Executive SummaryThe overview analyses challenges and options facing Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) at the start ofthe 21stcentury. It provides an analytical basis for the formulation of a coherent Danish Africapolicy, which includes foreign, development, trade and security policy towards Africa. Recentyears have witnessed new opportunities and encouraging developments in Africa, led byAfrican countries’ own initiatives. A new Danish policy is meant to support these positivedevelopments. Despite the encouraging signs, the challenges for peace, security, growth andpoverty reduction remain huge. Africa is the continent furthest from reaching the MillenniumDevelopment Goals.The African Economy – the challenge of generating growthEconomic growth is crucial to poverty reduction. In SSA the average per capita income hasdeclined in the 1980s and 1990s. For the majority of the countries, even the most recent growthrates are still too low to reduce the number of extremely poor men, women and children.Private sector-led growth is fundamental for Africa. A few African countries have so farmanaged to transform the good political intentions into sustainable changes that create anenabling environment for the private sector. The informal sector of Africa’s economies is stillsubstantial (often equal to 50% of GDP), and encompasses both a large share of theagricultural activities, micro-enterprises and self-employment in urban centres.The agricultural sector constitutes the economic backbone of most African countries, and thissector will remain the mainstay of economic growth benefiting Africa’s poor for years to come.Increased agricultural production is necessary to fight starvation and malnutrition, and rapidgrowth in agricultural production and productivity is a precondition for economic take-off andsustained poverty reduction. The agricultural sectors constitute the largest part of the privatesector, with agriculture accounting for more than 50% of GDP, over 50% of export earnings,and employing over 70% of the workforce.Poverty and environmental degradation mutually reinforce each other. The environmentalaspects of growth have to be addressed in order to implement sustainable solutions.The HIV/AIDS pandemic represents a major threat to economic development in Africa. Outof the 38 million people in the world suffering from HIV/AIDS approximately 25 million livein Africa. Recent estimates of the macroeconomic costs of HIV/AIDS suggest that theHIV/AIDS related drops in GDP range between 0,3 and 1,5%. Although this appears modestit will translate into larger effects over time.Globalisation offers an opportunity to integrate Africa in the world economy. Some barriersremain for increased international trade of African products. Industrialised countries’requirements to meet sanitary and phytosanitary standards and related food safety regulationsare probably the most difficult hurdles among the many non-tariff barriers confronting African

exporters. African countries and African exporters need to develop capabilities that ensureconformity with these standards.Closer coherence between trade policies and development and security policies is still needed atglobal, regional as well as country levels. While the liberalisation of world trade is expected togenerate a large global welfare-improvement, it is less likely to reduce poverty in Africa. Freeaccess to industrialised markets is not sufficient to reduce poverty. Preferential arrangementsfor the next 10-15 years could provide Africa with the window of opportunity to improve theproductivity and competitiveness of African businesses. Job creation for unemployed anddiscontent youth is another area to focus on.Peace and stabilityViolent conflicts in Africa affect the lives of millions, and civilians account for more than 90%of casualties in conflict. Conflicts seriously affect neighbouring states and cause instability aswell as hamper economic development in the affected country and in the sub-region. Theyfurthermore often last for more than a decade. Most of Africa’s conflicts occur in weak stateswith poor political and economic governance and poor development records. The root causesof most conflicts can be traced decades back, and they are often result of continued lack ofdevelopment – politically and economically.Development of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights are key aspects ofnation building to prevent conflicts. Long-term political and economic commitment frominternational partners to assist a country in addressing social, economic and political needs addsubstantially to conflict prevention.Responses to conflicts in Africa have been reinforced in recent years by Africa itself. The roleof AU and the regional organisations has been strengthened and is expected to result in anoperational African Security Architecture. This promising new activism has led to a significantdecrease in the number of new, armed conflicts and to new, if still fragile, peace solutions intwo major conflict areas.It will be important to increase focus on the prevention of conflicts, on building a regionalframework for effective crisis management in imminent or on-going conflicts in Africa, and onconsolidating peace through post-conflict measures.There are currently 4-5 million refugees and an estimated 12-13 million internally displacedpeople in SSA. Influxes of refugees and migrants have large social consequences for thoseaffected and for the countries receiving them, and it lead to instability with the risk of furtherconflict. Special attention to this problem has to be part of the effort of resolving conflict andpreventing new conflicts. Living conditions for both internally displaced, refugees and the localpopulation are often insufficient, and the capacity to provide protection for refugees is ofteninadequate. This places a large humanitarian burden on many African countries, and there is noreason to believe that migration figures will decline dramatically over the next decade.

Denmark will become member of the UN Security Council in 2005-2006. One of the Danishpriorities is security, growth and development in Africa. Experiences from the new DanishAfrica Programme for Peace, decades of experience in development cooperation and recentDanish involvement in peacekeeping missions provide strategic guidance to this work. As partof the Danish membership it could be considered to address some of the factors that fuel orare relevant to conflicts in Africa, including natural resources, regional approaches, unemployedand discontent youth, human rights violations, and illegal trade of small arms.Good governance, human rights and democracyGood governance and democracy is a fundamental prerequisite for effective use of resourcesfor poverty reduction and a corner stone for nation building, peace and stability. There areencouraging signs that several countries in Africa, both individually and collectively, showcommitment hereto. However, economic, cultural, and structural factors tend to prevent thefull implementation of good intentions. Corruption is a major problem, and long-termsolutions will depend not least on the successful implementation of public service reform andprocurement regulations.The means to enforce human rights are often not present. Institutions such as the courts,police and prison services, human rights commissions, national administrations and parliamentdo not have the capacity to deal with human rights issues. A strong civil society voice on thismatter has in many countries been instrumental in pressing through some of the necessaryimprovements.Denmark is generally considered a consistent and qualified partner in supporting goodgovernance; human rights and democratisation efforts and can contribute through developmentsupport as well as the bilateral and multilateral political dialogue with African partners.Development of Human ResourcesAfrica needs a more well-educated and healthy workforce to be able to increase economicgrowth for the benefits of the poor. Health and education indicators are generally lower forAfrica than for any other continent and the indicators have shown only marginal improvementsover the last three decades. But even when a country succeeds in creating a well-educated andhealthy workforce, this development is often undermined by a number of factors, one beingHIV/AIDS.The education systems suffer a number of problems and shortcomings due to understaffing,under-funding, poor teacher training etc. The low quality of primary schools leads to lowenrolments, poor attendance and high dropout rates, especially for girls. The education sectoris, moreover, heavily affected by the impact of HIV/AIDS, since teachers is a high-risk group.The health sector of most African countries faces numerous problems caused mainly by thecombination of declining resources in real terms and an escalating disease burden. HIV/AIDS,drug resistant malaria and other mainly preventable diseases have aggravated this burden.Furthermore, countries are now facing a double disease burden due to the arrival of “modern”

mainly life-style related diseases. At the same time the health situation for the poor is gravelyaffected by lack of access to clean water and sanitation.Africa is by far the most severely affected region in terms of HIV/AIDS. In many countries,life expectancy is now 40 years or less. African women are at greater risk of becoming infectedat an earlier age than men. This development, affecting all parts of society, poses a seriousthreat to the development process.Gender inequalities impose large costs on the well being of women, men and children,profoundly affecting their ability to improve their lives. Gender inequalities reduce productivityin farms and enterprises, thus impeding prospects for reducing poverty and achieving economicprogress.Denmark has extensive experience in the field of development of human resources based onlong-term sector programmes with eight partner countries in SSA and with South Africa.A coherent approachA coherent and strategic approach to the challenges in SSA would contribute to a morepeaceful and prosperous Africa. The broad range of challenges for Africa in the 21stcenturydemands a multifaceted and coherent approach, based on Africa’s own will. The newopportunities can be grasped with new initiatives to bring about security, growth anddevelopment. The Danish membership of the UN Security Council provides an opportunity toincrease the attention towards Africa in the years to come.

CONTENTS1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................82.DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND GOALS IN AFRICA............ 102.1 RICH IN RESOURCES BUT AT THE MARGIN OF WORLD ECONOMY...................................... 102.2 THE CHALLENGE OF ADDRESSING POVERTY......................................................................... 112.3 THEMILLENNIUMDEVELOPMENTGOALS............................................................................ 122.4 ARE THEMDGS ACHIEVABLE INAFRICA?............................................................................. 132.5 POVERTYREDUCTIONSTRATEGIES AS A WAY FORWARD? .................................................. 152.6 THEDANISH CONTRIBUTION TO POVERTY REDUCTION..................................................... 17

3. THE AFRICAN ECONOMY – THE CHALLENGE OFGENERATING GROWTH.................................................................................. 193.1 ECONOMICGROWTH................................................................................................................. 203.1.1 Agriculture as basis for growth ................................................................................................. 203.1.2 Private sector development......................................................................................................... 223.1.3 HIV/AIDS as barriers to economic development in Africa...................................................... 233.2 TRADE.......................................................................................................................................... 233.2.1 The EU: Africa’s largest trading partner.................................................................................. 243.2.2 Africa’s trade with the United States........................................................................................ 253.2.3 Intra-African Trade................................................................................................................. 253.2.4 Africa, the WTO and the Doha Agenda ................................................................................. 263.3 INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL FLOWS INAFRICA...................................................................... 273.3.1 Domestic savings and investments ............................................................................................. 283.3.2 Tax revenue............................................................................................................................. 283.3.3 Remittances ............................................................................................................................. 293.3.4 Foreign Direct Investment......................................................................................................... 293.3.5 Official Development Assistance ............................................................................................... 303.4 DEBT............................................................................................................................................. 313.5 THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION........................................................................................ 323.5.1 Urban Environment ................................................................................................................ 333.5.2 Natural Resource Management ................................................................................................ 333.5.3 Renewable Energy.................................................................................................................... 343.5.4 Climate change......................................................................................................................... 343.6 THEDANISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OFAFRICAN ECONOMIES....... 35

5. GOOD GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS ANDDEMOCRACY........................................................................................................... 475.1 BRIEF HISTORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE.............................................................................. 475.2 AN APPROACH TO ANALYSING GOVERNANCE INAFRICA................................................... 505.3 PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM............................................................................................................ 515.4 ANTI-CORRUPTION..................................................................................................................... 535.5 DECENTRALISATION.................................................................................................................. 545.6 DEMOCRATISATION................................................................................................................... 545.6.1 Constitutional reform ............................................................................................................... 545.6.2 Elections.................................................................................................................................. 555.6.3 Political parties ........................................................................................................................ 555.6.4 Parliament............................................................................................................................... 565.6.5 Security Sector.......................................................................................................................... 565.6.6 Independent institutions............................................................................................................ 575.6.7 Civil society.............................................................................................................................. 575.7 ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW........................................................................... 585.8 PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.............................................................................................. 595.9 SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MEDIA...................................................................................... 605.10 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS................................................................ 615.11 DANISH EXPERIENCES:MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE ON GOVERNANCE......................... 61

6. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.................................. 646.1 EDUCATION................................................................................................................................. 646.2 HEALTH........................................................................................................................................ 676.3 FACTORS EFFECTING HUMAN RESOURCES............................................................................. 696.3.1 HIV/AIDS .......................................................................................................................... 706.3.2 Migration ................................................................................................................................ 716.3.3 Gender dimension .................................................................................................................... 736.3.4 Vulnerable groups.................................................................................................................... 736.4 DANISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.............................. 74

Recent years have seen new opportunities and encouraging developments in Africa. A numberof African countries have initiated ambitious reform programmes that clearly provide anopportunity for the private sector to thrive and which offer a durable starting point for stronggrowth. African leaders and institutions have shown a new, collective will to address thecontinent’s conflicts and to significantly reduce their number and severity. In a growing numberof African states, basic democratic principles are being entrenched. Significant progress hasbeen achieved, and the experience has generated new strategies and models to be appliedAfrica is a continent in the process of change. Led by African countries’ own initiatives, thepossibility now exists in a majority of African countries to reverse the downward spiral ofearlier decades.Nevertheless, the challenges remain enormous. Poverty remains profound and inequality iswidespread. Peace and stability are often fragile, as tensions persist, and political corruption,violence and oppression are still common. Each year, millions of Africans die from diseasesthat are curable by simple, well-known treatments. Africa is the continent furthest fromreaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s), and the challenges here are greater thanfor any other continent.Internationally, there has been increased focus on the African challenges. Within the overallpriorities for Danish development assistance 2005-20091, the Danish Government has decidedto launch a forward-looking Danish Africa policy that addresses these opportunities andchallenges. With more than 40 years of development experience in sub-Saharan Africa – and acurrent focus on eight programme countries - Denmark has an obligation and natural part inassisting Africa in its pursuit of the MDGs. There are several instruments available for thispurpose, since Africa receives approximately 60% of Danish bilateral assistance. Danishmembership of the UN Security Council in 2005-2006 provides another relevant framework forpursuing an agenda for Africa.In accordance with Government priorities, a broad coherent policy is necessary in order forDenmark to effectively contribute to poverty reduction by supporting the many newpossibilities for renewed economic growth and development in Africa and to tackle the difficultchallenges that the continent still faces.The purpose of this analytical overview is to provide a solid basisfor the formulation of such a coherent policy, which must include instruments of foreign policy, development policy,trade policy and a security policy towards Africa.The geographical area covered by this analysis will be Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and statisticaldata will relate to this group of 48 countries. This demarcation does not ignore the importanceof relations between Sub-Saharan countries and North Africa or the role that North Africancountries play in the regional organisations, and these countries will be drawn into the analysis’Security, Growth – Development, Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2005-2009’,August 20041

where relevant. However, the situation in the countries of North Africa is affected by a numberof distinct economic, cultural and political factors that set them apart from the rest of Africa.At the same time, selecting SSA as the area of focus does not imply that SSA is a uniformgroup of countries for which a single social concept can be assumed or a standard solutionapplied. It should be noted that the term ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ covers 48 highly differentcountries with a total population of approximately 700 million. Each of these countries facestheir own challenges. Each African country has its own unique historical background, socialconditions, political structure, etc. Lessons and conclusions drawn from the analysis shouldtherefore be applied in the specific regional and national context.According to Danish Government priorities, Danish Africa policy takes its point of departurein the development plans of the African countries themselves. Within the overall objective ofpoverty reduction the aim is to create sustainable economic growth, support regionalcooperation, assist the African countries in resolving conflicts, promote human rights,democratisation and good governance, and improve social conditions – children’s schooling,combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases – and enhance the possibilities of African exportersto sell their goods competitively on the world market.2At the same time it is necessary toenhance the environmental sustainability so as to secure the desired global stability anddevelopment.The chapters deal with key aspects of these development objectives.Chapter 2 of this analytical overview presents the overall economic trends for Africa withspecial emphasis on the poverty issue and on the goals and strategies formulated to address thischallenge.Chapter 3 provides an analysis of key issues relating to Africa’s economic potential, includinggrowth, trade, investments, development assistance and the environmental dimension.Chapter 4 analyses the dynamics of conflict in Africa and the challenges posed by conflicts todevelopment.Chapter 5 examines the state of governance in Africa and its importance for pursuing povertyreduction in African countries.Finally, chapter 6 focuses on education and health as central factors in developing humanresources.

2.1 Rich in resources but at the margin of world economyFavourable natural conditions for agriculture exist in large parts of the continent, and severalAfrican countries are rich in natural resources such as water, arable land, fish stock, forestproducts including timber, diamonds and other precious stones and metals as well as fossil fuelsas oil and coal. Some regions contain an abundance of flora, fauna and wild life found nowhereelse in the world. Although highly varying precipitation and soil degradation in some countriesthreaten the conditions for agriculture, and natural disasters in the form of drought and floodsoccur regularly, the overall picture is not that of a continent deprived of basic naturalconditions for feeding its population and extracting a development dividend from sustainablemanagement of natural resources.Nevertheless, it is a general feature of many African countries that a large share of the totalagricultural production is used for consumption, while export earnings depend on a few (oftenonly one or two) unprocessed agricultural commodities or minerals. One of the very few newgrowth sectors is tourism, often based on sustainable practices. In 2001, manufactured goodsaccounted for only 33% of total exports (27% if South Africa is excluded), while the remainingexports consisted of unprocessed commodities. Although the share of manufactured exportshas nearly doubled since 1990, it is still much lower than that of any other region of the world.The level of processing which takes place also remains very low. For some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, oil presents another window of opportunity, although the magnitude of oilreserves is less significant on a global scale3. Gas reserves could likewise become a greatersource of income.The world demand for those commodities traditionally exported from Africa is either growingvery slowly or declining. The supply has exceeded the demand and this trend has beenstrengthened as new producers have turned up e.g. in South East Asia. For some commodities,such as coffee, the supply has increased significantly. The stagnant demand and the increasingsupply have resulted in declining prices. World market prices for traditional Africancommodities have fallen between 40% and 60% over the three decades 1970-2000 (except fortobacco and petroleum). These historical trends – a structural decline in commodity prices overtime - are likely to continue and leave little room for export-led economic growth unlessSub-Saharan Africa oil reserves account for 35-50 billion barrels of the world’s 1000-1200 billion barrels. Reference:www.eia.doe.gov.Figures may be underestimated.3

African countries start to both diversify the production and add value. Even with falling termsof trade, countries outside Africa (like Vietnam) have been able to achieve high growth rates inexport revenue from traditional commodity exports through expanded production, increasedproductivity and processing. Falling commodity prices should therefore not be an excuse fornot increasing efficiency and better management in export production.Excluding Nigeria (a major oil exporter) and South Africa, SSA countries exportedaround $11 billion worth of commodities in 1999. If the real prices of commodities hadremained constant between 1970 and 1999, African export levels in 1999 would havebeen $30 billion. The $19 billion loss owing to the fall in commodity prices was abouttwice the amount received by Africa in foreign aid in 1999.Rich countries subsidise their farmers to the tune of $320 billion a year, a sum close toAfrica’s annual GDP.A key aspect of the international terms of trade for Africa is the existence of subsidies onproduction in industrialised countries on products where developing countries have acomparative advantage, such as sugar and cotton. The abolition of these production and exportsubsidies is likely to result in higher world market prices, providing African producers withhigher prices for their agricultural exports. The removal of subsidies given to American andEuropean cotton farmers for instance is estimated to result in an increase in the world cottonprice by 12 cents per pound. This, in turn, could increase revenues from cotton by $250 milliona year for West and Central African countries, equal to about 14% of the total developmentassistance received by these countries annually. In terms of people affected the figures are evenmore staggering. Subsidising 40–50,000 cotton producers in USA and Europe leaves 6-8million African cotton farmers on the brink of starvation.If un- and underemployed youth in Africa is a significant factor in armed conflicts and maybein terror network’s recruitment – as discussed in chapter 6 – such a trade policy is hardlyconducive to Europe’s or USA’s own security agenda.The marginal role of Africa in the global economy is demonstrated by comparing its 10% shareof the world’s population to its share of only 1.3% of the world’s exports, 0.6% of the world’stotal foreign direct investment, and 1% of the world’s Internet subscribers.

day) has increased from 227 million in 1990 (which was 44.6% of the total SSA population) to314 million in 2001 (46.5%).4While other low-income countries have on average grown rapidly, Sub-Saharan Africa has notonly failed to keep up with other regions of the world; it has suffered an absolute decline.Unlike other developing regions, Africa’s average output per capita in constant prices was lowerat the end of the 1990s than 30 years before – falling by more than 50% in some countries. Inreal terms, fiscal resources per capita in many African countries were less than in the late 1960s.Excluding South Africa, the region’s income per capita averaged just $315 in 1997 whenconverted at market exchange rates. When expressed in terms of purchasing power parity(PPP) – which takes into account the higher costs and prices in Africa – real income averagedone-third less than in South Asia, making Africa the world’s poorest region. The total incomeof all Sub-Saharan African countries is not much more than that of Belgium. A typical Africancountry has a GDP between $2 and $3 billion, equivalent to that of a provincial European townof, say 100,000 inhabitants.Just as the extent and character of poverty vary among the African countries, so do the causes.Key factors include Africa’s position in the global economy and its vulnerability to externalshocks caused by economic trends, the international terms of trade and distorted developmentprocesses (initiated during colonialism and aggravated by geo-political interests during the ColdWar). Additional causes are related to domestic factors, such as poor governance and weakinstitutions, deficiencies and shortages in human and institutional capacity, and social andethnic tensions. Natural disasters, the AIDS pandemic, and violent conflicts within regions orbetween ethnic groups, are also very significant factors.While the complexity of the poverty problem calls for many different responses at the sametime (dealing with production, trade, human resources, conflict prevention, etc.), there is anemerging international consensus regarding the importance of defining shared objectives andformulating and implementing policies which can address core aspects of poverty and whichcan prioritise available resources so that benefits reach the poor.

The Millennium Development GoalsMDGs are a framework of 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators to measure progress towardsthe goals:Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hungerGoal 2: Achieve universal primary educationGoal 3: Promote gender equality and empower womenGoal 4: Reduce child mortalityGoal 5: Improve maternal healthGoal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and other diseasesGoal 7: Ensure environmental sustainabilityGoal 8: Develop a global partnership for developmentThe consensus behind the MDGs was further strengthened at the WTO Meeting in Doha inNovember 2001, where agreement was reached on a new round of talks with a focus on therequirements of the developing countries. At the Monterrey Conference in March 2002, ODAand good governance were targeted as preconditions for sustainable development. This positivetrend continued at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg inSeptember 2002, where the global support for the MDGs was underlined. WSSD furtheremphasised Goal 7 (Ensure environmental sustainability), adding further goals such as theprovision of basic sanitation, implementation of national strategies for sustainabledevelopment, maintenance or restoration of the stocks of fish to achieve sustainable fisheries,decoupling of economic growth and deterioration of the environment and of natural resourcesand increased use of sustainable energy. These crosscutting environmental issues are especiallyimportant in the African context, as the African economies are heavily dependent on accessand utilisation of natural resources.

2.4 Are the MDGs achievable in Africa?Despite various differences in assessments of the situation, most analysts agree that Africa’sprospects for reaching the MDGs by 2015 are far bleaker than the average trend for the worldas a whole, as this goal is predicated on reversing the economic decline. Whereas MDG no. 1,eradicating extreme poverty and hunger5, is likely to be met on a global scale, this is due mainlybecause of a foreseen reduction in absolute poverty in China and India.For Sub-Saharan Africa, projected dates for reaching three key targets – eliminating hunger,reducing poverty and improving sanitation - cannot be established, because the situation in theregion is not just stagnant but worsening.6Calculations show that in order to achieve the income MDG, GNI growth must increase to 7%or more in most African countries7On the basis of current trends, only a handful of countries56

in sub-Saharan African are likely to achieve their income poverty MDG, though with markeddifferences among the countries. Hence, Guinea-Bissau requires an annual growth rate percapita of 11.7%, while the figure for Benin is only 0.8% In addition to Benin, the required percapita growth rate is less than 2% for Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda andbetween 2% and 2.5% for South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Namibia. Finally, among countriesrequiring growth rates of more than 8% are Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republicof Congo.The figures indicate that while all the African states may not reach the MDGs, some countriesmay reach some of them. With the current policies, institutions, and external resources, only 3-4 countries may reach some or all the targets under the poverty reduction goal. With improvedpolicies, institutions and additional external resources, however, a limited number of countries -- representing approx. 15 percent of Africa’s population - may reach not only the poverty goal,but also one or more of the targets within the education, health and environment goals.8Experts insist that much better results can be ensured with increased and improved assistance.On the question of MDG 8 – Establishing a Global Partnership - some scholars9argue that anadditional transfer of official development assistance (ODA), combined with placing theMDGs at the centre of all national and international poverty reduction strategies would make itpossible for Africa to reach the MDGs by 2015. The required level of ODA geared towards theMDGs and assuming a particular focus on Africa would thus be around USD 125-140 billion(equivalent to 0.5-0.6% of donor countries’ GNP), about twice that of the present USD 58billion (0.23%) This figure is well within the UN target of 0.7%, but still well above the EUcountries 2002 collective target of 0.39% in 2006.It is undoubtedly true that the prospects of achieving some of the MDGs in Africa willimprove with increased ODA. However, increased funds in itself is not sufficient. Equallyimportant are the quality of aid and a co-ordinated and harmonised approach to aid, improvedrelevance of short- and long-term national policies and enhanced effectiveness inimplementation. Violent conflicts are major constraints in the pursuit of MDGs. Conflictsinevitably lead to destruction of infrastructure, and decline in economic growth and in socialinfrastructure. Many of those countries that have the bleakest prospects have been affected byarmed conflict in recent years (e.g. Sudan10, Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone). The burdensdue to large numbers of refugees or internally displaced people also make it more difficult toreach the MDGs.

Based on UNIDO Industrial Development Report 2004, p. 40 (the calculation of the required growth rate is based onpoverty head count in 1999 assuming unchanged income distribution). Considering the high increase in population in mostcountries this will be equivalent to annualper capitagrowth rates of 4-5%.8Development Committee, joint WB and IMF;Global Monitoring Report 2004.9For example Jeffrey Sachs in Draft versions of “Millennium Project, Summary of a Global Plan to achieve the MDGs”,OECD-DAC, July 200410Sudan is understood to have untapped oil reserves of a magnitude that could provide the economic development neededto lift the country out of poverty (Bannon, Ian & Collier, Paul (2003): Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, The WorldBank).7

2.5 Poverty Reduction Strategies as a way forward?In most African countries, a comprehensive reform process took place during the 1980s andearly 1990s, strongly directed by the World Bank and IMF. The reform had a unilateral focuson liberalisation, privatisation and macro-economic stability. After an intense dialogue in themid-1990s with major donors, including the Nordic countries, the World Bank responded tocriticism of the structural adjustments policies by adopting a much stronger emphasis on socialaspects of development and governance, leading to a stronger focus on poverty reduction. Itwas also recognised that imposing the same global formula on countries with very differentconditions and possibilities did not lead to the expected results in terms of reduced poverty.This refocusing process led to the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paperconcept, which emphasise national ownership and diversified strategies, as well as on means ofachieving measurable impact on poverty and social development.Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) has become central to the provision of developmentassistance. They were introduced by the World Bank and IMF as a condition for obtaining debtrelief under HIPC II11(1999) and were based on the idea of linking aid flows to thedevelopment of comprehensive poverty reduction strategies by the recipient countriesthemselves.Despite the fact that PRSPs were originally donor-driven, the intention has been to establishnationally-formulated strategies where ownership of the national planning and budget prioritiesand subsequent monitoring is vested in the national government, in close consultations withcivil society and the private sector. The PRSP concept evolved as a response to lessons learntwith previous (World Bank and IMF) experiences and mistakes. Evaluations had pointed to atendency to undermine national capacity by creating parallel systems and by imposing policyconditionalities; however, conditionalities did not succeed in generating more effective use ofresources. Furthermore, the PRSP approach was guided by the recognised need to refocusdevelopment assistance more firmly towards poverty reduction rather than focusing only onmacro-economic stability, privatisation and conditions for economic growth.

While the PRSPs and the MDGs have much in common and are mutually reinforcing, they areconceptually different entities. The importance ofcountry ownershipin PRSPs is crucial. Theownership approach allows for strategic choices that fit the specific national situation, whereasthe MDGs have the character ofglobalisedand aggregated goals and targets, which have to bemet with whatever means or strategies are available.Typical elements in PRSPs include infrastructure development, improving governance, and anenabling environment for private sector development and diversification of production. Theseelements may not themselves impact directly on the MDGs in the short run, but they may setthe stage for long-term development, reaching further than 2015 and the MDGs.By May 2004, a total of 19 countries in Africa had produced first-generation PRSPs, and someare already refining them into second-generation PRSPs based on the experiences from the firstthree years.While it is still too early to draw definite conclusions about the PRSP experience, two recentevaluations12indicate that a considerable challenge remains for many countries to link PRSPs tothe rolling national Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) and budgets. PRPSs arecriticised for not adequately addressing the need for macro-economic planning and for lackingfeasible policies to implement. Related to this is the need for greater prioritisation of genderequality in PRSPs, not least the need for increasing the allocation of resources to interventionspromoting gender equality in national budgets. Mainstreaming of gender equality has potentialfor improving the efficiency of poverty reduction. Screening of first generation PRSPs alsorevealed general weak information of environment13and environmental health issues14. Thestrong links between poverty, environment and health justify a stronger focus on the need forThe Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative, An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank support through 2003; WorldBank 2004 and Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Poverty Reduction andgrowth Facility (PRGF), IMF, 2004.13Bojö and Reddy 2001, 200314WHO 200412

better integration of environment and health concerns in pro-poor development planning.Consultation processes prior to the formalisation or revision of PRSPs reveal that there isscope for improvement, and that not all interested parties have ownership of the strategies. Onthe positive side, however, the evaluation points out that most donors have agreed that thePRSPs should be the focal point around which they will administer their developmentcooperation, based on the principles of partnership, ownership, harmonisation and alignment.While implementation of the strategies may take some time, they are expected to improve theeffectiveness and impact of government policies on long-term development, increase value formoney, and contribute to poverty reduction.

2.6 The Danish contribution to poverty reductionDanish development cooperation has always had a strong emphasis on poverty alleviation, butthe modalities and criteria for cooperation have changed with the lessons learned during thepast 40 years. In bilateral cooperation activities, focus on poverty reduction has been enhancedwithin the broader approaches to development, and isolated, short-term projects have nowgiven way to a more comprehensive, long-term commitment to sector support with focus onpolicy and institutional development. In its multilateral cooperation, Denmark has played anactive role in placing poverty reduction on the international agenda, including more recently inthe dialogue with the World Bank on PRSP. The donor-recipient relation has changed topartnership cooperation based on principles of national ownership of and responsibility fordevelopment plans. Focus has moved to supporting effective policies, good governance andcreating conducive environments for development. Efforts have been made to achieveimproved quality of development assistance through better coordination and harmonisationbetween donors and alignment of the cooperation with the national development plans,priorities and systems.Danish development cooperation now concentrates on a limited number of programmecountries instead of the previous approach of spreading project assistance to a large number ofcountries. In order to improve effectiveness and efficiency, the 60 ‘recipient countries’ forDanish bilateral assistance was reduced in the mid-1990s to 20 ‘main recipient countries’, 11 ofwhich were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently, the number of ‘programme countries’ hasbeen further reduced to 15. Presently, Denmark cooperates with eight programme countries inSub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda andZambia) and has some development activities with another two countries (South Africa andNiger). A main purpose of concentrating bilateral development assistance on a limited numberof partner countries is to achieve “critical mass” as a donor, allowing Denmark to play a majorrole in local donor coordination and harmonisation effects.A basic characteristic of the programme countries is that they (seen in the African context) arerelatively good performers in terms of sound sector policies, a more or less holistic povertyapproach and in their movement towards stable macro-economic and political frameworks.1515

The 1990s saw the emergence of the concepts of Sector Programme Support (SPS) and SectorWide Approach (SWAp). Denmark was among the first donors to adopt this approach, whichremains the basis for Danish bilateral development cooperation. The cooperation builds onpartnerships focusing on three pillars: cooperation in social sectors/human capital; investmentin conditions for equitable, economic growth; and interventions to achieve good governance.During this period, the understanding of the gender dimension also developed, and theapproach changed from ‘remember to help the women’ to an appreciation that thedevelopment process would fail without proper understanding of gender relations andinvolvement of both men and women.The goals for Danish development assistance are set out in ’Partnership 2000’, a policydocument endorsed in October 2000 by a broad majority of the Danish Parliament.PARTNERSHIP 2000Poverty reduction is the overriding objective of Danish development policy. Denmark willcontribute to reducing poverty in the world through long-term and binding partnerships withdeveloping countries. The objective of these partnerships is to strengthen the ability of thedeveloping countries to create sustainable development processes that will benefit the poor.Denmark will base its development cooperation on partners whose policies and activities createthe necessary conditions for poverty reduction for the many rather than prosperity for a narrowelite.Partnership 2000 establishes the political foundation for Denmark’s development policy,emphasising that reduction of poverty through long-term and binding partnerships remains thefocus of Danish development cooperation.In recent years, the importance of harmonisation of donor procedures and alignment ofinterventions with national strategic frameworks and procedures has gained momentum.Several partner countries have developed first- or second-generation PRSPs, and alignment anddonor harmonisation now constitute core pillars of Danish bilateral and multilateraldevelopment cooperation. The experience with this approach has so far been very positive inseveral countries, including Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia. In Zambia,for instance, a common framework with explicit commitments is changing the relationshipbetween the Zambia government and its development partners. One initiative – on the donordevelopment needs and the country’s own development plans; 2) Assessment of the total donor assistance and the capacityto absorb and make good use of the assistance; 3) Possibility of improving sustainable development through dialogue withthe country; 4) Possibility of cooperating with the country with a view to enhancing respect for human rights in accordancewith the international standards and conventions; 5) Possibility of cooperating with the country in ensuring that genderaspects are fully integrated and centrally placed in the development process; 6) Assessment of previous experience frombilateral development cooperation between Denmark and the country; and 7) Provided the six foregoing criteria arepositively met – the possibility for Danish private sector participation in the development cooperation.

side lead by Denmark - is the preparation of a joint assistance strategy, which will be completedin 2005. Under Zambia guidance, cooperation between partners is thus expected to make aidmore effective and cut transaction costs.While many so-called ‘like-minded’ donors (including the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, andNorway) have moved very rapidly towards the provision of general budget support, Denmarkhas so far been more hesitant, particularly regarding general budget support (not earmarked to aparticular sector). Budget support implies the provision of funds channelled through andadministered as part of the national budget, in accordance with the national poverty reductionpolicy and usually based on well-defined conditions. Budget support facilitates economicmanagement and reduces partner transaction costs. Apart from increasing national ownership,budget support enhances the predictability of funds, being that clear benchmarks ‘trigger’ anagreed (and usually significant) amount of funds within specified time frames. Being thatexternal funding is very important when African countries plan and budget, predictability ismost vital, not least in terms of enhancing poverty-reducing efforts. Budget support, however,also entails a reduction of the control formerly possessed by donors and the ability to trackindividual donor’s funds, thus minimising the possibility of documenting the direct outcome ofindividual donors’ support. Danish assistance acknowledges the many benefits of budgetsupport, but in order to keep risks (especially ‘fiduciary risks’) at an acceptable level, the extentof Danish development assistance provided in the form of budget support does not usuallyexceed 20-25% of the country programme. The level of budget support is generally determinedbased on the country’s financial management, track record of implementing ‘good policies’,reliability in meeting targets and so forth.It remains a challenge for Danish development cooperation to improve alignment andharmonisation by ensuring that all assistance is reflected in the national budget, is managed bypartners and not by Danish-controlled parallel or semi-parallel structures, and is coordinatedwith other donors based on national strategic frameworks.Because of the multifaceted nature of the challenges in sub-Saharan Africa, a holistic andcoherent approach is required that combines foreign and development policies, multi- andbilateral assistance, trade policy and security policy, and also emphasis on the environmentaldimension.

Economic policies have changed markedly since the initiation of structural adjustment policiesin the mid-1980s. The attempts to ‘roll back the state’ through liberalisation of prices,abolishing many government parastatals and reduction of the public sector have had bothpositive and negative impact on conditions for production and trade: while the reduction ofbureaucratic obstacles to agricultural production and marketing has benefited the majority ofagricultural smallholders, the public sector in many countries has at the same time beenweakened to such an extent that it is unable to provide even the most basic services.Around three-fourths of Africans live in the countryside. The urban areas are home to theAfrican elite, the middle class, and the urban poor. The latter group is by far the largest andfastest growing due to significant and accelerated migration from the rural areas.

3.1 Economic GrowthEconomic growth is crucial to the reduction of poverty in Africa. The existing empiricalevidence confirms that economic growth generally leads to a decrease in the number of peopleliving on less than one dollar per day. In this sense “growth is good for the poor”. However,the pattern of growth also matters a great deal, and the actual impact on the poor variesconsiderably depending on circumstances and context. Well-designedpro-poor policiescan do alot to ensure that social and economic indicators for the most disadvantaged groups improvemore rapidly than for the rest of the population.16In Sub-Saharan Africa, the average per capita income declined by 1.9% in the 1980s and by0.2% in the 1990s. The early 2000s show a slight improvement, but as indicated in thediscussion of the MDGs in Chapter 2, for the majority of the countries, even the most recentgrowth rates are still too low to reduce the number of extremely poor.3.1.1 Agriculture as basis for growthThe agricultural sector constitutes the economic backbone of most African countries, and thissector will remain the mainstay of pro-poor economic growth benefiting Africa’s poor.17Smallholders with land sizes usually not exceeding 1 hectare dominate the sector, which alsoincludes livestock holders, small-scale agricultural processing enterprises and marketing actors.Increased agricultural production is necessary to fight starvation and malnutrition. Most poorpeople live in the countryside, and experience from high-performing economies shows thatrapid growth in agricultural production and productivity is a precondition for economic take-Hunberto Lopez, ’Pro-Growth, pro-poor: Is there a trade off?’, World Bank, draft manuscript. Lopez argues that in thelong run, pro-growth policies, regardless of their impact on inequality, are likely to be pro-poor.17Recent research and policy initiatives have identified pro-poor growth as the most important ingredient to achievesustainable poverty reduction. The MDGs emphasize the importance of pro-poor growth. However, it is often unclear whatpro-poor growth means and how it should be monitored. One definition is that the poor should benefit disproportionatelyfrom economic growth, such that social and economic indicators should improve faster for the poorer relative to the rest ofa country’s citizen. It should also have a focus on both agriculture and non-farm rural growth, since the majority of the poorlive in rural areas.16

off and sustained poverty reduction. Agricultural production is also critical since agriculturalprogress generates local demand for other goods and services. It is generally agreed that forevery dollar income goes up in the agriculture sector total income in society goes up by around2.5 US$, and agriculture will have to underpin the export performance of African countries foryears to come.Historically, agricultural policies in Africa have tended to encourage the production of cashcrops for export, while local food crop prices have been kept low to avoid protests from theurban population. At times, conditions for marketing agricultural products have been sodifficult that farmers have tended to produce mainly for their own consumption. Although thishas changed with the economic reforms in the 1980s, serious obstacles to increased agriculturalproduction remain. Free trade can give many advantages, but free trade in itself cannot solvethe many problems faced by poor farmers. These problems include insufficient access toagricultural inputs, poorly developed physical and marketing infrastructure, the virtualabolishment of agricultural extension services in many countries, poorly developed agriculturalresearch, limited access to agricultural credits, limited access to information on national andinternational commodity prices, and competition from subsidised products exported by richcountries. Low productivity levels are a further impediment to higher growth. In somecountries, land tenure issues, soil degradation, deficiency of water for irrigation, drought, andincreasing lack of fuel wood add to the problems. Increasing production is therefore not simplya matter of liberalisation and free trade. It is as well about overcoming a myriad of supply sideconstraints. Moreover, many African governments are challenged to consider agriculture part ofthe business sector and to see farmers as potential investors, who – like any other businesssector actor – have to balance their goal of increasing income with that of spreading the risks.A particular problem is faced by the livestock sector, which has a substantial developmentpotential in Africa. Agricultural development policies (both national policies and donorapproaches) tend to focus on crop production – even in arid and semi-arid areas, where cropproduction is difficult, expensive and unsustainable. The economic development potential oftraditional African pastoralism is even more neglected. While pastoralism suffers from negativestereotyping and is often perceived as primitive, non-productive and environmentallydestructive, research shows that pastoralism is in fact productive and contributes significantlyto national economies.In addition to increasing the volume of agricultural production, it is important thatopportunities exist for diversification of incomes for the rural population. Small-scalemanufacturing activities, in agro-processing for example, may contribute to raising ruralincomes, while the existence of various forms of wage labour (e.g. related to marketing andtransport activities) is important. Even small amounts of purchasing power among the poorwill, as already highlighted, create the markets necessary to attract investments and improve theservice sector. This could contribute to a reversal of the vicious circle of indebtedness in whichmany African farmers are presently trapped.Improved organisation of farmers is necessary in order to strengthen their influence on theconditions for their livelihood. Although the rural population make up about three-quarters of

the population in most African countries, only few examples exist of farmers (or pastoralists)able to mount an effective lobby. They have been too scattered, badly organised and too poorto place the important challenges to the agricultural sector on the national political agenda.Attempts to organise themselves into co-operatives have often been frustrated by excessivegovernment controls.3.1.2 Private sector developmentAlthough agriculture is part of the private sector, the concept is often used to refer to non-agricultural activities in urban areas only. This is unfortunate. It is encouraging that Africanleaders now agree that private sector-led growth is fundamental for improving the welfare ofthe people. These leaders are making serious efforts to create an enabling environment for theprivate sector. However, few African countries have so far managed to transform the goodpolitical intentions into sustainable changes on the ground. Authoritarian and centralisttraditions are difficult to break, and poor governance, lack of effective property rights;ineffective judicial systems; high interest rates; red tape and corruption all pose seriousobstacles to the development of a vibrant private sector in Africa.Lack of effective property rights and registration means that very few individuals can prove thatthey actually own their land and houses – they do not have a title deed. Without a reliablesystem for ascertaining who owns what, assets cannot be used as collateral. Ineffective judicialsystems make it both expensive and time consuming to enforce even simple commercialcontracts. Commercial laws are rudimentary and not geared to a modern market economy andeven less so to an international business environment.Employees are often subject to adverse working conditions such as low salaries, unhealthy ordangerous working environments, oppression of labour organisation and the like. Labourmarket organisations and branch and producer associations are still relatively weak, and thuslimited in raising political attention for these issues, although their influence is increasing. InSouth Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, e.g., they are active in raising issuespolitically.Poor physical infrastructure and transport logistics create high costs and uncertainties for bothdomestic and export oriented economic entities. Transport and insurance costs are in generalvery high in Africa compared to other areas of the world. Africa has lower labour productivityeven compared to other developing countries. Poor physical infrastructure and heavy burden ofdisease among the workforce lead to high real labour costs for companies, thereby eroding theircomparative advantage in cheap labour. Inadequate skills lead to a pervasive need forexpatriates in technical and administrative positions. Other areas such as vocational training andinternet access also pose a challenge.Africa’s private sector also faces a number of challenges from beyond Africa’s borders. Theinternational environment for business has become more volatile, more competitive, and morecomplex as globalisation proceeds. Success is more difficult to achieve, and failure harder toavoid for companies from all over the world, but most companies outside Africa have thebenefit of better conditions in their home markets. Africa’s private sector must confront the

same hurdles, often without the benefit of a stable and supportive business environment athome. A successful outcome of the Doha development round of trade negotiations and aglobal reduction in trade barriers will mean an erosion of the trade preferences of many Africancountries, thus actually increasing their competition on the world market (cf. 3.2.4).The informal sector, accounting for about than 50% of registered GDP in African economies,constitutes a particular challenge to private sector development. Characterised by an abundanceof micro-enterprises and extensive self-employment in the cities, the informal sector has beenrobust because of the high costs of formalisation associated with taxes and regulatorycompliance and because of the relative ease of operating informally. Although the informalsector has served as a safety valve for African countries in terms of employment and incomegeneration, these countries need the efficiencies and institutional capacity of formal sectorcompanies to bring their private sector into the global economy.3.1.3 HIV/AIDS as barriers to economic development in AfricaThe HIV/AIDS pandemic (ref. Section 5.3) represents a major threat to economicdevelopment in Africa. Early estimates of the macroeconomic effect of HIV/AIDS18assertedthat African economies would sustain the initial loss from HIV/AIDS due to the perceivedready supply of surplus labour and an assumption that AIDS mortality was concentratedamong the low-productive poorer segments of the populations. Although no agreed method ofmodelling the macroeconomic costs of HIV/AIDS exists, recent attempts to calculate the costshave estimated the HIV/AIDS related reduction in the growth rate of GDP to range between0,3 and 1,5 percent. Although this appears modest it will translate into larger effects over time.One analysis (Arndt19) finds that the GDP of Mozambique in the absence of policyinterventions will be 23% smaller in 2010 due to HIV/AIDS, while another (Cuddington andHancock20) estimate that the AIDS related cumulative loss of GDP in Malawi would be around10% in 2010. This type of analysis does not, however, take into account the above-mentionedlong-term cumulative effects, leading Bell et al.21to predict that the long-run effects ofHIV/AIDS will be much larger – possibly ending in economic collapse.

Many observers believe, however, that globalisation offers African states and their citizens animportant opportunity to undertake the economic and political reforms necessary for economicgrowth, democratic development and improvement in overall living and working conditions ofthe people. To seize this opportunity requires effective leadership, additional input of resourcesand management by both the private and public sector working together at all levels of society;international assistance to develop capacity; and improved access for African products to themarkets of the developed countries.International experience suggests that outward-looking countries tend to grow faster thancountries with more closed economies. Although it is difficult to compare conditions forexport-oriented countries in Asia to those of African countries trying to increase theirintegration into the global economy, it is notable that the Asian countries in question haveachieved higher growth rates, longer life expectancy and better schooling. They have alsoexperienced rising wages and declining numbers of people in poverty, thereby improving theirposition to achieve the MDGs. Countries unable to integrate into the world economy face aserious risk of being left behind. However, it is equally true that free trade is not sufficient toturn present trends around, and in some cases can even make things worse. Outward orientedpolicies require good and well-designed supplementary actions on the supply side, andimproved coherence in the trade and aid policies of the international donor community.3.2.1 The EU: Africa’s largest trading partnerEurope counts for about half of Africa’s exports (see figure 1). Exports to North America arebelow 20%, roughly the same as to Asia.Fig. 1: Destination of Africa's Exports (2002)605040

of the EU’s General System of Preferences were supplemented by the so-called Everything ButArms (EBA) arrangement, which allows all least developed countries (LDCs of which 34 are inAfrica23) to export duty- and quota free to the EU all products other than arms. However, theremoval of restrictions for bananas has been deferred to 2006 and for sugar and rice to 2009.During the intervening period, progressive tariff cuts will be carried out for all three products,and access to tariff-free quotas for sugar and rice will be increased. The impact of the EBA forthe African LDCs has so far been limited, mainly because these countries already enjoyedpreferential access to the EU, but also because of the serious supply-side constraints within theLDCs to increase the volume of their production of exportable goods. The African LDCs,thus, have generally been unable to make use of the free market access provided by the EBA.According to the Cotonou Agreement, the future trade relations between the EU and Africawill be regulated by a series of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under which the EUand regional groupings of African countries (including non-LDCs) offer reciprocal tradepreferences to each other. South Africa already has an EPA. The detailed negotiations withother African countries are likely to begin next year, as EPAs are expected to come into effectaround 2007. From the EU perspective, the EPAs should also aim to increase intra-regionaltrade in Africa (cf. 3.2.3)3.2.2 Africa’s trade with the United StatesIn 2000, the US Congress passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), whichprovide duty free access to US markets for those products originating from African countries.The eligibility to AGOA’s duty free access, however, is not without conditions. To qualify, theAfrican countries must demonstrate that they are making progress towards the establishment of(i) market-based economies, (ii) the rule of law and political pluralism, (iii) elimination ofbarriers to US trade and investment, (iv) protection of intellectual property, (v) efforts tocombat corruption, (vi) policies to reduce poverty, (vii) increasing availability of health care andeducational opportunities, (viii) protection of human rights and workers’ rights and, (ix)elimination of certain child labour practises. In January 2003, the US announced that 38 Africancountries have qualified for preferential treatment under AGOA.3.2.3 Intra-African TradeOne of the key characteristics of trade links within Africa is the low level of intra-regional trade.In 2001, only 5.4% of exports and 3.8% of imports within the 20 countries that are members ofCOMESA24came from COMESA. Trade with the rest of Africa is also remarkably low.

The low trade flows between African countries reflect the structure of production characterisedby concentration of exports in a few unprocessed commodities exported to internationalmarkets. In many instances African companies and farmers are competing for the same marketswith identical commodities. Low levels of intra-African trade are also due to poor quality ofinfrastructure and financial linkages in Africa, as well as restrictions on trade and exchangeregimes adopted by most of the countries in previous decades. Moreover, high tariffprotections, restrictive import licensing requirements, notoriously slow and costly customsprocedures and other restrictive non-tariff barriers have limited the scope of intra-African tradein the past.The level of intra-African trade has been increasing, albeit very slowly. There has been asubstantial reduction in tariffs for African goods traded within Africa. Yet, unless themultitudes of non-tariff barriers that the countries currently impose on each other are seriouslytackled, significant increases in regional trade flows are unlikely to emerge. There is an urgentneed to remove border barriers, which implies streamlining customs procedures, harmonisingcustoms documentation and certificates of origin and establishing a well-functioning singletransit-transport regime. These reforms are costly and will therefore require a strong politicalcommitment on the part of the African leaders – a commitment that has been lacking in thepast. Indeed, most of the regional trading agreements in Africa have not been really effective inadvancing regional integration and promoting trade because ultimately, despite the rhetoric,countries were not always fully committed to the regional agendas. Implementation of treatieshas been sluggish at best and simply non-existent in some cases. Lack of commitment alsoexplains why most countries belong to more than one regional trading agreement. In thiscontext, there definitely seems to be too many – and too inefficient – regional integrationinstitutions in Africa.3.2.4 Africa, the WTO and the Doha AgendaThe WTO’s key mandate is to manage the liberalisation of world trade. One of the mainprinciples of the WTO is to serve as a forum for negotiation of a development-oriented globaltrade regime that can better serve the interests of the poorest nations. These negotiations arecurrently conducted within the framework of the Doha Development Round. The impasse atthe ministerial conference in Cancun, in November 2003, was a setback for the WTO. Eventhough the WTO succeeded in reaching the major goal set for Cancun by establishing anegotiating framework in July 2004, substantial negotiations in the Doha Round are not likelyto recommence in practice before the beginning of 2005.The main focus of the negotiations is on significantly reducing (and in some cases eventuallyremoving) tariffs and non-tariff barriers. However, liberalisation of markets erodes thepreferences given to a favoured country or group of countries. The poorest countries in Africahave favourable trade agreements with the EU and the US, two of Africa’s biggest tradingpartners. An erosion of these preferences is likely to result in loss of African market shares tomiddle income and developing countries in South Asia and Latin America. For example, theclothing industry is regularly seen as a starting point for accelerated industrialisation in Africa.The poorest African countries have enjoyed a quota-free entry for their textile products to theUS and EU through special agreements, while other major textile exporters such as China,

Pakistan and Bangladesh have faced quota restrictions. These privileges are likely to disappear,as all quotas on textiles are expected to be phased out by 2005. The question is whether the‘privileged’ African countries have been able to take sustained advantage of this special accessto European and American markets or whether their production of textiles will collapse as soonas the market is free.The draft package for global agricultural reform – the so-called Harbinson Draft – whichformed a basis for the present framework for the agricultural negotiations under the DohaRound, is expected to yield a global welfare gain of approximately $100 billion annually.25However, the Harbinson Draft is unlikely to improve the situation in Africa, particularly notover the short term.Africa’s position in forthcoming trade negotiations in the WTO (Doha Round) and with theEU (EPAs) would be significantly strengthened if there were greater unity and harmonisationamong the African regional organisations. In Cancun, African negotiators tended to alignthemselves with middle-income countries such as China, India and Brazil. These countriesseem to be very strong competitors rather than natural allies; hence, the positions of Africannegotiators are in the process of changing.Industrialised countries’ requirements to meet the sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS)and related food safety regulations are probably the most difficult hurdles among the manynon-tariff barriers confronting African exporters. Any increase in exports of non-traditionalgoods from Africa is likely to take place within product categories subject to SPS regulations(horticulture, fruits, livestock, and fish). Any challenge by the Africans to the status andcontents of the SPS is unlikely to succeed. It is therefore important that African countries andthe individual African exporters develop capabilities that ensure conformity with the SPS. Asthis is technically demanding and very costly, there is a clear case for donors to support capacityand institution building in this area. It is, of course, also important that Denmark and otherlike-minded EU countries follow this issue closely and do their utmost to ensure that SPSrequirements are not used by the EU as (hidden) technical barriers to trade.The factors underlined above reflect the importance of maintaining the Special and DifferentialTreatment arrangements (SDTs) in a transition period long enough to allow the poorestAfrican countries to improve their productivity. If maintaining SDTs is not possible, theindustrialised countries should find other ways to compensate Africa. Of prime importance isassisting Africa in reducing the supply side constraints for increased production andproductivity that it now faces. Unless this challenge is addressed effectively, African countrieswill not manage to get into a self-sustaining pattern of poverty reducing growth.

3.3.1 Domestic savings and investmentsBoth domestic savings and investments in Africa are low. The average rate of savings in Africawas 16,2% of GDP during 1990 to 2001, the lowest in the world. Africa is the only majorregion to see investment and savings per capita decline after 1970. The low level of savings andinvestment is a significant constraint for economic growth. Over the past 30 years, through theflight of capital, Africa has exported considerable amounts of its own private savings. By 1990,Africa had a higher proportion of its private wealth held outside the region than any otherregion, including the Middle East.The investment ratios (to GDP) show a considerable variation among African countries. Thosecountries that have improved their macro-economic policy and investment climate haveincreased their domestic investments significantly in recent years (Botswana, Ghana,Mozambique), while countries that have experienced political and economic instability recordedpoor investment performance (Sierra Leone, Burundi, Zimbabwe). The challenge is to reversethis capital flight. A good example of this is Uganda. In 1990, a large proportion of Uganda’sprivate wealth was held abroad, a consequence of the political unrest that the country hadexperienced during the 1980s. In the past decade, thanks to the convincing improvements in itsinvestment climate, Uganda has managed to retrieve a significant part of this capital. In someyears, the capital repatriation flow was larger than export earnings.3.3.2 Tax revenueTax revenues as a percentage of GDP have remained stable from 1992 to 2001 for Sub-SaharanAfrica as a whole (excluding Nigeria and South Africa). Nevertheless, the tax burden remainslower in Sub-Saharan Africa (21% in the late 1990s)26than in OECD countries (32%).Moreover, there are substantial variations in tax rates across African countries, ranging from33% of GDP in Swaziland to 4% in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The importance oftaxation of incomes and profits also varies significantly, from 0.4% of GDP in EquatorialGuinea to 12% in Zimbabwe. These differences are often taken as evidence of untappedrevenues in Africa.Such simple revenue/GDP comparisons are often used (also by donors) for tax policy-purposes. Yet they can often be misleading. First, the average tax rate is comparatively higher inAfrica than in many Western countries, when these had GDP levels similar to those of Africancountries today. Second, simple cross-country comparisons of tax rates ignore substantialvariations in economic structure (mining, oil, peasant agriculture, industry) that have majorinfluence on the tax base.27Third, and more seriously, it makes little sense to compare anincome tax rate of 5% of GDP in Zambia, where 85% of the population is estimated toconsume less than $1 per day, with a 13% tax income rate for the United Kingdom, wherethere is no comparable poverty. In fact, the low-income countries, despite their manifestpoverty, tend to have the highest average rates of marginal tax on income. Even worse, theirhighest marginal tax rate falls on a comparatively low level of income.

High tax rates, however, hide the fact that there remain relatively substantial untapped revenuesin many African states. Tax reforms in the 1990s have focused on such possibilities (althoughoften insufficiently sensitive to local contexts). They have addressed poorly designed taxsystems, inordinately complex tax codes with a multitude of exemptions, poor taxadministration, high-level, institutionalised corruption and lack of political will to tax the rich.The establishment of semi-autonomous tax agencies, the introduction of Value Added Tax, theoverhaul of custom services and computerisation are among the more spectacular initiatives.The results have been mixed, but there have been unmistakable successes. In many countrieswhich have already embarked upon such tax reforms, major institutional or policy changes areno longer needed, but the focus is now on improved tax administration – including improvedrelations with taxpayers and better respect for their rights. This is true for both central and localgovernment taxation. The latter in particular is often done with a substantial use of coercion.Moreover, community mobilised resources have traditionally been important for theestablishment and running of economic and social infrastructure. It is a tradition that shouldnot be neglected but revitalised.While income from custom and duties is likely to decline the potential seems to shift into valueadded and company taxes.. Tax reforms and revenue targets have become an importantcomponent of aid conditionality.3.3.3 RemittancesRemittances from migrant workers and the Diaspora are a major source of financing indeveloping countries. According to the latest figures available from the World Bank, at theglobal level close to 73 billion USD was sent back to developing countries in form ofremittance in 2001. No aggregate figures for officially registered remittances are available forAfrica, but they are estimated to account for only 5% of the total global remittances. Given theinadequately developed banking systems in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is safe to assume thatinformal remittances are higher. Studies (e.g. on Sudan) show that informal remittances coulddouble and in some cases even triple the officially registered amounts. Due to inefficiencies inthe transaction process, a significant part of the actual remittances is lost to middlemen.The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) concludes that in the African context, theremittances represent considerable financial inflows and are an economic reality not to beoverlooked. In Benin, the average remittance level for the years 1980 to 1999 was 4.5% ofGDP and in Burkina Faso 5.8%. Remittances are used for consumption as well as forinvestment in human capital (education, health, better nutrition).3.3.4 Foreign Direct InvestmentForeign Direct Investments (FDI) to low and middle income countries increased sharply in the1990s. Africa, too, experienced this increase, though receiving only 4% of total FDI in 2000.Although most FDI went to seven oil- and mineral exporting African countries, other countriesalso increased their share of foreign investment during the second half of the 1990s. With theconsiderable economic and political liberalisation during this period, the large increase in FDIseems to indicate that Africa’s participation in the global economy is directly linked to its

economic performance, and that there is a strong potential for increased FDI and other privatecapital flows to play a vital role in African economies. Most foreign investments have aninherent ability to transfer technology and skills. The most recent data, however, indicate thatthere has been a worldwide slump in FDI flows. In consequence, the FDI inflows to Africadeclined from $19 billion in 2001 to $10.9 billion in 2002.3.3.5 Official Development AssistanceThe 1990s saw a substantial and continuous decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA)levels as compared to previous decades, where ODA was also part of the Cold War efforts tosolicit partners and clients among developing countries. Africa has been particularly hit by thisdecline – in real per capita terms, foreign assistance to Africa dropped by 50% during the1990s. Since 2000, however, net ODA to Africa has begun to recover, rising from a total $15.7billion in 2001 to $21.2 billion in 2002. At the same time, Africa’s share of the total ODA hasbegun to rise and is now at the same level as in the mid-1990s (36% in 2002). This is widelyattributed to the shift in development strategies where poverty reduction has been prioritised,to the growing awareness of the importance of good governance in increasing the effectivenessof ODA and to the new thinking concerning Africa’s development contained in NEPAD. Therise in ODA to Africa is also in the line with promises made by donors at the March 2002Monterrey Summit.

3.4 DebtAfrica’s over-indebtedness is not attributable merely to poor governance and protracted civilwars in too many countries. Africa’s debt crisis has been severely exacerbated by several otherreasons. Among these could be mentioned irresponsible over-lending by private and officialcreditors, as well as easy access to financing when real interest rates were negative during the1970s, while the debt burden accumulated through the 1980s with high positive real interestrates. Repeated official and private rescheduling, often at punitive terms, further increased thedebt. Creditors tolerated this building up of egregious arrears in an attempt to restoredisciplined debtor-creditor relationships. With the experience we have today it would have beena more sensible action to reduce debt and debt service right away in the first place.Protectionism in the world’s markets for agricultural products and low technologymanufactures made it particularly difficult for African countries to earn their way out of thedebt trap – scheduled debt service in 1990 accounted for 70 per cent of sub-Saharan exportearnings.Moderate debt forgiveness took place in the course of the 1980s and the beginning of the1990s, but it wasn’t until the mid 1990s that the discussion gained momentum. In 1996, theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed a debt relief initiative forthe heavily indebted poor countries, the HIPC Initiative, which for the first time includedreduction of multilateral debt in coordination with cancellation of bilateral official debt. Out of42 countries classified as highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs), 34 are sub-Saharan Africancountries. The initiative was enhanced in 1999. The initial goal was to remove the debtoverhang as a constraint to economic growth and poverty reduction and the enhanced HIPCexplicitly identified debt sustainability and poverty reduction as its twin objectives.The initiative was meant to solve these countries’ urgent debt problems within a short period oftime. However, the implementation of the initiative has taken longer than envisaged, essentiallybecause of interruptions in implementing economic and social programmes in the debtorcountries, delays in preparing poverty reduction strategies and difficulties in complying withvarious conditions required at the beginning of the HIPC process.Today 14 countries28, of which 11 are African, have completed the process, while 13 countriesare expected to complete the process within the next year or two. The recent extension of the‘sunset clause’ of the HIPC initiative to the end of 200629allows an additional 10 countries, ofwhich 9 are African, to commence the process.So far the HIPC initiative has resulted in reducing the debt of 27 countries by two thirds andbudget allocations to the social sectors have increased by approximately 36 per cent on average.However, some HIPCs are again facing increasing debt levels and other low-income countries,With Madagascar reaching completion point shortly the 14 will become 1529The remaining 5 countries out of the 42 are expected to obtain a sustainable debt by means of traditional bilateral debtrelief.28

in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, are threatened with excessive debt. The major part of theHIPCs’ old bilateral debt has been or will be cancelled, while there is still multilateral debt leftover as a result of the policy and methodology applied. UK has, therefore, proposed to cancel100 per cent of the old multilateral debt to eligible HIPCs and some other low-incomecountries with severe debt problems. The US has similar views. However, the financialconsequences of such an initiative may be difficult to solve. A particular concern amongcreditors reluctant to support the proposal is that scarce ODA resources could be used at theexpense of assistance to countries in more dire need.The full implementation of the HIPC initiative, to which the international community iscommitted, is still not fully financed. Additional resources are required, multilateral as well asbilateral.Although debt relief as implemented under the HIPC initiative was urgent and necessary, it alsohas a reverse – it is not the most effective mechanism for aid allocation. The HIPC initiativeprovides a “one size fits all” debt reduction framework for old debt. There is now a need toapply a more country specific approach in the ‘post-HIPC era’.Empirical evidence has shown that countries with better institutional capacity are able tosustain higher debt levels, for which reason it is relevant to look at different indicators includingdebt service over time and different thresholds, thereby providing a country specificassessment. The recent and on going work by the IMF and the World Bank on comprehensivedebt sustainability analysis will constitute an essential tool in this context. Thus, debtsustainability criteria are likely to be the deciding factors for the grant allocations under theWorld Bank’s concessionary window, IDA. Once agreed, the same principles will also apply forthe grant allocations under the African Development Fund. Grant assistance from theseinstitutions is expected to increase, but it must be kept in mind that increased grants versusloans from the multilateral development funds today will require increased resources underfuture replenishments, though these problems are a decade or two away. On the other hand, byincreasing grants, the multilateral institutions may prevent future debt cancellations of newloans given today and thereby reduce the risk of moral hazard through irresponsible newborrowing.To reverse the vicious circle whereby the poor African countries may be caught by a new debttrap, it is important that support to these countries take place through grants and highlyconcessionary loans. Investments in social and economic infrastructure combined with efficientreform policy are necessary to pave the way for steady economic growth. But it is not sufficient.Liberalization of the industrialized countries’ markets to allow increased exports from the poorcountries is among the requirements to avoid future debt crises.

most affected by unclean water, land degradation, outdoor and indoor air pollution andexposure to waste and toxic metals30. To address this problem, poor people must be seen aspart of the solution through the right incentives and support, the environmental quality ofgrowth must be addressed, and environmental management must be integrated into povertyreduction efforts. The new Environmental Strategy for Denmark’s assistance to developingcountries 2004-2008 aims at integrating environmental concerns into multilateral as well asbilateral development efforts. Many environmental problems are not merely local but trans-boundary with regional and global consequences. All countries must live up to theircommitments in the global environment conventions if the conventions are to have any effect.Developing countries need assistance to build up the necessary legislative and administrativecapacity in order to comply with the conventions, including establishing secretariats andreporting systems. Combined multilateral and bilateral efforts could constitute a cost-effectiveapproach to this challenge.As far as the direct bilateral environment cooperation is concerned the strategy focuses onurban environment, natural resources management including water, and renewable energy. Thesituation in these areas is described below.3.5.1 Urban EnvironmentFrom a global perspective Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) is under-populated but at the same time ithas some of the highest population growth rates in the world. This growth is primarily found inthe urban areas, the coastal zones and along lakes and rivers. The rapid growth of population inthese areas is caused by a combination of the high birth rates combined with migration fromrural areas and in some cases the influx of refugees from conflict areas. This makes Africa thefastest urbanising region of the world. Urban population in SSA is expected to grow from37.9% in 2000 to 54.5% in 203031.In the cities where the heavily polluting industry is located you will find a strong link betweenthe state of the environment, health and poverty. Urban development plays a strategic rolebecause change of life style and pattern of consumption combined with the lack of urbanplanning is creating health problems due to lack of waste collection, water and sanitation. Toneutralise this requires infrastructure, education and jobs – requirements that are difficult tomeet in most African countries. This eventually leads to social tensions between various ethnic,religious and social groups.3.5.2 Natural Resource ManagementAfrican livelihoods and national economies rely mainly on extraction of mineral and biologicalresources32. Africa has a wide variety of habitats and ecosystems and the biodiversity is huge.Protecting and managing the natural resources base of economic and social development istherefore a key factor in the future development of Africa.

Only about 20% of Africa’s total land is arable and much of it is under pressure. A contributingfactor has been a ban on traditional land distribution putting an effective hold on traditionaland sustainable land management systems and farming practises33. These methods havedisappeared or are under heavy pressure from the growing population, resulting inenvironmental degradation. Thus, soil degradation has affected 65% of Africa’s cropland.The tropical forests in Africa have been exposed to the globally most extensive forest clearingand only 30% of the original area is left. The main reason for this is the need for farming landand production of fuel wood.Globally, Africa has the biggest arid area covering 65% of the continent. Drought is frequent,often lasting for one to five years leading to increased desertification affecting 36 countries inAfrica. Change between heavy rains giving rise to flooding and drought combined withdepletion of the cambium and deforestation will lead to increased soil erosion andtransportation of sediment to the rivers.The increasing depletion of the natural resources including increasing shortage of freshwater,drought, increasing shortage of fuel wood and decline of natural resources for traditionalmedicine, food and building material will mainly affect the poor without getting access to thewealth that is created at the same time.3.5.3 Renewable EnergyAfrica is the world’s largest consumer of biomass energy, primarily through fuel wood. Thisaccounts for as much as two-thirds of total SSA energy consumption34. The demand for otherenergy sources especially renewable energy sources is growing especially in rural Africa. Analternative to biomass is coal of which Africa is an important producer and exporter. However,production and incineration of coal also have environmental implications and the low-costquality of coal that is affordable to the poor has a high content of ashes, sulphur and dustcausing even more severe health problems than fuel wood.The negative impact of global climate change will affect poor developing countries andadaptation measures will have to be incorporated in the planning of future developmentinvestments design of future infrastructure, as only mainstreaming will make it affordable.3.5.4 Climate changeThe negative effects of global climate change will in particular affect the poor and vulnerabledeveloping countries as the general conditions of life are heavily dependent on the resources ofthe nature. On the African continent only South Africa have emissions of greenhouse gases toan extent that can justify a general strategy on CO2mitigation. The rest of the continent willhave to prioritise adaptation. In practical terms this means that deforestation has to come to anend, integrated water resource management be introduced, and that coastal zones be protectedagainst erosion and flooding. For this sort of interventions to materialise it requiresstrengthening of economy, infrastructure and education.3334

3.6 The Danish contribution to the strengthening of African economiesDenmark has a long and rich experience in supporting the agricultural sector in Africa.Currently, sector programme support to agriculture is provided to six of the eight programmecountries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda), along with thefunding of a major agriculture programme in Niger. While the assistance has covered a widerange of activities (capacity development, natural resource management, training, extension andsupport to farmers’ organisations, improved seeds, and micro-credits), a key challenge in thefuture is to better address the linkage between production, processing and marketing ofagricultural commodities. Improved and cheaper transport services are essential in this respect.Denmark is supporting upgrading of roads with increasing attention on the peripheral part ofthe network (feeder roads), sector reforms and establishment of sustainable mechanisms forroad maintenance in five countries (Benin, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia). It isimportant that agricultural production be considered part of the private business sector andthat it becomes part of the formal economy. Both governments and donors are graduallyplacing more focus on the pivotal relationship between agriculture, private sector, trade andpoverty reduction. Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and Danish trade policies,efforts can be made to contribute to the establishment of the most effective policy frameworkfor this and to provide the conditions necessary to implement the policies.Private sector support is provided to all programme countries in the form of the PSProgramme, and the recently initiated business sector support programmes in Tanzania andGhana. Whereas the objective of the PS Programme is to facilitate business-to-businesscooperations between private companies in the developing countries and Danish companies,the aim of the business sector programme support is to improve the overall framework, whichis of crucial relevance for private sector development. This framework support thus focuses onthe legal regulations and institutions, corporate governance, credit facilities, trade relatedsupport, and private sector organisations. An evaluation of the PS Programme has pointed outthe importance of considering broader aspects of development of the private sector and therole of private sector development in overall growth and development, including issues such asjob creation and international competitiveness.35Although it is too early to draw generalconclusions as to how the business sector programmes are working, experience so far indicatesthat the reforms initiated with support from the programmes are helping to reduce some of the‘sector specific’ supply-side constraints and impediments for private sector development.Private sector-led outward-oriented economic growth is among the main pillars in Africanpoverty reduction strategies. Increased trade with the outside world is expected to result inreduction of poverty. Danish attention to the issue is reflected both in the bilateral andmultilateral cooperation, including the dialogue with the World Bank and the AfricanDevelopment Bank, and in the attempts to ensure coherence between developmentcooperation and trade policies.35

On the demand side, it is important to keep in mind that the EU is by far the largest tradingpartner for Africa and that it will continue to be the dominant factor determining the growthand development of African countries. The upcoming negotiations of the EconomicPartnership Agreements (EPAs) between EU and the African states are therefore crucial;indeed, for many African countries the EPA is even more important than the Doha Roundwithin the WTO. As pointed out earlier, these negotiations will take place in a context wherethe value of the preferences enjoyed is, most likely, going to be eroded, and when theestablishment of new technical barriers such as food-safety standards could hinder theprospects of developing agriculture-based industries in Africa. The EPAs are meant to bereciprocal, but it will be difficult to counter the likely revenue losses and fiscal problems forpartner countries in Africa due to the overall global development, following a successful resultof the Doha Round.Closer coherence between trade policies and development policies is definitely needed at global,regional as well as country levels. A holistic approach that combines trade and developmentissues into one coherent Africa policy is likely to be mutually beneficial for both the developedworld and Africa. The Everything But Arms (EBA) and the United States’ African Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA) represent steps in the right direction. While the liberalisation of theworld trade is expected to generate a large global welfare-improvement, it is unlikely to reducepoverty in Africa. Free access to industrialised markets is not sufficient. In order to reducepoverty, Africa will continue to need preferential arrangements. The preferential access is likelyto attract foreign investments to Africa, which apart from the capital involved would also bringtechnological change and valuable know-how in management. Preferential access for the next10-15 years could provide Africa with the window of opportunity to improve the productivityand competitiveness of African businesses.In sum, the real challenge in overcoming the problems of African countries is to address thereasons for their lack of growth. Domestic institutional failure has certainly played its part inthe African dilemma, but this continent faces development obstacles that would defy even themost resolute governments. Insights gained about the need for and content of necessary policyreform should not divert attention from the whole complex range of domestic causes thathamper growth (including poor policy). Outside help in learning about and devising effectivedevelopment policy and overcoming inappropriate governance is for this reason a worthyenterprise for aid donors. On the other hand, it is also necessary to promote investment forgrowth; and there are, as noted, worldwide factors of considerable importance looming in thebackground. The African development partners and the donor community may for quite sometime to come have to try to advance on many, many fronts simultaneously to overcome thestructural weaknesses and human misery of African economies.

4.1 The conflict scenarioViolent conflicts in Africa affect the lives of millions. Civilians account for more than 90% ofall casualties in conflict, and a major and increasing victimised group are women. Mass rape hasincreasingly become visible as a means of coercion, and women are increasingly strategicallytargeted as reproducers of a given society. Mortality rates increase by an average of 13% duringa typical conflict, and the health situation deteriorates. HIV/AIDS rates escalate, since conflictscreate conditions favourable to the spread of the virus. Militias and other armed groups, forinstance, use rape or sexual enslavement of women and girls systematically as a strategy ofwarfare. Conflicts in Africa create large uprooted populations and refugee-affected areas, aswell as causing large-scale migration. In SSA 4-5 million persons are currently uprooted asrefugees and those forced to leave their homes - internally displaced persons (IDPs) – currentlycount approximately 12-13 million persons.36Conflicts also have serious economic effects andsignificantly set back development in the directly afflicted countries.37The African Unionestimates that conflicts have cost Africa 250 billion USD in the period 1980-1996.38Investmentin the formal economy drops sharply, growth is significantly lower, exports decrease andmarket access is lost. Inflation soars, prices of imports skyrocket, transport access is blocked,the productive capital is diminished and the human capital is depleted. On average, countries atwar will double their military spending, which drain resources from socially productiveactivities. War action targets the physical, economic and social infrastructure, which impedes afull resumption of economic activity after peace.39In many cases, a ‘war economy’ replacesnormal economic activities giving rise to human trafficking, drug production and smuggling.Criminal networks often have vested interests in the continuation of conflict, which will tend toprolong instability. On average, the World Bank estimates that it takes 10 years or more toreinstate normal economic activity and regain the pre-conflict GDP level.40In addition, conflicts seriously affect neighbouring states and cause instability as well as hampereconomic development in the sub-region as a whole. This is obviously seen in the Great Lakesregion (Rwanda, DRC, Burundi and Uganda), in West Africa (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and36373839

Ivory Coast) and in East Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea). Conflicts also curtail thedevelopment of the kind of regional economic integration necessary for creating larger, moreviable and competitive markets in Africa and for allowing economic specialisation anddiversification.Patterns of conflict in Africa are constantly shifting and are characterised by changing linkagesbetween global and intra-African conflict dynamics. The end of the Cold War, around 1990,unleashed a shift in the pattern of conflicts in Africa and brought about the fall of some of thecontinents worst dictators. More significantly, it led to collapse and prolonged conflict in anumber of states, just as other conflicts such as in Angola and the Sudan simply continuedunabated – fuelled by struggle over natural resources. In 1999, Africa had more non-statecombatants than the rest of the world combined41, and in 2002, Africa had half the world’sestimated active armed conflicts (15 out of 31).42The wars were characterised by two mainfactors. They were mainly fuelled by internal dynamics and were essentially intra-state conflicts.However, their negative economic, political, social and migration effects transcended nationalborders and seriously impeded development in sub-regions as a whole.

4.2 Causes of conflicts in AfricaThe crucial element for understanding African conflicts is not primarily the root causes per se,but rather, why the same structural causes lead to armed conflict in some states and not inothers – why are contentious issues resolved by political processes in some places, but not inothers?The structural causes of conflicts in Africa include a variety of political, economic, social andethnic or religious and cultural factors. These factors interact in a dynamic and complex way.Some observers argue that economic decline, economic shocks and dependency on primarycommodity exports are important triggers of conflict, and that severe declines in world marketprices on primary products have contributed to fuelling conflicts in Africa. Others stress thelack of nation building, the significance of weak institutions, and a more ‘rootless’ politicalculture since the 1950s. Others again argue that the answer to why armed conflicts emerge insome but not in other countries is often the character of political leadership (enrichmentregimes and power struggles). In many cases, several of these factors coincide. Economic crisis,for example, can mobilise other root causes of conflict – the effects of structural reforms(unemployment, price increases) coupled with (historically) structural inequalities (access toland, jobs, education, political influence, social status) and the political elite’s exploitation of agrowing tension. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is one such example.Some analysts have argued that economic development significantly reduces the risk of conflict,albeit not to the extent of preventing violent conflicts once the risk is looming.43Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 79 (www.smallarmssurvey.org)Conflict Data Project and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) including all conflicts withmore than 25 battle-related deaths per year (www.prio.no)4142Uppsala43

Natural resources make conflicts more likely in two ways: they reinforce other divisive factorsin societies in rivalry over access to these resources and, most importantly, they provide asource of financing for insurgencies. Many would argue that large international corporations orneighbouring countries play their part by prompting or financing wars to facilitate their accessto these resources.To find out why structural related conflicts turn into violent conflicts in some countries one hasto look at the system of dealing with conflicts as well as (political) leadership. Most of Africa’sconflicts occur in weak states with poor political and economic governance and poordevelopment records. It is important to note that states do not fail overnight. The root causesof most violent conflicts in Africa can be traced decades back. Most often the root cause is thecontinued lack of development – politically and economically. That makes some of the Africanstates unable to deal with conflicts – thus allowing these to become violent. Weak institutionsprovide limited ability to resolve crises through political processes. Weak states are by natureunable to ensure compliance with political decisions through legitimacy and authority. Inaddition, efficient political manipulation of societal tension, allowing conflict to grow out oforder (Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Sudan), is more likely in weak democracies where elites dominatethe political debate. One factor, which is acquiring increased attention, is the Islamistmissionary activities, which are on the rise in countries in East Africa, for instance. Anincreased competition between religious communities is being observed. A religiousconsciousness - Islamist as well as Christian – is securing foothold. In some cases, it hasresulted in pointed and rigid discourse, which could, ultimately, impact negatively on the openand free debate. The overall impact of this development, however, remains to be seen.Several factors may influence future conflict patterns in Africa:(1) Long-lasting insurgencies by rebel organisations, such as those in Sudan, Angola andDRC, may become a less dominant feature in future patterns of conflict. Since 2000,there has been a significant decrease in the number of new insurgencies and in thenumber of on-going conflicts. The main determinant of this trend seems to be thestrengthened responses to this particular type of conflict in new cooperativearrangements between international (multilateral and bilateral) and regional Africanactors.(2) Conflict dynamics below the national level – ‘local conflicts’ such as pastoralist issues aswell as conflicts over access to scarce land and water resources are likely to remain in theforeseeable future. There has been no significant increase, consolidation orimprovements in interventions with regard to these conflicts.(3) Whereas the major conflicts in Africa are either formally resolved (peace agreements inAngola, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire) or areunder negotiation (Sudan, Somalia), there are significant stabilisation challenges relatingto the unfinished post-conflict situations of these countries. Experience shows that alack of long-term stabilisation commitment over at least a 10- year horizon significantly

increases the risk of relapse into conflict.44Also fundamental is political commitmentamongst elites to truly cooperate for the benefit of the common good. Ensuring thelatter often requires consistent mediation on the part of regional organisations, the UNand other mediators.(4) In addition, the enormous proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) inAfrica provide insurgents with easy access to the means of war. Estimates place as manyas 30 million SALW in Africa alone.45 The trade routes of SALW are reasonably wellknown, but are not being dealt with in any efficient manner.(5) The lack of re-integration of children formerly associated with armed conflictconstitutes another crucial factor that may lead post-conflict societies back into cycles ofconflict. Most significant is the growing number of discontented unemployed youngmen without hope of a decent future. Experiences from Liberia and the Ivory Coastreveal patterns of marginalized youth being co-opted into military activity due to lowprospects of a viable income, education and self-reliance.(6) The presence of refugees affects large areas around conflict zones. Their presence cancontribute to destabilising the security situation in e.g. border zones and serve asrecruiting bases for insurgencies.(7) Urbanisation is progressing rapidly in Africa, and urbanisation tends to create newconflict dynamics, changing from elite-based to popular-based conflict dynamics. Themassive migration to urban areas in Africa (the OECD estimates that more than 50% ofall Africans will live in cities by 2020) coupled with insufficient economic growth tocreate sufficient opportunities is likely to create new, large-scale economicallymarginalized and politically volatile urban groups with no hope of a decent future.(8) The patterns of interaction between global and intra-African conflict dynamics may bechanging. The processes of globalisation have brought about a resurgence of aglobalised militant Islamist agenda. This primarily relates to conflicts in other parts ofthe world, but the stated goals are increasingly converging on the installation of Islamistregimes. Many experts seem to agree that Sub-Saharan Africa poses its main terroristthreat to the international community by offering opportunities for internationalterrorist groups to obtain safe havens in weak and failed states46and to use those andother states for transport of arms and financial transactions. The Al-Qaeda network, forexample, seems to have operated in both the Sudan and in Somalia. Another issue iswhether externally connected Islamist fundamentalist groups are able to mobilise moreradical youth groups within Sub-Saharan Africa. Experts disagree about the potential forthis. Some argue that radical Islamism has become a mobilising force especially forfrustrated unemployed young urban men in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that economic and444546

4.3 Responses to conflicts in AfricaThe challenges of peace and security are complex and multifaceted. It requires renewed effortsto prevent and manage conflicts and not least, integrating understanding of conflict dynamicsinto development priorities. But if the challenge of peace and security is to be met effectively, itmust be on the basis of a dynamic understanding of the ever-changing pattern of conflictdynamics in Africa, of the elements that generate conflicts and of how conflicts influencedevelopment.Responses to conflicts in Africa have been reinforced and are becoming more operational inthe new Millennium. This new activism has led to a significant decrease in the number of newarmed conflicts and in the duration of the active phases of wars since 2002. It has also led tonew, if still fragile peace solutions in two of the major conflict areas – the Great Lakes and theMano River countries/Côte d’Ivoire.Among the challenges that remain it is important to look at the following issues:Increasing the focus onpreventingconflicts, both through a general mainstreaming ofconflict understanding into development processes (strengthening institutions,consolidating democracy, creating jobs, etc.) as well as through building a strongerpolitical commitment in the AU, in the sub-regional organisations and in theinternational community for strengtheningoperationalconflict prevention.Strengthening the ability of weak states and states at risk of ‘failing’ to confront negativeeconomic and political developments and to deal with conflicts through inclusivepolitical processes.Building a regional framework for effectivecrisis managementin imminent or on-goingconflicts in Africa.Strengthening the efforts to consolidate peace throughpost-conflictprocesses – with sub-regional dimensions where relevant.These challenges have consequences for bilateral and multilateral development partners’support as well as for thepolitical dialogue(bilaterals, EU) with governments in Africa.

New and encouraging developments in response to these challenges include the emergingdevelopment ofjoint(international, African regional and state actors together),combined(exploring complementarities and synergies in different phases of the conflict) andoperationalapproaches to peace and security in Africa.In this context, the UN and increasingly also the EU are entering into a strategic partnershipwith regional organisations in Africa, and a ‘principle of subsidiarity’ is emerging. This includes:Development of comprehensive peace and security platforms in Africa, primarily withinthe AU and in the sub-regional organisations, and the beginnings of operationalmechanisms for their implementation.The enhanced role of the AU – compared to its predecessor – and the beginnings of amore coherent African Security Architecture.Reassessing the non-interference principle. ECOWAS and AU were the first regionalbodies to enshrine the right of intervention under what is termed ‘gravecircumstances’.48This allows for a greater pressure on political elites to resolve conflicts.Operationalising the decision-making process by moving to a 2/3-majority vote onsecurity issues (in the AU and its Peace and Security Council as well as in ECOWAS, butnot yet in SADC or IGAD).Involving civil society, emerging as a significant factor of change, in the context ofdemocratisation, much more operationally in complementary responses to conflictprevention and post-conflict efforts.A much greater focus on the need to intervene strategically and over a longer timeperspective in the crucial, but fragile post-conflict situations and in weak states at risk offailing as well as in already failed states.The emerging situation is characterised by a growing degree of strategic cooperation between(1) central actors in the international community, notably the UN and the EU, (2) majorAfrican actors, notably the African Union, as the overall pan-African institution for politicaland economic integration, and (3) the sub-regional organisations ECOWAS, SADC and IGADfor West Africa, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, respectively. This development isimportant as support to African institutions in conflict management, peacekeeping andreconciliation is only likely to produce tangible results if and when supported by an increasedand persistent international engagement i.e. diplomatic pressure, mediation, technical expertiseetc.

Standby Brigades that can be deployed within 30 days in Peace Support Operations. The G8and the UN are expected to provide the main capacity-building assistance for the ASF. Anothercentral element is the establishment, in 2004, of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC),entrusted with the main responsibility among African states for dealing with conflicts.The main thrust of the UN efforts is on subsidiarity: strengthening African regional responsesand seeking to complement these regional efforts where needed.49For this task, the UN hasincreased the number of political missions supporting and complementing African peaceefforts. The UN currently deploys the largest number of peacekeepers since the early 1990s. Animportant new role for the UN is to provide follow-up peacekeeping missions to African PeaceSupport Operations (PSO), as was recently the case in Liberia (2003), Côte d’Ivoire (2004), andBurundi (2004). Herein, the UN is exploiting a comparative advantage, in as much as theAfrican regional organisations can deploy PSOs rapidly, but not sustain them over long periodsof time due to financial constraints, while the UN can deploy only slowly, due to internalprocedures, but is in a better position to sustain missions over time.Security sector reform, especially in post-conflict situations, is considered a crucial factor formaintaining stability. With the provision of the integration of armed groups in the nationalsecurity forces, in combination with e.g. DDR operations, security sector reform is often anessential part of peace agreements. Some analysts argue that experiences from e.g. West Africashow limitations to a somewhat successful integration of armed groups in security forces (i.e.applying a technical solution to a political problem). This problem has also been seen inNorthern Uganda, where children have been abducted by LRA and upon return invited by thegovernment to join a brigade consisting of formerly abducted children and their commanders.Good practices are needed to ensure that coherent security sector reform looks beyond simplythe military and police services, encompassing the overall security context including thejudiciary, legislation and democratic oversight. It constitutes a very delicate sector in the heartof national sovereignty and calls for a coherent and holistic approach involving all relevantnational actors and the donor community.The European Union is emerging as a strategic actor for peace and security in Africa, not leastas a focal point for mustering the necessary financial support for action. Key instruments arethe political dialogue between the African States and EU under the Cotonou Agreement (2000),the direct partnership increasingly being built between the EU, the AU and the subregionalorganisations involved in economic integration and peace and security on the Africancontinent, the establishment of a EU Peace facility for Africa of € 250 million in support ofAfrican peace support operations, and the operationalisation of the civil and military aspects ofthe European Security and Defence Policy (e.g. in Sudan).50Recent years have shown aconsiderable development in EU’s engagement with Africa in the area of peace and stability,not least at the level of political dialogue (with e.g. DRC, Guinea, Togo, Ivory Coast) but also inactual missions such as the Integrated Police Unit in DRC and observers to the AU-mission inSudan. The size of EU development aid and peace and security assistance to Africa as well as49

4.5 The LICUS initiativeThe UN and the World Bank are also emerging as strategic actors in the crucial post-conflictstabilisation phase as well as in situations where weak states are at risk of ‘failing’.51The UNand the World Bank have engaged in efforts within Reconstruction, Demobilisation,Disarmament and Reintegration and enhanced natural resource management. The World Bankis now targeting countries that face intertwined challenges such as very weak policies, weakinstitutions and poor governance. This comprehensive approach, known as the ‘Low IncomeCountries Under Stress’ (LICUS) approach, was launched in 2002. Traditional developmentassistance programmes, it is argued, have fared poorly in ‘LICUS -countries, primarily becausestates lack the capacity or inclination to implement effective poverty reduction policies.A number of African countries have been selected for World Bank LICUS assistance in 2003and 2004, including Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan andZimbabwe. The LICUS initiative has sought innovative approaches to re-engagement andreform in the fragile environments, including:A combination of top-down initiatives (policy dialogue, technical assistance andexposure to the lessons of reform programs in other countries) with bottom-upcommunity mobilisation to implement reform priorities and accelerate povertyreduction.A strategy to increase the transparency of oil revenue management in Angola.Early engagement in leadership capacity building in Sudan.Support to programs to fight HIV/AIDS.A key finding is the necessity to support post-conflict states over a much longer timeperspective (10 years) in order for peace to become sustainable. In this sense, the World Bank’sresearch underlines the basic flaw in donor downsizing of assistance 3-4 years after peace.Another finding is the necessity to phase support by responding flexibly to opportunities, asthey emerge, peaking after 4-5 years rather than immediately.

foundation for a peaceful and sustainable development, developing an inclusive politicalframework to resolve conflicts before they turn into armed conflict, building vertical andhorizontal relationships, improving security and establishing the rule of law, and securingrespect for human rights. While development efforts in general are considered to contribute toconflict prevention in Africa, increased attention could be paid to a more systematic approachto mainstreaming conflict aspects into development efforts, and engaging civil society in these.In addition, more efforts need to be focused to create a regional and sub-regional capability foroperationalconflict prevention such as early warning and mediation (further developments awaita UN report on early warning). The political awareness of the prevention imperative is there,but the development of an operational capacity has only just begun.Another challenge relates to conflicts below the national level – the ‘local conflicts’, such asthose with pastoralist groups, conflicts relating to access to scarce land and water resources, andclashes between ethnic groups. There are many of such on-going or potential local conflicts,but there is inadequate understanding of which of them could escalate into violent conflict.Governments and local actors are responding to these conflicts, but there is only little Africanregional or international support, so interventions remain fragmented and varying ineffectiveness. In this respect, civil society organisations, increasingly emerging in networks ofcooperation with the AU and sub-regional organisations, offer the potential to underline theircomparative advantages in addressing local conflicts, regionally and at the national level. Civilsociety can thus play a significant complementary role to that of the regional organisations.

4.7 Danish contributions to peace and stability in AfricaAlthough Africa has demonstrated a remarkable determination to intervene early in seriouscrises, it is evident that for the foreseeable future, external assistance in terms of financialassistance, training and peacekeeping experience will be required. A larger role for Africanorganisations does not suggest that peace and stability in Africa should no longer be a jointinternational effort. But some would argue that the international community today is lesswilling to intervene in African conflicts than earlier. Africa will need the assistance of theinternational community and the UN. Through the new DanishAfrica Programme for Peace(APP), launched in 2004, Denmark will support the emerging potential for Africa to increase itsrole in preventing conflicts and managing crises. The overall objective is to promote peace andsecurity as a basis for sustainable development in Africa, and by promoting the development ofan operational African regional conflict prevention capability; strengthening the Africansecurity architecture; and promoting civil society networking across countries and between(sub)regional organisations.Experiences from the Africa Programme for Peace as well as more than twenty years ofexperience in development cooperation and recent Danish involvement in peacekeepingmissions in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan could provide strategic guidanceto Danish membership of the UN Security Council in 2005-2006. Consideration could be givenas to how Danish Security Council membership could be optimised to address some of thefactors that fuel or are relevant to conflict in Africa, including natural resources (diamonds,

timber, oil), regional responses to conflict, encouraging to ratify and/or implement the majorinternational and regional human rights instruments, effective follow up on human rightsviolations, gender issues and combating trafficking. Other topics could include increasedprotection of children and youth in armed conflicts, African participation in international anti-terrorism efforts and the participation of African countries in efforts to combat internationalcrime.Danish humanitarian assistance is channelled mainly through the UN humanitarian agenciesand Danish NGOs, the impact of which have been generally positive. Support provided toSudan in the 1990s proved particularly successful, as it was sustained at a time when manyother donors withdrew.52Through evaluations and the continued dialogue with partners on theapplication of best practices, Denmark plays an active role in the continued work to improvethe delivery of humanitarian and relief aid.There are currently 4-5 million refugees and en estimated 12-13 million internally displacedpersons in SSA. Influxes of refugees and migrants have large social consequences for thoseaffected and for the countries receiving them. Living conditions for both internally displaced,refugees and the local population are often insufficient, and the capacity to provide protectionfor refugees is often inadequate. This places a large humanitarian burden on many countries inSSA. With ongoing conflicts and natural catastrophes being part of the situation in SSA there isno reason to believe that migration figures will improve dramatically over the next decade orso. For that reason the Danish government has strengthened the assistance in the refugees’regions of origin and will continue to do so in the coming years. The focus is on strengtheningthe level of safety and protection in the regions of origin of the refugees and other displacedpeople, and at the same time ensure that the assistance also reaches the permanent populationsin the migration affected areas. The strengthened efforts are to be seen in the context of theeffort of resolving conflict and preventing new conflicts: when large groups of people areuprooted it often leads to instability with the risk of further conflict. The developmentcooperation with eight partner countries in SSA provides an opportunity to integrate durablesolutions for refugees and IDPs into the development process.The continuous improvement of responses is also reflected in the dialogue on how to assistsocieties in transition. This dilemma has been presented in many forms and with many names:‘relief to development continuum’, ‘grey zone’ and ‘transition gap’ among others.A number of issues could be considered in formulating a comprehensive framework for peaceand stability, including:Standard technical and mechanistic solutions (based on a ‘one model fits all’ mentality)to conflict management and reconstruction have proven to be inadequate. Acomprehensive approach to peace and stability continuous (e.g. UN or EU-coordinated)high-level political dialogue with African partners on how to ensure immediate andcoordinated responses to crises, a strong civilian component to conflict managementand reconstruction and coordination between civil and military components.52

Development cooperation is considered a key element in creating peace and stability inAfrica, but a more systematic mainstreaming of the conflict dimension intodevelopment efforts (including Danish sector support in ‘programme countries’) couldbe beneficial.Development partners and countries should combine their efforts to ensuresustainability of post conflict interventions and it would be more efficient to utilise amid-term perspective rather than the usual short-term perspective.While the readiness of African organisations to address the conflicts of the continent inan operational manner is very encouraging, a worrying tendency remains Africanreluctance to address blatant human rights abuses, such as the situations in the Sudan (inparticular Darfur 2003/4) and Zimbabwe. African countries must address this weakness.Targeted efforts to include children and youth in the development process.Bilateral partners could consider how best to contribute to the new strategic partnershipbetween the UN and the (sub-)regional organisations.Innovative approaches could be further developed to engage civil society in conflictprevention, conflict management, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, andadvocacy for ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments.Regional approaches to Reconstruction, Demobilisation, Disarmament andReintegration as well as combating trafficking of arms and persons could be furtherexplored in order to help prevent future conflicts rather than isolated nationally focusedprocesses.Anti-terror responses based on further analysis of the potential for terrorist mobilisationin Africa.Interventions in areas with large influxes of refugees should focus on human resourcedevelopment (training, education, etc.) to build potential for reconstruction and statebuilding.

5.1 Brief history and political cultureGood governance53is considered a fundamental prerequisite for an effective use of resourcesfor poverty reduction54. Hence, good governance has gained increased attention amongdevelopment practitioners and researchers concerned with African development.There are encouraging signs that several countries in Africa, both individually and collectively,are showing increasing commitment and capability to take responsibility for their owndevelopment. This trend provides an opportunity for the international community to focusThe longer term ‘Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance’ has normally been used, probably in order to stressthe importance of Human Rights and Democracy in Danida support. Here we employ the briefer term of good governance,as good governance necessarily includes HRD.54UN Millennium Assembly and the UN Conference on Financing for Development.53

cooperation on supporting the national and regional efforts to further democratisation andstrengthen African states’ capacity in key strategic areas of importance for state-building,economic growth and - ultimately - poverty reduction. A well functioning democratic politicalsystem and a strong governance record increases responsiveness to popular demands andlessens the risk of mayor conflicts. It also provides a tool for conflict resolution at a lower andmore peaceful level avoiding that conflicts are played out in more violent forms.An increasing number of African countries have adopted basic and shared democratic values asthe major pillars of social and political development. These include free and fair elections,freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly and organisation, rule of law,protection of minority rights, responsive governments, and the limitations to the abuse ofpower of the executive. Likewise, there has been a trend to make public institutions moreefficient and transparent in order to bring efficient services to the population. However, itshould come as no surprise that in countries where spending on education is less than 20 USDper capita per year, there is a long way to go before a qualified public service has beendeveloped. A number of economic, cultural, and structural factors also tend to prevent the fullimplementation of seemingly good intentions.At independence, different forms of constitutional democracies were established in Africa. Thepolitical systems adopted were inherited largely from, or inspired by, the systems of the formercolonial powers.In the early years of independence, most countries had multiparty systems and regular elections.However, the new democratic institutions were not really embedded in African societies.Combined with the struggle for power when the colonial masters disappeared, and based onthe inequalities that had been created during the colonial rule, this led to a situation where manyelected governments turned authoritarian or were swept aside by the army. Parliaments becamemerely rubber-stamp institutions. Where civilian rule survived, constitutions were changed tointroduce one-party systems, often with a lifetime president. The only allowed political partyassumed hegemony over the political institutions as well as over the state apparatus.International geo-political interests, particularly during the Cold War, also facilitated the un-democratic trend by supporting one-party systems – on both sides of the political divide – andsome of Africa’s worst dictators.Not all leaders lacked legitimacy. For example, President Nyerere of Tanzania and PresidentNkrumah of Ghana enjoyed significant popular support. At the other end of the scale,President Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire was well known for abusing his power by enrichinghimself and his family or supporters.Many regimes turned out to be unstable, which only added to further repression and theleaders’ ruthless desire to stay in power and enrich themselves and their supporters. Theseregimes had little to do with democracy and are often referred to as patronage-based regimes. Afew of these first generation regimes, e.g. Gabon, Togo and Zimbabwe, remain in power, eventoday.

No African leader was voted out of office in the three decades from 1960 to 1990, except inone case (Mauritius, 1982). Most leaders who left office were overthrown in coups or duringwar, and out of the 107 overthrown African leaders so far, more than two thirds were eitherkilled, imprisoned or went into exile. This uncertainty of the future added to the leaders’attempts to cling to power and encouraged their systematic plunder of national resources.The pattern of leaders clinging to power has changed. During the 1990s and 2000s significantlyhigher numbers of leaders left office due to lost elections or voluntary retirements, as shown inthe table below.How African leaders have left office55:1960-691970-79Overthrown in coup, 2730war or invasionDied of natural23causes/accidentsAssassinated11Retired12Lost elections00Other (interim regime) 68

The trend in the table above corresponds with the (re-)introduction of multiparty system inmany countries in the early 1990s and increasingly improved quality of conduct of elections,combined with a higher degree of freedom of the press and an emerging civil societyparticipating more freely in political debate.The apparently continuous problems in Africa have led many scholars to argue that there is aparticular African political culture, where personal relations matter more than rules. Parts of theliterature suggest ‘neo-patrimonialism’ as the core feature of politics in Africa, but otherresearchers have strong reservations about it or reject it as inappropriate.The concept of neo-patrimonialism reflects cultural values that are widely respected in Africa,linking the choices of the individual to the interest of family, clan or home community. Itimplies that a patron, culturally anchored in a social and political order, provides followers withhis ‘own’ resources (or those appropriated by virtue of his official position) in order to obtainand strengthen their loyalty and support. Clients, in turn, obtain material benefits andprotection. The ‘neo-‘ signifies that patrons typically are office-holders (up to the level ofpresident) in rational-legal state institutions that use public funds to build their personal loyaltyamong clients so as to stay in power. Thus, neo-patrimonialism connotes a type of hybridpolitical system in which patterns of patrimonialism coexist with rational-legal institutions.

There is no doubt in this analysis that neo-patrimonialism is important to understandingAfrican politics and economic development. But there are other important forces at play, suchas the so-called “drivers of change”. These include and represent interests of the private sector,trade unions, outspoken women, youth, intellectuals, “modern” politicians and underprivilegedcitizens who question and oppose the power of the “patrons”, and who actively attempt toorganise around building a democratic and efficient state and independent institutions andorganisations to safeguard it. Progressive leaders and states can also bring about change byexerting positive influence on other countries, illustrated by e.g. South Africa and othercountries’ recent regional initiatives to promote democracy. As is to be expected in societiesunder change there is an ongoing struggle between progressive and reactionary forces.Denmark’s Development Policy “Partnership 2000” clearly states the Danish approach to this:

“The developing countries are undergoing processes of change in which groups with different

interests quite naturally seek to influence the future development and structure of their society.

Not all groups give priority to democratisation and poverty-oriented development. The

process of change often gives rise to conflicts of interest. Development co-operation seeks to

influence this process. This requires in-depth insight into formal and informal political and

economic decision-making processes and into the dynamic interaction among various

interests in both government and civil society in the developing countries. Denmark will seek

to support those interests that are working through formal and informal channels to ensure

democratic processes of change that will benefit the poor.”

5.2 An approach to analysing governance in AfricaResearch56indicates that macro-economic stability with a relative open economy is a keyprerequisite for economic growth and poverty reduction. There are also clear linkages betweengood governance and poverty reduction, although no actual international consensus on whichspecific good governance practices are needed in order to create and sustain poverty reductionpolicies. Governance in Africa is often judged from a rights-based perspective rather than apoverty reduction perspective, and the performance of African states in governance aremeasured in terms of more or less fixed international norms, where such exists (e.g. humanrights norms) and/or Western standards (e.g. parliamentary democracy). While African states,as part of the international community, have an obligation to fulfil international conventionsand agreed standards, relying on fixed norms as a basis for assessments, demands or conditionsmay fail to take sufficient account of the historical context, and may therefore do more harmthan good. Instead of talking about good governance, some scholars suggest the less normative‘good enough government’.57

In analysing governance in Africa, it is more useful to take a point of departure in what kind ofbasic state capabilities are needed to pursue poverty reduction and protect human rights. Thefollowing 7 key state capabilities have been suggested58:1. To operate political systems, which provide opportunities for all people, including thedisadvantaged, to organise and influence state policy and practice;2. To provide macro-economic stability and to facilitate private sector investment andtrade;3. To implement a pro-poor policy and to raise, allocate and account for public resourcesaccordingly;4. To guarantee the equitable and universal provision of effective basic services;5. To ensure safety and security in communities with access to justice for all;6. To manage national security arrangements accountably and to resolve differencesbetween communities before they develop into violent conflicts;7. To develop honest and accountable government that can combat corruption.These capabilities seem to be useful guidance points for analysing the extent to which theAfrican states are progressing towards a positive development – within the limitations andpossibilities of economic and human resources. When analysing good governance in Africa,these key capabilities should be kept in mind.Improvements in good governance cover a number of possible areas of intervention and avariety of institutions and organisations in the public sector, private sector and civil society.As a practical tool for promoting good governance, the following categories will be used:Public sector reformAnti-corruptionDecentralisation (building local capacity)Democratisation (constitutional reform, elections, political parties, parliament, civilsociety)Access to justice and the rule of lawPromoting human rightsSupporting independent media

An increasing focus of development cooperation is on national ownership to the developmentprocess as part of the PRSP process. Emphasis is on promoting coherent policies and effectiveinstitutions - characterised by responsibility, transparency, accountability, responsiveness andcommitment to promoting human rights. These prerequisites are now seen as a necessity forimproving service delivery and achieving sustainable institutional development. Moreover, theyare needed in order to absorb increased aid efficiently and they are necessary in order fordonors to move towards sector or budget support, insofar as public administration should beheld accountable. The internal pressure and dynamics are related to the shift in politicallegitimacy, whereby those in power increasingly need to generate loyalty from their supportersthrough delivery of services rather than via personal favours. The impact of critical media andpublic debate has raised expectations of accountability.During the Structural Adjustment period – strongly promoted by the Bretton Woodsinstitutions – a strong emphasis was placed on changing the role of the state to create anenvironment conducive to private sector development and market forces, primarily by reducingthe state apparatus, privatising public entities and creating macro-economic stability. The PRSPprocess reflects a revised view of the role of the state on the part of the international financialinstitutions. The PRSPs are intended to involve a high element of public participation andprivate sector involvement. This entails an increased role for the ministry of finance andplanning bodies for long term planning, establishing monitoring mechanisms and implementingpublic sector reforms:Strengthening of the planning, budgeting and monitoring capability of the economicministries and the central financial institutions, such as the central bank, and ensuring itsindependence; this helps ensure macro-economic stability and facilitates investment.Strengthening the planning and implementation capacity of social ministries and of theministry of tax collection as well as oversight bodies such as parliamentary committeesand the auditor general help enhance pro-poor policies while raising funds, allocatingpublic resources and accounting for them in an open manner.More efficient public services and performance measurement in health and educationcontributes to equitable and universal provision of effective basic services.Several African states are undertaking broad capacity development exercises and drastic publicadministration reforms (training, restructuring, computerisation, salary reforms to attract newand better skilled personnel, introducing performance measurements, downsizing, etc.).Moreover, most African countries acknowledge the need to increase mobilisation of internalfinancial resources for development through enhanced tax-collection, private investments,remittances and resources from the NGO sector. Mobilisation of additional domestic resourcesand increased government responsibility of donor funds can enable governments to provideadditional and better services. It can increase accountability to the taxpayers on how publicresources are spent and thereby promote government accountability to the total population

rather than to a few supporters or to the donors – in contrast to the former situation, whichcentred on responding to the needs of foreign donors and lenders.Apart from its revenue implications ‘better’ taxation may, under certain conditions, also affectgovernance positively. Tax practices may shed more light on some of the causes of (bad)governance in Africa. The arguments for the governance potential of taxation arestraightforward. To collect taxes in a reliable and low cost manner taxpayers must beencouraged to ‘volunteer’ to pay, while the non-compliant must be coerced to pay if caught. Ifthis ‘bargaining process’ is successful it can enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the statein three ways. Consultation with taxpayers promotes quasi-voluntary compliance so that taxesare collected more effectively. Revenues are enhanced as a result. Bargaining also helps togenerate consensus about and coherence of national policies and priorities for revenue use.Finally, paying tax becomes a valid basis for claiming political influence, and where this takesroot, it contributes towards the consolidation of meaningful electoral democracy.Unless the power of states is constrained by legislatures, the prospects for establishingaccountable, democratic governance are limited. Legislatures, in turn, will greatly enhance theircounter-veiling powers if they also represent the interests of taxpayers. Politicising taxationissues is thus central to promoting good governance.

5.4 Anti-corruptionCorruption is a major problem in Africa. According to Transparency International’s survey,Chad, Nigeria, Madagascar, Kenya, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mali, Mozambique andEthiopia are perceived to be the ten most corrupt countries in Africa. In addition, Cameroon,Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zambia are high on the list.Corruption has serious negative impacts on the economy, the prospects of achieving povertyalleviation as well as the general political climate. It generally leads to sub-optimal decisions onallocation of resources, it is associated with wasteful spending, and it deprives weak groups ofintended benefits.Corruption takes many forms. In most countries there is a widespread misuse of poweramongst low-paid civil servants, including the police, who supplement their meagre incomeswith bribes in order to survive. This kind of corruption has a strong poverty bias, as it hits poorvictims the most. A long-term solution to this problem will depend not only on enforcement ofanti-corruption measures, but more so on implementation of public service reforms, includingsalary reforms. Other types of corruption take the form of systematic plundering of publicresources or fraudulent allocation of concession rights (e.g. exploitation of natural resources),often with the blessing or protection from those highest in power. Apart from undermining theperformance of the public institutions, plundering of public coffers also drains nationalresources and increases poverty. Corruption has a negative impact on effective governance anda negative effect on investment – domestic as well as foreign.

Most countries (at least those not involved in armed conflicts) have expressed theircommitment to fight corruption and have established anti-corruption bodies and strengthenedaccountability measures and integrity systems. The single most important factor in this regard isthat public procurement systems are being reformed to follow international standards. The roleof the media and the judiciary are also important for this task, as is the involvement of theprivate sector. The moral foundations by which society can combat corruption – whichTransparency International calls ‘integrity’- remains weak. Nevertheless, the private sector,religious groups and civil society organisations have now initiated campaigns in some countries.Some of the ’partner countries’ feature high on Transparency International’s CorruptionPerception Index: Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Zambia. They are also among thecountries that have recently emerged from civil wars or authoritarian regimes and theirgovernance structures are weak. This constitutes a challenge for Danish developmentcooperation, especially in light of the recently endorsed Danish anti-corruption strategy.

5.5 DecentralisationIn conjunction with public sector reforms, the process of decentralisation is gainingmomentum in many countries. Decentralisation – or in some countries de-concentration – isseen as essential to improving service delivery, especially to the rural poor. When implementedcapably, decentralisation can also enhance democracy, in so far as locally elected bodies, servicedelivery, and mobilising and administering public resources follow one another, this resulting ina more participatory political system and more accountable government. At thelocal/decentralised level, however, low capacity is an obstacle. A gradual and planned processof decentralisation along with major investments in capacity building at the local level, includingchecks-and-balance organisations such as community-based organisations, can help avoiddecentralisation becoming decentralisation of inefficiency and corruption.Central institutions, especially line ministries, almost inevitably resist decentralisation; hence,decentralisation will probably only come about through pressure from especially the ruralpopulation and the population living in smaller towns outside the capital (organised in nationaland community based civil society organisations) – a pressure, which is closely linked toimproved service delivery as a result of decentralisation. Decentralisation is a difficult process,which often rearranges local power structures and creates a new equilibrium between the (new)locally elected authorities, the local representatives of central government (regionalcommissioners and the like) and, in some countries, traditional/customary structures. Hence, itis a process that takes time and calls for careful preparation and thorough discussion.

demanded from internal and external partners, debate on constitutional issues is widespread.Particularly limiting the powers vested in the executive (reducing the terms of office for thepresident, increasing decentralisation) is a heavily debated topic. A specific issue in manyAfrican countries when moving towards democracy and nation-building, is the protection ofminority rights (see 5.8)5.6.2 ElectionsA prevalent view amongst African elites and Western politicians is that political partiescompeting in elections (must) play a vital role in democratic transition and consolidation – inAfrica as elsewhere. The (re-)introduction, in the early 1990s, of multiparty systems in manyAfrican countries was generally welcomed by the national publics and the internationalcommunity. Multiparty systems were seen as the ultimate and irreversible step towardsdemocratisation, and indeed regularly held, multiparty elections have now become the norm inAfrica.Since mid-1980s, most countries have held elections of some sort, and often regularly. Duringthe last decade, elections have become both more transparent and more efficientlyadministered. Modalities for voter registration have improved, thereby increasing the numberof eligible voters, but registration procedures remain cumbersome. The actual conduct ofelections has been refined: secret ballots are now routine, some voter education takes place, andobservers often supervise the counting of votes.While the technical aspects of the conduct of elections may have improved, there are stillreasons to question the fairness of many elections. Unequal access to the state-controlledmedia, restrictions in the permission for holding public rallies, and access to public resources interms of money, cars and facilities are often allocated with a clear preference to the ruling partyduring campaigning time. This is also the case in countries where elections are considered free,in the sense that they are not marred by violence and threats. Corrupt practices, bribing andvote buying also occur. In countries where the judiciary enjoys a reasonable degree ofautonomy, a significant number of election results are often petitioned in court.Many African countries have taken a major step forward towards popular participation ingovernance and establishing legitimacy for the executive and the legislature. But there is stillsome way to go.5.6.3 Political partiesA great number ofpolitical partiestypically register and participate in elections. Nonetheless,this generally contributes to fragmentation rather than meaningful political competition withthe ruling party. In only a few African countries do political parties represent a specific class orgroup sharing the same interests. Very often the competing parties are not based on realdifferences in ideologies, policies or issues. Political parties are, in addition, characterised byweak structures – except for the ruling party, which has the possibility to utilise state resourcesdirectly or indirectly in its campaigning for support.

The weakness of many political parties – combined with the prevalent electoral systems ofmajority vote in single constituencies – makes it very difficult to establish whether a certaindistribution of seats in parliament reflects the ‘will of the voters’. This weakness challenges therelevance of political parties as political competitors in Africa. Some countries have chosen toestablish party-free democracies. The Ugandan example is often discussed, and observersdisagree as to whether the political competition based on the ‘movement’ structure can becharacterised as democratic59.Even though the party systems contain a number of limitations and imperfections in mostAfrican countries, they have at least one useful function: where political parties in opposition tothe incumbent have been able to establish alliances, they have been successful in voting apresident out of office and thereby laying the groundwork for a change in regime. This is whatoccurred in Kenya in 2002 and in Zambia in 1991. The fact that this change could take placethrough the ballot box represents significant progress.5.6.4 ParliamentParliaments in Africa play an increasingly important role and have been rather neglected bydonors. In some instances, parliaments have developed from rubber-stamping bodies in toauthentically law-making institutions, critically examining and adjusting bills proposed by thegovernment, while also struggling to monitor government policies and financial management.However, many parliaments are not yet equipped to perform this role.Many MPs and parliamentary groupings lack resources in the form of analytical and researchcapacity in assessing issues brought before them. However, some parliamentary committeeshave broadened their resource base by inviting civil society and professional associations topresent their views.A second constraint in parliamentary work is that many MPs, particularly those elected bysingle constituencies, tend to focus on representing the particular needs and wishes of theirconstituency rather then having the national interest at heart.Finally, many MPs become part of the neo-patrimonialistic system: they strive for ministerialpositions and have to stay on good terms with the president. Hence, they cannot be an effectiveopposition. Also, Parliaments have a tendency to grow, cf. e.g. the growth of the Ugandanparliament since 1988. This clearly illustrates a way of buying political support.5.6.5 Security SectorWhile the frequency of military coup has decreased in recent years, transitory non-democraticrule is still a risk in certain parts of Africa. An especially important and often neglected issue isthe democratic control of the security sector, especially the military and police. In somecountries, the military have become important political (and economic) powers, e.g. Zimbabwe,Rwanda and Nigeria. Obviously, when the control of the security forces is in the hands of a59

President or a ruling party, this might be - and often has been - used to repress opposition,bring about a military coup, or keep in power an authoritarian regime. Ensuring parliamentarycontrol of the security forces minimises this risk. In the SADC-region, research organisations,civil society, parliamentarians, governments and military leaders are networking on civil-militarymatters, leading to discussions and practical proposals for improving democratic control of thesecurity forces60.5.6.6 Independent institutionsOther independent institutions, which should perform checks and balances of the powers ofgovernments, are likewise weak resource-wise and/or in their political independence. Thisapplies to human rights commissions, ombudsman institutions, auditor generals, electioncommissions and others. In light of a typically weak public administration, the importance ofthese independent checks and balance functions are crucial in creating the conditions fordemocratic governance, and for effective and transparent policy development and servicedelivery by the public sector.5.6.7 Civil societyCivil society organisations play an important role in consolidating democracy and as‘watchdogs’. Interaction between civil society and formal democratic institutions can bringabout a more vivid and dynamic political debate. Through their advocacy activities, theseorganisations give a voice to otherwise voiceless groups. Individual civil society organisationsdo not necessarily need large constituencies, as long as they are capable of articulating the viewsof underprivileged groups. In more repressive societies, there are attempts to restrict themovement of critical NGOs, but the general trend is a growing and increasingly outspoken civilsociety. In many countries, this is particularly true for women’s movements, which flourish asthe economy grows. Public education campaigns concerning democracy and human rights arenecessary for the development of democracy and good governance.There has sometimes been a tendency, however, to focus on the role of the civil society at theexpense of the parliament. Many African politicians, e.g., object to the notion that civil societyorganisations with limited constituencies should be more legitimate than democratically electedparliamentarians. On the other hand, civil society and parliamentarians – especially those inopposition – often work hand-in-hand to enhance democracy, human rights and povertyalleviation.Religious leaders and institutions have often been the key to progress on social issues despitesome regressive influence (e.g. campaigns against the use of condoms). In the political field, theinfluence of religious leaders has also been significant, e.g. in pursuing the conduct of elections,improving human rights adherence, rehabilitation of victims of torture, and mobilisation ofcitizens against corruption. In Malawi, the Council of Churches forced lifetime PresidentKamuzu Banda to call the elections that led to his downfall. In Zambia, religious groups havebeen instrumental in preventing an unconstitutional extension of the term of office of theformer president, and in Kenya religious organisations played an important role in ensuring freeand fair elections in 2002. The strength of these groups is not solely that they can exert political60

5.7 Access to justice and the rule of lawThe rule of law is widely recognised as a prerequisite for respect for human rights and peaceand security and vice versa (right to a fair trial, avoidance of arbitrary arrests, protection of civilrights). However, rule of law is also an important precondition for economic development andinvestments (for example, the protection of property rights, settlement of disputes). Mostcountries have constitutionally enshrined the independence of the judiciary, civil and politicalrights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Yet access to justice is still not guaranteedin most countries, which is particularly harmful to women and vulnerable groups.The major problems in ensuring the rule of law are related to capacity and accountability.Under-funded and understaffed courts and prosecution, poor accessibility of defence lawyers,and inadequately updated legal framework are more the rule than the exception. In addition,poorly functioning enforcement mechanisms and institutions, e.g. police, prisons, andarbitration mechanisms, add to the problem. Police lack access to and education in moderninvestigation techniques. Use of violence including torture is widespread in prisons, policedetentions and by the military. Prisons are inhumanly crowded, and the majority of inmates areoften prisoners in custody, waiting years to go on trial.The legal system in most African countries was normally copied from the colonial system. Thesystem has rarely been adapted to fit the actual needs and prevailing perceptions of justice ofthe country. The lower levels of the legal system are most often official local courts, chiefs’courts or both. They are normally based on customary law, which is rarely codified or written.Such local legal institutions would deal with civil disputes and minor criminal matters, whilemajor criminal cases or political/constitutional issues are dealt with at the higher tiers.Establishing and maintaining a formal court system is very costly, and various attempts havebeen made to develop low-cost lay courts or paralegal structures. For the individual, access tothe system is costly, thus limiting access to justice for poor people. The lower court systems,especially, reflect a serious amount of gender bias.Several countries, however, have embarked on legal or judicial reforms. In some countries, thehigh number of incidents of corruption in the legal system, which seriously undermines theconfidence in the legal system as such, is being actively addressed. In 2002, the Kenyangovernment thus suspended half the country’s high court judges as a result of corruption

charges, but a number of countries unfortunately refrain from taking similar measures. Prisonand police reforms have also been introduced in several countries, but they take time toimplement.The establishment or improvement of commercial courts is taking place in some countries, andalternative dispute resolution mechanisms in both civil and commercial disputes is beingpromoted. Para-legal advisers and legal aid clinics for the underprivileged have becomeincreasingly common.The judiciary often plays a significant role in constitutional and other generally political issues,especially when it is perceived to be independent. A high number of public complaints andpolitical disputes are brought before the courts as legal or constitutional matters. In otherstates, many of these disputes would have been dealt with administratively or within thepolitical sphere, e.g. in parliaments, if these had been capable of assuming their independentchecks-and-balances responsibilities.

5.8 Promotion of human rightsResearch shows that among African countries, a high level of formal acceptance of humanrights provisions (e.g. accession to the conventions) is not strongly correlated with actualhuman rights implementation. While political commitment may be present, the means toenforce respect for human rights may not. The courts, police and prison services, human rightscommissions, national administrations and parliament may not have the capacity to deal withhuman rights issues. In many countries a strong civil society voice has been successful inpressing through some of the necessary improvements.Poverty and respect for human rights are interrelated. The most underprivileged segmentswithin countries have a higher risk of having their civil as well as economic rights violated. Theuneducated poor have little knowledge of their rights and few means to fight for them.International labour standards are not sufficiently recognised or respected. Retention of cheaplabour practices, e.g., maintains a cycle of poverty, which relies on low costs and lowproductivity for maintaining income61.Gender equality improved considerably across Africa over the last half of the 20thcentury.Today, an increasing number of African countries endorse the international instruments andstandards applying to women’s rights and gender equality. More tangible results have been met,such as an increased life expectancy of women and a reduction in the boy/girl disparity inschool attendance. But girls’ and women’s rights are still inadequately adhered to in mostAfrican societies. In most cases, women do not have equal status to men with respect to legal,social and economic rights. Thus, it remains a major challenge to translate the internationalagreements, norms and objectives in the field of human rights and gender equality into tangible61

improvements in women’s lives in areas such as inheritance rights, participation in (political)decision-making, sexual and reproductive rights, protection against violence, etc.An often neglected aspect of human rights is how the rights of minority groups – not leastethnic groups - and other marginalized or vulnerable groups are addressed. These include e.g.Africa’s 25 million indigenous peoples. There has been an unwillingness to acknowledge thatsome ethnic minorities in Africa could be referred to as indigenous peoples. Apart fromundermining their cultural identity and self-esteem by calling them backwards and traditional,these groups have often also been deprived of their livelihood. In 2003, the AfricanCommission for Human and Peoples Rights under the auspices of the African Unionrecognised the ILO-definition of indigenous peoples (self-identification).There is a general tendency to pay special attention to protect the rights of other marginalizedgroups such as refugees, internally displaced peoples, the disabled and children. The focus onchildren has gained new momentum. There is an increasing awareness of the UN Conventionon the Rights of the Child as a lever for social change e.g. through the work of NGOs engagedin support to the increasing number of orphans and vulnerable children. Some countries areimproving the juvenile justice systems and the rights of the girl child have gained significantattention, particularly with regard to education. Finally, on the implementation of the UNConvention against Torture it is noted that the convention has been ratified or acceded to bysome of the Sub-Saharan African states but not all.Another challenge involves respecting the rights of people suffering from HIV/AIDS,including the right to non-discrimination in employment and the right to treatment, let alonethe problem of stigmatisation.Finally, ensuring the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons deserves higher priority.

5.9 Support for independent mediaCritical, professional and investigative journalism and media pluralism are major factors andmeans to complement weak institutions. An independent media is an integral part of ademocratic society and a means through which civil society can actively participate in thepolitical debate. Although professionalism in journalism still leaves considerable room forimprovement, conditions for the independent press and not least access to broadcasting (e.g.de-monopolising) have improved tremendously over the last decade. Only a few countries havegone in the opposite direction, for example Zimbabwe and Eritrea. Most media, though, areconstrained by very limited financial resources. Denmark has traditionally worked closely withthe independent media.In post-conflict situations, independent media are vital for peace and reconciliation. Aninteresting development is seen in Liberia, where consolidated efforts to strengthen theindependent media are taking place in collaboration with a number of overseas partners,including Danish partners.

5.10 Regional and international instrumentsThe end of the Cold War has resulted in an emerging democratisation, which might slowly bechanging the premises for development in Africa. Two of Africa’s largest countries, SouthAfrica and Nigeria, have been instrumental in the launching of the initiative called the NewAfrican Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and in the re-launching, a yearlater, of the African Union (AU). NEPAD and the AU have put democratisation and respectfor human rights higher on the agenda in Africa.The NEPAD plan of action focuses on five broad policy areas, one of which is ’Democracy,Governance, and Peace and Security’. NEPAD distinguishes itself from past developmentinitiatives by its explicit emphasis on African ownership of ideas and its pledge to upholdnorms of democratic governance and market policies. The NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism,which is intended to serve as a means through which African leaders can monitor compliancewith NEPAD principles of political and economic governance, is still evolving. Somewhatdelayed, Ghana will be the first country to undergo the review in early 2005. Accordingly,doubts have been raised as to the ability and willingness of some African leaders to implementthe voluntary Peer Review Mechanism effectively and to impose sufficient political pressure ontheir fellow heads of state62. According to this position, establishing effective oversight andvery clear rules as to how the review should be conducted and the kinds of conclusions that canbe drawn would enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism. Another challenge will be toinvolve African civil society organisations in NEPAD’s planning and presentation processes. Ifthe NEPAD process is to be successful, it will be important that the APRM and its supportersfocus on progress achieved rather than fixed milestones, and that they keep in mind that thisshould be a helping hand, not a judgement about the countries assessed.Regardless of any initial uncertainties, however, development partners commend the NEPAD-initiative and place confidence in the ability of reform-oriented African governments to forwardthe democratisation agenda throughout the continent. The majority of partners providefinancial support to NEPAD and, most importantly, participate in levering the initiativepolitically though the African Partnership Forum63.

Political dialogue in bilateral as well as multilateral fora;Good governance as a cross-cutting issue in all development programs and projects;Specific programmes.Critical political dialogue with the African countries on democracy and human rights takesplace continuously, often within a wider political dialogue. Denmark conducts bilateraldialogues through its Embassies and during regular high-level consultations. This is seen as animportant part of the framework, within which Danish development assistance is provided. Inaddition, regular contacts with the AU and the sub-regional organisations are envisaged. Withinthe framework of Nordic cooperation, contacts with a number of African countries take placeunder the ‘Nordic Africa-initiative’, which provides for ministerial-level consultations betweenNordic countries and some of the most progressive African countries.An increasingly important forum for political dialogue on governance in Africa is the politicaland security cooperation within the EU. A central framework instrument, the Cotonou-agreement, requires that the Heads of Missions in the various Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP)countries, have a regular and structured dialogue with the authorities, the opposition, the civilsociety, etc. (the ‘Article 8 dialogue’). Good governance is a key element in this dialogue, andone in which Denmark actively participates. In case of serious violations of basic values andprinciples, the Article 96 dialogue can replace Article 8, in which case the EU draws upbenchmarks in areas where changes in the country’s policy are found imperative. The EU,furthermore, conducts a regular dialogue with the AU and the sub-regional organisations.Backed by the EU’s development assistance, this political dialogue on governance is a verypowerful tool.Working within the various international organisations, which are continuously refining thedevelopment framework for ODA to Africa (World Bank, IMF, , the UN agencies, OECD-DAC and like-minded groups such as Nordic+64), Denmark has continued to advocate for theimportance of good governance in development cooperation with Africa. This includesprioritising multilateral support in favour of the poor population in countries where poorgovernance renders bilateral development cooperation difficult or impossible.The African countries’ compliance with the human rights conventions they have signed isdiscussed at bilateral consultations, as part of EU’s country dialogue, and at relevantinternational meetings, not least at the UN Commission on Human Rights.Within its ‘partner countries’, Denmark actively promotes good governance reforms togetherwith other development partners, e.g. through multi-donor budget support mechanisms builtaround PRSPs. Key reform areas, where Denmark is active, include public financialmanagement, auditing, anti-corruption, improving the capacity of the civil service,decentralisation and legal reform.

In conjunction with the general shift towards general and sector budget support, goodgovernance is becoming an increasingly important cross cutting issue. A well-functioning publicsector is imperative in order to maintain mutual confidence between donors and recipientcountries. In this respect, Denmark and partner countries have a joint interest in improvedgovernance, as most partners prefer the move towards SWAPs and budget support. On theother hand, the close links between governance and budget support represent a potential risk.Donors can, e.g., withhold disbursements due to an unacceptable deterioration in governancecapacity not directly related to the disbursement (human rights abuses of prisoners, riggedelections). This withholding of funds may undermine the capability of the partner governmentor institution to plan and deliver the services expected. Clear and transparent agreementsinvolving central decision makers should therefore determine the overall governancecommitments and performance - including specific benchmarks where feasible - and ensurethat failure to honour commitments would have implications for the cooperation at all levels.In all partner countries, programmes and projects in the field of good governance aresignificant, comprising up to 20% of the national bilateral financial frame. In some countries,thematic and coherent governance programmes are replacing individual projects, e.g., in Ghana,Benin, Kenya and Zambia. These programmes included support for the rule of law, elections,media, civic society, human rights and anti-corruption activities. In addition, general capacityand institutional development in financial management and accountability, public sectorreforms, civil service reforms, decentralisation, and poverty reduction planning and executionform an increasing part of Danish development cooperation, as do the policy development andadministrative reforms within the sector programmes.The most recent evaluation of Danish support to promotion of human rights anddemocratisation was carried out in 1999. The major conclusions and recommendations of theevaluation are the following:a) There should be official Danish presence on the ground, and it should be capable ofsupporting human rights and democratisation in a flexible manner;b) Staff should have profound –country-knowledge and be trained in political analysis;c) Progress over time in partner countries should be measured;d) Closer donor coordination in support of good governance;e) Long-term dialogue and ownership of support to human rights and democracy.While there has been progress in all these areas, including moves towards a more programmaticapproach to good governance, the recommendations should be kept in mind for furtherDanish support.Finally, it should be mentioned that Denmark often has a comparative advantage in thedialogue and cooperation regarding governance and democracy. In the partner countries as wellas in the international community and amongst donors, Denmark is generally considered to bea consistent and qualified actor in the dialogue.

A major element in developing human resources is a well-educated and healthy workforce.Access to adequate and relevant education and appropriate health services are fundamentalrights that should be enjoyed by any population. The efficiency and productivity of theworkforce forms the basis for a competitive productive sector. In this respect, Sub-SaharanAfrica, with a few exceptions like Mauritius, is significantly behind other regions. The publicadministrations are the main suppliers of education and health to the populations, but in manyAfrican countries, private organisations such as churches and religious organisations are alsoimportant providers of these services.Health and education indicators are generally lower for Africa than for any other continent;moreover, the population’s health and education have seen only marginal improvements overthe last three decades. There is ample evidence that investment in human resourcedevelopment can yield high returns over the long term, but for many African countries it is verydifficult to mobilise the required resource inputs. However, even at the same level of GDPthere are significant variations. Namibia, for example, spends almost 25% of its GDP on healthand primary education, while Benin uses only 11%. Strict and clear prioritisation in policydevelopment and in the planning of public expenditures and donor funds is imperative in orderto maximise output in the health and education.

6.1 EducationEducation is a cornerstone for development in Africa. Basic knowledge, skills, and attitudesprovide students with the potential to broaden his/her understanding and to develop capacitiesas active, participating members of society, and as future agents of positive change in Africancountries. In particular, education is an important way to make children’s rights a reality, andshould be seen as a strong vehicle for change. It enables the child to make choices, to becomeliterate, form his/her own opinions and develop self-reliance. Good quality education improvesthe live conditions for children and their families by creating knowledge, which can improvee.g. health, community participation, gender awareness, HIV/AIDS awareness and generalpeace building.In view of the immense challenges they face, educational services in Africa are heavilyunderdeveloped. Not much aggregate data are available to illustrate the situation in Africa, butthe public budgets for primary education are almost entirely spent on teacher salaries (Kenyawith 95.8% being the highest recorded in 2000), leaving the costs of, for instance, teachingmaterials and school uniforms with the parents. On average in 2000, each teacher had 47 pupilsin a class in Africa, but the variations are considerable. In Botswana and South Africa, schoolclasses had 27 and 33 pupils, respectively, while Ugandan and Mozambican teachers were onaverage teaching 59 and 64 pupils each. Primary school enrolment rates differ betweencountries.

In most African countries, the education systems suffer a number of problems andshortcomings. They are often heavily understaffed and under-funded. There is a great need forincreased funding – also from the international community. The teachers are poorly trained,badly paid and inadequately motivated. Pupils are not always encouraged by their families toattend school; the children may have to walk long distances and are often poorly fed. The lowquality of schools leads to low enrolments, poor attendance and high dropout rates, especiallyfor girls. Better-off parents react by enrolling their children in expensive private schools, whichfurther deepens the marked social differences. Some African countries have in recent yearsintroduced free, universal primary school, resulting in dramatic increases in enrolment and evenmore overcrowded school classes. In many cases, the resulting drop in quality, often combinedwith an inhospitable environment in the schools, leads to lower attendance, as parents –needing their child’s labour inputs - keep their children at home. Unfortunately, the generalpicture in recent years reveals a decline in the number of children attending school, and a lowerratio of girls to boys’ enrolments, though with some exceptions.Secondary schools have traditionally been exclusively focused on preparation for universityeducation, even though the vast majority of the pupils never obtain the opportunity to attenduniversity. Recognising this fact, African governments now try to promote vocational trainingand non-academic educations, e.g. nurses, teachers, artisans and social workers, but this has hadlittle impact on mainstream secondary education, and their recognition is generally not reflectedin budget increases. The presence of large numbers of disenchanted young people who havecompleted what they thought was a valuable secondary education only to find themselveswithout jobs or income, has given rise to serious social tensions in many African countries.Good quality higher education is essential for the development of both the private and publicsectors. Its level of development determines the required size of the tertiary education systemin a particular country. However, the costs of maintaining an education system at the tertiarylevel are relatively higher for a poor country than for wealthier countries. As an example, SouthAfrica spent 61.3% of its GDP per capita per student in 2000, while Lesotho spent as much as962.7% of GDP per capita per student. The challenge for the African governments is toestablish the most effective size of its tertiary education system, so that it reflects a realisticdemand for higher education in order not to waste valuable government resources.Technical and vocational education and training has undergone radical changes during the1990s, as public training provision declined markedly as a consequence of structuraladjustment, while at the same time donors shifted the emphasis towards basic education. Alsothe approach has changed, reflected in the increasing used of the term ‘skills development’rather than training. The notion of training used to refer to separate institutions or was seen asa distinct part of schooling targeted at youth or people in their early adulthood. In recent yearsfocus has increasingly been on enter-prise based training. Although the interest in training forthe informal sector has grown, commitment by government and donors to the informal sectorremains weak in practice.The education sector is heavily affected by the impact of HIV/AIDS. Teachers are a high-riskgroup in relation to the pandemic, and in many countries the mortality is so high that it is

difficult to maintain the already inadequate number of teachers. Skilled teachers are not easilyreplaced. In hard-hit countries, more teachers need to be trained, but conventional teachertraining will not be able to meet the demands because of the high costs related to conventionaleducation.Special efforts must be made in the education sector to prevent the further spread ofHIV/AIDS. Almost regardless of the countermeasures taken, the death of tens of thousands ofteachers across Africa will reduce the rate at which the education system is able to train cominggenerations. In addition, the resulting larger number of students per teacher in combinationwith the incurred fiscal burden of training new teachers and/or a reduction in the educationalrequirements of teachers will undermine the central role of education in preventing andcombating HIV/AIDS.Many governments in Africa are now realising the potential of open learning and distanceeducation as a way of increasing access, improving quality and cutting costs at the same time.The increased access to education through open learning and distance education could includegroups, which have been marginalized by disability or gender. The quality of primary andsecondary education could be improved if this approach is applied for the training of teachers,and supported by policies and investments in materials and qualified staff.Other possible strategies, besides reducing the teacher-training period, could be that of enticingformer teachers to return to the education system and allowing teachers to work afterretirement age. In a number of African countries, between 25% and 50% of trained teachers donot teach in primary schools for various reasons.The education sector is one of the areas where the gender dimension is most important, whichis also indicated in the MDGs (Goal 3). The World Bank has long acknowledged thatinvestments in girls’ education provide the best returns of any development effort. Not onlywill the productivity of women increase dramatically, but as the person responsible for familymanagement, educated women tend to have fewer and better- spaced children, their familiesare healthier and better nourished, their children more motivated for education, and educatedwomen tend to participate more in decision-making. However, such education is often attainedwith great difficulty. The girls are less encouraged – if not directly discouraged – to attendschool, their chores in the family are more extensive, they are given little attention or status inschool and are quite early subjected to sexual harassment by teachers and boys. Many parentskeep their teenage daughters away from school for the latter reason. Pregnancy normally leadsto termination of school enrolment.The inclusion of special needs education for the disabled and other minority groups in theeducation sector is likewise important. Access to schools and literacy rates are lower forexcluded and marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples than for other sections of thepopulation. Moreover, many of these groups live in the periphery of their respective countries,where the number and quality of schools are below national averages.

6.2 HealthProtecting and promoting health is central to the process of poverty reduction and humandevelopment. A sick person is less productive; a liability both to the family members affectedand to those who must support them, and expenses associated with disease is one of the majorcauses of impoverishment. The benefits of investing in health care in terms of povertyalleviation is well established65, what is not well documented is whether investments in healthprovides more or less effect in this respect than investments in other sectors, e.g. education,agriculture or roads.After independence most African countries adopted WHO’s Primary Health Care strategy. Thisemphasis on cost-effective services for the most common and important diseases producedremarkable reductions in morbidity and mortality. Subsequently the recurrent cost implicationsof the infrastructure (buildings, vehicles, personnel etc.) that was established proved too highfor the fledgling economies, a problem that was further aggravated by the economic declinefollowing the oil crisis. The result was stagnating, often declining, performance. In order tochange this situation many countries embarked on new approaches including decentralisation;user charges and health insurance; and integration of vertical programmes in general servicedelivery with an emphasis on district health management. All with the aim to curb governmentexpenditure and improve efficiency. These strategies, often labelled health sector reform, werestrongly supported by the donors increasingly in the form of integrated approaches supportingwell-articulated government policies and plans. This assistance modality was named SWAp66and often included a significant element of pooled donor funding. It too was an attempt toenhance efficiency of the funds available to governments. Reducing the health infrastructure inorder to achieve a better match between its size and the resources available for running it, wasrarely if ever part of the reforms, except for retrenchments of staff following structuraladjustment. Such radical action was deemed politically impossible to embark on. At the sametime the private sector, for profit and not for profit, was expanding, and in many countries it isnow responsible for around half of service delivery.Today, the health sector of most African countries faces numerous problems caused mainly bythe combination of declining resources in real terms and an escalating disease burden.HIV/AIDS, drug resistant malaria and other mainly preventable diseases have aggravated thisburden. Furthermore, countries are now facing a double disease burden due to the arrival of“modern” mainly life-style related diseases like tobacco induced disease, traffic accidents anddiabetes. The problems are illustrated by developments in health indicators, which are generallymoving in the wrong direction, or are otherwise moving too slowly to fulfil the MDGs.Life expectancy at birth for Africans has fallen drastically over the last 15 years, due mainly tothe increase in HIV/AIDS, but also due to other diseases, particularly malaria and TB. In manycountries, life expectancy is now 40 years or less. This development, affecting all parts ofsociety, poses a serious threat to the development process. Of 35 countries rated in the low6566

human development category of the UN’s latest Human Development Index 2004, 32countries are from Africa.Between 1997 and 2000, health expenditures per capita in Africa (both public and private)amounted to 29 USD per year. This figure differs substantially from country to country. SouthAfrica and Botswana are on the high end of the scale, with US$ 255 and US$ 191, respectively,whereas in Mozambique and Benin, only US$ 9 and US$ 11 per capita, respectively, was spentfor health related purposes by the government or by individuals. For many the goal is thatgovernment should have 9 $s per capita for district health services67, although the AbujaDeclaration sets a target of 15$/cap for health services and Commission on Macro-economicsand Health estimate that 30-40$/cap are needed to reach the MDGs.There is in fact no clear-cut relation between the health budget and the achievements in termsof health outcomes. Partly because of the multitude of weak links in the chain running fromgovernment spending to health outcomes. Partly because the effect of the money investeddepends on the choices for their use, an important aspect of this is resource allocations, forexample between levels (central/district), type of services (curative/preventive) andgeographical (rural/urban) and social strata (rich/poor). No blueprint exists and priority settingin the form of policies and strategies will need to be developed on the basis of the problemsand conditions in each individual country.African countries are struggling with extremely difficult issues:-How to increase financing while at the same time secure access for the poor. Given thesector’s huge financing gap user charges, be that formal or informal, cannot be totallyabolished, and effective exemption mechanisms are therefore key to ensuring qualityservices for the poor. In this context many countries are embarking on health insurance indifferent forms.-Decentralising health services often as part of a more fundamental devolution of power tolower levels. This poses new challenges for health ministries on how to secure the quality ofservices, when they are no longer responsible for running them.-Achieving synergy and complementarity between the public and private sector, in order toutilise all the available resources most efficient in reaching the governments ambitions forimproving the health of the population, not least the poor.-Maintaining and increasing proper staffing levels and motivation.Particularly the latter is emerging as one of the biggest challenges for improving health services,so big that it is often labelled the Human Resource Crisis. Countries are faced with too fewfunds to maintain the levels of health professionals needed. This is aggravated by theopportunity for doctors and nurses to work abroad at much higher wages, with which thegovernments cannot compete. In Ghana, for example, the yearly exodus of doctors and nursesis almost equal to the production. To this is added the worldwide problem of attracting healthprofessionals to remote and poor areas. Furthermore, authoritarian and old-fashionedmanagement systems provide little incentive for improving performance.67

Millennium Development Goals are now providing the direction for developments also in thehealth sector. In Africa they are not achievable within the given timeframe. It is crucial torealise that those who eventually will have to deliver the MDGs are not governments but healthworkers private as well as public. These health workers are too few, are insufficiently paid, haveambiguous career opportunities, and are working in poor facilities. As a consequence they areoften poorly motivated and management control is weak. To them the commitment of topgovernment officials may mean little. Thus, it is important to raise the motivation of thisworkforce by providing decent working conditions. The solution is not only providing theadditional financing for employing sufficient numbers and paying a decent salary. An importantpart of the solution is modernising management, and first of all making health workers at alllevels responsible for target setting.Controversies (esp. religiously-founded) regarding sexual and reproductive health and rights ledto the issue being excluded from the MDGs. However, UN-agencies and a number ofbilaterals, including Denmark, have been active in promoting the issue, linking it not only to thehealth agenda, but also to the wider discussion on democracy and human rights, not least thegender aspects hereof.Marginalised and impoverished groups need to be specifically targeted in health policies andprogrammes. A special problem is indigenous communities, which often do not have access tohealth facilities or health campaigns, and where mortality rates are much higher than nationalaverages, including extremely high infant mortality rates.The cause-effect relationship between environmental and social health determinants may leadto increase in such poverty related illnesses such as diarrhoeal diseases, respiratory diseasesrelated to in-door air pollution and vector-borne infections. Because important healthdeterminants are related to development activities in non-health sectors such as for examplewater, agriculture, environment and transport, it is important that efforts to prevent adversehealth effects should take a starting point in crosscutting actions for health risk prevention andmanagement.In order for the health sector to contribute to the building of African human resources, theproblems must be addressed at many levels with further development of sound policies andsystems. This reflects the realistic possibilities within the existing capacity, but withoutneglecting specific poverty related activities.

6.3.1 HIV/AIDSAfrica is by far the most severely affected region in terms of HIV/AIDS. With only 10% ofthe world’ s population, it holds approximately 67% of the world’s HIV/AIDS cases. Out ofthe 38 million people in the world suffering from HIV/AIDS approximately 25 million live inAfrica. Of the 4.8 million people infected with HIV in 2003, three million people were living inAfrica, and of the three million of the world’s people which died from AIDS in 2003, 75%were from Africa.There is a tremendous diversity across the African continent in the levels and trends of HIVinfections. In Southern Africa, all seven countries have adult prevalence rates above 17%,whereas in West Africa no country has a prevalence rate above 10%. Adult prevalence inCentral and East Africa ranges from 4% to 13%.African women are at greater risk of becoming infected at an earlier age than men. At present,there are 13 infected women for every 10 infected men in Africa. The difference is even morepronounced among 15-to-24 year olds, where the ratio ranges from 20 women for every 10men in South Africa to 45 women for every 10 men in Kenya and Mali. Moreover, women alsocarry the major share of the burden of caring for the sick and orphans, and young girls areoften deprived of schooling, as families might withdraw young girls from school to care for illfamily members. Challenging negative gender roles are critical to the global AIDS response, andstrategies to reduce girl’s and women’s vulnerability must include strategies that promotewomen’s advancement and human rights.With the world’s highest HIV prevalence, Africa faces the greatest demographic impact. In theworst affected countries of Eastern and Southern Africa, the probability of a 15-year old dyingbefore the age of 60 has risen dramatically. In seven African countries where HIV prevalenceexceeds 20%, the average life expectancy of a person born between 1995 and 2000 is now 49years – 13 years less than in the years before AIDS. In Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, theaverage life expectancy of people born over the next decade is projected to drop below 35 yearsin the absence of antiretroviral (ARV) treatment.AIDS has killed one or both parents of an estimated 12 million children in Sub-Saharan Africa.Far too many orphans and vulnerable children are not properly cared for. Those living withfoster families or as street children are likely to be malnourished, underweight, short for theirage. In worst-case scenarios, orphan and vulnerable children may be abducted and enrolled aschild soldiers or driven to hard labour, or to sex work.In order to reduce the effects of HIV/AIDS on the development of human resources, it isimperative to develop and implement strategies, which can deal with the disproportionateimpact of HIV on women, girls and orphans, such as income generating activities, schoolsupport and food assistance and even lodging. Children between the age of five and thirteen aregenerally seen as an HIV/AIDS free generation. Targeting this age group is therefore of keyimportance.

The pandemic is also generating a serious strain on budget resources. The mortality amongstaff in key sectors such as education, health and the military gives rise to additional need fortraining. Since the late 90's international funding to combat HIV/AIDS has increasedsignificantly, from approximately USD 400 million to USD 4.7 billion in 2003. At the sametime, cheaper drugs prices and new international initiatives such as the Global Fund, ClintonFoundation, the WHO 3by 5 initiative and the US’s PEPFAR (The President’s Emergency Planfor AIDS Relief) have contributed to ARV treatment becoming a more realistic option for lowincome countries. However, as provision of and demand for ARV increases, there is a dangerthat prioritisation and focus changes away from support to primary health care, thereby shiftingalready scarce resources and creating an imbalance in allocation of funds and human resources,often to the detriment of controlling other poverty related diseases. Hence HIV/AIDS createssome very real dilemmas for service providers and donors. Some countries have extremelyambitious goals. For example is the Tanzanian government’s Care & Treatment Plan aiming at400,000 Tanzanians on ARV by 2008, the drugs alone will cost almost half of the presenthealth budget amount. Prevention is, as shown by numerous studies, by far more cost-effectivethan ARV in saving life-years and stopping the spread of HIV and there has been a tendencytowards focusing the funds available on prevention. Treatment with ARV has of course also arole, as governments need to provide balanced health services. But, as also pointed out in theDanish HIV/AIDS strategy, a proper balance is needed, and this implies at least that any largescaling up needs to be backed by solid evidence that it is feasible and effective under the givencircumstances. This also goes for the surviving relatives and other dependents.It is of key importance to scale up ARV use in such a way that it improves the health systemsrather than distort it. Moreover, the increasing commercial and informal supply of ARV poses achallenge in terms of continuity and prevention of resistance. It is also important to ensuresustainability and avoid situations where donor fatigue in the future leaves countries with a bigARV programme that they will have to fund from their very scarce domestic resources.Experience has shown, e.g., inadequacies in efficient allocation from the Global Fund forHIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB.6.3.2 MigrationThe mobility of the African population is significant to understanding Africa’s integration inthe world economy. Migration is for many Africans an integrated part of the family survivalstrategy. The migration of a family member to work or study abroad, living with e.g. relatives,can be a valuable investment for an entire family.At a larger scale, labour migration can potentially provide a form of development support,especially through the acquisition and transfer of skills and remittances. However, unmanagedand indiscriminate international recruitment of skilled workers is more often the case, and thishas a negative impact in countries of emigration, with fragile economies and skill shortages insectors from which workers are recruited.Many Africans obtain university degrees outside their home countries. In Kenya, for instance,the number of university students studying outside Kenya is more than half the number

studying within Kenya. The expatriate students are studying in both the developed anddeveloping countries.Immigration can be a benefit for a country facing labour shortages. It removes labour scarcityfor the receiving countries and facilitates occupational mobility. Labour migration can helpdeveloped countries in their effort to maintain the current workforce level. Migration flows areshaped by highly varying combinations of historical, economic, demographic, political orenvironmental factors within any country, region or between the continent and overseasdestinations. Inter-African migration far outstrips the volume of workers or asylum seekersknocking at the doors of industrialised countries.In the ongoing process of globalisation, labour-related migration within and from Africa isexpected to remain a major social and economic force. Brain drain – an important sub-set oflabour-related migration – is one of the most serious migration issues of concern to Africancountries, as it has profound development implications. The ‘feminisation’ of brain drain is alsoa noteworthy phenomenon, as a growing number of highly skilled African women, are nowleaving their home countries.No systematic data are available regarding brain drain in Africa. However, available fragmentaryinformation on highly skilled African migrants provides an insight into the scale of thephenomenon. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), West Africahas been the most important source of brain drain from Africa over the last thirty years, andfrom the 1980s we have witnessed a substantial brain circulation to other African countries.Until recently, Côte d’Ivoire was a magnet for skilled and unskilled labour from all of WestAfrica. Two small oil and mineral rich Central African countries – Equatorial Guinea andGabon -- have recently become important destinations for both skilled and unskilled workersfrom other African countries. For several decades, the war-torn countries in the Horn of Africanot only produced huge numbers of refugees but also legions of highly skilled emigrants.Human rights abuses including torture carried out in some Sub-Saharan Africa states oftentarget well-educated oppositional groups, causing them to flee, thus increasing the “brain drain”out of Africa or to other African countries. The economically buoyant countries in SouthernAfrica – Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, and formerly Zimbabwe – have attracted skilledmigrants from neighbouring countries.Based on the latest available statistical data, the IOM estimates that some 3.8 million Africanslive in Europe, North America and Australia, including several hundred thousand high levelprofessionals. According to the World Bank, some 80,000 highly qualified Africans leave thecontinent annually to work overseas.Countries of destination hardly acknowledge migrants’ contribution to development, and brainmigration can in some instances turn out to be a mere ‘brain wastage’, as skilled people mightend up in either irrelevant positions or working for much lower wages than their qualificationmerit.

Migration may also contribute significantly to the development of African countries, ifmigration is viewed and understood as a development resource. The importance of remittanceshas been stated in Chapter 3.3.3. The migrant Diaspora, composed of unskilled, semi-skilledand highly skilled migrants, must also be seen as a development resource.6.3.3 Gender dimensionIn most African countries, women are the main producers of agricultural products, especiallystaple foods. They generally work longer and harder than men. If development is to be pursuedin an efficient manner, women must be provided with much better opportunities and support.All societies experience gender asymmetries. In no region of the developing world are womenequal to men in social and economic terms. Although legislation sometimes awards women thesame formal rights as men, actual practise is to the disadvantage of women in the sense thatpractise originates from tradition, which prioritises the man and his family. Therefore, womenand girls bear the largest and most direct costs of these inequalities, but the costs cut morebroadly across the society.The last half of the 20thcentury saw great improvements in the absolute status of women andin gender equality in most developing countries. With few exceptions, female education levelsimproved considerably. The primary enrolment rates of women nearly doubled in Africa, risingfaster than boys’ enrolment rates. Women’s life expectancy in developing countries hasincreased by 15-20 years, and more women have joined the labour force.In much of Africa, however, women still obtain land rights chiefly through their husband aslong as the marriage endures, often losing these rights when they are divorced or widowed.Women continue to have systematically poorer command over a range of productive resources,including education, land information, and financial resources. The practise of female genitalmutilation constitutes the worst kind of gender discrimination. Moreover, young andparticularly married women are suffering from HIV/AIDS epidemic, which reduces theworkforce and productivity in agriculture and leave many children as orphans.Gender inequalities impose large costs on the well being of men, women and children,profoundly affecting their ability to improve their lives. In addition to these personal costs,gender inequalities reduce productivity in farms and enterprises, thus impeding prospects forreducing poverty and achieving economic progress. Gender inequalities weaken a country’sgovernance and hence, the effectiveness of its development policies.Gender inequalities also impose costs on productivity, efficiency, and economic progress. Byhindering the accumulation of human capital in the home and the labour market, and bysystematically excluding women or men from access to resources, public services, or productiveactivities, gender discrimination diminishes an economy’s capacity to grow and to raise livingstandards.6.3.4 Vulnerable groupsMinorities in Africa, whether ethnic, sexual or social, are often vulnerable groups whose rightsare being violated by the failure to respect or recognise the values, institutions and ways of life

of those minorities. Even though such groups can represent substantial proportions of anation’s population, and hence human resources, they are being subjected to political exclusionand discrimination. These groups require adequate rehabilitation in order to be reintegrated intotheir societies and contribute to their development. What are needed are approaches thatconstructively build on the diversity of cultures in African states and thereby integratemulticultural policies with human development strategies.Development of human resources must include all groups, and special focus must be placed onincluding otherwise excluded and marginalized sectors such as ethnic minorities, who typicallysuffer from the lowest educational levels and lack of access to skills development.More than 10% of the African population is either disabled or have serious learning disabilities.Apart from respecting the human right to live a decent life also for these groups, nations areobliged to integrate disabled people into the development process, and policies in this respectneed to be (further) developed.

6.4 Danish contributions to development of human resourcesDenmark has extensive bilateral and multilateral experience in the field of development ofhuman resources. For years, Danish development assistance has focused on improving anddeveloping human resources through investment in education and health. Since the emergenceof the Sector Programme Support and the Sector Wide Approach in the 1990s, cooperation inthe social sectors has been one of the three pillars of the new development partnerships.In the health sector, Denmark supports programmes in Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania,Uganda and Zambia as part of SWAP processes. In addition, water and sanitation programmesare supported in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Uganda. Evaluations68provide an indicationof the positive outcome of shifting from project support towards Sector Programme Support.Health is an issue with strong implications for other sectors, and there is a need for devotingmore attention to the health sector’s interaction with sectors such as education, environment,agriculture, etc. Another lesson learned is that the effectiveness of support is stronglyinfluenced by the degree of political commitment and ownership at the country level, and thecapacity within the health sector. The importance of systematically integrating a gender strategyin activities of health sector support is an additional lesson to be learned. Finally, by focusingon Primary Health Care principles, health has been brought closer to the people and priorityhealth problems have been addressed. Reproductive health is typically an integrated part ofDanish bilateral aid to the health sector. In addition, Denmark support UNFPA managedReproductive Health Commodities Fund, which provide contraceptives to approximately 50developing countries.In the education sector, Denmark supports programmes in Mozambique, Zambia and SouthAfrica and is presently planning support to Benin and Burkina Faso. Support to vocationaleducation and training has been part of Danish development cooperation for almost four68

decades, and African countries account for a substantial share of the total support provided.The emphasis of Danish support on formal training centres and provision of technicalassistance is gradually being replaced by an approach, which emphasizes support to systemsreform and institutional development. A joint donor evaluation of support to basic education69suggests that the shift from project-based aid to programme and sector support improves thenational ownership in partner countries. However, project support may represent an importantsupplement, particularly in the form of activities, which target marginalized groups. Thoughimportant, emphasis should not only be on the formalised primary school, but also oneducation of adults and young children. Particularly concerning skills development (vocationaleducation and training), a recent evaluation70recommends devoting more attention to in-service rather than pre-employment training and to the informal sector. It is recommended thatthe activities supported should focus more on developing skills and competences useful in therural areas (where the majority of the poor people live), and that NGOs and the private sectoris becoming more involved in the provision of vocational training.Denmark also has a track record of supporting inclusive education, which caters especially fordisabled children. Major interventions have taken place in Uganda and Kenya, and theexperiences have been used to influence the international organisations setting the norms foreducation worldwide. Denmark has been an active participant in the initiatives centred aroundEducation for All, initiatives that have inspired the MDG goals on education.Concerning /AIDS, a new ‘Danish Plan of Action for Combating HIV/AIDS’ is presentlyunder preparation and will form the background for further interventions to assist Africancountries in combating the epidemic – bilaterally and multilaterally.

The Analytical Overview has analysed challenges and options facing Africa in the 21st century.It provides a basis for the formulation of a general and coherent policy, which includes foreignpolicy, development policy, trade policy and security policy towards Africa. The analysis hasfocused on issues relating to the integration into the world economy, generation of growth,prevention of armed conflicts and organised violence, encouragement of democracy, goodgovernance and human rights, and development of human resources.It lies beyond the scope of the analysis to provide solutions. Nevertheless, one lesson that canbe drawn from the analysis is that a coherent and strategic approach to the challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa – bringing together all partners in dialogue on lessons learnt, comparativeadvantages and harmonising efforts – could contribute to a more peaceful and prosperousAfrica. Another lesson learnt is that any single initiative will require an in-depth analysis of thespecific and coherent country/region/problem.

Not only has it become increasingly recognised that coherent and concerted efforts by allparties will be needed to bring peace and prosperity to Africa. More than before it has becomeevident that numerous problems in different African countries concern Africa at large and thatmany of Africa’s problems concern the world.This recognition has created a momentum in Africa itself and among Africa’s partners inEurope and elsewhere, a momentum that sensibly translates into preparedness to applysolutions so far considered of little practical value.Denmark will have to consider this scenario carefully in preparing a new strategic frameworkfor a partnership with Africa and make the best of experiences, opportunities and potentials -as a longstanding bilateral partner, as a member state of the European Union and as a memberof the UN.The strategic framework must be realistic. No quick solutions are present - but urgency is. Thenext decade is decisive if Africa is to take full advantage of the opportunities of the 21stcentury.

AbbreviationsACPAGOAAPPAPRMARVASFAUCOMESACPRCPIADANIDADRCEBAECOWASEPAESDPESCREUFDIGNPHIPCHRDGGIDPIGADILOIMFIOMLDCLICLICUSMDGMPMTEFNEPADNGOODAOECDPRSPPPPRSPPSOSADCAfrican, Caribbean and Pacific Group of StatesAfrican Growth and Opportunity ActAfrica Programme for PeaceAfrican Peer Review MechanismAntiretroviralAfrican Standby ForceAfrican UnionCommon Market of Eastern and Southern AfricaCivil and Political RightsCountry Policy and Institutional AssessmentDanish International Development AssistanceDemocratic Republic of CongoEverything But ArmsEconomic Community of West African StatesEconomic Partnership AgreementEuropean Defence and Security PolicyEconomic, Social and Cultural RightsEuropean UnionForeign Direct InvestmentsGross National ProductHeavily Indebted Poor CountriesHuman Rights, Democracy and Good GovernanceInternally Displaced PersonIntergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentInternational Labour OrganisationInternational Monetary FundInternational Organisation for MigrationLeast Developed CountriesLow Intensity ConflictsLow Income Countries under StressMillennium Development GoalsMember of ParliamentMedium Term Expenditure FrameworksNew Partnership for African DevelopmentNon-Governmental OrganisationsOfficial Development AssistanceOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentPoverty Reduction StrategiesPurchasing Power ParityPoverty Reduction Strategy PaperPeace Support OperationSouthern African Development Community