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**ECONOMICS AND
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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DRAFT RESOLUTION

on

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

presented by

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Chairman Rapporteur

The Assembly,

1. **Aware** that violence in developing societies inflicts appalling visible and invisible damage, and the long-term ravages, the most destructive are its consequences;
2. **Noting** that the end of the Cold War has been marked by a proliferation of wars in the developing world, causing Western governments, international development and lending institutions, the United Nations and NGOs to scale resources to helping war-torn countries;
3. **Recognising** that in the wake of the attacks of September 11 the international community has become increasingly aware of the close relationship between development and security;
4. **Lamenting** the fact that Western governments confront serious barriers to inter-ministerial and international co-operation and are therefore poorly structured to offer emergency post-conflict support;
5. **Acknowledging** that only after hostilities have ceased that attention can shift from humanitarian relief operations to long-term reconstruction efforts and the revival of basic services;
6. **Convinced** therefore that a reasonable degree of peace and security is the *sine qua non* for initiating economic, political and cultural reform;
7. **Concerned** that the international community generally spends far more capital and energy coping with the aftermath of war and internal conflict than it would have had it taken earlier measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

8. **Noting** that the most successful efforts to spark development in post-conflict societies have involved wide and deep consultation with recipient societies;
9. **Applauding** the positive impact of Community-driven Reconstruction Strategies (CDRs), which accord local and broadly representative councils significant powers to decide how development funds will be spent;
10. **Acknowledging** that the need for foreign assistance and the recipient country's capacity to put it to good use generally increases significantly three years after a conflict;
11. But **concerned** that aid is almost never disbursed along such intrinsically rational criteria, as the largest aid inflows often occur in the immediate wake of a conflict and decline from that point onward;
12. **Recognising** the potential problems that can arise from highly restrictive contract bidding procedures and the failure to engage fully local people and governments in their own reconstruction efforts;
13. **Applauding** the interest of Western countries as well as the contributions of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and a range of NGOs in seeking to reduce violence and fostering genuine reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq;
14. **Yet noting** the lack of progress that has been made within Iraq as a result of widespread insurgency, planning shortfalls, and the occupying authorities' unrealistic emphasis on market driven solutions rather than meeting immediate security and human needs in a period of grave economic, political and social crisis-errors that likely inflamed some of the violence currently besetting that country and further retarding the reconstruction process;
15. **Recognising** the need for western governments and NATO to work with Afghan authorities as well as other governments from Central Asia to combat the burgeoning opium trade, which threatens to overwhelm Afghanistan's highly fragile political and economic reconstruction;
16. **Acknowledging** the challenge to all Western countries to generate sufficient and sustained funding to underwrite humanitarian relief, reconstruction and longer-term development in Afghanistan;
17. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to accord a far higher priority than in the past to conflict prevention in order to avoid having to deal with far more daunting post-conflict problems;
 - b. to shape post-conflict reconstruction policy in accordance with several core principles including the ideas that:
 - i. security is sine qua non for beginning the reconstruction process;
 - ii. UN Security Council endorsement of a post-conflict operation or an intervention itself lends far greater legitimacy to the operation;
 - iii. a sense of local ownership over development processes and a degree of decentralisation in decision making and resource allocation increase the likelihood of ultimate success;
 - iv. international lending organizations and NGOs have a key role to play in ensuring adequate dispatch of aid, accountability and transparency in its delivery;

- v. rapid job creation and swift restoration of basic utility, health and social services help inculcate civil societies in the sense that they have a stake in the reconstruction process;
 - vi. the sequencing of aid policies should be driven by local conditions rather than artificially established deadlines dictated by the Western political calendar;
 - c. to begin international peace operations with a political basis for peace;
 - d. to strive for UN mandates for critical missions and to allocate sufficient resources to underwrite those missions;
 - e. to cultivate a sense of local ownership of the reconstruction and development process through close consultation and shared decision-making;
 - f. to engage local firms in the reconstruction process and to strive to employ local rather than foreign workers when possible;
 - g. to ensure that more weight is given to achieving social stability over radical liberalisation schemes in the immediate wake of conflict;
 - h. to work towards rebuilding social trust and a more vibrant civil society by:
 - i. encouraging rather than suppressing labour unions and other civil society institutions that are needed to build the habit of dialogue and the practice of pluralism;
 - ii. encouraging a free and independent media both as a foundation of democratic practice and to ensure greater transparency in the use of development funds and the organization of reconstruction efforts;
 - i. to empower central governments by providing support through multi-donor trusts which gives recipient governments a greater say in establishing development spending priorities without having to navigate through a tangle of international bureaucracy;
 - j. to ensure that the structures of donor aid packages are coherent with post-conflict development goals and are coordinated with other donors and recipients;
 - k. to continue to work to find a basis for a common approach to Iraq which remains in the midst of a very serious security and political crisis;
 - l. to take steps not to allow the significant resources allocated to Afghanistan and Iraq to crowd out resources needed to assist other developing countries including those that are making progress in implementing difficult economic and social reforms;
 - m. to administer oil contracts in Iraq in a transparent fashion, and to ensure that these revenues are used to underwrite fundamental needs like a social safety net;
 - n. to bolster Afghanistan's central governmental capacity to assert its authority throughout the country by increasing the presence of international security forces;
 - o. to work with the Afghan government and its neighbours to develop innovative strategies to curtail poppy production in Afghanistan;
 - p. to continue efforts under way in both Iraq and Afghanistan to advance the protection of basic human rights, paying special attention to the needs of women who can provide a vital catalyst to development.
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