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material by supporting the aims of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in strengthening national export control systems, removing legal loopholes, and enacting legally binding controls;
 - b. to support the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by increasing international military, intelligence, and law enforcement cooperation;
 - c. to amend the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to make the transport of WMD on commercial vessels an internationally recognised offence;
 - d. to negotiate a non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to stop the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes;
 - e. to expand the G-8 Global Partnership and better coordinate all initiatives to support cooperative non-proliferation projects in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States aimed at better securing weapons, materials and technical expertise;
 - f. to make the IAEA Additional Protocol mandatory for NPT members and by 2005 to allow only states that have signed this Protocol to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programmes;
 - g. to conclude that states declared by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations, have deprived themselves of their right to develop sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, such as enrichment and reprocessing;
 - h. to promote the creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors, which would focus exclusively on safeguards and verification;
 - i. to empower IAEA inspectors with the right to conduct broader inspections – such as those performed recently in Libya and Iran – in every member country that has not signed an Additional Protocol;
 - j. to strongly urge North Korea to refrain from developing nuclear weapons, cease the marketing of ballistic missile technology and resume the Six Party Talks as soon as possible;
 - k. to use all appropriate diplomatic and political means to convince Iran not to develop nuclear weapons;
 - l. to persuade Iran to comply with the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 18 September 2004, by providing further information and explanations about its nuclear programme and suspending all enrichment-related activities in order to promote confidence;
 - m. to strengthen the NPT by implementing the decisions of all NPT conferences;
 - n. to ensure that the withdrawal of any country from the NPT would prompt an immediate review of that country's nuclear activities by the UN Security Council;
 - o. to engage the states that remain outside the NPT and possess declared or undeclared nuclear weapons – India, Israel and Pakistan – and convince them to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and gradually eliminate production of fissile material;

- p. to strongly urge China to refrain from developing new nuclear weapons;
 - q. to make the United States Government aware of the concern that its research into the development of a robust nuclear earth penetrator or of any other new nuclear devices could affect international nuclear non-proliferation efforts;
 - r. to seriously examine the issue of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the NATO-Russia Council and eventually submit a proposal on a phased and verifiable withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.
-

